Getting it Right
Fire Support in MOUT
Versandkostenfrei!
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
14,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
PAYBACK Punkte
7 °P sammeln!
Although the Army began updating its primary military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) doctrinal manual, FM90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, in 1999, the fire support community did not initiated any significant changes to its MOUT doctrine. The most recent fire support doctrine for MOUT was published in 1990. In March 1999, military planners considered contingencies in event that the air campaign to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo during Operation Allied Force was not successful. One of those contingencies was a ground offensive, which presented numerous challenges to th...
Although the Army began updating its primary military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) doctrinal manual, FM90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, in 1999, the fire support community did not initiated any significant changes to its MOUT doctrine. The most recent fire support doctrine for MOUT was published in 1990. In March 1999, military planners considered contingencies in event that the air campaign to remove Serbian forces from Kosovo during Operation Allied Force was not successful. One of those contingencies was a ground offensive, which presented numerous challenges to the Army. Some of the most demanding challenges centered around urban warfare. Planners were compelled to accept the potential dilemma of fighting Serb forces in urban areas to meet the military objective of forcing Serb forces out of Kosovo. Planning for the Kosovo ground offensive indicated that serious shortfalls exist in MOUT doctrine, especially the primary urban operations manual, FM 90-10. FM 90-10 and the FM 6-20 series manuals did not provide doctrine required for planning fire support in MOUT. This monograph supports this argument by: 1) defining current US Army fire support doctrine and examining how its execution is affected by a MOUT environment; 2) providing observations regarding fire support problems in MOUT that have been documented, especially in the Russian army's Chechen campaign in 1994-1995; and 3) identifying fire support observations in the Chechen campaign that impact current fire support doctrine. This monograph identified three basic lessons learned regarding fire support to MOUT. Commanders must: 1) coordinate artillery and maneuver during assaults into urban areas; 2) mass fires when necessary; and 3) establish a consistent, disciplined ROE. The incorporation of doctrinal responses to the lessons learned will help to prevent US forces from experiencing failure similar to the Russians in Chechnya. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich für
