Executive compensations package and stock splits
Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from it?
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Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from them? The greater the variable compensation in the remuneration package, i.e., the more a compensation package represents a call option on the stock; the more inclined CEOs are to split the firms' shares. Accompanied by the increase in stock price and volatility subsequent to a stock split, CEOs can increase the value of their option packages by splitting the firm's shares as it sends a credible signal to the market. By focusing on stock option exercise behaviour of CEOs I provide initial evidence that ex...
Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from them? The greater the variable compensation in the remuneration package, i.e., the more a compensation package represents a call option on the stock; the more inclined CEOs are to split the firms' shares. Accompanied by the increase in stock price and volatility subsequent to a stock split, CEOs can increase the value of their option packages by splitting the firm's shares as it sends a credible signal to the market. By focusing on stock option exercise behaviour of CEOs I provide initial evidence that executives use the stock split to time option exercises.
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