The knowability paradox suggests that wherever there is empirical ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. This volume presents the original papers in which this notorious problem was first set out, nineteen new papers seeking to resolve it, and a helpful introduction. It will be the definitive resource for study of the paradox.
The knowability paradox suggests that wherever there is empirical ignorance there is also logically unknowable truth. This volume presents the original papers in which this notorious problem was first set out, nineteen new papers seeking to resolve it, and a helpful introduction. It will be the definitive resource for study of the paradox.
Joe Salerno received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in 1999. He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at Australian National University, and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. He writes in epistemology and the philosophy of logic
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * I. Early History * 1: Alonzo Church: Referee Reports on Fitch's "A Definition of Value" * 2: Frederic Fitch: A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts * 3: Joe Salerno: Knowability Noir: 1945-1963 * II. Dummett's Constructivism * 4: Michael Dummett: Fitch's Paradox of Knowability * 5: Stig Rasmussen: The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection * 6: José Luis Bermúdez: Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox * III. Paraconsistency and Paracompleteness * 7: Graham Priest: Beyond the Limits of Knowledge * 8: JC Beall: Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities * IV. Epistemic and Temporal Operators: Actions, Times and Types * 9: Johan van Benthem: Actions That Make us Know * 10: John Burgess: Can Truth Out? * 11: Bernard Linsky: Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief * V. Cartesian Restricted Truth * 12: Timothy Williamson: Tennant's Troubles * 13: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope * 14: Neil Tennant: Revamping the Restriction Strategy * VI. Modal and Mathematical Fictions * 15: Berit Brogaard: On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: a Case Study on Fitch's Paradox * 16: Otávio Bueno: Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics * VII. Knowability Reconsidered * 17: Michael Hand: Performance and Paradox * 18: C.S. Jenkins: The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond * 19: W. D. Hart: Invincible Ignorance * 20: Christoph Kelp and Duncan Pritchard: Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning * 21: Greg Restall: Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
* Introduction * I. Early History * 1: Alonzo Church: Referee Reports on Fitch's "A Definition of Value" * 2: Frederic Fitch: A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts * 3: Joe Salerno: Knowability Noir: 1945-1963 * II. Dummett's Constructivism * 4: Michael Dummett: Fitch's Paradox of Knowability * 5: Stig Rasmussen: The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection * 6: José Luis Bermúdez: Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox * III. Paraconsistency and Paracompleteness * 7: Graham Priest: Beyond the Limits of Knowledge * 8: JC Beall: Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities * IV. Epistemic and Temporal Operators: Actions, Times and Types * 9: Johan van Benthem: Actions That Make us Know * 10: John Burgess: Can Truth Out? * 11: Bernard Linsky: Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief * V. Cartesian Restricted Truth * 12: Timothy Williamson: Tennant's Troubles * 13: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope * 14: Neil Tennant: Revamping the Restriction Strategy * VI. Modal and Mathematical Fictions * 15: Berit Brogaard: On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: a Case Study on Fitch's Paradox * 16: Otávio Bueno: Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics * VII. Knowability Reconsidered * 17: Michael Hand: Performance and Paradox * 18: C.S. Jenkins: The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond * 19: W. D. Hart: Invincible Ignorance * 20: Christoph Kelp and Duncan Pritchard: Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning * 21: Greg Restall: Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
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