European Governance. Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 22. Band
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The enlargement of the European Union to 25 member states will require a reform of the institutional structures and decision-making mechanisms for Europe to be governable. In this volume, economists and political scientists show which competences and decisionmaking procedures could fulfil the criteria for good governance: efficiency, transparency, openness, coherence and democracy.The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance.Contents: Dieter Schmidtchen: Editorial Preface Institutions Bernard Steunenberg: Deciding among Equals: The Sectoral C...
The enlargement of the European Union to 25 member states will require a reform of the institutional structures and decision-making mechanisms for Europe to be governable. In this volume, economists and political scientists show which competences and decisionmaking procedures could fulfil the criteria for good governance: efficiency, transparency, openness, coherence and democracy.
The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance.
Contents:
Dieter Schmidtchen: Editorial Preface
Institutions Bernard Steunenberg: Deciding among Equals: The Sectoral Councils of the European Union and their Reform (Comment by Ronald Heiner) - Roger Congleton: On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Stability within Partisan Polities (Comment by Dennis C.Mueller) - Urs Schweizer: Technical Detail to the Discretion of the Commission? The Contract-Theoretic Analysis of an Agent's Desire (Comment by Gebhard Kirchgässner) - Stefan Voigt: Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power (Comment by Hans-Bernd Schäfer)
Voting Power Dennis Leech: Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem (Comment by Manfred Holler) - Dennis Leech and Moshé Machover: Qualified Majority Voting: The Effect of the Quota (Comment by Max Albert)
Competitive Government Giorgio Brosio and Federico Revelli: The Assignment of the Income Redistribution Policy in the Presence of Migration (Comment by Günther G. Schulze) - Berthold Wigger and UdoWartha: How to Allocate the Power to Tax in Europe? (Comment by Bernhard Neumärker) - Pierre Salmon: Assigning Powers in the European Union in the Light of Yardstick Competition among Governments (Comment by Roland Kirstein) - Reiner Eichenberger: Towards a European Market for Good Politics - A Politico-Economic Reform Proposal (Comment by Roland Kirstein)
Interest Groups Gerald Schneider and Konstantin Baltz: Specialization Pays Off: Interest Group Influence on EU Legislation in Four Member States (Comment by Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz)
Enlargement Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union - An Institutionalist Analysis of Policy Positions, Accession Scenarios and Institutional Reform (Comment by Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano) - Paul Nemitz: Convention, Governance, Reform of Institutions - Towards a Political Europe that Works?
Regieren in Europa.
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 22. Band.
Die Vergrößerung der Union erfordert eine Reform der institutionellen Strukturen und Entscheidungsmechanismen, wenn Europa regierbar sein soll. In diesem Band zeigen Ökonomen und Politikwissenschaftler, wie die Kompetenzen und Entscheidungsverfahren aussehen könnten, die den Kriterien guten Regierens genügen: Effizienz, Transparenz, Offenheit, Kohärenz und Demokratie.
The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance.
Contents:
Dieter Schmidtchen: Editorial Preface
Institutions Bernard Steunenberg: Deciding among Equals: The Sectoral Councils of the European Union and their Reform (Comment by Ronald Heiner) - Roger Congleton: On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Policy Stability within Partisan Polities (Comment by Dennis C.Mueller) - Urs Schweizer: Technical Detail to the Discretion of the Commission? The Contract-Theoretic Analysis of an Agent's Desire (Comment by Gebhard Kirchgässner) - Stefan Voigt: Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power (Comment by Hans-Bernd Schäfer)
Voting Power Dennis Leech: Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem (Comment by Manfred Holler) - Dennis Leech and Moshé Machover: Qualified Majority Voting: The Effect of the Quota (Comment by Max Albert)
Competitive Government Giorgio Brosio and Federico Revelli: The Assignment of the Income Redistribution Policy in the Presence of Migration (Comment by Günther G. Schulze) - Berthold Wigger and UdoWartha: How to Allocate the Power to Tax in Europe? (Comment by Bernhard Neumärker) - Pierre Salmon: Assigning Powers in the European Union in the Light of Yardstick Competition among Governments (Comment by Roland Kirstein) - Reiner Eichenberger: Towards a European Market for Good Politics - A Politico-Economic Reform Proposal (Comment by Roland Kirstein)
Interest Groups Gerald Schneider and Konstantin Baltz: Specialization Pays Off: Interest Group Influence on EU Legislation in Four Member States (Comment by Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz)
Enlargement Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger: The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union - An Institutionalist Analysis of Policy Positions, Accession Scenarios and Institutional Reform (Comment by Jean-Michel Josselin and Alain Marciano) - Paul Nemitz: Convention, Governance, Reform of Institutions - Towards a Political Europe that Works?
Regieren in Europa.
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 22. Band.
Die Vergrößerung der Union erfordert eine Reform der institutionellen Strukturen und Entscheidungsmechanismen, wenn Europa regierbar sein soll. In diesem Band zeigen Ökonomen und Politikwissenschaftler, wie die Kompetenzen und Entscheidungsverfahren aussehen könnten, die den Kriterien guten Regierens genügen: Effizienz, Transparenz, Offenheit, Kohärenz und Demokratie.