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Die Untersuchung von Senecas Epistulae Morales 94 und 95 im Gesamtkontext führt zu neuen Ergebnissen.
Letters 94 and 95 of Seneca's Epistulae Morales introduce and discuss a distinction between individual moral instructions or praecepta and the doctrines of Stoic moral philosophy or decreta. According to Seneca, some people reject the teaching of decreta, preferring non-doctrinal methods of moral instruction, while Aristo of Chios, the heterodox Stoic, rejects praecepta in favor of decreta alone. Seneca charts a middle course between these positions, defending praecepta (in 94) and decreta (in 95) against their respective opponents.Schafer argues against interpretations which see praecepta as "rules" which a Stoic agent follows, in conjunction with decreta or "principles" in moral deliberation. He shows both that the text does not answer to the concerns which an account of Stoic deliberation must address, and that Seneca's praecepta could not be the rules which structure that deliberation, if such rules exist.
Letters 94 and 95 of Seneca's Epistulae Morales introduce and discuss a distinction between individual moral instructions or praecepta and the doctrines of Stoic moral philosophy or decreta. According to Seneca, some people reject the teaching of decreta, preferring non-doctrinal methods of moral instruction, while Aristo of Chios, the heterodox Stoic, rejects praecepta in favor of decreta alone. Seneca charts a middle course between these positions, defending praecepta (in 94) and decreta (in 95) against their respective opponents.Schafer argues against interpretations which see praecepta as "rules" which a Stoic agent follows, in conjunction with decreta or "principles" in moral deliberation. He shows both that the text does not answer to the concerns which an account of Stoic deliberation must address, and that Seneca's praecepta could not be the rules which structure that deliberation, if such rules exist.