

Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe

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Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe

Past Developments, Current Status and Future Potentials

Edited by

Michael Bommes (†), Heinz Fassmann & Wiebke Sievers

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Preface

Michael Bommers passed away on 26 December 2010, after a long and debilitating illness which he bore with patience and great discipline. His interest in issues arising from the field of migration and integration research continued throughout, as did his endeavours to bring the numerous projects and research efforts to a satisfactory end. Sadly, he was not able to witness the completion of the publication presented here, which marks the conclusion of the research project 'Migration as Opportunity and Danger' funded by the *Robert Bosch Stiftung*.

This project regarded the MENA region (including Turkey) as a possible region of origin for a quantitatively significant migration to Western Europe, and placed it at the focal point of the analysis. To facilitate further in-depth work on the project, Michael Bommers established a working group. The members of this group developed the research question and research concept and went on to jointly discuss the preliminary results in a series of working-group sessions. In addition to Michael Bommers, the working group consisted of Tanja El-Cherkeh, Heinz Fassmann, Simon Fellmer, Franz Nuscheler, Ralf Ulrich and Friederike Zigmann. Invited guests, such as Steffen Angenendt, Sigrid Faath, Ahmet İcduygu, Andrew Geddes, Hein de Haas, Hanspeter Mattes, Carmella Pfaffenbach, Andreas Pott and Ayman Zohry participated in selected sessions and contributed their expertise with regard to specific issues and topics. The working group officially concluded its work in 2010 with a preliminary final report, which was to form the foundation for a proposed publication under the joint editorship of Michael Bommers and Heinz Fassmann.

The editors of the now-completed publication felt a moral obligation to publish the final report posthumously, as it includes many ideas conceived by Michael Bommers. The contributions were carefully selected, the authors were provided with an opportunity to update their work and some of the texts were subsequently translated into English. A topic such as this is clearly of interest not only to the German-speaking world, but also to an international audience. The editors and authors also made some adjustments to the contributions to ensure that they would provide readers with a comprehensive insight into a multidisciplinary research question. This joint research question may best be summarised as follows: How will migration between the MENA region and Europe develop in the future, what are the possible causes of future migration from the MENA region to Europe and how reliable are such projections when viewed against the background of a political transition process attended by numerous uncertainties?

Prefaces are always textual depositories of gratitude. Gratitude is due, in the first instance, to Viola Breuer, project manager at the *Robert Bosch Stiftung*, who accompanied us along the lengthy path from conception of the project all the way to its publication – a generous, at times critical, but always highly committed travel companion. In addition, we would like to thank her colleague, Hannes Schammann, who took over from Viola Breuer when she left the *Robert Bosch Stiftung* shortly before the completion of this publication. Sincere thanks are also due to the contributing authors, who provided us with their work and remained patient, despite repeated requests by the editors for amendments to the manuscripts. Some of the manuscripts were translated into English by John Smith and Karen Meehan, with subsequent final editing carried out by the team of editors and, in particular, by Wiebke Sievers. Jenny Money proofread the book with great care. Our heartfelt gratitude goes out to everyone who contributed to making this publication possible.

Heinz Fassmann and Wiebke Sievers
Vienna, July 2013

Introduction

Heinz Fassmann and Wiebke Sievers

All member states of the European Union will be in need of labour in the near future. Three factors are decisive for this development: low fertility rates, extended life expectancy and, in most EU countries, a baby-boom generation in their late 50s and early 60s that will slowly be reaching retirement age over the coming decades. It is highly probable that, after a period of moderate growth in the present decade, the EU population will stagnate until 2030, decline after that date and age significantly in the whole period until 2050. This decline will particularly affect the workforce when the baby-boom cohort leaves the labour market and is replaced by a smaller cohort. As a consequence, EU countries will enter a phase of significant labour shortage and will be confronted with tremendous problems in financing their social-welfare systems. While such a situation may seem unimaginable at a time when the EU is experiencing a deep economic crisis, when moderate growth and employment levels of almost 11 per cent are projected for the coming years (European Commission 2012: 1), it is clear that the EU faces a serious reproduction problem with its workforce in the long run.

The United Nations Population Division (UNPD 2011) projects that the EU-27¹ will gain about 11.3 million inhabitants over the coming four decades (medium variant). However, due to the current age structure, this general growth will be accompanied by a significant decline in the labour-force population aged 15-64. This age group will decrease by 47.9 million (or 14.2 per cent) from 337.6 million in 2010 to 289.7 million in 2050. At the end of this transitional phase, the retired baby-boom generation will rely on a relatively narrow working-age population. These developments will affect all countries in the EU-27, but the decline of the population of working age will be much more dramatic in those countries that experienced a sharp fertility decline, from high to very low, in the past. In Germany, for example, the population aged between 15 and 64 will decline by one quarter by 2030 if current demographic developments persist over the coming two decades.

Many European states have been trying to increase the fertility of their populations by introducing measures supporting families and

1 This book project was completed before the EU-27 became the EU-28, when Croatia joined on 1 July 2013.

increasing the number of child-care facilities. States could also implement further measures to reduce labour-force shortages, such as increasing the numbers of women and immigrants participating in the labour force, increasing the factual retirement age, shortening the time spent in tertiary education and finally re-qualifying the unemployed with a view to reintegrating them into the labour market. However, such measures cannot change the root cause responsible for the decline of the labour force. It therefore seems clear that states in the EU-27 will need some immigration to balance the tremendous changes they will be confronted with in the coming decades, and immigration seems to be an appropriate instrument with which to break this ageing process. It will offer the economy the labour force which is needed. While the *Replacement Study* of the UN Population Division (United Nations 2001) shows that immigration cannot extinguish the consequences of ageing baby-boom cohorts, it can mitigate this process and help to develop sustainable policy measures in the meantime.

The EU has partially recognised the significant changes in the demographic development that will take place over the coming decades. At the 1999 Tampere Council, the Commission clearly expressed the need to implement an immigration policy in order to close the gaps in the labour force. The main objective of this common policy is to better manage migration flows through a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and demographic situation of the EU. The approach agreed in Tampere was confirmed in 2004 with the adoption of the Hague Programme (2004-2009). In addition to developing a policy plan for economic migration, this programme highlighted the importance of cooperating with third countries.

But where is future migration to the EU to come from? Migration from Eastern Europe, a traditional source of labour migration to Western Europe that has come to be of major importance again since the fall of the Iron Curtain, will not be able to fill these gaps in the long run for three reasons: most of the states in this region are now EU member states, their economies have been catching up with Western Europe, in some cases with remarkable speed and, last but not least, their populations, like those in Western Europe, are decreasing due to falling birth rates and emigration. Hence, in the long run, Eastern Europe will be confronted with the same question which Western Europe is already facing: where to find the labour force no longer guaranteed by reproduction.

The situation is very different in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, bordering Europe to the south and south-east, where the

labour markets cannot offer adequate employment to young, growing and well-educated populations.² Indeed, Fargues (2008: 3) described the MENA region as ‘an ideal demographic match’ for Europe: ‘The former has a large supply of young active workers, and the latter has a shortage of the youthful skilled or unskilled labour it needs to sustain its economic competitiveness.’ Gubert and Nordman (2008: 3) reach a similar conclusion in their in-depth study of migration from MENA to OECD countries: ‘Increased labour mobility from the MENA Region could compensate for demographic trends in European labour markets in the next two decades, while constituting a response to the lack of employment in the home countries.’ And Gubert and Nordman’s study, amongst others, led the World Bank (2009: xv) to conclude: ‘Both industrial and developing countries stand to benefit from better-organized migration schemes, more opportunities for labor migration, and better matching between skill demand and skill supply. This is very much the case for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Europe, where important migration links exist’.

Assessing migration potential from the MENA region

Such observations were the point of departure for this book, which analyses the MENA region, in particular Morocco, Egypt and Turkey, as a possible source of future migration to the European Union. Established experts from various disciplines discuss this issue from the point of view of migration studies, political sciences and demography. The first three chapters present the migration histories of the three countries under discussion, to assess future emigration as well as the impacts of migration on the sending and the receiving countries. Chapters 4 to 6 approach the topic from two political perspectives: EU migration policy – which mainly served to prevent migration from the MENA region in the past – and political conflicts in the MENA region that have triggered migration. The final section presents forecasts of demographic growth and future migration potential as well as possible scenarios for migration from Turkey, Egypt and Morocco under varying economic circumstances.

2 The abbreviation MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa, but the geographical definitions of this region differ. The countries commonly included are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. Other countries sometimes discussed as part of the MENA region include Turkey and Sudan.

The overarching aim of this publication is to assess whether the MENA region is, indeed, an ideal demographic match for the EU. In other words, will the high demand for labour immigration to be expected in Europe in the near future meet with a similarly high emigration potential in the MENA region? While the individual chapters use different theoretical and methodological approaches according to their field of expertise, the book as a whole tries to answer this question within the general framework of the push-pull approach. First developed by Lee (1966), the push-pull approach explains migration by a combination of factors pushing people to leave their home countries and factors attracting them to specific other countries and regions. As explained above, we regard the demand for labour in EU countries as the main pull factor for future migration from the MENA region. A second major pull factor which we take into account is the existing migration links. More recent migration theories have shown that such links lead to the establishment of networks that bring about new migration (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1993: 448-449). This particular factor partly explains the choice of countries which we discuss in more detail in our publication. Compared to other MENA states, the flows of emigrants from Egypt, Morocco and Turkey to the EU-27 are particularly high – either in numbers or in proportions of their populations (Docquier & Marchiori 2011: 245). Morocco and Turkey have long-standing migration links with selected member states of the European Union, as Hein de Haas and Ahmet İçduygu show in chapters 1 and 3 of this volume. The large majority of their emigrants settle in Europe. By contrast, most Egyptian emigrants move to the Gulf States, as Ayman Zohry shows in chapter 2 of this volume. However, as de Haas suggests, there seems to have been a certain reorientation of Egyptian migration towards Europe over the past decade.

While these pull factors are discussed in more detail in the first three chapters, the book mostly concentrates on an in-depth analysis of the main push factors for migration from the MENA region. A particular focus is on the growing populations of working age in the MENA region and their limited chances of finding adequate or any employment at all due to limited economic growth in many countries in the region. These are the factors that Ralf E. Ulrich (chapter 7), Heinz Fassmann (chapter 8) and Michael Bommers, Simon Fellmer and Friederike Zigmann (chapter 9) use in their detailed calculations of migration potential in part 3 of our book. At the same time, we are aware of the fact that growing populations and weak economies are not the only factors pushing people to leave their home countries. At least equally important, in particular in the MENA region, are conflicts brought

about by political instability and environmental conditions. However, these are not as easy to predict as demographic growth, especially at a time of radical political changes, such as those brought about by the Arab Uprising, when predictions change almost by the day. Moreover, such predictions are also more subjective, since views on the possible future impact of such changes differ, as becomes apparent from the contradictory views presented by Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes in chapter 5 and by Franz Nuscheler in chapter 6 in this volume. Under such circumstances of political instability, political stability in the EU is an important pull factor for migration. However, EU policies towards migration – still conceived as a danger to be controlled, as Andrew Geddes shows in chapter 4 of this volume – may have the opposite effect of discouraging highly skilled migrants in particular from moving to the EU.

Moving beyond the push-pull approach towards a systems approach to migration, our publication also considers the impact of migration on sending countries. A recent study has shown that the EU would greatly benefit from growing migration flows from the MENA region to the EU – tax rates would decrease and per capita Gross National Income (GNI) would increase – while the MENA region would mainly suffer from growing emigration, with the most productive workers leaving and tax rates increasing (Docquier & Marchiori 2011). Such observations have been the main motivation for the inclusion of in-depth analyses of the past effects of emigration on Egypt and Turkey, not only from an economic point of view, but also from wider social and political perspectives. These analyses of the past may serve as a point of departure for what the World Bank (2009: xv) called ‘better-organized migration schemes’ that also benefit the sending region. Several EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (CEC 2003) and the Global Approach to Migration (CEC 2011) have tried to address this issue. But criticism of these policies as confirming power asymmetries (Browning & Joenniemi 2008) and focusing on push factors of migration only (Collett 2010), shows that there is still ample space for development.

Migration histories and futures: Patterns and effects

Migration patterns from the MENA region to the EU not only differ greatly across countries and times, but are also closely linked to migration flows to other regions, in particular the Gulf States, as de Haas shows in this volume in his comparative overview of Euro-Mediterranean migration

futures, exemplified by the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. Migration from the MENA region to Europe started with post-colonial migration from Morocco to France, which was followed by guest-worker migration from Morocco and Turkey to several Western European destinations up until the oil crisis in 1973 that led to a recruitment stop in European countries. This date also marked the beginning of growing labour migration, in particular from Egypt, to the Arab Gulf countries up until the 1991 Gulf War that led to massive repatriations from this region. Migration from Morocco and, especially, from Turkey, to Europe has continued both as family and as asylum migration, and destinations have diversified – in particular for Moroccans, who have increasingly also moved to Southern Europe. In addition, Turkish emigration has also been directed to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since the 1990s. However, in general Turkish emigration has been declining over the last two decades.

De Haas regards three factors as decisive for migration patterns: political and economic developments, such as the 1973 oil crisis or the 1991 Gulf War, differentials in economic and social opportunities between sending and receiving countries, and path dependence in the sense that emigrants tend to follow the routes laid out by pioneers. Based on these assumptions, de Haas argues that emigration from Turkey is likely to decline further in the future if political stability and economic growth there persist. Migration from Morocco is likely to remain substantial, at least in the short term, since income differentials between Morocco and Europe remain relatively high and the political situation in Morocco will not change. Only Egypt, a large country characterised by demographic growth and few economic prospects, may become a main source country for longer-term future migration to the EU.

Ayman Zohry's in depth-analysis of Egyptian emigration largely confirms de Haas' projections. In addition, Zohry points out that the Egyptian government has long regarded emigration as a tool for development. When it first authorised emigration in the 1970s, this was mainly a strategy to ease pressure on the Egyptian labour market. But, since then, Egypt has also come to regard emigrants as a potential source of remittances, which are among Egypt's largest sources of foreign currency along with Suez Canal receipts and tourism. However, it has also been shown that only a small amount of this money is invested into activities with multiplier effects in terms of income and employment creation. While brain drain may have been a problem for the Egyptian labour market in the first emigration phase, Zohry argues that this is no longer the case, since the Egyptian labour market cannot absorb the large number of well-educated young people. This is also the main reason for emigration from Egypt to continue

in the future, with another being the possibility of growing conflicts in the wake of the Arab Uprising that has brought to light the deep political and religious divisions within Egyptian society.

In the third chapter, devoted to Turkey, Ahmet İcduygu comes to similar conclusions regarding the links between migration and development in Turkey in the past. Like Egypt, Turkey has regarded emigration as a means of alleviating unemployment, which certainly also worked in practice. At the same time, there is some indication that the loss of skilled workers may have had a growth-slowing effect on Turkey, while skills acquired by the workers abroad were often not in demand in Turkey and therefore did not contribute to development. Remittances, on the other hand, have made an important contribution to the Turkish economy – often in need of foreign currency. However, as in Egypt and in many other emigration countries, this money rarely flows into productive investments generating employment, even though the Turkish state has initiated several projects to guide the flows of capital in this direction. Apart from the economic impact, emigration has also been an important source of social change in Turkey, since settlement abroad exposed not only the emigrants but also their families at home to modern economic, social and political processes. One of the most important changes concerns the role of women, who have become more emancipated through migration. At the same time, there have also been cultural-revivalist tendencies, such as the growth of Muslim fundamentalism or the reinforcement of ethnic allegiance among the Kurdish minority, both of which may have contributed to recent political developments in Turkey. Apart from the consequences for the home country, İcduygu also briefly analyses the impact of migration on the receiving states. Turks in Europe seem to be in a particularly disadvantaged position: their education is generally lower than that of other migrants in the receiving societies and they are more often affected by unemployment. The problems both of utilising migration for development in the countries of origin and of including immigrants and their descendants in the receiving countries will have to be addressed in any future migration strategy to be developed by the European Union, together with possible countries of origin for future migration.

Policies and conflicts: Two incalculable factors influencing migration

The second part of the book addresses two issues which affect migration from the MENA region to Europe but which cannot be included in any

calculation of migration potential: first, European Union migration policies and, second, conflicts in the region that may trigger refugee movements. Andrew Geddes, in the fourth chapter of this book, argues that the EU perceives migration from the MENA region primarily as a threat to be guarded against, as became obvious again in the reactions of EU states to the migration inflows in the wake of the Arab Uprising. As a consequence, EU migration policy towards the MENA region has mainly aimed to stem unwanted migration flows. The EU has tried to involve MENA countries in this process by offering them limited migration opportunities in return for better migration management on their part, in particular by combating irregular migration and trafficking, facilitating return and fighting trans-border organised crime. This approach is not new. In fact, all major capitalist countries use comparable strategies based on similar conceptualisations of migration as a danger to be guarded against and a risk to be managed. However, the EU is the first supranational entity to develop such an approach, and new problems have emerged from this particular construction. For instance, it has been difficult for the EU to fulfil its part of these agreements, since labour-migration rules are a national competence. However, these rules will have to change in the near future when the EU will again need labour. A major point in these labour-migration rules will have to be that the source region also benefits from these agreements, which has not necessarily been the case in the past.

The following two chapters focus on political conflicts within the MENA region that may also trigger refugee flows to the EU, and Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes describe their long history. The most well-known among these are the Middle-East conflict that started with the foundation of Israel in 1948 and is still ongoing, the two Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 that have resulted in internal conflicts, and the conflicts surrounding the Arab Uprising. However, these are only the conflicts that have received the most international attention. Far more important were the many fights for sovereignty and lost territory following the end of colonisation. In addition, the MENA region was also involved in the Cold-War conflict. While post-colonial and East-West conflicts have been losing importance in the region for obvious reasons, internal conflicts concerning ethnic and religious minorities will most probably continue to be important in the future. Faath and Mattes predict that there will be three major causes of future conflict in the MENA region: the fight for resources, in particular for water, domestic conflicts over the role of Islam in society (a conflict going back to the 1990s) and the fair distribution of government resources. However, they also make clear that, as in the past, the refugee movements resulting from these conflicts

mostly affect the surrounding countries – only a minority has ever reached Europe.

Franz Nuscheler, in his chapter entitled 'The uncertainties involved in calculating migration', is far more cautious regarding such predictions of conflicts and thereby also regarding any calculations of migration potential as they are carried out in the last three chapters of the book. Nuscheler argues that conflicts could arise anywhere in the region, even in countries such as Turkey, that are regarded as more or less economically and politically stable. However, this may change at any time, due not only to the ongoing conflict regarding recognition of the Kurdish minority, but also to the ongoing conflict between secular Kemalists and the traditional Islamic party in government and the volatility of economic growth. The unexpected uprising in summer 2013 initiated by the protest against the building of a shopping mall in the Gezi park in inner-city Istanbul provides ample proof for Nuscheler's conclusion, written long before these events. Nuscheler's projections of future conflicts differ markedly from those made by Faath and Mattes. Apart from the Middle-East conflict, he regards a possible disintegration of Iraq as a major source of future conflict in the MENA region. In addition, he highlights the dangers of climate change only marginally taken into account by Faath and Mattes. While climate change will mostly affect sub-Saharan countries, the migration following from it will be directed towards the North. This will put more pressure on those North African countries which have agreements with the EU to aid the latter in controlling migration. While these agreements have been problematic from their inception because basic human-rights standards were often ignored in the course of their implementation, in particular in Libya, it is also unclear whether and how these will continue in the wake of the Arab Uprising and in particular after the fall of Gaddafi. If they were to be discontinued in the future, this would certainly have an effect on migration to the EU.

Migration potential: Figures and scenarios

The third part of the book is devoted to defining the frame of possible future migration from the MENA region. Ralf Ulrich provides an overview of demographic developments there compared to the EU-27. The MENA region grew 4.4 times between 1950 and 2010, when it had 454.5 million inhabitants. However, population growth has already slowed down over the last 60 years from a growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the 1950s to 1.7 per cent today. Of the inhabitants of the MENA region, 41 per cent live in the three

countries under discussion in this volume: Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. However, only in Egypt has the population growth been about the same as in the whole MENA region, while it has been lower in Turkey and Morocco. Ulrich shows that the MENA region will continue to grow. By 2030, the population in the region will have reached 594 million inhabitants. This is mainly due to the fact that the present generation of children is larger than that of their parents and, even if fewer children are born to each set of parents, the greater number of parents in the future will still guarantee that the population will continue to rise. Ulrich expects that this growing population will increase conflicts regarding the scarce water and food resources. Moreover, a large share of the young men entering the labour markets in the near future will not be able to find employment. For some parts of the still-growing young population, migration to Europe or to the Gulf states, where labour migrants are needed, could be an alternative.

Heinz Fassmann fine-tunes Ulrich's observation that the MENA region is an ideal demographic match for the EU by calculating emigration potential based on age-specific emigration rates. Since Fassmann is interested in the rather abstract question of whether the migration potential in the MENA region can meet the need for labour in the EU, he tries to exclude, as far as possible, any effects of migration control by using age-specific emigration rates from Slovakia, Poland and Austria, following their accession to the EU, as a basis for his calculations – Slovakia as an example of low emigration, Poland of medium emigration and Austria of high emigration. The medium variant results in a potential 1.3 million emigrants in 2015 – i.e., around 1 per cent of the working-age population of the three countries under discussion here. If most of them enter the EU, the resulting immigration would amount to about 70 per cent of all present immigration into the EU-27. While this may seem a high emigration potential, it is much lower than that resulting from recent opinion polls, which identify a migration potential of 16 per cent in the current MENA population – i.e., 20.8 million people in Turkey, Morocco and Egypt.

The final chapter, written by Michael Bommers, Simon Fellmer and Friederike Zigmann, takes Fassmann's model a step further by combining his emigration potential with various projections of future economic developments in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, based on the assumption that emigration will increase if the differential between the EU and the MENA region increases and *vice versa*. In addition, the three authors take into account that the large majority of the large emigration potential from Egypt will most probably not move to the EU but to the Gulf states, due to existing migration networks there. Bommers, Fellmer and Zigmann clearly show that economic growth, combined with growing employment, may

markedly reduce emigration potential. For example, if Turkey continues to reform, maintains its current economic performance and joins the EU, the emigration potential would fall to a meagre 102,677 people by 2030, while the opposite developments would increase the emigration potential from 673,771 in 2015 to 806,542 in 2025. Nevertheless, the authors conclude by confirming the extreme importance of demographics for determining emigration potential, mainly due to the large economic gap between the MENA region and the EU – which further increases even if the EU only grows moderately.

In sum, the present volume clearly illustrates that the MENA is a possible source region for future immigration to the EU. The populations in the MENA states will continue to grow, while their economies will be unable to absorb the large number of young people entering their labour markets over the coming decades. However, the articles also highlight the insecurities involved in such calculations, in particular because it is difficult to foresee any developments in such a volatile region, either economically or politically. Moreover, they identify large differences between the three countries discussed in more detail in this volume. Turkey may lose any importance as a country of origin for immigration to the EU over the coming two decades if reforms continue and economic development remains stable, while emigration from Morocco will continue at its current rate if there are no major economic or political changes. Egypt will not only have the greatest emigration potential by far, but this potential will most probably also grow over the coming decades. Hence, Egypt would also be able to fulfil labour needs in the EU over a longer period of time. However, Egyptian migration has traditionally been directed to the Gulf countries. The EU would therefore need to take a pro-active stance on immigration in order to attract Egyptians to their labour markets. This not only implies moving away from the prevailing perception of immigration as a danger that strongly governs EU migration policy at present. It also means introducing more attractive integration policies in the individual member states that would prevent a permanent location of immigrants in the lower social strata, as has happened with Turkish immigrants in many European countries. Last but not least, the EU, together with the source countries of migration, could also try to develop strategies guaranteeing that they, too, profit from emigration, in particular regarding a more productive use of remittances, but also with respect to the possible use of acquired skills after return. Hence, the growing need for labour in the EU may turn the currently largely asymmetric migration dialogues between the EU and selected MENA countries into real dialogues benefiting both the sending and the receiving countries.

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Part I
Country profiles

1 Euro-Mediterranean migration futures: The cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey

Hein de Haas

1.1 Introduction

Over the past 50 years, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean regions have evolved into the main providers of labour migrants to the European Union. In the early stages of the post-war economic boom in North-West Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, most workers were recruited in Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece. However, since the mid-1960s, the place of these countries has been rapidly taken over by Turkey, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and Tunisia, while the recruitment of workers has shifted from governments to companies, mainly from Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Although the stay of these 'guest workers' was expected to be temporary, many migrants ended up settling, a process which was accompanied by large-scale family reunification and, later, by family-formation migration as a consequence of new marriages.

Due to an unprecedented economic boom, a rapid demographic transition in some countries and the southward expansion of the European Union, most Southern European countries have gone through migration transitions, thereby transforming from net emigration to net immigration countries. Spain, Italy and Greece, in particular, have now evolved into major immigration countries. In the meantime, Turkey, Morocco and other Maghreb countries have maintained their position as major source countries of EU immigration. While family and other network-facilitated migration perpetuated flows to the traditional destination countries of North-Western Europe, new labour migration has occurred from the Maghreb to Southern European countries.¹

While the Maghreb countries and Turkey have been fully integrated into Euro-Mediterranean migration systems over the past half century, migration from poorer Mediterranean countries south of Turkey, and from

1 In Southern Europe, only Albania, most former Yugoslav republics and, to a certain extent, Portugal, have not (yet) evolved into major immigration countries.