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Violetta L. Waibel (ed.)

Detours

Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria,
and in Eastern Europe

In collaboration with Max Brinnich, Sophie Gerber, and Philipp Schaller

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Detours – Introduction to the *Detours* Reader

by Violetta L. Waibel

To coincide with the 12th International Kant Congress, taking place at the University of Vienna from 21 to 25 September 2015 on the theme “nature and freedom”, the exhibition “Detours. Approaches to Immanuel Kant in Vienna, in Austria and in Eastern Europe” (“Umwege. Annäherungen an Immanuel Kant in Wien, in Österreich und in Osteuropa”) is being presented in the University library. The exhibition runs until the end of 2015. This reader, published in German and English, is designed to explore the exhibition themes in considerably greater detail than is possible in the exhibition itself.

The exhibition and reader are focused on the reception of Kant in Vienna and Austria, and also in Eastern Europe, particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries. Some more recent perspectives on Kant research from the 20th and 21st centuries are also covered.

The International Kant Congress coincides with the celebration of the 650th anniversary of the founding of the University of Vienna in 1365. This was one of the reasons prompting the decision to supplement the congress with a research project to investigate the history of the reception of Kant in Vienna, in Austria as a whole, and in Eastern Europe, given Vienna and Austria’s special links with this region on the basis of their geographical situation and the historical dual monarchy structure of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Both the reader and the exhibition are structured around six thematic areas relevant to the history of philosophy and Kant’s reception in Vienna, Austria and Eastern Europe.




Fig. 1: Map of Vienna (1798)

The Topics of the Reader and the Exhibition

- Kant and Censorship
- Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold
- Kant and Eastern Europe
- Kant and his Poets
- Kant and the Vienna Circle
- Kant and Phenomenology

The “Kant and Censorship” theme reveals some of the tortuous “detours” travelled by Kant’s writings during the history of their reception in Vienna and Austria, under the shadow of censorship. Whereas intellectuals in the German states quickly engaged with Kant’s ideas and appreciated his significance, his reception in the Austria of the time was highly ambivalent. Censorship and at times sharp criticism of Kant contrasted with a real and lively “underground” interest in the new philosophy. This first chapter of the reader attempts to

explore and explain this initial ambivalence towards Kant, and its ongoing consequences.

The “Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold” theme is an important part of the reader, since Reinhold was actually born and raised in Vienna. This is a little known fact, even to many scholars closely involved in research on Reinhold, as one of the first significant Kantians and forerunner of post-Kant idealism in Germany. Reinhold’s most significant and lasting impact was as a professor in Jena and as a pioneer in the reception of Kant’s writings in Germany and Austria. While this reader is primarily focused on engagement with Kant in Vienna (and in Austria and Eastern Europe), we have also provided an appropriate forum for Reinhold in his capacity as a “Viennese citizen”, to enable researchers on Kant to discover the significance of Reinhold in this regard.

Vienna’s geographical location and its status as the imperial capital of the Habsburg dual monarchy give the city a special significance within Eastern Europe. Vienna was, and to some extent still remains, the “gateway to the east”. It was therefore important for us to include “Kant and Eastern Europe” as one of the themes of the exhibition and this reader. Through its historical status and position, Vienna has always had cultural exchanges with Eastern European countries, of varying degrees of intensity. The research contributions in this chapter discuss the implications of these interactions for the reception of Kant.

“Kant and his Poets” is one of the key themes of the congress, since as well as being a city associated with all musical genres, Vienna also boasts some of the leading venues for German-language theatre, along with many other forms of temple to the muses. It is therefore logical that the aesthetic domain should be strongly represented in the research conducted at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Vienna. In view of the long line of poets and writers, from Kant’s time to the present day, who have reflected on Kant’s aesthetics and teleology, moral philosophy and theory of cognition, and drawn on them in their works on various registers: now affirming, now critical, outbidding the ideas of the master, or changing them beyond recognition, this facet of research has been adopted as a theme of the 2015 Kant Congress, and forms a substantial chapter of this reader.

Moreover, our project also addresses the theme of “Kant and the Vienna Circle”. The Vienna Circle, a philosophical and scholarly circle named after the city in which it was established, is now an important topic of philosophy research at the University of Vienna, as reflected in an institute devoted specifically to this area. Without Kant as an initial point of departure, without its engagement with critical philosophy, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle would never have come into existence. As well as being one of the specific topics covered in the congress, it is the subject of a detailed overview in this reader and in the exhibition.

Another keynote theme of the congress is “Kant and Phenomenology”, and it

too is covered in this reader and in the exhibition. Over a period of many decades, philosophy at the University of Vienna has had a distinct focus on phenomenology, a philosophical movement that turned towards concrete existence and phenomena as a way of escaping the distant abstract realms of Kant's transcendental philosophy and returning to the solid fundament of fact. This philosophical tradition, particularly well established in Vienna, is further explored as a thematic area of the 2015 Kant Congress and the celebration of the 650th anniversary on the one hand, and in the research contributions in this chapter of *Detours* on the other.

The exhibition and reader are intended not solely for Kant experts, but also for students of the humanities and social sciences, school pupils and the interested public, as a source of insights into the reception of one of the most important western philosophers, and the tracks and traces left by his writings in Vienna, Austria and Eastern Europe.

The “Detours” Project in the Making

The idea of a *Detours* reader emerged in the context of a research seminar held in summer 2014 at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Vienna, attended by a group of highly motivated doctoral and master's students, under the leadership of the editor of this volume. This initial nucleus of the project comprised Max Beck, Marek Božuk, Max Brinnich, Elisabeth Flucher, Georg Heller, Christoph Leschanz, Olga Ring, Philipp Schaller, Caroline Scholzen, Bastian Stoppelkamp and Alexander Wilfing. There was no lack of interest among the participants, and proposals for research topics and articles had soon been received on almost all the themes to be covered, according to each person's skills and areas of specialisation. The next step involved the group working closely together, reading each other's ideas, making suggestions, selecting and progressively refining the approaches to be taken, and then working on the content, expression and proofreading of the articles themselves, still as a joint activity, with assistance willingly offered and accepted within the group. Thanks to the outstanding commitment displayed by the doctoral and master's students involved we were able to cover many of the project themes. A few topics still remained, which we felt should ideally be included in order to create a well-rounded publication. Some ultimately had to be set aside, but for others guest contributions were sought from outside the group. In this way some of the gaps were successfully filled.

For the “Kant and Censorship” theme, the team of Alexander Wilfing and Olga Ring (both of Vienna) was backed up by Franz Leander Fillafer (San Domenico di Fiesole) and Eszter Deák (Budapest). In spite of the prevailing cen-



Fig. 2: *Kant-frieze*, main building of the University of Vienna

sorship in Austria, for a time there was strong interest in Kant's philosophy in the principality of Salzburg, and accordingly a significantly condensed version of an article by Werner Sauer has been included. Kant was also intensively studied at the Melk Abbey, in spite of the official line at the time, as described in a joint article by Bernadette Kalteis, Helmut Jakob Deibl and Johannes Deibl (all from Melk). And finally, contributions on this theme were also received from Herta Nagl-Docekal and Kurt Walter Zeidler (both of Vienna).

The considerable attention paid to Reinhold in the volume – even though he lived in Vienna only in his younger years, before his maturity and greatest impact, as a professor in Jena, Germany (and subsequently also in Kiel, which at that time belonged to Denmark) – partly reflects his status as a “familiar stranger”. This part of the reader invites Kant researchers who in the past have paid little attention to Reinhold to take a closer look at his achievements. His importance would clearly not be adequately reflected by an examination limited to his early days in Vienna, as he was growing up. It was therefore decided, along with the contributions from Philipp Schaller (Vienna), to call on Martin Bondeli (Bern), as a leading expert on Reinhold and the editor of his works, who duly provided the bulk of the contributions on this topic. Further valuable insights on this theme have been provided by Guido Naschert (Weimar).

For the “Kant in Eastern Europe” theme there was no-one with the required expertise to write these articles within the seminar group, or indeed at the University of Vienna Institute of Philosophy. Guest contributors from many Eastern European countries were therefore invited to write on the reception of Kant's writings in their countries. The greater or lesser representation of individual countries, and in some cases the lack of any contributions, is mainly attributable to the interest shown by the researchers approached, and the time at their disposal. The very pleasing result of our quest for contributions from researchers in Eastern European countries can be found in these pages with the articles by Mădălina Diaconu and Marin Diaconu (Bucharest) about Romania, Peter Egyed (Cluj-Napoca) about Hungary, Jindřich Karásek (Prague) about the Czech Republic, Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz (Warsaw) about Poland, Jörg Krappmann (Olomouc) about the Czech Republic, Béla Mester and László Percz (both Budapest) about Hungary, Jure Simoniti (Ljubljana) about Slovenia, Márton Tonk and Imre Ungvári-Zrinyi (both Cluj-Napoca) about Hungary, Jan Zouhar (Brno) about the Czech Republic and Jure Zovko (Zagreb/Zadar) about Croatia. Since our guest contributors from Eastern European generally have neither German nor English as their first language, the students also had the task of closely editing and polishing these texts. Special thanks in this regard go to Philipp Schaller, and also Elisabeth Flucher.

“Kant and his Poets” attracted particularly strong interest among the students, all the more so since in an earlier semester, in winter 2012/2013, an initial

research seminar had been held on the subject of “writers as readers of Kant”, conducted by the editor of this volume. The members of the research seminar team working on this theme in the *Detours* project consisted of Max Beck, Elisabeth Flucher, Gabriele Geml, Christoph Leschanz, Philipp Schaller, Caroline Scholzen and Alexander Wilfing, with an additional contribution on Friedrich Schlegel’s time in Vienna from Guido Naschert (Weimar), and another from Sebastian Schneck (Vienna), who in the research seminar on Kant’s reception among writers had given an outstanding presentation on Thomas Bernhard’s *Immanuel Kant*. The considerable space devoted to Friedrich Schiller is based on the fact that, as an early Kant enthusiast and theoretician advocating a form of aesthetic education based on Kant’s ideas, he played a role of outstanding significance in establishing Kant as a subject of debate among poets and literary figures in Germany, and also in Austria. While Schiller is still considered as an important author, he does not have the same profile among researchers as was previously the case. Readers wishing to gain an initial understanding of Schiller’s role are invited to read the article by Violetta L. Waibel (Vienna), which explores some of the key elements of Schiller’s reception of Kant.



Fig. 3: Karl Goetz, *Immanuel Kant*, silver medal commemorating Immanuel Kant’s 200th birthday with sailing ship on globe garlanded with clouds

The theme of “Kant and the Vienna Circle” was mainly addressed with articles by Olga Ring and Bastian Stoppelkamp (both from Vienna), backed up by Sophie Loidolt and Kurt Walter Zeidler (also both from Vienna). The Vienna Circle is the subject of an intensive research project in its own right at the University of Vienna Institute of Philosophy, which is to be presented in this 650th anniversary year in independent events and exhibitions. There is little or no mention of Kant in this context – a gap which is duly filled with the articles in this reader.

The research seminar team addressing the “Kant and Phenomenology” area, which is so important to the University of Vienna Institute of Philosophy, comprised Max Brinnich, Marek Božuk, Georg Heller (all from Vienna), with

support from colleagues at the institute, namely Sophie Loidolt, Philipp Schmidt and Kurt Walter Zeidler. The coverage of the phenomenology theme was supplemented with an overview article on the reception of Kant by Martin Heidegger (by Philipp Schmidt). This offers some initial insights for readers not familiar with this area; while Heidegger had only marginal connections with Vienna or Austria, he played a highly significant role for the phenomenology movement in Austria.

Warm thanks go to all contributors to this reader.

As the idea of presenting all participants in the International Kant Congress with a copy of *Detours* to take home with them began to take shape, we had to find a team of translators and proofreaders to translate into English the main bulk of contributions that were not originally written in English or translated by their authors. So many thanks to Susanne Costa-Krivdic (Innsbruck) and her outstanding international team of translators and proofreaders, including Dalbert Hallenstein (Verona), John Jamieson (Wellington), Linda Cassells (Auckland), Renée von Paschen (Vienna), Katharina Walter (Innsbruck) and Peter Waugh (Vienna). Their tireless efforts have made an invaluable contribution to this project, and are most sincerely appreciated.

It should be noted that gender-explicit forms are not exhaustively used in the text of the reader, so nouns and pronouns are not to be understood in an exclusive sense in this regard.

Special thanks for their outstanding efforts and contributions to the production of both volumes go to Max Brinnich (for his own articles and translations of some texts and for the final editing of the German and English volumes), Sophie Gerber (for coordinating all the contacts with the publisher, authors, sponsors and funders, along with personal meetings, and her help with publication editing) and Philipp Schaller (for his own articles and translation of some article texts and for close editing). And finally, our grateful thanks to Sarah Caroline Jakobsohn, Florian Kolowrat and Artemis Linhart for the help they have provided in preparing the volumes for publication. Aurelia Littig and Thamara Thiel provided valuable support with finding images for the publication and exhibition project. Without the outstanding effort and commitment displayed by everyone involved in this project, these volumes could not have been produced.

We are also most grateful for the help and support received from the University Library Vienna, especially Alexandra Matz and Pamela Stücker and all the archives, libraries and institutions which provided us with pictorial material (see the register of illustrations).

The project has also received generous and enthusiastic support from funders and sponsors. This ambitious undertaking could not have been brought to a

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Violetta L. Waibel, Vienna, July 2015

Kant and Censorship

Kant and “Austrian Philosophy” – An Introduction

by Alexander Wilfing

Is there a specific “Austrian philosophy” that can be distinguished from that of neighbouring Germany as an independent thinking tradition? This question, which apart from its historical relevance probably also highlights a need for national self-assertion,¹ has never really been resolved up to this day. The recently deceased philosopher Rudolf Haller, who recurrently addressed this complex topic, summarised the basal criteria for a genuine Austrian philosophy as follows: The positives he emphasized were a “demand for the scientific character of philosophy” and, consequently, a “research ideal grounded in the natural sciences”, an empirical methodology and a critical take on language; these positions were promoted by analytical philosophy from Bernard Bolzano to Ludwig Wittgenstein.² The negative features, or, in other words, the characteristics that allow us to differentiate between Germany and Austria, can be summed up even more concisely: Apparently, Austria has firmly rejected Kant’s teachings and German idealism, thus founding an autochthonous philosophical tradition.³ Otto Neurath, who, together with Rudolf Carnap and Hans Hahn wrote the manifesto *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* [*The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle*], already held this position. This book already began to historically anchor logical positivism.⁴

In Neurath’s essay, *Die Entwicklung des Wiener Kreises* [*The Development of the Vienna Circle*], the hypothesis of Austrian anti-Kantianism, which is still in effect, is made explicit: “Austria has forgone the interlude with Kant.”⁵ Neurath argues for a sociological disposition to justify the features of Austrian national philosophy he has identified, which anticipate Haller’s thesis of an “empiricist”, “positivist” and “anti-metaphysical” orientation of Austrian philosophy.⁶ While Roman Catholicism and its “strongly theologically imbued philosophy” both decidedly promote the abstract analysis of “logical operations”, German Prot-

estantism has suspended Catholic orthodoxy and thereby foreclosed the assumption of a shared foundation for all future philosophical questions. Thus, German Protestantism has preserved “half-metaphysical, quarter-metaphysical phrases as relics of an incompletely suppressed theology.”⁷ According to Neurath, German idealism therefore has to continually sound out a new positive foundation for its speculative thoughts, while Catholic dogmatism, “unclouded by metaphysical details”, enables a well-founded establishment of logical analysis: “The likes of Bolzano, Herbart and Brentano represented a logicising tradition, which never ceased to oppose Kantianism and German idealist philosophy.”⁸

Roger Bauer was one legacy from this historical construction, which designates the “grande narration” of a uniform Austrian philosophy and which therefore has to be treated with the utmost care.⁹ Bauer’s thesis, which comes very close to Neurath’s contributions to the sociological explanation of religion,¹⁰ also seeks to prove that Kant’s teachings were barely known in the Hapsburg domain, so that “the intellectual development that begins with Kant’s writings is practically non-existent in Austria.”¹¹ The tenor of Bauer’s thinking thus takes us back directly to Rudolf Haller, who described the independent development and autonomous characteristics of Austrian philosophy in terms of those aforementioned features, which in turn prevented “that Kant and Hegel, the thinker from Königsberg and the Prussian state philosopher, would get strong resonance within the k.u.k. Monarchy.”¹² Both Bauer and Haller were reproached for being highly selective in their choice of textual evidence. Neurath, however, who proceeded in a non-empirical and thus highly speculative manner, can safely be overlooked in this context.¹³ Concerning Bauer’s book, Werner Sauer spoke with good reason of a “little satisfactory publication”, which clearly falsifies the overall initial acceptance of critical philosophy and which effectuates a more or less conscious “distortion of the historical situation for the sake of presenting an explanatory hypothesis”, leading to an unsatisfactory simplification of complex issues.¹⁴

Barbara Otto, who heartily endorsed Sauer’s verdict, also made clear that Bauer’s monograph (as well as the writings of Robert Mühlher¹⁵ and Herbert Seidler¹⁶) was primarily characterized by an outdated methodology grounded in the history of ideas, which entails an “inevitable disdain for a social history of philosophy” and a “chronic disinterest in the environment of cultural institutions for this discipline.”¹⁷ Although there may be some legitimacy in this reclamation, it has to be said that Haller’s studies recurrently stressed the enormous relevance of (national) institutions: Any philosophy that sought to achieve supra-regional status, according to Haller, would have to rely on support from the public, from organizations or from universities. This would help to initiate a substantial secondary education, which in turn would require the



Fig. 1: Max Pollak, *View of ‘Universitätsplatz’ [University Square] with the Academy of Sciences and the University Church* (around 1910)

implementation of a set of political and ideological preconditions that would grant the overall acceptance of certain philosophical conceptions at a given time and in a given place: “Knowledge and science rely on traditions and conventions since all learning builds on previously produced knowledge.”¹⁸ This dictum was endorsed by Werner Sauer, who also pointed to the fact that even philosophical movements required “an institutional frame, provided by universities, academies or even [...] public institutions in order to enable the formation of traditions and, in turn, to facilitate their development and decay.”¹⁹

At that point, Sauer’s and Haller’s paths diverge again, since the former clearly demonstrates that Haller’s universal criteria for “Austrian philosophy” cannot be applied consistently to the individual exponents of this supposedly uniform orientation.²⁰ This refers not just to the fundamental philosophical differences in epistemology, aesthetics, logic, etc., from Bernard Bolzano via Franz Brentano to the Vienna Circle, which are hardly surprising. In addition, Sauer’s argument also considers the individual relationships between these diverse positions and Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of Pure Reason*]. Sauer illustrates his point with the aid of Brentano’s four phases of the rise and decline of philosophy. Furthermore, he also uses individual representatives of logical empiricism (Reichenbach and Carnap) to substantiate his argument: Brentano views Kant’s teachings as the first manifestations of the decline of philosophy in the fourth phase (mysticism and enthusiasm). Thereby Brentano makes clear that he

considers precritical philosophy, by which he actually means pre-decadent philosophy (Leibnitz and Wolff), as superior.²¹ The representatives of the Vienna Circle, by contrast, regard Kant's First Critique as an important climax of a paradigm that is outdated but towards whose scientific disposition they nevertheless feel obliged: "Kant's theoretical philosophy thus appears as a related but, due to progress made in the natural sciences, outdated programme of a scientifically based philosophy."²²

Haller's response in his essay *Gibt es eine österreichische Philosophie?* [*Is there an Austrian Philosophy?*], which is based on the relatively weak maxim that "what is unimportant does not warrant mentioning", seems unsatisfactory right from the start.²³ "I have not concealed those examples because I wanted to close my eyes to unwanted instances of refutation, but because those omissions that are mentioned or could be mentioned are simply unimportant."²⁴ This distinction between "important" and "unimportant" examples is supposed to justify Haller's intentional omissions in the continuous development of "Austrian philosophy" – Haller mentions the likes of Rudolf Kassner, Robert Reiniger, Carl Siegel and Othmar Spann. Nevertheless, Haller's distinction is based on a subjective construction. Firstly, some problematic writers, who do not meet or only partially meet the criteria specified at the start, are overlooked as purportedly insignificant. Secondly, the divergences between conceptually irreconcilable philosophers made plausible by Haller's criteria are simply flattened by interpretive intervention in order to retain the larger historical narrative. Both methods inevitably result in a hermeneutic circle, which does not dispel but in fact reinforce Sauer's doubts.

However, Sauer himself emphasizes that in the Hapsburg domain a free dissemination of Kant's teachings was never really possible. He speaks of the "indisputable fact" that "in Austrian philosophy a Kantian [...] tradition has never formed."²⁵ Although he has unquestionably proved that in the beginning the engagement with Kantian philosophy was intense, Sauer also highlights the ways in which an initially fruitful reception of Kant was impeded by the intervention of the state.²⁶ According to Sauer, one can certainly find individual exponents of Kantian philosophy within the "Austrian thinking tradition", but the formation of an actual school never occurred, which ultimately also answers the question of whether an Austrian Neo-Kantianism exists.²⁷ This clearly shows that the problem arises not just from an unsatisfactory review of the extant source material but also from its interpretation, which always includes speculative moments as soon as particular analyses are abandoned for the sake of drawing the "big picture" of scientific cognitive interest. Sepp Domandl also demonstrates this. He offers a different interpretation of the source material used by Sauer: Austria was "so open" to Kant's teachings "that the government had to opt for a complicated official intervention against them."²⁸ According to Domandl's

a priori designed interpretive framework, all authors who do not explicitly oppose critical philosophy thus become secret Kantians, who keep their sympathies hidden just because of pressure from the state.



Fig. 2: Auditorium of the old University of Vienna, nowadays Academy of Sciences

Johannes Feichtinger has recently shown that the largely unresolved problem of the Austrian Kant reception in the 19th century is also saturated with political motivation.²⁹ Before him, Werner Sauer had already stressed the importance of this dimension in the belated construction of “national identity.”³⁰ Feichtinger especially accentuates the celebration of the centenary of Kant’s death, which has led to two completely disparate verdicts on this particular topic. In 1904, Max Ortner presents numerous instructive documents which draw attention to an enormous scepticism towards Kant’s teachings among Austrian writers, philosophers and politicians. Ortner concludes succinctly: “Austrian politics under Francis II was anti-Kantian right to the core.”³¹ Karl Wotke was the first to publish the relevant official documents from Rottenhan’s commission, the immediate results of which were to suppress critical philosophy at Austrian universities. Wotke drew very different conclusions: “This should once and for all

silence claims that in our circles Kantian philosophy met with outright hostility and opposition.”³² Wotke supports his claim with the at best half-hearted attempts of a few individual contributors to integrate Kantian philosophy in university curricula “some time later.” At the same time, Wotke overlooks the fact that a positive result of this questionable endeavour was illusory right from the beginning due to an intervention from the Emperor.

Like in many other cases, the truth was certainly located somewhere in between the extreme opinions that the examined documents outlined so one-sidedly. The fact that these interpretative oppositions formed in the first place can probably be attributed to the political importance of Kantian philosophy or of its artificially constructed explosive force, which turned it into the “paradigmatic deputy medium for political disputes”:

In the 1850s, the retrograde rulers in Austria accused an apparently overpowering Kantian enlightenment tradition of social sedition. Their liberal opponents in turn objected that due to the massive smear campaign against Kantian thinking such a tradition did not exist during the pre-March era and could not develop as Kant’s teachings continued to be suppressed.³³

Count Thun, the non-liberal architect of the post-revolutionary Ministry for Education, consciously exaggerated the actual impact of Kantian philosophy in the Hapsburg domain. In doing so, he “at once associated enlightenment with revolution” in order to ultimately abolish the “‘rotten’ education system from the pre-March era.” However, his opponents put no less effort into defending the “liberal narrative.”³⁴ Georg Jellinek portrayed Austrian philosophy as a scholastic relic, as “doctrines approved by the Church”, since “narrow-minded, shortsighted cabinet politics in conjunction with a shrewd, considerate priesthood” had suppressed the idealist development in Germany at nationally controlled chairs at Austrian universities and was supposed to never admit the movement in the first place.³⁵ Alfred Wieser already proved that Jellinek rhetorically exaggerated in his description of the situation. Wieser found evidence of no more than 50 lectures about Kant’s *Critiques* from 1848 until 1938, followed by Schopenhauer in second place with 29 and Aristotle in third place with 20 lectures.³⁶ However, there was a gap of about ten years (1852–1861) under Count Thun.³⁷ The situation with regard to dissertations submitted at that time is similar: Kant leads with 39 theses in Wieser’s overview, followed by Schopenhauer with 17, Herbart with 13, Spinoza with 12, Nietzsche and Leibnitz with 11 each and Plato with 10 projects. The remaining philosophers are registered with fewer than 10 submissions.³⁸ As a result, Johannes Feichtinger rightly concludes: “As part of an invention of tradition, traditions were invented by way of exaggerations; the eminently political purpose associated with their realization, however, was overlooked.”³⁹



Fig. 3: *University of Vienna* (2015)

Nevertheless, even if current research can overcome the political limitations clearly manifest in the abovementioned elaborations by Ortner and Wotke respectively, it is very difficult to give a clear answer to the questions posed in this essay. This is because an understanding of Kant’s impact on Austrian intellectual history is usually framed by an unsatisfactory hypothesis of a “national philosophy.” Against its original intentions, this notion of “national philosophy” clouds, rather than enables, a balanced representation of historical events. Besides, more detailed examinations in other intellectual disciplines from legal history via the natural sciences to psychology, biology, medicine, etc., are required in order to round off the so far rudimentary image of the Austrian reception of Kant. This would help to offer a more objective answer, unmarred by the baggage of political theory. It remains uncertain whether a homogeneous impression of the Austrian relationship with Kant’s critical philosophy can be distilled from any future individual analyses. However, we may ask whether such a diversified set of problems can be analysed meaningfully by giving an abstract overview without generalising. A largely unmediated representation of at times

disparate areas of influence for Kantian philosophy can perhaps offer more useful approaches than a smoothed out bird's eye view of "the" Austrian Kant reception.

Translated by Katharina Walter




Fig. 4: Decree that condemns and prohibits the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (1827)

The Early Kant Reception in Austria – From Joseph II to Francis II by Alexander Wilfing

The history of the Austrian Kant reception is closely connected with the official education policies in the Hapsburg Empire from Joseph II to Franz Joseph I. It remains highly controversial to what extent censorship, prohibitions and regulations really led to a distillation of a persistent anti-Kantianism as a core feature of Austrian philosophical history.⁴⁰ This is not only due to the fact that some essential documents have not been found yet, so that we do not know, for

instance, which of Kant's writings from the 18th century were really censored. According to Johann Adolf Goldfriedrich's *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels* [*History of the German Book Trade*, 4 vols., Leipzig 1908–1913], Kant's writings were generally banned in 1798. According to Werner Sauer, however, the ban was limited to Kant's writings in religious theory and state philosophy, which would mean that Kant's *Kritiken* (*Critiques*) would not have been affected.⁴¹

Perhaps the problem also arises from the fact that the manifest results of the Austrian education policies, which were officially clearly anti-Kantian, had completely different effects across the diverse disciplinary areas and at different times. Bernard Bolzano, a priest, philosopher and mathematician from Prague, was removed from his theological chair in December 1810 due to the unfounded accusation⁴² of “dangerous” Kantianism.⁴³ At the same time, Kant's writings were particularly popular among Austrian writers. Although the individual consequences of the official ban of Kant's work in 1798 have scarcely been analysed, Werner Sauer has clearly proved that the early reception of Kant's teachings was overwhelmingly positive. Two of Empress Maria Theresa's education reforms (1752/1774) paved the way for a philosophical discourse that led to a gradual abandonment of Austria's Catholic ties and to a national organization of universities, which had previously been led by the Jesuits.⁴⁴ Orthodox Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy – the so-called “schlendrianum scholasticum” (Abbot Alexander Fixelmüller)⁴⁵ – was replaced with Wolff's and Leibniz's “popular” philosophy,⁴⁶ which was to dominate universities in the Hapsburg Empire for some decades – called “popular” because rational metaphysics was removed from its earlier central position by posing psychological questions.⁴⁷

The coronation of Joseph II (1780) and the concurrent onset of “enlightened absolutism”, which promoted the political education of the middle classes with the aim of modernising the state,⁴⁸ became extremely relevant for Austrian Kantianism. This is because Joseph's state system enabled at least a temporary implementation of Kant's teachings in the Hapsburg domain. Gottfried van Swieten, who presided over the imperial study commission from 1781 to 1791, was also entrusted with the national censorship department from 1782 onwards.⁴⁹ This led to a noticeable liberalisation of the relevant regulations.⁵⁰ The principles of university education had previously been extremely pragmatic, which had rendered university education into mere professional training. These principles underwent substantial revision and were subordinated to the values of tolerant enlightenment. Thus, university education was to harmonise with national interests, while nevertheless educating mature citizens.⁵¹ Van Swieten and the similarly inclined Joseph von Sonnenfels did not propagate an unreserved enlightenment ideal as adult citizens were to subordinate themselves to a just

monarchy based on common sense.⁵² However, these thinkers were the first to permit a deviation from the strictly standardised textbooks used for university teaching.⁵³



Fig. 5: Franz Anton Zauner, *Joseph II.*, Josefsplatz, Vienna (1807)

In 1783, van Swieten drafted a concrete reform plan, which was designed to gradually change philosophical education at school level. Furthermore, the reforms were supposed to create some freedom in terms of content for didactic teaching, so that “young people would not just learn about philosophy, but also learn to philosophise” and so that they would “get used to independent thinking.”⁵⁴ Apart from these direct incentives, van Swieten’s position became relevant for Austrian Kantianism in so far as van Swieten officially approved Anton Kreil’s professorship at the University of Pest in 1785 and personally pressed ahead with his risky appointment.⁵⁵ Due to his sympathies for Kant, Kreil also soon began to publicly teach Kant’s *Critiques*, in particular his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of Pure Reason*].⁵⁶ Kreil himself, who was a member of the

Masonic Lodge “True Harmony”, had stepped forward earlier with seven contributions for the *Journal der Freymaurer* [*Journal of Freemasons*], in which he praises Kant’s teachings, particularly the critical limitations Kant imposes on rationalist conceptions of reason. Furthermore, Kreil published a *Handbuch der Logik* [*Handbook of Logic*] in 1789, which clearly seems to be inspired by Kant.⁵⁷ Johann Nepomuk Dellling, the most famous victim of the Bavarian persecution of the illuminates, who was appointed at the same time by van Swieten to the Hungarian University of Pécs (Fünfkirchen), also taught according to Kantian principles.⁵⁸ This initially liberal attitude towards critical philosophy was even introduced into Catholic moral theology, which, due to Augustin Zippe’s efforts, Anton Reyberger taught partly following Kantian principles.⁵⁹



Fig. 6: Kaspar Clemens Eduard Zumbusch, *Franz Joseph I.*, University of Vienna (1886)

The real Austrian Kantianism, however, was located in the personal domain. That was also true of scientific inquiries, which were strictly separated from the dogmatic teaching operations and which had to be conducted privately; science

was often furthered by educated civil servants.⁶⁰ At the time, Austria rigorously separated between the humanities and the natural sciences. The latter were regarded as relatively value-neutral and practically applicable areas of study. Philosophical disciplines, by contrast, were viewed as potentially dangerous. Later, they were replaced by a “blissful darkness” that elevated the status quo to a “positive norm”.⁶¹ Consequently, apart from Karl Leonhard Reinhold many other intellectually interested citizens also left the Hapsburg domain from time to time in order to seek personal contact with Kant or to visit his stronghold in Jena (Johann Benjamin Erhard, Leopold Ritter Meißel, Count Wenzel Gottfried von Purgstall, Joseph Schreyvogel, Cajetan Tschink etc.). As Werner Sauer succinctly stated, “The camp of critical Josephines, which held on to the enlightenment and, in the course of its politicization, moved towards early liberalism” was “the main basis for the reception of Kantian philosophy.”⁶² Someone who gained particular significance in this context was Franz Paul von Herbert, a factory owner from Klagenfurt who founded a Kantian reading group and consequently ended up being prosecuted by the police.⁶³ Hungarian philosophy from the early 19th century also clearly manifests Kantian influences. This is the case in several progressive textbooks from the 1790s and in Stephan Tichy’s anonymous request for Kant’s system to be integrated into university education (*Philosophische Bemerkungen über das Studienwesen in Ungarn* [*Philosophical Remarks about the System of Study in Hungary*], 1792).⁶⁴ Even the enlightened clergy received Kant’s teachings very positively as the case of the Viennese Bishop Matthias Steindl demonstrates. Steindl did not hesitate to recommend Kant’s writings to his students.⁶⁵

No later than 1786, five years after its first publication, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and his other publications were available in most Viennese bookshops, even though twelve months earlier it was almost impossible to find them at all.⁶⁶ In June 1788 Paul Pepermann spoke to Karl Leonhard Reinhold of a literal flooding with Kant-related publications, which one could obtain without any problems (Pepermann to Reinhold, 18 June 1788).⁶⁷ The climax of this short-termed enthusiasm for Kant was probably reached around the mid-1790s, when a reprint of Kant’s writings (1795–1797) was published in Graz.⁶⁸ This edition marks a turning point in the initially favourable reception of Kant’s work.⁶⁹ Political events, the French Revolution and the assassination of Louis XVI (1793) had caught up with Kant’s readers. These incidents strongly influenced the dissemination of Kant’s teachings: Francis II, who had been Emperor of Austria since 1792 and who under no circumstances wanted to import the political situation from revolutionary France, launched a reactionary counter-initiative. He wanted to suppress enlightened tendencies, of which Kant’s system was considered to be part.

This development manifested itself, for instance, in Lazarus Bendavid’s lec-



Fig. 7: Pompeo Marchesi, *Emperor Franz II./ I.*, Hofburg, Vienna (1846)

tures about Kantian philosophy (Vienna 1793), which were attended by so many people that even the large lecturing theatre in the old Viennese university (which now serves as the historical banquet hall for the “Austrian Academy of Science”) could not hold them. Due to the evident curiosity about Kant’s teachings, Bendavid’s highly popular talks had to be hosted in the much larger Palais Harrach.⁷⁰ However, despite – or, rather, because of – this incredible surge, which even enabled a circle of lay people to familiarise themselves with Kant’s thinking, Bendavid’s lectures were banned by the state half-way through a cycle of talks. Furthermore, the philosopher from Berlin was forced to leave the imperial residential city in 1797.⁷¹ That was when the Hapsburg dynasty broke with its initially fairly liberal attitude towards Kant’s philosophy. The Hapsburgs then officially began to follow a “special course” in Austria, which prevented the development of Kantian schooling on a long-term basis.⁷²

Translated by Katharina Walter

LAZARUS BENDAVID'S
VORLESUNGEN
 ÜBER DIE
 CRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT.

(Mit doppeltem Register.)

La seule chose que nous ne savons point, est
 d'ignorer ce que nous ne pouvons savoir.
 (Profess. de foi d'un vicaire savoyard.)

Wien, 1795.

gedruckt und verlegt bey A. A. Patzowsky.

Fig. 8: Lazarus Bendauid, *Lectures on the 'Critique of Pure Reason'*

State Censorship of Kant – From Francis II to Count Thun by Alexander Wilfing

Most people consider it a fact that the previously liberal attitude of Austrian education policies did not change until the reign of Francis II. Nevertheless, Maria Theresa's perhaps more pragmatic disposition, as well as that of her temporary co-regents and that of her direct successor, Joseph II, was probably less tolerant than is widely suspected.⁷³ Metternich and Emperor Francis have recurrently been held responsible for implementing an increasingly more authoritarian style of leadership and, ultimately, creating a veritable police state.⁷⁴ However, censorship facilities that would continue to exist until the revolution of 1848 and beyond were already established during Maria Theresa's time.⁷⁵ The "System Metternich", a catchphrase that characterises the pre-March era in Austria, was already created under Joseph II, so that Emperor Francis only had to ensure the perfection of its application.⁷⁶ The "secret service" (founded in 1786),

which would continue to exist until the First Republic, and the centralised police force under Count Pergen (1789) were the result of some of Joseph II's restorative measures. Evidently, Joseph II quickly abandoned his initial reform plan.⁷⁷ This backtracking from civil freedoms that he had previously willingly granted was a consequence of the revolutionary developments in France, where Kant's teachings had apparently come to exert significant influence.⁷⁸

But why were Kant's works, which can hardly be accused of glorifying the French Revolution, that suspicious for the educational policies of the Austrian empire? This judgment on critical philosophy was primarily based on Kant's critique of reason, which dissociated various politically relevant areas – religion, moral, state, etc. – from the absolutist codex of norms and was thus able to develop a high critical potential. For this reason, the Austrian Restoration "rightly" opposed Kant's a-priori constructivism, which enabled a gradual emancipation of the bourgeoisie through critical reflection. In addition, with his risky "quid juris" question Kant posed a serious threat to the established order, which would now have to persist in light of human reason and its laws, which are in no way determined by the social order.⁷⁹ Peter Miotti, for instance, shared these political reservations and wanted to prohibit Kant's teachings for good. He wanted only those thinkers to be accepted who "would design their philosophy to fit the existing world, rather than the other way round."⁸⁰ Otherwise, Kant's thinking, which had come to be seen as unacceptable in the absolutist Corporate State, could have been used to theoretically substantiate social upheaval. This was particularly significant as Kant's teaching was regarded as the epitome of political philosophy, the dissemination of which would have to be prevented at any cost. Werner Sauer argues:

Kant's philosophy was regarded as the philosophy of political progress *par excellence*, as the undoubtedly most profound contribution to the self-conception of the bourgeois emancipation process. This emancipation process began with enlightenment and culminated in the Great Revolution. In a system whose very *ratio essendi* was based on the obstruction and suppression of this process, Kant's philosophy had to meet with resistance, at least when its political dimension became apparent.⁸¹

This tendency also manifested itself in the controversial ban on Freemasonry in 1797.⁸² This ban deprived the Austrian enlightenment of its most central forum for the free exchange of ideas. In fact, the first measures towards its implementation date back to the patent on Freemasonry issued by the police in 1785,⁸³ which led to rigorous interventions in the previously unrestricted organisation.⁸⁴ Masonic Lodges had been prohibited temporarily under Empress Maria Theresa (1765–1780), but flourished under Joseph II. in a way nobody could have foreseen, because he recruited his direct advisors from these enlightened circles. The different attitude changed this radically. Reactionary



Fig. 9: Peter Miotti, *On the Falsehood and Impiety of the Kantian System With a Response to A. Kreil's Remarks on the Latest Paper of Mr. Miotti*

journalists like Alois Leopold Hoffmann (*Wiener Zeitschrift* [Viennese Journal]) or Felix Franz Hofstätter (*Magazin der Kunst und Literatur* [Magazine of Art and Literature]) thought that the French Revolution originated in a conspiracy of Freemasons, whose seemingly perverted idea of freedom was also manifest in Kant's writings.⁸⁵ This harmed Austrian Kantianism as Kant's teachings were in fact popular among Freemasons in Austria. Seven articles Anton Kreil wrote for the *Journal der Freimaurer* [Journal of Freemasons] give evidence of that. On top of the bargain, Kreil was a member of the Viennese Free Masonic lodge "True Harmony."⁸⁶ This climate, which *de facto* regarded the enlightenment, Freemasonry, the French Revolution and Kantian philosophy as synonymous, culminated in the persecution of Jacobites by the state (1794), which was followed

by the forced retirement of Anton Kreil, ordered by the Emperor. Furthermore, the situation also entailed numerous imprisonments, denunciations and executions, some of which even affected former members of Leopold II's government.⁸⁷

Anton Kreil and Johann Nepomuk Delling were both dismissed for the obvious "reason" that "lecturing critical philosophy leads to atheism."⁸⁸ More active Enlightenment philosophers were now called "mangy sheep" (quoting Francis II).⁸⁹ This aggressive attitude also turned against Kant as a person, who traded under the name "Grandpa of Murderous Philosophy"⁹⁰ in the popular satire magazine *Eipeldauerbriefe* [*Eipeldauer Letters*],⁹¹ which the police supported with development funds. Apart from Benedikt Sattler's *Anti-Kant*, this criticism of Kant was particularly reinforced by Peter Miotti's polemics (*Über die Nichtigkeit der Kantischen Grundsätze in der Philosophie* [About the Voidness of Kant's Principles in Philosophy], Vienna 1798; *Über die Falschheit und Gottlosigkeit des Kantischen Systems* [About the Falseness and Godlessness of Kant's System], Augsburg 1802). To the great delight of Severoli, the Viennese nuncio, those writings emphatically fought the "perverse principles of the materialist Kant."⁹² In his *Kantische Grundsätze* [Kant's Principles], Miotti also demanded the complete suppression of Kant's philosophy, which through its heretical apriorisms attempted to thoughtlessly undermine ecclesiastical truth and national order. Once more, Miotti's critique did not just aim at the content of Kant's work, but also at his methodological approach, which clearly contradicted the idea of a positive orientation of Austrian education policies as Kant did not acknowledge the objective conditions of state authorities to be beyond doubt:

today's Jacobins, how did they forge their concepts of equality and liberty, of tyrants and tyranny? By contemplating this world? O! Certainly not; in this world you cannot find a trace of the kinds of liberty, equality and tyranny they brag about; they gained their high insights *a priori*; they took them from the world they created from their imaginations, according to their own ideas. If so much damage has been done by arbitrary, *a-priori* insights, what can be expected of a system that deals with nothing but transcendental concepts, or, in other words, *a-priori* insights?⁹³

Although Kant's teachings could not be permitted freely anymore, many of those involved in the planning of education in the Hapsburg Empire still had considerable doubts about the official prohibition of Kant's works, which had damaged "Austria's reputation in the educated world" and had ultimately increased the existing interest.⁹⁴ However, due to the enormous resonance and supposed danger of Kant's philosophy, it was necessary to implement at least an indirect restriction, which preceded the prohibition of Kantian thinking by the Vatican (1827). In 1795, Anton Pergen, the organizer of the police, encouraged a reformed study commission to "undo the damage that the Enlightenment had

done to the heads of the Austrian people.”⁹⁵ Under Minister Heinrich Rottenhan, the study commission was to renovate the Austrian education system in the spirit of Francis’s style of leadership. School was supposed to only serve restorative goals. Consequently, it had to be freed from all scientific nonconformity towards state and church. Furthermore, the profoundness of school education had to be carefully limited, as “the danger for the current order emanating from philosophy” had been caused by a “political realisation of the mode of thinking propagated in the humanities.”⁹⁶ Rottenhan’s programme, which was particularly sceptical in regard to the “studium generale”, the general introduction to philosophy at universities, was conceived according to the following criteria:

the study of maths and physics, as well as the positive sciences [ought to] outstrip the so-called rational and speculative sciences [...] in order to place restrictions on scepticism and political and philosophical freethinking, which have recently so divided the spirit of erudition from sheer common sense.⁹⁷

A meeting was organised on 4 July 1798 concerning the necessary reorganisation of philosophical curricula, which Count Rottenhan regarded as “the most important of all [...] tasks.”⁹⁸ Those present decided on how to proceed with Kant’s teachings, which overtly opposed the official political orientation in Austria.⁹⁹ Independent experts’ reports were commissioned for this politically contentious decision, the aim of which was to thoroughly understand the socio-political impact of critical philosophy: *Über kantische Philosophie mit Gutachten in Hinsicht außerbländische Universitäten* [About Kantian Philosophy with Experts’ Reports Concerning Universities on the Hereditary Lands, anonymous author] and *Gedanken über das einstweilige ratsamste Verhalten der Lehrer auf österreichischen Schulen in Anschauung der kantischen Philosophie* [Thoughts about the Advisable Behaviour for Teachers at Austrian Schools Regarding Kantian Philosophy, Samuel Karpe].¹⁰⁰ However, both experts refused to recommend a firm ban on Kant’s works, agreeing on the fact that critical philosophy posed no direct threat either to the state or the church. The authors even demanded that long-serving professors should familiarise themselves with the transcendental methodology in order not to lose connection with developments in Germany once more. An integration of Kant’s teaching in general introductory classes on philosophy was ruled out categorically, however, as Kant’s complex argumentation would simply be too much for inexperienced adolescents. The unnamed expert, who has remained anonymous to this day, even pleaded against an explanation of the contents of Kantian philosophy, which should only be discussed in historical terms.

These reports, however, were not immediately forwarded to the responsible commission. Instead, they were used by the censor, Franz Carl Hägelin, to draft his much more critical memorandum, *Bemerkungen über die Gedanken, die*

kantische Philosophie betreffend [Remarks about Ideas Concerning Kantian Philosophy], which was subsequently put before the commissioners. Hägelin was also convinced that Kant's teachings were not offending any religious opinions. Nevertheless, he emphasised grave political considerations: While, following the tradition of Leibniz and Wolff, the established philosophy apparently protected the political constitution, Kant's thinking was disseminated by radical agitators, so that even regular participants of philosophical studies should only be exposed to it very cautiously and fleetingly, rather than examining critical philosophy in depth. At a secret meeting, those who led the discussion (von Hägelin, von Schilling, von Spendou and von Zippe)¹⁰¹ soon reached an agreement that propaedeutics in philosophy should continue to deal with dogmatic philosophy. Only von Zippe, who had formerly worked for Gottfried van Swieten, wanted to establish a designated lectureship in Kantian philosophy. Von Zippe wanted the appointee to offer optional courses that students would have been allowed to attend once they had finished their regular course of studies. However, the students themselves would have had to remunerate their professor, whose position was unsalaried. That would have ensured low student numbers, while at the same time keeping up the appearance of philosophical liberality.¹⁰² A provisional regulation was made for designated academic study courses in philosophy which would stay in place for approximately forty years: While in propaedeutics, Kant's name should not be mentioned, he could be addressed in doctoral degree courses, but only polemically.¹⁰³ This permanently determined the *modus vivendi* for the approach to Kant's teachings, which were not officially but in fact indirectly banned.

Chairs for Kantian philosophy, which were only envisaged half-heartedly for the University of Prague and for the Alma Mater Rudolphensis, were never approved.¹⁰⁴ Instead, an additional professorship for dogmatic theology was established,¹⁰⁵ for which the confessed anti-Kantian Jacob Frint (1804) was appointed.¹⁰⁶ This prohibition lasted until 1860/61,¹⁰⁷ when the fiercest Kant opponent in the Austrian Ministry for Education, Count Leo Thun-Hohenstein, finally had to resign. Together with Franz Exner and Hermann Bonitz, he had previously launched a step-by-step introduction of Humboldt's education system at universities in the Hapsburg Empire.¹⁰⁸ However, Thun-Hohenstein continued to exert control over the Hapsburgs' universities through his appointment politics, which were critical of philosophy.¹⁰⁹ When exactly the first ban of Kant occurred still seems controversial: While Domandl claims that it was issued as early as 1793,¹¹⁰ Werner Sauer refers to Johann Goldfriedrich's *Geschichte des Deutschen Buchhandels* [History of the German Book Trade, 4 vols., Leipzig 1909–1913], which records a partial censorship of Kant's, Fichte's and Schellings's writings in 1798.¹¹¹ The reprint in Graz of Kant's writings (1795/97) supports the dates recorded by Sauer. Despite Sepp Domandl's statements, the

reprint was not a “mistake in the perfectly, seamlessly working system” initiated by Francis II.¹¹² Ernst Topitsch even considers the first censorship of Kant’s works to be as late as 1803, a year from which police documents about a confiscation were found.¹¹³



Fig. 10: Carl Kundmann, *Franz Exner, Leopold Graf von Thun und Hohenstein, Hermann Bonitz*, Arcade Court, University of Vienna (1893)

But even if the earlier dates suggested by Domandl were correct, we would still have to emphasise that Kant’s works were not part of popular literature, which censorship mainly aimed at. This makes Domandl’s reasoning seem highly unlikely. Besides, an all too radical control of scientific publications would have been difficult to reconcile with the predominantly pragmatic orientation of Hapsburg absolutism. Even the much stricter censorship laws from September 1819 continued to distinguish between “on the one hand, works whose content and treatment of subject is only for scholars and those whose lives are dedicated to the sciences, and, on the other hand, brochures, popular writings, books for entertainment and humorous writings.” The former were mainly excluded from state intervention.¹¹⁴ The extent to which the censorship of Francis, who reserved for himself the exclusive right to decide on this matter,¹¹⁵ was informed by the potential mass impact of suspicious literature, is shown by the fact that expensive books had fewer problems to pass the censorship laws than more popular and thus inexpensive writings.¹¹⁶ It seems likely, but is only an assumption, that Kant’s writings were part of the first category, which would mean

that apart from his writings on the theory of religion and the philosophy of state¹¹⁷ they probably did not disappear completely from the public book trade.

Translated by Katharina Walter

Herbartianism – Rembold, von Thun und Hohenstein, Exner, Zimmermann by Kurt Walter Zeidler

On 24 May 1893, in an impressive inauguration ceremony, a group sculpture of Leopold Count of Thun und Hohenstein, Franz Exner and Hermann Bonitz was unveiled in the arcade courtyard of the University of Vienna.¹¹⁸ In the subjects of the sculpture – Bonitz, Exner and Thun-Hohenstein, the government minister who during his term of office in 1849–1860, in the words of the Latin inscription “Universitates et Gymnasia novis legibus institutisque feliciter reformavit” – the University of Vienna honoured the memory of three men who after the 1848 revolution had carried out the long-overdue reform of the education system,¹¹⁹ in the process installing Herbartianism¹²⁰ as virtually the official “Austrian philosophy”. A glimpse of the background and origins of Herbartianism in this context can be gained from the memoirs of Ferdinand von Bauernfeld (1802–1890), who sketches a vivid picture of the circumstances and situation during his student days at the University of Vienna (1819–1825): “Our philosophy lectures were given in a former stable of the Jesuit fathers, metamorphosed into a barely tolerable condition [...]. Only two of the professors made any impact on our youthful minds: *Vincenz Weintridt* and *Leopold Rembold*.”¹²¹ *Vincenz Weintridt* (1778–1849),¹²² who taught the subject of divinity,

was a secular priest, but also a man of the world in the wider sense [...], with an aesthetic rather than a scientific background; he often put the required dogmatic material to one side and gave free-ranging lectures, semi-extemporised. [...] As early as November 1819 he told me that a denunciation had been laid against him, claiming that he took students to beer halls and sang scurrilous songs to them. It all sounded so ridiculous! But during the next winter Professor *Bolzano* in Prague was dismissed, specifically because of his ‘excessively free lectures’; *Weintridt* was threatened with a similar fate, which indeed overtook him soon after the first semester of 1820. His association with *Bolzano* was the *main indictment* raised against him.¹²³

Ultimately Weintridt’s crime appears to have been to “play the master among his disciples”,¹²⁴ since “from the records [...] it can be seen that all the reprimanded professors were brought into contact with the student association movement”.¹²⁵ His “association with Bolzano” is indicative of the significance of Prague, which in the mid-19th century was to become the centre around which Austrian Her-

bartianism crystallised. This development was initiated by a professor of philosophy of south-west German origin, Leopold Rembold (1787–1844), “who, originally a follower of Jacobi, felt drawn towards Herbart’s mathematical psychology, and as the teacher of Franz Exner, whose attention he drew to these ideas, actually became the founder of the Herbartian school in Austria”.¹²⁶ According to Bauernfeld’s memoirs, Rembold

could at first glance be seen as the opposite of our refined divinity professor [Weintridt]. [...] He formed a close personal bond only with the young *Exner*, otherwise he spoke only to the *entire class*, and kept strictly to the sequence of his lectures, without any substantial literary or aesthetic deviations. *Logic and metaphysics*, unfortunately taught in *Latin*, opened up completely new vistas for us [...]. *Speculation* attracted little or no interest among us; of all the hundreds of philosophy students, *Franz Exner* (one year behind us) was probably the only one to derive any real benefit from *Rembold’s* teaching [...]. When we got to *moral philosophy*, things seemed to improve. *Rembold* was really an eclectic, but he had great respect for *Kant* (even he attacked him at some points with *Herbartian* weapons), and so he managed to get us suitably excited by the ‘*categorical imperative*’.¹²⁷

However in Metternich’s police state with widespread use of informers, such enthusiasm for Kant

could not go unpunished, and a categorical imperative even stronger than Kant’s, the all-powerful *police*, had long been listening covertly to the professor’s sceptical words, and twisting them in secret into a deed of indictment. [...] Professor *Rembold* was suddenly removed from his teaching position and pensioned off with a paltry four hundred guilders, and a *priest* was provisionally appointed as our teacher of philosophy. Notwithstanding the grumblings of us young philosophers, the strict rule was applied, and the student uproar that broke out on the matter was quickly snuffed out with the help of the police. [...] If *Weintridt’s* fall from grace irritated us, the dismissal of *Rembold* brought our displeasure to a peak. So this is the *Austrian system*, we cried, as if with one voice. Hypocrisy, priests and brutality, joining forces against the world of thought!¹²⁸

After the 1848 revolution had toppled the “Metternich system” and shaken the Austrian Empire to its core, making the need for reform dramatically obvious to the political actors, the hour of the educational reformers from the Herbartian school had come.

Leopold Count of Thun und Hohenstein (1811–1888)

Leopold Count of Thun und Hohenstein was born on 7.4.1811 in Děčín (Bohemia). After studying law (1827–31) at Prague University and after lengthy stays in London, Oxford and Paris, in 1836 he entered the civil service. At the end



Fig. 11: Konrad Geyer, *Johann Friedrich Herbart*

of July 1849 he became Minister of Culture and Education, holding the portfolio through until October 1860. He died on 17. 12. 1888 in Vienna.

Thun-Hohenstein's name is associated with far-reaching reforms in the Austrian education and university system, although these had actually been set in train under his predecessors. During his brief term as Minister of Public Education, in March 1848 Franz Seraph von Sommaruga (1780–1860) made the following statement in the Aula of the old university:

We mean to erect a permanent edifice like [...] those flourishing universities in Germany, which we revere as exemplars of thorough scientific education and scholarship. It will be built upon a foundation of *freedom of learning and teaching*, bound by no other constraints than those of constitutional laws.¹²⁹

Sommaruga was still in office in April 1848 when Franz Serafin Exner was appointed as scientific adviser (*Wissenschaftlicher Beirat*), and then transferred from Prague to Vienna as ministerial counsellor (*Ministerialrat*). It was thanks to the liberal guidelines and advanced preparatory work, as well as his academic reputation and skill, and not least his close personal relationship with Thun-Hohenstein as the minister¹³⁰ that long-overdue reforms of the Austrian edu-

cation and university system were carried out, which were not at all what the minister had expected. As a representative of political Catholicism and the Bohemian high aristocracy, Thun-Hohenstein was neither an admirer of the “flourishing universities of Germany” nor a pioneer of “freedom of learning and teaching”. For example, a memorandum published under his direct supervision in 1853 entitled *Die Neuordnung der österreichischen Universitäten* [*The reorganisation of the Austrian universities*] complained that “at the Protestant universities in Germany, scholarship has degenerated into the kind of monstrosities that provide horrific proof of the results arrived at by an intellect that is no longer guided by the facts of Revelation”, arguing that the “lofty goal” for the Austrian universities must therefore lie in the “nurturing of scholarship in accordance with the spirit of the Church and special respect for the State”.¹³¹



Fig. 12: Alois Flir, *The Restructuring of Austrian Universities*

Under such conditions the anaemic realism of Herbart’s philosophy offered itself as the least unacceptable option; it met – as Herbart himself amply demonstrated with his stance against the Göttingen Seven – the “post-revolutionary

need for a scientifically credible philosophy that would at the same time exercise and propagate academic self-restraint".¹³²

Franz Serafin Exner (1802–1853)

Franz Serafin Exner was born in Vienna on 28.8.1802, studying philosophy there from 1818 to 1821, and law from 1822. After a period of university study in Padua (1823) and taking his degree in Vienna (1827), he taught education and philosophy at the University of Vienna as a teaching assistant, replacing his former teacher, Leopold Rembold, following the latter's dismissal in disgrace. He was appointed to an ordinary professorship of philosophy at Prague University in 1831, where he associated with leading Bohemian intellectuals (Bernard Bolzano, Christian Doppler, Johann August Zimmermann) and aristocrats, including the future minister Thun-Hohenstein. As from 1844 he was commissioned by the body responsible for educational institutions, the *Studienhofkommission*, to prepare expert opinions on the reorganisation of the education system. On being appointed by minister Sommaruga in April 1848 as a scientific adviser, and then transferred to Vienna as a ministerial counsellor, he and Hermann Bonitz (1811–1888), whom he had met in Berlin in 1842 through the Herbartian Gustav Hartenstein, jointly drew up the draft organisational structure for Austrian classical and modern secondary schools, which was duly implemented under minister Thun-Hohenstein in 1849, along with Exner's proposals on the university reform. Exner was then put in charge of the reorganisation of education in Austria's Italian provinces. He died in Padua on 21.6.1853.

In the philosophical domain Exner made a name for himself primarily as a severe critic of the Hegelian school. He believed that Hegelianism was characterised by three main features: the "receipt of concepts from without, which are however passed off as self-generated; [...] the arbitrary application of a method adopted as the one and only correct one", and thirdly, "distortion of the concepts of experience to the point of unrecognisability".¹³³ And yet,

if a single page of *Herbart's* psychological works is correct, then the entire edifice of Hegelian psychology collapses into ruins. Even supporters of the *Hegelian* system state and admit that *Herbart's* philosophy is most decidedly at odds with *Hegel's*, and that at present in Germany it alone has the inner vitality required to stand as a cohesive force and equal opponent of *Hegel's* system. It is too late to ignore it now.¹³⁴

The opposition between Hegel and Herbart, which definitely defined philosophical debate in Germany through to the mid-19th century, was indeed difficult to ignore. But with the appointment of the philosophers Franz Karl Lott (Vienna

1849), Robert Zimmermann (Olomouc 1849, Prague 1852, Vienna 1861), Wilhelm Volkman (Prague 1860), Josef Wilhelm Náhlofsky (Graz 1862) and Josef Durdik (Prague 1874), and of the educationalists Theodor Vogt (Vienna 1871), Otto Willmann (Prague 1872) and Gustav Adolf Lindner (Prague 1878), Herbartianism gained the status of the state philosophy in Austria at a time when its star in Germany was already waning, and neo-Kantianism was becoming the leading philosophy in the universities. Austrian-born representatives of neo-Kantianism (Alois Riehl, Richard Hönlswald, Johannes Volkelt, Emil Lask) therefore made their careers in the German *Reich*, whereas in Vienna, Robert Zimmermann as the “last Herbartian” dictated the fortunes of philosophy over a period of more than three decades.

Robert Zimmermann (1824–1898)

Robert Zimmermann was born in Prague on 2. 11. 1824, as the son of a classical secondary school teacher and later *Studienhofkommission* official, Johann August Zimmermann (1793–1869). While attending classical secondary school he also received private instruction in philosophy and mathematics from Bernard Bolzano, as a close friend of his father. He undertook university studies from 1840, including under Franz Serafin Exner, at Prague University, and from 1844 continued his studies (philosophy, mathematics, physics, chemistry and astronomy) in Vienna. After graduating (1846) he worked as an assistant at the university observatory (1847–49), and during the 1848 revolution he was a member of the Academic Legion. In 1849 he gained his *Habilitation* qualification and was appointed as Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Olomouc, followed by an ordinary professorship at Charles University in Prague from 1852 to 1861, where he was Dean in 1860/61. From 1861 to 1896 he was a professor at the University of Vienna, where he was Dean in 1865/66 and 1876/77, and Rector in 1886/87. Following Franz Brentano’s resignation from his professorship (1874–1880), for 15 years Zimmermann was the only ordinary professor of philosophy. In 1889 he was a co-founder of the Grillparzer Society, which he chaired until his death. He was raised to the nobility on his 72nd birthday, and he died in Prague on 31.8. 1898.

As Bolzano’s favourite student, converted to Herbartianism under the influence of Exner, Zimmermann described his life journey and position as follows:

It is well-known that at the end of the foreword to his ‘General Metaphysics’ published in 1828, Herbart described himself as a ‘Kantian of the year 1828’. If the writer of these lines, who owes his first stimulus to take up the study of philosophy to an opponent of Kant (the most illustrious thinker and endurer Bolzano, born exactly one hundred years ago, on 5 October 1781) and to a friend of Herbart’s (Franz Exner, the acute critic

of Hegelian philosophy), was to be so bold today, when a full century has passed since the appearance of the *Critique of pure reason*, and more than half a century since that of the General Metaphysics, to call himself a ‘Herbartian of the year 1881’, he would see this as correctly reflecting his attitude to both Kant and Herbart.¹³⁵




Fig. 13: August Steininger, *Robert Zimmermann* (before 1898)

This self-characterisation by Zimmermann is accurate to the extent that “his attitude to both Kant and Herbart” was determined by Bolzano. Zimmermann combines the pronounced anti-Kantianism of Bolzano (the “Bohemian Leibniz”) and the anti-idealistic “realism” of Herbart, in that he refers back to Leibniz. In his comparison of the monadologies of Leibniz and Herbart¹³⁶ he makes Leibniz the mouthpiece of his Bolzano-inspired critique of Herbart, as follows:¹³⁷ whereas the central point of Leibniz’s own monad theory lies “in the real world of the monads themselves, in the almighty and all-powerful Urmonas [...] the central point of [Herbart’s] theory of the real is none other [...] than our own ‘I’. [...] *Herbart* therefore advances only a few steps further than *Kant* along this path”.¹³⁸ In spite of reproving Herbart for his idealism and subjectivism, however,¹³⁹ Zimmermann esteems him as a worthy “successor to *Leibniz*, whom he also highly esteemed”, with *Herbart* having “the merit of returning *Leibniz*’s investigative thinking, [...] which since the appearance of *Kant* [...] had pro-

liferated beyond all bounds, back to within strict limits, indeed mathematical limits as the strictest of all".¹⁴⁰ This assessment of Herbart is not to be seen merely as an "astounding about-face by Bolzano's 'favourite student', forced to change sides in order to avoid ending up like Bolzano, in the academic wasteland."¹⁴¹ Zimmermann is rather here following a dictum of Bolzano, who in § 21 of *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of science) himself placed his logical objectivism in the tradition of Herbart and Leibniz, because when Herbart requires that "the *logical* [be kept free] from any admixture of the *psychological*", his intention was that "a judgment be regarded not as a phenomenon in the mind, but as something objective, consequently no different from how I [...] wish the proposition in itself to be regarded", just as "Leibniz [...] presupposes that by 'propositions' he meant *propositions in themselves*".¹⁴² Accordingly, in the foreword to the second edition of his *Philosophische Propädeutik* (Introduction to philosophy), for decades the most widely-used textbook for the subject of philosophy at the classical secondary schools of the Danube monarchy, he highlighted the "difference so rightly emphasised by *Herbart* between 'concept in the psychological sense' and 'concept in the logical sense'", referring explicitly to this as being in agreement "with *Bolzano's* theory of science".¹⁴³ It is also Bolzano's logical objectivism that determines his critique of Kant, when he disposes in short order of the latter's "mathematical prejudice" in favour of the synthetic character of mathematical judgements with the comment and/or admission that:

I am unable to see how as a result of thinking the combination of 'seven' and 'five' in a sum total I do not yet think the 'twelve', which after all is nothing but the said sum total of seven and five expressed with its own name! [...] The judgement $7+5=12$ [...] is therefore not just analytical, but even identical, since the predicate repeats the subject, only under a different name!¹⁴⁴

Zimmermann's most significant philosophical achievement is not however in the area of the theory of cognition or metaphysics, but in aesthetics,¹⁴⁵ where again he modifies Herbartianism on the basis of the precepts of Bolzano.¹⁴⁶ Viewed retrospectively in terms of the history of philosophy, Zimmermann's real significance can be seen in his function as a bridge: by preserving Bolzano's logical objectivism under a cloak of Herbartianism, and helping to arrange Brentano's appointment in Vienna, he constructed a bridge between Bolzano and Brentano which – without his intention – became a critical juncture not only for the Brentano school, but also for the subsequent evolution of neo-positivism and analytical philosophy.

Translated by John Jamieson

Lazarus Bendavid – Teaching Kant's Philosophy in Vienna

by Olga Ring

Lazarus Bendavid, who was born in Berlin on 18 October 1762 and died there on 28 March 1832, was a philosopher, mathematician, educator, journalist and an expert in Jewish history. He came from an educated, liberal Jewish family.¹⁴⁷ His mother Eva Hirsch was a daughter of David Hirsch – the owner of the first velvet factory in Berlin. His father, David Lazarus, was from Brunswick. Both parents could speak and write Hebrew, German and French, and Bendavid himself was also fluent in these three languages.¹⁴⁸ He had a traditional Jewish education in various Talmud schools and received extra private tuition in German, French, Latin, Greek and arithmetics. Furthermore he taught himself Arabic and Syrian grammar. “I read [...] just about everything I came across: Abu'l-Fida and the Qur'an, the New Testament and Rousseau's *Émile*, Voltaire's *Pucelle* and *Thérèse the Philosopher*, the German poets and Wolf's metaphysics, books about the Kabbala and about medicine.”¹⁴⁹ His early contact to the Enlightenment philosophers Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), Moses Mendelssohn (1728–1786) and Markus Herz (1747–1803) was hugely important in the development of this self-educated man. After a brief and intensely religious period, Bendavid became increasingly sceptical about religion and from then onwards he assumed an unorthodox attitude towards faith. “Having given up all that was positive, I kept my faith in God, in immortality and in a better future; and I gave up saying my Jewish prayers – not gradually, but all of a sudden”.¹⁵⁰ After his father's death in 1789 he broke off all contact with the synagogue for good.

At first Bendavid devoted himself to mathematics and the natural sciences, focusing mainly on astronomical studies with Johann Elert Bode (1747–1826) in the observatory in Berlin. His first scientific treatise on the theory of colours entitled *Ob die sieben Hauptfarben schon die einfachsten sind?* [*Are the Seven Main Colours the Simplest Ones?*] published in *Berlinische Monatsschrift* [*Berlin Monthly*] (1785) and his *Theorie der Parallelen* [*Theory of Parallel Lines*] published in the same year brought him “into contact with scientists in Berlin and in other regions, including Kaestner.”¹⁵¹ As the companion and mentor of a medical student he came to know the mathematician Abraham Gotthelf Kaestner (1719–1800) personally in Goettingen in 1790 and attended classes there including a physics lecture given by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799). After that he began a fruitful collaboration in Halle with Johann August Eberhard (1739–1809), who was a disciple of Wolff, but this came to an abrupt end since Bendavid became more and more involved in Kant's philosophy.

At the end of 1791 Bendavid took over a position as private tutor in Vienna, where he moved in the circles of Josephinian followers of the Enlightenment. He



Fig. 14: Moses Samuel Lowe, *Lazarus Bendavid* (1806)

taught critical philosophy to Count Carl von Harrach and others. Count Harrach and Prince Lichnowsky gave him an introduction to the chief constable of the time, Count Franz Josef Saurau, who managed to obtain a permit allowing Bendavid to give public lectures on Kant's philosophy. However, "the envy of some university professors [...] led them to exploit the rising suspicion of the government, who – as he himself put it humorously – distrusted Bendavid due to all his attributes as a philosophical-Kantian-Protestant-Prussian Jew". As a result he was banned from giving further public lectures at the university. Consequently, "Count von Harrach, with whom Bendavid was staying [opened] a spacious hall in his house, where the lectures continued for some time."¹⁵² Bendavid's books and private lessons continued to be still very much in demand in Vienna: "I had become fashionable, so to speak, and it was considered the epitome of good taste to be taught by me. So I had more requests for lessons than I was able – and wanted – to accept. I was never interested in making money and I loved my independence and my studies too much"¹⁵³ During his time in Vienna Bendavid published *Versuch über das Vergnügen* [Essay on Pleasure] in two

volumes (1794), *Vorlesungen über die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [Lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason] (1795), *Vorlesungen über die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* [Lectures on the Critique of Practical Reason] (1796), *Vorlesungen über die Kritik der Urtheilskraft* [Lectures on the Critique of Judgment] (1796), *Beiträge zur Kritik des Geschmacks* [Essays on the Critique of Taste] (1797). When Bendavid wrote his lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (based on the second edition), his intention was to present "Kant and *only* Kant as briefly, coherently and popularly as possible¹⁵⁴ using concepts in common use, so as to engage readers, for whom my lectures are expressly written, in debates that they may not be familiar with."¹⁵⁵ Bendavid admits that he had ordered some proofs differently to Kant and had also "put the schematism at the end of the analytic of principles",¹⁵⁶ but otherwise his lectures follow the structure and contents of Kant's text and are – as Werner Sauer puts it – "notably free of all the obscurity and confusion [...] that have become notorious in Kantian literature."¹⁵⁷ Therefore "it is probably the principal merit of the *Lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason* that they present the critical doctrine of the thing in itself or the noumenon with great clarity and that they therefore do not leave any space for the consequential dogmatic-ontological interpretation initiated by Jacobi and Reinhold that was a central problem in the early discussions about Kant."¹⁵⁸ In his *Lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason* (1796) Bendavid

obviously makes concessions to the era he was writing in [...]. He says Kant teaches us 'that if God had not shown us mercy and revealed his existence to us, our weak reasoning would not have enabled us to deduce it with complete certainty; ... that we ... have to regard the Creator as the maker of moral laws.' The first assertion is more in line with the philosophy of belief of Jacobi and Wizenmann than with Kant's rational faith, and the second clearly contradicts the autonomy of Kant's moral law, being made as it is without mentioning any further points to support it.¹⁵⁹

Karl Rosenkranz describes Bendavid's importance for the dissemination of Kant's philosophy in Vienna as follows:

It was Lazarus Bendavid who taught Kant's philosophy to the Viennese, he was their Mendelssohn, who died in 1802. It is significant that he – as a Viennese philosopher – published two volumes on *Pleasure*. He was capable of dividing all of Kant's Critiques into clear, elegant and well formulated paragraphs complete with highly commendable indices. [...] – But in spite of Bendavid's *Lectures*, critical philosophy never really took root in Vienna, let alone in other parts of Austria, except in a very cryptic form.¹⁶⁰

In the end, the authorities ordered Bendavid to leave Vienna in 1797. He first went via Prague and Dresden to Berlin and tried shortly afterwards to return to Vienna, but was prevented from doing so by the police, who issued a residency ban against him. So Bendavid returned to Berlin at the end of 1797, where he engaged in commercial activities and later worked as a journalist. He also be-

came a member of various Jewish associations in spite of his abandoning traditional Jewish religion: these were the “Gesellschaft der Freunde der Humanität” [Society of the Friends of Humanity] “Philomatische Gesellschaft” [Philomatic Society], “Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden” [Association for Jewish Culture and Science] and he was the head of the *Jüdische Freischule* [Jewish Free School] from 1806 until its closure in 1825. At first he continued his lectures in Berlin, but had to “abandon his talks because they infringed the rights of the newly founded university, in the very same year – as he used to say wryly – in which the introduction of economic freedom abolished the guild system.”¹⁶¹

During his time in Berlin he published several other philosophical writings: *Vorlesungen über die metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* [Lectures on the Metaphysical Bases of Science] (1798), *Versuch einer Geschmackslehre* [Essay on Taste] (1799), *Philotheos, oder über den Ursprung unserer Erkenntniss* [Philotheos or the Origins of our Cognition] (1802), *Versuch einer Rechtslehre* [Essay on Jurisprudence] (1802).¹⁶² He was even awarded a prize by the Berlin Academy of Sciences for his publication on the origins of our cognition. He no longer participated actively in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, because his literary and scientific work focused more and more on Jewish topics. After his death in Berlin on 28 March 1832 his friend Heinrich Heine wrote the following lines about him:

He was a wise man imbued with antiquity, bathed in the sunlight of Greek serenity, a monument of true virtue and hardened by duty like the marble of his master Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. Throughout his life Bendavid was the most dedicated follower of Kant’s philosophy. For this he suffered relentless persecution during his youth, but still he never wanted to separate from the old community of the Mosaic faith, and he never wanted to change the outward insignia of his belief. The mere suggestion of such denial filled him with repulsion and disgust.¹⁶³

Bendavid’s heirs gave his writings to the Jewish philologist and educator Leopold Zunz. They were conserved in the *Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums* [Higher Institute for Jewish Studies] in Berlin until 1939 and are now in Department A of the Leopold-Zunz-Archives in the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem.

Translated by Susanne Costa

The Reception and Criticism of Kant in Hungary at the End of the 18th Century – The Teaching Activity of Anton Kreil by Eszter Deák

At the end of the 18th century Kant's philosophical writings began to spread more widely in Hungary through the reception of Kantian philosophy and through the controversies surrounding Kant's teachings.¹⁶⁴ The first stage of Kant's reception occurred in the 1790s and began with the publication of the work of József Rozgonyi (1756–1823). The philosophy professor from Sárospatak, who later became a Protestant, first provided a critique of Kant in his journal *Dubia de initiis transcendentalis idealismi Kantiani. Ad viros clarissimos Jacob et Reinhold* [*Doubts about the elements of Kantian Transcendental Idealism: To the most distinguished men, Jacob and Reinhold*] (Pest 1792). As an exceptionally highly educated scholar, he familiarised himself with the Kantian system of thought during his student years at Göttingen. After that, in Jena, he heard Carl Leonhard Reinhold, the Austrian philosopher of the German Enlightenment, whose *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie* [*Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*] (published in book form in 1790) contributed considerably to the popularisation of Kantianism. Rozgonyi's work, which was dedicated to Reinhold, is a precise and measured critique of Kant. Rozgonyi knew Kant's writings well and attempted to understand the essence of Kantian philosophy, although he himself preferred the philosophy of Hume.¹⁶⁵ The year of 1792 also saw the publication of the work of István Tichy, who was employed as a Catholic teacher in Kassa. In his *Philosophischen Bemerkungen über das Studienwesen in Ungarn* [*Philosophical Considerations on the Education System in Hungary*] (Pest-Kaschau, 1792) he argues the case for a critical engagement with the works of Kant.¹⁶⁶

The most prominent proponent of Kantian philosophy in Hungary was István Márton (1760–1831), who taught philosophy in the Kantian spirit at the Protestant College of Pépa – which is how he came to be known as “the Kant of Pépa”. His major work, the textbook *Keresztyén Theológiai Morál Vagy-Is Erkölcsstudomány* [*Christian Theological Doctrine of Morals or Ethics*] of 1796 attests to his thorough knowledge of the critical philosophy of Kant.

Pál Sárvári (1765–1846) was professor of philosophy at the Protestant College in Debrecin. He became familiar with the Kantian philosophy while studying in Göttingen under Friedrich Ludewig Bouterwek. Kant's influence is noticeable in his dissertation as well as in his major published work, although he cannot be regarded as a true Kantian. Worth mentioning are the first part of his essay *Moralis Philosophia* [*Moral Philosophy*], Pest 1802, and its second part, *Filozofusi Ethika* [*Philosophy of Ethics*], Nagyvárad 1804. In his essay *Moral Philosophy*, in the fourth chapter (*A Formás Eköltsi Princzipiumról* [*On the Formal Moral Principle*], 124–212) he outlines Kant's ethical system very thoroughly.¹⁶⁷

Two German professors are among the first proponents of Kantian philosophy in Hungary: Johann Delling (1764–1738) at the Academy in Pécs (Fünfkirchen), and Anton Kreil (1757–1833) at the University of Pest, whose employment there quickly came to an end for political reasons. Kreil was born in Passau and was a leading member of the Illuminati in his homeland. When the [Illuminati] order he belonged to was forbidden in Bavaria, Kreil moved to Vienna, and was active in Ignaz Born's Masonic lodge "Zur wahren Eintracht". In his work for the lodge he presented the idea of a scientific approach to Freemasonry and became intensely interested in the traditions of ancient Egyptian and Greek culture. These interests are reflected in Kreil's lectures on the Pythagorean Covenant and on the Eleusinian Mysteries.¹⁶⁸ Kreil came to Pest in 1785 on the recommendation of Ignaz Born, and was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pest by Joseph II. He continued his Illuminati and Masonic activities in Hungary. He was the head and "Grand Master" of the Pest Lodge "Zur Großherzigkeit". Several professors at Pest University were among his close friends, especially the Professor of Aesthetics Ludwig Schedius, as well as the historian Karl Koppi and the Professor of Philosophy István Szűts.

Ludwig Schedius (1768–1847) came from a Lutheran family from Győr and completed his studies in classical philology, theology, history and statistics at Göttingen University between 1788 and 1791. When he was appointed Professor of Aesthetics at Pest University in 1792 he was more than just an academic colleague of Anton Kreil. Both men moved in the same circles and together participated in the scientific and Masonic activities of the district of Buda-Pest. In his lectures and writings Kreil questioned the religious dogmas, which is why the authorities brought a charge against him in 1790 for promoting pantheistic doctrine, scepticism and the free thought movement. The official trial resulted in the accused being dismissed. In the 1790s Kreil was heavily involved in Hungary's radical political circles and was in close contact with liberal-leaning Jacobite circles in Hungary. He is even attributed with translating the *Marseillaise* into German. A second trial was brought against the university professor in 1795 after the Hungarian Jacobite movement was uncovered. Schedius was himself charged because of his close friendship with the executed Pest lawyer Pál Óz, but was later acquitted. As well as Kantianism, Kreil was also accused of promoting atheism and anti-monarchism. Following the trial against the Hungarian Jacobites, the pro-consulate undertook investigations against university academics who were sympathisers of the movement for democracy, since it deemed their radical political and anticlerical views to be harmful to young people. The authorities at this time even considered Kantian views to be politically suspicious. The historiographer Karl Koppi and Anton Kreil were sent into retirement and had to leave Buda-Pest for good.

Kreil moved to Vienna, where he became involved with the bookshop of the



Fig. 15: Stephan Tichy, *Philosophical Remarks on the University System in Hungary*

former Jacobite Alois Blumauer, and otherwise kept himself afloat by selling antiquarian books, including some from his own library. Kreil maintained a regular correspondence with his good friend and former Pest University colleague Schedius.¹⁶⁹ And in this way he was able to stay in touch with Hungarian colleagues and scholars. Schedius facilitated the expansion of Kreil's book business to Hungary, so that professors, teachers and academics from all faculties became the book buyers. The catalogue of books in Kreil's letters contained new editions of ancient Greek and Latin authors, as well as works on philosophy and the natural sciences from the 17th and 18th centuries, and included a wide selection of the widely read Kantian writers of the time, such as Johann Nikolaus Tetens and Christoph Gottfried Bardili. The correspondence

between Kreil and Schedius also documented the current political and social events in Vienna and Buda-Pest.

Kreil's letters of 1796 give some impression of the contemporary discussion on Kant's works in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Kreil also pursued his campaign against the anti-Kantians in Vienna. In his letters to Schedius he criticised the reception of Kant in Hungary, particularly the writings of the Piarist Joseph Grigely (*De Concordia philosophiae cum religion* [*On the Unison of Philosophy and Religion*] which was published in Ofen in 1796), whose unsubstantiated findings proved, in Kreil's opinion, that the author could not have read one single work of Kant.¹⁷⁰ Kreil, the rather combative supporter of Kant, wished to publish his critical judgment on this matter. In one of his letters he says that he would like to send his comments, with the help of Alxinger, to the editor of the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* [*General Literary Journal*] in order to clarify the misunderstandings about Kant's theories that were so widespread among the government:

For this reason and with these comments I will pass the essay over to Alxinger: so that the literary journal reveals these pathetic errors of fact (which act as guidelines for the chancellery and the court in forming their legislation), and so that perhaps, through this, some good may come about.¹⁷¹

However, in the years 1796, 1797 and 1798 there is nothing of Kreil's reflections to be found in the General Literary Journal. Kreil also deliberates on the anti-Kantian attacks of the Hungarian Jesuit professor Janos Horváth (1732–1800), one of the best known philosophers in Hungary at the end of the century, whose mathematics and physics textbooks were very popular. In his work *Declaratio infirmitatis fundamentorum operis Kantiani Critik der reinen Vernunft. In supplementum metaphysicae suae elaborate* (Buda 1797) Horváth attacked Kant's system and Kreil's *Handbuch der Logik* [*Handbook of Logic*] (Vienna 1789) on the grounds of the theory of religion. He criticised Kant's subjectivism and agnosticism and so determined the basic tone of the reception of Kant in Hungary. As is clear from his letters, Kreil had also argued with the Austrian theologian and philosopher Peter Miotti. This professor of logic and metaphysics was a fierce opponent of Kantian philosophy. He published his essay attacking Kant and Kreil in Vienna. It was entitled: *Über die Nichtigkeit der Kantischen Grundsätze in der Philosophie nebst einer kurzen Rezension, der nach Kant geschriebenen Logik von Prof. Kreil*. [*On the Invalidity of Kantian Principles of Philosophy with a Short Review of Logic According to Kant by Prof. Kreil*] The following year Kreil published his response to Miotti's article: *Bemerkungen über die jüngste Schrift des Herrn Miotti, nebst einer Vergleichung der Lockischen, Leibnitzischen und Kantischen Philosophie* [*Comments on the Latest Article by Mr Miotti, with a Comparison of the Philosophy of Locke, Leibniz and Kant*] (Vienna 1799). Kreil's defence of the Kantian system

appeared in 1801, entitled *Vindicae systematis Kantiani* [*Defence of the Kantian System*]. Miotti then published his extensive book *Über die Falschheit und Gottlosigkeit des Kantischen Systems, nebst einer Antwort auf A. Kreil's Bemerkungen über die jüngste Schrift des Herrn Miotti* [*On the Falsehood and Impiety of the Kantian System, with a Response to A. Kreil's comments on the Latest Article by Mr Miotti*] (Vienna 1801). Miotti was an ex-Jesuit who had studied Kant thoroughly and who substantiated the argument of his thesis; he saw in Kantian philosophy a threat to the church. "Enlightenment philosophers", "Kantians" and "Jacobites" were all one and the same, he argued – they were a threat to religion and the throne.¹⁷² Miotti can be regarded as the sole initiator of the Vatican's anti-Kantianism. His assessment that Kant's philosophy was "incomprehensible", "dark", "godless" and "poison to every good Catholic" was also taken up by the Viennese Court.

In the year 1795, when the Hungarian Jacobite movement was discovered and the Hungarian Jacobites were beheaded, the chancellery, by a courtly decree of 23 June, forbade the teaching of Kantian philosophy in Catholic schools and by all professorial chairs. This political milieu facilitated the publication of a blatantly anti-Kantian pamphlet entitled *Rosta* [*The Filter*] (*A Kánt szerént való Filozófiának Rostálgatása Levelekbenn* [*Philosophy According to Kant Filtered through Letters*]); its author, Ferenc Budai, invoked a higher political authority. This work curtailed the spread of Kantian philosophy in Hungary for many years. And one consequence was that Hungary's most significant Kantian philosopher, István Márton, could not work until 1817.¹⁷³

Translated by Linda Cassells

Anton Reyberger and the Reception of Kant at Melk Abbey

by Jakob Deibl, Johannes Deibl and Bernadette Kalteis

The records show that Kant's works were read and studied from the 1780s at Melk Abbey, as at other Austrian monasteries and convents. This reception was related to the enlightened Josephinian ideas spreading in religious institutions at this time.¹⁷⁴ The library at Melk Abbey has a considerable number of Kant's works, in first and second editions. Among other periodicals, the library subscribed to Wieland's *Deutscher Merkur*, in which Reinhold's *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie* [*Letters on Kant's philosophy*] were published, and *Jenaer Allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, a journal of great significance for the philosophical debates taking place at the time. The book purchasing decisions of librarians Gregor Mayer (1784–1786) and Benedikt Strattmann (1786–1793) were clearly

attuned to the Enlightenment period. Strattmann is clearly assumed to be a reader of Kant's works in a letter to Prior Ulrich Petrak of 2 April 1788: "And how is our dear P. librarian? How did he like Kant's philosophy?"¹⁷⁵ This probably refers to the second edition of *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*Critique of pure reason*], purchased in 1788.



Fig. 16: Rosenstingl/Schmitner, *Melk Abbey* (1736/1750)

A leading figure in this context was Anton Reyberger (1757–1818), who was appointed by Gottfried van Swieten in 1786 as Professor of Pastoral Theology in Pest, and two years later to the chair of Moral Theology at the University of Vienna, where he was also Dean of the Faculty of Catholic Theology (1800/01) and Rector (1810/1811). From 1810 to 1818 he was Abbot at Melk Abbey.¹⁷⁶ Sepp Domandl, in his study *Die Kantrezeption in Österreich* [*Kant reception in Austria*] describes him as the "leading clerical Kantian"¹⁷⁷ of the time. On the basis of a directive of 1787 formulated by the *Studienhofkommission* (the authority responsible for university curricula) entitled *Anleitung zur Verfassung eines zweckmäßigen Entwurfs der Moraltheologie für die öffentlichen theologischen Schulen in den k.k. Staaten* [*Directive on the drafting of a suitable plan of moral theology for public schools of theology in the Royal and Imperial states*], reflecting a policy of "intellectual openness",¹⁷⁸ he wrote his own book of lectures for the subject of moral theology, which was published in 1794 under the title *Systematische Anleitung zur christlichen Sittenlehre oder Moraltheologie* [*Systematic instruction in Christian morality or moral theology*]. In 1805–1809, in

line with the instruction to return to writing in Latin, he wrote *Institutiones ethicae christianae seu theologiae moralis*. Reyberger's approach was a clear departure from the usual casuistry of the time, offering a systematic philosophical foundation for a moral theology. At the end of each chapter he provides an extensive list of further literature, comprising not only enlightened Catholic authors but also in particular contemporary Protestant and philosophical writers, including Immanuel Kant, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Erhard Schmid, Johann Heinrich Abicht and Augustin Schelle, and also the anti-Kantians Johann Georg Heinrich Feder und Christian Garve.

The year of publication of the *Systematische Anleitung* coincides exactly with the time when the brief phase of greater openness had to give way to restoration impulses. While well received in enlightened circles, the work soon encountered resistance from the Church, with criticism levelled not least at the clear references to Kant. According to a report by Archbishop Migazzi in Vienna:

A lack of clarity results from the philosophical language he uses, taken from texts by Kant. Anyone who has not studied Kant's philosophy will have difficulty in understanding this language; and is it indeed advisable to encourage youth to read a philosophy such as Kant's, which is opposed, disputed and regarded as harmful by many of the most learned and truest Catholics?¹⁷⁹

In his speech in his own defence, Reyberger admits having read and studied Kant, although in another context he also clarifies some distinctions:

In our own day, a new philosophical system has emerged, through Kant, which like all its predecessors has its own language and terminology. Whatever one may think regarding the validity or invalidity of this system, it is undeniably the case that for several years it has been imparting a very distinctive form and tone to the texts of learned scholars in all disciplines. Anyone today who is entirely unfamiliar with the spirit and language of this system will only half understand all recent scholarly writings.¹⁸⁰

With regard to determination of the will *solely for the sake of the moral law* Reyberger distances himself from Kant:

Man's action is and must always be a striving for happiness; [...] but it must also be in accordance with the acceptable demands of reason. [...] Herewith there would originate from the general laws of reason and principle of happiness a composite supreme principle of morality which might be expressed as follows: *Strive so for happiness that your maxim may deserve the approval of every reasonable being.*¹⁸¹

Three of the four reports from faculty colleagues were favourable, and accordingly Reyberger's books – notwithstanding recurring criticism and placement on the index by the Church (1820) – remained in use until the 1830s.¹⁸²

Translated by John Jamieson

Kant and the Principality of Salzburg by Werner Sauer¹⁸³

Both politically and from the point of view of the history of ideas, the reception of Kant in the prince-archbishopric of Salzburg forms part of early Kantianism in southern Germany. Kant's doctrine began to gain acceptance in southern Germany towards the end of the 1780s, above all at the universities of Bamberg, Mainz und Würzburg, but also in Benedictine monasteries.¹⁸⁴ The pioneer of Kantianism in Bamberg was the philosopher Georg Eduard Daum (1752–1800), of whom it was later said that he was the first to give lectures that presented an impartial view of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [*The Critique of Pure Reason*] at a time when obscurantism must have sensed heresy and seduction in every syllable of Kant,¹⁸⁵ which may well have been intended as a reference to Benedikt Stattler (1728–1797), the rabid Bavarian adversary of Kant, and his *Anti-Kant* (1788).¹⁸⁶ At Mainz University it was the later Jacobins of Mainz, Anton Joseph Dorsch (1758–1819) and Felix Anton Blau (1754–1798), the former a philosopher, the latter a theologian, who helped Kant's philosophy to achieve its breakthrough.¹⁸⁷ In Würzburg it was represented by Maternus Reuß (1751–1798) from 1788 onwards. The great respect that Reuß enjoyed among supporters of Kant also contributed to the fact that, in 1792, he undertook a journey, accompanied by his fellow Benedictine monk, Conrad Stang (?–1827), to Königsberg to visit Kant, with the aid of a grant awarded by the Enlightenment-friendly Prince-Archbishop Franz Ludwig von Erthal (1730–1795), whose sphere of jurisdiction included Bamberg. Reuß was also in contact with Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823).¹⁸⁸

In 1789, Reuß energetically championed the acceptance of Kant at the Catholic universities in his essay *Soll man auf katholischen Universitäten Kants Philosophie erklären?* [*Should Kant's Philosophy be Expounded at Catholic Universities?*]. In it, he attempted to prove "that religion and ethics have enjoyed great advantages thanks to Kantian philosophy, and that they could not reproach it with any well-founded justification".¹⁸⁹ His intention is similar to that which Reinhold had pursued in his *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie*, [*Letters on Kantian Philosophy*], a work to which Reuß also makes explicit reference in his essay.¹⁹⁰ Kantian philosophy reveals the unshakeable ethical ground of religious knowledge in a practical rational belief in God and immortality, and in doing so purifies theology, since the latter "by denying rational theology the power to demonstrate the existence of God, a power which it claims is bad, assigns to that rational theology the great destiny of purging moral belief of both the coarse and the fine errors which have so far obscured it, and of preserving it from degeneration into superstition and unbelief for ever".¹⁹¹ In order to avoid the danger that Catholic universities might become isolated from scientific developments, and also the not unproblematic situation of the unregulated study of Kant by the

students, Reuß calls for a kind of private lecturer in Kantian philosophy at every Catholic university, which would serve the purpose of offering those students who have already completed a course in philosophy, and wish to study Kantian philosophy, a well-founded introduction to it: “Those [...] who, having completed courses of philosophy, apply themselves to other disciplines, and in doing so, alongside their bread-and-butter studies, wish to become more familiar with the state of the new philosophy and to penetrate to the very core of the Kantian system [...], should be able to find, at every well-organised university, a man who can explain to them the profundity of the Kantian system, at least in private lectures”.¹⁹²

This essay was included in the first collection of materials on Kantian philosophy, Karl Gottlob Hausius’ (1754–1825) *Materialien zur Geschichte der kritischen Philosophie* (1793) [*Materials on the History of Critical Philosophy*]. Augustin Zippe’s (1747–1816) proposal to appoint private lecturers in Kantian philosophy at Austrian universities, which was made to (and rejected by) the Viennese Committee for the Revision of Studies in 1798, may have been influenced by Reuß’ essay.

The *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung*

Salzburg took its place on an equal footing with the other centres of early southern German Kantianism, and perhaps one must even grant the archbishopric a certain special status, on account of the very significant journalistic role played in propagating Kantian thought by the *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung* [‘Upper German General Literary Journal’], which was published there. The Salzburg reception of Kant constituted the climax and conclusion of the Salzburg Enlightenment, which began to emerge – as elsewhere in Catholic southern Germany and the Danube monarchy – around the middle of the century. At the Benedictine University in Salzburg, which was originally committed to a strict Thomism, the gradual change in orientation towards modern philosophy and science occurred in the decade between 1740 and 1750.¹⁹³

At the same time as the decline of scholasticism, reformist Catholic movements began to assert themselves in the archbishopric.¹⁹⁴ In 1772, the election of Count Hieronymus Colloredo (1732–1812) as archbishop brought about the final swing towards ecclesiastical and secular enlightenment in Josephinist style. The astonishingly relaxed approach of the censor, the training of many people in Salzburg at Protestant universities, and lastly even the reaction in Bavaria, which manifested spectacularly in the persecution of the Illuminati, all contributed to the rise of the Enlightenment in Salzburg. As a result of the Bavarian reaction,

there came to Salzburg the ex-Jesuit Lorenz Hübner (1751–1807), who knew how to gather round him a circle of able assistants. In 1788, he started publishing the *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung*, at first together with Augustin Schelle (1742–1805), a Salzburg professor for world history and ethics, and then, from 1790 onwards, on his own. As a counterpart to Jena's *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* [General Literary Journal], it became the most important organ of the southern German Enlightenment. Among its contributors were Blau, Dorsch, Erhard and others.¹⁹⁵

As early as 1788, the magazine declared: "We would like to encourage people to take up the study of Kantian philosophy, which is still pursued too little in our parts".¹⁹⁶ It also published reviews of *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* [Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science] and the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* [Critique of Practical Reason]. In discussing Kant's major work of natural philosophy, the reviewer emphasised the fruitfulness of the attempt to read it, the value of which is revealed in seeing "how much can here be deducted *a priori* from one single given notion" – that of the movement, or of matter as the moveable in space – "in accordance with the laws of pure reason".¹⁹⁷ He sees in the work an important supplement to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [Critique of Pure Reason], "since both the application of the transcendental principles of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to physical nature, and the manifold considerations which Mr. Kant makes here on his whole system almost at every step, as well as the elucidations which he has to give about them spread a light which these principles could not possibly have done when presented in their generality".¹⁹⁸

An extensive and enthusiastic review is given of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* [Critique of Practical Reason], with which Kant "has provided a worthy counterpart to his *Critique of Speculative Reason*, and [...] has crowned his efforts to reform philosophy".¹⁹⁹ In deference to a coarse, yet widespread misunderstanding, drastically expressed in Schiller's well-known yet certainly not quite seriously intended distich about duty and inclination, the reviewer emphasises that "one of the main subjects of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is the principle not of discarding one's own happiness, but rather of assigning it to its own true, inferior place".²⁰⁰ After a lengthy listing of the contents, he finally comes to speak of the famous concluding section of the second *Critique* concerning the two subjects of respect, the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. Summarising the doctrine of this section, which is that only a strict method of reasoning can give adequate expression to the two subjects of respect, which otherwise simply lead to superstition and reverie, he writes, making a sharp dig at popular philosophy:

Only a Kant [...] was able to express so definitely, and at the same time so briefly, the rights and the uses of reason, even when pushed to the limits of investigating by those who so love to restrict it within arbitrarily placed constraints, and would like to gauge it after an all-too-hasty popularity; which is why it is recommended, especially to all those expiating patrons of shallowness who require their measure of reason in order to prove that seeking a greater anywhere is both useless and unnecessary, to pay heed to these few words [...].²⁰¹

The *Kritik der Urteilskraft* [*Critique of Judgement*] is received with the same applause, being just “as full of new, profound, fruitful and closely associated thoughts ... as the previous writings by this new legislator of philosophy; just as critically modest in resting on the narrow middle way between scepticism and dogmatism: these thoughts are presented in just as crowded and telescoped a way as in the previous writings, if not even more so”.²⁰² After its review of Kant’s *Kleine Schriften* [*Minor Writings*] (1793), which was greeted with equally unanimous applause, the journal was faced with the apparently impossible task of taking up a position on *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* [*Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*]. Even in 1793, the year of publication, the magazine published a review of Kant’s *Religionsschrift* [*Essay on Religion*], which in 1794 was followed by a second, by another reviewer, on account of the interest aroused by the first text. Although the first reviewer admits that in the general remarks on the second to fourth section of the work, about miracles, secrets and the means of grace “some claims are to be found which do not harmonise quite so well with the dogmas of some religious parties”, he does not try to hide his positive attitude to the work and closes with a committed acknowledgement:

Incidentally, every reasonable worshipper of the Christian religion would warmly offer his gratitude to the venerable old man who, [...] even in our days, sheds such a bright light on the unappreciated harmony between reason, religion and a certain faith. May the best German minds unite their powers with this man, inspect his ideas honestly and, if they then find them, as far as possible, to be true, then make them generally known!²⁰³

In the second half of the 1790s, the *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung* also contributed to the development of post-critical idealism and became affiliated with the ‘more modern’ Fichte. Yet Kant, too, continued to be discussed with great attention. The short essay *Zum ewigen Frieden* [*On Eternal Peace*] was greeted enthusiastically. The reviewer regarded its contents more or less as a criterion for correct philosophising, based on the criticist principles of legal philosophy, and opposed the opinion uttered even “by some critical philosophers, of whom one would not have presumed it”, namely “that everything, regardless of the profound insights and the original views which characterise

this little work so completely, will remain but a philosophical wish”.²⁰⁴ Rather more distanced is the judgement passed on the *Streit der Fakultäten* [*Dispute of the Faculties*], above all on the famous thesis that the process of becoming conscious triggered by the French Revolution was proof of the progress of humanity.²⁰⁵ Finally, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* [*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective*], which once again met with unanimous approval, is regarded as the conclusion of Kant’s life’s work, in which the “readers who have followed him in the course which has led from the beginnings to this latest product”, are once again led back “to the goal that was sketched out at the start”, in order to educate “themselves for their dealings with other human beings (i. e. with reasonable human beings)”.²⁰⁶

As in general, so also in the *Oberdeutsche allgemeinen Literaturzeitung*, Reinhold’s elementary philosophy formed the link between Kant and Fichte. Reinhold’s *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens* [*Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation*] was greeted as a work which “must surely be epoch-making in the history of the latest speculative philosophy”.²⁰⁷ It was “the most important product of the new speculative philosophy since Kant’s reforms, nothing less than a commentary on the Critique of Reason, independent, yet forming a continuum with it in the greatest harmony”, whereby “the realm of philosophy has also expanded into an undisputed new province, the theory of the pure faculty of the representation” and to remedy “previous misunderstandings of Kantian Philosophy [...] at least a few big strides have been taken in the process of convergence”.²⁰⁸ The enthusiasm for Reinhold was short-lived; in 1794, in its review of the second volume of the *Beiträge*, the journal no longer held out any hope that elementary philosophy could end the philosophical controversy.²⁰⁹ As a consequence of this, the *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung* also proceeded to transfer its allegiance to Fichte, whose theory of science was immediately received with approval. When Kant in 1799 distanced himself from the theory of science in a public declaration, the journal let it be known that it was siding with Fichte: without making any comment, they printed Kant’s declaration and then followed it with no less than two polemic counter-declarations at once, one of which was written by Schelling.²¹⁰

In this year, the *Oberdeutsche allgemeine Literaturzeitung* moved to Munich, where reactionism had come to an end upon the accession to power of Max Joseph I. Through its work over the course of a dozen years, the journal had made Salzburg an excellent centre for the propagation of Kant’s thought and that of his successors in the southern German area, and in so doing had created a worthy antithesis to the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung* in Jena. It could therefore not be missing from the short report, probably written by Reuß about the reception of Kant in southern Germany, which Kant, without mentioning the author by name,




Fig. 17: Matern Reuß, *Should Catholic Universities Teach Kant's Philosophy?*

sent to Borowski on 2 October 1793 with the request that he publish it in his biographical collection. The report closed with the words: "The Salzburg literary journal contributes greatly to further dissemination".²¹¹

Kant in the Philosophy Education at the University of Salzburg

At Salzburg University, Kant's influence became tangible soon after 1790. Schelle, for instance, attempted to bring the old and the new moral philosophy closer together in his essay *Über den Grund der Sittlichkeit* [*On the Foundations of Morals*] (1791), which was accorded the honour of being included in Hausius' collection. Schelle writes that, in the dispute of the parties