



WITTGENSTEIN'S WHEWELL'S COURT LECTURES

Cambridge, 1938–1941

From the Notes by
Yorick Smythies

EDITED, INTRODUCED,
AND ANNOTATED BY
VOLKER A. MUNZ
BERNHARD RITTER

*Yes?', y'd. stat many give examples
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des the Union Jack
not be, he not try to come*

WILEY Blackwell

**Wittgenstein's
Whewell's Court Lectures**

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From the Notes by Yorick Smythies

*Edited, introduced and annotated by
Volker A. Munz and Bernhard Ritter*

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To the memory of Peg

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Preface

I first met Rush Rhees when I came to Swansea as an exchange student in autumn, 1988. He allowed me join his PhD seminar, and from then on we saw each other regularly. That winter, Rhees spent some time in hospital, and I visited him almost every day to talk about Wittgenstein's philosophy. The first day he was allowed out of bed, I saw him sitting in an armchair with Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Grammar* on his lap. This made a great impression on me. After his discharge from hospital, Rhees and I continued our meetings at his home, where I first came into contact with his wife, Peg Smythies Rhees. She had been Yorick Smythies' wife before marrying Rhees, after Smythies' death, in 1980. From then on, I kept in close contact with Peg over the years until her own death in 2014.

Some time in the mid-1990s, she gave me around 30 typescripts of lecture notes Smythies took during lectures held by Wittgenstein mostly between 1938 and 1941, all in all about 700 pages. Additionally, Peg signed over to me the rights to work on and publish these notes. In 1998, she engaged Bernard Quaritch, a London antiquarian, to sell Smythies' original notes of Wittgenstein's lectures, in sum about 2000 notebook pages, plus 23 tapes of recordings of the same material dictated by Smythies, based on those notes. Quaritch then got in contact with me and asked if I could make an inventory of the material. With respect to the notes, this was only possible because I already possessed the corresponding typescripts; the notes just by themselves were hardly legible. And since I owned the copyright, Quaritch allowed me to make photocopies of all the relevant notes and copy the tapes. All the other Smythies' notebooks, manuscripts, and typescripts not directly related to Wittgenstein's lectures, Quaritch sent to my private address in Austria.

In 2001, the original lecture notes were sold to Kagoshima International University, Japan, where they have been kept under wraps since then. A microfilm of the whole handwritten material is held by Trinity College Cambridge and myself. The microfilm had been made for legal reasons before the material was sold to Japan.

Through Peg Smythies Rhees, I also came into possession of a few items that shed light on Smythies' personality, some of which are written by Wittgenstein. Since they have not appeared in print, I would like to include them here. When Smythies applied for a position as a librarian at Barnett House, in 1950, he collected various testimonials by Georg Henrik von Wright, G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein, and others. Wittgenstein wrote:

Mr. Yorick Smythies attended my classes on philosophy for over three years during the time when I was first lecturer and later Professor of Philosophy in Cambridge. I came into personal contact with him about eleven years ago and soon became greatly impressed by his mind and his personality. He is a man of very great intelligence, scrupulous honesty and conscientiousness, and of a kindly and obliging nature. He has a vivacious mind and is widely read. I have, in the last ten years, had innumerable discussions with him on a wide range of subjects and have always found his remarks most stimulating.¹

Already 10 years earlier in 1940, Wittgenstein had written his first reference for Smythies:

Mr. Yorick Smythies has attended my classes for four years; I have also had a great many discussions and conversations with him outside these classes. He has always impressed me by his uncommon intelligence as well as by his seriousness and sincerity. He is a kindhearted, gentle, and even-tempered man.²

Although Smythies had already joined Wittgenstein's *Lectures on 'Personal Experience'* in the academic year 1935/36, he only made his acquaintance in 1938 through James C. Taylor, another student. The most probable reasons for this delay are, on the one hand, Wittgenstein's absence from Cambridge after Easter Term 1936, when his Research Fellowship expired, and Smythies' young age, on the other. When Smythies began the Moral Science Tripos in 1935/36, he was only 18. In a draft of a letter to his mother, from 1938, he writes:

Dear Mama,

I have been having lectures from Wittgenstein nearly every day. He has been very good. Yesterday he lectured from 2 p.m.–7. Taylor asked him if he would meet me at lunch; he said he would come to lunch, but wouldn't meet me. I don't think he likes the look of me very much.³

1 Subsidiary Written Source [15], dated 29 May 1950.

2 Subsidiary Written Source [14], dated 7 April 1940.

3 Subsidiary Written Source [6], probably dating from 1938.

In the last decade of his life, Smythies prepared his own notes for publication and made various attempts to get them published. He also wrote an introduction to the notes in which he defends an austere editorial approach:

Wittgenstein said to me, on several occasions, that he would like me to publish, one day, my notes of his lectures. The lectures from which these notes were taken were delivered, at Whewell's Court, Trinity College, at various times between 1938–1947.

Re-reading them, now, after thirty years, I find them more natural, fluent, simple, continuous, expressive, than the remarks contained in Wittgenstein's so far published writings. I think that there are other people, especially amongst those unlinked with professional philosophy, who will, like myself, obtain more pleasure from these notes, than from those more compressed, more deeply worked upon, more tacit, remarks, written and selected by Wittgenstein himself, for possible publication. While he was lecturing, he was not able to delete what had been said, or to give to trains of thought more tightness than they were showing themselves to have. Also, tones which give personal expressiveness to his lectures became omitted from his writings. The expletives, interjectory phrases, slangy asides, etc., which were essentially constituent in what he was saying to his classes, would have shown affectation if they had been addressed to the general, reading, public.

These notes were taken down at my maximum speed of writing, making the words Wittgenstein was uttering and the notes being taken down, nearly simultaneous with one another. It results from this that the notes contain numerous grammatical errors, German constructions, uncompleted beginnings of sentences, etc. In nearly all, but not in all instances, such errors and inconsistencies have been left uncorrected. Editorial corrections would have resulted in blotting the impression that, in these lectures, Wittgenstein was not engaged in developing trains of thought (previously worked out, less completely, by himself), but was engaged in thinking out, spontaneously and *impromptu*, the utterances he was producing.⁴

The two main reasons Smythies failed to get the notes published were this editorial approach and the way he went about preparing the text for publication. Smythies returned to the notes in the early 1970s. He made tape recordings of nearly all the notes he had made of Wittgenstein's lectures during his time in Cambridge. This was only possible because he had provided a clean handwritten version of most of the notes he had taken. As already mentioned, those first notes were themselves barely legible, particularly because Smythies had developed his own kind of stenographic system.

4 Subsidiary Written Source [8], probably dating from the 1970s.

I assume it was those rewritten notes that he showed to Wittgenstein, and to which the latter referred, when he said that he would like to have them published. The tapes were the basis for a typescript version made by a secretary from Blackwell Publishers. Jim Feather, Blackwell's General Manager at the time, was particularly enthusiastic about the project, and offered to help produce a printable version. Feather left for the United States in the mid-1970s, and it seems that the whole project was pursued with less eagerness. Furthermore, the secretary clearly had little understanding of the nature of the material. This led to innumerable gaps, spelling mistakes, nonsensical expressions, etc. She also misspelled most of the names, including Wittgenstein's own. So, without the original notes and rewritten versions, much of the typed material was quite useless, not unlike the way the original notes might be difficult to decipher and order correctly, without being able to consult the rewritten and typed lectures.

In his correspondence with Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, and the publisher, it becomes obvious that Smythies rejected almost all editorial intervention. This attitude was strongly supported by Anscombe. I suspect this had to do with the fact that not all mistakes or awkward expressions were due to Smythies and his note taking, or the typing process, but also some were from Wittgenstein himself, as implied in the last paragraph of Smythies' introduction. The publisher, however, explicitly insisted on a range of editorial interventions.

So, the only notes that were eventually published, by Blackwell, although not with Smythies as editor, were those included in the *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* (1966) and the *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1976, edited by Cora Diamond). At some point in the mid-1970s, C. Grant Luckhardt intended to publish the *Lectures on Freedom of the Will* (included here in Chapter 10) as well as two of the *Lectures on Volition* in his book *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives*. We know this from Smythies' correspondence, though neither item was eventually included in this 1979 publication. After Smythies' death, Rhees made another attempt to publish at least part of the notes, strongly supported by D. Z. Phillips. But the only result was the inclusion of 'A Lecture on Freedom of the Will' in *Philosophical Investigations* in 1989, the year in which Rhees died.

In the length of time taken to prepare this edition for print, I have incurred so many debts that there is no simple way of identifying the individual contributions people made to the edition in its present form. I limit myself to simply naming those who helped in some way or other, knowing only too well that this list remains incomplete. In the name of both editors, I wish to thank Liam Cooper, Juliet Floyd, Peter Hacker, Britt Harrison, Lars Hertzberg, Wolfgang Kienzler, James C. Klagge, Brian McGuinness, Patricia McGuire, Felix Mühlhölzer, Michael Nedo, Alois Pichler, Josef Rothhaupt, Joachim Schulte, Paul Sensecall, Jonathan Smith, Ilse Somavilla, David G. Stern, and Susan

Sterrett. We used Norman Malcolm's notes of the *Lectures on Similarity* and the first lecture on *Description* by permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library to update Smythies' versions. We also wish to thank the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club for permission to publish Casimir Lewy's minutes from a meeting held on 1 March 1940. The preparation of this volume would not have been possible without the generous support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). The publication was facilitated by a grant from the Faculty of Humanities and Cultural Sciences of the University of Klagenfurt.

Volker A. Munz, Klagenfurt,
July 2016

Editorial Introduction

The contents of the present volume consist of notes taken by Yorick Smythies (1917–1980) when attending Wittgenstein's lectures at the University of Cambridge from early 1938 to Lent Term 1941. Exceptions are Lecture 1 and part of Lecture 10 of the *Lectures on Knowledge*, which Smythies copied from notes made by James C. Taylor. Smythies also copied some of the lectures in Chapter 2 of this volume from Taylor's notes. Moreover, only part of the material in Chapter 10 is likely to derive from lectures Wittgenstein gave in 1945, while the other part reflects Smythies' own views. This item falls outside the period of '1938–1941', mentioned in the title of this volume, but since the material of Chapter 10 cannot be described without qualification as 'notes of lectures', we did not include the year 1945 in the title. Only a small amount of this material has already been published, namely the *Lectures on Freedom of the Will*, the second half of Lecture 4 on *Description*, and what has been known as Lecture III of the *Lectures on Religious Belief* (cf. Introduction 3). They are presented here in their original contexts and with a revised dating.

Whewell's Court Lectures – pronounced 'Hyou-el' – is the title Smythies used to refer to the lecture notes of this volume. Whewell's Court is the name of several buildings of Trinity College, in one of which the lectures took place.¹ G. E. Moore gives a good description of the location of Wittgenstein's rooms in that building: 'Of the only two sets which are on the top floor of the gate-way from Whewell's Courts into Sidney Street, they were the set which looks westward over the larger Whewell's Court, and, being so high up, they had a large view of sky and also of Cambridge roofs, including the pinnacles of King's Chapel' (MWL: 49). The room where Wittgenstein lectured is the one behind a tripartite set of neo-Gothic windows on that side of the building.

Apart from the title of Chapter 2 and the descriptive titles of Chapters 9 and 10, which derive from titles Smythies used elsewhere, all titles were

1 William Whewell (1794–1866) was an English polymath, most influential in the philosophy of science, the history of science and moral philosophy. He financed the construction of the courts that were to bear his name.

provided by Smythies himself. These titles – *Lectures on Knowledge*, *Lectures on Similarity*, *Lectures on Belief*, and so on – may suggest a more determinate topic than Wittgenstein actually intended to follow in each case. Even where the title more than likely goes back to Wittgenstein himself, as is the case with the *Lectures on Belief*, the topic mentioned in the title is only one of several discussed, and sometimes not even clearly the most salient one.² As such, the lecture titles provide only limited guidance when it comes to determining Wittgenstein's central concerns in a course of lectures.

Smythies gives only rough indications as to when the lectures were given. In his draft of an introduction, he says, 'at various times between 1938–1947' (cf. Preface). His aim was not to publish the lectures in the order they were given, but in a systematic order he had devised himself (cf. Introductions 3 and 6). His 'Textual Notes' are instructive in this respect:

The differing, consecutive series, which these notes contain, are not arranged in any chronological order of series. Others who attended these lectures, may be able to specify year, term, etc., at which such and such a series of lectures was delivered. But: – (a) I do not trust my own memory sufficiently to do this myself, (b) I think that an arrangement of the lectures in a logical, rather than a chronological, order, helps to make evident the continuities and divisions characteristic of Wittgenstein's thinking.³

The aim of the present edition is, on the contrary, to reverse the intentions of this plan and to reconstruct the original chronology of the individual lectures.

The final year, 1947, mentioned by Smythies may refer to a manuscript he called 'Miscellaneous Remarks Relating to Volition by Wittgenstein in Various Other Lectures Which He Gave'. Smythies selected these remarks, which are not printed in this volume, drawing primarily on Peter Geach's version of *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, 1946–1947* (GWL: 3–116), but also on the *Lectures on Volition, Description, and Freedom of the Will*. Smythies possessed a typescript version of Geach's notes, some 30 pages of which were found among his papers. Why he did not take notes himself is an open question. By that time, he was certainly the most proficient note-taker who could have been there, and the reports have it that he was indeed in Cambridge at the time (cf. PPO: 358). A comparison of the manuscript to a shorter typescript with the same title shows that Smythies omitted the remarks he had taken from the *Lectures on Volition, Description and Freewill*. It is not clear, however, whether he would have stuck to his plan of including

² Rose Rand refers to the material of the *Belief Lectures* as 'Vorlesung über den Glauben', i.e., 'Lecture on Belief', which suggests that Wittgenstein actually declared this to be his topic (cf. Iven 2004: 87).

³ Quoted from Subsidiary Written Source [8].

this selection as an addendum to *Whewell's Court Lectures*, since the Miscellaneous Remarks appear in only one of his preliminary tables of contents along with '6 lectures' on *Volition*, instead of eight.

Also the first year, 1938, mentioned in Smythies' introduction needs some comment. Smythies actually began attending Wittgenstein's lectures in the academic year 1935/36, when Wittgenstein gave his *Lectures on 'Personal Experience' and Other Topics*, as Margaret MacDonald called them.⁴ Smythies' not very extensive notes of these lectures are not printed here. As O. K. Bouwsma reports, Smythies made Wittgenstein's acquaintance only years later: 'I asked [Wittgenstein] about Miss Elizabeth Anscombe and Smythies. At some length again he told me about them. Smythies never saying a word – for three years until some Canadian-Edinburgh student by the name of Taylor brought them together' (Bouwsma 1986: 66). This probably happened in 1938, the only year James C. Taylor attended Wittgenstein's university lectures.⁵ Wittgenstein's research fellowship expired at the end of Easter Term 1936, and he spent his time until January 1938 mostly in Norway and Vienna. He visited Cambridge in January and from early June to 9 August 1937 (Nedo 1993: 37). Wittgenstein's Cambridge Pocket Diary from 1936–37 shows that he met a 'Taylor' on 18 June 1937, and Francis Skinner mentions James Taylor in three letters to Wittgenstein in autumn 1937.⁶ It is also true that Wittgenstein sometimes gave 'not open' lectures: lectures that were not part of any university courses. It is, however, very unlikely that he gave such lectures in 1937, since he did not then have a position at Cambridge. The view to be favoured is that the earliest items in this volume date from the first half of 1938.

It may be useful to give an overview of Smythies' presumed presence in Cambridge, at this point. Smythies was a student on the Moral Sciences Tripos from October 1935 to June 1939 at Kings College, part of the University of Cambridge. He stayed in Cambridge until June 1940 when he went back to his family home in Devon (cf. Introduction 4). He returned to Cambridge some time after 6 November 1940, for the rest of Michaelmas Term of that year (cf. Introduction 7). He also must have been present at a few lectures around 20 January 1941 (cf. Introduction 8), though this visit is unlikely to have lasted more than a short time. A long absence followed until early December 1944 when Smythies delivered a talk to the Moral Sciences Club (cf. Introduction 5). He then returned permanently to Cambridge the next year, in May 1945 or earlier, and stayed until after Wittgenstein resigned his professorship, in summer 1947, thereby putting an end to the lectures (cf. Introduction 9).

4 Cf. Subsidiary Written Source [2].

5 James Carson Taylor (1914–1946) was admitted to Trinity on 1 October 1936, as a Dominion Exhibitioner. He took the Moral Sciences Preliminary examination in 1937 and Moral Sciences Tripos Part II in the following year, which qualified him for the BA degree (communication with Jonathan Smith, Trinity College, Cambridge, in January 2015).

6 Cf. Subsidiary Written Source [12]; GB, 14, 22 October, and 8 November 1937.

For the most part, Smythies uses the same kind of small spiral-bound notebooks for both immediate lecture notes and rewritten versions of lectures. By 'small', we mean notebooks with 20 to 21 lines to write on. Most of them are 'National Natty 300/2 Series' notebooks of approximately 200×160 mm. He also uses a larger version of the same type of notebook, the 300/6 Series, which offers 27 writing lines and is approximately 255×200 mm. We refer to notebooks of this size as 'middle-sized' and to notebooks with 30 or more writing lines as 'large'. Other kinds of notebooks will be specified in the introductions to the relevant chapters.

One can see a rather soft pencil in action from Smythies' first lecture notes in the academic year 1935/36 until Lent Term 1939, when he switches to a fountain pen in Lecture XII of the *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*. The soft pencil returns for the first notes of Lecture XXV and in Michaelmas Term 1939 for the *Similarity Lectures*. It returns one more time early in Lent Term 1940 for *Description* Lecture 1. In Lecture 2, Smythies switches to a pencil with a harder lead and finally to what seems to be a fountain pen with a fine nib, which he uses until the end of Easter Term 1940. This fountain pen must have been particularly appropriate for its purpose, since he writes faster than at any time before or after. This speed is also due to a system of abbreviations that Smythies has been developing since 1938. The same system is still in place when he returns in Michaelmas Term 1940, but the fountain pen with a broad nib that he uses now makes his writing slower. It is the same model that he employs for all rewritten versions. The broad nib and the absence of abbreviations are reliable features by which to distinguish a rewritten version from immediate lecture notes.

Smythies' notes never give the year of a lecture, and only in very few cases do they come with a specific date. The dating of certain lectures printed here has been revised more than once, as can be gleaned from comparing the present dating with a preliminary dating in an earlier 'Sketch of a Project' (cf. Munz 2010). In most cases, comparison with the *Nachlass* was used only to confirm a dating that had been established independently. The most important clues were derived from the names of students that occur in the lectures, together with lecture summaries by other students, and Smythies' reconstructed presence in Cambridge. As for lecture summaries, we wish to single out Rose Rand's summaries, published in Mathias Iven's (2004) *Rand und Wittgenstein*, as being particularly useful when it came to dating some of the most recalcitrant items.

An 'academic year' at Cambridge University runs from October of one year until June of the following year and is divided into Michaelmas Term, Lent Term, and Easter Term. We speak of the *Regular* Michaelmas Term, when we mean the period from 1 October to 19 December, and similarly for the other terms, which last from 5 January to 25 March, or 24 in a leap year, and 10 or 17 April to 18 or 25 June, respectively. In all other cases, we refer to the corresponding *Full* Terms. A Full Term corresponds to the lecturing period and is

about two weeks shorter than a Regular Term. As will be seen, Wittgenstein did not always stick to the dates of a Full Term, even in cases where he was teaching a regular course, as opposed to his unofficial, 'not open', lectures.

We annotate the lectures with page references to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* as well as published writings. 'MS' and 'TS' are used for Smythies' notes and typescripts of the lectures. We refer to the *Nachlass* by 'vW' plus an item number and page. Since the item number already encodes whether an item is a manuscript or a typescript ('1-' for manuscripts and '2-' for typescripts), it is possible to use 'MS' or 'TS' for another purpose here. We have decided to adopt the abbreviation 'vW' for references to the *Nachlass*, in honour of Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003), who, among Wittgenstein's literary executors, did most service to the *Nachlass* and also introduced the numbering.

With very few exceptions, no references to Wittgenstein's own typescripts are given. We concentrate on original manuscript sources of the ideas expressed in the lectures and their dates. In cases where a manuscript has been edited and published, or where a virtually identical print version exists, we usually give reference to the published version only.⁷ We also give references for the books and articles of authors Wittgenstein discusses. In some cases, it is likely that his knowledge of their views derives from discussions, rather than reading. In these cases, we nevertheless point out a printed passage in which the corresponding view is expressed.

Wherever possible, the text is taken from immediate lecture notes ('N'). Additions in square brackets indicate significant additions in the rewritten version ('MS') or, if there is no rewritten version, in the next-closest textual source, usually a typescript ('TS'). Additions or modifications of our own appear in diamond brackets, '⟨ ⟩' (see section 'List of Editorial Conventions'). Brackets may be dropped if there is a footnote that specifies what has been changed. Parentheses indicate parentheses in the original lecture notes, or the most authoritative source of the corresponding lectures, where there are no immediate lecture notes, regardless of whether square brackets or parentheses are used in the original. There are only very few textual variants in Smythies' notes. These are printed in the main text within parentheses. Whenever possible, we have used square brackets in a way that allows for independent quotation of N and of MS.

There is no general answer to the question of how reliable Smythies was when he wrote up his immediate lecture notes. As for the status of MS, we believe that it was Smythies' practice either to rewrite his notes anything up to several months after a lecture or not to rewrite them at all. Some additions he

7 For example, we refer not to the Manuscripts 114: 1–228, 115: 1–117 and 140: 1–39, but to Part I of *Philosophical Grammar*; not to Manuscript 144, but to *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (PPF); not to Manuscripts 172 and 174–177, but to *On Certainty*; similarly, to *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volumes I and II, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Volumes I and II, and *Remarks on Colour*, but not to the corresponding manuscript sources.

made to his immediate lecture notes may be based on notes of other students, such as Taylor's in 1938. Accordingly, we believe that the MS-based text is fairly accurate, as long as there is no evidence to the opposite.

We replace Smythies' abbreviations (e.g. 'B' for 'belief', 'T' for 'thing', 'des' for 'describe', or 'description', etc.) by the corresponding words without further indication. He mostly uses the first-person singular, but can move between first and third person. We replace 'W.' by 'I', making the necessary changes wherever this seems desirable, and add a footnote where the changes are non-trivial. Obvious linguistic mistakes are corrected without further notification. This extends to most cases of missing words or abbreviations, such as, *cf.*, *a(n)*, *the*, or *that*. There is admittedly no clear line between linguistic corrections and interpolations. In some cases, adding an article, for example, implies a non-trivial choice between a definite and an indefinite article, which may affect the sense of a whole sentence. Whenever we find this to be the case, we mark a one-word addition of our own with diamond brackets. Incomplete or crossed out sentences are sometimes omitted without any notification, sometimes kept in a footnote, and sometimes restored in the main text. The choice depends on the estimated usefulness for the reader.

Wittgenstein used to have a blackboard at his lectures, which he also used for drawings (cf. MWL: 49, LSD: 293). The lectures in this volume feature more than 70 illustrations, for the most part redrawn from Smythies' immediate lecture notes. In some cases, we decided to include vectorised versions of Smythies' original drawings, mostly taken from a rewritten version, where redrawing them would have involved choosing between different ways of rendering the original. In other cases, illustrations have been newly drawn according to instructions given in Smythies' text. This is never done without an indication in a footnote.

Our division of the book into 'chapters' groups those sets of notes that refer to one and the same lecture courses, or to groups of individual lectures that followed each other chronologically in close proximity. The introductions to the chapters adopt the following pattern: (1) a physical description of the source material, (2) the dating of the corresponding lectures, and (3) general remarks about textual parallels in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*.

List of Editorial Conventions

- N 'N' refers to Smythies' *immediate lecture notes* and is used, in particular, where the printed text, while otherwise following N, has to depart from it in the way specified.
- MS 'MS' refers to Smythies' *rewritten version* of a lecture and is used, in particular, where the printed text, while otherwise following N, prefers the 'MS' version; or where the printed text is following MS, but has to depart from it in the way specified.
- TS 'TS' refers to a *typescript* of Smythies' lecture notes. Occasionally, superscripts are used to distinguish different typescripts.
- ... Ellipses not enclosed in diamond brackets always appear in the source text.
- () Parentheses occurring in the most basic textual source are rendered in parentheses; regardless of whether parentheses or square brackets are used in the original. The very few variants that appear written over a line are incorporated into the main text also within parentheses.
- [] Square brackets mark the beginning and the end of additions Smythies himself made to the text of the most basic textual source in the course of composing a rewritten version, MS, or a typescript, TS.
- < > Diamond brackets mark the beginning and the end of an addition made by the editors. They are omitted in cases where there is a footnote that specifies what has been changed.
- ? ? Elevated question marks at the beginning and the end of a word or a phrase indicate that a transcription is conjectural.
- ¶ The paragraph mark is used in footnotes to indicate that there is a new paragraph in the source text.
- Italics* Italicized text in footnotes to lectures is by the editors; quotations in footnotes are given in regular type without adding quotation marks. A punctuation mark at the end of a quotation is always part of the quotation.

- 19-/- We use a slash between years, e.g. '1938/39', when what we mean is an academic year, lasting from October to the following June, and a dash, e.g. '1938–39', for a period of two years.
- In the original lecture notes, a dash on a line by itself is used to indicate a gap of no note taking. These dashes are reproduced in the printed text as they occur in N. Smythies did not indicate all gaps in this way.

Abbreviations

1. Writings by Ludwig Wittgenstein

- BB *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'*. Ed. Rush Rhees, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969² (1958).
- BT *The Big Typescript: TS 213*. Ed. and transl. C. G. Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, Malden (MA), etc., 2005.
- CE 'Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen – Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness.' In *Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel*, Vol. 6, Nos. 3–4, 1976, 391–445. Quoted from PO: 370–426.
- CV *Culture and Value*. Ed. G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman, transl. Peter Winch, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984² (1980).
- KgE *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Kritisch-genetische Edition*. Ed. Joachim Schulte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M, 2001.
- LW I *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology; Vol. 1: Preliminary Studies for Part II of Philosophical Investigations*. Ed. G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman, transl. C. G. Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.
- LW II *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology; Vol. 2: The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1950*. Ed. and transl. C. G. Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
- NB *Notebooks, 1914–1916*. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. H. von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979² (1961).
- NFL 'Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"'. In *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 3, 1968, 275–320. Quoted after PO: 200–288.
- OC *On Certainty*. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. H. von Wright, transl. Dennis Paul, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974² (1969).
- PB *Eine philosophische Betrachtung (Das Braune Buch)*. In Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Werkausgabe*; Bd. 5, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a/M, 1989, 117–237.
- PG *Philosophical Grammar*. Ed. Rush Rhees, transl. Anthony Kenny, Blackwell, Malden (MA), etc., 1980² (1974).
- PI *Philosophical Investigations*. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, Joachim Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester (UK), 2009⁴ (1953).

- PO *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951*. Ed. J. C. Klagge, Alfred Nordmann, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1993.
- PPF *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* [= PI II]. In PI: 138–143.
- PR *Philosophical Remarks*. Ed. Rush Rhees, transl. Raymond Hargreaves, Roger White, Blackwell, Oxford, 1975² (1964).
- RC *Remarks on Colour*. Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, transl. L. L. McAlister, Margarete Schättle, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2007² (1977).
- RFM *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, Blackwell, Oxford, 1978³ (1956).
- RPP I *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*; Vol. 1. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. H. von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
- RPP II *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*; Vol. 2. Ed. G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman, transl. C. G. Luckhardt, M. A. E. Aue, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
- TLP *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. Pears, David; McGuinness, Brian (transl.). Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
- vW *Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition*, Oxford University Press, London, 2001.
- Z *Zettel*. Ed. and transl. G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. G. H. von Wright, Blackwell, Oxford, 1981² (1967).

2. Lectures and Conversations

- AWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932–1935. From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald*. Ed. Alice Ambrose, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.
- GWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology, 1946–1947. Notes by P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah, and A. C. Jackson*. Ed. P. T. Geach, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1988.
- LC *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. Ed. Cyril Barrett, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978⁴ (1966).
- LFM *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939. From the Notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies*. Ed. Cora Diamond, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1976.
- LSD 'The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience.' In *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2–45; Vol. 7, No. 2, 101–140. Quoted after PO: 290–367.
- LWL *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1932. From the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee*. Ed. Desmond Lee, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.

- MWL 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33.' In *Mind*, Vol. 63, No. 249, 1–15; Vol. 64, No. 253, 1–27. Quoted after PO 45–114.
- WVC *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*. Ed. B. F. McGuinness, Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.

3. Correspondence and Secondary Literature

- CL *Cambridge Letters: Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa*. Ed. B. F. McGuinness, G. H. von Wright, Blackwell, Malden, MA, 1995.
- GB *Gesamtbriefwechsel – Complete Correspondence*. Ed. B. F. McGuinness, Monika Seekircher, Anton Unterkircher, electronic edition, Brenner-Archiv, Innsbruck, 2004.
- PPO *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions*. Ed. J. C. Klagge, Alfred Nordmann, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2003.
- WC *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951*. Ed. B. F. McGuinness, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2012² (2008).

4. Subsidiary Written Sources

- [1] Lewy, Casimir. 'Y. Smythies: Mental Processes.' Minutes of the Moral Sciences Club. Classmark UA Min.IX.44, fol. 105b, Cambridge University Library, University of Cambridge. Used with the permission of Syndics of Cambridge University Library.
- [2] MacDonald, Margaret. *Lectures on 'Personal Experience' and Other Topics by L. Wittgenstein. Session 1935–36*. Unpublished typescript with handwritten corrections by MacDonald. Literary Estate of Yorick Smythies (L. E. Y. S.), owned by Volker A. Munz, Klagenfurt.
- [3] Malcolm, Norman. [*Notebook with notes of Wittgenstein Lectures*.] Dated notes of lectures from Michaelmas Term 1939; undated notes of a lecture from January 1941; and undated notes copied from John Wisdom. In Ambrose Lazerowitz, Alice. Classmark Add. 9938, Box 2, Cambridge University Library, University of Cambridge. Used with the permission of Syndics of Cambridge University Library.
- [4] Rhees, Rush. [*Knowledge Lecture 10*.] Typescript with pencil-drawn illustrations, 4 pages, unpublished, undated. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [5] Smythies, Yorick. [*Notes of Wittgenstein's 1935–36 Lectures*.] Immediate lecture notes ('N') and rewritten version ('MS'), unpublished. Microfilm, Bernard Quaritch Box 3, Wren Library, Cambridge.
- [6] Smythies, Yorick. Draft of a letter to his mother. Undated, probably 1938, in a notebook with notes from lectures by John Wisdom. Microfilm, Bernard Quaritch Box 3, Wren Library, Cambridge.

- [7] Smythies, Yorick. 'Understanding.' Two versions of a typescript (10 pages, 14 pages), both incomplete without title pages, and two small spiral-bound notebooks, entitled 'Understanding (1)' and 'Understanding (2)', 1947 or later. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [8] Smythies, Yorick. 'Contents,' 'Introduction' and 'Textual Notes.' Typescript, 5 pages, undated, probably 1970s. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [9] Smythies, Yorick. Application for the post of Tutor Librarian. Oxford College of Further Education. Large folded sheet; three pages filled in by Smythies, signed and dated 16 March 1967. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [10] Smythies, Yorick. Draft of a letter to C. G. Luckhardt. Typescript, dated 30 June 1975. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [11] Smythies, Yorick. Draft of a letter to C. G. Luckhardt. Manuscript, dated August 1975. L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [12] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Cambridge Pocket Diary, 1936–1937. 27 September 1936–31 December 1937, The Wittgenstein Archive, Cambridge.
- [13] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Cambridge Pocket Diary, 1937–1938. 26 September 1937–31 December 1938, The Wittgenstein Archive, Cambridge.
- [14] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Testimonial for Smythies. One-page autograph, signed and dated 7 April 1940, 'Trinity College, Cambridge', L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.
- [15] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Testimonial for Smythies. One-page typescript, signed and dated 29 May 1950, '27, St. John St. Oxford', L. E. Y. S., Klagenfurt.

WHEWELL'S COURT LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE 1938–1941

Thinking is being alive. Living is exchanging thoughts.
Yorick Smythies

1

The notes Smythies made during the lectures of this chapter, the *Lectures on Knowledge*, are contained in two small spiral-bound notebooks. The first notebook begins with Smythies' version of 'Are There an Infinite Number of Shades of Colour?' (cf. Chapter 2), followed by this chapter's Lectures 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. Smythies inserted the lectures from the other notebook as Lectures 2, 7, and 11; Taylor's notes as Lecture 1 and the first half of Lecture 10. The latter he went on to cross out, for unknown reasons. We use 'N' for these original notes and 'MS' for Smythies' rewritten and expanded version of the original notes. The immediate notes are written with a rather soft pencil, typical of Smythies' early lecture notes. The expanded version of Lectures 1 to 11 is written with a broad-nibbed fountain pen into the same kind of middle-sized notebook he used during the lectures. This was probably done in 1938, when Smythies had Taylor's notes available. We do not know whether his insertion of Taylor's notes and the other three lectures in their respective places was led by chronological considerations, but nor do we know enough to interfere with this arrangement. Lecture 10, as it appears in MS, may be a compilation. The section before the words 'My Notes' has no parallel in Rhees's unpublished version of the lecture, while everything from 'My Notes' to the end of Lecture 10 does.¹

The *Lectures on Knowledge* differ from other notes by Smythies in that most of the meetings – six out of 11 – are dated. Unfortunately, no year is indicated, and half of the day numbers are difficult to read. Moreover, those that are relatively unambiguous do not correspond to the pattern that we were anticipating, being: 20 May (Friday), 27 May (Friday), 4 June (Saturday), 15 June (Wednesday). We expected lectures on Mondays and discussions on Fridays, as Wittgenstein had announced to Moore in a letter of April 1938: 'I'll have the first meeting on Monday (25th) at 5 p.m. ... We shall meet in Taylor's rooms in

1 Cf. Subsidiary Written Source [4].

Trinity'. On 26 April, Wittgenstein writes: 'I find that I shall have to be in Paris on Thursday (day after tomorrow) so my Friday discussion is off ... I shall lecture on Monday next' (CL: 296f.).

Since this is puzzling, it is mandatory to consider the available evidence for dating in detail. Smythies' dates, including those with ambiguous day numbers, refer to Full Easter Term. Actually, the last two lectures appear to have taken place after the end of the official lecturing period on 10 June (cf. Cam. Univ. Cal. 1937–38: xviii). The immediate lecture notes of Lecture 11 are dated to 15 June. Lectures 5, 7, and 9 are known in a version by Rush Rhees, two of which are dated by Smythies to 20 May and 10 (?) June.² Rhees and Theodore Redpath think they remember that Wittgenstein taught a course in Lent Term, and Rhees dates the *Lectures on Knowledge* partly to Lent Term 1938 (cf. CE: 407, Redpath 1990: 46). This, however, is either false or needs qualification (cf. Introduction 2). According to manuscript volume 120, Wittgenstein was still in Vienna on 6 January. He travelled to Cambridge only after that. On 8 February, he notes his arrival in Dublin, where he spends five weeks in the middle of the term. His return to Cambridge on 18 March seems to be prompted exclusively by the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany (cf. vW 120: 57v, 128v). Thus, Wittgenstein could not have taught a regular course in Lent Term 1938, and since he was not well during the last couple of months of the same year, he did not lecture in Michaelmas Term 1938 either (cf. Klagge 2003: 349).

Our dating of the *Knowledge Lectures* to Easter Term 1938 is consistent with the cast of people who Smythies reports as intervening in discussion – Casimir Lewy, Theodore Redpath, Rush Rhees, Alister Watson, and John Wisdom – all of whom are likely to have been at Wittgenstein's lectures in 1938 (cf. Klagge 2003: 348f.). Taylor's presence is evidenced by the fact that Smythies employed his notes for Lectures 1 and 10. The joint presence of Lewy and Taylor is particularly significant, since Lewy attended Wittgenstein's lectures from 1938 until Easter Term 1945, and Taylor probably only in 1938 (cf. Redpath 1990: 46, Klagge 2003: 348).

Consistent with our dating, most *Nachlass* parallels are to be found in the Manuscript Volume 119 (24 September to 19 November 1937) and in Notebook 159 (spring to summer 1938), as Rhees already observed (cf. CE: 406–411, 418–426). Notebook 159 begins by alternating between the topics of the *Lectures on Knowledge* and the *Lectures on Gödel* (cf. Introduction 2). Since these remarks are partly in English, Wittgenstein may have used this notebook for his own preparation. Significant parallels are also to be found in Notebook 158, begun on 24 February 1938. It has a passage, partly written in English, that parallels the beginning of Lecture 2. The passage consists of a distinctive juxtaposition of remarks about philosophical puzzles in general and what he calls

² Rhees' version was published, without any exact dating, in *Philosophia* 6, 1976, 430–433, 438–440, 442–445; reprinted as CE: 407–411, 419–421, 423–426.

'the dream puzzle': whether a dream occurs while we are asleep or is just remembered as occurring while we are asleep (cf. vW 158: 37r–41r).³ At one point in the notebook, he quotes an apparently typical phrase of one of his pupils: 'Watson: "The key question is ..."' (vW 158: 39v). A few pages later, he draws the same figure of a cube that he uses in *Knowledge* Lecture 3 (cf. vW 158: 43v). The notebook says nothing about the philosophical meaning of the figure, while this comes out very clearly in the lecture.

3 See also the passage towards the end of Smythies' Preparatory Notes (Chapter 10), where it is called 'a most important fact about dreams' that they occur while we are asleep.

Lectures on Knowledge

⟨Easter Term 1938⟩

Lecture 1

Taylor's notes.

If someone says 'I have pain' and someone else says of him, 'he has pain,' does 'I have pain' mean the same as 'he has pain'? How can they mean the same, since the ways of verifying them are different? You could say: 'Our scheme of paradigms is too simple.'

Is 'It's going to rain' *about* the present or the future? You can say both (to a large extent what you say depends on your mood). Whether a proposition is 'about' something or not is generally a complicated matter. You're putting (the question) into too straight a jacket.

There is a temptation to say that the two sentences *refer to the same fact*. The temptation is due to the use of a certain picture. You think of 'the same fact' as like 'the same person.'

Is 'He has pain' about his behaviour?⁴ Cf. 'I seem to have a rush,' 'He seems to have a rush.'

For such phrases as 'I'm in pain,' 'I see red,' 'I have such and such a wish,' I'll use the word 'utterance.' Like a moan, etc., as opposed to a description.

There is a complicated relation between 'He's in pain' and the behaviour. They don't mean the same. Though 'He moans' may mean (under special circumstances, e.g. when he is in bed dying, very, very ill) 'He is in pain.' (The two may come to exactly the same thing.)

The connection between 'I'm in pain' and 'He's in pain' is that his saying the former is a criterion for 'He's in pain.' Is there a verification in the case of an utterance? (Cf. Lecture 2.)


⁴ In MS, followed by: Akin in the third person.

How did you learn the use of the word 'pain'? You were crying and someone told you you were in pain, etc.⁵ Cf. 'I dreamt so and so.' How do we learn the use of this? Has anyone ever shown us what a dream is like? What red is like? We woke up and told a story in the past tense. Then we were told, 'you dreamt it.' So we learned.⁶

Experiment (alarm clock etc.) to show that a long dream only takes two seconds. Does the experiment show this? Someone might say: 'Perhaps you didn't dream it, but only remembered dreaming it.' Is the child correct in using the present or the past tense about its dream? Is something *now* happening, or *did* something happen? Correlated phenomena. (Events in the brain, moaning in sleep, etc.) You can use the present or past tense, as you like. (The choice is a linguistic one.)⁷

We're inclined to say: 'Something corresponds to the utterance.' A case of shifting the responsibility. To say 'something corresponds' is just another way of saying, 'What he says is true.' Cf. saying, "A statement is true" means "Reality is in agreement". What's done? A grammatical recommendation is made.

Lecture 2



The fly catcher.⁸ The fly gets in but can't get out. The stronger the wish to get out, the harder it is for it to get out. (It is fascinated by one way of trying to get out.) If we put the fly in glasses of shapes and shades different to this one, where it was easier for it to get out, where it was less fascinated by the light, etc., and we trained it to fly out of these, it might fly out of this one also.

Similarly, when we spoke about the dream puzzle, we shifted to a less puzzling problem. We produce a similar puzzle in another case where the puzzle is less alive.

⁵ Cf. *PI* §244.

⁶ Cf. *GWL*: 30f., 180, 252.

⁷ Cf. *Smythies' Preparatory Notes, near the end*, *vW* 158: 37v–38r (March 1938), *vW* 128: 22 (1944), *vW* 130: 251 (1 August 1946), *PPF* §52f. = *PI II*: 184a–c.

⁸ Cf. *Wittgenstein's Reply*, *vW* 149: 67 = *NFL*: 258 (1935/36), *vW* 118: 44r (1 September 1937), 71r–v (8 September 1937), *vW* 117: 60f., 92 (1937, later than 11 September), *RFM*: 56, I, §44, *PI* §309.

Is it an idle question about the dream, whether a dream is a waking experience or a disturbance of one's sleep?⁹ Ask where this sentence is at home.

Two sentences from quite different contexts fight when they are brought together in a certain way.

You'd find this sort of question (about the dream) asked at the beginning of a scientific book.

Distinguish the *point* of a game from something just given in the rules. The shape (of the board, say) may have something to do with the point. I abolish something in the game, i.e. I say it's not to the point. But you say it is to the point. Nothing deep seems to me to be bound up in this difference of opinion.¹⁰

The law of causality is referred to at the beginning of scientific books, and then never mentioned again.¹¹ Ought we to leave out the bow to the law of causality? I say: 'Do away with it! But what today you give up, you wouldn't have given up a hundred years ago, e.g. someone says the discussion about transubstantiation was futile. Was it? It depends on what the person you talk about it to, does: Luther would not have turned a hair at the talk about verification.

It is in a sense a personal question, whether the discussion rests on a misunderstanding. Does putting 'yours sincerely' at the end of letters rest on a misunderstanding?

What I do is, in a sense, influence your style. (What I do is alter your style.)¹² I point out that the mouldings *had* a point which they no longer have.

The more progressive people say one thing (about dreams); the others deny it. Freud says he isn't going to discuss the question. But he talks as a man talks who has in his hand the picture of something happening while the man's asleep.

If you look closely at one aspect (the man asleep or the recollection), the other blurs. Cf. looking now at an object in the foreground, the background blurred; now at an object in the background, the foreground blurred.¹³

A dream in a silent picture used to be a man asleep and a blue haze. What the cinema says is conclusive.¹⁴

It was found that the exact wording of the dream sentence was important.¹⁵ So we were more inclined to speak of the phenomenon of recollection.

9 Cf. You can imagine a kind of dream-germ having been there and it expanding when you recollect the dream. (vW 158: 38r–v; cf. 37r–41r, March 1938).

10 Cf. vW 147: 13r–14v (1934), vW 149: 16 (1934/35) = NFL: 233f., RFM: 109, PI §564.

11 Cf. vW 108: 198f. (29 June 1930), vW 134: 3 (1 March 1947).

12 Cf. LC: 28, *Lectures on Aesthetics*, III, §37–41 (1938).

13 Cf. vW 121: 12r (13 May 1938).

14 Cf. vW 114: 6r–v (27–30 May 1932), PR §217, BT: 466.

15 Cf. Freud, S. A. V: 512–515 = G. W. II/III: 517–520.

The foreground begins to interest you, whereas it didn't previously. In a law court, the exact words you use don't matter. But in describing a dream they are all important.¹⁶

The question might be brought up whether 'He has pain' and 'I have pain' mean the same or not where it was not known who was meant by 'he'. [E.g., someone says 'I have pain.' I say to someone else 'He has pain,' where I might be referring to one of several people. He asks me: 'Were you both meaning the same?'] This would be the 'home' of the question in ordinary life.

[The behaviourist wished scientifically minded people to stop using 'I'm in pain,' and instead use remarks about behaviour, etc. This was not a scientific discussion, but the preliminary to one. To say 'I ought to say something about my behaviour instead of "I am in pain"' gives a shock. In a way, the substitution doesn't in the case of 'He's in pain.'

Let's try to reach to depths of the utterance puzzle.]

You are both inclined and disinclined to say: 'To an utterance there corresponds something' and 'To an utterance there corresponds nothing.' The question might be put: 'Is pain something or is pain nothing?'¹⁷

'Surely, if I say "I have pain," something corresponds to it [my words]. If I say, 'What?', you say, 'A certain feeling.' 'A certain feeling' is used in a queer way, not [as it is usually used] as a preliminary to a specification. You might get to 'a certain something.'

How do you recognize it [the experience] to be the one so and so [as the one called so and so]? How do you know that what you call 'pain' [now] is the same as what you called 'pain' yesterday? You remember. How do you remember?

You said, 'I have pain.' I asked you for a reason, you said: 'I remember that the experience I have now is the same as what I had before.' But you now stand on no firmer ground. Cf. looking at two identical copies of the *Evening Standard* to be quite sure of the news.¹⁸ How do you know your memory image is right? Or, how do you know it is a memory image? 'Are you sure this is what you called "pain" yesterday?' is an absurd question. What is it like to remember calling this colour 'black' yesterday? In what way could I call this [your remembering calling it black yesterday] a justification for your calling this 'black' [today]? If I buy him a top-hat, he remembered calling (this) 'black' yesterday, this won't act as evidence against him.

My remembering 'God save the King' may consist just in my whistling it.

16 Up to this point the text of this course is taken from MS. For the rest, the basic source is N.






17 Cf. vW 121: 7v, 10v–11r (10–13 May 1938), PI §304.

18 This sentence is taken from MS. In N: Cf. Evening Standards. Cf. vW 120: 75r–75v (19 February 1938), vW 116: 250 (1938 or later), PI §265.

Suppose I spoke a language unintelligibly, now called a colour 'black', then 'green', then 'yellow', but I always say: 'What did I call it yesterday? Oh yes, "black".' This won't help.

'Why do you call him "Watson"?' – 'Because I remember calling him "Watson" before.' Does this act as a justification? How do I know which leads you right – the inclination to call it 'black' or the memory? If I say the first, am I likely not to say the second? You have no reason for calling it 'black'. There is no justification. [You didn't in any way deduce that it was black.]

You would not trust your memory (which may be just calling it black) more than your inclination to call it black. You could call the latter also a memory phenomenon. How does it help to appeal from one to the other?

Suppose [that in order] to remember the colour of , I have to draw it:  [a patch of shape  of the same colour] and then an image of  from painters' samples comes. Is this  evidence for calling the patch 'black'? It would be absurd to call it this. [You could say better: 'I'm sure this is black because it *is* black.']¹⁹

We are inclined to talk of a memory image as a sample which we can see, but which others can't see. Cf. the picture of steam comes from a picture of a pot in a movie picture. We might say: the steam must have been somewhere. This is similar to a memory image coming and our saying, 'It must have been somewhere,' 'came from somewhere.'²⁰

Why shouldn't I say: 'This [calling him so and so] *is* the phenomenon of recognizing that I call him so and so'? Do I recognize him first?

'Are you sure this is black?' It is not a case where you would say you were sure, or that you knew. The question of being certain or not does not arise.

Lecture 3

18²¹ May 1938

'The two colours are the same' may mean all kinds of different things, e.g. we can compare them to see if there is a transition, or put them side by side, etc. Similarly, if we say, 'Impressions A and B are the same.' 'Impression A and what I saw yesterday are the same' is different from 'Impressions A and B are the same,' [in the former there is] no putting side by side. Very different also [is] 'A's pain is the same as B's.' There are entirely different methods of comparing (different methods of verification).

¹⁹ In MS, 'blue' instead of 'black'. Cf. vW 150: 18, 31 (1935/36), NFL: 250f.

²⁰ Cf. PI §297.



²¹ The reading of the second number is conjectural.

Don't look for the same meaning of 'same'. We have different methods of verification. But it might be said: 'If we could do what we can't do, wouldn't we find out that they were the same?' We don't look at the actual language-game. We look at the words [spellbound], and supplement them by an *imaginary* language-game, a mirage of a language [towards which we rush].²²

'Do I have one impression of a chair, which persists, or are there millions of atoms of impressions, different but alike?' This is an example of supplementing a language-game by an imaginary one. We see in a cinema one picture standing still and we ask: 'Is this one picture or lots?' meaning 'Is there one picture in the projector or lots?' There is in this case [in the case of the impression] no lantern, etc. But we supplement what we see with something else. You can get yourself saying: 'It's always another impression.'²³ [You're not just now puzzled by this. It's not loaded with passion. So it serves our purpose.]

'Is the utterance of pain justified when you have pain?' You are inclined on the one hand to say, 'Obviously it is', on the other hand to say: 'How do you know it is the same thing as you called 'pain' yesterday?', etc. Suppose I said: 'You always need a new intuition to tell you what pain is.' This is intuitionism; the same as intuitionism in mathematics.

Russell might say: 'If I have pain, I am directly aware that the sensation is the same as I had yesterday', or 'that this is black'. I would ask: 'Do you mean that you are directly aware that the word "same" fits the situation?', or: 'I know exactly what this colour is. But I don't know its name'. Someone might reply: 'No, it's not the word. It's the meaning.' I say:²⁴ 'If it's not a question of the word, we'll have an instance. Then what you are immediately aware of is that these instances fit.'

'We have  as a paradigm of sameness, and we are immediately aware that the paradigm fits .²⁵ Would it fit if one was black and one yellow? Then, you have to have a paradigm of the way it fits. [Is a new intuition needed to see whether the paradigm fits in the right way?]

Cf. 2 4 6 8 10 ... You need a new intuition to go on. Saying that you have a new intuition doesn't help you in the slightest. You could just as well say [you make] a new decision, although in fact you don't make a decision. You just go on.

I am directly aware that they are the same? If you don't mean you are directly aware that the word fits, you mean that [you are directly aware that] the paradigm fits.

²² The expression mirage of a language also occurs in *vW* 158: 36v–37r (March 1938).

²³ Cf. *MWL*: 102, *PR* §54.

²⁴ In *N*: *W.* says

²⁵ No quotation marks in *N*, only in *MS*.

Suppose someone said: 'Are you justified in applying the word "pain"?' If you mean: 'Is there a step between?', then we may or may not be justified. There being no reason for doing it doesn't mean you are wrong (or unjustified).²⁶ You might say, there is no right or wrong about it. Cf. 'How can the earth rest on nothing?' [Cf. 'The house rests on the earth, but what does the earth rest on?']

→ ← 'Do (these) arrows point the same way?' [You can make a man say that both point in the same direction, or away from one another.]²⁷

How do you distinguish between shamming being in pain (seeing black) and not shamming? Why is one doubtful how to answer these questions?

How do you distinguish between having pain and not having pain?

You look.


How do you have a mirage of a language-game? Obviously, you don't look.

Another answer is: 'You just say so or you just yell.' I might say: 'There is no way of distinguishing.' [Is this a case of distinguishing at all?] 'How do you verify the fact that you have pain?' What strikes you first is that this question is rubbish.

[It is important, when answering questions of this kind; in these discussions, etc., to say whatever comes into your head. Cf. psychoanalysis.]

Saying, 'There is no reason,' brings up the picture of shamming every time. (Cf. earth again.) [Notice the similarity with the case of the earth 'resting on nothing.' We say, 'Surely the earth *must* be held up.']



'You can't look at it as a plane figure.' The appearance changes. Put in lines  and you can look at it as a plane figure.²⁸ This is similar to what we do in philosophy.

[Compare a description of how you learn to say 'pain,' with a description of how you learn to say 'pencil.' 'When you have the same feeling again you say it is pain.' Cf. 'When you see the same thing again you call it a pencil.' The latter is an experiential statement. How do you know the former? 'When you pinch him again, he has pain.' This is all right.

²⁶ Cf. vW 124: 132 (15 March 1944), PI §289.

²⁷ Cf. vW 115: 254f. = PB: 212f. (1936, August or later), BB: 140.

²⁸ For similar figures, see, for example, vW 158: 43v (later than 15 March 1938, when W. drafted a letter to Gilbert Pattison; cf. 28v–32v and vW 120: 172r) and vW 121: 23r–v (16 May 1938). Both figures are in MS, but only the second one is in N.