

Adam W. Jelonek (ed.)

Power-sharing in the Divided Asian Societies



unipress

Adam W. Jelonek (ed.)

Power-sharing in the Divided Asian Societies

V&R unipress

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available online: <https://dnb.de>.

This publication was financially supported by the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland.
The publication was co-funded under the program “Excellence Initiative – Research University”
at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland.

© 2023 by Brill | V&R unipress, Robert-Bosch-Breite 10, 37079 Göttingen, Germany,
an imprint of the Brill-Group
(Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd,
Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Germany; Brill Österreich GmbH, Vienna, Austria)
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh,
Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic.
All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and
retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Printed and bound by CPI books GmbH, Birkstraße 10, 25917 Leck, Germany
Printed in the EU.

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlag | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com

ISBN 978-3-8470-1575-8

Contents

Adam W. Jelonek	
Conflict management in Asian segmented societies	7
Krzysztof Trzciński	
Power sharing in Indonesia: Stability through hybridity	13
Adam W. Jelonek	
Multi-ethnic Malaysia. Consociational democracy vs. consociational authoritarianism	45
Michał Lubina	
Disunity in diversity. The failed attempts at power sharing in Myanmar	65
Antonina Łuszczkiewicz	
India as an Anti-Consociational Project under Narendra Modi	97
Kamila Junik	
Identity narrative and power distribution in Sri Lanka	121
Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert	
Consociationalism as a power-sharing solution in Pakistan. Obstacles and prospects for a democratic transformation	133
Michał Lipa	
The potential for power sharing in Bahrain: Opportunities and limitations	149
Łukasz Fyderek	
Iraq: Paradoxes of post-conflict power sharing	167

Krzysztof Kościelniak	
The elite interactions. Elements of consociationalism and the intra-organisational factors in Syria in the pre- and post-Arab uprising periods	189
Przemysław Turek	
Lebanon – an exemplary consociational democracy state and its eventual failure	213
Joanna Dyduch	
Israel's democracy at the crossroads: What is left of power-sharing	223
Agata M. Karbowska	
The failure of consociational democracy in Cyprus	251
Authors	269

Adam W. Jelonek

Conflict management in Asian segmented societies

The book is a collection of analyses of the current situation of power sharing in selected countries in the Middle and Far East. Many countries in the region are inhabited by multisegmented societies diversified in terms of race, religion, language and economic status. They have repeatedly provided the basis for analysis of the search for consensus in the construction of a political scene that would ensure the participation in power of each group. Regardless of the chosen model, the distribution of power in multisegmented societies has always been characterised by a state of “unstable equilibrium”. Practical solutions constantly evolved between consociationalism, centripetalism, federalism. In extreme cases, they led to political disintegration of states or to the permanent domination of one of the segments, most often based on authoritarian solutions.

In this volume, a group of scholars specialising in particular countries of the region, in addition to characterising the basic social divisions, try to point out the dynamics of the “unstable equilibrium” of power sharing in particular Asian countries and analyse the trends occurring in them over the last decades.

In the first chapter, Krzysztof Trzciński focuses on analysing the transformation of the power-sharing model in Indonesia. The author argues that a hybrid power-sharing political system has been designed to achieve political stability thanks to the implementation of political institutions of centripetal, consociational, and hybrid types. These institutions allow various social segments and sub-segments specified on ascriptive, cultural, and ideological foundations – including ethnic groups, religious communities, and ideological sub-segments – to be part of the decision-making process at different power levels. The main institutions discussed are segmental Islamic parties. They are hybrid in character due to having both consociational and centripetal traits. The chapter demonstrates the origin, nature, and importance of this institution. The thesis adopted states that religious parties contribute to stabilising the political situation in Indonesia by sharing power with non-segmental supra-religious parties and channelling political Islam within the legally permitted limits. The

research is based on analysis of the content of published primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with Indonesian political scientists.

In the second chapter, Adam W. Jelonek focuses on Malaysia which provides a textbook and oft-described example of a multisegmented society that has undertaken numerous experiments with consociational power sharing. The racially, ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse Malay, Indus and Chinese segments live side by side. The social mosaic is further complicated by the numerous tribal communities living in northern Borneo and the growing number of immigrant groups. In May 2018, Malaysians elected a new coalition to power, ending 61 years of a de facto one-party monopoly of power. However, the new government failed in reforming a system embedded in an old political culture of patronage. The democratisation that many expected to this day has not yet materialised. Is Malaysia capable of building a modern democratic political scene that ensures participation in power by all segments of society or is it doomed to return to authoritarianism stemming from traditional patron-client relationships?

In the next section of the book, Michał Lubina analyses the failures of power-sharing projects in Myanmar/Burma. Although Myanmar never tried to implement any power-sharing model in full, it did, however, attempt to carry out some power-sharing aspects of governance in its short period of democracy in 1948–1962 and again after 1988. Unfortunately, these all ended in failure for both objective and subjective reasons. Myanmar society is a quintessential plural society, divided into segmental cleavages, the most important ones being ethnic. Officially Myanmar is inhabited by 135 ethnic groups divided into eight major ethnic groups (Bamar/Burman, Shan, Kayin/Karen, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine/Arakanese, Chin, Kayah/Karenni). Myanmar also represents a highly elite-driven nation where the dominant elites from the major segmental group – the Bamars (Burmans) – do not believe in power-sharing arrangements, with fatal consequences for the country. The Bamars, instead of accommodating other segments, have been trying to integrate them, often forcefully, into the Bamar-dominated state. Therefore, instead of power sharing, Myanmar has a constant power struggle that undermines the state, complicates nation-building process and at times – such as now, after the fourth coup d'état – leads to anarchy.

Another anti-consociational vision of power sharing, but this time in India, is the subject of Antonina Łuszczkiewicz. India – the largest democracy in the world, and one of the most internally diverse countries in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion – has been an interesting, yet challenging case for the theorists of *consociationalism*. This paper focuses on the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) vision of India under the leadership of Narendra Modi. Based on the ideology of Hindu nationalism known as Hindutva – which assumes the consolidation of philosophies and religions born in India under Hindu dominance,

and exhibits hostility towards non-Indian constructs (especially Islam) – the BJP promotes the idea of pan-Indianism summed up as “one nation, one culture”. Analysing the process of delegitimising federalism, reluctance towards caste-based quotas, promotion of Hindi as the national language, and strengthening Hindu-Muslim antagonism, this chapter reconstructs the *anti-consociational* dimension of the ideology, narratives, and policies of the BJP.

In the following chapter, entitled *Identity narrative and power distribution in Sri Lanka*, Kamila Junik provides an analysis of power sharing in another multi-ethnic country in South Asia. She discusses its social diversity, addressing the question of identity and communalism, as well as power attribution, inherited from its colonial past and projecting on the current relation between the various segments of society. Focusing on recent times, this chapter proposes a critical approach to Sinhala identity narration, which allows this majoritarian group to act as if under constant threat and re-construct itself only against the “other”. Thus, noticing the recent shift of focus from Tamils to Muslims, it will aim at proving that the current government’s policy would maintain the already known framework of hierarchy rather than working towards “political empowerment and reconciliation”.

Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert focuses on Pakistan – a strategically located key regional player in South Asia, with a deeply divided society, incessant (and often intentionally bolstered) ethnonational and sectarian tensions which have never been properly addressed. It has an elected civilian government, albeit genuine power rests primarily with the military establishment and a small number of other privileged groups. She argues that Pakistani political cohesion is forced rather than negotiated; specific correlations between the social structure and political culture are inherited from the rough colonial past, with a persistent lack of adequate sociopolitical and economic inclusion. Notwithstanding some reforms, the power-sharing model is still highly exclusivist and faces overwhelming challenges, originating in domestic specificity, where the decision makers project, domestically and internationally, the ideological features of the state, intermingling them with defence objectives.

Power-sharing arrangements in post-authoritarian and post-conflict settings are the subject of Łukasz Fyderek’s analyses focusing on contemporary Iraq. The author argues that, in the case of Iraq, power-sharing institutions enshrined in the federal constitution proved to be both resilient and unstable. In the post-conflict setting, the main segments of Iraqi society: Arab Shiites, Arab Sunnis and Kurds adopted different political strategies. While Shiite parties were able to dominate the system soon after 2005, several Sunni actors contested the power-sharing arrangements in 2008–2010 and again in 2014–2017. The Kurds, on the other hand, adopted the system most of the time, while contesting it during the independence referendum in 2017. Despite the tensions, the Iraqi power-sharing

system proved to be robust, yet unstable. This paradox may be explained by the multilayered power-sharing arrangements in Iraq, which results in the compartmentalised behaviour of the three relevant segments of society.

The chapter by Michał Lipa looks at the prospects for power sharing in another authoritarian multisegmented country in the Middle East region – Bahrain. Shia Muslims make up the majority of the population, although political power is held by the Sunni elites. Bahrain's authoritarianism is hybrid in nature, meaning that the country has had a semi-pluralist parliament, in which the Shiites were represented mainly by Al-Wefaq “party”. However, this did not result in the Shiites achieving greater political participation. Thus, in 2011 they initiated protests (known as the Arab Spring in Bahrain), which did not lead to a thorough political transition, but to a sort of consociational democracy. In this paper, the major internal and external factors, hindering the implementation of power-sharing institutional arrangements in Bahrain that would enable Shia Muslims to participate in governance, are analysed.

In the following chapter, Krzysztof Kościelniak looks for the elements of consociationalism in the pre- and post-Arab uprising period. For more than half a century, Syria has been one of the few secular states in the region, inhabited for centuries by a multi-ethnic and multireligious population. Coexistence in such a fragmented society was maintained by the one-party system of the Baath party. The domination of the Baath party, however, caused a split among the Sunni population, especially Muslim fundamentalists opposed to its secular social agenda. His text shows how President Assad's consociational pragmatics, other than consociational democracy, used both ethnic composition, territorial fragmentation, socio-economic divisions and multiple belief practices, generating different (and sometimes contradictory) collective Sunni identities before 2011 as well as during the civil war.

The next chapter by Przemysław Turek focuses on another “classic” case of power sharing – Lebanon. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the consociational system of Lebanon in the period up to the Lebanese war of 1975–1989/1990. Emphasis will be placed on such features of Lebanese consociational democracy as segmental autonomy, proportional representation based on communal and/or religious bases, the numerical strength of the 18 sects, and the relatively continuously preserved democratic stability. The second part is dedicated to the ethnic/political/religious conflict during the 1975–1990 period, Syrian occupation of the state until 2005, and the slow erosion of the consociational system caused by a serious incongruity between the country's socio-economic and political development. The cause of that erosion could be cultural differences and the clash of incompatible values, the role of the elites in the war and the militarisation of the ethnic conflict.

Israel's political system specificity, to a great extent, stems from numerous political cleavages, empowered by long-standing, and deeply rooted in the Israeli society, tensions and conflicts. Nevertheless, Israel is considered to be, maybe not perfect yet still, a stable and consolidated democracy. The chapter by Joanna Dyduch aims to investigate the course of changes occurring in contemporary Israeli society with respect to the characteristic of its major segments. Secondly, and more importantly, it aims to track the linkages and causalities between the societal changes, political turnovers, legal-institutional reforms and efficiency of the political system in the State of Israel. The chapter also raises a question about the actual trends of power sharing in Israel in the context of the evolution of democracy variants.

And last, but not least, an analysis of a country located on the border of Asia and Europe by Agata Karbowska – Cyprus. This chapter is an incentive to polemics of the Lijphart model of consociational democracy, showing how it has failed in the Republic of Cyprus and which options are still on the table for this country. Although consociationalism as a system was chosen for the newly established republic, there is still a multifaceted conflict between the Greek and Turkish populations living on the island. This conflict emerged sharply on the international arena in the 1950s. A division was created into Greeks and Turks, which the inhabitants, who lived on good terms, did not previously feel. This constitution is still in force, although there are no Turkish Cypriots in the Cypriot government.

The individual case studies in this book undoubtedly encourage the reader to reflect on the prospects for contemporary democracy around the world. None of them carries ready-made theses. Drawing on diverse methodological and theoretical apparatuses, the authors attempt to offer their opinions on the future of democratic solutions in Asia. At the same time, they try to identify the fundamental barriers that underlie instability in multisegmented societies.

Krzysztof Trzciński

Power sharing in Indonesia: Stability through hybridity

This chapter is dedicated to the power-sharing political system functioning in Indonesia.¹ This system, thanks to employing specific institutions, allows the members of various segments (including ethnic groups and religious communities) and sub-segments, defined especially on ascriptive, cultural, and ideological foundations, to be part of the decision-making processes at different power levels.

The main aim of power sharing is to achieve political stability understood in the context of a multisegmental state as a peaceful arrangement of relations between diverse segments and sub-segments as well as between them and the state authority.² Thanks to institutional engineering in Indonesia under the conditions of democratisation, at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, a power-sharing political system of a hybrid type was constituted, since it combines the dominant centripetal institutions with consociational ones and a hybrid one (consociational-centripetal) in the form of religious parties.

The following thesis was adopted at the beginning of the research: hybrid religious parties operating in Indonesia contribute to the stabilisation of the political situation by sharing power with non-segmental supra-religious parties (nationalist, secular, and Pancasila-based political parties) and channelling political Islam within the legally permitted limits. To prove the truth of the thesis, I demonstrate first the main types of segmental divisions existing in Indonesia. Then, I present, from a historical perspective, the problems that hinder the achievement of political stability, which were fundamental for the creation of a power-sharing political system in this country. Next, I identify the main power-sharing institutions in Indonesia and assign them to two classic power-sharing models, centripetalism and consociationalism, which, when utilised together,

1 I am grateful to Michael G. Breen and Muhammad Mushtaq for offering valuable comments on this chapter.

2 An extended conceptual analysis of the term “political stability” is developed by Trzciński (2015b).

make up the hybrid model. Later, I discuss the main ideological divisions created within the Muslim segment, referring to its members' attitude towards so-called political Islam. Afterward, I explain the origins and essence and present arguments about the significance of the segmental Islamic parties. Finally, I highlight, from the perspective of political stability, the importance of implementation in the mostly centripetal institutional environment of consociational elements and thus a hybrid model of power sharing is created. In my work, I have employed inductive reasoning developed during a case study of the Indonesian political system along with institutional and legal analysis of the content of primary (interviews conducted in the field, legal acts, reports of official election results) and secondary sources (scholarly studies and press sources).³

The multisegmental nature of Indonesian society

Contemporary Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a population of about 278 million inhabitants at the beginning of 2022 (Worldometers, 2022). Indonesia occupies an area of almost 2 million km², and its territory on the equatorial axis extends to more than 5,000 km. The country is made up of about 17,000 islands, over 6,000 of which are inhabited. Indonesia has 37 provinces, 32 of which are located in Southeast Asia and five (Papua, Central Papua, Highland Papua, South Papua, and West Papua) in Melanesia, in the western part of New Guinea and its smaller neighbouring islands.

Indonesian society is multisegmental. The basic segments are races, ethnic and linguistic groups, and religious and denominational communities. Indonesian society is especially divided ethnically. According to data from 2010, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia is Javanese (a little more than 40% of the entire population), followed by Sundanese (approx. 15.5%), Malay (approx. 3.7%), Batak (approx. 3.6%), Madurese (approx. 3%), Betawi (approx. 2.9%), and

3 The fieldwork sought to establish if a blend of centripetal, consociational, and hybrid institutions contributed to achieving/maintaining political stability. Interviews with Indonesian political scientists took place during five visits to Indonesia between 2013 and 2018. The questions referred primarily to the following general issues: the origin of the implementation of power-sharing institutions and their blend; the way power-sharing institutions allow members of different segments to take part in the decision-making processes; the way the institutional blend operates, including any possible collision between institutions of different power-sharing models; the way and the extent to which the blend itself and specific institutions (like segmental religious parties in this case) contribute to achieving/maintaining political stability. Some of the findings have been or will be utilised in other works focusing on how hybrid power-sharing in Indonesia functions. The research leading to this work has received funding from the National Science Centre, Poland (Grant No. 2014/15/B/HS5/01174 entitled "Centripetalism as a Model of Political System for the Multi-ethnic States: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases").

Minangkabau (approx. 2.7%) (Ananta et al., 2013: 14). The share of any of the several hundred other native ethnic groups in the Indonesian population is minor.⁴ Among the immigrant population, the most numerous are Chinese (approx. 1.2%) (Ananta et al., 2013: 15). The vast majority of Indonesians, approx. 87%, are Muslim, overwhelmingly Sunni (Shia Muslims make up about 1% of all Indonesian Muslims). In the Sunni Muslim segment, there are serious divisions of a doctrinal nature (traditionalists vs. modernists). The number of Christians (Protestants and Catholics) is just under 10%, and Hindus represent approx. 1.7% of Indonesian society (Index Mundi, 2020; Macdonald, 2013: 6–7).

Indonesia is a peculiar case where power is shared between different groups, which is very complicated due to the indicated differentiation of types and numbers of segments that can participate in different levels of power (Trzciński, 2016a, 2017b, 2019). Moreover, within the Muslim segment, almost entirely Sunni, Indonesia is a prime example of power sharing between ideological sub-segments.⁵ Concretely, the Muslim segment is far from homogeneous concerning recognition (or lack thereof) of the role of political Islam and thus the essence of the mutual relations between the state and religion.

Much of the Muslim segment, which can be called the liberal Islamic sub-segment, sees no need for the interference of Islam in the political system. This part votes in elections for the non-segmental parties of a supra-religious nature. Another important part of the Muslim segment, which can be called the illiberal Islamic sub-segment, sees the need for the close interrelation between the state and religion, which, however, is limited by state law. This part mostly votes in elections for Islamic parties. A smaller part of this sub-segment, which is usually not directly represented within the party system, supports the idea of strictly basing political life on the principles of Islam (and a lack of separation between state and religion), and supports radicals, and even striving to achieve this goal by violent means, and supports extremists.

Problems of political stability

To understand the premises of the implementation of a power-sharing political system in Indonesia, attention should be paid to its state-building process, including the internal and external challenges to political stability. Indonesia was

4 According to Macdonald (2013: 4), there are “over one thousand ethnic and subethnic segments” in Indonesia.

5 In this respect, analogies can be drawn with historical power-sharing cases, e.g., in the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968; Andeweg, 2019), Austria (Luther, 1992; Luther and Müller, 1992), and Colombia (Dix, 1980; Hartlyn, 1988), although the Indonesian case is more complicated especially due to its hybrid nature.

founded in the colonial domain of the Dutch East Indies. It declared independence in 1945, which the Dutch recognised in 1949.⁶ The first decades of the state-building process and the functioning of Indonesia as an independent state were very rough. State power was initially under the leadership of the well-respected founding fathers of Indonesia and the heroes of the independence struggle: Sukarno of Javanese-Balinese origin (the first president, formally ruling in the period 1945–67) and Mohammad Hatta of Sumatran Minangkabau descent (vice president in the years 1945–56). Their alliance was known as the *Dwitunggal* (duumvirate).

This authority struggled with various threats to political stability, the process of building the national identity, and the territorial integrity of the newly established political entity. These included an attempt by radical Muslim elites to overthrow the secular nature of the state and create an Islamic state (*Darul Islam*, or House of Islam, rebellion in 1942–62), separatist movements (including an attempt to establish the independent Republic of South Maluku in 1950–63) and the dynamic growth of the strength and importance of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia). The government of Indonesia was originally built on a democratic foundation, however, in response to the centrifugal tendencies and complexity of the political situation, over time it began to become more authoritarian and centralised, and increasingly based on the Javanese. Consequently, Hatta severed the alliance with Sukarno. Hatta's departure came as a shock to Indonesians of non-Javanese origin, for whom he was the main exponent of their interests in a Javanese-dominated government. In the aftermath of Hatta's resignation, the legitimacy of Sukarno's power began to be more strongly questioned, which was reflected, inter alia, in several rebellions that broke out in 1956 in various parts of Sumatra and the *Permesta* rebellion in Celebes in 1957–61, as well as in the creation by rebels from both islands of a joint government called the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), which operated in 1958–61. The rebels expressed dissatisfaction with the level of development of their regions and the whole of Indonesia under the conditions of centralised power and demanded, inter alia, the limiting of the influence of the Javanese and Sukarno in state power, as well as granting autonomy to their regions. However, the military suppression of the rebellions by the government meant the further progress of authoritarianism and power centralisation, as well as strengthening the Javanese dominance in politics and the army.

6 The national liberation movement declared Indonesia independent in 1945 and adopted the constitution. In 1945–49, in the area of what is now Indonesia (then the Dutch East Indies), there was an independence war, also known as the Indonesian National Revolution, aimed at removing the Dutch colonisers.

In 1963, Sukarno led the Indonesian administration in taking power in an area inhabited by Papuans, the so-called Dutch New Guinea, the decolonisation of which, according to the original Dutch plans, was to lead to independence. In 1969, the territory was successfully formally incorporated into Indonesia. From the very beginning, the Indonesian presence there has been contested and fought, albeit unsuccessfully, by the *Fri Wes Papua Grup* or *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM, Free Papua Movement), an armed representative of Papuan interests.⁷ In 1971, the OPM declared West New Guinea's independence as the Republic of West Papua. The main goal of the OPM is the genuine independence of this territory.

In 1963–66, during the so-called *Konfrontasi*, Indonesia unsuccessfully tried to militarily seize northern (British) Borneo and prevent it being taken over by the nascent Federation of Malaysia. In the mid-1960s, the activities of Indonesian communists became the major threat to the political stability of Indonesia, at least in the eyes of the army. This should be seen in the context of broader international realities at the time, including the war in Indo-China. Since Sukarno was passive against the communist threat or downplayed it (perhaps in part due to his leftist views), the army, de facto, removed him from power in 1965 although he formally held the president's office until 1967. From 1965, General Suharto played a key political role in Indonesia. In 1965–66, the Indonesian army, together with various local militias, carried out a pogrom against communists and people with leftist sympathies. According to different and divergent estimates, from several hundred thousand to more than a million Indonesians died in this purge. In its aftermath, Suharto's political position strengthened strongly, and in 1968 he formally assumed the office of president, which he held until 1998.

In 1975, the Indonesian army brutally invaded East Timor (Timor-Leste) shortly after its independence from Portugal was declared by the *Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente* (Fretilin, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). Indonesia incorporated the territory and declared it a province (Timor Timur) in 1976. Fretilin opposed the Indonesian occupation by force for several decades, which was met with ruthless reaction by the Indonesian army and meant that tensions remained permanent in the province.

For most of the period of his power, Suharto exercised it in an authoritarian and highly centralised manner, which, inter alia, contributed to the outbreak of a separatist rebellion led by the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) in the most conservative province of Aceh in northern Sumatra. The rebellion lasted from 1976 to 2005. The end of Suharto's dictatorship was mainly

⁷ In 2014, as a result of the unification of several smaller organisations, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP, 2022) was formed, which aims to use peaceful means to gain independence for the present Indonesian provinces in Western New Guinea.

due to the so-called Asian financial crisis that broke out in 1997 and hit Indonesia's society very hard, including rampant inflation and a drastic increase in basic products prices. In 1998, in the wake of a rising tide of discontent that took the form of extensive protests and riots, Suharto was forced by the army to resign. Social frustration was often accompanied by large-scale aggression against the well-off Chinese minority, as well as looting and the destruction of property. Immediately after the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, there was a deepening of political instability, which, among other things, manifested itself in the rise of tensions between certain segments of Indonesian society.

In Indonesia, under the rule of Sukarno and Suharto, almost from the moment of actual independence from the Netherlands, the state authority implemented various policies aimed at uniting a multisegmental society and at the same time maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. Among these, a crucial role was played, in particular, by adopting the Pancasila nationalist ideology; establishing and implementing the national language, that is, the Indonesian language (*Bahasa Indonesia*) in education, administration, and public life; the declaration of Indonesia as a secular state and the disagreement of leaders with the constitutional recognition of the dominant role of Islam; and the introduction of universal primary education, part of which is pro-state propaganda.

Under the conditions of authoritarianism, the indicated policies were, however, either insufficient to fully achieve the intended aims or, at times, generated effects contrary to the planned ones since the authoritarian government banned autonomy and used coercion and terror against its political opponents. As a consequence, authoritarianism influenced the development of separatism and the independence aspirations in some areas of Indonesia, especially in Aceh, Western New Guinea, and East Timor. The fuel for the development of these phenomena was also the so-called transmigration (*Transmigrasi*) programme consisting of the relocation of part of the population from overpopulated areas (mainly Java, but also, among others, Madura and Bali) to less populated areas (including Sumatra, Borneo, Western New Guinea, Celebes, the Moluccas, Riau Archipelago, and Lesser Sunda Islands). In many places, transmigration has resulted in the involuntary mixing of ethnically, linguistically, religiously, and even racially different people.

The transmigration programme was dynamically developed especially during the Suharto rule, accelerating and promoting the process known as the *Javanization* of Indonesian society,⁸ which is the key to understanding Indonesia's intersegmental relations. Simply put, it means the pursuit of the Javanese people for hegemony in the spheres of culture and social life, but also in politics and the

8 Important for the development of this process is, among others, the fact that Suharto was born from ethnic Javanese parents in the vicinity of Yogyakarta, the very centre of Javanese culture.

economy (Bebbington et al., 2004: 191, 193). Culturally and socially, it is a process by which the Javanese culture dominates, assimilates, or influences other cultures in various ways. It includes the conscious or unconscious dissemination of Javanese norms and values, including the imposition of Javanese patterns of thinking and behaviour (Mulder, 1994: 29–41). Under conditions of high intensity, this process may even mean cultural imperialism. In the spheres of politics and economy, the term *Javanization* is sometimes used to describe the popularisation of Javanese norms and values in the Indonesian political culture. However, it is usually used to describe a process by which the Javanese gradually gain an overwhelming majority among the ruling elite of independent Indonesia, out of proportion to their percentage of society as a whole. Dominance in politics places the Javanese people in crucial positions in the civil service, military, police, and security services, as well as in state-owned enterprises. An element of *Javanization*, both as a political concept and as a practical activity, is the large-scale spread of Javanese settlements in areas outside Java. The tool of this process was the transmigration programme (Abdoellah, 1987: 189; Tirtosudarmo, 2019: 103), through which the state authority – as some Indonesians say – carried out a kind of internal colonisation of the so-called outer islands (Tirtosudarmo, 2019: 42). Transmigration favours Javanese Muslims and, at the same time, discriminates against indigenous people, often non-Muslims, of migration target areas, which they perceive as far unfair.⁹ As A. Sutarto (2006) claims, “in the view of

9 The dissatisfaction of the native population in the areas to which Javanese and other migrants were relocated has been associated with a variety of factors (Abdoellah, 1987; Fearnside, 1997; Hoey, 2003; Tirtosudarmo, 2019). First, in mostly Christian areas (e.g., Western New Guinea, East Timor, and the Poso region of Celebes), Muslim settlement has felt like a hidden form of Islamisation. Second, transmigration has often been seen as a form of cultural Javanization. Third, transmigration discriminated against the native population in various ways (due to their lack of participation in the decision-making process concerning, e.g., administration and the local economy; the threat to local cultures; the insensitivity of migrants and the state authority to local legal traditions; the so-called adat, e.g., concerning land ownership; the threat to the natural environment, among others, through deforestation and mining). Fourth, it has privileged the immigrant population, bringing them various economic benefits (such as alleviating poverty, unemployment, and overcrowding; obtaining free agricultural land and non-returnable funds for development). Fifth, transmigration has provided foreign (mainly Javanese) labour in areas where there is extraction of natural resources, which strengthened the belief of the native population about their economic exploitation by the state authority, dominated by the Javanese. Some Indonesians are still dissatisfied with the level of development of their regions and believe that Java's higher level of development is financed by the extraction of natural resources from their regions (Both, 2011: 36–37). Sixth, to assist migrants, for their safety, and to protect their interests, the authorities used to send additional police and military forces to the migration areas and in many cases filled the main local administrative positions with retired Javanese army officers. These and other phenomena have increased the sense of lack of agency and dominance by the Javanese among the native population.

some ethnic groups (Acehnese, Papuans, and Dayaks, for example), the Javanese are conquerors or pillagers”.

Of course, the most crucial conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, and Western New Guinea had a broader historical, political, and economic context than the one related to transmigration. This concerned, inter alia, such problems as the way these borderland territories became part of Indonesia, their loose ties with the rest of the country, the evident cultural differences between their inhabitants and other Indonesians, the feeling of exploitation and oppression by the Javanese and by the state authority, and the inability to obtain actual autonomy. The problems developed by the relocation of mainly Javanese (and Madurese) also arose in many other places in Indonesia and generated various communal conflicts. These occurred with the fall of the authoritarian rule of Suharto in, among others, Borneo (Sambas and Sampit), Celebes (Poso), and the Moluccas (including Ambon, Halmahera) (Schulze, 2017). On the other hand, a separatist movement called the *Gerakan Riau Merdeka* (GRM, Free Riau Movement) started in the mainland part of the Riau region (McCall, 2000; Amri and Rianto, 2021: 193). However, these minor conflicts have been extinguished over time.

In the late 1990s, in the face of significant economic problems, it was rather costly for Indonesia to maintain an active military presence in East Timor. The Timorese took advantage of the period of political instability associated with the fall of Suharto's rule to intensify their demands for independence. However, in Indonesia, the belief prevailed that East Timor's independence would threaten the territorial integrity of the entire state, especially in the face of separatism in Aceh and attempts to gain independence by the Papuans. New President B. J. Habibie¹⁰ tended to give East Timor special autonomy. Ultimately, however, under international pressure, he agreed to hold a referendum there in 1999, in which the population of the occupied territory voted against autonomy within Indonesia and for independence. The periods before and after the referendum were marked by a serious increase in tensions as the Indonesian militias, supported by the army, did not want to allow East Timor to become independent. However, this territory eventually became a sovereign state in 2002.

The conflict between the Indonesian authorities and the OPM in Western New Guinea continues. However, its intensity was limited after the Indonesian parliament passed a law in 2001 introducing special autonomy for the province of Papua (now five Papuan provinces) (Indonesia Law 21/2001). However, some of its provisions have not yet been implemented (Trzciński, 2016a, 2019: 135–143). The conflict in Aceh culminated in the signing of a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the GAM in 2005 (Memorandum of Understanding,

10 B. J. Habibie originated from southern Celebes. His father was from the Gorontalo ethnic group, and his mother was of Javanese descent.

2005). As a result of this agreement, the Indonesian parliament adopted a law granting this province special autonomy (Indonesia Law 11/2006).

Some of the conflicts resulted in the separation, in the spirit of the centripetal model of power sharing, of new provinces from those in which independence aspirations, separatism, efforts to obtain greater autonomy, or communal conflicts were more or less vivid. For example, in 1999, the province of North Moluccas was separated from the Moluccas; in 2004, the Riau Archipelago from the Riau (Kimura, 2013: 104); in 2003, West Papua from Papua (Amri and Rianto, 2018: 3), and in 2022, Central Papua, Highland Papua, and South Papua from Papua.

Power-sharing major models and institutions

The presented problems are related to the turbulent beginnings of Indonesian statehood and its limited stability, for example, in the intersegmental relations and between the segments and the state authority. The democratisation process of Indonesia that started in 1998, which meant, *inter alia*, the need to resolve or limit conflicts and disputes peacefully, contributed to a thorough reform of the Indonesian political system and the establishment of a power-sharing political system in this country at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries.

After the fall of Suharto, attempts were made to implement power sharing based mainly on centripetal institutions, which is deeply justified. It is the result of the concerns of the Indonesian elite, especially Javanese and at the same time Islamic, about consociational institutions and is often the result of pragmatism. First, consociational institutions may have a centrifugal effect that threatens the integrity of the state. Second, there are too many segments in Indonesia (most of which are small) to give each one, for example, autonomous status or allow some policies to be vetoed. Third, not all segments make (decisive) demands for consociational arrangements (like, for example, Malays or Christians). Fourth, under the conditions of centripetalism dominating Indonesian power sharing (that is, its “softer” model than consociationalism), the main segments and sub-segments (Javanese, liberal Muslims) more easily retain a key influence on the decision-making process, which is also less complicated (Trzciński, 2015a).

It may happen since centripetalism is designed to ensure the participation in power of various segments at the level of intersegmental institutions like interethnic parties; decentralisation leading to a division of large segments into parts so that they live in several administrative regions, and establishing multi-segmental regions where members of political elites of different segments are “forced” to cooperate; the procedure of electing a “supra-segmental” president applying the requirement of territorial distribution of votes (Trzciński, 2016c,

2017a); the requirement of preferential voting in the form of the single transferable vote or alternative voting systems or other electoral patterns promoting vote pooling (Horowitz, 1985: 601–652, 2007: 958–962, 2008: 1218; Reilly, 2011: 290–296). Such an approach is designed to create among members of segmental elites moderating, accommodating, and possibly integrating political behaviours across segmental divisions and to depoliticise segmental separateness (Reilly, 2007: 83–91).

Currently, the following essential centripetal institutions operate in Indonesia (Trzciński, 2019: 73–92, Reilly, 2021: 471–473): 1) supra-regional, interethnic political parties, the nature of which contributes to the formation of a multi-ethnic parliament and cabinet (Indonesia Law 2/2011 art. 3 [2] [c], [d]; Indonesia Law 7/2017 art. 176 [3], 177 [1]);¹¹ 2) the procedure of electing a “supra-ethnic” (moderate) president based on the requirement of territorial distribution of votes (to win the presidential election in the first round, an absolute majority of votes must be obtained statewide and at the same time at least 20% of votes in more than half of the 34 provinces) (Indonesia Constitution 1945, art. 6A [3]; Indonesia Law 7/2017, art. 416); and 3) a territorial structure consisting predominantly of multi-ethnic provinces and, at the same time, dividing the main ethnic group, the Javanese, into as many as six provinces on the island of Java (Trzciński, 2017b: 174–176).

However, centripetal institutions are not or would not be able to reduce all conflicts. At mostly the vertical level, that is, the regions (and the ethnic groups they live in) and the relationship between the state authority and regions (ethnic groups), it was decided to introduce “tougher” than centripetal institutions, namely consociational ones, aimed at segments that show separatist tendencies (the Acehnese), independence aspirations (the Papuans) and autonomous demands (the Dayaks).

The essence of consociationalism can be summarised in the statement that under the conditions of a divided multisegmental society, individual (racial/ethnic/national/linguistic or religious/denominational/ideological) segments should have, as *sui generis* interest groups, their separate representation in state power structures by which they gain real participation in making political decisions. Consociational institutions – especially a grand coalition of mainly segmental parties; a segmental cultural or territorial autonomy; proportionality in elections, distribution of government positions, employment in public offices, and even in the security institutions, judiciary, media, and state-owned enterprises; and a minority veto – are designed to directly protect segmental interests (Lijphart, 1977, 2008; Trzciński, 2018b: 22–23).

11 To be supra-regional, political parties must function first of all in all provinces.

Prominent institutions of the consociational type in Indonesia are: 1) special autonomy for the provinces of Aceh and five Papuan provinces;¹² among the crucial autonomous aspects are: Sharia law and ethnic parties in Aceh (neither operate in other parts of Indonesia) (Indonesia Law 11/2006, art. 75–76, art. 125–137; Indonesia Law 7/2017, art. 569); a requirement for the native origin of governors and their deputies in the Papuan provinces (Indonesia Law 21/2001, art. 12 [a]; Indonesia Law 11/2006, art. 67 [2] [a]); a guarantee that the six provinces will preserve a substantial part of the financial revenues generated by the exploitation of their natural resources (Indonesia Law 11/2006, art. 181–182; Indonesia Law 21/2001, art. 34); 2) a proportional electoral system to the lower house of parliament (with party lists) (Indonesia Law 7/2017, art. 168 [2]);¹³ 3) (mostly) cultural autonomy for the Dayak people in Borneo¹⁴ in the framework of the customary council¹⁵ and its Batamad¹⁶ paramilitary wing tasked to curb Islamic extremism; 4) the segmental provinces of Gorontalo,¹⁷ and Bali,¹⁸ each of which is overwhelmingly inhabited by members of one ethnic group and one religious community.

It is also worth noting that the vice president of Indonesia is most often a non-Javanese. Since 2004, the president has been directly elected, along with the vice president, four times. A Javanese has always been elected president. However, on three occasions, a vice president has been a politician of ethnic origin other than

12 In the case of the Papuan provinces, the legally guaranteed special autonomy has been only partially implemented (Trzciński, 2016a).

13 From a power-sharing perspective, a proportional electoral system is important in Indonesia in the context of the division of the political party scene into non-segmental supra-religious parties and segmental Islamic parties. This is because it allows both groups of parties to win a number of seats in the lower house of parliament proportional to the scale of social support and influence and gives an image of the real division of power between them. However, proportionality is partially distorted by the high national threshold, as experienced in 2009 by, for example, the PBB party that did not enter parliament.

14 The Dayaks have a tradition of creating institutions of the consociational type. In 1945–59, the Dayak party, *Partai Persatuan Dayak* (PPD, Dayak Unity Party), operated in the Indonesian part of Borneo (Davidson, 2003). It was closed down as a result of the decree issued by Sukarno in 1959 prohibiting the activity of ethnic parties.

15 *Majelis Adat Dayak Nasional* (National Dayak Customary Council).

16 *Barisan Pertahanan Masyarakat Adat Dayak* (Indigenous Dayak Defence Line).

17 In 2000, the province of Gorontalo, where the vast majority are Muslims (mainly members of the Gorontaloan ethnic group), was separated from North Sulawesi. By forming a new province, the Muslim-dominated Indonesian government purposely stopped Christian (mainly of the Minahasan ethnic group) political and economic domination over Muslims. Such a conclusion is derived from my discussions with Indonesian political scientists (cf. Kimura, 2007: 85–92).

18 The specificity of the functioning of this segmental province, mainly inhabited by Balinese Hindus, is related to the existence of a tradition of administrative distinctiveness and natural borders within one island.

that of the president: in 2004 and 2014 (Jusuf Kalla, Buginese) and 2019 (Ma'ruf Amin, Sundanese).

Having both centripetal and consociational institutions, the current Indonesian political system is one of the best examples of, what I call, hybrid power sharing.¹⁹ Hybrid power sharing occurs especially when, in the same multi-segmental state, there are simultaneously institutions that come from the two major power-sharing models, which hold different conceptual assumptions. But hybrid power sharing is also developed by adding its “own” institutions, in which the components corresponding to centripetalism and consociationalism overlap. I call these hybrid institutions (Trzciński, 2022, 2020b). In Indonesia, at least one of these institutions can be identified in the form of religious political parties.

Religious parties are of a mixed, consociational-centripetal nature. The consociational component of this institution is that they are segmental parties, open mainly to members of a specific religious segment and representing its needs and interests. On the other hand, the centripetal component manifests itself in the fact that religious parties must be supra-regional and interethnic. Religious parties, specifically Islamic ones,²⁰ are the most important Indonesian power-sharing institution, which is not purely centripetal. The significance of this institution has not been sufficiently analysed in the literature; therefore, it is the Islamic parties that the main attention will be devoted to in this chapter.²¹

The Muslim segment and its sub-segments facing political Islam

Indonesia is a multireligious country, but with a predominant share of adherents of Islam. At the beginning of 2022, about 240 million inhabitants of Indonesia were Muslims, making it the largest Islamic state in the world. The vast majority

19 Other examples of hybrid power sharing are especially Nigeria, Burundi and Kenya (Trzciński, 2016b, 2018a, 2020a, 2020b, 2021).

20 Christian political parties currently play virtually no role in the Indonesian political system. The two requirements for participation in the elections to the lower house of parliament in Indonesia – the centripetal (supra-regional and inter-ethnic) nature of the political parties and the election threshold (4%, previously 3.5% and 2.5%) – effectively eliminate such parties at the statewide level (Trzciński, 2017b: 180–181). Christian parties could only count on substantial support in the areas of Indonesia inhabited by Christians, mostly belonging to small ethnic groups. The most important such areas are Western New Guinea, Flores Island, South Moluccas, and some parts of Celebes and Sumatra. The issues of political Christian parties in Indonesia from a historical perspective will be discussed in another work.

21 Other power-sharing institutions, including those designed for Aceh and Western New Guinea, have been discussed, among others, by Trzciński (2016, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b: 25–27, 2019).

of Indonesian Muslims (around 99%) are Sunni.²² From the very beginnings of Indonesia, its politics has been operating between the Scylla of supporters of the limited influence of Islam and religious elites on the state, including its political and legal system, and the Charybdis of supporters of making Indonesia an Islamic state, or at least a state based on Sharia law.

In 1945, shortly before the declaration of independence, the elites of the national liberation movement, both nationalist/secularist and Islamist, prepared the so-called Jakarta Charter, that is, the preamble to the future constitution. This document, at the will of Sukarno, included the principles of the future national ideology of Pancasila (including leaving space for the professing of various religions in Indonesia), and, at the will of the Islamic elites, the order to observe Sharia law by Indonesian Muslims, the so-called *tujuh kata* (Seven Words). The Islamic elites also tried to force through the constitution a provision stating that the president of Indonesia must be a Muslim. Ultimately, however, thanks to Sukarno and other supporters of the separation of religion and state, the constitution that entered into force on 18 August 1945 did not incorporate such content. This shows how sensitive the important part of the future political elites of independent Indonesia was to the issue of the role of Islam in the new state. The prevailing trend was to separate political and religious matters to diminish the political significance of Islamic elites and counteract the development of religious fanaticism. But to also better integrate, within the nation being formed, followers of various religions, including Christians and Hindus, whose elites were afraid of emphasising the status of Islam in the constitution. Among Indonesian nationalists, Sukarno and Hatta, among others, believed that constitutional references to Islam would alienate non-Muslims and harm the state-building process. The implied constitutional separation of religion and state was consistently enforced under the rule of Sukarno, Suharto, and their successors. However, Islamic elites have repeatedly highlighted their dissatisfaction with the failure to include content in the constitution that emphasises the particular role of Islam in Indonesia (Elson, 2009; Al-Hamdi, 2015; Salehudin, 2018). The elites operating within the political system have repeatedly tried to legally force a change in this state of affairs.²³

On the other hand, Indonesia has tragic experiences of the functioning of extremist Muslim organisations. For example, *Darul Islam* tried in 1942–62 with the help of its armed arm *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Army) to establish a theocratic state, *Negara Islam Indonesia*. In later years, Indonesia

22 The remaining Muslims in Indonesia are mostly Shiites and members of the Ahmadiyya community.

23 The most important such attempts took place in 1959, 1968, and 2002.