Hitler's Collapse in the East
A New Analysis of the Catastrophic Campaigns of 1944
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An analysis of the Eastern Front in 1944, where Soviet triumphs and German disasters reshaped the war. When 1944 began, the Third Reich's position on the Eastern Front still seemed promising. Despite a series of major defeats at Kursk, Smolensk and on the Dnieper, the Germans still held vast swathes of Russian territory. Hitler declared that the conquered space would allow him to keep the Red Army away from the borders of Germany for a long time. However, such optimism was soon to be swept away. In January, the Soviets launched a powerful offensive in the northern sector, and then they repeate...
An analysis of the Eastern Front in 1944, where Soviet triumphs and German disasters reshaped the war. When 1944 began, the Third Reich's position on the Eastern Front still seemed promising. Despite a series of major defeats at Kursk, Smolensk and on the Dnieper, the Germans still held vast swathes of Russian territory. Hitler declared that the conquered space would allow him to keep the Red Army away from the borders of Germany for a long time. However, such optimism was soon to be swept away. In January, the Soviets launched a powerful offensive in the northern sector, and then they repeatedly attacked the Germans in Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus, and the Baltic States. Then, on 22 June 1944, Stalin unleashed Operation Bagration, a massive offensive from which the German forces would never recover. Hitler's answer was to prohibit his generals from any retreat. This made operations easier for the Russians and led to the German divisions being encircled and trapped in pockets, most of which had to be supplied by air. Endless crisis situations forced the Wehrmacht to transfer its divisions from one sector of the front to another. Then the weakened sections of the defence collapsed, provoking more and more catastrophic defeats. The disaster that the German army experienced was on a scale never seen before in warfare. More than 70 percent of the divisions engaged were defeated, destroyed or captured. In nine months, the front had stretched from 500 miles to over 1,000 miles. But all these victories came at a price. The Red Army experienced several severe crises of its own, sustaining heavy losses. The Soviet command also committed strategic blunders. It overestimated its forces and reduced its effectiveness by dispersing its resources too widely. It also suffered from the constant interference of Stalin which often meant the real objectives of the campaign were lost and the Red Army was drawn into senseless costly battles. These events, and the participation of Soviet troops in them, are analyzed in detail in this truly ground-breaking book.
