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Joint doctrine, which places the engineer staff element under the J-4, is seriously flawed. Recent operations are replete with examples where this doctrinal concept was either altered or ignored altogether. In those cases where it was reluctantly followed, success occurred "in spite of" established doctrine, not "because of" it. In a downsizing military, war fighters must maximize all potential combat enhancers and multipliers. In both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW), engineers are constantly in demand, never in abundant supply, and habitually overworked. Our doctrine must evolve within the context of our rapidly changing global threat. To simulate that change, we must encourage the combatant commanders and our sister services to enter the debate.