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TO AMERICAN HISTORY



EDITED BY CHESTER J. PACH

A COMPANION TO  
DWIGHT D.  
EISENHOWER



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*A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*

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# A Companion To Dwight D. Eisenhower

*Edited by*

Chester J. Pach

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*For Gregory and Lauren*





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# INTRODUCTION: EISENHOWER, YESTERDAY AND TODAY

*Chester J. Pach*

In his farewell address to the American people, Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered what many observers at the time and in the decades since have considered his most eloquent speech as president. Speaking from the Oval Office of the White House on January 17, 1961, Eisenhower refrained from enumerating his accomplishments in office other than to point to his administration's productive cooperation with Congress, both houses of which had been under the control of the opposition party—the Democrats—since 1955. Instead, Eisenhower peered into “society's future” from the vantage point of a cold war that “commands our whole attention” and “absorbs our very beings.” Because of the enormous demands of protecting US security against an attack that could occur with only a few minutes' warning, there had emerged “an immense military establishment and a large arms industry” that were “new in the American experience.” The outgoing president then issued a warning that quickly became his most famous presidential legacy. “In the councils of government,” Eisenhower declared, “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” The president added that a “technological revolution” had changed research, making it “more formalized, complex, and costly,” enlarging the role of the federal government in directing and subsidizing the work in university laboratories, and creating the danger that the lure of a government contract could eclipse the importance of intellectual curiosity. Finally, Eisenhower cautioned his fellow citizens against policies that plundered “for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow....We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow” (Eisenhower, 1961).

Eisenhower's farewell address received praise, but some of the plaudits were little more than backhanded compliments. The *Washington Post*, for example, concluded that the president's valedictory speech would increase the public “affection” that Eisenhower already enjoyed, even if it included “little that was new” (“Ike's Farewell,”

1961). The *Nation* was more caustic in its appraisal, editorializing that “nothing became Mr. Eisenhower’s career in office like the leaving of it....For eight years, Mr. Eisenhower has depressed his fellow Americans by a seeming inability to grasp the major problems of his era; but now in the closing days of his Administration he spoke like the statesman and democratic leader we had so long hungered for him to become” (Pach and Richardson, 1991: 230). European commentators also offered tepid assessments. For example, the French newspaper *Le Monde* declared that Eisenhower’s farewell address was “without originality” (“European Press Decries Ike Record,” 1961).

With the passage of time, however, Eisenhower looked less like a befuddled or belated statesman and more like a prophet who foresaw vital and enduring issues of contemporary US public policy. Writing 50 years after the president’s speech, historian Andrew J. Bacevich praised Eisenhower for “transcend[ing] circumstance and bear[ing] witness to some lasting truth.” Long and difficult wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan had persuaded Bacevich that the military-industrial complex was “stubbornly resistant to change,” the expenses of war had swollen federal deficits while contributing to “acute economic distress,” and American democracy had suffered (Bacevich, 2011). Other analysts writing a half-century after the farewell address emphasized that Eisenhower was right about the temptation of paying for today’s expenses with tomorrow’s resources. Journalist Rupert Cornwell, for example, maintained that the “‘credit card’ wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, whose costs will burden American taxpayers for years to come,” showed that “the old general knew whereof he spoke” (Cornwell, 2011).

The shifting reaction to Eisenhower’s farewell address mirrors the changing assessments of his presidency over more than six decades. Eisenhower was popular with the American people throughout his eight years in office from 1953 to 1961. His approval rating in the Gallup Poll never dipped below 52 percent and averaged a robust 65 percent. Many political commentators and early historians of his presidency, however, were less impressed. Marquis Childs, a respected correspondent for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, published *Eisenhower: Captive Hero* in 1958, in which he dismissed the president as a weak and often ineffective leader. An enthused electorate in 1952 invested their hopes in the heroic general of World War II, while ignoring, according to Childs, that Eisenhower’s stature “had little or nothing to do with politics and government.” The result of having “so little preparation for what is surely the most difficult and demanding position in the world today” was that Eisenhower provided fumbling or indifferent leadership in meeting Cold War challenges like the Soviet launching of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik, or in resolving critical domestic issues, such as the desegregation of public schools in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education* (Childs, 1958: 292).

Cruder contemporary critiques reduced Eisenhower to a caricature—a general who delegated essential tasks to his staff while devoting much of his time to golfing vacations or bridge games with a circle of rich friends known as “the gang.” According to this view, Eisenhower was in charge but not in control of his own administration. His heroic reputation and genial smile inspired popular respect and admiration, even if his baffling answers to questions at news conferences suggested a tenuous grasp of important issues. Eisenhower even joked about his tendency to talk in circles that sometimes made reporters scratch their heads. When Press Secretary James C. Hagerty cautioned him about a sensitive issue prior to a news conference, Eisenhower replied, “Don’t worry, Jim, if that question comes up, I’ll just confuse them” (Ambrose,

1990: 384). When the president suffered serious illnesses—a heart attack in 1955, a stroke in 1957—humorists joked about Eisenhower’s supposed dependence on his subordinates to run his administration. It would be awful, they asserted, if Eisenhower died and Vice President Richard M. Nixon succeeded him. But it would be even worse if White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams died and Eisenhower became president (Thomas, 2012: 400). In short, the American people may have “liked Ike,” but mainly because of who he was rather than what he did while in the White House.

Most scholars considered Eisenhower at best an average chief executive soon after he left office, but his reputation began to improve in the following decade. A poll of 75 US historians in 1962 ranked Eisenhower as mediocre in his White House achievements, just above Andrew Johnson, who barely survived impeachment, and behind such lackluster presidents as Benjamin Harrison and Chester A. Arthur (“Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians,” 1962). By the end of the decade, however, what historian Mary McAuliffe describes as the “revulsion against the turmoil of the 1960s and the Vietnam War, reinforced by nostalgia for an apparently simpler and happier era” produced reevaluations of Eisenhower’s presidency (McAuliffe, 1981: 626). The strong economic growth of the Eisenhower years and the absence of US involvement in a major shooting war after the armistice in Korea in 1953 no longer seemed like happy coincidences, but the result, in large measure, of Eisenhower’s calculating and resolute leadership. In an important 1967 article, commentator Murray Kempton complained about the “underestimation” of Eisenhower as a weak president. “He was the great tortoise upon whose back the world sat for eight years,” Kempton asserted. “We laughed at him...and all the while we never knew the cunning beneath the shell” (Kempton, 1967: 156). By the early 1970s, biographers such as Herbert Parmet had documents from the Eisenhower Library to sustain a revisionist interpretation of the thirty-fourth president as a leader with “a remarkable political instinct” who achieved substantial success in both domestic and international affairs (Parmet, 1972: 577).

Eisenhower revisionism reached high tide at the beginning of the 1980s. Extremely influential was Fred I. Greenstein’s *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, which sought to explain Eisenhower’s “unique record in winning and holding public support” at a time when increasing executive powers and rising popular expectations carried with them risks of “making enemies and disappointing followers.” Central to Greenstein’s interpretation was Eisenhower’s canny ability to hide his role in day-to-day policy-making in order to preserve freedom of maneuver and divert criticism of controversial policies away from the Oval Office. This hidden-hand leadership enabled Eisenhower to appear to be above politics and thus preserve his remarkable popularity during his eight years in office. Simultaneously, however, hidden-hand leadership prevented contemporaries from appreciating that Eisenhower was an activist president (Greenstein, 1982: 4). Stephen E. Ambrose, too, found success in Eisenhower’s presidency that a previous generation of scholars had failed to discern. At the end of his magisterial two-volume biography, Ambrose declared, “Eisenhower gave the nation eight years of peace and prosperity. No other President in the twentieth century could make that claim. No wonder that millions of Americans felt that the country was damned lucky to have him” (Ambrose, 1984: 627). By the early 1980s, many scholars of the presidency shared Greenstein’s and Ambrose’s conclusions. A poll of 49 experts on the presidency in the *Chicago Tribune* in January 1982 ranked Eisenhower as the ninth most successful chief executive (“Our Best and Worst Presidents,” 1982).

By the early 1990s, new scholarship had begun to challenge some of the fundamental ideas of Eisenhower revisionism. Eisenhower postrevisionism, as I have called this emerging school of thought, accepted the revisionist view that Eisenhower was an activist and thoughtful leader determined to advance prosperity at home and protect US interests abroad. Postrevisionists, however, maintained that revisionists had dwelled too much on the processes of policymaking—especially the president's newly discovered activist role—while neglecting the results of the Eisenhower administration's decisions or actions. As I wrote, revisionists often "mistook Eisenhower's cognizance of policies for brilliance and his avoidance of war for the promotion of peace" (Pach and Richardson, 1991: xiii).

During the past generation there has been a vigorous debate about the results of the Eisenhower administration's actions—or, in some case, inaction—in shaping public policy, and this volume reflects the vigor and diversity of that scholarship. The authors of the essays that follow interpret Eisenhower from different and, often, conflicting perspectives, and they seek to understand his impact, as appropriate, in broader domestic and international contexts. The emphasis in this volume is on the presidency. It would be impossible, however, to evaluate Eisenhower's White House years without analyzing his career in the US Army. Accordingly, this volume is divided into three sections. The first, "General of the Army," examines Eisenhower's most important personal, professional, and intellectual experiences beginning with his childhood in Abilene, Kansas, and continuing through his education at the US Military Academy at West Point, his command of Allied forces in Europe during World War II, his service as Chief of Staff of the US Army, and his role as the first Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) armed forces. The next section, on Eisenhower as "President," probes the many dimensions of Eisenhower's White House policies as well as the culture and society of "Ike's America" in the 1950s. These essays address fundamental issues, such as the Eisenhower administration's involvement in civil rights, managing the economy, and protecting the environment. The Cold War was Eisenhower's central concern, and the essays in this volume discuss Eisenhower's shaping of national strategy, his use of covert action and public diplomacy, and his reliance on nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence and diplomacy. In addition, individual essays probe US relations during the Eisenhower presidency with Western Europe, Great Britain, Latin America, China, Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Third World. A final section, on Eisenhower as "Citizen," assesses the former president's influence on public policy during the 1960s and his legacies for the Republican Party.

"My place in history," Eisenhower declared during his last year in the White House, "will be decided by historians....And I don't think I will be around to differ with them" (Pach and Richardson, 1991: 237). Eisenhower surely would have disputed the conclusions of historians who lament his reluctance to provide stronger moral leadership on civil rights or who deplore his excessive and unwise reliance on covert action to overthrow unfriendly or hostile foreign governments. He also would have applauded those scholars who believe that he shaped a national strategy that led to US success in the Cold War or that he played an important role in expanding and strengthening vital social welfare programs, such as Social Security. On many issues, international and domestic, of the Eisenhower presidency, however, there is no consensus. Historians continue to debate, while decisions remain contested. The essays in this

volume analyze the rich historiography of the Eisenhower years, provide thoughtful and sometimes provocative assessments, and encourage readers to think about the connections between past and present. As his farewell address indicates, Eisenhower was concerned about the vitality of democracy in his own lifetime and in future generations. We can all learn from the challenges he faced, the successes he achieved, and the dilemmas he encountered about how to deal with similar issues in our own lives and in America today.

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Part I

GENERAL OF THE ARMY





# Chapter One

## YEARS OF PREPARATION, 1890–1941

*Jonathan Reed Winkler*

### Introduction

For many people, Dwight David Eisenhower represents the American Dream in action: the idea that a poor boy from a hardscrabble family living in a small town in the middle of America could rise to become one of the most important military commanders in United States if not modern history, and then follow that with two terms in office as president of the United States at the height of its economic and political influence in the world. For scholars attempting to make sense of Eisenhower's accomplishments, part of the exploration requires understanding the formative experiences that helped to shape his outlook, capabilities, and motivations. If, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, officials in positions of great responsibility have no time once in office to develop an interpretive framework with which to understand what they are observing but must instead rely upon the ones they created earlier in life, what was Eisenhower's and how did he construct it (Kissinger, 1979: 54)? How, as scholars, can we decide which events shaped the future leader? How do we know what made the formative years or events formative? Relying upon Eisenhower's own recollections and reflections, historians have traced much of this story, but not entirely, particularly as more comes to light about the things that Eisenhower may not have wished to remember or did not want others to ponder much about his legacy. Moreover, scholars seeking to understand the man must contextualize what Eisenhower experienced, to be able to make sense of certain events or times even if Eisenhower himself did not fully understand at the time.

Eisenhower has been the object of lengthy biographical works since the end of World War II and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. The more prominent earlier biographies include Kenneth S. Davis, *Soldier of Democracy* (1945); Steve Neal, *The Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty* (1978), and Stephen E. Ambrose's two-volume work (1983–1984). Ambrose's biography, while a standard in the field, must also be

qualified by the later revelations that Eisenhower had not, in fact, approached Ambrose to write the work and that Ambrose did not conduct the extensive interviews with Ike that he later claimed to have done (Rayner, 2010; Rives, 2010). The most recent full-life treatments include Carlo D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life* (2002); Michael Korda, *Ike: An American Hero* (2007); and Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (2012). Each of these recent works draws upon the earlier standard biographies, Eisenhower's own published reminiscences, particularly (for this period) *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (1967), and the plethora of archival material available at the Eisenhower Presidential Library and elsewhere.

### Childhood, 1890–1911

Dwight D. Eisenhower was born on October 14, 1890, in Denison, Texas, where his father David was working for a railroad. Shortly afterwards, the family moved back to Abilene, Kansas, where David and Ida Eisenhower had been married in 1885 and with which the Eisenhower name would be forever associated. David Eisenhower's family had been farmers and businessmen, members of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, or River Brethren, who moved to Kansas from Pennsylvania in the 1870s in a great migration organized by his grandfather Jacob. Dwight D. Eisenhower's mother Ida, though born in Virginia, followed her brothers on the migration in 1883 (Neal, 1978).

Once back in Abilene, Dwight and his five brothers enjoyed a modest upbringing in a lower-class house on the south (and poorer) side of town. His father worked at the creamery, while his mother raised the boys. Historians, channeling Eisenhower's own reminiscences and those of his brothers, note the great influence of both parents in shaping the boys' determination, discipline, ruggedness, and responsibility. Physically and emotionally warm, Ida in particular was selfless, hardworking, and very religious. Observers in the 1940s and historians since have also presented Abilene of this era as the quintessential American small town, one where the boys could have grown up safe and happy, exposed to both the country and the street, and where success in life could be measured on a much smaller scale than it might be a century later, while opportunities abounded for any who sought to strike out for greater things (Kornitzer, 1955; Jameson, 1961). Biographical treatments detailing the boyhood adventures and formative experiences in Abilene include the most recent by D'Este (2002), Korda (2007), and Smith (2012), and all frequently draw upon Eisenhower's own recollections in *At Ease* (Eisenhower, 1967).

One area of particular interest more recently for scholars plumbing Eisenhower's wartime and presidential thinking, particularly on the dangers of nuclear warfare, has been his religious influences. Here, however, much less is known, perhaps because Eisenhower himself left little information about his religious views and was not especially active in his practice, and because of the particular circumstances of his upbringing. Through his extended family, Eisenhower was brought up within the cultural milieu of the River Brethren sect. Religious guidance appears to have come mostly from his mother Ida, who later turned toward what would later become known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, while the boys were young. By the 1950s, when Eisenhower was in the public eye, and then in the 1960s, when he was shaping his legacy, this

religious denomination remained on the periphery of Christianity in America. Several scholars have suggested that Eisenhower and his brothers deliberately downplayed discussion of Ida's influence lest there be negative consequences of association with what was seen by mainstream Christians as a fringe millennial sect (this at a time when it was still controversial that a Catholic would run for, let alone win, the office of president) (Bergman, 1998, 1999; Smith 2006).

Eisenhower did not refer to religious influence much in his writings, and the archival materials do not support any sense that he and his wife Mamie had an active religious life. (Smith 2006; Holmes, 2012) His recognized familiarity with the Bible stemmed from deep exposure in childhood, through his mother. D'Este notes that by the time Ike went to West Point, he had read the Bible twice through (D'Este, 2002: 33). Ida apparently directed Ike toward religious, ethical, and moral instruction to temper his growing fascination with the ancient wars of the Greeks and Romans. Reading *The Pilgrim's Progress* was, according to Gary Smith, particularly influential (Wirt, 1965; Smith 2006). While as an adult he did not formally join a church (but maintained, through Mamie, an alignment with the Presbyterian Church), his relationship with God appears to have been deep and personal, if not expressed publicly or through his papers.

### West Point, 1911–1915

Graduating from high school in 1909, Eisenhower was not admitted to West Point until 1911. He spent the two years working to pay for his brother Edgar to attend the University of Michigan, in an arrangement that was to have seen Edgar make Ike's attendance possible. Chance led to Eisenhower applying for Annapolis and West Point, and securing the appointment to the military academy in January. His four years there were both formative and transformative. Attracted initially more by the opportunity to play sports and obtain a college degree than by the idea of a military career, Eisenhower changed under West Point's emphasis on teamwork and the suppression of individuality in favor of the corporate. Biographers have explored how Eisenhower developed his abilities as a leader and guide here. Not an academic standout, he impressed his peers well enough that they granted him influence over them. The traits he acquired at West Point, particularly in organizational ability, competitive energy, and motivation, would be key to his continued success, a point highlighted by David Jablonsky among others (Holland, 2001; Jablonsky, 2010). The West Point that Eisenhower saw has been well described by historians (Ambrose, 1966; Fleming, 1969; Ellis and Moore, 1974).

Active participation in athletics, and particularly football, was a key motivator for Eisenhower at this point (indeed, it was part of the reason he went there) (D'Este, 2002: 67). Eisenhower was involved in football at the exact time when the modern rules, particularly involving passing and downs, were developed. The 1912 Army–Carlisle Indian School game saw Eisenhower struggle against the great Jim Thorpe, and he watched from the sidelines the famous 1913 Army–Notre Dame game (where Notre Dame's successful repeated use of the forward pass brought this existing play to common notice). This, Ambrose and others note, tweaked his attention and his enthusiasm, and he was urged to coach the junior varsity team, which he did very well.

Though he would never play again (he wrenched his knee, with permanent damage, after the 1912 Carlisle game) he would continue to coach, and acquired a strong reputation for his coaching. While Eisenhower's involvement was significant more in retrospect, historians such as Lars Anderson have focused on the 1912 game as a key one in the sport's history (Anderson, 2008). On the history of football, development of its rules, and its significance in this period in understanding the context of Eisenhower's experiences, see also the works by David Nelson (1994) and John Watterson (2002). But the emphasis on athletics as part of military preparation was not unique to Eisenhower by any means, and provided part of his bonding with his fellow officers in the years to come (Holland, 2001).

### **World War I and Fort Meade after the War, 1915–1922**

In his first years after West Point, Eisenhower established the key professional friendships that lasted through his career, grasped the measure of the responsibilities that his chosen career entailed, and met the love of his life. Without these firm connections, it might well have been the case that the subsequent disappointments with his experiences in World War I and the years immediately after would have destroyed his career. With his knee injury ruling out cavalry service, and having considered going to Argentina to seek his fortune, Eisenhower opted for the infantry and had requested service in the Philippines when he graduated in June 1915. He was instead assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment at Fort Sam Houston near San Antonio, Texas, and arrived there in late 1915. Historians have tended to focus on his coaching football for two different institutions (Peacock Military Academy and St. Louis College), learning the rudiments of being a junior officer, gaining a lifelong friend in Leonard T. "Gee" Gerow, and meeting Mamie Doud, whom he would marry in July 1916. Mamie's perspective on their courtship is covered in the work by her granddaughter Susan Eisenhower (Eisenhower, 1996). Eisenhower would also be caught up in the aftermath of the Pancho Villa raid on New Mexico and the mobilization of the National Guard to the frontier. He requested service with Pershing's Punitive Expedition, which was rejected; instead he was assigned to training a newly mobilized National Guard regiment—the 7th Illinois—stationed at Fort Sam Houston. Eisenhower ran most of its training, and D'Este in particular sees this as a significant moment in Eisenhower's career development and his acceptance of an army career (D'Este, 2002; Coffman, 2004).

When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, the officers and enlisted men of the existing army formed the cadre around which to build the massive wartime army. In May, Eisenhower was assigned to the new 57th Regiment. As supply officer, Eisenhower had the responsibility of acquiring the necessary essentials to make the unit come together. Under great pressure and competition for scarce resources, Eisenhower learned the importance of logistics, planning, anticipation, and foresight. Effective at the task, he came to hope that he would go overseas with the unit. (Interestingly, it was never sent abroad.) Instead, the army saw fit in September to use his skills at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, at one of the eight Officer Training Schools with which the army would obtain—after only 90 days—the essential lieutenants to command the drafted soldiers in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), a process

detailed by J. Garry Clifford and decried most recently by Richard Faulkner (Clifford, 1972; Faulkner, 2012). Several weeks later the army realigned officer training under the divisions, and Eisenhower transferred to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to oversee training of new officers there. Despite his repeated requests for combat duty, Eisenhower's skills at training and organizing kept him right where he was. While this was going on, Mamie had given birth to their first son, Doud David (known as "Icky"), and was raising him while she remained in Texas. (It is worth noting that the correct spelling is Icky, but some biographers have persisted with the spelling "Ikky.")

Eisenhower's career shifted in February 1918. Assigned to Camp Meade, Maryland, and the 65th Engineers, he found himself involved in the creation of the first tank units for the US Army. Ambrose suggests, Smith echoes, and Matthew Holland cites materials from the Eisenhower Library to clarify that Eisenhower had taken a course on tanks at Fort Leavenworth, but the other major biographies do not note this as determinative in why Eisenhower went to Fort Meade (Ambrose, 1983; Holland, 2001; Smith, 2012). The true reason may well be that the first director of the Tank Corps being assembled there was Lt. Col. Ira C. Welborn. According to Holland, Welborn had been Eisenhower's superior at Fort Oglethorpe and specifically requested Eisenhower when he moved to Meade. Preparing the 301st Tank Battalion to go overseas, Eisenhower threw himself into the task, but learned that his success was his undoing: Welborn needed him to continue training others.

Rather than going to France, Eisenhower went instead to Camp Colt, Pennsylvania (adjacent to Gettysburg), to oversee the army's new tank-training facility. Deeply disappointed at the evaporation of his chance to go to war, Eisenhower had been given, nonetheless, a very significant responsibility. Arriving in March 1918, he had by July more than 10,600 officers and men under his command at a sprawling facility, and by October he had been promoted temporarily to lieutenant colonel at the age of 28. By war's end, some 20 tank battalions had been created and undergone initial training under Eisenhower's purview. Most accounts of Eisenhower dwell on the stories recorded of his experiences there rather than on the work done to create the idea of a tank corps, but we should recognize that the real mark on Eisenhower was the positive feedback of running what was a substantial organization, engaging problems of leadership and morale (including the ravages of the Spanish flu coming through the camp), and doing it well. At last in November he received orders to sail for France to take command of a tank unit there. The armistice of November 1918 stopped that. Eisenhower instead oversaw the reduction of Camp Colt in December, and withdrawal of materials to the Tank Corps to Fort Benning, Georgia. After a short time at Fort Benning, Eisenhower went to Camp Meade in March 1919. The Tank Corps would be based permanently at Camp Meade. The tank units that had been overseas now returned, and with George S. Patton in Washington, DC with the Tank Board, Eisenhower was assigned temporary command of the 304th Tank Brigade. Eisenhower remained embarrassed by his having missed the war, but Ambrose suggests that, in a way, it meant that he would not be burdened with the later fears and memories that haunted others, such as Marshall, who did see combat and its effects (Ambrose 1983; Wilson, 1989).

Another formative, if under-examined, event for Eisenhower was his participation in the army's famous Transcontinental Motor Convoy in July–September 1919. Eisenhower volunteered to be a Tank Corps observer, together with Maj. Sereno

Brett, and joined nearly 300 other participants. Patton held Brett in high esteem as an aggressive tank officer who had commanded one of the two tank battalions in France. Like Patton and Eisenhower, Brett had chosen to remain on after the war, but unlike his two more famous peers his life and his influence have largely escaped historical notice (he did not, for example, have a Wikipedia page until 2012). Eisenhower and Brett thus accompanied the convoy shortly after its departure from Washington, DC (joining at Frederick, Maryland) and accompanied it all the way to San Francisco. Along the way they came to understand much about the endurance capabilities of the vehicles available at the time and the poor condition of the national road network in the United States. Most historical observers do little more than cite this as a formative event that influenced Eisenhower's later efforts to establish the Interstate Highway System, though Carlo D'Este provides among the best accounts yet. He also notes that Eisenhower himself remembered the event in his *At Ease*, mostly for the shenanigans that he and Brett got up to on the trip (Wickman, 1990; D'Este, 2002: 140–143; Davies, 2003). Considering the intensity of the previous two and a half years, it may well be that this simply was for Eisenhower his first well-deserved rest since the summer of 1916.

Following the transcontinental trip, Eisenhower returned to Camp Meade, where he, George Patton, and other tank enthusiasts considered the implications of the new devices for the future of warfare amid the unwinding of the massive wartime army. Historians have rightly pointed out the significance of this period both in Eisenhower's life and in the development of the US military. Eisenhower and George Patton, living and working closely together, developed a lifelong personal and professional relationship, as D'Este in particular has exhaustively detailed (D'Este, 1995, 2002). At Camp Meade through 1919 and 1920 Patton, Eisenhower, and others (though who these others were is little detailed in the standard biographies) worked on armor and ideas for using tanks in future combat. Eisenhower also took over the coaching of the Fort Meade football team, though he felt that he was past this duty.

Eisenhower's personal life also swayed greatly. Mamie joined Ike at Camp Meade in 1919 only to return to her parents in Denver after several weeks of dismal living conditions. Rejoining Ike in 1920, she and son Icky fashioned comfortable married quarters next door to the Pattons, and most biographers identify this as a pleasant year for them, though perhaps best seen as calm before the storm of professional chaos and, in January 1921, the death of Icky from scarlet fever. Most biographers, drawing on Eisenhower's own remembrance, note that the death was significant and long felt for both parents, and a turning point in the marriage (Eisenhower, 1967). Interestingly, no biographer notes that it led to any special turn toward religion, as a similar death of a child had motivated Ike's mother Ida.

Professional turmoil as well occurred. Eisenhower, Patton, and others, at the urging of Brig. Gen. Samuel Rockenbach, the new head of the Tank Corps, formulated their thinking about armor into articles that would be circulated to the army through its professional journals (Eisenhower, 1920; Wilson, 1989). Though Secretary of War Newton Baker and Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. Marsh wanted tanks to become an independent branch, AEF commander and General of the Armies John J. Pershing did not. Congress deferred to his wishes. With the 1920 National Defense Act, the Tank Corps merged into the Infantry. Eisenhower, for his outspokenness, would face rebuke from the Chief of Infantry, while Patton opted to transfer to the cavalry instead

of remaining in what now seemed to be a professional dead end. Ideas for how to use armored vehicles in war continued to circulate, but their position in the army would not change for more than a decade (Johnson, 1998).

It was at a dinner organized by George Patton at Camp Meade that Eisenhower met Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, who would profoundly alter Eisenhower's career and life. Conner had been Pershing's chief of operations and consequently held particular sway in the army in the years after the war. Conner, impressed by his lengthy conversation with Eisenhower after the dinner, began to shape the direction of Eisenhower's career. For all the significance of the meeting, it is remarkable that biographers have given different dates for it, though Holland believes it to have been in June 1920, citing the diary of Floyd Parks, while D'Este argues for September 1919 (Holland, 2001; D'Este, 2002; Smith, 2012).

### **Transformation, 1922–1926**

The four most critical years for Eisenhower's professional intellectual development were those from 1922 to 1926. During this time, Eisenhower served under the close tutelage of Brig. Gen. Fox Conner in Panama, and then, with Conner's intervention, attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. In his early thirties, Eisenhower was also experiencing the additional transformative experiences of being a father once more, with the birth of son John S. Doud in 1922, and keeping a family together through difficult assignments.

Eisenhower went to Panama at the express request and intervention of Brigadier General Conner. As Jean Edward Smith points out, neither Eisenhower himself nor the first generation of biographers (including Ambrose) explained the full circumstances for Conner's subsequent intervention (or the debt Eisenhower would owe Conner). Ambrose writes that Brig. Gen. Samuel Rockenbach repeatedly blocked Eisenhower's 1921 requests for transfer elsewhere, on the grounds that Ike was essential for the Tank Corps (and Camp Meade's football team), and that this changed with Pershing becoming army chief of staff. That opened the way for Conner to have Pershing approve a transfer, and it came out of the blue (Ambrose, 1983). The reality was more complex. Conner had, in early 1921, indicated to Eisenhower that he desired him to be his executive officer in Panama with the 20th Infantry Brigade. Eisenhower's chain of command disagreed (D'Este [2002] concurs with Ambrose that it was Rockenbach who blocked it). This happened weeks after the death of Icky and could only have darkened the mood. Then, in the summer of 1921, the army investigated Eisenhower for financial irregularities: he had improperly drawn around \$250 in reimbursement for Icky's stay in Iowa with family in 1920. Despite Eisenhower's repayment of the money, and the support of his superiors, the army's inspector general wanted to make an example of Eisenhower for the signing of a financial document and misuse of public funds. The investigation dragged on through December 1921, and there were preparations for a court martial. Ike's career would likely have been over. At this point, as Smith clarifies, Conner intervened with Pershing (who had become chief of staff in July 1921), who presumably then pressed the inspector general to reconsider an earlier rejected punishment of formal reprimand. This rebuke then came from a senior officer who was also a close friend of Conner's.

Shortly afterwards (within days) Dwight and Mamie left for Panama. Conner's intervention could not have been invisible to Eisenhower, even if he did not share it with others later (Holland, 2001; Smith, 2012).

In Panama, Eisenhower's involvement with Conner extended far beyond his nominal duties as executive officer while Conner commanded the 20th Infantry Brigade. Part of the Panama Canal Division, formed in 1921 (and deactivated in 1932), the unit was based at Camp Gaillard in the Canal Zone (Wilson, 1997). For Eisenhower, the daily responsibilities were comparatively light, if the living conditions were dreary and the pressures on the marriage great. Conner, sensing Eisenhower's mood, quickly pushed him to read and think about military affairs rather than dwell on the recent personal and professional calamities. The result was an intense intellectual study that Eisenhower himself later referred to as a "sort of graduate school in military affairs," that shaped his thinking for the remainder of his career (Eisenhower, 1967: 183–185).

Perhaps because he served in a staff role during the war (he was too valuable for combat) and because he never became chief of staff (Douglas MacArthur was his rival), historians have remembered Fox Conner more for his influence over Marshall and Eisenhower than for his own accomplishments. Most note his wealthy Mississippi upbringing, his graduation from West Point in 1898, and his successful career that saw Pershing select him for the AEF's staff. From November 1917 onwards, Conner was the G-3 (assistant chief of staff for operations) and among his smartest subordinates was Lt. Col. George C. Marshall. Had Eisenhower's assignment been anywhere but the remote one in Panama, Conner might not have had the time to be the valuable teacher to the willing student. Though more could be done, there has been some focused scholarly work on Conner (Bigelow, 1984; Brown, 1987; Kingseed, 1990). Possible mentoring lessons are the focus of works by Edward Cox and F. Douglas Mehle (Mehle, 1978; Cox, 2010). Conner's role on Pershing's staff is recounted in James Cooke's study of the AEF command and staff (Cooke, 1987).

During this time in Panama, Eisenhower had effectively a multi-year individual tutorial in military strategy and policy under Conner's close direction. Beginning with historical fiction to rekindle his interest (Ike had lost his enthusiasm for history at West Point), Eisenhower then moved on to serious history while drawing on Conner's personal library. These studies included the US Civil War, the wars of Frederick the Great, the campaigns of Napoleon and the military history and theory of French Army colonel, Ardant du Picq. Conner would quiz Eisenhower extensively on the material and its implications, and in the process conveyed to Ike significant insights about controlling large forces, managing alliances, and anticipating future conflict. In particular, Conner was distilling for Eisenhower the experiences he had gained directing the operations and alliance problems of the AEF. Conner also emphasized to Eisenhower his concerns with the Versailles settlement and the likelihood of war again in Europe, ideas that would later shape Eisenhower's own writings in the 1930s. Comparing him favorably with Marshall (with whom Ike was advised to connect), Conner did not constrain Eisenhower with precise rules on what he should do but rather provided the intellectual framework for him to grapple with the intense psychological challenges of high command as they came up. Most significantly, Conner compelled Eisenhower to read—in its entirety—Carl von Clausewitz's key work *On War*, not once but three times. Eisenhower would later identify this as the



most influential work he had ever read (D’Este, 2002). The insights about policy and strategy it contained would guide his actions for the remainder of his public life. Part of the significance of Eisenhower’s close study of Clausewitz is that US Army officers in this period were not particularly familiar with Clausewitz or his ideas, though they had heard of him. Only a few motivated officers examined the tome (Conner and Patton among them), most likely through one of the few English translations. It is not clear when Conner digested the work, or what edition Eisenhower read from Conner’s library, though we can speculate that Conner owned either the Col. J. J. Graham translation or Maude’s subsequent edition of Graham (Pickett, 1985; Bassford, 1994).

Prepared by this tutorial, Eisenhower went on to further instruction at the army’s Command and General Staff School. Having left Panama in September 1924, he returned to Camp Meade as much to be a football coach as anything else. Ordered then to Fort Benning to command the 15th Light Tank Battalion, he protested this reassignment personally in vain with the chief of infantry in hopes of going to the Command and General Staff School. As Mark Bender found, Eisenhower had already tentatively been slated to attend Leavenworth for the 1925–1926 class, but no one told him (Bender, 1990). Eisenhower likely also saw Conner, in the same building, who arranged the now-famous diversion. Eisenhower was transferred to the Adjutant General Corps to be a recruiting officer at Fort Logan, Colorado (near Denver, where Mamie and son John were staying) pending his assignment, as the adjutant general’s selection (at Conner’s request) to Leavenworth for the 1925–1926 class. Given the tutorial (and Patton’s notes from his own attendance), few officers were more ready for the year than Eisenhower.

Historians have clarified what the Command and General Staff School experience would have been like for Eisenhower through detailed studies of its development and its evolution through the interwar period (Nenninger, 1978, 1994; Schifferle, 2010; Muth, 2011). The best account of Eisenhower’s experience is that of Mark Bender, while Eisenhower’s own (unsigned) reflection appeared in *Infantry Journal* (Eisenhower, 1927; Bender, 1990). Part of the success came from Eisenhower’s close work with his study partner and old friend Leonard T. Gerow, who would later go on to be one of Eisenhower’s key lieutenants if largely overlooked by biographers (Weigley, 1990). The focus was on army tactical and operational-level staff work, and on presenting the “correct” answer to the posed problems. The essential need for teamwork and unity of effort was a lesson that remained with him even if he disagreed with the instilled doctrine (Holland, 2001; Jablonsky, 2010). Graduating at the top of his class (with Gerow right behind him) Eisenhower had completed the course earlier in his career than most and had acquired a reputation for being one of the smartest rising officers in the army.

### **Washington and Paris, 1926–1931**

Over the next three years, Eisenhower’s career took him to Washington, DC, to join the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) and the Army War College. A brief interlude at Fort Benning as commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment—the segregated unit being used in support of the Infantry School, and a career backwater

for officers—ended with another Fox Conner intervention. In January 1927 Eisenhower joined the ABMC, under the direction of General Pershing, with the responsibility of writing a narrative account of the AEF's time in Belgium and France. After six months of intense work, Eisenhower had written a historical account of the AEF's work in Europe that gained copious praise from Pershing. He finished by August, having learned in the spring that he had also been selected to attend the Army War College that fall. Biographers do not much examine the guide beyond noting its thoroughness and the significance of that assignment as indicating Eisenhower had been marked for greater things. Eisenhower was, however, writing as a historian, and a close analysis of the guide (and what he chose to highlight and omit) against what he had studied at Fort Leavenworth might well yield interesting results.

Eisenhower attended the Army War College in 1927–1928, as did Gee Gerow and others whom he knew at Leavenworth. Located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, the college emphasized large-scale operations, strategy, industrial mobilization planning, grand strategy, and alliance relations. Historian Benjamin Cooling has indicated that there is little known of Eisenhower's time at the college, other than the research paper he had to write. Subsequent biographers have also accepted this minimalist interpretation, with Ambrose and, later, Smith suggesting it was a relaxing year. But he could not have learned nothing (Cooling, 1975; Ambrose, 1983; Smith, 2012). George Pappas has examined the curriculum, which was mostly a close study of the AEF and its experiences. In one particularly insightful work Holland, looking at Eisenhower's course papers, argues that from the references in them one can appreciate just how broadly Eisenhower had read in military theory and history by this point, and understand better what Eisenhower then did after 1941. It would also have been significant as a time for Eisenhower to connect with other bright rising officers (Pappas, 1967; Ball, 1994; Holland, 2001). But most biographers emphasize the social and cultural life the Eisenhowers experienced in Washington at the Wyoming Apartments, from the close time with brother Milton Eisenhower to the networking that Dwight did with fellow officers and government officials (Cooling, 1975; D'Este, 2002; Smith, 2012).

Upon conclusion of the Army War College tour, Eisenhower had a choice: take a post on the General Staff (a prestigious assignment) or return to the Battle Monuments Commission and go to France, which is what Pershing wanted him to do. Mamie pushed for France. After a year, Eisenhower tired of the work, and according to Smith sought out Conner's intervention once more (Smith, 2012). In November 1929, Ike reported for duty at the War Department as the executive assistant to Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, the military advisor to the assistant secretary of war, Frederick H. Payne. Payne, Moseley, and thus Eisenhower's charge was to consider the industrial mobilization plan for the country in the event of war. The first 12 or so months were quiet, though Eisenhower worked extensively on economic and industrial issues, and with Bernard Baruch. Moseley's office was out of favor with Chief of Staff Charles P. Summerall, and historians have touched on the subject very little, choosing to concentrate instead on Moseley and his particular views, with the exception of Kerry Irish's account of the 1930 plan and its importance for Ike (Irish, 2006).

Things changed with the arrival of Douglas MacArthur as chief of staff in November 1930. Moseley became MacArthur's deputy, and Eisenhower followed. Assigned to

the task of drafting the official procurement and mobilization report for the congressionally established War Policies Commission, Ike successfully pulled off the report and managed the relationship with Congress. As Jablonsky has pointed out, Eisenhower developed a great understanding of the relationship between the industrial and economic resources of a nation and national power and the necessity of interservice cooperation (Eisenhower, 1931; Jablonsky, 2010). Ultimately, the report went nowhere amid the deepening of the Great Depression. The significance of the activities with which Ike was involved, both the industrial mobilization plan and the War Policies Commission, in the longer history of industrial planning for war is clear from the work of Paul Koistinen (Koistinen, 1998). Also notably, for Eisenhower, the work attracted the positive attention of MacArthur, who came to rely more and more on his efforts.

### **Working for MacArthur, 1931–1939**

From late 1931 to 1939, Eisenhower worked closely with Douglas MacArthur, first in Washington and then in Manila. Following the organizational success of the War Policies Commission report, MacArthur asked Eisenhower to stay on for an additional year rather than rotate out to field command in the summer of 1932. Eisenhower agreed, and until late February 1933 was informally attached to MacArthur with an office between the chief of staff and Moseley. From then until October 1935, Ike was effectively MacArthur's executive secretary.

It was a time of intense work for Eisenhower, and, at times, his health declined significantly from overwork. From writing the annual reports to processing the internal memoranda filtering up to the chief of staff, Ike saw how the army functioned in its entirety. He learned from MacArthur as much what to do as what not to do. MacArthur did not mentor; Eisenhower instead simply observed and absorbed. With the United States mired in the Great Depression, the army suffered accordingly from the reduction in resources, and Eisenhower praised MacArthur for the deftness with which he fended off budget cuts. In describing this period of Eisenhower's career, most biographers have emphasized the differences between Eisenhower and MacArthur, the evolution of Eisenhower's political views, and the personal relationships that Ike maintained in Washington at a difficult time (Ambrose, 1983; D'Este, 2002; Smith, 2012). Like a great many educated people in this period, Eisenhower developed particular ideas about an activist president, including ideas about the evolution of the relationship between executive and legislative branches in times of crisis. Some gave Eisenhower the nickname "Dictator Ike" because of his belief in a strong executive. Within months of Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration, however, Eisenhower became disillusioned with the role of "theorists and academicians" in the New Deal, but did not stop thinking about the power of the presidency (Holt and Leyerzapf, 1998; Jablonsky, 2010: 25).

Few biographers address much more than that, making it difficult to know fully how much Eisenhower learned from this experience of working for MacArthur. Indeed, one part of Eisenhower's time on MacArthur's staff has largely escaped proper historical study. Eisenhower attended the Army Industrial College (later the Industrial College of the Armed Forces) in 1931, but scholars do not seem to address much

more than that fact. It is not entirely clear when he actually attended, what he would have studied beyond supply and industrial policy, and on what he lectured there after he completed the course. D'Este is wrong that Ike created it (Holland, 2001; D'Este, 2006). If so little is known of the experience, how can its non-significance for Eisenhower be so solidly accepted?

Whatever the merits of a strong presidency for the challenges of wartime, Eisenhower's views on federal intervention in disorder in peacetime must also have been formed by his experience with the 1932 Bonus March. The concern among the army and the administration of Herbert Hoover that a communist-inspired revolution was nigh was overblown, and General MacArthur's heavy-handed response is generally regarded as reactionary and unnecessarily provocative. Most of Eisenhower's biographers devote considerable attention to the events of May–June 1932, and historians have generally covered them, as well as their ambiguities. Among the most recent treatments is that of Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen (Dickson and Allen, 2004). Smith is critical of Eisenhower's later recollections that he opposed MacArthur's decision to observe the clash in person and found the entire episode distasteful, suggesting that instead Eisenhower was supportive at worst and discreet at best (Smith, 2012). D'Este is more circumspect, noting that while Eisenhower wrote the official after-action report in a positive light and likely shared many of the views of his colleagues about the Bonus March, his personal disgust with the scene was probably sincere at the time (D'Este 2002).

Eisenhower followed MacArthur to the Philippines in October 1935 and remained there with him until December 1939. The four years were, in the judgment of Stephen Ambrose and most others, difficult, neither professionally rewarding nor appropriate for him, personally challenging for the marriage, and ultimately fatal for the relationship between the two officers. Eisenhower did, however, continue his exposure to the very highest levels of budgetary planning and organizational management, albeit for a jump-started foreign army in financial straits (Ambrose, 1983). Though Eisenhower may not have fully grasped what had happened, President Franklin D. Roosevelt extended MacArthur's stay as chief of staff into 1935 to block Moseley from succeeding MacArthur, and then managed to exile MacArthur by dispatching him (though at Manuel Quezon's request) to head the military mission to the Philippines. The islands were to become a commonwealth following the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 and would become fully independent in 1946. MacArthur loved the idea of returning to the islands to build up their army and accepted his retirement from the US Army as the price. Roosevelt replaced MacArthur with Malin Craig the day after the departure, to the general's great anger. It was exile of a sort, and it would hurt Eisenhower by denying him command time and keeping him at his rank behind his peers.

Defense of the Philippines was not an easy task. MacArthur saw it as a moral obligation, a duty the United States had to continue to uphold. The likely opponent was Japan, and MacArthur entertained the idea that the US Navy would deter the Japanese from invading the islands (not what the navy planned to do) and that if they invaded nonetheless, the defenders would stop them on the beaches, though it was not entirely clear what with. Eisenhower's task, a job shared with his assistant Maj. Jimmy Ord until his death in a flying accident in 1938, was to operationalize MacArthur's larger vision about how a citizen army could be created in short order

with minimal financial or industrial resources and limited support from the United States. It was a tall order, and ultimately futile, as the Japanese proved in 1941–1942. MacArthur's views are in his memoirs, while Eisenhower's own writings indicate Ike's dissatisfaction with his lot (MacArthur, 1964; James, 1970; Holt and Leyerzapf, 1998). Jablonsky argues that Eisenhower learned from the negatives and gained a greater appreciation for the importance of unity of effort between the political and military leadership on matters of national defense (Jablonsky, 2010). On the evolving ways the US Army envisioned defending the Pacific outposts, Brian Linn's treatment is especially valuable (Linn, 1997).

### **Preparation for War, 1939–1941**

Eisenhower's return from the Philippines coincided with the intense uncertainty of the beginnings of World War II. Between the political infighting with Maj. Richard D. Sutherland, who poisoned Eisenhower's relationship with MacArthur, and the staff reorganization that occurred while Eisenhower was temporarily in the United States, Eisenhower believed the time was right to leave Manila and return to the regular US Army. Eisenhower wrote to old friends T. J. Davis and Mark Clark, who interceded with James Ulio, the executive officer to the adjutant general. As D'Este and Smith have detailed, Ike renewed his friendship with Mark Clark in the summer of 1938, and this intercession had serious consequences for the next few years and indeed the remainder of Eisenhower's life (Blumenson, 1984; D'Este, 2002; Smith, 2012). Having received orders in May 1939 assigning him to Fort Lewis, Washington, the Eisenhowers departed Manila in December 1939 and arrived at Fort Lewis in January 1940. Upon arrival, Eisenhower became caught up in the large-scale exercise of the Fourth Army along the West Coast that the new chief of staff, George C. Marshall, had set in motion. Eisenhower was temporarily reassigned to the staff of the Fourth Army, headed by Lt. Gen. John L. Dewitt. His responsibility was to study the transportation requirements for moving units into California. By early February, DeWitt released Eisenhower, and he headed at last to Fort Lewis.

The next few months were ones of intense work and constant movement that challenged Eisenhower's ambitions. At Fort Lewis, Eisenhower was executive officer and then, additionally, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 15th, aligned under the 3rd Infantry Division. The regiment soon relocated to Camp Ord, California, as part of the Fourth Army maneuvers that Eisenhower himself had helped to plan. Eisenhower relished this experience of being back in direct command of soldiers in the field, and feared that his position and the expansion of the army might well result in his being pulled away to a staff assignment, something he bitterly opposed.

Eisenhower soon became torn between, on the one hand, his personal desires to continue his career path in the US Army with as much troop command time as possible and, on the other, his strong reputation as an effective planner that led to multiple requests for his services in positions away from command. In short order, Eisenhower confronted or was considered in several possibilities as the army underwent massive expansion and reorganization. Maj. Gen. Walter Krueger, commander

of VIII Corps, requested Eisenhower to be his chief of staff shortly after taking command in June 1940 (Ike would learn later of the request and the denial) (Holzimmer, 2007). George Patton and Ike corresponded in September and November 1940 over Patton's suggestion that Eisenhower apply for assignment under him (Patton expected divisional command). As D'Este relates, Eisenhower considered that such an assignment would be the likely apex of his career. In November, Gee Gerow, deputy director of the War Plans Division, asked Eisenhower to join him. Eisenhower demurred, and he reached out to Clark to ask that subsequent requests be blocked. The implications of this are unclear—D'Este suggests that Clark, as a favor to Ike, stopped further requests, while Ambrose believes that not only did Marshall monitor these developments but was manipulating the situation with Eisenhower's assignments, something neither substantiated by the evidence he cites nor reiterated elsewhere. It is an interesting outstanding question, then, to what extent General Marshall was already manipulating Eisenhower's career in 1940–1941.

Despite his turning down Gerow's invitation, Eisenhower advanced steadily upwards through the staff ranks. By the end of November 1940, he became chief of staff of the 3rd Division at Fort Lewis (the parent unit of the 15th), at the request of Maj. Gen. Charles F. Thompson. By March 1941, he had been promoted to full colonel, and assigned as chief of staff for Maj. Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce, commanding the IX Army Corps (which included the 3rd Infantry Division). Eisenhower would have overseen the preparations for the Fourth Army maneuvers to occur in mid-summer at Camp Hunter-Liggett in California. But by mid-June 1941 Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commanding the Third Army, secured from George Marshall the reassignment of Eisenhower from IX Corps to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. How and why this happened as quickly as it did, given Ike's earlier protestations, is unclear.

Thus, the Eisenhowers moved once again to San Antonio, Texas, where Ike took up the job of planning the Third Army's efforts against General Ben Lear's Second Army in the famous Louisiana Maneuvers of August–September 1941. The war game, structured by newly promoted Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, the assistant chief of staff (G-3), would be observed by Gen. Leslie J. McNair, responsible for organizing the ground forces as chief of staff of the general headquarters, US Army. For the particulars of the maneuvers, see the accounts by Christopher R. Gabel (1992) and Francis G. Smith (1945). Some 27 divisions participated in what was the largest exercise by the US Army prior to World War II in an army where very little of the large-unit staff and command experience from World War I remained. In two separate games, Krueger and Eisenhower's army outmaneuvered Lear's both times. Gaining his first star, Eisenhower also won public attention for his role. As both Ambrose and D'Este explain, Eisenhower's effective planning as well as his good nature, honesty, and modesty impressed reporters who were there observing the maneuvers. Interestingly, D'Este, citing memoirs by Robert Eichelberger in his papers at the US Army Military History Institute, indicates that Krueger was resentful of Eisenhower's getting credit for the planning of the operation. It was Eisenhower, not Krueger, who would go farther.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower's career altered forever beyond what he could possibly have imagined. On December 12, 1941, Col. Walter Bedell Smith, the secretary to the general staff, summoned Ike to Washington at General Marshall's request. Eisenhower, thinking it was to be a short trip, packed a single bag.

From the War Plans Division General Eisenhower would go on to become the commander of US Army forces in the European theater in June 1942.

From this point forward, Eisenhower had to draw steadily upon the accumulated knowledge and wisdom from his formative years to guide him in his most difficult decisions. The moral and emotional courage required to lead in combat was something that Eisenhower possessed because of his hard work over the previous decades. It was the physical effort (and setbacks) of the team sports, the emotional turmoil of personal loss and career challenges, the intellectual growth from close study of history and leadership, and the professional experiences in training, organizing, and leading large groups of people that together made Eisenhower a suitable candidate for his subsequent assignments. But it was Eisenhower's ability to draw quickly, effectively, and reliably upon those strengths that enabled him to meet the new dilemmas he confronted. Having been tested before, he could meet the subsequent trials. He only passed them by drawing upon everything he had gained in his formative years before 1941.

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## Chapter Two

# EISENHOWER IN WORLD WAR II

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Dwight David Eisenhower's life and career offer a number of opportunities for serious students to understand American history. None is more instructive than the period when Eisenhower was at the height of his military career—World War II. Although the amount of writing about Eisenhower's time as a general pales in comparison to that on his service as president, it is sizeable enough. The literature on this topic has been shaped by a number of forces, though: personal ambition, domestic American politics, international affairs, and historical commemoration even as historians superseded journalists as the dominant group writing on the war. The two strongest factors are, however, the personalities of the historical subjects and the ethnocentrism of the two major English-speaking allies. Historians have, for a number of reasons, perpetuated until fairly recently these contemporary themes rather than breaking free of them.

### **Early Years: Memoirs and Journalism**

For many decades after the war, an effort to refight the war dominated the literature on the campaigns in North Africa and Europe. Shots were fired from the memoirs of Eisenhower's subordinates and war correspondents. To a certain degree, such a development was hardly a surprise as proud men wrote their memoirs and claimed credit for their decisions and actions, or journalists tried to explain what they had seen. In many cases, they also tried to deflect blame. Even laudatory books created problems for Eisenhower. The memoirs of his naval aide and a biography published in 1945 included derogatory statements from Eisenhower about British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, for which the general apologized in private letters (Davis, 1945; Butcher, 1946; Reynolds, 2004: 39–40; Korda, 2007: 608–609). In 1947 Alan Moorehead, an Australian-born reporter for the London *Daily Express*, published his biography of Montgomery.

Upset at the comments in the diary of Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, Montgomery gave Moorehead access to his papers. The biography established Montgomery's official position that the battles in Northwestern Europe went according to his plan, but Moorehead did break new ground with his focus on the dispute between Montgomery and Eisenhower over command of Allied ground forces. Montgomery believed that Eisenhower could not devote adequate attention to ground combat while also serving as the theater commander (Moorehead, 1947: 206; Murray, 1996: 15–17, 25), Ralph Ingersoll, the founding editor of *PM*—a New York city daily—was on the staff of Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group. His book had a strong anti-British tone and was conspiratorial in nature. He argued that the British were directing strategy and manipulating Eisenhower with a “British dominated” staff. He also insisted that Eisenhower was indecisive, did not have a staff designed to run a battle, and that these two factors cost the Allies a chance to end the war in 1944 (Ingersoll, 1946: 47, 166),

Memoirs dominated the debate in the late 1940s. Many of these accounts were, intentionally or not—Gen. George S. Patton's posthumous publication and Robert S. Allen's work were intentional—anti-Eisenhower in nature. Patton's book needs to be read with caution. Eisenhower and Patton were friends in the full meaning of that word for two and one-half decades. The book is a version of his diary, which he used to release privately his anger and frustration about the course of the war (Patton, 1947). This view, of course, was one that was hardly unique to Patton among the headquarters of his army (Allen, 1947). Montgomery's book *Normandy to the Baltic*, though, was quite complimentary: “A great Allied team went into battle in North-West Europe in June 1944 under the supreme command of General Eisenhower. The efficiency of the team to which we all belonged can be judged by the results it achieved.” The field marshal was still on active duty as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the time and was pulling his punches. He even argued that the primary objective of the coalition was to reach the Ruhr and destroy Germany's industrial capacity rather than Berlin (Montgomery, 1947: v). As G. E. Patrick Murray notes in his careful book-length historiography: “Montgomery's 1947 book was more significant for what it did not say” (Murray, 1996: 46).

The biggest memoir of all, though, was that of Eisenhower himself. When he wrote his book, the general had several agendas in mind. He clearly had a political future to consider, and there were sound reasons in the early days of the Cold War to avoid insulting friends and colleagues. The general of the army's memoirs were a deliberate exercise in coalition-building. The book might have been a bit bland, but there was glory and credit enough to go around (Eisenhower, 1948). Although it is a good book, sold well, and gave credit to many, many people, it still managed to insult Montgomery and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, the wartime Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and opened up controversies between the United States and the United Kingdom along nationalistic lines. Eisenhower presented Montgomery's proposals for command as a major issue and suggested that his proposed drive toward Berlin would have been weaker than what Montgomery believed he was proposing. He also described Brooke as a man who “lacked the ability to weigh calmly the conflicting factors in a problem and so reach a rocklike decision.” To his credit, Montgomery told Eisenhower directly he was wrong: “It is definitely not true.” Brooke was certainly an excitable person, but he was an exceptionally talented

and analytical strategic thinker. Eisenhower knew that and said Brooke “was always honest, quick and generous.” Montgomery also disliked the American-centric presentation in the book. The British Army had helped defeat the Germans as well (Murray, 1996: 65–66, 135).

The battle of the memoirs continued on into the 1950s. Omar Bradley entered the fray when he made an ethically suspect decision to write his memoirs while on active duty, using government resources for his own commercial profit. Bradley was respectful of his West Point classmate, but was critical of Eisenhower’s tendency to favor the British and Montgomery. Most of his criticisms, though, were aimed at individuals: at Patton and, even more so, at Montgomery. The issues in dispute were those of command, rather than strategy (Bradley, 1951: 52, 207, 423, 480–481).

In 1952, Chester Wilmot, an Australian reporter, intervened in the memoir debate with *The Struggle for Europe* and changed the course of the conversation. This book focused on issues of strategy and argued that while the Allies won the war militarily, they lost the peace. Montgomery cooperated with Wilmot, establishing a relationship similar to the one he had with Moorehead. Wilmot argued that American decisions had delayed the end of the war, helped accelerate the decline of the United Kingdom as a world power, and written off Eastern Europe to Soviet domination. This argument elevated the debate from issues of personality to those of strategy and took the personal onus off Eisenhower and put it on the United States in general, and the US Army in particular. Wilmot did not focus on command issues, because Montgomery never shared documents on this topic, which was a key issue with this book. This focus on strategy was new, since many Americans at the time had seen “British proposals” as nothing more than a way for the field marshal to enhance his own stature rather than as an innovative move to end the war faster. Montgomery also admitted in roundabout fashion that his proposals for an advance on Berlin had little chance of working in 1944, but he did believe it would have been possible to defeat the Nazis in “early 1945” instead of in the middle of the year (Wilmot, 1952: 454–455, 460; Murray, 1996: 83–84).

A year later, the final installment in Winston Churchill’s six-volume memoir of World War II appeared. These books made Churchill a rich man—after a long career of burning through his income and saving little—and won him the Nobel Prize in literature. He was careful to avoid criticizing Eisenhower directly; he even offered Eisenhower the opportunity to read early drafts. The final volume stresses issues of strategy and policy. He complains much about the decision to forego a move on Berlin, claiming it complicated postwar issues (Churchill, 1953: 461; Reynolds, 2004: 436).

In the late 1950s Lord Alanbrooke—as Sir Alan Brooke was now known—and Lord Montgomery fired back at Churchill and hit Eisenhower. Alanbrooke allowed Sir Arthur Bryant to publish portions of his diaries. His motivations were money and honor. In the first case, since he was a field marshal, Alanbrooke was still on active duty and was receiving half pay instead of the more generous pension that was awarded to retirees. In the second case, he believed—with good reason—that Churchill’s memoirs had slighted the role of the British Army, his contributions as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and those of other members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in making strategy. Publishing his journals may not have been the best

way to advance the cause of the chiefs. His diary entries were often an emotional release from dealing with the brilliant but frustrating prime minister. Alanbrooke's criticisms of Eisenhower were minor compared to those he made of Churchill, whose expertise the field marshal savaged. The comments on the American were rather tepid in comparison, and focused on his command ability, his aptitude at planning, and his distribution of supplies (Bryant 1957, 1959; Danchev and Todman, 2001: xi–xxvi). Montgomery's book came out between the two Alanbrooke/Bryant volumes. His account was about his entire military career, but in the sections about Europe he stressed command issues. At the end, though, he discussed matters of strategy. He argued the failure to seize Vienna, Prague, and Berlin squandered the political victory that the Allied armies had earned. These were arguments that he did not make in his first book, but he also believed Eisenhower's memoirs were misleading and that it was time to correct the record (Montgomery, 1958).

There were two key elements in the Eisenhower-in-World War II literature that amount to “dogs that did not bark.” The first was the total lack of the German perspective. That memoir writers failed to incorporate the perspective of their enemy is understandable. They were writing books about “their war,” what they had experienced, and they did not know what the Germans were doing. That journalists ignored the Germans is a little more difficult to forgive. The defeated and their records were certainly available to writers, but British and American journalists tend only to read and speak English. The second factor is the absence of the perspective of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF). Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory were Eisenhower's sea and air commanders, holding commands equal to those of Montgomery. Both were critical of the field marshal's decisions, believing that Montgomery pushed operational plans that ignored the advantages that airpower and seapower offered, and pushed strategically unsound ground operations like bypassing Antwerp or trying to take too much territory with airborne assaults in Operation Market Garden. Both men died in airplane crashes before the end of the war, which resulted in Montgomery and the British Army advancing themselves as the “British view” on the campaigns in Northwestern Europe (Murray, 1996: 166–167).

### **Zombie Memoirs**

In the 1970s the memoir literature entered its last and nastiest phase. Many first-hand accounts began appearing in print posthumously. Since there was less concern on the part of publishers about libel as all the subjects were deceased, uninhibited comments made it into print. The most sensational blow in this round came from Harry S. Truman. In a series of interviews that he conducted in the early 1960s, the former president claimed that Eisenhower had requested permission from George C. Marshall to get a divorce so he could marry Kay Summersby, his British wartime driver and secretary. Although there had been a great deal of gossip about the two during the conflict, it had faded away until Merle Miller's biography of Truman appeared in print two years after the former president's death (Miller, 1974).

With new-found interest in her, Kay Summersby Morgan, who had married and divorced in the years since the war, was getting offers to write another book. (She had

written a memoir shortly after the war.) “I’m short of money,” she admitted, “and the temptation is great” (Shearer, 1974: 4). In another interview that was not made public until after her death, she stated “To tell you the truth, there wasn’t that much between me and Ike.” She added, “If I write anything about Ike and me, it’s only because I need the money” (Shearer, 1977: 6). In the end, financial need won out. Morgan was ill with cancer and had medical bills that she needed to pay. Simon & Schuster gave her a \$50,000 advance, but she died before the book was finished. Wanting to recoup its investment, the publishing house relied on the ghostwriters that Morgan had hired to finish the project. Simon & Schuster made its money back with *Past Forgetting: My Love Affair with Dwight D. Eisenhower*, in which Morgan and/or her ghostwriters claim there was indeed an affair, although the two tried but failed to sexually consummate their relationship (Morgan, 1977). The book was eventually turned into *Ike*, a 1979 television mini-series, starring Robert Duvall as Eisenhower and Lee Remick as Summersby. Historian Carlo D’Este has written a series of essays in which he demolishes in persuasive fashion the contention that the two had an affair; he notes that Simon & Schuster had a financial incentive at work; no publisher was going to want to try and sell a book in which there was no affair. Historian Robert H. Ferrell has also subjected the original Miller book to close inspection and argues that the author made up quotations from Truman, including the story about Eisenhower wanting a divorce (Ferrell and Heller, 1995, 14–16; D’Este, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d).

Omar Bradley entered the debate again. His second set of memoirs supplied the last posthumous memoir. It was published two years after his death, and although it was written in the first person, Bradley never saw the sections about the postwar period and the Korean War. He unleashed long-stored resentment toward his West Point classmate: Eisenhower did not know how to manage a battlefield and favored the British over his own army, perhaps because of Summersby. His criticisms were far harsher than anything Montgomery had stated 25 years earlier. “This is a different Bradley from the homespun hero who wrote ‘A Soldier’s Story.’ There is an arrogance, an intolerance, a forcefulness, seldom glimpsed in the past,” a reviewer in *The New York Times* noted. “In the end, it must be said that his many sharp criticisms of other commanders, especially of Eisenhower, make reading this book a little painful” (Bradley and Blair, 1983; Middleton, 1983: BR4).

### Official Histories and Published Documents

Eisenhower made two decisions that dramatically shaped the historiography of World War II and his role in the conflict. As chief of staff, US Army, he authorized the creation of a series of official histories. In the memorandum initiating this project, he declared: “The Army possesses no inherent right to conceal the history of its affairs behind a cloak of secrecy.” The *U.S. Army in World War II*, or “green book” series, eventually had 79 volumes and took five decades to produce. “The historical records of the Army’s operations as well as the manner in which these were accomplished are public property, and except where the security of the Nation may be jeopardized, the right of the citizens to the full story is unquestioned” (Blumenson, 1962: 156; D’Este, 1983: 494).

These books were hardly the last word on their topics, but they represent an honest effort on the part of a government agency to learn what it had done right and wrong (Spector, 1990: 25–30). One of the historians working on this series, Forrest C. Pogue, actually began writing the history of Eisenhower's command before the creation of the *U.S. Army in World War II* project. The general assigned the undertaking to the historian directly. "I don't think Ike had any grandiose notion of what was being done," Pogue observed, "he just felt that there should be some kind of record written from his staff, and from his personal records and the records of the headquarters, which would summarize for the Pentagon and for later planners, some notion of what the war was about and how its headquarters had handled it." This official status gave Pogue certain advantages.

I was at his outer office at the Pentagon, and could go and ask him any questions. Through Ike's office, I was able to reach people, even three- and four-star generals, in a way that I couldn't have done if I had started this ten or fifteen years later. I have always argued that those of us who got this amazing access very early were able to do two things. To write quite early from the real documents. And once those things had appeared in print, and we had identified the sources, it was then easy for the regular scholars to come and say: "I'm not asking you to let me see thirteen feet of documents; but I want to see this document that you've let Dr. Pogue see." It eased that access. (Pogue and Shulman, 1993, 36–37, 42–43)

The relevant volume on Eisenhower's wartime activities was Pogue's *The Supreme Command*. His account depended a good deal on oral history. In the book, Pogue warned readers that the differences between individuals were honest ones about different strategic options that were legitimate and based on differing doctrines and principles. These discussions were not personal feuds, and issues of personality and ambition were largely absent from them. In interviews, British officers told Pogue that Eisenhower was too patient with Montgomery, an idea the historian adopted as his own. He also explained that Eisenhower stopped at the Elbe because he wanted a river between his command and the Red Army. Pogue noted that changing the foreign policy of the United States government, which is what a move on Berlin would have amounted to, was beyond Eisenhower's authority (Pogue, 1954: 289, 465, 467).

The second decision Eisenhower made came after he left the White House, when he commissioned the publication of *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*. Believing that he had a record to be proud of, and that contemporary documents made the best case for his accomplishments, Eisenhower wanted them to be made available as quickly and as widely as possible. The volumes were printed by Johns Hopkins University Press; Milton Eisenhower, the former president's brother, was the president of the university. Milton recruited Alfred D. Chandler Jr., a historian who would later win the Pulitzer Prize, to supervise the project. When Chandler met the former president, it "convinced me that here was a chance to be first into a new period of history. Moreover, the opportunity to watch the day-by-day development of Allied strategy and the building of an organization to implement it during World War II was too good to miss." Chandler made the decision to ignore Eisenhower's earlier career and begin with the World War II years. "In creating a

unified theater command that included not only the Army, Navy, and Air Forces of the USA, but also those of Britain and other allies, Eisenhower had a keen understanding of a need for and of problems involved in defining a clear-cut organization structure so essential to both the formulation and implementation of military strategy" (Chandler, 2009: 243).

### Stephen E. Ambrose and Eisenhower Revisionism

Although Eisenhower's military and political careers were distinct, early dismissive views of his presidency affected assessments of him as a general. Journalists and political critics—writing often from a partisan perspective—portrayed him as a simple-minded general, out of his league in Washington, used to the straightforward life of a soldier. This dismissal of his presidency and its importance was premised on a simplistic, condescending view of the military, and affected views of his military career. In the 1970s and early 1980s a small group of historians and political scientists challenged the conventional wisdom. Chandler recruited Stephen E. Ambrose to work on the *Eisenhower Papers* as an associate editor, making him one of the first and most important revisionists. In a famous footnote in an article that provided a major reassessment of the political economy of the Eisenhower presidency, Robert Griffith identified the nine pioneers in this area. Of them, only Ambrose had written on Eisenhower's military career. What Ambrose and the other "Eisenhower revisionists" found was an individual who was far more intelligent in his thinking and skillful in his actions than was commonly thought when he was in the White House (Griffith, 1982).

In 1970 Ambrose published his own book, *The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower*, which built on his work on *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* and was his first major contribution to "Eisenhower revisionism." The general emerges as a man who was a team player, who understood how the US Army operated as a bureaucracy and knew how to advance within the system. He had a strong temper, which he could unleash when provoked, but he also had a congenial personality that inspired others. He clearly understood how domestic politics shaped military operations. Ambrose, however, had a more difficult time trying to explain Eisenhower's understanding and implementation of strategy and policy. A dominant trend in contemporary reviews of *The Supreme Commander* is that Ambrose made many factual errors. He also used exceptionally vague citations, making it difficult to consult the sources on which he drew (Newton, 2010; Rayner, 2010; Rives, 2010).

In 1983 Ambrose published the first volume of his two-volume biography of Eisenhower. It was the first biography of Eisenhower from one of the nine pioneering Eisenhower revisionists, and the two volumes quickly became the leading account of the man's life. Ambrose's findings in this volume were similar to those in *Supreme Commander*, but shorter. Since the book was a full-fledged biography, he started with Eisenhower's birth and brought the volume to a conclusion with his election as president in 1952 (Ambrose, 1983).

There are two serious problems with Ambrose's books. One regards issues of interpretation. While he emphasizes the political sophistication of his subject, Ambrose



tends to take Eisenhower's side in disputes with the British. Seeing complaints from Montgomery and Brooke as nothing more than resentment at being proven wrong undercuts the portrayal of Eisenhower as a coalition builder. If the general is giving nothing to the other side, how much cooperation does he have from his foreign allies?

The second issue with Ambrose's books was his professional conduct. In 2002 other historians and journalists began raising questions about his use of other writers' words. This controversy developed after Ambrose had shifted to historical topics outside his main area of expertise, such as the Lewis and Clark expedition, the building of the first North American transcontinental railroad, and the air war in Europe during World War II. Some critics at first alleged that he had cut corners while working on topics that were unfamiliar to him (Kirkpatrick, 2002). The criticisms grew. Some of the complaints were nothing more than grievances over honest disagreements on how to interpret the evidence, but journalists continued to point out in early 2002 that he had copied the words of others without attribution in books that were in his main area of expertise. Others showed where he had altered facts and that this pattern extended far back into his career. One reporter revealed that Cornelius Ryan had threatened to sue Ambrose for plagiarism after the publication of *The Supreme Commander* (Lewis, 2002; Ringle, 2002; Duin, 2010). These charges were the subject of numerous newspaper editorials across the country. In the middle of the year, Ambrose discovered he had cancer. He had only a few weeks left to live, and this controversy quickly faded as he faced his final illness (Delevett, 2002; Dresser, 2002; McTaggart, 2002; Podhoretz, 2002; Quillen, 2002; Romano, 2002).

This controversy mattered little to the American public; proper citation format—which is what Ambrose claimed the criticism was all about—had no importance for most general readers. He had gotten a bit sloppy, no big deal. That argument won out. He was eulogized by former president George H. W. Bush, and a section of Interstate Highway 10 in Mississippi was named the “Stephen E. Ambrose Memorial Highway.”

That favorable view continued for a decade, but efforts to commemorate the publication of *The Supreme Commander* inadvertently led to the discovery that Ambrose had falsified his sources. In the book, Ambrose cites nine different interviews with the former president that took place at Eisenhower's farm outside Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The problem is that Eisenhower's daily schedules show that he was often somewhere else, sometimes in a different state, and not with Ambrose when the historian claims to have been interviewing him. The records actually show that the two only met three times, and never alone (Rives, 2010). To be blunt, Ambrose lied. He manufactured his sources, and presented fiction as fact.

## Biography

Eisenhower's life was a natural canvas for biography, and although the first appeared right after the war, those based on archival documents did not begin to appear until the 1970s, after his death. Peter Lyon wrote one of the first, and his book reflected the “Eisenhower revisionism” of the era. Lyon's primary focus was on his subject's public persona versus his private character; 44 percent of the 859 pages are devoted

to the White House Years, as opposed to 30 percent on World War II. Lyon makes clear that Eisenhower was no “chairman of the board” as supreme commander. Ike

had shown himself to be firm and steady under pressure, resilient in the face of temporary setbacks, an excellent judge of his officers but an indifferent judge of his political advisers, adroit in his conduct with the press but maladroit in his interpretation of the larger political concepts that had come his way, reasonable, clearheaded, matter-of-fact, usually even tempered, and—except when the weather had sometimes betrayed him—phenomenally lucky. (Lyon, 1974: 266)

The war seems to be setting the stage for what comes later. His deal with French admiral François Darlan, a Nazi collaborator, to end the fighting in North Africa exposed

the sort of political animal Eisenhower was and would be: fundamentally right of center, fundamentally decent, indifferent to civil liberties, intolerant of abstract concepts, perfunctory rather than thorough in matters foreign to his experience, prone to repose confidence in men of wealth and temporal power, tending too easily to accept advice of doubtful value, anxious to be liked by others, and, when he chose to be, well-nigh irresistible. (Lyon, 1974: 185–186)

In 1981 R. Alton Lee’s *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman* appeared in print. Aimed at college students in undergraduate courses, it is a concise one-volume life. Lee devotes a hefty chapter to the World War II years. Previous accounts that label Eisenhower as a political general were correct. “He learned a great deal about diplomacy and European politics. His major contribution to the war was to make the Allied military operations work with generals as diverse as Montgomery and Patton.” There was more to Eisenhower, though. “A great tactician in his own right, he made numerous military decisions during the war, some of them against all the expert advice, and events usually proved him correct” (Lee, 1981: 116).

In 1986, David Eisenhower wrote a biography of his grandfather. Knowing his subject personally and well, the younger Eisenhower does a good job of presenting a human picture of the general. Eisenhower had a strong temper, worked in a stressful job made more complicated by the strong personalities of his subordinates, craved recognition for his actions, and found many ways to combat the stress that ranged from the heavy consumption of tobacco to Western novels. The younger Eisenhower argues that previous students of the general fail to realize that the eastern front weighed heavily on the supreme commander’s thinking and decisions. The Allies needed to keep the Soviets in the war, since they were absorbing the bulk of the German Army’s fighting power. The price of that involvement was Soviet control of Eastern Europe. “The important point is that the eventual East–West split, whether inevitable or the result of misunderstanding, did not occur when it might really have mattered in the struggle against Germany” (Eisenhower, 1986: xii). As for Berlin, an Allied effort to take the city “invited an outright break with the Russians, and unless such a move was justified for military reasons, it would say to the world that Allied–Soviet cooperation was not and perhaps had never been Allied policy.” A power vacuum had developed in the Allied high command, which Eisenhower had to fill,

and he was not prepared to write off cooperation with the Soviets at time when “his forces still lacked the power to accomplish the unconditional surrender of German forces without the cooperation of Russian forces” (Eisenhower, 1986: 728).

British historian Piers Brendon published his one-volume biography that same year—his book and David Eisenhower’s were often reviewed together—and his main interest was to offer a corrective to Eisenhower revisionism. Brendon’s focus is on the presidential years, but he devotes 112 pages out of 418 to World War II. Brendon sees Eisenhower as a complicated man who was often at war with himself. Eisenhower usually knew what to do, but was reluctant to make the move. As a general, Eisenhower had good instincts, but was cautious and inconsistent. He was a political and diplomatic general with limited battlefield expertise, but his main contribution was keeping the coalition together. “There is no disgrace in this; and as it happened, Ike did have a certain tactical flair. At least three times—during Kasserine, after the Ardennes, and at Remagen—his hunches were correct. But he lacked the will or the courage to play them to the full, opting instead for safety first” (Brendon, 1986: 185–186). Brendon, though, seems conflicted. A sentence later, he concedes: “His generalship was careful, orthodox, and uninspired. But it was sound. He never made a fundamental mistake and he was successful in the end” (Brendon, 1986: 186). Brendon states that the keys to Eisenhower’s success were his charm, discretion, moderation, and simple virtues, but that these have to be contrasted with his opportunism, guile, and devious nature.

In 1988, Merle Miller released *Ike the Solider: As They Knew Him*. Miller finished the book two weeks before he died. Despite the suggestion of the subtitle, this book is not an oral history; it is primarily a military biography. It skips through his early years and stops at the end of World War II. The book is a solid summary of the war, but it was designed for a popular audience rather than specialists (Miller, 1988). He did original research on the topic of Eisenhower’s personal life, but he failed in his primary mission. D. K. R. Crosswell, Miller’s research assistant, noted, “One of Miller’s motives for writing the book centered on his desire to find some substance for rumors Eisenhower had an affair with his Irish driver, Kay Summersby. I never found any evidence of Eisenhower’s infidelity.” Crosswell eventually dismissed Truman’s comment as the product of “an old man’s active imagination and too much bourbon” (Crosswell, 2010: xiii).

A decade later, Geoffrey Perret, a writer who specializes in producing popular histories on military topics, turned to Eisenhower. (He had written a survey of US military history and two years earlier had produced a one-volume biography of Ulysses S. Grant that sold well and was a *New York Times* “Notable Book of the Year.”) His Eisenhower biography found less of an audience and fared poorly at the hands of reviewers. Neither *The American Historical Review*, *Journal of Military History*, *Journal of American History*, nor *Presidential Studies Quarterly* reviewed the book. Assessments of the biography that appeared in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* are best described as mixed to negative. As was the case with his Grant biography, Perret leans toward the military phase of his subject’s life: the three and one-half years of World War II get 206 pages, while the eight years at the White House, only 139. As is his style, he offers some interpretations that push the envelope for the sake of pushing the envelope. He finds that Eisenhower was an expert on combined and joint operations. Perret’s dismissal of the charges about an affair with Kay Summersby—that she was trying to find some meaning in her failed professional and personal lives

as she neared the end—are a bit harsh, but also seem on the mark. His assessment of the general's style of decision-making is insightful and shows how Eisenhower learned from MacArthur. Perret also observes how it could be misinterpreted as indecision (Perret, 1999).

In 2002, with Ambrose's professional reputation in free fall, the Henry Holt publishing house released Carlo D'Este's *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*. This book quickly surpassed Ambrose's as the most informative and insightful book on Eisenhower's military career. Its major shortcoming is that its coverage ends in May 1945 and does not extend into his political career. The research is impressive and shows in the ways D'Este deals with various controversies. Montgomery and Brooke's complaints about Eisenhower had some merit. His headquarters staff did not function well in North Africa, Italy, or even in France. Montgomery was correct that the Italian campaign had no strategic purpose, and for that Eisenhower was responsible. Operation COBRA, which closed the Falaise Gap and gave the Allies control of Normandy, was a significant military victory. The German units that escaped were small remnants of their former selves and had little equipment. Personality—for better or worse—played a large role in Eisenhower's leadership style. He tended to minimize contact with those he disliked. The best-known example is Montgomery, and that gave the British field marshal a good deal of liberty that was unwise. Logistics was a shortcoming, but D'Este puts more of the blame on Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, the chief supply officer in theater, rather than Eisenhower. Despite repeated demands that he remove Lee, Eisenhower never did. Patton was a real friend, but Eisenhower almost removed him from command over his subordinate's indiscreet comments about the postwar world. Although Eisenhower thought Bradley was a friend, D'Este makes it clear Bradley was anything but (D'Este, 2002).

A series of short biographies began appearing at this time, and collectively they pushed hard against the British Army (Montgomery) argument about Eisenhower's military and battlefield skills. William B. Pickett argues that Eisenhower's strategic education made the difference. It was Eisenhower's insistence on unity of command that created a joint integration of air, land, and seapower and staff and command structure that bested the Italians and Germans (Pickett, 1995: 43, 55). Douglas Kinnard, a retired brigadier general with a PhD from Princeton, argues in his short biography, *Eisenhower: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*, that it was the general's political and military skills that brought about victory. He took control of the battlefield during the Battle of the Bulge, salvaging the situation, and he handled Bradley and Montgomery—two very difficult personalities despite the American's reputation as the “GI General”—in two very different ways. With Bradley, Eisenhower simply gave orders and was done with the matter. Although Churchill had given Eisenhower the power to remove British officers from their commands, Ike was smart enough to know that the ramifications of removing Montgomery would be immense and was much more patient (Kinnard, 2002: 53–55). In *Eisenhower: A Biography*, John Wukovits argues there were five factors that made Eisenhower a great general. The first was his focus. He could set goals and implement them. He also emphasized teamwork, believing the whole of a well-run organization was greater than the sum of its parts. As a military officer, he had a good deal of empathy for the soldiers at the front line and never forgot the human factor in war. A fourth consideration was that Eisenhower had good relations with the news media. The fifth factor was a devotion

to duty rather than an effort to enhance his own reputation or wealth. This was why he stayed with the military during the interwar period: “the nation needed him” (Wukovits, 2006: 180–186).

William Korda produced the next major Eisenhower biography. Korda brought several strengths to his project. He was the editor for people familiar with Eisenhower, including Cornelius Ryan, Kay Summersby, and Richard Nixon. A former editor-in-chief of Simon & Schuster, he had also written a biography of another general turned president, Ulysses S. Grant. His book is an easy read, but is largely superficial. His research is limited to published sources, primarily memoirs and secondary sources, and popular histories. He did not consult many detailed academic studies, or even *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*. As a result, this one-volume account is vague. Korda devotes more attention to Eisenhower’s military career than to his stay in the White House. While there was a relationship between Summersby and Eisenhower, he downplays it and holds no truck with the contention that in 1945 the general wanted a divorce so he could marry her—which is telling since he edited Summersby’s second, more sensational, memoir. Korda also makes clear that Eisenhower was a soldier, and in Normandy he understood that in order to move off the beaches into the interior the Allies needed to take Caen. Montgomery’s slow conquest of the city caused Eisenhower no end of irritation (Korda, 2007).

Five years later, Jean Edward Smith, another former biographer of Grant, put out his own one-volume life of Eisenhower. As the title indicates, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* focuses on Eisenhower’s use of power, as general and president, in world affairs. In addition to his Grant biography, Smith has written impressive studies of Eisenhower’s contemporaries—Franklin D. Roosevelt and Gen. Lucius D. Clay. As a soldier, Eisenhower had no training to lead a brigade or division, but he was more than able to perform as a supreme commander. He could and did understand how various operations contributed to the whole war effort. To that end, he weighed costs against benefits, delegated authority, communicated clearly, and above all else realized that maintaining the alliance with Britain was crucial. Smith’s Eisenhower is far more of a creative thinker than the one in Ambrose’s books. He also argues that Eisenhower learned from his mistakes and was willing to fire subordinates, even if they were friends, if they failed. Smith’s portrayal of Eisenhower’s relationship with Patton makes that clear; of that with Mark Clark, less so; of that with Lee, not at all. His political blunders in war termination in North Africa—the deal that Clark negotiated with Darlan—were repeated in large part in Italy. He did get better when he got to Paris, adroitly setting up a situation that made Charles de Gaulle France’s head of state because it advanced the war effort, even though it went against Roosevelt’s clear preference to have little to do with the French general. Smith believes that there was a real romance between Eisenhower and Summersby and that Eisenhower did try to leave his wife for her in 1945. He might be right, but his evidence basically is the discredited Miller (Smith, 2012).

Jim Newton’s *Eisenhower: The White House Years* is a biography that, as the subtitle indicates, focuses on Ike’s political career, though it does have a chapter on his military life. His account stresses the importance of personality in two ways. First, throughout his career, Eisenhower always had important mentors, patrons, and supporters, be it in politics or the army. In the military, Newton argues the most important figure was a supporter—George S. Patton Jr. The other feature was Eisenhower’s character; he was “comfortable with detail, proficient in training, committed to planning but open to

improvisation” (Newton, 2011: 39). His “upbeat disposition and his genial ability to command, to be decisive without being overbearing, and to exercise professional but warm leadership” earned him many admirers (Newton, 2011: 43).

### Group Biography

As strong as a personality as Eisenhower was, he also interacted with legendary names, and a number of writers have measured him against others. In 1971 Edgar F. Puryear Jr. published *Nineteen Stars*, a study of the military leadership styles and development of Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall, and Patton. He found several recurring themes. Military leaders were made, not born, through professional development. Most had been exercising leadership for years; major command success was decades in the making. Although they seemed quite different in style, they all tended to be showmen in one form or another. (Puryear specifically mentions Eisenhower’s distinctive “Ike jacket.”) They also tended to care about their subordinates—MacArthur being a noticeable exception—showed considerable courage in one fashion or another, and were analytical thinkers (Puryear 1971).

In *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, a biography of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the generals and admirals that served him, Eric Larrabee gives considerable attention to Eisenhower, focusing on his leadership and diplomacy. He grew in his job and understood the military as well as the political elements of the task in front of him. The general was a diplomat in uniform, yes, but he was also a soldier, a commander, and a strategist. Larrabee gives credit to many of Eisenhower’s subordinates without being sentimental, seeing past the sound and fury of Patton and Montgomery, giving them their due as professionals, and not getting taken in by Bradley’s reputation as the “GI General.” Knowing how to manage and lead these men, Eisenhower ended the war quickly, with Germany capitulating less than a year after D-Day (Larrabee, 1987).

In *A Time for Giants: Politics of the American High Command in World War II*, D. Clayton James makes it clear that personal connections mattered a great deal in explaining Eisenhower’s success. His book is a portrait of 18 individuals who held command above the numbered armies, fleets, and air forces (the only exception being Patton, who commanded the Seventh and the Third Armies). The power of respect, trust, and familiarity that Eisenhower engendered becomes quite strong in the sections about his colleagues. James also notes that Ike learned on the job quickly and had an “orderly, logical mind” (James and Wells, 1987: 273).

Norman Gelb offers a dual biography of Eisenhower and Montgomery that is sympathetic to both. Eisenhower emerges as a likeable fellow who worked hard to keep his temper under control. He was open-minded and considered views that diverged from his own. Montgomery was a great general who was at times bold and brilliant, but who also was egocentric and difficult to get along with because of emotional defense mechanisms he developed during an unhappy childhood in response to a domineering mother. Neither could communicate well with the other. Many of the British field marshal’s complaints had merit. The fact that Eisenhower was open-minded led Montgomery to think he had no firm ideas of his own. Montgomery ruined his relationship with Eisenhower with misleading reports and a cockiness that

alienated the American. Eisenhower tended to personalize his command relationship, and Montgomery's effort to have as little contact as possible with his commander and to lecture him when he did turned off the American. Montgomery was so obtuse that he failed to understand what damage he had done, until a trusted subordinate told him (Gelb, 1994).

Despite being one of the five main protagonists in David Fromkin's group biography of World War II strategic leaders, Eisenhower is a bit player. Fromkin argues that the US experience in World War I shaped the views, ideas, and strategies that these Americans pursued in the World War II. Fromkin successfully makes this case in the bulk of his book, but not for Eisenhower. In fact, Fromkin's portrayal suggests quite the opposite. While someone who missed out on combat and spent the entire previous war on the homefront might be eager to get into the fray, Eisenhower emerges as conservative and cautious in his strategic leadership (Fromkin, 1995).

Despite its title, *Partners in Command*, Mark Perry's dual biography of Eisenhower and George C. Marshall, focuses on their strategic leadership rather than command. Perry's research includes little-used collections at the Marshall Research Library and the Eisenhower Presidential Library that help bring the strong personalities of both men alive. The two generals took their strategic views from their readings of military history and believed that concentration of force in as rapid a manner as possible was the key to victory. Eisenhower's great asset was that he was equally skilled as a soldier, administrator, and diplomat. Marshall also valued Eisenhower because he pushed his own thinking on matters of strategy (Perry, 2007).

Jonathan W. Jordan's group biography of Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley, *Brothers, Rivals, Victors*, is a military history of World War II. It ends with Patton's death in 1945. The book focuses on command issues and relationships. It has more description than analysis and relies heavily on source material to show what the three generals were feeling at the time. Patton, as an operational commander, saw much value in the Darlan deal in keeping the Arab population of Morocco from rebelling. The fact that the three knew each other allowed them to work well together, but their "friendships" began to come undone with the stress of combat in Sicily. To begin with Bradley was never that close with either Patton or Eisenhower. Patton, for his part, did not trust Kay Summersby. He—and many others—saw Eisenhower's relationship as inappropriate, since she had no security clearance but attended high-level meetings. The Ardennes and the Battle of the Bulge were command failures on Bradley's part, but Eisenhower supported him and there were no congressional inquiries into this setback (Jordan, 2011).

William Lee Miller's dual biography of Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman focuses—as one might expect—on their presidential years. World War II is a time of preparation for both. Miller emphasizes the importance of logistics and American material superiority in Eisenhower's strategic leadership (Miller 2012).

### **Eisenhower in the Biographies of Other World War II Figures**

Many of the individuals that Eisenhower interacted with have been the subject of biographies, and the authors have looked at Ike from the perspective of their subject. David Fraser, a general in the British Army himself, challenges the criticisms that

Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, made about Eisenhower. Brooke's differences with Ike were professional not personal in nature, and he was quite critical of many people, both American and British. Fraser also notes that Brooke tried to get Montgomery to relent in his disputes with Eisenhower over command. Many Eisenhower biographers fail to make these distinctions and instead present Sir Alan as far more shrill than he actually was (Fraser, 1982).

The official biography of Lord Montgomery is a different story altogether. Nigel Hamilton won the Whitbread Award (a prize given for the best books in British publishing) and the Templer Medal Book Prize (awarded for the best book on the British Army). Each book in this three-volume biography is thick—nearly 1,000 pages each—and Hamilton advances Montgomery's arguments without reservation. He believes that Eisenhower was indecisive and lacked the experience to be a battlefield commander. (It should be noted, though, that Montgomery thought the same of his superior in North Africa and Italy, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander). British officers serving in Eisenhower's headquarters who did not agree with Montgomery on the conduct of the war were unpatriotic. Hamilton also argues that Eisenhower was sensitive to the charge that his ground advance had been slow in North Africa and Italy, and, as a result, always pushed for more rapid action to prove he was not timid or sluggish. Time, rather than supplies or casualty rates, was the biggest factor driving his decisions, which according to Hamilton reflected the American's simplistic thinking. Eisenhower did have strengths, though. His "brilliantly sensitive, honest and open mind" made him an ideal military diplomat and supreme commander, but not a battlefield general. Hamilton's research is extensive, and he repeatedly calls out Stephen E. Ambrose by name, showing that many of the historian's assessments were fabrications or distortions of the historical record (Hamilton, 1983: 655; 1986: 48, 170, 182, 231, 274, 289, 527, 795).

In two biographical studies of Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff during the war, D. K. R. Crosswell argues that Eisenhower lost control of the strategic direction of the war in North Africa, relying heavily on his British air, land, and sea commanders. In his first study, an account of Smith's military career, Crosswell examines Eisenhower's handling of Patton's physical assault of two soldiers under his command in Sicily in August 1943 who were suffering psychological distress from their participation in combat. Unsure of what to do about these incidents, he had Smith brief a press conference, and the results were disastrous. In this account, Smith and Bradley are the key shapers of Eisenhower's strategic approach. The confrontation with Montgomery was actually the product of RAF officers in Eisenhower's headquarters who believed the field marshal was squandering the advantages that airpower offered in the campaigns across France. Eisenhower only began to exert supreme command when he forced Montgomery to back down over command issues (Crosswell, 1991). Two decades later in a full-fledged biography of Smith, Crosswell takes this position further, stating that Smith had significant decision-making powers because Eisenhower wanted to disguise his own actions, which was quite similar to his "hidden-hand" leadership style when he was president. Crosswell's Eisenhower, however, is indecisive and uncertain. "Eisenhower proved decisive only when the decision was not to do something" (Crosswell, 2010: 4). Crosswell believes that the United States won because of its material wealth, and he also explains "why opportunities for ending the war sooner and at less cost miscarried. The first Allied



invasion—Operation Torch in northwestern Africa—was nearly postponed or even canceled owing to the near breakdown of American logistics in the United Kingdom during the buildup and mounting phase.” Early failures in Tunisia were due to supply problems. Those problems were never solved. “A succession of crises in 1944—first fuel and then ammunition and winter clothing, climaxing in the debilitating manpower crunch—left enervated American forces stalemated and vulnerable astride the French–Belgian–German frontiers, giving rise to serious concerns about the war’s outcome.” There is, in Crosswell’s interpretation, no question about who was responsible for these problems. “Much of the blame for this operations supply disconnect rested in Eisenhower’s obstinate refusal to alter the headquarters structure. Smith fought and lost numerous battles with Eisenhower over this issue. By examining command decisions through the prism of logistics, a different picture emerges of both Eisenhower as commander and the conduct of operations in North Africa, Italy, and Europe” (Crosswell, 2010: 3–4).

In his biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Vincent Orange comes to similar conclusions. Orange maintains that the disputes between Eisenhower and Montgomery were not nationalistic. Tedder, who was Eisenhower’s deputy supreme commander, supported Eisenhower because he agreed with the American’s strategic logic. Tedder actually pushed Eisenhower to be more confrontational with Montgomery. Marshals of the Royal Air Force and admirals of the Royal Navy often were quite critical of Montgomery for squandering the advantages that air and sea superiority offered (Orange, 2004).

### Combat Operations

Accounts of combat operations in World War II have favored Northwestern Europe over the other theaters. The best-known operation is, of course, D-Day. It will surprise many that Eisenhower has a small role in many of these accounts. For example, the first major book on D-Day was Cornelius Ryan’s *The Longest Day*. This book is an episodic account, much like the better-known film of the same time, rather than an analytical or narrative account of the battle. Eisenhower has a brief but important role in approving the assault (Ryan, 1959). John Keegan looks at the six armies fighting in Normandy (American, British, Canadian, French, German, and Polish) as national institutions and manifestations of distinctly different ways to fight. His coverage is episodic, and a brief character sketch of Eisenhower exists to provide a strategic context (Keegan, 1982). Carlo D’Este offers a much more analytical assessment. His balanced account gives every major player a voice. Eisenhower’s contribution came mainly during the planning stage. Montgomery and Bradley played crucial roles in combat operations, although D’Este maintains that the battle did not develop according to plan, as Montgomery wanted people to believe (D’Este, 1983).

In 1984, as part of the fortieth anniversary celebrations, British journalist Max Hastings released *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*. Hastings’s emphasis is on the operational level, and Eisenhower is a non-factor.

The Supreme Commander laboured under a misapprehension that he himself could best serve the Allied cause by touring the touchline like a football coach, urging all his

generals to keep attacking more or less simultaneously. Eisenhower's personal lifestyle, journeying between fronts with a ragbag of sycophantic staff officers, his Irish driver and perhaps lover, occasionally his newly-commissioned son and cosseted pet dog, was more suggestive of an eighteenth-century European monarch going to war than of a twentieth-century general. (Hastings, 1984: 240)

Ten years later Stephen Ambrose published *D-Day: June 6, 1944* to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary. He spends more time on preparation than Hastings and gives more attention to Eisenhower as a result. Ambrose, however, also documents the experiences of the officers and men on the front line even if this coverage favors the Americans over the British and Canadians. As Ambrose points out, Eisenhower made his major contributions before the battle. After Eisenhower gave the command to go forward with the invasion, people cheered and left the room to implement the order. The supreme commander was alone in the room with nothing to do. "His isolation was symbolic, for having given the order, he was now powerless" (Ambrose, 1995: 189). In fact, on June 6, he gave no orders or commands at all.

The main problem with this book is the professional conduct of its author. In *D-Day: June 6, 1944*, all of the problems associated with Stephen Ambrose's scholarship—that he falsified citations, made up interviews with Eisenhower that never took place, got facts wrong or altered them to suit his purpose, and used exceptionally vague citations, making it difficult to consult the same sources—are similar to the charges that he made against Ryan (Ambrose, 1966: 301). Antony Beevor's account is sympathetic, but he too focuses on the fighting and by that time Eisenhower's importance had waned. As a result, Beevor's Eisenhower is a bit player as well (Beevor, 2009: 6).

Craig L. Symonds's study of Operation Neptune, the naval element of D-Day, is one of the more innovative D-Day books. The importance of Eisenhower's personality emerges as a key element in the planning for the amphibious assault as the US and British militaries struggled over the number of available landing craft. There simply were not enough ships to do both a landing in Normandy and another in southern France. Nerves were frayed during this tense time, but Eisenhower maintained his calm when others did not and let the numbers do the talking. When it became clear that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff could not supply the required ships, he postponed the southern assault (Symonds, 2014).

Eisenhower's decision to go forward with the invasion despite uncertain weather conditions was one of the most important he ever made. Despite that fact, Tim Rives shows that there are huge differences about how that meeting developed and what he said. These differences reflected problems with memory and a lack of documentation, which reflected Eisenhower's leadership style (Rives, 2014).

The undertaking of Operation Market Garden—an Allied effort to use airborne units to seize a series of bridges that would allow ground units to advance rapidly into northern Germany—was one of the more controversial decisions of the war. In *A Bridge Too Far*, Cornelius Ryan, using an interview with Eisenhower that took place in 1963, argues that the decision was one of the more "daring and imaginative" operations of the war. It was, however, a compromise between Montgomery's even more aggressive proposal to drive into Central Europe and what Eisenhower thought was logistically feasible (Ryan, 1974: 76). Richard Lamb believes that Brooke used

Montgomery to challenge Eisenhower's strategic leadership of the war and that personality mattered a great deal in these confrontations (Lamb 1984). Stephen Ashley Hart's study of the British 21st Army Group seeks to show that the disputes were not based on personality, but on two rather different types of operational and tactical approach to ground combat (Hart, 2000: 62). David Bennett notes that the supreme commander's decision to go forward with this operation was casual in nature and was not the product of rigorous or sustained analysis (Bennett, 2008). Martin Watts argues that Eisenhower's decision was the product of coalition warfare, where each nation needed and got a certain amount of the glory (Watts, 2013).

John S. D. Eisenhower's *The Bitter Woods* was a best-selling account of the Battle of the Bulge. The author manages to present the story from the perspective of the generals and the foot soldiers on both sides. His presentation of his father's command during this time period is respectful, and differences of opinion between their views of the battle seem minor (Eisenhower, 1969).

The literature on Eisenhower's role in the earlier campaigns in North Africa and Italy is much less extensive. David Rolf's book on Tunis presents Eisenhower as ruthless in writing off associates when they failed and quick to blame others when the campaign went wrong. In these efforts to pass blame, though, his evidence suggests otherwise (Rolf, 2001). Douglas Porch's account of the Mediterranean campaigns argues that Eisenhower became involved in political disputes because Roosevelt refused to provide guidance. His political decisions—such as the deal with Darlan or efforts to negotiate the surrender of Italy—were failures, because of factors outside his control, including French and Italian timidity and German aggressiveness (Porch, 2004),

In an operational sense, Italy did not go well for the US Army. Carlo D'Este's three books make clear that British complaints (from Brooke, Montgomery, and Alexander) about Eisenhower's command had merit. His planners were optimistic, command relationships broke down, and personal feuds between US Army officers and others between American and British officers often got in the way of operations. Eisenhower understood that Sicily had been a strategic failure in which they allowed the German and Italian defenders to escape because of their own slow advance. What the British failed to see, and what D'Este documents well, is that Eisenhower grew in his job and became better. He particularly gained in his understanding of logistics (D'Este 1988, 1990, 1991).

The best-known accounts of the US Army in World War II are those of Rick Atkinson. Ike's temper is quite evident in *An Army at Dawn*, as the supreme commander seems to take out his frustrations on his subordinates. He was uncertain of himself, being untried by war. His diplomatic skills were greatly in demand as there was a good deal of animosity and rivalry between the British and US armies, though much less so with the French Army, which did resist Operation Torch with real effort. Eisenhower is almost absent from Atkinson's second book. In the third volume, *The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944–1945*, Eisenhower returns as a major figure and his disputes with Montgomery are less dominant in this storyline rather than his battle against the silent tyranny of logistics and the irresponsible actions of Lt. Gen. J. C. H. Lee. Eisenhower let Lee set up a wasteful system of supply, because he was so distracted by other concerns that went with his position. Atkinson makes clear, though, that Montgomery's proposals for a thin pencil-line advance into

Germany were unrealistic. Staff estimates of the requirements for an advance on Berlin indicated that the force would require 500 truck companies, but only 347 existed in the theater (Atkinson 2002, 2013).

### Elements of Power

There is only a relatively small number of studies of the use of military power in various mediums—ground, air, sea, diplomacy, and information. The most detailed account of Ike as a ground general is Russell F. Weigley's *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945*. The US Army and Eisenhower were shaped significantly by the US Civil War. Ulysses S. Grant had won in 1864–1865 using mass and firepower in direct head-on confrontations in efforts to destroy the Confederates. As a result, the US Army had invested heavily in the artillery in the years since, and this branch was always quite good. Even British and German critics of American war-fighting ability granted the heavy gunners their due. Since the Americans relied so much on firepower, logistics became hugely important. Weigley devotes two full chapters to the topic. Despite American plenty, the US Army had real supply problems that limited its ability to exploit and pursue German units as they collapsed and fell back in northern France in 1944. Ammunition began to run short, long before the Battle of the Bulge. Manpower was an issue as well. At the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans had 70 divisions, while the Allies (Britain, France, Canada, Poland, and the United States) had only three more. Rear echelon units consumed enormous amounts of personnel. The training system for replacements was set up to provide individual infantry soldiers, not artillery gunners or tank crews. Many of these problems were structural deficiencies beyond Eisenhower's control, but he tolerated the wasteful J. C. H. Lee.

Personality mattered a great deal in Eisenhower's command, which was one reason Lee survived. Weigley spends more time, though, on Eisenhower's relationship with Montgomery. He sees the British field marshal as being as bold and creative as possible given the manpower shortages that faced the British Army, and says that Eisenhower went out of his way to meet his demands. Had Montgomery been more astute in personal interactions, he might have gotten much more out of the American general. Weigley emphasizes that Eisenhower tended to give command to officers with combat experience—which is a bit odd, since he had none—and was biased against officers with commissions through the National Guard. As a supreme commander, Eisenhower vacillated on key strategic decisions, according to Weigley. Long story made short, Eisenhower often failed to appreciate the differences among the fighting forces at his command and how to use them best (Weigley, 1981).

In contrast to Weigley's powerful and well-researched book, D. J. Haycock's *Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare: A Critical Appraisal* is a superficial account that is best forgotten. He repeats the criticisms about command and expertise that Montgomery and Brooke made about Eisenhower at the time (Haycock, 2004).

Adrian R. Lewis explores US Army amphibious warfare used at Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. He is quite critical, calling the landing a "flawed victory." His analysis includes an assessment of Eisenhower's leadership. As a general, Eisenhower relied on technology. He understood the importance of synchronization of military power