Evaluating U.S. Air Force Nuclear Weapon Storage Area Security in the Post Cold-War Environment
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Air Force physical nuclear standards have not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the potential threat to nuclear assets in storage is now asymmetrical in nature. Given the threat, this paper explores adequacy of physical protection afforded nuclear assets in storage. Using the Central Intelligence Asset Risk Management model, the manuscript analyzes asset value, potential threats and vulnerabilities, and proposes countermeasures to mitigate risk of unauthorized access, sabotage and theft. The author holds current security standards...
Air Force physical nuclear standards have not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the potential threat to nuclear assets in storage is now asymmetrical in nature. Given the threat, this paper explores adequacy of physical protection afforded nuclear assets in storage. Using the Central Intelligence Asset Risk Management model, the manuscript analyzes asset value, potential threats and vulnerabilities, and proposes countermeasures to mitigate risk of unauthorized access, sabotage and theft. The author holds current security standards are adequate to prevent theft; however, serious vulnerabilities yield unacceptable risk of insider tampering, unauthorized access, and sabotage. The Air Force should leverage technology to improve the physical security posture in nuclear weapon storage areas and store nuclear components in underground facilities or vaults. Furthermore, consideration should be given to removing tactical nuclear components from Europe. Finally, because the proposed countermeasures would serve as force multipliers, a potential manpower windfall could benefit support forces for the Expeditionary Air Force.
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