Tobias Nicklas / Candida R. Moss / Christopher Tuckett / Joseph Verheyden (eds.)

The Other Side: Apocryphal Perspectives on Ancient Christian "Orthodoxies"

V&R

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Foreword

We have a vast quantity of source materials from the past, much of it in only fragmentary form. In part we engage critically with such materials to seek to determine their perspectives, their function, and perhaps too possible events of the past (connected with their 'ideas') which might lie behind them. But if we also wish to try to construct from then a 'story', and perhaps one which justifies the description 'history', we have to work with categories that help to bring order to the material studied, as well as to the ideas, concepts and events concerned. At the same time, such categories can often decisively affect our own way of looking at things and our evaluation of the sources. Thus some critical reflection about the categories we use is necessary and essential for any historical work. Categories which we might use from our own time are in great danger of being anachronistic when applied to the past; but equally there are dangers of simply taking over categories from the past, especially from antiquity, using unexamined perspectives from an earlier time. This is particularly the case when certain categories are not neutral, but have been used in a polemical way to draw boundary lines, separating some groups, and with them their connected ideas and texts, from others. An extreme case, which makes for great difficulties today, is the use of the category of 'apocryphal' to refer to one group (however loosely defined) of 'Christian' texts. On the one hand the implications, already present in antiquity, that such texts are 'false', and on the other hand that they are 'secret' and thereby very 'valuable', are still prevalent today and affect the way in which we engage with the texts. Other categories can also create problems, for example:

1. The division between 'apocryphal' and 'canonical' literature creates problems in various ways. Many texts which we today would call 'apocryphal' (or which, in Dieter Lührmann's terminology, 'became apocryphal') originated at a time when we cannot speak of a 'canon' of New Testament writings; making a distinction between canonical and apocryphal texts would, at the level of the production of the texts, as well as for a significant part of the reception of these texts in antiquity, be anachronistic. Even writers from the Constantinian and post-Constantinian era, who do have a clear idea about 'canonical' literature, do not simply assume a two-fold division of literature as being either 'canonical' or 'apocryphal': they use additional categories such as 'ecclesiastical literature', or things 'useful for the soul'. Further, other texts which we today might call 'apocryphal' (e. g. the *Doctrine of Addai* or the *Acts of Titus*)

played an important role in at least certain parts of the church to establish the identity and authority of some Christians.

2. Other categories, which sometime lie behind work on apocryphal literature, are equally problematic. Apocryphal texts (or texts which became apocryphal) are not simply 'heretical', nor were they created by, or for, groups which one can describe as 'heretical'. They cannot simply be placed in a simple binary opposition to 'orthodox'. This has to do not only with what has been said above, but also with the fact that words such as 'orthodox', 'heretical' or 'heterodox' are just as problematic as 'apocryphal' in that they are dependent on the perspectives and images of the development of the church which go back to writers of the 2nd century such as Irenaeus of Lyons.

The proposed volume of essays here is based on the papers given at a conference held in London (under the auspices of the University of Notre Dame) on 3–5 July 2014. The essays are concerned above all to show where the limitations in the categories discussed above play a role; but they also seek to show where these limitations might be overcome and hence how we perhaps should work with new categories (e. g. the significance, function and authority of texts in different contexts; 'First & Second Church') in order to understand better the significance of 'apocryphal' texts (or texts which 'became apocryphal') within the history of early Christianity, doing justice to the fact that this history was dynamic and multi-dimensional.

The following questions play a specific role:

1. In what contexts, and among which groups, were texts which became apocryphal used? Where did apocryphal texts play a role in contexts which we today might describe as 'orthodox'?

2. How far should the categories mentioned above (and other related ones) be re-thought, or even replaced, if we are to do justice to the realities of the past and to describe those realities better and/or more appropriately?

September 2016
Tobias Nicklas, Candida Moss, Christopher Tuckett & Joseph Verheyden

Christoph Markschies (Humboldt University Berlin)

Models of the Relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy"

From Antiquity to Modern Scholarship

The topic given to me by the organisers of the conference at which this paper originated sounds rather old-fashioned; or at least it sounds as if some old-fashioned material is about to be served up. Nearly every collection of early Christian Apocrypha contains at least a brief history of scholarship; indeed, the topic has been addressed specifically, among others, by Simone Claude Mimouni[1]. Nearly every one of these histories of scholarship deals in some way with the relationship between the so-called Apocrypha and orthodoxy, although the trend now, at least in the German-speaking world, is to follow Dieter Lührmann in referring to "texts that have become apocryphal" ("apokryph gewordenen Schriften") and, instead of the normative term "orthodoxy", to use the probably no less problematic and seemingly purely descriptive term "Majority Church" (or "Mainstream Church")[2]. On the English- and French-language research landscape there are similar examples of modifications of traditional terminology that do not require further treatment here. The new terminology, based on certain fashions of recent years, clearly has no impact on the core finding: when we are talking about the so-called Apocrypha, regardless of how the group of writings thus described is circumscribed, we must also consider what has been called orthodoxy since antiquity. This naturally also applies to the history of scholarship, comprising almost 20 pages, which I myself wrote as part of the "Main Introduction" to the seventh edition of the collection of New Testament Apocrypha started by Edgar Hennecke and continued by Wilhelm Schneemelcher, which now bears the title *Antike Christliche Apokryphen* – Ancient Christian Apocrypha[3].

But if the problem of circumscribing a group of writings in a more or less coherent manner under the heading of "Apocrypha" (or, as we have seen, "texts that have become apocryphal") is generally accompanied by a history of schol-

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1   C. Markschies, "Neutestamentliche Apokryphen" – Bemerkungen zu Geschichte und Zukunft einer von Edgar Hennecke im Jahr 1904 begründeten Quellensammlung, *Apocryphes* 9 (1998), 97–132 and S.C. Mimouni, "Le concept d'apocryphité dans le christianisme ancien et médiéval", in *Apocryphité: Histoire d'un concept transversal aux religions du livre. En hommage à Pierre Geoltrain* (BEHE 113; Turnhout, 2002), 1–30.

2   C. Markschies, "Haupteinleitung" in *Antike christliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung. I. Band: Evangelien und Verwandtes,* ed. C. Markschies & J. Schröter in Verbindung mit A. Heiser (Tübingen, [7]2012 [7. Auflage der von Edgar Hennecke begründeten und Wilhelm Schneemelcher fortgeführten Sammlung der neutestamentlichen Apokryphen]), 1–180: 111–114 (here cited as ACA).

3   ACA I/1, 90–114.

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arship, and in that history of scholarship the relationship between the "Apocrypha" (or "texts that have become apocryphal") and "orthodoxy" (or rather Christian Majority or Mainstream Church) plays a very prominent role, this raises the simple question of why I should speak about "Models of the relation between "Apocrypha" and "orthodoxy" from antiquity to modern scholarship" – *bis repetitio non placent.* However, having now accepted the title proposed for this paper (in what was perhaps a brief mental lapse), I must now, for better or worse, attempt to avoid bringing the proverbial owls to Athens and re-covering already well-trodden ground.

But how can I find a new approach to well-known ideas without simply conjuring up a few forgotten recent scholars of Apocrypha, or trotting out a few unheralded ancient critiques of the writings commonly counted among the "Apocrypha"? It seems to me that I can perhaps offer something new by first speaking specifically about "models", then actually form models for a grouping of the history of scholarship, and in a third step, demonstrate the appropriateness of these models on the basis of a few characteristic examples. The rest can be read in the histories of scholarship already mentioned.

Let me begin with a few introductory remarks on "models". "Models" are, as the German philosopher of science Jürgen Mittelstraß once formulated it, "recreations of a real or imaginary object with the aim of learning something about it or though it"[4]. They are intended to simplify a complex reality or illuminate convoluted structures. In this sense they are, as the physicist Ludwig Bolzmann formulated it in the 1902 *Encyclopedia Britannica,* a "tangible representation", although the English word tangible, with regard to mathematical models which of course lack any tactile quality in a literal sense, is rather poorly expressed by the German term "berührbar" – touchable, but is rather more like "greifbar" – graspable in the intellectual sense[5]. The advantage – both literally and figuratively – of the visual and tangible quality of models is clearly again though there is the ambivalence just mentioned, that non-tangible diversity is reduced. Thus the model lacks some part of the reality which it seeks to represent. In other words, a model presents a reduced version of the reality which it intends to embody. We can only escape from this tragic quandary, of which the Berlin art historian Horst Bredekamp remarked "the condition of resolution is also the basis of a captivity", if we regard a model in the tradition of Plato and Augustine as an independent intellectual entity (according to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in debate with John Locke)[6]. For Leibniz, in the Platonic tradition such independent entities have the power to

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4   J. Mittelstraß, "Anmerkungen zum Modellbegriff", in *Modelle des Denkens. Streitgespräch in der Wissenschaftlichen Sitzung der Versammlung der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften am 12. Dezember 2003* (Debatte Heft 2; Berlin, 2005), 65–67: 65.

5   Citation follows: H. Bredekamp & K. Pinkau, Einladung zum akademischen Gespräch – Rundbrief, in *Modelle des Denkens,* 9–12: 10.33

6   Additional evidence in F. Kaulbach, s.v. "Modell", in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (vol. VI; Darmstadt, 1984), 45–47: 45.

shape reality. They then create more reality rather than reducing it. If, by contrast, we join John Locke in regarding a "model" from an empirical and nominalistic viewpoint as a mere abstraction of existing "reality" (and recent philosophical debate seems to side with Locke over Leibniz), any formation of a model implies automatic and inevitable reduction. In spite of the general post-modern preference for the anti-essentialist description of "model", what remains remarkable, in my view, in Leibniz's position is the assertion that models have a reality-structuring power: they lead – in view of our dilemma, we could even say seduce – us to see the individual in the many. Or in post-modern terms: they possess the power essentially to force people into discourses. If we clearly recognise this fundamental structure of models, we see that some of the objections raised in recent times against monolithic constructions of the history of ancient Christianity based on the difficulty of drawing borders between the different forms of "Christianities" (in quotation marks) also get to the fundamental structure of models: in a model of reduced dimensions, the borders of the modelled phenomenon are by definition sharper than in a 1:1 representation of an object. We can see this even more clearly in the widely controversial example of the Gnostics: In a typological definition of this phenomenon on the basis of certain philosophical and theological positions, as I attempted some time ago, the fuzzy borders (as David Brakke rightly pointed out in the introduction to his book entitled *The Gnostics*[7]), of the "complex and often strikingly different mythologies" of the writings designated as "Gnostic" are indeed drawn more sharply than they would be in a more complex representation of the phenomena – the diffuse borders, as in any model, are drawn more sharply for didactic reasons in order to illuminate an obscure phenomenon. Also the definition "as a social category", as Brakke himself attempts in modifying the views of his teacher Bentley Layton, reduces reality and draws borders more sharply than in the texts that the modelling describes. This becomes clear when Brakke himself first notes that the name "Gnostic" functioned to distinguish a "school of thought" from their contemporaries in the second century[8]. This sociological modelling is supplemented in the further course of his book by various pieces of contextual information, such as a description of the "Gnostics" as "ancient religious people" who were "interested in 'mystical knowledge'"[9], or the assertion that the religious people in question developed myth and ritual, described as "one distinctive attempt to tell the story of God and humanity in the light of the Jesus event"[10]. In other words: even those who are committed "to the blurring of the lines between these different forms of early Christianity" (as the invitation to contribute to this volume formulated it), must draw some borders for linguistic reasons alone. The question of whether a particular model has gone

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7 D. Brakke, The Gnostics. Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, Mass. & London, 2010), 26 f.
8 Brakke, *The Gnostics,* 47 f.
9 Brakke, *The Gnostics*, 27.
10 Brakke, *The Gnostics,* 42.

too far with respect to the unavoidable reduction of reality, for example in that the model has been over-simplified or misdrawn, can only be determined once all phenomena that a model intends to describe have been examined.

After these lengthy preliminary remarks, it will be clear without further ado that in the title of the essay itself, "Models of the Relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" from Antiquity to Modern Scholarship", – we have the formation of a model, and not only later in our consideration of the models that are the subject of this essay. In other words, the title proposed to me seems to predicate that there are two entities, "Apocrypha" and "orthodoxy", that have some relationship to each other, or more philosophically precisely, that are in a relation to each other. This is unquestionably an elegant model for a much more complex, perhaps even obscurely complex reality. I say "seems" because the quotation marks used with the words "Apocrypha" and "orthodoxy" in the title proposed to me naturally highlight that it is not so simple when it comes to the things which these terms describe. For my following remarks, I will begin by simply pretending that there are no quotation marks around the words and suppose that there are a finite number of generally recognized, contextually unambiguous definitions for them. When one is clear about the fact that the lecture title "Models of the Relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" from Antiquity to Modern Scholarship" already provides a constructed model, it also becomes clearer that this model relies greatly on certain prerequisites, and not only with respect to the two terms "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy". Another prerequisite for the construction of this model is, of course, the fact that it is proposed as a dual entity. By doing so, it is assumed that we *can* in this case take a dual approach. And presumably we only accept the strong prerequisites of such a model with a dual approach without further explanation, because we love thinking in dual terms anyway and therefore often tend to reconstruct the history of early Christianity in such dualistic terms. Let me name a few of the particularly popular dual pairs: "orthodoxy" and "heresy", "Arianism" and "Niceanism", "Judeo-Christianity" and "Gentile Christianity" – it almost seems as if the notion that antithetically constructed dualities are the motor of historical development, which was made popular once again in the history of Early Christianity by Ferdinand Christian Baur[11], still continues to have a profound influence on our reconstruction of the past. And if one bears this in mind, then the traditional duality of "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" is not only highly charged with prerequisites, but is also highly suggestive. What this duality suggests is namely, on the one hand, that there are *only* two entities, for which a description of the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" is relevant, and not three or even several. On the other hand, the duality suggests that, in the sense of Aristotle, τὰ πρός τι applies for this relationship[12], that something exists in relation to something and only in relation to

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11 Cf. now: J. Zachhuber, *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From F C Baur to Ernst Troeltsch* (Oxford, 2013), 25–72.
12 Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* V 15 1021 b 6–8.

something, that is, it is a something: accordingly, Apocrypha must be understood in relation to Orthodoxy, fully in the classical sense that what we understand as "Apocrypha" are those writings that have not been accepted into the authoritative canon of the Biblical writings that have been established as such by Orthodoxy. On the one hand, it requires only few words to be clear about the fact that "Apocrypha" has been defined in this way for a long time; but on the other hand, it is just as clear that such a definition only covers a part of the materials, that is, those that have been compiled in relevant collections and lists and identified as being "Apocrypha". I wrote about this circumstance surrounding the definition of "Apocrypha" which underlies the first volume of the *Early Christian Apocrypha* published in 2012: "Apocrypha" "have not become – and to some extent also should not become – canonical. In parts they were a genuine expression of the religious life of the Majority Church and have often had a great influence on theology and the visual arts." When we apply this definition to the question at hand, this means that with respect to these writings which "should not become canonical" at least, the question concerning the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" does not really bring us beyond a specific point, because these texts are clearly understood as belonging within the context that is more or less happily described using the term "Orthodoxy". There is no need for me to expand on this correlation at this point, because I analysed the "Apocrypha as a testimony to the piety of the Majority Church" using the so-called Gospel of Bartholomew as an example some time ago[13]. More interesting for our purposes here is the observation that, if we want to describe adequately the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy", we need to include – in addition to the duality just mentioned – the third term "Biblical canon". This term is of course, like the two other terms "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy", notoriously difficult, solely because no further explanation is given as to whether we are talking about, for example, the "Biblical canon" of Origen on which he bases his writings, or the "Biblical canon" of a provincial synod in Phrygian Laodicea to which we can hardly give a reliable date and which obviously describes in its lists a wide consensus within the Early Christian Majority Church and not only the views of the bishops of a single Church province. But how can we now construct a model for a "Relation between 'Apocrypha' and 'Orthodoxy'" under the proviso that these two – "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" – adequately describe the relation or can be complemented without further ado by other aspects such as the Biblical canon? The most constitutive method for grouping together entities in a relation in my opinion arranges these entities according to the degree of *stability* of the relation in question: on the one hand, if we are to have groupings of different models of a relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy", this relation can – like every other relation – be *stable* between two *stable* entities. However, this relation can

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13 C. Markschies, "Apokryphen als Zeugnisse mehrheitskirchlicher Frömmigkeit – das Beispiel des Bartholomaeus-Evangeliums", in *The Apocryphal Gospels within the Context of Early Christian Theology,* ed. J. Schröter (BETL 260; Leuven/Paris & Walpole, Mass., 2013), 333–355.

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also be *dynamic,* and in the extreme case dynamic between *entities* that are *themselves dynamic.* Such a dynamic is evident in the phrase by Dieter Lührmann mentioned earlier: "have become apocryphal". The dynamic exists in the fact that something that was not originally apocryphal was then transformed into an "Apocryphus". Terminology that was originally static has become dynamic here. There are to some extent comparable terminological transformations, also with respect to the second term. When, for example, Rowan Williams critically discusses the concept of "Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy" (for instance, in the Festschrift for Henry Chadwick in 1989)[14], then he unmistakeably makes clear that, just as "has become apocryphal" exists, so does "has become orthodox". The term "Orthodoxy" is then understood less as a theologically normative term and more as a descriptive, historiographical expression. If the term "Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy" is to make sense at all then it refers, according to Williams, to an ensemble of dogmas which, when transformed, characterise the confession of faith of the imperial synods of Nicaea and Constantinople which became orthodoxy. In other words: when apparently stable entities are described as dynamic structures, which perhaps even change in different times, then what emerges is of course a picture of great plurality. Accordingly, if the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" describes dynamic and not stable entities, one would instead speak of relations in the plural, or of configurations.

All of what I have just talked about is less theoretical than might appear at first glance. In the classical ancient concept of orthodoxy, "Orthodoxy" is of course by no means a dynamic entity, but rather – and we know the famous words *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est* ("what is always, what is everywhere and what is believed by all"[15]) – a static entity and, according to the common Early Christian concept, is even a static entity that remains valid for eternity.

Bearing this notion of orthodoxy in mind, it is also true that the second entity "Apocrypha" in line with this model of the relations is again fundamentally a stable entity – anything that as a text did not conform with the form and content of the orthodox was never canonical, even if the definitive declaration of what constitutes the canonical and/or non-canonical did not come from the Majority Church until later.

Indeed, one must remind oneself again and again that this model of a stable orthodoxy with which we are all somehow familiar, and which defines what "Apocrypha" are against the background of a fixed canon, describes only a part of the relevant texts with any real precision in Early Christianity. Here a few observations that can verify this impression. For example, Origen speaks in his homily on the first psalm, which was written during his first phase of life in Alexandria before 232 AD, of "twenty-two books that belong to the Bible" and therefore –

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14 R. Williams, Does it make sense to speak of pre-Nicene orthodoxy, in *The Making of Orthodoxy. Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick,* ed. R. Williams (Cambridge, 1989), 1–23.

15 Vincentius Lerinensis, *Commonitorium* 2,5 (Vinzenz von Lerinum, *Commonitorium,* ed. M. Fiedrowicz, trans. Cl. Barthold [Mülheim, Mosel, 2011], 186).

as the rare term ἐνδιάθηκος shows – refers rather to a literary unity than to one determined by the Church, because the term ἐνδιάθηκος is actually at home in a literary context: in the Lexicon of Hesychius, for example, which was compiled by a pagan scholar in the fifth century AD, the word ἐνδιάθηκος is explained as follows: ἐνδιάθηκος λόγος· πᾶς ἔγραπτος, a written text is such when "everything has been explained in writing"[16]. The information on the number twenty-two (matching the number of letters in them) in Eusebius in the passage of his *Church History* is the first to add an, as it were, metaphysical reasoning to the more literary-based reference to a collection of books against the background of a Platonising, essentialist theory of language. The actual existence of a tangible (in the truest sense of the word) book collection is archetypically justified as a reflection of the letters of the alphabet. "Apocrypha" are then simply those writings that are not contained within the existing collection recorded in writing.

Similarly, Eusebius, the grand disciple of Origen, also uses very few static formulations in his famous passage about "the (already previously) mentioned writings of the New Testament" in the third book of his *Church History*[17]: certain writings belong to the "recognised" ones (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν ὁμολογουμένοις). However, Eusebius uses a word here which describes the dynamic act of building consensus far removed from any notion of the static; ὁμολογέω here means: I agree with the statements of another person, I show an interest in the proposals of another person, I agree with him in certain modes of conduct and customs[18]. In other words, Eusebius is referring back to a consensus which must be renewed in each case and which cannot be renewed if certain deviating consensuses are present. And this is precisely how the status of other writings is described: these belong to the "disputed" texts (τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων), and so, once again an extremely dynamic, communicative term is used – when a matter is disputed, the matter of whether the debate might not at some point end in a consensus has not yet been concluded. Within the body of disputed writings, there are some that are accepted by a greater number; instead of a theological, essentialist evaluation, Eusebius' categorisation is, to put it pointedly, dominated by statistics, because the group of disputed writings includes those texts that "are known by most" (or "are familiar to most") (γνωρίμων δ' οὖν ὅμως τοῖς πολλοῖς), for example, the Epistle of James or the Epistle of Jude, the second Epistle of Peter or the so-called second and third Epistles of John. Eusebius' categorisation does not gain more certainty until the last group, the "false" writings; what we have here is no longer a purely static description of text reception, but rather a clear, as it were juridical statement in which a falsehood and therefore a deceit is verified. However, this value judgement is also not particularly theological. As we know, the Bishop of Caesarea counts among the false writings (ἐν τοῖς νόθοις) "the Acts of Paul, the so-called

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16 Hesychius, ed. M. Schmidt, 530,36.
17 Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica* III 25,1–7 (GCS Eusebius II/1, 250,19–252,24 Schwartz); German
    translation in in ACA I/1, 154–156.
18 O. Michel, s.v. "ὁμολογέω κτλ.", *ThWNT* V (1954), 199–220: 199.

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Shepherd, the Apocalypse of Peter, furthermore the Epistle of Barnabus and the so-called Didache and, as I have said, the Apocalypse of John, if one holds it to be good, which some, as mentioned, reject, but which others include among the recognised writings". And one cannot make the dynamic nature of this recognition, which has to do very much with certain communication situations, clearer than in the closing remark about the Apocalypse of John: "if one holds it to be good" (εἰ φανείη); this is how a person writes who is either not quite sure about which direction he himself tends towards or who, in view of the very divided status of the debate, considers his own opinion on the matter to be insignificant. The dynamic constitution of the corresponding judgement plays a role even in the area of the apparently objective categorisation concerning the falsification of texts – and one gets the impression that here it is also the consensus that decides the day, and not the Church or an abstract theological norm.

It is not until Cyril of Jerusalem in the middle of the fourth century that the, as it were, academic circumstances in how consensus was arrived at concerning certain texts – which in Origen and Eusebius tends to remind one of philological auditoriums in Alexandria – is placed within another context: "If you should ever hear a heretic …"[19]. The Bishop of Jerusalem made it quite clear to his catechumens that it wasn't worth their while to proceed along the literarily grounded, dynamically structured path on the way to building consensus because, in the view of those who were not allowed to take part in the discourse, who nevertheless wanted to have their say like the heretics, the already standardised texts were valid: "If you know nothing of the generally accepted books, why make any efforts to learn the disputed books. Read the divine writings". The dynamic process of collective recognition, which relied on majorities, gives way to a paternalistic pedagogy in which others have already long since reached a consensus and recommend those without a say simply to recognise and accept this consensus.

I have gone into the trio of ancient authors Origen, Eusebius and Cyril because this can save us from the belief that the clear process of dynamisation that traditional static models have undergone is a result of modern research, or even a direct consequence of certain philosophical contributions towards the discourse in the twentieth century. In other words, there were dynamic models of the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" long before the linguistic and cultural turn of the last century. If we are looking for an exact answer to the question of when and why dynamic models took the place of static ones and vice versa, referring to the modernity of the modern and the assumed ground-breaking influence of certain anti-essentialist philosophical propositions will not suffice.

As we draw to a close, it is time to undertake a critical examination of this argument by looking more closely at what form the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" takes, particularly with respect to the dynamics of this relation and in terms of its feeling of obligation towards the linguistic, if not

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19 Cyrillus Hierosolymitanus, *Catecheses* IV 33 (I, 124 Reischl/Rupp, German translation in *ACA* I/1, 157).

towards the cultural turn. In the proposal put forward by Tobias Nicklas eight years ago concerning how to deal with the term "Christian Apocrypha"[20], the initial focus is on the literal meaning of the texts and text is understood in line with the demands of contemporary literary studies as a dynamic entity which is newly constituted in each case in a more or less orderly interaction between a linguistic entity and a recipient ("however, a recipient is necessary if a linguistic entity is to be *recognised* as a structured network that bears more meaning than the single words that make it up and therefore as a text")[21]. In his approach to the subject matter, which for Nicklas is grounded in literary terms, he also does not want use the canon as a criterion for determining the "apocryphal" nature of the "Apocrypha", but more or less wants them to be seen as collections of Christian Biblical writings that existed as books or groups of books, and in doing so he basically takes the term "Orthodoxy" out of a static category, placing it instead into a dynamic one: "In any case, a disparaging notion of the term "Apocrypha" in the sense of "contrary to the canon" or "heretical" should be avoided at all costs"[22]. Describing the relation between "Apocryphal" and "Biblical" texts with the aid of the literary category of the "privileged hypotext" (themes, motifs or contents of the "Biblical" hypotext play a decisive role in understanding essential information which the "apocryphal" hypertext aims at)[23] assumes dynamic relations between several entities or actants, for example, a "model reader" posited with Umberto Ecco in mind[24].

If one now asks about the specific difference between an ancient model, which reconstructs dynamically the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" (as in Origen and Eusebius) and a contemporary one (as in Nicklas), what first of all springs to mind are the structural analogies: both the Alexandrian theologians Origen and Eusebius as well as the Regensburg theologian Nicklas assign their contemporary recipients a decisive role in positioning a written text. The ancient and the contemporary theologian both fall back on contemporary standards from the area of literary studies and consequently, when researching into the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" from the ancient to the modern field of study, one will not be able to reconstruct a perfectly straight-line teleology which leads from theologically normative dogma to the anti-essentialist, compact description that is grounded in literary studies. A model of ascertaining truth by building consensus that almost reminds one of Habermas greatly influ-

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20 T. Nicklas, "Semiotik – Intertextualität – Apokryphität: Eine Annäherung an den Begriff 'christlicher Apokryphen'", *Apocrypha* 17 (2006), 55–78; cf. also ibid., "Christliche Apokryphen als Spiegel der Vielfalt frühchristlichen Lebens: Schlaglichter, Beispiele und methodische Probleme", *Annali di storia dell'esegesi* 23 (2006), 27–44 and ibid., "'Écrits apocryphes chrétiens'. Ein Sammelband als Spiegel eines weitreichenden Paradigmenwechsels in der Apokryphenforschung", *Vigiliae Christianae* 61 (2007), 70–95.

21 Nicklas, "Semiotik – Intertextualität – Apokryphität", 59.

22 Nicklas, "Semiotik – Intertextualität – Apokryphität", 59.

23 Nicklas, "Semiotik – Intertextualität – Apokryphität", 68.

24 Nicklas, "Semiotik – Intertextualität – Apokryphität", 71 f.

ences, albeit covertly, the views of the Alexandrian theologians who at the same time want to be philologists.

It would be interesting at this juncture to add some comments about the static models – both in history and in the present day; however, I do not have the space for that here. I only have enough space left for one concluding question: in view of our findings, what sense does it make, if at all, to ask about the relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy"? Does the person who asks such a question not remain the prisoner, as it were, of a model which we have been discussing for eighty years now following the publication of the well-known monograph by Walter Bauer (*Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei* or *Orthodoxy and Heresy* first published in 1934[25])? What groups, what individuals, what writings should even be examined with the term "Orthodoxy" in mind? I admit that when faced with this term and the endlessly repetitive debate which it necessarily triggers, I am overcome by a mixture of boredom and anger. The organisers of this volume have nevertheless held on to the term "Orthodoxy" – presumably for well-considered reasons – and were obviously not asking about the exclusionary view of "Orthodoxies" and "Apocrypha", which is apparent in their use of plurals and in the use of inverted commas in the conference title "Apocryphal Perspectives on Ancient Christian Orthodoxies", but are rather far more interested in the view of Orthodoxy held by the "others" apparent in the title "The Other Side". And I have perhaps contributed less to this main theme of our volume than I have to the subject given to me, namely "Models of the Relation between "Apocrypha" and "Orthodoxy" from Antiquity to Modern Scholarship". However, it has perhaps become clear that, in my opinion, the theme of this volume – namely the view of the "Apocrypha" towards the "Orthodoxies" – if it does not lead us to ask more precise questions like the question, for example, about how so-called Gnostic groups saw "the other" Christians according to the statements of certain writings, it would once again lead to very general statements. The materials that we traditionally subsume under the term "Apocrypha" are too disparate, too colourful to achieve any other results – however, so that we do not conclude in a tone of resignation, it can be said that the apocryphal literature is a wonderful field in which to practice speaking in methodically precise terms and to critically analyse time and again the applied models to ascertain how adequate they still are. If I have been able to demonstrate this in this essay then a great deal has already been achieved.

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25 Cf. on Bauer at lengh: C. Markschies, *Christian Theology and Its Institutions in the Early Roman Empire. Prolegomena to a History of Early Christian Theology,* trans. W. Coppins (Waco, Texas, 2015), 303–331.

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Beyond "Canon"

Christian Apocrypha and Pilgrimage

In the Catalonian city of Tarragona, which was once the ancient capital of the Roman province *Hispania citerior,* a medieval Catholic cathedral towers on the site of a former Roman Temple. Although it was officially dedicated to St Mary, another female saint is featured inside the cathedral: both the iconography of the high altar and the main altar where the Eucharist is celebrated depict scenes from the apocryphal *Acts of Paul and Thecla,* a part of the apocryphal *Acts of Paul.*[1] This may appear surprising, since the *Acts of Paul* were viewed as false teaching as early as the end of the second century CE by Tertullian. In his tractate *De baptismo* 17, Tertullian wrote:

"But if certain Acts of Paul, which are falsely so named, claim the example of Thecla for allowing women to teach and to baptize, let men know that in Asia the presbyter who compiled that document, thinking to add of his own to Paul's reputation, was found out, and though he professed he had done it out of love for Paul, was deposed from his position. How could we believe that Paul should give a female power to teach and to baptize, when he did not allow a woman even to learn by her own right? Let them keep silence, he says, and ask their husbands at home (cf. 1 Cor 14.35)."[2]

What at first sight (and from our modern perspective) looks like an ancient Church father's decisive rejection of an apocryphal text – in effect, its exclusion from (proto-)orthodox circles – may have simply been one (more or less unheard) voice with little influence on the reception of the text (and, even less, on its female protagonist).[3] At least in certain regions, such as Tarragona with its very special

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1   Regarding the complex history of the origins of Acts of Paul and their relation to Acts of Paul and Thecla, see G.E. Snyder, Acts of Paul. The Formation of a Pauline Corpus (WUNT II.352; Tübingen: Mohr, 2013).

2   Translation according to E. Evans (ed.), Tertullian's Homily on Baptism (London: SPCK, 1964), 36–7.

3   Interestingly, the Acts of Thecla have been preserved on various miniature codices, which show that the text captured interest for a long time; in addition, the later Life and Miracles of Thecla expanded the impact of this extraordinary saint. For more information see S.F. Johnson, The Life and Miracles of Thekla: A Literary Study (Hellenic Studies 13; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).

local traditions about Paul,[4] the figure of Thecla and the stories about her were too important to condemn or neglect.

There are, of course, also written sources about the use of the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* in antiquity.[5] For example, on her journeys to and from the Holy Land the pilgrim Egeria[6] (ca. 400 CE) used to read the biblical passages about the events which (allegedly) happened at the very places she visited (see *Itin. Eger.* 4.3); very often these readings were connected to prayer and even liturgical contexts.[7] When Egeria and her companions passed Tarsus they used the opportunity to visit the "martyrium of holy Thecla" in the Isaurian Seleucia (today's Silifke).[8] After a description of the place where she happily meets the deaconess Marthana, a previous acquaintance from Jerusalem, we read:

"In God's name I arrived at the martyrium, and we had a prayer there, *and read the whole Acts of the holy Thecla;* and I gave heartful thanks to God for his letting me fulfil all my desires so completely, despite all my unworthiness" (*Itin. Eger.* 23.5).[9]

The text does not specify whether Egeria (and her companions) received a copy of the *Acts* from the nuns of the monastery or if she already had a (miniature) codex of the text in her luggage.[10] Be that as it may, the way that Egeria describes reading the "whole Acts of the holy Thecla" is certainly not an exception: because of the stories told about her in this writing (usually labelled "apocryphal"!), Thecla is called "holy". Egeria describes her own act of reading the text in a simple manner, as if such a reading was unspectacular and perhaps even ordinary. In other words: in a context which can by no means be called "heretical", a text (which was condemned by a person like Tertullian for telling lies about Paul)

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4   For more information see D. Eastman, Paul the Martyr: The Cult of the Apostle in the Latin West (SBL Writings of the Greco-Roman World Supplement Series 4; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 144–53. On the broader ancient and medieval reception and impact of the figure of Thecla and stories around her, see J.W. Barrier/J.N. Bremmer/T. Nicklas/A. Puig i Tarrèch (ed.s), Thecla: Paul's Disciple and Saint in the East and West (Studies on Early Christian Apocrypha 12; Leuven: Peeters, 2017).

5   Additionally, the figure of Thecla remained highly important in "proto-orthodox" circles; see, for example, the witness of John Chrysostom, who authored two homilies on Thecla.

6   In some manuscripts her name is also transmitted as Aitheria/Etheria.

7   Regarding the impact of prayer at holy places as an integral part of ancient pilgrimage, see J. Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims before the Crusades (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1977), 33–43.

8   Seleucia is the most important pilgrimage place related to Thecla in the East. See, however, the witness of the monasteries of St. Thecla in Ma'alula and Menine (both in Syria). For more details see I. Peña, Lieux de Pèlerinage en Syrie (SBF.Mi 38; Milan: Francescan Printing Press, 2000), 244–5, 248–9.

9   Translations from the Itin. Eger. are taken from J. Wilkinson, Egeria's Travels to the Holy Land (Jerusalem: Ariel; Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1981).

10 I am grateful to T.J. Kraus, who reminded me of the popularity of miniature codices of the Acts of Thecla in late antiquity.

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is read and valued both for the depiction of its protagonist, Thecla, and for the place of her "martyrium".

Is this case a mere exception or is it possible to find other comparable examples? If other examples are found, what do they tell us about the impact of supposedly "apocryphal" texts on places of pilgrimage in contexts we would label "orthodox" today?

To answer this question I consider some of the most important early ancient accounts about pilgrimage to the Holy Land:[11]

– the *Itinerarium Burdigalense (itin. Burdig.)* describes a pilgrimage between Bourdeaux and Jerusalem which took place in the years 333–334 CE. For parts of the journey, the text is mainly interested in the distances between different locations along the trip and in opportunities for overnight lodging or to change horses; when the journey comes to the borders of ancient Palestine, the text also describes places of pilgrimage.[12]

– the *Itinerarium Egeriae (itin. Eger.),* already mentioned above, describes the pilgrimage of Egeria, a religious woman – probably a nun – from Aquitania or Galicia who at the end of the 4th century CE (381–384?) travelled from Constantinople to Jerusalem, visited Galilee, Samaria, Egypt (incl. Sinai) and went back to Constantinople. The text consists of two parts: while chapter 1–23 describe Egeria's travels, chapters 24–49 are a highly important witness for the liturgies of Jerusalem.[13] Because the important question about the use of "apocryphal", or "non-canonical", writings in ancient liturgies would introduce a completely new topic (and would require an analysis of many more sources), I must limit myself to the first part of the *Itin.,* that is, to chapters 1–23.[14]

– Jerome's *Epitaphium Sanctae Paulae (Epistula 108 ad Eustochium)* is actually a vita of *Paula,* a member of a prominent Roman family (related to the *Scipiones*) who was a long time spiritual friend of Jerome. The text was written in 404 CE shortly after Paula's death and is composed as an epistle to her daugh-

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11 I follow the sources collected by H. Donner, Pilgerfahrt ins Heilige Land. Die ältesten Berichte christlicher Palästinapilger (4.–7. Jh.) (Stuttgart: Bibelwerk, ³2011 [according to ²2002]). This study could, of course, be broadened through the inclusion of several accounts about pilgrimage to Rome, for example, the Itinerary of John (ca. 590–604 CE), a priest who was interested in Holy Oils from the graves of martyrs, the Cymeteria totius Romanae urbis, the Notitia ecclesiarum urbis Romae (625–49 CE), De locis sanctis martyrum quae sunt foris civitatis Romae (635–45 CE), the Itinerarium of Malmesbury (648–82 CE) and the Itinerarium of Einsiedeln (8th century). For more information see G. Röwekamp, "Itinerarium", LACL (1998), 323–4.

12 For a short introduction see G. Röwekamp, "Itinerarium Burdigalense", LACL (1998), 324, and, more detailed, H. Donner, Pilgerfahrt, 35–42.

13 For a short introduction see G. Röwekamp, "Egeria", LACL (1998), 185–6, and, in more detail, H. Donner, Pilgerfahrt, 68–81, and J. Wilkinson, Egeria's Travels, 3–88.

14 For more details on the Jerusalem liturgies see H. Buchinger, "Heilige Zeiten? Christliche Feste zwischen Mimesis und Anamnesis am Beispiel der Jerusalemer Liturgie der Spätantike", in Heilige, Heiliges und Heiligkeit in spätantiken Religionskulturen, ed. P. Gemeinhardt & K. Heyden (RGVV 61; Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 2012), 283–323.