
Campaigns for the Pacification of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco
PAYBACK Punkte
8 °P sammeln!
The Campaigns conducted by the Spanish Army from 1909 to 1926 to pacify the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco are almost unknown in the US Army, and the scarce literature written or translated to English provides only a partial vision of them. The ideas that prevail the mainstream scholarship are the severe defeat of Spanish troops at Annual in 1921 and the influence the Protectorate could have had in the political life of the country This monograph provides a broader vision which, first of all, highlights that the Spanish armed forces not only achieved the pacification of the Protectorate in 19...
The Campaigns conducted by the Spanish Army from 1909 to 1926 to pacify the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco are almost unknown in the US Army, and the scarce literature written or translated to English provides only a partial vision of them. The ideas that prevail the mainstream scholarship are the severe defeat of Spanish troops at Annual in 1921 and the influence the Protectorate could have had in the political life of the country This monograph provides a broader vision which, first of all, highlights that the Spanish armed forces not only achieved the pacification of the Protectorate in 1926, but administered it peacefully until 1956 in a remarkable example of Stability Operations. The key to achieve this success was the ability of the Spanish Army to learn how to adapt to the Moroccan scenario culturally, tactically, and technically. Most importantly, during the campaigns of 1921-1926 the Army devised the methods and instruments that would allow for the fruitful administration of the Protectorate until 1956. To reach this conclusion, the paper provides first the background information that shows the challenges of the task presented to the Army in 1909. The next two sections discuss some of the factors, usually overlooked, that constrained the performance of the Spanish military: the international implications of the Protectorate, the strategic goal to maintain control of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the failure of the Spanish Government to design a coherent and well supported National Strategy regarding the Protectorate. Section four explains the stability operations that the Army performed, within means and capabilities, at the same time that it was providing security and how civilian projects increased as resources became available. Section five studies those areas in which the army improved the most along the campaigns, namely fighting effectiveness, unity of effort, training and coordination, experience and professionalism, equipment and relationships wit This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.