This book describes classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, critiques thereof, and alternative theories. It discusses the meaning of probability, focusing on the behavioral definition of subjective probability by Savage's theorem. It presents non-additive and multiple prior theories, as well as the case-based approach to the formation of beliefs.
This book describes classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, critiques thereof, and alternative theories. It discusses the meaning of probability, focusing on the behavioral definition of subjective probability by Savage's theorem. It presents non-additive and multiple prior theories, as well as the case-based approach to the formation of beliefs.
Itzhak Gilboa is Professor in the Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, and Professor in the newly established Department of Economics and Decision Science, HEC, Paris. Earlier, he became a chaired professor at Northwestern University in 1992, visited at the Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (1995¿7), and was a Professor at Boston University (1997¿9). Professor Gilboa also served as a Fellow at the Cowles Foundation at Yale University from 2001 to 2007. The recipient of a Sloan Fellowship, among other awards, he has published articles in the leading economic theory journals, primarily on decision under uncertainty. Professor Gilboa coauthored A Theory of Case-Based Decisions with David Schmeidler (Cambridge University Press, 2001). He received his Ph.D. from Tel-Aviv University in 1987.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Preface; 2. Motivating examples; 3. Free will and determinism; 4. The principle of indifference; 5. Relative frequencies; 6. Subjective probabilities; 7. A case study; 8. The role of theories; 9. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem; 10. De Finetti's theorem; 11. Savage's theorem; 12. The definition of states; 13. A critique of Savage; 14. Objectivity and rationality; 15. Anscombe-Aumann's theorem; 16. Choquet expected utility; 17. Prospect theory; 18. Maxmin expected utility; 19. Case-based qualitative beliefs; 20. Frequentism revisited; 21. Future research.
1. Preface 2. Motivating examples 3. Free will and determinism 4. The principle of indifference 5. Relative frequencies 6. Subjective probabilities 7. A case study 8. The role of theories 9. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem 10. De Finetti's theorem 11. Savage's theorem 12. The definition of states 13. A critique of Savage 14. Objectivity and rationality 15. Anscombe-Aumann's theorem 16. Choquet expected utility 17. Prospect theory 18. Maxmin expected utility 19. Case-based qualitative beliefs 20. Frequentism revisited 21. Future research.
1. Preface; 2. Motivating examples; 3. Free will and determinism; 4. The principle of indifference; 5. Relative frequencies; 6. Subjective probabilities; 7. A case study; 8. The role of theories; 9. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem; 10. De Finetti's theorem; 11. Savage's theorem; 12. The definition of states; 13. A critique of Savage; 14. Objectivity and rationality; 15. Anscombe-Aumann's theorem; 16. Choquet expected utility; 17. Prospect theory; 18. Maxmin expected utility; 19. Case-based qualitative beliefs; 20. Frequentism revisited; 21. Future research.
1. Preface 2. Motivating examples 3. Free will and determinism 4. The principle of indifference 5. Relative frequencies 6. Subjective probabilities 7. A case study 8. The role of theories 9. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's theorem 10. De Finetti's theorem 11. Savage's theorem 12. The definition of states 13. A critique of Savage 14. Objectivity and rationality 15. Anscombe-Aumann's theorem 16. Choquet expected utility 17. Prospect theory 18. Maxmin expected utility 19. Case-based qualitative beliefs 20. Frequentism revisited 21. Future research.
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