Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow
Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication
Herausgeber: Heller, Walter P.; Starrett, David A.; Starr, Ross M.
Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow
Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication
Herausgeber: Heller, Walter P.; Starrett, David A.; Starr, Ross M.
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The third in a series of volumes published in honour of Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, each covering a different area of economic theory.
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The third in a series of volumes published in honour of Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, each covering a different area of economic theory.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 304
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. Februar 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 18mm
- Gewicht: 496g
- ISBN-13: 9780521063869
- ISBN-10: 0521063868
- Artikelnr.: 23554997
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 304
- Erscheinungstermin: 23. Februar 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 18mm
- Gewicht: 496g
- ISBN-13: 9780521063869
- ISBN-10: 0521063868
- Artikelnr.: 23554997
Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger
B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3.
Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive
allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and
Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5.
Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas
Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a
new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and
Organisation: 7. The cost of communication in economic organisation: II
Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organisations? W. M. Gorman; 9.
Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data
compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative
limited communication systems: centralisation versus interchange of
information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3.
Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive
allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and
Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5.
Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas
Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a
new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and
Organisation: 7. The cost of communication in economic organisation: II
Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organisations? W. M. Gorman; 9.
Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data
compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative
limited communication systems: centralisation versus interchange of
information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger
B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3.
Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive
allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and
Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5.
Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas
Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a
new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and
Organisation: 7. The cost of communication in economic organisation: II
Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organisations? W. M. Gorman; 9.
Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data
compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative
limited communication systems: centralisation versus interchange of
information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3.
Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive
allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and
Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5.
Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas
Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a
new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and
Organisation: 7. The cost of communication in economic organisation: II
Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organisations? W. M. Gorman; 9.
Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data
compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative
limited communication systems: centralisation versus interchange of
information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.