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Migration und Integration – wissenschaftliche Perspektiven aus Österreich

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Mit 16 Abbildungen

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Integration und Identität

Vorwort

Die in diesem Band versammelten Aufsätze gehen auf die vierte Jahrestagung für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung in Österreich zurück, die gemeinsam von der Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und dem Forschungsschwerpunkt Migration, Citizenship and Belonging der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Wien im September 2016 an der Universität Wien durchgeführt wurde. Die insgesamt 17 Aufsätze sind eine Auswahl von ursprünglich mehr als 40 Beiträgen, die im Rahmen dieser Konferenz präsentiert wurden. Den Beiträgen vorangestellt ist das für diese Publikation überarbeitete Manuskript des Hauptvortrags von Dawn Chatty zum Thema *The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: Perceptions of Sustainability of Containment in the Region of Conflict.*

In seiner inhaltlichen und disziplinären Breite dokumentiert das vorliegende Jahrbuch erneut den Querschnittscharakter der Migrations- und Integrationsforschung. Die thematischen Schwerpunkte Asyl, Gesundheit und Pflege, Familie und Sprache sowie Integration und Identität dokumentieren, dass sich die Akzente der Forschung im Laufe der Jahre immer wieder verschieben. Unverändert bleibt die Anforderung, zu einer differenzierteren und kritischen Auffassung von Migration und Mobilität beizutragen, und zwar sowohl in Bezug auf ihre vielfältigen Erscheinungsformen und Dynamiken als auch hinsichtlich jener tieferliegenden gesellschaftlichen Transformationen, für die sie Symptome sind, wie etwa geopolitische Verwerfungen, transnationale Ungleichheiten oder die Globalisierung ökonomischer und ökologischer Risiken. In diesem Sinn trägt Migrations- und Integrationsforschung immer auch zur Erforschung von sozialem Wandel bei, seinen Ursachen, Begleiterscheinungen und Folgen. Die Ergebnisse der Forschung, das unterstreichen auch die Beiträge dieses Jahrbuchs, konterkarieren Halbwissen und vermeintliche Wahrheiten und bilden eine potentielle Grundlage für kollektive Lernprozesse und soziale, politische und kulturelle Innovation. Die gesellschaftliche Konflikthaftigkeit, die dem Thema Migration heute innewohnt, zwingt die Forschung aus dem Elfenbeinturm. Es geht um soziale Verantwortung und Engagement, um öffentliche Mei-

nungsbildung und eine wissenschaftlich begründete Auseinandersetzung mit Regierungs- und Behördenhandeln. Wer im Bereich der Migrations- und Integrationsforschung tätig ist, sieht sich auch mit Fragen und Problemkonstellationen konfrontiert, die nach konkreten Antworten und Lösungen verlangen. Welche gesellschaftliche Funktion und Wirkung der Migrations- und Integrationsforschung dabei zukommt, gilt es (selbst-)kritisch zu befragen.

Die zweijährliche Jahrestagung und die damit verbundene Veröffentlichung im Jahrbuch dienen dazu, die wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit den Themen Migration und gesellschaftliche Inklusion voranzutreiben. Ein vorrangiges Ziel ist es, die Vernetzung der institutionell nach wie vor recht dispers verteilten und disziplinär fragmentierten Forschungslandschaft zu stärken und den fächerübergreifenden, aber auch transdisziplinären Dialog zu fördern. Viele der in diesem Band versammelten Beiträge entstanden aus Disziplinen und Sektoren übergreifenden Forschungskooperationen. Wie bereits die drei vorangegangenen Jahrestagungen spiegelte die vierte Konferenz dieses facettenreiche Wirken einer Migrationsforschung, die im universitären und außeruniversitären Bereich gleichermaßen angesiedelt ist. Sie verfolgt sowohl grundlagen- als auch anwendungsorientierte Forschungsstrategien und positioniert sich in einem Forschungsfeld, das nicht nur wissenschaftsimmanent, sondern auch von Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft, Verwaltung und Politik mit definiert ist. Dass Migrationsforschung eine Querschnittsmaterie ist, zeigte sich im Spektrum an behandelten Themen. Bildung und Sprache, Kinder und Jugendliche, Literatur und Medien waren ebenso im Fokus der vorgestellten Forschungsarbeiten wie Medizin, Gesundheit und Gender. Darüber hinaus wurden Migration und Integration aus den Blickwinkeln der Stadt sowie des Arbeitsmarkts beleuchtet, aber auch Fragen des Migrationsmanagements, der Rückkehrmigration, des Asyls, und der Menschenrechte behandelt. Historisch-politisch gerahmt war die Tagung durch die zugespitzten Krisen im Nahen Osten und auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent, die dadurch ausgelösten Fluchtbewegungen und zunehmend polarisierte migrationspolitische Debatten auf europäischer wie nationaler Ebene. International übliche Qualitätsstandards und Begutachtungspraktiken waren für die Auswahl der Tagungsbeiträge ausschlaggebend. Ausgewählt wurden die Beiträge aus den auf Grundlage eines Call for Papers eingereichten Vorschläge für Panels und Vorträge. Die im vorliegenden Band versammelten Artikel wurden für eine Veröffentlichung eingereicht und nach nochmaliger wissenschaftlicher Begutachtung ausgewählt.

Das vorliegende Jahrbuch gliedert sich in vier Abschnitte: (1) Asyl, (2) Gesundheit und Pflege, (3) Familie und Sprache sowie (4) Integration und Identität. Eingeleitet wird der Sammelband mit dem Eröffnungsbeitrag von Dawn Chatty (Refugee Studies Centre, Universität Oxford), *The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: Perceptions of Sustainability of Containment in the Region of Conflict.* Unter

Hinweis auf die zugespitzte humanitäre Krise in den Flüchtlingslagern in den Nachbarländern von Syrien plädiert Dawn Chatty für eine Politik, die den Flüchtenden über temporären Überlebensschutz hinaus längerfristige Lebensperspektiven eröffnet, wobei vor allem die Länder der Europäischen Union gefordert sind, entsprechende menschenrechtlich begründete Rahmenbedingungen, auch gegen rechtspopulistische Angstmache, umzusetzen. Im ersten Abschnitt zum Themenfeld „Asyl" findet sich zunächst ein Beitrag von Josef Kohlbacher und Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, in dem sich die Autorin und der Autor mit den Erfahrungen von AsylwerberInnen aus Afghanistan, Syrien und Irak nach ihrer Ankunft in Österreich auseinandersetzen. Mit dem Abschieberegime und parlamentarischen Anfragen zwischen Menschenrechten und Souveränität setzen sich anschließend Sieglinde Rosenberger und Judith Welz auseinander. Im nachfolgenden Beitrag untersucht Sibel Uranüs die vergessene Verantwortung in Bezug auf Folteropfer im österreichischen Asylverfahren.

Der zweite Abschnitt versammelt Beiträge zum Thema Gesundheit und Pflege. Ingrid Jez behandelt das Thema Impfpflicht in Zeiten der Migration. Mit den Anforderungen einer kultursensiblen Gesundheitsversorgung von geflüchteten Personen „im Spannungsfeld zwischen staatlicher Verantwortung und Health Literacy" befasst sich der Beitrag von Katharina Leitner. Christoph Reinprecht und Ina Wilczewska befassen sich in ihrem Beitrag mit der Rolle familienbezogener Verpflichtungsnormen für die Akzeptanz von Pflegeeinrichtungen und sozialen Diensten. Herausforderungen für die Präventionsarbeit im Bereich Migration und Sucht untersuchen Anna Faustmann und Lydia Rössl im folgenden Beitrag. Der Beitrag von Daniela Wagner widmet sich migrationsbedingter Diversität in österreichischen Alten- und Pflegeheimen.

Im dritten Abschnitt – „Familie und Sprache" – befassen sich zunächst Viktoria Tempel, Maria Weichselbaum, Katharina Korecky-Kröll und Wolfgang Dressler mit dem Deutschspracherwerb ein- und zweisprachiger Wiener Kindergartenkinder und dem Einfluss des sozioökonomischen Status der Familie, des sprachlichen Hintergrunds und der Sprechsituationen. Monika Potkański-Pałka resümiert in ihrem Artikel die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Forschung zu intergenerationalen Wertetransmission in Familien polnischer Herkunft in Österreich und Deutschland.

„Integration und Identität" lautet der Titel des vierten Abschnitts, in dem zunächst Anna Faustmann, Lydia Rössl und Isabella Skrivanek „Einflussfaktoren auf die regionale Integration und Bleibeabsichten von (hoch-)qualifizierten Zu- und Rückwanderern in Oberösterreich" vorstellen und diskutieren. Angelika Frühwirt und Ana Mijić widmen sich in ihrem Beitrag, anhand einer Analyse literarischer Werke, den „Grenzen des Selbst" im Kontext von Identität und Diaspora. Unter dem Titel „Offenheit als kulturelles Kapital: Kosmopolitischer Konsum in migrantischen Ökonomien" diskutiert Michael Parzer die These,

dass bildungsprivilegierte Angehörigen der Dominanzgesellschaft den Konsum „fremder Kulturen" als Ressource und Distinktionsmittel einsetzen. Ursula Reeger berichtet die Ergebnisse einer Forschung zur Situation von Arbeitskräften ausostmitteleuropäischen EU-Ländern in einem Städtevergleich Wien und Linz. Arno Pilgram und Christina Schwarzl liefern eine Analyse von „Kriminalstatistiken als Erzählung über soziale Teilhabe von MigrantInnen". Im abschließenden Beitrag von Markus Rheindorf geht es um „Integration durch Strafe?" sowie die erfolgreiche Durchsetzung des umstrittenen Begriffes „Integrationsunwilligkeit" im politischen Diskurs.

Den HerausgeberInnen dieses Jahrbuchs ist es ein Anliegen, ihre Wertschätzung all jenen zu vermitteln, die am Gelingen dieses immer wieder herausfordernden Projekts – Konferenz und Herausgabe eines Konferenzbandes – beteiligt waren. Besonderer Dank gilt den Mitgliedern des Programmkomitees für ihre gutachterliche Tätigkeit, die bei der großen Anzahl der Einreichungen von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Auswahl der Panels und Vorträge waren, sowie den unabhängigen GutachterInnen, die den vorliegenden Sammelband durch ihre Empfehlungen mitgestaltet haben. Dank gebührt den institutionellen UnterstützerInnen dieser Tagung, insbesondere der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Wien. Dank gilt in spezieller Weise naturgemäß den Vortragenden der Jahrestagung und AutorInnen des Jahrbuchs. Die Beiträge dokumentieren nicht nur das stetig anwachsende Interesse an migrations- und integrationsrelevanten Fragestellungen, sondern auch das Bemühen um inhaltliche Originalität und methodologische und konzeptionelle Qualität. 2018 bietet sich mit der 5. Jahrestagung eine neue Gelegenheit, aktuelle Forschungen im Bereich der Migrations- und Integrationsforschung zu präsentieren und kennenzulernen!

Jennie Carvill Schellenbacher, Julia Dahlvik, Heinz Fassmann
und Christoph Reinprecht

Wien, im November 2017

Dawn Chatty

The Syrian Humanitarian Disaster: Perceptions on Sustainability of Containment in the Region of Conflict

The speed with which Syria disintegrated into violent armed conflict shocked the world; it has also left the humanitarian aid regime in turmoil as agencies struggled to react effectively to the massive displacement which ensued initially in the Eastern Mediterranean but by 2015 on the borders of Europe as well. Each country bordering on Syria responded differently to this complex emergency: Turkey rushed to set up its own camps for displaced Syrians; Lebanon refused to allow the international humanitarian aid regime to do so; Jordan prevaricated for a year and then in 2012 invited the United Nations Agency for Refugees (UNHCR) to set up a massive encampment. Turkey and Jordan have permitted Syrians to enter as temporary 'guests'; Jordan has also returned some of the displaced peoples arriving from Syria contrary to international norms. Lebanon has permitted Syrians to continue to enter Lebanon as 'foreign workers'. Each of these states has established a variety of temporary measures to deal with this crisis. However, the Syrian humanitarian crisis is no longer in an 'emergency' phase. As we enter the 6th year of the crisis we also are seeing a protracted situation where not only the displaced, but also the local hosting community are intimately affected. Yet few governments or national and international agencies dealing with this critical situation have consistently consulted either the displaced or the local receiving areas (host communities); what little consultation has taken place has been piecemeal, sporadic, and opportunistic. Discrepancies are rapidly becoming visible and tensions and protests have quickly emerged among host communities, displaced Syrians and humanitarian policy-makers. The established humanitarian system appears to be struggling to assist those taking refuge from Syria's implosion. And the policy of containment in the region shows signs of collapse.

What I would like to do here in this presentation is first give you a sense of the global nature of forced migration and displacement and then also show you the *heavy* hosting burden which the Middle East bears. Then I will give you an overview of how containment of the displaced in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan works and does not work. I will indicate the significance of historical migrations,

ethno-religious attachments, and social networks and trans-border affiliations. I will do this by focussing on the perceptions and aspirations of the displaced but also on the members of the hosting communities. I show how disparities in perceptions as well as failures to protect the displaced and the unsustainable burden across the three hosting countries have resulted in an onward migration to Europe. This fact is an inevitable and unstoppable reality that emerges out of the human need to escape from violence, but also to unite or reunite family and to find hospitality and solidarity.

World Wide Displacement

In the closing years of World War II, more than 20 million people were displaced in Europe. The successor of the League of Nations, the United Nations, set out to create a temporary agency, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), to complete the task of resettling Europe's war refugees. Following on from the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the UNHCR recognized as refugees persons fleeing from their country as a result of violence or from fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, political affiliation, or social group. It was assumed that after a few years the Agency would complete its task and be dissolved. That however did not happen. Gradually over the 1950s, it responded to the Hungarian Crisis in 1956 and helped to resettle more than 200,000 Hungarians in North America and in Europe. By the 1960s, it was clear that the UNHCR was not going to be temporary and in 1967 its mandate was expanded to include refugees outside of Europe. Even with that expansion, by 1975 persons of concern to the UNHCR worldwide were about 2.5 million. At the end of the Cold War, by 1999, that number had jumped to 22 million. And by 2011 at the start of the Arab Spring or Uprising it was 35 million and included not only refugees, but also stateless persons and IDPs (internally displaced peoples) – those who had not crossed an international border, but had nonetheless been displaced due to violence. By 2016 UNHCR's people of concern – all persons whose protection and assistance needs were of interest to the Agency – exceeded 60 million people world-wide. Of these numbers 21.3 million were refugees.

UNHCR Persons of concern	
1975	2.5 m
1994	27 m
1999	22 m
2009	36 m
2010	34 m

(Continued)

UNHCR Persons of concern	
2011	35 m
2012	35.84 m
2013	35.83 m
2014	59.5 m**
** *Refugees under UNHCR mandate = 16.2 m* *Palestinians under UNRWA mandate= 5.1 m* *World-wide total refugees = 21.3 m*	

The scale of world-wide displacement. Sources UNCHR, UNRWA.

The Major Refugee and IDP Source Countries

Recent UNHCR figures indicate that the three main source countries for refugees are from Somali, Syria and Afghanistan. Together they have produced more than half of the world's refugees: Somalia with 1.1 million, Syria with 4.9 million and Afghanistan with 2.7 million.

Again from UNHCR figures we know that the major hosting countries are not in the developed world but in developing and middle income countries. Although one million displaced people entered Europe in 2015/2016, most of the world's displaced have sought sanctuary in low and middle income counties. More than 80 % of the world's forced migrants are hosted in the global South, mainly in the Middle East. Worldwide, Europe hosts 6 % of the world's displaced people, the Americans 12 %, Africa 29 %, Asia and the Pacific 14 %, while the Middle East and North Africa hosts nearly 40 % (UNHCR 2016). However when the nearly 5,000 Palestinian refugees in the Middle East are added to these figures, the total percentage of the world's refugees hosted in the Middle East becomes more than 60 % of the worlds' total.

UNHCR estimates that Middle East and North Africa host more than 40 % of all world's refugees	
Total for MENA	8,700,000*
World total	21,300,000
*When the nearly 5,000,000 Palestinian refugees in the region are added, the total percentage in the Middle East is more than 60 % of the world's refugees.	

Recent history of forced migration in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Transcaucus

How does one explain these enormous burdens? How has it happened that this part of the world has seen such massive forced migration in recent times? Here, history can be an explanatory source as well as an illustrative one. The past 180 years on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Trans-Caucasus have seen numerous wars fought between Empires. I will focus here briefly on the six Russo-Ottoman Wars of the 19th century, because each war ended with massive displacement of between half to one or more million people into the Ottoman Empire and eventually into the Eastern Mediterranean region. I begin my illustrations with the Crimean War of 1853–56 which was the only one of the six Russo-Ottoman wars which the Ottomans and their British and French Allies won. I often simplify that conflict by saying it was a war started over a dispute between France and Russia concerning who had the right to the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. Following from the traditions of the Ottoman Capitulations, that royal prerogative was first instituted by the Ottomans with the Italian city states in the 15th century. It later became seen as gesture of goodwill or 'favoured nation status'. The Ottoman Suleiman the Magnificent gave the first Capitulation to a French sovereign, Francis the 1st, in the 16th century. But by the mid-19th century these Capitulations came to be regarded as a right rather than a 'favour'. France, under Napoleon III, wanted the French Catholic Church to have possession of the keys to the Church in Jerusalem transferred from the Russian Tzar to him and the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Majid I agreed. Obviously Imperial Russia was quite outraged and retaliated by going to war with the Ottomans, sinking its entire fleet at Sinop. Great Britain and France became concerned that a greatly weakened Ottoman Empire might collapse and thus came into the dispute on the side of the Ottomans. Despite victory, the Ottomans were forced to accept a mass influx of Muslim people, the Tatars from the Crimea, as part of the settlement at the Treaty of Paris at the conclusion of the War. The Crimean Tatars were given several months to sell their possessions and property and relocate to the European part of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. A few years later, in the 1860s, nearly 1 million Circassians and Chechnyans were forced out of the Caucuses where the Russian Empire was making significant territorial gains. By the 1880s these forced migrants, originally Crimean Tatars, and Circassian peoples were forced to move a second time as a result of Russian demands at the end of another Russo-Ottoman war in the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Over a period of 40 years, forced migrant numbers in excess of 3–4 million people, according to Ottoman records (see also McCarthy 1995 and Karpat 1985), were pushed into the Eastern Mediterranean, into Anatolia and the Arab provinces. These ex-

pulsions were followed by nearly 1 million Armenian and Assyrian Christian forced migrants who sought sanctuary in Greater Syria between 1890 and the 1920s. These mass influxes during the Ottoman period were followed by more displacement and dispossession during the Interwar Mandatory Period in the Levant: Kurdish flight into Syria in the 1920s after the defeat of the Shaykh Said Revolt (about 10,000); about 100,000 Palestinian refugees fleeing the Arab Israeli War of 1947–48, and in the 21st century over one million Iraqis in the early 2000s.

Figure one. Forced migrations.

Yet until the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, these millions were all accommodated locally and provided with refuge. Some of these groups were assimilated and granted citizenship, others such as the Palestinians were provided with 'temporary protection' as per the Casablanca Protocol of 1965. How was it possible that such large numbers of forced migrants were managed locally and regionally for such a long period of time?

The key to understanding how local accommodation was so successful for nearly two centuries in our modern era is to look back at how the Ottoman Empire managed to accommodate and resettle these large numbers. One needs to keep in mind that over a period of about 50 years – between 1860 and 1910 – the

Ottoman Empire received nearly 4 million forced migrants in an empire of only 35 million people. That would be as though the United Kingdom had received 8 million refugees since 1967, or Austria had received and accommodated 1 million refugees since 1967. These are immigration numbers that are hardly possible in our current political climate.

What many modern humanitarian aid historians fail to realize was that the Ottoman Empire was the first modern state to set up a coherent code of legal practice for refugees and immigrants and establish a Commission to help integrate and resettle these people. In 1860 the Ottomans established the Refugee Commission and set about creating emergency support and resettlement incentives for these displaced peoples. With the Levant, or region known as Greater Syria largely underpopulated the emphasis was on resettlement in rural areas. Devolving practices and implementation to the local level, land, farm animals, seeds and other support were distributed to families setting out to farm. Further incentives included the right to build homes and places of worship as they liked. The newcomers were given tax relief for periods of 6–12 years depending on where they settled and their sons were provided with exemption for military service for extended periods of time. Some of these forced migrant newcomers built up frontier towns between feuding social groups and others were purposively scattered by Ottoman policy to create a network of communities tied together horizontally rather than by territorial roots. Such organization reflected commonality with the existing semi-autonomous organization of the ethno-religious communities (the milla/millet) of the late Ottoman Empire (e. g. the Armenian Apostolic milla, the Jewish milla, the Armenian Protestant milla, the Bulgarian Catholic milla). These forced migrants found that they had significant horizontal ties based on their ethno-religious identity across the Ottoman Empire and the pattern of accommodation and resettlement promoted by the Refugee Commission strengthen those ties and created new ones. Belonging and identity to discrete ethno-religious communities thus reinforced by Ottoman settlement policy and was further encouraged in the 20th century during the Interwar Mandatory period. Some modern historians looking at the modern state of Syria saw it as having come into being as a refuge state – having integrated in the 20th century alone waves of displaced and dispossessed Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, Palestinians (White 2011).

The Arab Uprisings and the Syrian Crisis of 2011

As demonstrators took to the streets of Der'aa, Homs, Hama and Syria in early 2011 to protest at the Bashar al-Asad's Ba'athi government treatment of youth in the town of Der'aa, some raised the three star Syrian flag adopted at in-

dependence in 1946.[1] Many in the streets chanted slogans for a united Syria – united in the face of regime efforts to create a sectarian battlefield: *wahed, wahed, wahed, al-sha'ab al-souri wahed* (One, one, one, the Syrian people are one). Slowly at first, but with growing fury, the demonstrators clashed with security services; unarmed demonstrators were shot, people suspected of taking part in demonstrations or sympathetic to them were disappearing off the streets by forces allied with the regime or were being arrested from their homes. Slogans that supported the cities or neighbourhoods subjected to the harsh repression and retribution of the regime were relayed by social media throughout the country and a concerted effort by civil society activists emerged to counter the regime's strategy of repression based on fragmenting the uprising.

By April of 2011, the first wave of Syrians fled to Lebanon and to the Hatay province of Turkey (the Alexandretta governorate of Syria until 1938). As the fighting increased the Syrian army was called in and fierce clashes developed between them and local demonstrators in Hama, Homs and Der'aa. A shadowy set of men in various security militias supporting the regime emerged, the *shabiha*, spreading fear, and terror in their wake. Families targeted by the *shabiha*, or the army began to flee to safety in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. The numbers were small at first but rapidly grew in 2012 and 2013. By 2014 it was obvious to many that had become a playing field for a number of international state and on-state actors: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, Al-Qaeda affiliates, and latterly the so-called Islamic State. These actors drew many radicalized extremist youth and hardened fighters from the Russian Wars in the Caucuses and Afghanistan as well as from Europe and other Middle Eastern countries. By 2015 the so-called Islamic state had taken over large swathes of Syrian territory, mainly the underpopulated semi-arid and arid regions of the West of the country near the Iraqi border. With the Asad regime seeming to totter, Russia began serious efforts to prop up the government and began to actively conduct joint air attacks on opposition forced in civilian areas. By the summer of this year, many middle class and educated professionals who had tried to hold on and remain in their homes and support local community services decided they had no choice but to leave. Syrians impacted by the fighting in or near their cities, towns, and villages continued to flee.

Many tried to find safety within the country becoming internally displaced – in United Nations parlance IDPS (Internally Displaced People). And thus we saw the Syrian humanitarian crisis spill over to the shores of the Eastern and Northern Mediterranean as families who could afford to pay smugglers to reach

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1 This flag was replaced with a number of variations starting in 1958 at the time of the Syrian Union with Egypt until a new design with two stars was accepted in the early 1970s as the Ba'ath party consolidated its control of Syria.

safety in Greece, Italy and the Balkan states began to arrive in large numbers. This surge in numbers of forced migrants crossing the Mediterranean in rickety boats and inflatable rafts caught the attention of the West media – especially as the drowning and rates of death at sea soared. The Italian government launched the Mare Nostrum project to save lives at sea while the European Union established the project Trident to protect Europe's Southern borders. The land bridge through the Balkans also attracted Western attention as a human line of forced migrants snaked its way north searching for safely, sanctuary and protection from hostility in Germany, Sweden and also the United Kingdom. This mass influx of people created a grave situation in Europe, but not, I would say, a crisis. The West began to address the issue of why the policy of containment of the dispossessed populations from the Syria crisis was failing. I will return to this point later.

By 2016 there were estimated to be nearly 7 million Syrians internally displaced and another 5 million who had crossed international borders in the search for safety and sanctuary: nearly 3 million had sought asylum in Turkey, 1.1 million registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon and nearly 700,000 were registered in Jordan with the UNHCR. In total more than half of Syrians pre-crisis population of 22 million were displaced either in their country or abroad.

Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention that sets out principles and responsibilities of states in providing protection and asylum for those deemed to fit the definition of 'refugee' according to the 1951 Statutes and the 1967 Protocol which extends the definition of the refugee to beyond Europe. Although Turkey has signed the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, it has reserved its interpretation of the Convention to apply only to Europeans seeking refuge/asylum in Turkey. UN estimates are that over 85 % of the Syrian refugee flow across international borders is self-settling in cities, towns and villages where they have pre-existing social and economic networks. In Turkey, most Syrians are clustered in the Southern region of the country bordering Syria and circular migration in and out of the Syria is tolerated by the Turkish state. Despite a general rejection of encampment among those fleeing, still some 10–15 % of the Syrian flow into Turkey has been directed into Turkish temporary camps. In Lebanon, informal settlements – often based on pre-existing relationships with shawish (gang-master in the Lebanese agricultural hierarchies) – are proliferating with accompanying patron-client relationships overcoming more participatory and transparent management of humanitarian aid. In Jordan, most Syrians have settled with relatives of varying degree of kinship or tribal affiliation. Those found to be working are deemed to be engaged in an illegal activity and are 'deported' into the UN managed refugee camps from which there is no escape other than by paying to be 'sponsored' by a Jordanian or

to be smuggled out and re-entering the liminal state of irregular status in the country.[2]

Mass Influx Contained Regionally?

Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have each established a variety of temporary measures to deal with this crisis. However, in no case have the displaced or the host communities been consulted. Discrepancies are rapidly becoming visible and tensions and protests have quickly emerged among host communities, displaced Syrians and humanitarian policy-makers. The current situation is unsustainable and threatens to test the humanitarian aid regimes' preferred 'solution' of regionally containing the crisis. Without significant changes in policy and practice throughout the region, Syria's forced migrants will continue to search for protection – temporary protection – elsewhere. Unable to work and provide their children with an education for the future they will move on or they will send younger members of their families on dangerous sea crossings and exhausting land marches led by people smugglers to give their family members a future; they search for safety, family unification, and a hospitable environment where education and employment is possible. The European Union member states as a whole (outside of Sweden and Germany) are trying to keep these forced migrants out of the EU. The contemporary 'containment policy' of the EU states is to send money to support humanitarian and development efforts in the hosting states of the Middle East as a way to solve the problem/crisis. However, containment alone as a policy has limited chances of success. If safety, family unification, and a future for their children are the primary goals of the Syrian forced migrants, then some recognition and adjustment of policy needs to occur; and recognition of these aspirations among Syrians is needed by the European states in setting out their refugee and migration policies. Trying to contain forced migrants of such massive numbers in a small part of the Eastern Mediterranean is simply unsustainable.

Between October 2014–September 2015 I undertook a pilot study to ascertain the perceptions and aspirations of displaced Syrians in Turkey (Istanbul and Gazianteb), Lebanon (Bekaa Valley and Beirut), and Jordan (Amman and Irbid) as well as those of practitioners and policy makers in the region. Interviews were conducted in Arabic and in English and interpretation was only required in

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2 In 2016 Jordan agreed a compact the terms of which included the provision of up to 200,000 jobs for Syrians but only in the agriculture or construction sector of the economy. Needless to say, the take-up for these work permits has been slow, with only 35,000 issued thus far. Many Syrians prefer to work in the informal economy at jobs that more closely match their skills even though that exposes them to possible arrest and deportation.

Turkey when interviewing members of local communities hosting refugees from Syria. Once the initial key informants were selected using a purposive sampling approach, a snowballing technique was employed to identify further participants for interviewing keeping an eye on representativeness in terms of gender, class, education, ethnicity and origins. A participant observation strategy also defined this pilot study.

Lebanon

Before the crisis in Syria, Lebanon regularly had in the region of 400,000 to 500,000 Syrian agricultural and construction industry workers. Many Syrians had social networks going back several decades in Lebanon if not longer. Syrians were permitted to buy residence permits every six months. They worked legally like any other foreigner.

Many of the more than 1 million Syrians in Lebanon displaced by the conflict in Syria do not feel that they are refugees. However, they sense a growing level of social discrimination, especially in Beirut. In addition they articulate a fear that the Lebanese population associates them with a rise in criminality. The continuing armed conflict in Syria has meant that many of the Syrian workers' wives and children had fled Syria and come to join husbands already working in Lebanon for some time. Their movements were largely progressive and in stages, first arriving at border regions in the Akkar or Wadi Khalid of Northern Lebanon and gradually making their way to join their spouses in the Bekaa Valley, Tripoli and Beirut. Those with jobs feared losing them once it were known that their families had joined them, contributing to the fear, distress, and isolation of many of these Syrians.

> "My husband came to Lebanon a long time ago, even before the war in Syria. He used to come over since he was 17, therefore he knows Lebanon very well. He used to come and go, stay for a while [working as a carpenter] and then go back to Syria. In 2011 he was in Lebanon; then the situation was very bad in Syria, so I came to Lebanon …, my husband had a job and we stayed at his boss's house. Back then I couldn't go back to Hama. My husband had no intention of bringing me to Lebanon, for him it was settled that he worked in Lebanon and I stayed in Syria. But after all the explosions in Hama, I couldn't protect my kids. I decided to come and stay in Lebanon. My husband is always afraid he might be fired [if the children get into any trouble]." (Reem, Beirut, 2014)

Illegal curfews in over 40 municipalities have meant that many Syrians are afraid to go out at night, to work over time or to mix in any way with the Lebanese population. For many of the skilled and unskilled Syrians in Lebanon, these curfews have meant that older children and adolescents are being pulled out

whatever schooling they had been entered into in order to work during daylight hours with their fathers.

> "My son should be in 9ᵗʰ grade, but he works in a supermarket now. But people tell me that it is a waste that my son is not in school. He will have no future without education. But our situation is very bad, I really want to send him to school, but at the same time we are in deep need of his financial help." (Layla, Beirut, 2014)

In the Bekaa Valley, Syrians with no savings are accepting very low wages in order to provide their families with food. This has raised hostility among local Lebanese who see the Syrian workers as a threat to their own livelihoods, resulting in increased social discrimination and vigilantism.

Many Syrians – despite their long association with Lebanon over decades and often close kinship ties – are feeling frightened and cut off from Lebanese society. Although a number of international NGOs and national and local NGOs operate in Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley to provide basic needs, there is little interaction with the Lebanese host community. Very little evidence emerged from the interviews of host community involvement in any 'survival in dignity' activity on an individual basis; NGO activity was limited to more 'distant and distancing' charity work or local civil society efforts in Beirut organized by middle class Lebanese and Syrians resident in the country. The UNHCR's very slow uptake of cash assistance to the most needy and vulnerable Syrians in Lebanon has resulted in large numbers of women and children being seen on the streets of Beirut begging – something which is generally scorned upon and regarded with little sympathy by Lebanese.

Jordan

Most Syrians regarded Jordan's initial response to the humanitarian crisis and mass influx of people from the Der'aa region of Syria into the country as open and generous. Many of the first wave of Syrians to cross into Jordan had kinship ties in Northern Jordan or well-established social and economic networks developed over decades, and the hosting of this initial influx was regarded as a duty (to be generous and hospitable). However, over time, the Jordanian government has restricted access to the country and actively prevented some from entering (unaccompanied male youth and Palestinian refugees from Syria).

> "At the beginning you had a refugee crisis with a security component and it has become a security crisis with a refugee component. So in the early days it was "these are our brothers" and so the natural generosity has now given way to more suspicion about who these people are and the security card is played all the time now." (Senior international practitioner, Amman 2015)

A discrepancy between what is widely written about in the local press (the burden of Syrians on the Jordanian economy) and what policy makers and practitioners understand has emerged. Many policy makers feel that Syrians are contributing to the Jordanian economy in a greater fashion than is widely being written about in the media. Some point to a recent United Nations repot (cf. ILO) suggesting that the unemployment rate had dropped by 2 % in 2013 and 2014 due to the surge in Syrian-owned factories opening (200) and the heavy employment of Jordanians (estimated at about 6,000). The host community in Jordan is bombarded with information regarding the negative influence of Syrian refugees in the country – although this is not backed up by the studies that are emerging. However at the same time there is a widespread acknowledgement that Syrians are skilled workmen, especially carpenters. Employment in the informal sector has created significant stress for Syrians even though it brings in much needed funding. Syrians who are working are fearful of possible arrest as they have no work permits – even though they are largely replacing Egyptians, not Jordanians, in the work force.

> "Syrian refugees are skilled craftsmen, especially carpenters, we all know that. Jordanians are not skilled carpenters. Syrians are not taking jobs from Jordanians; but they may be taking jobs from Egyptians. They are working informally, but that puts a lot of stress on them because they can be arrested and deported if they are found out." (Senior Jordanian policy maker, 2015)

There is some social discrimination levelled at Syrians in Jordan but it is muted compared with that expressed in Lebanon. Even though the majority of Syrians in Irbid and in Amman are tied in 'real' rather than fictive kinship, the negative social attitudes of Jordanians are kept closer to 'the chest'. This may be associated with tribal custom and general conceptual concerns related to the duty to be generous and hospitable to tribal kin and others in patron/client relationships. Jordanians generally do recognize that the country benefits (from international aid) from its expenditure on refugees and that a significant percentage goes into direct government projects to assist Jordanians (e. g. the recent US-Jordanian bilateral announcement of \$ 1 billion over the next 3 years for Jordanians infrastructure development and construction of 50 high schools for Jordanians). However the limited access to education in the form of three-hour afternoon second-shift schools is of grave concern to Syrian families with older children. The need to provide real education opportunities to their youth drives some Syrian families to seek such opportunities outside of the region. Pooling resources to pay a smuggler to take a youth from the family to Europe was not unusual in 2014 and 2015.

Turkey

Syrians in Turkey come from a variety of backgrounds and social classes. Many Syrians were concerned with the negative imagery of 'dirty' and 'uncouth' Arabs, commonly attributed to them by middle class Turks. Furthermore, many Syrians remarked that Turkish observers had difficulty differentiating between the general Syrian refugee population and the 'nawwar' (Gypsies) begging on the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. Gypsy communities have been a part of the fabric of Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian society for centuries and they too have been displaced by the Syrian crisis and the Iraqi sectarian conflict before. Largely unrecognized, the Gypsies of South-West Asia have also seen their peripatetic and seasonal economy disrupted by the armed conflict in Iraq and Syria and have gravitated to Turkey where they can survive in greater security.

A widespread sentiment of recognizing the needs of Syrian refugees was widely articulated by members of local Turkish hosting communities. The importance of the third sector – charitable organizations and religion-based associations – in providing assistance was acknowledged. But street begging was widely condemned by both host community members and Syrian refugees themselves.

> "I don't like to give money to beggars because it just encourages them." (Turkish practitioner, Istanbul, 2014)

Lack of communications and poor understandings of the situation of Syrians led to demonstrations, arrests and a dozen or so deaths in the fall of 2014; many Turkish citizens felt that more transparency on the part of the government in terms of just what Syrians were entitled to would have relieved the critical situation and growing discriminatory attitudes. Many thought that refugees from Syria were being given salaries by the Turkish government; others felt that Syrians were working for lower wages (their Turkish employers did not have to pay taxes) and this was driving out the unskilled Turkish workers who had no safety net when they lost their jobs to Syrians.

Balancing these concerns was the widespread support from the civil society especially among long-established NGOs and religious organizations; in recent years local community civil society activists have also worked to create a sense of hospitality and solidarity at the neighbourhood level among Turkish hosting communities; neighbourhood public kitchens providing free meals and bread to the poor as well as refugees resident in the area were widespread in Istanbul and in Gaziantep.

> "My husband and I are IT specialists from Homs. My husband came first and then I joined him 8 months later with our baby. At first we went to Mersin, but my husband couldn't find a job. When we ran out of money we came to Gaziantep, because the Syrian

Interim Government was here. We figured there would be more jobs here. So we came here and 2 months later we met this nice man who found a job for my husband in construction and rented us these two rooms. Our neighbours gave us some mattress and a TV to watch Syrian television. There is also a mosque nearby where I go and the people there give me diapers for the baby, bread and daily hot meals as well as supplies of sugar, pasta and oil." (Hala, Gazianteb, 2014)

Lack of common language may have been a divide in other times and may have made it difficult for professional and skilled Syrians to find work in Turkey, but in the present crisis, language seems to be less insignificant in the short term. For professionals and skilled workers it has meant the inability to work at their professions (especially doctors, teachers, and others in syndicated professions). In the short term, being 'very' different (not speaking the same language) seems to have bred greater sympathy and general support at the local community level. In the long term, however, onward migration for education opportunities and the possibility of working in a professional capacity means that Europe remains a medium term destination.

Conclusion

Across the board, what emerges is that history matters. Much of the discrepancies I found in my interviews with Syrians, and host community members, and practitioners can be linked to historical social ties and political relations between Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon and Syria and Jordan. In Lebanon, the consociational shape of governance and long period of time during this crisis in which there was in effect 'no government' led to a paralysis within the UN humanitarian aid system. Thus, effective relief programmes for the poorest and most vulnerable of Syrians – such as cash transfer – were very late in getting started resulting in an exponential rise in street begging and other 'negative coping' strategies such as pulling young children out of school to work or moving into structures unfit for human habitation. These factors together with the close ties and often extended family networks among the very poor across the two countries has resulted in significant social discrimination and an unwillingness or inability – at the local level – to help Syrians with basic health and education needs. The lack of education opportunities for nearly 50 % of Syrian refugee children in Lebanon weighs heavily on the consciousness of their families. In Jordan, the majority of Syrian refugees are closely linked to the Jordanian population especially in Northern Jordan where close tribal ties are pronounced and where original refuge was granted with host families related either by blood or marriage. Jordanian sensitivity to the presence of Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) has resulted in draconian surveillance to identify such refugees, a

dragnet that often pulls in non-Palestinian refugees from Syria. Those Syrians found to be 'illegal' because they are working in the informal economy are then 'deported' across the border (if Palestinian refugees from Syria) or to the UNHCR refugee camps creating greater mistrust and suspicion of the host government by the refugees from Syria. Education opportunities in Jordan are limited and many Syrians children are only able to attend second-shift schools with inferior curriculum and reduced hours. Some Syrians consider the situation in Jordan so dire that they are preparing to return to Syria rather than face what they consider 'inhuman conditions' any longer. In September 2015, Andrew Harper, the UNHCR senior humanitarian aid practitioner in Jordan, reported that 200 Syrians were returning to Syria each day. In Turkey, lessons learned have been more widely implemented in response to various critical events (demonstrations in October 2014) and widespread criticism of lack of transparency of the government. The camps set up by the Turkish emergency relief organization (IFAD) starting in 2012 without assistance of the UN experts and their camp templates, have rightly been described as 5*. These settlements are open – in that refugees may enter and leave on a daily basis and absences (generally to return temporarily to Syria) are tolerated if of a duration of less three weeks. Although interviewing in Turkey took place before the announcement of domestic law providing Syrians with formal IDs and temporary protection (including rights to health and education opportunities and permission to apply for work permits) in January 2015, it was clear that Turkey – of all the three countries – was far more humane and practical in its approach to the mass influx of refugees from Syria; and this despite a language barrier that did not exist in Lebanon or Jordan.

It is ironic that Turkey, the one country which had not originally requested assistance from the UNHCR, seems to have managed the process of providing assistance without undermining the displaced Syrians' agency and dignity. Largely working alone with local Turkish staff drawn from the Turkish civil service as well as the Disaster Management Unit of the Prime Minister's Office (AFAD) and the main quasi-official Turkish NGO (IHH), Turkey has managed the Syrian refugee crisis with a modicum of sensitivity. The separate histories of Turkey and the countries of the Levant have obviously contributed to the disparities in perceptions, aspirations and behaviour among refugees, host community members and practitioners in each of the three countries.

Temporary protection, not resettlement, is the main aspiration for those who have been forced to flee Syria – that is, to work and educate their youth until such a time as they can return to Syria. Finding safety from violence alone is not enough. Syrians are looking for opportunities to unite or reunite their families and to find sustainable livelihoods which offer them the opportunity to educate their children. These perceptions and aspirations cannot all be managed nor contained in the region. The crush of numbers is too large to be managed over the

medium term. Lebanon, with a population of 4.5 million, has 1.1 million registered Syrians in the country (the non-registered probably number about another 500,000). That represents more than 30 % of the population. It would be as though the entire population of Mexico (128 million) had fled the country and poured into the USA (a population of 324 million) fleeing a disaster of some kind and seeking safety and protection. It is hardly imaginable, yet that is what we are asking Lebanon to carry on with as well as Jordan and Turkey with similarly heavy protection burdens. The present situation is unsustainable. Lebanon and Jordan, and even Turkey, cannot sustain these numbers for much longer without assistance that does not require only containment in the region. Without a change in policy and programming in the European Union we will continue to allow even the relatively small number of Syrians who resort to people smugglers to flee the region to face death and hostility at sea and on land. The right to flee violence and seek asylum in another country is a fundamental article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[3] However by criminalizing the journey and preventing an individual from the opportunity to secure survival in dignity in the medium term – an opportunity to work to feed and educate their families until the day they can return to Syria – do we undermine our own humanity? Can we all do a little more? Burden sharing has been raised off and on in the various European Union states. But growing populism and electoral politics put these concerns on a back burner. We need them to be considered again.

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3 Article 14 – Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."

Asyl

Josef Kohlbacher / Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek

"From Destination to Integration" – First Experiences of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq arriving in Austria

This paper summarizes the main results of a pilot study conducted by members of the newly established ROR-n (Refugee Outreach and Research Network, Vienna) from December 2015 to April 2016. Funding was primarily provided by the Institute for Urban and Regional Research (ISR) with substitute financial support from the Institute for Social Anthropology (ISA), both part of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

We were interested in a broad variety of issues covering the sending as well as the receiving context in Austria. Thus we investigated the life experiences of refugees in their home country or last place of residence,[1] their reasons for leaving, the obstacles they witnessed during their flight including short term refugee in Turkey, and their first experiences in Austria. Asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq were selected as they constitute the largest segment of people currently applying for asylum in Austria.[2]

Following some brief notes on the interview sample and the methodology of our research this paper will highlight selected aspects of our rich data set. Herein we will focus on issues less studied in analyses on refugees and asylum seekers currently coming to Europe.[3] Amongst others we will draw attention to the role of

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1 This refers in particular to Afghan refugees who often came to Austria following years of exile in Iran or Pakistan.

2 According to official Austrian data a total of 88,151 individuals applied for asylum in 2015, among them 25,475 persons from Afghanistan (= 29 % of all applications), 24,538 from Syria (= 28 %) and 13,602 (= 15 %) from Iraq (BMI 2015). Since the beginning of the year 2016 the overall number of new applications has decreased. However, refugees from these countries still constitute the largest individual groups: Afghanistan 10,249 persons (= 29.57 %), Syria 6,972 (= 20.11 %) and Iraq 2,304 (= 6.64 %) (BMI 2016). Unaccompanied minor refugees (UMR) were excluded as interviewing them constitutes a legal challenge (interviews with them are only possible with authorization by the Austrian youth welfare office). Yet, UMR substantially contribute to the number of asylum seekers in Austria, accounting for around 10 % of all asylum applications in 2015. Among the later 68 % were of Afghan origin (BMI 2015).

3 Most current studies on refugees and asylum seekers focus on the reasons for fleeing, the challenges the latter are confronted with (e. g. struggles with human traffickers, border controls, imprisonment in camps in transit countries, hardship of flight etc.). For details cf.

social relations (e. g. family members, kin, friends, and acquaintances) and social obligations (e. g. protecting the live of family members, offering one's children a better future) in organizing and facilitating the flight by providing logistic and other support. Special attention will also be paid to the impact of initial interethnic social contacts in shaping refugees' attitudes towards Austria and its population, thus questioning to what extent positive or negative first interactions influence their willingness to integrate into the host society.

The interview sample and methodology

Our analyses are based on a sample of 60 extensive narrative interviews which were conducted from January to April 2016 in Vienna by native speakers (mostly former refugees or migrants originating from the refugees' home countries) in the languages Arabic, Farsi-Dari, Pashto and Kurdish (Sorani) and were later on transferred by them into English and German transcripts.

Due to initial difficulties in recruiting interview partners in accommodation facilities for newly arriving refugees we had to draw on personal networks to find individuals willing to participate in our study. From this follows that our sample does not represent a congruent profile of these asylum seekers and refugees, but rather reflects individual cases. Nevertheless, it shows certain conformities with other available empirical studies and statistical data on refugees and asylum seekers (cf. Brücker et al, 2016 ; Crawley et al. 2016 ; Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2016a and 2016b).

The majority of our 60 interviewees (20 individuals from each country) were male (46 persons out of a total of 60).[4] Nearly half of them (22 out of 46) belonged to the age group 20 to 29 years, thus reflecting the overall impression that it is basically young males that migrate to Europe.[5] Only 7 individuals were older than 50 years.

Among the 14 female interviewees 7 originated from Syria, another 4 came from Iraq and 3 from Afghanistan. While the Syrian and Iraqi sample included several women who had fled alone or with other family members than their

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Crawley et al. 2016; Healy 2016; ICG 2016; IOM 2016; De Bel-Air 2016; Brücker et al. 2016; Bjelica 2016; Donini, Monsutti, and Scalettaris 2016; Echavez et al. 2014; Linke 2016; Hansen 2014; Marfleet 2011.

4 According to official Austrian statistics around 72.3 % of all asylum seekers in 2015 were male while only 27.6 % were female, cf. BMI 2015. Since the beginning of the year 2016 the number of new female applications has continuously increased from 32.87 % of all applications in January to 37.31 % in September 2016 (BMI 2016).

5 Cf. Figure 4: Distribution by age of (non-EU) first time asylum applicants in the EU and EFTA Member States, 2015 (last updated 18-03-2016); Eurostat: Asylum quarterly report; http://ec. europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report.

husbands (e. g. children), 2 of the 3 Afghan women migrated with their husbands.[6]

Our sample encompassed members of a large variety of different ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Half of the Afghan refugees and asylum seekers were Pashtuns originating from the southeastern part of the country or from Kabul. Shia Hazara – either directly from Afghanistan or from Iran, where they had spent long years in exile – constituted the second largest group. Within the Iraqi sample Kurds (either Sunni or Yezidi) represented the largest group followed by Sunni and Shia Arabs. Another substantial group were individuals who made references to an ethnic or religious double identity (e. g. Sunni Turkmen Arab or Sunni-Shia – locally labeled as "Sushi"-Arab), signifying descent of parents of mixed ethnic or religious background. The Syrian sample included Sunni Muslims – both Arabs and Kurds – as well as members of Christian and other minority groups (e. g. Alawi and Yezidi).

Methodically the analysis is based on qualitative content analysis according to Mayring (2000:2010).

Research Results: Part I) The sending context

1)   The reasons for fleeing

In line with other studies highlighting the reasons for taking refuge (cf. Brücker et al. 2016 ; Crawley et al. 2016 ; Donini, Monsutti, and Scalettaris 2016 ; Linke 2016 ; ICG 2016 ; IOM 2016a ; FMR 2014 ; De Bel-Air 2016) our data shows that it is usually a combination of causes that influenced the decision to flee or to renew a flight. Here it is often a mixture of general security concerns (increase in local violence and suicide attacks, heightening of ethnic and religious conflicts) and experienced violence (e. g. abduction by oppositional groups and/or criminals, death threats, assassination of close family members, etc.; persecution by religious radicals like the Taliban or Daesh for not subscribing to their regulations) that plays a role.

> "My life, not only my own personal one, but that of every Iraqi was molded since birth by war, oppression, threat by the state or a variety of militias, discrimination, violence and death. Since I have been living in Iraq I never experienced a single happy and calm day" (Iraq 2, male, 24).

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6 The third one came alone to join her husband living in Austria.

In addition, discrimination on ethnic and/or religious grounds in the home country or place of initial refuge (Afghan refugees in Iran, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds in Turkey, Yezidi in Iraq and Syria) may also inform the decision to leave.

> "Afghans in Iran have no easy life […]. An Afghan must work until he dies, he has no insurance, he has to pay for his education, his medicine […] an Afghan is treated like an animal, he has no rights […]" (Afghanistan 5, male, 25, Iran, Hazara).

While threats against people who have worked for foreigners (e. g. US military, international organizations) are specific for the Iraqi and Afghanistan case, the impact of the ongoing civil war often overrides other causes in the Syrian sample. Among the most often mentioned reasons for finally fleeing were the destruction of respondents' homes, they fear of being involuntarily drafted for the Syrian army or of being forced to join one of the numerous oppositional forces fighting the government, and in particular the anxiety for the life of their children due to the daily bombings.

> "I left all my property and my money, I left everything in my country, and came for the sake of my children" (Syria 17, male, 54, Damascus).

Next to security related concerns, disillusionment about the current political situation and future perspectives in the home country as well as economic reasons (unemployment, lack of career advancement) often attributed to the final decision of fleeing.

> "According to my opinion the situation will not improve within the next hundred years. The government of Afghanistan will never be a stable one" (Afghanistan 5, male, 25, Iran, Hazara).

In addition to the above-mentioned causes, several of our interviewees highlighted very specific personal reasons, e. g. having been persuaded by friends to flee, avoiding a forced marriage, escaping an ongoing personal vendetta or conflicts with in-laws, fleeing from discrimination due to being handicapped or finding it impossible to adapt to the home country upon return from long years in exile.

2)   Factors determining the flight and its course

The manner how our respondents organized their flight, what refuge country they selected and how their flight process evolved depended on a host of personal factors (e. g. individual economic means and personal connections) as well as on legal and political conditions in transit countries and potential places of refuge.

The flight often took place via several steps, e. g. waiting in transit places to organize further movements or to gain additional means to pay for the con-