Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency.
Is it possible for the name of a particular person not to refer to that person? Ori Simchen defends a negative answer to this question, and presents a new account of aboutness, or intentionality. He argues that intentional items--such as words, thoughts, photos--are about whatever they are about as a matter of necessity, rather than contingency.
Ori Simchen received his PhD in 1999 from Harvard University and is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Colombia.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Modality 1: Particular Possibilities 2: General Possibilities Intentionality 3: The Intentionality of Words Appendix I: Necessity in Reference 4: Epistemology Factualized 5: Cognitive States as Relational Appendix II: Omniscient Believing and Consistency Bibliography Index
Introduction Modality 1: Particular Possibilities 2: General Possibilities Intentionality 3: The Intentionality of Words Appendix I: Necessity in Reference 4: Epistemology Factualized 5: Cognitive States as Relational Appendix II: Omniscient Believing and Consistency Bibliography Index
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