Dynamics of Power in Dutch Integration Politics

SOLIDARITY AND IDENTITY

In the past decades several large-scale social, cultural and economic developments have occurred. Processes of economic restructuring (de-industrialization) have brought into existence new categories of unemployed people; the process of individualization is manifested in increased individual independence, a growing sense of personal rights, and – possibly – in a growing opposition between self-interest and civil virtues; the increased world-wide mobility of people, commodities, services, money and information – globalization – has far-reaching consequences for the way individual citizens are living and experiencing their lives. Contemporary society is characterized by cultural and ethnic diversity. People's social and cultural identities have become more varied.

What are the consequences of these developments for the way people form social bonds and experience mutual solidarity in our society? Is there any empirical support for the widespread idea that social solidarity is declining? Which social domains – care, volunteer work, living together in old city quarters, relations between family members, neighbors, friends, etcetera – are the most vulnerable for a potential decay of solidarity? What is the role of familism and within-group solidarity among immigrant communities? Which new challenges are brought about by the multicultural society in terms of new forms of cultural expression, new (group) identities, new alliances, new institutions, new forms of formal and informal support? These and similar questions are the theme of the series *Solidarity and Identity.*

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From Accommodation to Confrontation

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and developing the network measures. The chapters on Amsterdam in Part III build upon and extend certain arguments that were first developed in a joint research project with Ugo Rossi and Henk van Houtum. Part III also uses data on subsidy relationships that Frank van Steenbergen gathered as part of his research assistantship and Master's thesis.

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PART I

1 Introduction: Integration politics and the enigma of power

Movements for cultural protectionism have proliferated in recent years throughout Europe and many other parts of the world. The idea that immigration and multiculturalism are the natural and inevitable side effects of globalization has been discredited. The arrival of poor migrants is no longer seen as the logical consequence of an internationalizing labor market but as an invasion of aliens. Multiculturalism is no longer seen as the epitome of liberal democracy but as an ideology that undermines society's ability to respond to the reprehensible ideas and practices of minorities. Parties on the left reluctantly accede that immigration causes problems, while right-wing parties adamantly argue that liberal democracies have been too soft, too accommodating, too understanding. I refer to these notions as *Culturalism*, a discourse organized around the idea that the world is divided into cultures and that our enlightened, liberal culture should be defended against the claims of minorities committed to illiberal religions and ideologies.

The Netherlands is often considered an exemplary case of a country where multiculturalism has been abandoned in favor of policies that demand and enforce integration. In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the right-wing Liberals, argued that the culture of the West was very different from – and vastly superior to – the culture of Islam. He claimed that the integration of minorities had failed and that this was due to the overly accommodating stance of multiculturalists and welfare workers. Since Bolkestein made his intervention in 1991, discursive assaults against multiculturalism, Islam, welfare workers and the left have proliferated. After Frits Bolkestein came Paul Scheffer, followed by Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders. What matters now is not the background of these individuals or the particulars of their ideas (we will come to that) but the fact that they were, without exception, culturalists. It is therefore not surprising that Baukje Prins argued in 2004 that "Bolkestein's plea against taboos, for

the defense of Western values and for the necessity of tough measures … has achieved a definite victory" (Prins 2004: 13). Many other observers have come to the same conclusion, even if they have not used the same terms. Ellie Vasta (2007) speaks of a transformation of the "minorities policy" into a "majority policy"; Han Entzinger (2003) chronicles the "fall of multiculturalism"; Willem Schinkel (2008) argues that a discourse that he refers to as "culturism" has been dominant since the 1990s; and Peter Scholten (2007) speaks of the "rise of assimilationism". These scholarly observations echo journalistic accounts that portray the Netherlands as a country that has moved from tolerance to intolerance or – if the journalist leaned more towards Culturalism – from naïveté towards realism.

The question that immediately impresses itself upon the analyst of integration politics is: *why*? Why did Culturalism come to dominate in a country that was so accommodating of minorities? This question concerns me here as well, though I will have reason to rephrase it. But before answering or even rephrasing the question, we need to attend to a claim that usually appears so trivial that it remains unexamined. When commentators claim that Culturalism (or any other discourse, ideology or sentiment) "dominates", they rarely, if ever, elaborate on what this domination entails. What, exactly, is a discourse? What do we mean when we say that a discourse is "strong" or "dominant"? How do we measure the growth or decline in the power of a discourse? And how do we explain such dynamics of power? These questions have relevance far beyond the case of integration politics in the Netherlands, as they touch upon problems that have plagued (and inspired) social science from its inception, such as the interplay of the material and symbolic dimensions of politics and the causes of social change. Because of its volatility and dynamism, Dutch integration politics provides an interesting and challenging case to think through some of the theoretical, conceptual and methodological questions that emerge when we want to understand the dynamics of power better.

Since policy concerns motivate much of the research on integration, it is perhaps helpful if I indicate straight away that my goal is *not* to develop a view on integration or to propose measures to promote it. Neither is my goal to criticize Culturalism or any other discourse. If we want to understand why a discourse generates support, the last thing we want to do is to qualify or correct

the arguments of its proponents. However frustrating it may be for analysts to postpone judgment, the key to explaining why actors promote certain discourses is to understand why they do so, not why they should not. This also implies that we should not analyze discourses as emerging from uncivil motives, as antagonists in integration politics routinely do when they posit that their opponents support a certain position because they are prejudiced, naive, scared, ignorant, racist, opportunistic and so on. My goal is not to take sides but to understand why actors take sides and to explain why they win or lose. I want to develop an approach for analyzing dynamic power relations and apply it to a case study of the vexing transformations in Dutch integration politics.

How, then, do we explain the emergence of Culturalism or, for that matter, other developments in integration politics? Conventional approaches, I argue in the next chapter, have difficulty answering this question because they assume continuity rather than change, domination rather than contention. Although I draw heavily on Pierre Bourdieu, his work, too, sometimes lapses into an absolutist and static understanding of power relations. His notion of symbolic power, for instance, is defined in such a way that it refers only to power relations that are accepted by the dominant as well as the dominated. The major benefit of such a conceptualization is that it enables the researcher to identify one – crucial, foundational, essential – logic of power. But especially when we consider a case as dynamic and contentious as Dutch integration politics, we should start from the assumption that there is no single logic governing conflict. It is precisely the struggle *between* different ideas and notions – articulated through integration discourses and embodied by antagonists – that this study examines.

The purpose of this study is therefore to foreground the *politics* of integration and to develop an approach that captures the contentious *dynamics* of struggles over religion and culture. Politics is, as Harold Lasswell famously said, about "who gets what, when and how" (1936). But it is also about how people see things and how they are seen. Politics does not consist exclusively of the ordering and processing of endogenous preferences but is also about the interpretation of reality, the demarcation of symbolic boundaries and the mobilization of sentiments. While politics has never been entirely instrumental, it has become more ostentatiously symbolic now that the media communicate images and sounds with increasing intensity and velocity (Hajer 2009). The

media, in turn, is not a unified apparatus but a complex constellation of stages, producers and publics. The questions that Lasswell associated with the political sciences are now inextricably interwoven with the questions he associated with communication: "who says what, to whom, in what channel, and with what effect?" (Lasswell 1948: 37).

Precisely for these reasons, a political sociology of integration cannot do without discourse analysis. Discourse analysis shows how classifications, categorizations and labels serve to maintain or transform power relations, how settings of communication influence interactions and how the meaning of events becomes subject to discursive struggle. Discourse analysis has advanced the study of politics by opening up to investigation the ways in which actors negotiate their understandings, not just their interests. I feel, however, that its practitioners have too often presented discourse analysis as an *alternative* to more traditional approaches that aim to uncover objective relations. Whereas the systematic, quantitative analyses of traditional researchers are systematically blind to the meaning and drama of politics, discourse analysis – with some notable exceptions – has focused on the interpretation of images, performances and texts. To avoid the easy but lethal criticism that discourse analysis presents "just another take" on reality, it is necessary to ground interpretative analysis in an approach that acknowledges and identifies the objective relations that structure subjective interpretations. This study therefore incorporates the analysis of social inequalities and institutional structures into discourse analysis. To understand why discourses originate and why they prevail, we need to systematically research the figurations in which they are mobilized and through which they accrue meaning. This implies that we should not study Culturalism as a singular discursive order that engulfs the totality of society but rather as a force that emerges from, and transforms, political fault lines. To understand its rise to power and to appreciate the ambivalences and limitations of that power, we need to develop a relational perspective and probe the interactions between this discourse (actors promoting it) and other discourses (actors promoting them). The central question that this book thus seeks to answer is: *How and why did power relations transform in Dutch integration politics between 1980 and 2006?*[1]

The plan of the current study is to first elaborate, in Chapter 2, my approach to answering this central question. The question is

then divided into two parts. Part II focuses on the integration *debate* and analyzes opinion articles on integration that were published in three broadsheet newspapers. Part III investigates the *governance* of integration and focuses specifically on the relations between the government and minority associations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Part IV draws together the main findings, provides answers to the research question and explores the study's relevance beyond Dutch integration politics.

2 The struggle for civil power

This chapter's purpose is to develop conceptual lenses that allow us to ask empirical questions about the dynamics of power in integration politics. The chapter begins with a discussion of Jeffrey Alexander's work on the civil sphere and how it can be used to study integration politics. It then posits Bourdieu's field analysis as a fruitful avenue for examining power relations in the civil sphere. I subsequently argue that discourse analysis and network analysis can increase the explanatory leverage of field analysis. The result is an approach that provides a relational understanding of civil power, enabling us to examine transformations of power relations in a variety of different settings. Towards the end of the chapter, I argue that other approaches to the study of integration politics – while providing insight into power relations – do not sufficiently account for its dynamism. Finally, I indicate how this study's research question will be answered.

Integration: A national fascination

After it became clear that labor and post-colonial immigrants were here to stay, Western European countries developed comprehensive institutional practices and discursive frameworks to determine if and how these outsiders would be recognized as citizens. The response to the presence of immigrants reflected each country's conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. In the United Kingdom, immigrants were classified mainly in terms of "race". In France, they were labeled as "citizens" in the tradition of the Republic. Immigrants in Germany were excluded from citizenship as a result of the ethnic understanding institutionalized in its citizenship regime, while in the Netherlands ethnic diversity was accommodated according to the indigenous logic of "pillarization" (Brubaker 1992; Favell 2001; Joppke 1996; Koopmans et al. 2005).[1]

While national idiosyncrasies endure, there seems to be a convergence in citizenship regimes across Western Europe. Most na-

tional governments now explicitly aim to reduce the immigration of low-skilled (family) migrants and have developed comprehensive programs to turn those who do immigrate into self-sufficient and autonomous citizens (Joppke 2007). The desired outcome is individual and societal *integration* (Favell 2003). Joppke is quite right when he suggests that talk of 'national models' sounds old-fashioned (Joppke 2004: 452). Left- and right-leaning parties now also seem to agree on the basic ingredients of successful integration policy: the immigration of poor migrants must be curtailed, discrimination should be combated, and a set of incentives and disincentives put in place to induce immigrants to become economically productive and culturally assimilated citizens (Joppke 2007).

This international convergence and cross-party consensus on the necessity of integration does not, however, preclude contention. While there is certainly convergence between countries and parties when it comes to integration *policies*, integration *politics* has grown more contentious. Integration politics has burst out of its specific policy domain and entered into what Jeffrey Alexander (2006) refers to as the civil sphere – those institutions and communicative channels where actors negotiate the conditions and nature of civil belonging. The assassinations of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn and the filmmaker Theo van Gogh (see Chapter 5) are just two of the most extreme examples of a constant stream of mediatized incidents somehow associated with the presence of immigrants and especially Muslims. Newspapers and television programs constantly cover integration issues and the struggle to define what incidents and events mean: what does an assassination mean for the integration of Muslims, how should we interpret high crime rates among immigrants, what do we think of the fears among natives, what can or should the government ask of immigrants regarding their adaptation or assimilation? The answers to these questions define and redefine civil solidarities, determining who is in and who is out.

Discursive struggles in the civil sphere

Jeffrey Alexander's conceptualization of the civil sphere – comprised of institutions and communicative channels that "generate the capacity for social criticism and democratic integration" (Alex-

ander 2006: 4) – allows analysis of struggles over inclusion and exclusion. "Such a sphere," Alexander posits, "relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience, because of our putative commitment to a common secular faith" (ibid). As with any faith, however, sacredness implies the existence of profanity. The civil sphere is akin to religion in that it has institutions and rituals through which some actions, motives or relations are rendered pure, and others polluted. Alexander identifies a distinctive symbolic code of the civil sphere that:

> supplies the structured categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential member, of civil society is made to fit. ... Members of national communities firmly believe that "the world," and this notably includes their own nation, is filled with people who either do not deserve freedom and communal support or are not capable of sustaining them... they do not wish to include them, protect them, or offer them rights, for they conceive them as being unworthy and amoral, as in some sense "uncivilized". (2006: 55)

Much has been written about the procedures through which nations define and defend their formal membership.[2] But here my concern is with *integration* politics, i.e. with the struggles through which differences and inequalities are constructed between individuals and groups that share the same nationality, namely the Dutch one. More specifically, I want to examine how some identities and acts are construed as civil, while others are not. As Alexander argues, civil politics is:

> a discursive struggle. It is about the distribution of leader and followers, groups and institutions, not only in terms of material hierarchies but across highly structured symbolic sets. Power conflicts are not simply about who gets what and how much. They are about who will be what, and for how long. Representation is critical. In the interplay between communicative institutions and their public audiences, will a group be represented in terms of one set of symbolic categories rather than another? This is the critical question.

The meanings ascribed through discourses are by no means neutral: they not only define certain identities and problems but also ascribe *civil value* to some identities, actions or behaviors while degrading others. Civil discourses define who belongs to a *civil community*. A civil community is analytically and empirically distinct from a national community. While people with passports and full citizenship rights are formally full members, many are regarded as being outside society – which is why they have to be contained (prisoners) or integrated (immigrants, the unemployed) (see also Schinkel 2007). Integration discourses stipulate how the civil community will be protected and who or what will be sanctified or sacrificed in the process. Integration discourses also suggest ways to design state institutions so that they better sanction civil identities and practices. Through laws, regulations and material support, the ideas and notions that compose integration discourses can be inscribed into the state. Researching civil politics as a process of continuous discursive struggle means studying how actors categorize one another and why they succeed or fail to impose their definition of the situation on policies and debates.

The limitations of Alexander's strong program

While this study employs many of Jeffrey Alexander's concepts to analyze integration politics, it does not adopt his explanatory strategy. His analysis in *The Civil Sphere* (2006) is emblematic of his "strong program" in cultural sociology developed over recent years with several colleagues at Yale University. The type of cultural sociology Alexander advocates requires, first, that other "non-symbolic social relations" are "bracketed out" in order to reconstruct "the culture structure as a social text" (Alexander & Smith 2001: n.p.). The analyst then examines the impact of "culture structures" on social practices by anchoring "causality in proximate actors and agencies" (ibid). In his analysis of the civil sphere, this means that Alexander identifies some types of actors as agents of civil repair. Through metaphors and performances, social movements and other actors can entice "core groups" – i.e. historically dominant groups – to view previously stigmatized groups as full members of the civil community. Even though Alexander acknowledges that the drive for exclusion is as foundational for the construction of the civil sphere as the drive for inclusion, he designates only progressive movements as "civil". But as several reviewers of Alexan-

der's work have pointed out, nativist movements of the past as well as the contemporary new right articulate their demands in a civil vocabulary (e.g. Wolve 2007; Hurenkamp 2009). Much the same is true for movements that mobilize against Muslims and other minorities. While Alexander would undoubtedly consider them "backlash movements", this is not how they view and present themselves. Chapter 5 shows, for instance, that culturalists employ a symbolically rich discourse in which they frame their own interventions as a force for reason, truth and freedom. To claim that culturalists have grown stronger because civil or uncivil forces have prevailed does not offer an explanation but merely helps to politically locate the analyst who bestows such labels.

Alexander's work – while providing rich descriptions of the struggles over the status and incorporation of women, blacks and Jews – glosses over power. His framework explains *how* but not *why* social movements proliferate or falter at particular moments; nor does it enable us to gauge the impact of power *within* the civil sphere since civil relations are, by (Alexander's) definition, characterized by equality and solidarity. Though Alexander recognizes the impact of social inequalities on the distribution of civil power (see below), his strong program in cultural sociology demands that he "brackets out" these relations. In short, Alexander's concepts are useful to describe what integration politics consists of, but are insufficient to identify and explain dynamic power relations.

Field analysis and inequalities in the civil sphere

Whereas Alexander's project is to identify the "possibilities of justice" in liberal democracies, Pierre Bourdieu's work demonstrates the limitations of liberal democracy.[3] Bourdieu focuses on how seemingly universal institutions – religion, education, democracy – can work to legitimate and conceal social inequalities (Bourdieu, 2005). His work can thus help us to incorporate the analysis of inequality in the study of the civil sphere – a necessary step to analyze integration politics. Synthesizing the work of both theorists, I argue, yields considerable theoretical returns, as the weakness of one author is the strength of the other. Alexander provides a vocabulary to explain the formation of solidarities between actors with divergent interests; Bourdieu shows how particular inter-

ests motivate universal claims (cf. Bourdieu 1990). But how can we achieve this synthesis? My argument is that the concept of the "civil sphere" can be borrowed from Alexander's cultural sociology and inserted into Bourdieu's field theory so that the civil sphere can be analyzed as a field. This theoretical move is possible because the civil sphere, as identified by Alexander, has two structural properties that Bourdieu associates with fields.

First, like fields, the civil sphere has a measure of *autonomy*: it has a distinct logic through which hierarchies are constructed between different actors who partake in a struggle. Like science, religion or art, the civil sphere has a vocabulary that all who wish to partake in it must speak. They must speak in the name of democracy, freedom and justice, and against those groups and discourses that threaten these values. Actors engage in struggles over classification as they try to impose their particular visions of the social world while devaluing those of their opponents (Bourdieu 1991: 170; Wacquant 1992: 14). A culturalist, for instance, might argue that the Islamic world has not yet experienced enlightenment and that its believers therefore suffer from irrationality and a distorted view of society. A critic of Culturalism, in contrast, might argue that fear of Islam amounts to hysteria and that civil integration is possible if all parties calmly look for solutions. In the specific vocabulary of the civil sphere, antagonists portray their opponents as a threat to the civil community, its democratic relationships and its capacities for rational reasoning (Alexander 2006: 57-62).

Second, like fields, the civil sphere only has *relative* autonomy: it refracts the power relations and inequalities of the surrounding environment. This point is crucial for Bourdieu, since he argues that the struggle for legitimation within fields is determined by the mobilization and conversion of different forms of capital. While Alexander's "strong program" precludes analysis of the effects of such inequalities on power relations within the civil sphere, he acknowledges that its autonomy is relative. The outcome of struggles within the civil sphere "depends on resources and inputs from other spheres... In this sense it can be said that civil society is dependent upon these spheres" (Alexander 2006: 54-55). Alexander's account of the performances and symbolism of the civil rights movement, for instance, complements rather than contradicts explanations that center on the growing economic power of the Southern black population or the organizational

strength of the black churches. While Alexander's strong program of cultural sociology demands that we "bracket out" such material and organizational factors, his conceptualization of the civil sphere does not require us to do so.

The concept of civil sphere thus understood is very close to Bourdieu's understanding of the "field of power"[4] – "the public sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the bureaucratic field" (Wacquant 2007: 1). This concept, designed to overcome the substantialist notion of a "ruling class," allows the relational analysis of struggles between elites rooted in different locations of various fields (Bourdieu 1985; Wacquant 1993). I thus conceive of the civil sphere as a space of struggle where actors compete and cooperate to define who belongs to the civil community and what its problems are. The civil sphere is a meta-field where logics from different fields collide or coalesce (Couldry 2003). Actors from different fields (academia, parliamentary politics, journalism, civil society associations, literature) try to promote their particular visions of the social world in public debates and to inscribe these visions into state institutions. Integration politics therefore does not primarily revolve around the relations between different ethnic or religious groups but between actors who promote different views of minorities and integration issues. At stake in the struggles is the value of embodied views and perspectives. We will see in Part II, for instance, that sociologists in the integration debate[5] advocate empirical research and appreciation of local contingencies against the tendency of culturalists to think in terms of civilizational or cultural conflict. Since sociologists have historically played an important role in advising the state on how to solve integration problems, it is hardly surprising that they advocate calm assessment to produce effective policy. In contrast, philosophers in the Dutch integration debate tend to focus on the fundamental principles that should inform integration politics and argue that the sacred texts – rather than the social practices – of Muslims should be subject to scrutiny. They usually do not detail how policies should be implemented, but instead argue, with reference to exemplary cases, the need to protect or reject a general principle. Representatives of both disciplines thus do not simply advance arguments about minority integration, they also try to show the value of the schemes of perception over which they have expert control. Divisions within academia are thus refracted and renegotiated in the civil sphere where actors translate

views cultivated in particular fields into discourses on how to understand and govern diversity.

Discourses, networks and the limitations of Bourdieu's analysis of symbolic power

Bourdieu's work provides the basic concepts and strategies to analyze struggles within the civil sphere and to undertake the sort of political sociology that Alexander's principled neglect of things non-symbolic prevents. The idea that integration politics is essentially about classificatory struggles and the inscription of these classifications into bodies and institutions is central to this study, as is the idea that actors mobilize different quantities and types of capital in their struggle to make their particular discourse dominant. Although Bourdieu has often been characterized as a reproduction theorist, his work offers ample analytical tools to map and explain historical change (Gorski 2012a). Nevertheless, the criticism that Bourdieu does not account for transformation – though not entirely accurate – does apply to his concept of symbolic power. While many of Bourdieu's key concepts are designed to map the gradations, differentiations and dynamics of power, his writings have continued to rely on an overly structuralist conception of symbolic power.

"Symbolic power" for Bourdieu "is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even they themselves exercise it" (1991: 164). The dominated are complacent in their own subordination because they do not have the capacity to think outside of the discourses that historically powerful actors have imposed on them. In Bourdieu's view, the state is the harbinger of such power because state institutions can inculcate subjects with schemes of perception which cue them to view the arbitrary power of the state as authoritative (1997: 175-176). This conception of symbolic power, however, is too absolutist: it does not help to identify power where there is open discursive conflict, as is the case in Dutch integration politics. The same criticism applies to the discourse analysis of Willem Schinkel who, inspired by Bourdieu, analyzes the integration discourse (Schinkel 2008). Schinkel argues that while actors in integration politics may appear to be virulently opposed to each other, their positions in fact emanate from one and the same discourse. In this type of analysis, actors' posi-

tions are over-determined by a discourse that so curtails the range of available options that the differences between actors become mere surface appearances. Without being able to account for the substantive differences between actors, it becomes impossible to analyze the relations of power between them.

Bourdieu's understanding of symbolic power not only absolutizes discourse, it also absolutizes power. For Bourdieu, power expresses itself most forcefully in the absence of conflict. While I accept this argument, a case as contentious as Dutch integration politics requires not only looking beneath the surface of political life for shared *doxa* but also analysis of actual conflict (cf. Bourdieu 1998a: 57). When Bourdieu maps power differentials between actors, he tends to equate power with capital. Rather than focusing on actors' interactions or strategies, Bourdieu proposes to study the distribution of capital which, in his view, constitutes the objective relations that structure a field. Bourdieu's principled unwillingness to examine interactions[6] reduces his capacity to understand the dynamics of collective action (cf. Crossley 2003; Girling 2004). Though the distribution of capital obviously shapes social action, the networks formed through interaction have an independent effect on power relations (Wellman 1988). The power of groups depends in part on their capacity to function as a group – that is, to channel resources and to coordinate action (Bruggeman 2008). Considering discourses and networks, I argue, complements Bourdieu's conception of symbolic power and allows us to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations.

Discourses and discursive power

I define discourse as a *coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities*. Let us examine these terms one at a time. I speak of a *coherent ensemble* to indicate that we cannot speak of a discourse if the attribution of meaning is entirely random (Hajer 1995: 44). Discourse implies that there are discernible patterns: a position on one issue corresponds to a position on another. For instance, people who argue that Islam and democracy are incompatible are also likely to believe that immigrants should be obliged to learn Dutch, that integration policies have failed, that Israel occupies Palestinian territories out of self-defense, that there should be less

attention paid to the atrocities committed in the Netherlands' colonial past, that Turkey should not join the European Union and that Dutch elites are imprisoned in a culture of political correctness. The correspondence of positions on these seemingly disparate issues justifies speaking of a discourse (a culturalist discourse in my terminology) in the same way that correspondence between scores on different variables indicates the presence of a shared dimension.

The notion of *framing* is used extensively in the social movement literature to highlight the importance of signification. A frame is "an interpretative schemata that signifies and condenses 'the world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences in one's present or past environments" (Snow & Benford 1992: 137; Goffman 1974). In my understanding, a frame is composed of ideas, notions and symbols. "Ideas" refer to explicit assumptions and causal reasoning. We may call this the intellectual element of discourse, as ideas stipulate how the world works and suggest certain ways to identify and explain patterns of social behavior. "Notions" refer to immediate conceptions or impressions. Notions very often remain implicit but can be expressed as statements that immediately reveal the position of actors. When actors remark that "the West has experienced enlightenment" or posit that "integration requires mutual respect", they immediately reveal their adherence to a certain discourse (respectively, a culturalist discourse and a pragmatist discourse in the terminology I develop in Chapter 3). "Symbols" are visual or verbal representations of values or collectives, such as the Christian cross, the Quran or the constitution. The meaning of these symbols is not stable but depends on how they are mobilized. The Quran, for instance, figures prominently in the discourse of both Muslims and culturalists but in very different ways.

Depending on the frame through which they ascribe meaning to reality,[7] actors not only see but also *feel* different things. Hochschild's notion of "feeling and framing rules" captures nicely how emotions are implicated in processes of signification. Framing rules stipulate how we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations; feeling rules "refer to guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation" (Hochschild 1979: 566). I frequently use words like "feel" or "sense" to indicate that what actors "think" is not merely a matter of cognition but also a

sensual process. The routine ascription of meaning-emotion normally referred to as "common sense" is different for actors embodying different discourses. As the experiments of John Bargh and other psychologists and neuroscientists have shown, embodied schemes of perception serve to assign positive or negative sentiments to persons, actions or statements in an instant reflex (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Kaplan et al. 2006: 55). Apart from these instantaneous emotional responses, different discourses also stipulate how emotions should be managed (Hochschild 1979). For instance, one influential promoter of Culturalism, Paul Scheffer, incessantly criticizes politicians and administrators for failing to communicate a "sense of urgency" about the unfolding "multicultural drama" that poses "the biggest threat to social peace" (Scheffer 2000).[8] Others warn against too much anxiety over integration issues and argue that we need to suppress prejudice to allow calm deliberation (see Part II).

A political geography of discourse

Discourses are produced in settings located in particular parts of a field or at the intersection of different fields. To grasp such situational differentiation, we need to think of the civil sphere not only as a symbolic universe or an abstract space but as a physical space with a distinct geography.[9] Integration discourses are formed in and through social practices in different settings (cf. Bourdieu 1980). The particular demands of the situation in these different settings induce actors to adopt discourses that serve some instrumental, material or emotional interest (Swidler 1994). For instance, diversity management professionals tend to adopt a particular integration discourse designed to capitalize on diversity within businesses or communities. These diversity managers, Chapter 9 shows, portray the city as a vibrant and diverse metropole where citizens are united in their pride of place. This integration discourse is cultivated in a different ecology of settings than, say, Culturalism. Culturalism is cultivated within right-leaning periodicals, right-leaning political parties and other specific settings discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Every discourse has its strongholds, its *milieus*, where participants share symbolic and class interests and are able to articulate a civil discourse from their perspective. Beyond these milieus, discourses clash and collide in *arenas*, i.e. settings where promoters of different discourses clash