Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence
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This monograph examines the ability of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IPB is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role in tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a strong expectation that IPB will provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. Current intelligence doctrine supports the proposition that IPB can determine the most probable enemy course of action. The question this study seeks to answer is whether or not IPB does provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. First the doctrinal IPB ...
This monograph examines the ability of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IPB is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role in tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a strong expectation that IPB will provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. Current intelligence doctrine supports the proposition that IPB can determine the most probable enemy course of action. The question this study seeks to answer is whether or not IPB does provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. First the doctrinal IPB process is discussed to show how it arrives at a determination of the most probable enemy course of action. The IPB process focuses on the effects of terrain and weather on the battlefield together with enemy tactical doctrine to arrive at a conclusion. During this process a number of assumptions are made which have a major impact on the validity of the analysis. These assumptions tend to be implicit rather than explicit so that the tactical decision maker may be unaware of their impact on the conclusions drawn from the IPB. Next the monograph examines the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, the Soviet Byelorussian offensive in June and July 1944, and the Soviet Manchurian offensive of August 1945. Each case provides evidence about the difficulty of predicting enemy courses of action based on the factors that IPB considers. An analysis of these cases shows that, in each, extensive knowledge of enemy doctrine based on actual combat experience was inadequate to predict enemy courses of action. Once a specific course of action was forecast, subsequent intelligence collection tended to confirm that conclusion. Even the most sophisticated intelligence means did not provide strong enough evidence to cause analysts and tactical commanders to see other possible enemy courses of action. Finally, this study concludes that there is an important role for IPB to play in providing a tool This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
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