Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Some Lessons From The Boer War, 1899-1902 (1903)]( "Some Lessons From The Boer War, 1899-1902 (1903)")
Some Lessons From The Boer War, 1899-1902 (1903)16,99 €![Annual report of Major General George W. Davis, United States Army commanding Division of the Philippines from October 1, 1902 to July 26, 1903]( "Annual report of Major General George W. Davis, United States Army commanding Division of the Philippines from October 1, 1902 to July 26, 1903")
Annual report of Major General George W. Davis, United States Army commanding Division of the Philippines from October 1, 1902 to July 26, 190317,99 €![United States Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941]( "United States Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941")
United States Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-194132,99 €![The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual]( "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual")
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual14,99 €![The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection: 1898-1902]( "The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection: 1898-1902")
The Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection: 1898-190217,99 €![Diary of Services of the First Battallion: The Royal Scots During the Boer War, South Africa, 1899-1902]( "Diary of Services of the First Battallion: The Royal Scots During the Boer War, South Africa, 1899-1902")
Diary of Services of the First Battallion: The Royal Scots During the Boer War, South Africa, 1899-190217,99 €![General Register Of The Society Of Colonial Wars 1899-1902]( "General Register Of The Society Of Colonial Wars 1899-1902")
General Register Of The Society Of Colonial Wars 1899-190227,99 €
After defeating the Philippine Republic's conventional forces in 1899, the U.S. Army was broken up into small garrisons to prepare Luzon for colonial rule. The Filipino nationalists transformed their resistance into a guerrilla warfare that varied so greatly from region to region in its organization, strategy, and tactics that early American attempts at centralization and nonmilitary pacification were useless. The study offers new insights for counterinsurgency theory and for the study of America's military experience in Asia.