Ronald J. Terchek

The Making of the Test Ban Treaty

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Eighteen years after the United States presented its plan for the international control of atomic energy to the United Nations, the first major arms control agreement was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Including Great Britain, the three major nuclear powers pledged to refrain from nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater in a treaty negotiated in Moscow within two weeks during the summer of 1963. It was hoped that the treaty would at least discourage those phases of the arms race which required large-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere or outer space as well as eliminate further radioactive pollution of the atmos phere. In addition, the test ban would discourage, though not eliminate, the development of nuclear weapons by other treaty adherents because the un derground testing allowed under the terms of the document would escalate already heavy costs for countries intending to conduct their first nuclear tests. The Kennedy administration expected other agreements to follow the test ban treaty, particularly an agreement to keep outer space free from 1 nuclear warheads and to outlaw underground tests in the near future. But one of the most important anticipated benefits of the treaty was the expected improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty was important not only because it was a tangible breakthrough in East-West arms-control negotiations but also because of its implications for domestic and international politics.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Springer / Springer Netherlands
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-94-011-8689-6
• 1970
• Seitenzahl: 228
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Januar 1970
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 155mm x 13mm
• Gewicht: 355g
• ISBN-13: 9789401186896
• ISBN-10: 9401186898
• Artikelnr.: 40767742

Inhaltsangabe

I. Introduction.- II. The President and the Treaty.- The President: Goals and Constraints.- Accumulated Experiences.- Presidential Formulation of Policy.- Preliminary to Success: The American University Speech.- The Harriman Mission.- The President and the Treaty.- Linkage with Domestic Constituencies.- Linkage with Foreign Constituencies.- Conclusions.- III. Decision-Making in the Executive Branch.- The Committee of Principals.- The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.- The Department of State.- The Atomic Energy Commission.- The Department of Defense.- Conclusions.- IV. The Media and the Treaty.- The Communication Role of the Press.- The Barometer Role of the Press.- The Decoding Role of the Press.- Magazines.- Radio and Television.- Uses of the Press by Decision-Makers.- Summary.- V. Group Articulation and Activity.- Primary and Secondary Goals.- The Activity and Position of the Peace Groups and Their Allies.- The Religious Groups.- The Economic Groups.- Veterans' Organizations.- Opposition and Patriotic Groups.- The Experts.- The Active Groups.- VI. Public Opinion and the Test Ban Treaty.- Inputs and Responses.- Public Opinion and the Test Ban Treaty.- The Structure of Opinion on Nuclear Testing.- Interest and Apathy.- VII. The Senate: Preliminary Considerations.- Initial Senatorial Reaction.- Executive-Legislative Relations.- The Committee on Foreign Relations.- The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.- VIII. The Senate: The Debate and Vote.- The Senate and Public Opinion.- The Senate Debate.- Three Senatorial Approaches to Arms Control.- The Administration and the Senate.- The Senate Vote.- Conclusions.- IX. Conclusions.- Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Burke Revisited.- Option Management.- Feedback: The Options of the Opposition.- Summary andConclusions.- Appendix I.- Comparison Between Texts of Treaty Tabled at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on August 27, 1962, and that Signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963.- Appendix II.- Selected Senate Roll Call Votes.