Culture and Effects: Based Operations in an Insurgency
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Despite its domination of conventional warfare the United States military finds itself in a quagmire concerning the unconventional fight in Iraq. Never a strong suit of the United States military, the insurgency is testing both the patience and the will of the military. Fighting both national and foreign insurgents, understanding the violence against the populace of Iraq and American forces have many questioning: what type of people perform and endure these types of violent acts? Therefore, to understand insurgency and the population/environment that breeds it, one has to understand culture. C...
Despite its domination of conventional warfare the United States military finds itself in a quagmire concerning the unconventional fight in Iraq. Never a strong suit of the United States military, the insurgency is testing both the patience and the will of the military. Fighting both national and foreign insurgents, understanding the violence against the populace of Iraq and American forces have many questioning: what type of people perform and endure these types of violent acts? Therefore, to understand insurgency and the population/environment that breeds it, one has to understand culture. Cultural factors influence the genesis, lifetime, and demise of an insurgency. In other words, without understanding the culture one will not understand an insurgency. Effects-based operations (EBO) are the new methodology that the Department of Defense (DOD) has embarked upon during its transformation. Its potential to utilize and maximize all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to shape or change the behavior of both foe and friend alike to achieve national policy aims has many considering EBOs' effectiveness as a modern tool against the insurgency in Iraq. Can EBO currently account for the cultural factors in Iraq and leverage the synergistic power of the coordinated elements of national power to defeat an insurgency? The potential for EBO to accomplish this task exists, yet the reality of it doing so still remains in question. The main limitations for EBO are the lack of a common lexicon and interagency coordination. The DOD should take key steps to improve the capability to effectively use EBO in the national security strategy and to defeat insurgency. For example, developing a common lexicon usable by all the elements of national power and educating senior leadership and interagency organizations on the capability and methodology of EBO could improve the overall effectiveness of EBO in serving the national defense and defeating a
