Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
Herausgeber: Kendler, Kenneth S; Zachar, Peter; Parnas, Josef
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
Herausgeber: Kendler, Kenneth S; Zachar, Peter; Parnas, Josef
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Leading experts in psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology integrate the scientific lenses relevant to understanding psychiatric disorders.
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Leading experts in psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology integrate the scientific lenses relevant to understanding psychiatric disorders.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 580
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. April 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 165mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 907g
- ISBN-13: 9781108485197
- ISBN-10: 1108485197
- Artikelnr.: 59362214
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 580
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. April 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 165mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 907g
- ISBN-13: 9781108485197
- ISBN-10: 1108485197
- Artikelnr.: 59362214
Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical
networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of
mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S.
Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix:
lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and
mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff;
7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems:
neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel
S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological
Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11.
Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher;
12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or
dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14.
Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15.
Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise?
Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a
disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for
psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the
psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler;
20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological
phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew;
21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about
a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy,
Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef
Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or
not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big
data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27.
Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and
nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28.
Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an
a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double
black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32.
Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and
how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William
Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and
what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in
Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter
Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological
causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler;
39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of
psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology'
Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric
discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan
Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific
reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction
Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels
Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at
different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.