This book explores new institutional solutions to the old question of how to constrain states when they commit severe abuses against their own citizens. The book argues that coercive international institutions can stop these abuses and act as an insurance scheme against the possibility of states failing to fulfill their most basic sovereign responsibilities.
This book explores new institutional solutions to the old question of how to constrain states when they commit severe abuses against their own citizens. The book argues that coercive international institutions can stop these abuses and act as an insurance scheme against the possibility of states failing to fulfill their most basic sovereign responsibilities.
Associate Director & Research Professor, University of Arizona Center for Philosophy and Freedom
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * 1. Why Divided Sovereignty? * 2. Method and Justification * 3. Outline of the Book * Chapter 1 Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness of the State System * 1. The Institutions of the Social Contract * 2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority * 3. Problems of Institutional Design * 4. Conceptual and practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 2 Divided Sovereignty: the Principal-Agent Model * 1. Sovereignty Limiting Norms and their Current Effects * 2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal-Agent Model * 2.1 The Origins of the Model * 2.2 The Principle-Agent Model for International Institutions * 2.3 Delegation * 2.4 The Role of Consent * 3. Agency Costs at the International Level * 4. Why Use Principal-Agent Theory? * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 3 Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide and Civil War * 1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority * 2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change * 3. Slavery * 4. Genocide * 5. Civil Wars and Failed States * 6. Conclusion * Chapter 4 Theories and Institutional Facts * 1. One Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice * 2. Two Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention * 3. Objections * 4. Conclusion * Chapter 5 Romanticizing Institutions * 1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy * 2. Rule of Law Experiments * 3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy * 4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 6 Institutional Pluralism * 1. Institutions in International Criminal Law * 2. Fragmentation and Conflict * 3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System * 4. Complex Social Orders * 5. A Hobbesian Challenge * 6. Conclusion * Chapter 7 The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics * 1. Cooperation under Anarchy * 2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations Theorizing * 3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference * 4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed Order * Conclusion
* Introduction * 1. Why Divided Sovereignty? * 2. Method and Justification * 3. Outline of the Book * Chapter 1 Sovereignty, the Social Contract, and the Incompleteness of the State System * 1. The Institutions of the Social Contract * 2. On Sovereignty and Delegation of Authority * 3. Problems of Institutional Design * 4. Conceptual and practical Hurdles to Divided Sovereignty * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 2 Divided Sovereignty: the Principal-Agent Model * 1. Sovereignty Limiting Norms and their Current Effects * 2. Divided Sovereignty: The Principal-Agent Model * 2.1 The Origins of the Model * 2.2 The Principle-Agent Model for International Institutions * 2.3 Delegation * 2.4 The Role of Consent * 3. Agency Costs at the International Level * 4. Why Use Principal-Agent Theory? * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 3 Domestic and International Implications: Slavery, Genocide and Civil War * 1. The Scope and Limits of International Authority * 2. Constitutional Interpretation and Change * 3. Slavery * 4. Genocide * 5. Civil Wars and Failed States * 6. Conclusion * Chapter 4 Theories and Institutional Facts * 1. One Step Theorizing: Cosmopolitan Justice * 2. Two Step Theorizing: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention * 3. Objections * 4. Conclusion * Chapter 5 Romanticizing Institutions * 1. Cosmopolitan Global Democracy * 2. Rule of Law Experiments * 3. Rule of Law for Global Democracy * 4. Institutional Assumptions and Bureaucratic Pathologies * 5. Conclusion * Chapter 6 Institutional Pluralism * 1. Institutions in International Criminal Law * 2. Fragmentation and Conflict * 3. The Benefits of a Pluralist System * 4. Complex Social Orders * 5. A Hobbesian Challenge * 6. Conclusion * Chapter 7 The Possibility of Rule-Governed Behavior in International Politics * 1. Cooperation under Anarchy * 2. Assumptions and Implications of International Relations Theorizing * 3. Self-Preservation as the Dominant State Preference * 4. The Possibility of a Rule-Governed Order * Conclusion
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