Jaegwon Kim presents a selection of his essays from the last two decades, on a set of related topics for which he has played a leading role in shaping philosophical debate, such as emergence, explanation, reduction, and mental causation. The volume will be compelling reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on mind, action, and science.
Jaegwon Kim presents a selection of his essays from the last two decades, on a set of related topics for which he has played a leading role in shaping philosophical debate, such as emergence, explanation, reduction, and mental causation. The volume will be compelling reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on mind, action, and science.
Jaegwon Kim received his PhD from Princeton University in 1962 and has taught at Swarthmore College, the University of Michigan, Cornell University, and University of Notre Dame. He is presently William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. Kim is past President of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Inhaltsangabe
* 1: Making sense of emergence * 2: The layered world: Metaphysical considerations * 3: Emergence: Core ideas and issues * 4: "Supervenient and yet not deducible": Is there a coherent concept of ontological emergence? * 5: Reasons and the first person * 6: Taking the agent's point of view seriously in action explanation * 7: Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion * 8: Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence * 9: Hempel, explanation, metaphysics * 10: Reduction and reductive explanation: Is one possible without the other? * 11: Can supervenience and "non-strict" laws save anomalous monism? * 12: Causation and mental causation * 13: Two concepts of realization, mental causation, and physicalism * 14: Why there are no laws in the special sciences: Three arguments * Index
* 1: Making sense of emergence * 2: The layered world: Metaphysical considerations * 3: Emergence: Core ideas and issues * 4: "Supervenient and yet not deducible": Is there a coherent concept of ontological emergence? * 5: Reasons and the first person * 6: Taking the agent's point of view seriously in action explanation * 7: Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion * 8: Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence * 9: Hempel, explanation, metaphysics * 10: Reduction and reductive explanation: Is one possible without the other? * 11: Can supervenience and "non-strict" laws save anomalous monism? * 12: Causation and mental causation * 13: Two concepts of realization, mental causation, and physicalism * 14: Why there are no laws in the special sciences: Three arguments * Index
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