

# Linguistic Emotivity

# Pragmatics & Beyond New Series

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Justus Liebig University Giessen, English Department  
Otto-Behaghel-Strasse 10, D-35394 Giessen, Germany  
e-mail: andreas.jucker@anglistik.uni-giessen.de

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## Volume 97

Linguistic Emotivity: Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of *pathos* in Japanese discourse  
by Senko K. Maynard

# Linguistic Emotivity

Centrality of place, the topic–comment dynamic,  
and an ideology of *pathos* in Japanese discourse

Senko K. Maynard

Rutgers University

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*To Michael*



# Contents

Preface and acknowledgments	xi
<b>Part 1 Preliminaries</b>	
1. Introduction	3
1. Introductory remarks	3
2. Types of knowledge and Knowledge of <i>Pathos</i>	10
2. Background	21
1. Studies on language and emotion	21
2. Emotion in the Japanese language	32
3. Emotion and culture	40
4. Critical assessment: Toward a negotiative theory of linguistic emotivity	47
<b>Part 2 Theory</b>	
3. The Place of Negotiation theory	53
1. An overview	53
2. Sign	59
3. Function	63
4. Language as bodily experience	64
5. Presentation of selves	66
6. Methodology	70
4. The (re-)turn to place	73
1. Concept of <i>basho</i> ‘place’ in Nishida’s philosophy	73
2. Place in Japanese language studies	76
3. <i>Bamen</i> ‘situated place’ in Tokieda’s theory	78
4. Place and interaction	81
5. The concept of place in the Place of Negotiation theory	82
5. Locating and interpreting emotive meanings	85
1. The location of meaning and <i>topica</i>	85
2. Negotiation of emotive meaning in conversation	88
3. Interpreting textual emotivity	92

4. Interpretation and tacit knowledge	94
5. Between cognition and emotion	96
6. Topic-comment, <i>futaku</i> , and the Rhetoric of <i>Pathos</i>	101
1. The significance of the topic-comment dynamic	101
2. Rhetorical figure of <i>futaku</i>	106
3. Rhetoric of <i>Pathos</i>	111
<b>Part 3 Emotive topics</b>	
On data for analysis	117
7. Vocatives and topics	123
1. Introduction	123
2. Vocatives	124
3. Topics	137
4. Where vocatives and topics merge	143
5. Reflections	147
8. Emotive nominals	149
1. Introduction	149
2. Exclamative nominals	150
3. Nominals and sentential nominals	155
4. Emotive nominals and text genres	161
5. Reflections	163
9. Quotative topics	165
1. Introduction	165
2. Background	166
3. From quotation to topic presentation	168
4. Quotative topic as an emotive	176
5. Utterance-final <i>tte</i> : Assertiveness and hesitation	182
6. Reflections	189
10. Emotive <i>nan(i)</i> ‘what’	191
1. Introduction	191
2. Background	194
3. <i>Nan(i)</i> as an anti-sign	196
4. <i>Nan(i)</i> and emotive meaning	203
5. <i>Nan(i)</i> and interactional meaning	207
6. Between interrogativity and exclamation	210
7. Reflections	212



## Part 4 Emotive comments

11. Da and <i>ja-nai</i> as commentary strategies	217
1. Introduction	217
2. Background	218
3. Stativity and situationality	221
4. Informational <i>da</i> and emotive <i>da</i>	226
5. Emotive <i>da</i> and the telling-it-as-is attitude	228
6. Emotive <i>ja-nai</i> and the telling-it-against-is attitude	239
7. Reflections	245
12. Interrogatives as emotive comments	247
1. Introduction	247
2. Background	248
3. Emotive interrogatives	251
4. Emotivity of commentary questions	258
5. Stray interrogative clauses	269
6. Reflections	274
13. Commenting through stylistic shifts	277
1. Introduction	277
2. <i>Da</i> versus <i>Desu/Masu</i>	278
3. Interactional particles	292
4. Reflections	304

## Part 5 *Pathos* in Japanese discourse

14. Analyzing expressions of <i>pathos</i> in <i>Oda Nobunaga</i>	307
1. The drama	307
2. In the cognitive place	308
3. In the emotive place	318
4. In the interactional place	326
5. Visual images and <i>pathos</i> in mass culture	333
15. Rhetoric of <i>Pathos</i> in <i>Mini-Jihyoo</i> newspaper articles	337
1. Introduction	337
2. Background	338
3. The topic–comment dynamic and text organization	341
4. Commentary sentences	344
5. The topic–comment sequencing in headline and text	346
6. Opening with topic and closing with conclusive comment	347
7. Sequencing of commentary sentences within <i>danraku</i>	352
8. Reflections: Textual <i>pathos</i>	354

16. Playing with <i>pathos</i>	357
1. Introduction: Emotivity and aspects of self	357
2. Gendered selves and interactional selves in <i>Long Vacation</i>	358
3. Stylistic choice and Minami's gendered selves	360
4. Stylistic shifts and Sena's interactional selves	372
5. Presentation of Minami's playful self	379
6. Vocatives and person references	386
7. Playing with <i>pathos</i> : A friend, a lover, or someone between	388

## Part 6 Reflections

17. Linguistic emotivity and the culture of <i>pathos</i>	393
1. The topic–comment dynamic and the centrality of place	393
2. Linguistic emotivity and realization of the feeling self	395
3. Concept of place and Japanese discourse studies	398
4. Significance of place/space in Japanese culture	403
18. Language, linguistic theory, and ideology	409
1. Japanese language studies and linguistic ideologies	409
2. Ideology of <i>pathos</i> and theoretical possibilities	411
3. Beyond the boundaries of place	414

Appendix: Information on select data	419
--------------------------------------	-----

Notes	423
-------	-----

References	435
------------	-----

Data references	460
-----------------	-----

Author index	465
--------------	-----

Subject index	469
---------------	-----

## Preface and acknowledgments

What does language communicate? What does it express? Or, what do humans do with language? Why do we, by using a system such as language, discover and locate ourselves in relation to others within cultures and societies? Why do we identify ourselves by living and experiencing the language, and how do we think and feel in it? To answer these related questions, I have studied the Japanese language primarily from the perspectives of discourse and conversation analyses. In the process I have strived to consistently analyze real-life Japanese language, part and parcel of contemporary Japanese culture, a dynamic flow that is continuously being produced, consumed, and interpreted.

What has become increasingly clear through these studies is the significance of meaning associated with emotion. Issues surrounding language and emotion have often been discussed under the heading of the “expressive” function. Within this broad functional notion, I concentrate on the emotion-related meanings expressed in language, that is, “linguistic emotivity.” Linguistic emotivity refers to human emotions and attitudes specifically expressed by linguistic strategies of emotives. These include the speaker’s attitude toward the speech act, toward the content of what is conveyed, feelings toward partners, emotions associated with interaction, as well as the general mood, feelings, and sentiment the speaker and the partner experience and share in communication.

Academically, emotion has been treated sometimes seriously, but often in convenient neglect. And as is widely recognized, the formal linguistics that has dominated linguistics in the latter half of the 20th century has consistently pushed aside and marginalized the emotional aspect of communication.

At the same time, the tenet of the postmodern has, for quite some time, questioned the fundamental legitimacy of the rational thinking subject of *cogito*, and the subject has come to be understood as a speaking, talking, narrating, and feeling self. Given the above, this book opens up a new way of understanding language, i.e., language as sources of the “feeling self.” In this work, I introduce linguistics that focuses on expressivity and explores emotive meaning on the center stage of inquiry.

This volume contains the theory, analysis, and interpretation of Japanese emotives, originally explored in *Jooi no Gengogaku: “Ba-kooshoron” to Nihongo Hyoogen no Patosu* (Kuroshio, 2000). At the end of that book, I expressed my hope to present my work in English so that my ideas will be made available

beyond the particularities of Japan. In the current volume, although the basic approach has not changed, I organize the content differently, hoping that my ideas are presented more explicitly. I am adding new chapters and incorporating new observations in other chapters.

The work to follow is a culmination of my research during the past several years, and consequently, it is drawn from a number of my earlier publications. Relevant works are mentioned and listed in the references. In particular, Chapter 10, Chapter 11, and Chapter 15 are similar in content to three of my earlier papers; “Speaking for the unspeakable: Expressive functions of *nan(i)* in Japanese discourse” (*Journal of Pragmatics*, 32, 1209–39, 2000), “Grammar, with attitude: On the expressivity of certain *da* sentences in Japanese” (*Linguistics*, 37, 215–50, 1999), and “Rhetorical sequencing and the force of topic-comment relationship in Japanese discourse: A case of *Mini Jihyoo* newspaper articles” (*Japanese Discourse*, 2, 43–64, 1997).

The theoretical construct enabling the analysis of linguistic emotivity is what I call the Place of Negotiation theory. The concept of “place” and related notions (e.g., situation, context, frame, script, schema, image schema, and so on) have been explored in various fields such as sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, anthropological linguistics, pragmatics, as well as cognitive linguistics. Following this line of thinking, the Place of Negotiation theory establishes a philosophical rationale for prioritizing place. It requires an appropriate understanding of the sign system, and establishes principles of interpretation based on the interactional negotiation among participants. In terms of methods for analysis, the Place of Negotiation theory draws from practices available primarily in conversation analysis and discourse studies, and secondarily from other related areas including sociolinguistics, pragmatics, rhetoric, and anthropological linguistics.

The Place of Negotiation theory enables the analysis of emotives, and forces a paradigmatic shift from the linguistics of *logos* to the linguistics of *pathos*. Linguistic meanings are no longer interpreted on the basis of propositional content alone, but rather, the meanings are interactionally negotiated, being indexically linked to the place of communication. The cotextual and contextual information become critical within the theory, rather than some constructs casually mentioned post-theoretically.

In my exploration of linguistic emotivity, I have learned much from previous works available both inside and outside of Japan. Many of the scholars are no longer with us, but many others are my contemporaries and friends. Although I do not list them, I would like to express my deep respect to those scholars whose works are cited in this book.

In May, 1997 I had the good fortune of meeting Yujiro Nakamura. It was a chance encounter; we both happened to be in the dining area of the Nassau Inn in Princeton, NJ, USA. Until that morning, I knew Professor Nakamura only

through his writings. Meeting him in person gave me the courage to seriously construct the kind of linguistics I had only vaguely toiled over for many years. I thank him for his insight, encouragement, and friendship.

For many years I have enjoyed knowing respected teachers and supportive colleagues in the field of Japanese linguistics and Japanese studies. My sincere gratitude goes to Noriko Akatsuka, Yoshihiko Ikegami, Chisato Kitagawa, Takie Lebra, Naomi McGloin, Suzuko Nishihara, Matsuo Soga, and Paul Takahara, who have, for so many years, kindly and warmly supported me.

Over the past several years, I have had opportunities to share some of my earlier thoughts at various universities and institutes. I would like to express my thanks (in chronological order of my visits) to the National Language Research Institute in Tokyo, University of Tokyo, Harvard University, Princeton University, UCLA, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies, Showa Women's University, Waseda University, the UCLA Center for Japanese Studies, Aoyama Gakuin University, and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku (Tokyo Women's Christian University).

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Last but not least, I express my warm appreciation to my late parents, Tsutomu and Harue Kumiya of Yamanashi, Japan. It is in their memories that I find a part of my place.

SKM  
Highland Park, NJ, USA  
Fall, 2001



PART 1

**Preliminaries**





## CHAPTER 1

# Introduction

## Language, emotivity, and *pathos*

### 1. Introductory remarks

#### 1.1 Emotivity and expressivity

Traditionally when emotion becomes a research topic in linguistics, it is discussed in relation to the expressive function of language. Expressivity of language, a dimension pervasive in human communication, includes all aspects of self-expression, whether they are dispositions, general mood and feelings, aroused emotive responses, evaluative attitudes, sense-based judgments, or cultural sentiments, as long as they are linguistically expressed.

Emotivity is a specific case of expressivity. Emotivity refers to emotional attitude and response, the feeling of being moved, as well as culture-based feelings and sentiment expressed through the use of linguistic and related signs. An emotive is a device expressing emotivity, and I use the term emotivity distinctly from the term “emotion(al)” which refers to basic and general human emotions such as anger, love, and happiness. Emotives refer to (1) linguistic devices that describe emotions, for example, *love* and *hate*, (2) linguistic strategies, such as interjections, that directly enact emotional attitudes, and (3) grammatical and rhetorical means which foreground the emotive meaning, for example, an exclamative sentence structure. I also use emotive to refer to any linguistic sign when its emotive meaning is foregrounded; in this sense all linguistic signs are potentially emotive.

Every language possesses an array of lexical terms referring to human emotions. Although the categories and the system of these emotion words may differ across languages and cultures, it is difficult to imagine a language without them. Obviously, emotion words offer much insight for understanding the emotivity and expressivity of language. And in recent years, emotion words and metaphors have become the focus of research among (cognitive) semanticists. Likewise, some obvious cases of grammatical and rhetorical means for emotivity have been studied.

In this book, recognizing different types of emotives mentioned above, I focus on devices that have not been fully investigated so far. Rather than analyzing emotion words and metaphors, I examine linguistic signs and strategies on varied

levels, i.e., lexicon, syntax, and text, including those signs that have not been traditionally identified as emotives. I take the position that although some linguistic signs and strategies may seem to carry the propositional meaning alone, they always express, in varying degrees, emotive meanings as well. By concentrating on seemingly emotionless signs, a stronger case can be made that emotivity is pervasive in all aspects of language. I identify and analyze a number of emotives in contemporary Japanese discourse to illustrate how rich and critical linguistic emotivity is in language and its use.

As I will discuss in the course of this book, emotives are indexical signs (Peirce 1992 [1868]), and can be said to be indexical in multiple ways. First, emotives reveal the speaker's identity indexically associated with the speaker's social, cultural, and emotional conditions. Second, emotives are interpreted on the basis of cotextual and contextual information that are indexically linked to the place of communication. Moreover, language as a whole is indexically linked to the culture it embraces (Silverstein 1976).

## 1.2 From *logos* to *pathos*

Many of the formal approaches to language that have dominated the latter half of the 20th century have concentrated on formal, abstract, and autonomous aspects of syntax and semantics. This preference for identifying language as an isolated (or, isolatable) object of analysis has deep roots in the Cartesian view of knowledge. The concept of autonomous syntax, which excludes all possibilities of explanation and motivation external to itself, successfully limits the analytical universe. Thus, scholars are able to pursue linguistics with the rigor of *logos*, as long as the proposed rules reach an adequate level of internal consistency and descriptive simplicity. This tradition so convincingly persuades us that we ourselves tend to find mental and psychological security, both peace of mind and heart, in the formalized rule-governed understanding of language.

Despite this dominant view of language, language has also long been associated with emotion. Throughout this volume, along with nonformalist and functional approaches to language, I challenge the formalist approach that places undue emphasis on language's referential (i.e., informational, or propositional) dimension. By resurrecting language's expressive possibilities, I propose a new way of understanding language as an experience of *pathos*, as sources of human emotion, and as a way of realizing our emotional *feeling* selves.

Language has been known to possess, at its disposal, the devices expressing human emotions, and this dimension has been traditionally captured by the term *pathos*. To elucidate the concept of *pathos* along with two other complementary elements, i.e., *logos* and *ethos*, it is necessary to turn to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In the classical sense, *logos* refers to rational arguments, and *ethos*, to the presentation of

the speaker's character and personality, especially the reliability of the person. And *pathos* refers to "the playing upon the feelings of the audience" (Wisse 1989:5). Critical to the Aristotelian understanding of *pathos* are the partner's feelings. *Pathos* involves the reaction of the message receiver.

However, as pointed out by Wisse (1989), there seem to be some contradictions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, particularly regarding *pathos*, in the sense of emotional appeal. In Book 1 of *Rhetoric*, Aristotle seems to deny the validity of *pathos* in his approach to rhetoric, as reflected in the quotation below.

Now those who in these days compose handbooks of rhetoric have spent their efforts on only a small part of this art. For proofs [*pisteis*] are the only things falling under the scope of art; everything else is merely accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes, which is the most essential part of persuasion, but devote most of their attention to things outside the matter itself: for the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions has nothing to do with the matter, but is directed at the judge only. (Wisse 1989: 17–18)

However, Aristotle does not totally "deny" *pathos* as an effective means of persuasion; he excludes it from the art of rhetoric, but he advocates it in practice. In fact, in Book 2, Aristotle analyzes fifteen emotions as a means for *pathos*, i.e. for the arousal of emotions in the audience. The fifteen emotions include anger, mildness, love/friendship, enmity/hate, fear, lack of fear, shame, shamelessness, favor, goodwill, lack of goodwill, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, and lastly, contempt. In other words, Aristotle's earlier denial of *pathos* seems to be a "rhetorical" reaction to the then lacking enthymemes; he does not deny, but in fact advocates, *pathos*.

According to Wisse (1989), Aristotle understands emotion (with anger as an example) in the following way.

It is necessary to divide the material about each of the emotions under three heads; for instance, when talking about anger, (1) what state of mind makes people inclined to anger, (2) with whom they usually get angry, (3) and on account of what. For if we knew one or two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse anger; and the same applies to the other emotions. (Wisse 1989:65)

Aristotle's conceptualization of emotion is situational in that emotion requires a target and a partner to share it with. This point is further elucidated by Cooper (1996) in his explanation of Aristotle's *pathos*. Cooper states:

Aristotle seems to recognize three central elements as constituting the emotions — they are agitated, affected states of mind, arising from the ways events or conditions strike the one affected, which are at the same time desires for a specific range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation as it appears to her or him to be. (Cooper 1996:251)

Significant to the understanding of *pathos*, then, is that human emotions are not simply experienced internal to the person, but rather, are experienced through interaction with other factors, including how the context influences the person, and how the interacting partner may emotionally react. The social dimension of emotion suggested here, which is in agreement with contemporary views of emotion (e.g., the social constructivist view of emotion), is particularly significant for developing the theory of linguistic emotivity explored in this book.

Perhaps a more serious point regarding the concept of *pathos* is spelled out in Aristotle's following statement, as given in Wisse (1989):

Emotions are all those (feelings) that so change men as to make their judgments different, and that are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and the like, as well as their opposites. (Wisse 1989:67)

Here, one cannot ignore Aristotle's words, "emotions are all those (feelings) that so change men as to make their judgments different." If one's judgment is changed by one's feelings, in order to persuade someone, one must take into account the partner's personality (*ethos*), and more importantly, how the partner feels (*pathos*). Since Aristotle takes the position that a person's judgment is influenced by emotion, his perspective comes close to espousing that the elements of *pathos* are fundamentally more influential in judgment than the elements of *logos*.

Following the Aristotelian rhetoric, when investigating language, one cannot ignore elements of *pathos*, for those elements are likely to alter the *logos*-based semantic content. More fundamentally, is it even possible to separate the semantics of *logos* and the meanings of *pathos* in the first place? At minimum, I must conclude that linguistics of strictly formal semantics is not sufficient to account for the full meaning of language. A linguistic theory must embrace not only the proposition-based meaning but also the emotive meaning, the latter of which is the focus of the present volume.

Regarding the Aristotelian conceptualization of the relationship between judgment and emotion, Lighton (1996) elaborates further. Aristotle viewed emotion's ability to alter judgment in terms of two principles, i.e., (1) change of judgment as a consequence of emotion, and (2) change of judgment as a constituent of emotion. And the former comes in the following kinds; (1) "connivance," (2) "alteration through favor and disfavor," (3) "alteration through perception," and (4) "alteration through pleasure and pain" (Lighton 1996:217). These judgmental changes seem intuitively correct; we have personal experiences such as intentionally ignoring truth, being more lenient toward those we like, severely punishing those from whom we expect more, compromising one's integrity for the fear of consequent psychological pain, and so on. There is no doubt that our "rational" thinking is influenced, regardless of whether or not we admit it, by our personal and interpersonal emotions.

In this book, I use the term *pathos* similarly to the Aristotelian notion of *pathos*, with all the possibilities of influencing *logos* and *ethos*. *Pathos* emphasizes interaction-based psychological and emotional aspects, while *logos* emphasizes the logical and informational aspects of language. *Pathos* is usually associated with femininity, and *logos*, with masculinity. The former is often discussed as being evident in Eastern culture, and the latter, as a philosophical foundation of the West.

Although *logos* and *pathos* seem polar opposites, they are, nonetheless, connected at their foundation. Emotion often requires conceptualization through language which requires aspects of *logos*, and logical rationality is often influenced by emotion. In reality it is perhaps more accurate to view them as complementary. And this view is the one I hold. Furthermore, differences between *logos* and *pathos* are a matter of degree or preference, and they do not constitute a mutual exclusivity. In the course of this book it will be revealed that depending on the purpose of communication, *pathos* may be chosen over the principles of *logos* under certain circumstances in certain genres. In this study I also use the term *pathos* to identify a type of knowledge. *Pathos* as a theoretical concept encompasses the emotion-related principles and preferences of a culture, as well as the philosophical position of prioritizing what will be referred to as the Knowledge of *Pathos*.

Although *logos* and *pathos* are complementary, it is also true that mainstream linguistics has prioritized *logos* at the expense of *pathos*. This *logos*-centeredness has influenced linguistics at least in two significant ways. First, investigation of language as *logos* has necessitated the theory of abstract and autonomous language, and consequently, has led to the denial of language as an event enacted by participants in a particular place. Under the influence of *logos*, propositional meanings are selected as objects of analysis, and the subject–predicate relationship becomes the center of syntactic analysis. Second, data of linguistic analysis are *logos*-centered, and actual usage of expression remains a non-issue. At the same time, linguists discard emotive aspects of meaning because these aspects are viewed as epiphenomenal, and are unexplainable within formal theories. Formal linguistics is a product of the *logos*-centered view toward knowledge, and its theories are built on select *logos*-supporting samples.

I am not claiming that formal linguistics is useless. I am saying, however, that if we conceive language from a *pathos*-centered view, our theoretical conceptualization of linguistics must also change. So, too, must change what constitute relevant data. Consequently, what constitutes an appropriate linguistic research design must be seriously questioned. By shifting our focus to a *pathos*-centered view, perhaps we are able to reach dimensions of language heretofore not having received full attention, or simply having been pushed aside too long for convenience's sake.

Language conveys more than information. More accurately, under certain circumstances, language prioritizes emotion over information. In the current

work, I explore, with as much vigorousness and precision as possible, how emotion is expressed through emotives, and how such emotive meaning is interpreted through a negotiating process. After proposing the Place of Negotiation theory of language, based on this theoretical standpoint, along with methodologies adopted primarily from conversation and discourse analyses, I explore the nature of emotivity and forms of emotives in contemporary Japanese discourse.

### 1.3 Organization of the book

Part 1, Preliminaries, presents background in which the current work is presented. Chapter 1 introduces basic concepts, emotivity, expressivity, and *pathos*, all of which, with slight differences in focus, serve the thread of discourse for this book. Furthermore, to philosophically locate the type of knowledge to be pursued in this work, Chapter 1 provides a brief history of knowledge, with a particular focus on the Knowledge of *Pathos*.

Linguistic emotivity and surrounding topics have become sites of analysis in linguistics and related fields, and tracing this historicity is the aim of Chapter 2. Particularly important in Chapter 2 is the review of traditional Japanese language studies whose fascination of emotivity is symbolized by the expression *kokoro no koe* ‘voices from the heart’. Closely associated with the issue of emotion is the sociocultural dimension. Chapter 2 reviews “affect” and “involvement,” the two theoretical concepts available in the field, and expands on their potential sociocultural consequences. In the last section of Chapter 2, assessing previous studies, I offer the rationale for my approach.

Part 2 introduces, in four separate chapters, the Place of Negotiation theory, on the basis of which I conduct my analysis of linguistic emotivity. I introduce the overall picture of the theory in Chapter 3, along with the explanation on how the concept of selves is realized through negotiation. In Chapter 4 I discuss, in detail, how the concept of place has occupied a center stage in Japanese philosophy and language theories. Chapter 5 turns to a more concrete issue of how emotive meaning is interpreted, negotiated, and approximated. Related principles of interpretation, such as ⟨empathetic conformity⟩, ⟨perspectivized appearance⟩, ⟨perspective of becoming⟩, and ⟨emotive focus⟩, are discussed as interpretive processes required in the Place of Negotiation theory.

Chapter 6 expands the horizon to overall characteristics of contemporary Japanese cultural discourse. I emphasize the significance of the topic–comment dynamic on all levels of the Japanese language, and connect this to the traditional rhetorical figure of *futaku*. It is for this indirect, round-about way of expressing and negotiating one’s emotion through the rhetoric of *futaku* that the topic–comment dynamic becomes especially functional. Included in Chapter 6 is the general characterization of the Rhetoric of *Pathos*, a rhetorical preference I

recognize in Japanese discourse. All features analyzed in this book function to realize, in one way or another, the Rhetoric of *Pathos*.

The realization of the topic–comment dynamic is captured by “emotive topics” on one hand, and “emotive comments” on the other. Part 3 discusses four related but different ways Japanese discourse creates emotive topics; (1) vocatives and topic-marking expressions in Chapter 7, (2) exclamative and emotive nominals in Chapter 8, (3) quotative topics in Chapter 9, and (4) emotive *nan(i)* ‘what’ in Chapter 10. These strategies are chosen as representative means to present topics and topic-like elements with varied shades of emotivity. Vocatives, exclamative/emotive nominals, quotative topics, and emotive *nan(i)* all appear as nominal elements, and they typically appear in the utterance-initial position where topic is most expected. Their function as a propositional element is minimal; instead they present the target of *futaku*, potentially rich in linguistic emotivity.

Three strategies of emotive comments are discussed in Part 4; (1) the so-called copulative *da* (and *ja-nai*), (2) emotive interrogatives, and (3) stylistic shifts. These strategies are chosen because of their potential for expressing linguistic emotivity in the form of a comment. All of these strategies appear toward the end of the utterance, closely associated with a comment. *Da* (and *ja-nai*) and interrogatives have been viewed as a part of the predicate, critical to the construction of proposition. If these strategies turn out to function as emotives as well, the case I am making for linguistic emotivity is that much stronger. In addition, stylistic shifts are known to be linked to the speaker’s personal and interactional attitudes, and therefore, significant expressive functions are expected.

Despite the commonly held view that *da* and *ja-nai* are copulative verbs, in Chapter 11, I argue that these are indexical signs with undeniable emotive implications. Chapter 12 discusses three different kinds of interrogatives that present emotive comments; (1) interrogatives seeking no answers, (2) commentary questions, and (3) stray interrogative clauses. In Chapter 13, based on the analysis of a television drama series and works of fiction, I argue that stylistic shifts indexically signal the speaker’s desire for expressing multiple aspects of emotivity. In this chapter, *da* versus *desu/masu* styles as well as use and non-use of interactional particles are discussed in relation to intimacy, power, and identity. Also discussed is emotivity associated with narrative voice in fiction, stylistic shift, and particle use.

Part 5 illustrates how linguistic emotivity comes to life in cultural discourse by analyzing it from the perspective of a Rhetoric of *Pathos*, and within the framework of the Place of Negotiation theory. Chapter 14 discusses linguistic emotivity observed in *Oda Nobunaga*, a one-episode television drama. The Rhetoric of *Pathos* in written text is explored in newspaper articles in Chapter 15. And Chapter 16 investigates how linguistic emotivity is associated with the presentation of different aspects of self. Based on examples taken from a television drama

series, *Long Vacation*, I discuss how gendered selves and interactional selves are expressed, negotiated, and legitimized through emotives.

In the final part, in Chapter 17, I reflect on linguistic emotivity and how it relates to the Japanese language's preferred strategies and how it helps to realize the ⟨feeling self⟩. Chapter 17 also broadens the scope and discusses the Japanese culture that embraces the concept of place and the aesthetics of *pathos*. Chapter 18 questions the significance of the current work in the context of linguistic ideologies. And lastly, I ponder upon how the spacial boundedness inherent in the concept of place can be overcome, especially in light of the potential contribution a researcher is able to make (by constructing a theory through a specific language) toward the knowledge on language in general.

## 2. Types of knowledge and Knowledge of *Pathos*

Formal approaches to linguistics have dominated the theoretical landscape throughout the latter half of the 20th century. This hegemonic force of formal approaches in linguistics has spread beyond Western academia, and indeed, has profoundly impacted Japanese language studies as well. In this book, I attempt to come to terms with this historicity, and propose a kind of linguistics capable of accounting for the linguistic phenomena so far not fully accounted for.

I use the Japanese language as a site for this exploration, but obviously, my interest is not to proclaim the “uniqueness” or the “particularity” of Japaneseness. Rather, the Japanese language serves only as a starting point for a broader rethinking of language, as it provides a means for linguistic theory-building. As an initial step, to locate the present work in context, I must begin by reviewing the type of knowledge I find inadequate for the purpose of fully understanding language, i.e., an ideology of *logos*.

### 2.1 An ideology of *logos*

The tenet of modern Western science is, in a word, a pursuit of rationality. It is not that all Western scholarship prescribes to it. However, in general, there has been a received understanding that science requires the observer's objective and rational analysis, and that scientific findings add to the body of coherently accumulating universal knowledge.

This Cartesian view of rational (clear and distinct) thinking has tended to push aside humanistic knowledge, e.g., memory, psychological processes, feelings, imagination, emotion, myth, and so on. And as symbolized by the expression, *cogito ergo sum*, one's inner thinking leads to the *logos*, the ultimate “clear and distinct ideas.” As a result, one's self is understood to be a ⟨thinking self⟩, un-



scathed by the sway of emotion. In humanities, emotion is inevitable, but emotion-related knowledge has been considered unreliable. Humanistic knowledge, supported by the interpersonal relationship between “I” and “you” as characterized by Buber (1970), was considered less trustworthy. Instead, rational thinking based on observation (i.e., the ⟨I-it⟩ relationship) was prioritized and praised.

Following this line of thought, a human being is divided into mind and body, with prestige given to the former. Mind is capable of creating rational thought, and therefore, the ultimate authority is given to the subject of *cogito*, the initiator of human thought. But obviously, there is an irony in this thesis of *cogito*. When Descartes uttered *cogito ergo sum*, it was realized through a language (although a “dead” language), a specific language with inherent ideology associated with it. Thinking is not totally free nor absolutely clear. This is because thinking must be achieved through a particular, not universal, language, which inherently is shrouded in its ideologized sociocultural mist.

In this sense, linguistic theories, from whomever they originate, can not be totally “free” of ideology. Formal linguistics was conceived primarily in English within the English-based universe. Given this, it is not overly presumptuous to assume that the English language (or more cautiously, English, German, and French) influenced the construction of the *logos*-based theories. Consider that the theory built in English for English is, in turn, legitimized in English academic discourse. Through this process, a particular view of the universe is reinforced, while other possibilities are precluded. In what follows, I offer an alternative to this hegemony of *logos*.

## 2.2 Vico’s warning

Although, in retrospect, the Cartesian view has dominated modern Western sciences, there is also a tradition in the West to prioritize humanistic knowledge. Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), an Italian philosopher, was placed in the historical time when Cartesian philosophy was beginning to invade the humanities. For fifteen years beginning from 1710, Vico continued to criticize the Cartesian world of the ⟨I-it⟩ relationship. He doubted the possibility that the essence of humanity is objectifiable, and that it is describable by assembling empirical data alone. Instead, Vico believed that for a human being to truly understand oneself, one must appreciate the meaning of history, that is, one must understand oneself *in* history.

According to Paparella (1993), in Vico’s view “truth is a dimension of the subject and it is a basic fallacy to think with Descartes that it can be conceived as a property of objects themselves” (1993:31). Therefore, Vico insisted that beyond the three recognized kinds of knowledge, i.e., metaphysics (rational intuition), mathematics (deductive knowledge), and natural science (empirical knowledge), there is a fourth kind of knowledge, that is, self-knowledge. In order to gain self-

knowledge, one must not remain a simple passive onlooker. We are participants within our history, and through participation, we understand our existence from the inside. Believing that Cartesian “clear and distinct ideas” constitute the highest form of knowledge, one may engage in introspection. But this does not lead to understanding. For there is no such thing as “objective” history.

Thus, we confront the idea of Vico’s hermeneutical circle. When human beings create history, and above all, language, we build internal structures based on our experience. But that experience itself is interpretable only through those interpretive structures. In other words, one’s method of interpretation organizes the world, which in turn nourishes one’s method of interpretation. Thus, the study of history becomes an ongoing reinterpretation of these interpretive structures which human beings have created. But, because one cannot interpret history without language, one’s knowledge is intrinsically tied to that language. Consequently, knowledge gained through re-interpretation is only relative to that language. This position of Vico is summarized by Caponigri (1976) as “(T)he concrete processes of culture alone provide the context for the idea of man because only in that context are the conditions of total presence realized” (1976:310).

Now, gaining self-knowledge requires self-experience. But self-experience does not materialize by way of introspection. Self-experience results when a person meets others and shares one’s world with theirs. Thus, by means of empathy toward others, we reach an understanding of history, through which we understand ourselves. Vico believed that we make history, while, at the same time, history makes us.

Vico’s hermeneutics is a reminder against the sheer arrogance of the Cartesian mind-set. Objectivists tend to insist that such and such theory is the only valid “objective” view of what constitutes reality, while other views or paradigms are the products of ignorance and, therefore, are of little, if any, intellectual value. This arrogance of the learned still pervades our present-day academies where much production of truth is achieved in specialized, exclusive academic corners. In linguistics, unless one reaches for the ordinary language realized through participation among ordinary people, one’s mere abstract thinking may only add to the Cartesian introspection-based rationality, which may or may not reflect what people do with and in language.

Vico’s professed academic discipline was rhetoric, the study of creative aspects of language. For Vico, it is language, rather than “clear and distinct ideas,” that offers the most important source for understanding the relationship between human beings and the world of which we are a part. More significant to the discussion of linguistic emotivity, Vico viewed the relationship between language and meaning as that of interdependence. For Vico, contrary to what Descartes thought, content and form can be distinguished but cannot be separated from one another.

For Vico, the principle of complementarity sustains. Just like the relationship between form and meaning, the relationship between language and mind is synergistic. Minds are fashioned by languages just as languages are fashioned by minds. The two are inseparable. Following this line of thinking, it is absurd to think, as Descartes thought, that there are “clear and distinct ideas” standing behind language, and then language strains to express such ideas. Rather, the meaning of language arises with the language that testifies to it. According to Paparella (1993:67), Vico was “the first linguist to point out that language is performatory in nature.” Paparella emphasizes Vico’s insistence that our relationship to language and history cannot be one of “using” them but rather, one of “participating” in them (1993:74).

Overall, Vico issued a warning against the Cartesian rationality, and being concerned with science’s assumed authority, stated:

Since, in our time, the only target of our intellectual endeavors is truth, we devote all our efforts to the investigation of physical phenomena, because their nature seems unambiguous: but we fail to inquire into human nature which, because of the freedom of man’s will, is difficult to determine. A serious drawback arises from the uncontrasted preponderance of our interest in the natural sciences. (Vico 1965 [1709]:33)

Perhaps I am not the only one to recognize that Vico’s warnings were consistently ignored and often vigorously denied in many of the mainstream formal approaches in linguistics. The analysis and interpretation of language I pursue in this volume are in basic agreement with Vico’s view toward language. I take Vico’s view seriously, especially the following points. First, when constructing a linguistic theory, one needs to take into consideration the hermeneutic self-knowledge. Second, one needs to understand that we participate in history through language which carries within it its culture and history. Third, one must appreciate that language constructs the way we evaluate the very manner in which we understand ourselves. And lastly, the meaning of language comes into being where language and thought meet, and where speaker and partner interact.

In this place where language and thought encounter, there must be a (feeling self) who simultaneously understands the language of *logos*, and who experiences the personal, interpersonal, and social empathy of *pathos*. If language and thought are in synergistic relationship supporting and realizing each other, both are fused with *logos* and *pathos*. And if such is the case, linguistic theory must also be able to shed light on both *logos* and *pathos*.

### 2.3 Knowledge of *Pathos*

The humanistic aspiration Vico held is clearly captured by Nakamura’s term “Knowledge of *Pathos*” (*patosu no chi*). Knowledge of *Pathos* refers to a type of

knowledge that Nakamura, a contemporary Japanese philosopher, has developed over the past 25 years, as documented in many of his writings (1975, 1982, 1992, 1993c, 1996). Nakamura sometimes refers to the Knowledge of *Pathos* as the Knowledge of Dramatic Model (*engeki no chi*), and the Knowledge of Clinical Model (*rinshoo no chi*). Here I refer to the idea represented by all three terms simply as the Knowledge of *Pathos*.

In strictly formal linguistics, Cartesian *logos* had taken root, and has spread in all directions. In the process, rationality has gained ascendancy over memory, imagination, emotion, and the human body. More pointedly, rationality has all but obliterated the primacy of locality-based particularities as key to understanding humanity and culture. Nakamura, repeatedly acknowledging the importance of Vico's humanistic approach, characterizes the Knowledge of *Pathos* with renewed interest, particularly as a potential heuristic for a host of issues associated with contemporary thought.

In Nakamura's view, Knowledge of *Pathos* is passive and responsive, while the Cartesian knowledge of *logos* is active and proactive. As opposed to a mechanized scientific knowledge, the Knowledge of *Pathos* appreciates the dynamic energy which a place itself exerts on whatever emerges there. We receive our energy from a place, and so does our knowledge. Knowledge, like experience, is born through intimate association and interaction with others and objects located in a place, resultant of which is the appreciation of multiple layers of relationships. In Nakamura's words:

The Knowledge of *Pathos* is based on three structural principles, i.e., cosmology, symbolism, and performance, in its process of appreciating the meaning of other elements that act upon us such as other persons, worlds, and environments. To put it differently, the Knowledge of *Pathos* does not understand human beings merely as active existence, i.e., in the abstract. Rather, it starts with the idea that it is a passive-suffering existence receiving the action from others in a semantically rich place. And it refers to the kind of knowledge that understands the self-other relationship as mutual interaction.<sup>1</sup> (Nakamura 1996: 306, my translation)

Nakamura's three principles for the Knowledge of *Pathos* (cosmology, symbolism, and performance) are polar opposites of three elements basic to the knowledge of *logos*. Cosmology contrasts with universalism, symbolism with logicity, and performance with objectivism. Nakamura's *pathos* is predicated upon cosmological thinking, symbolism, and the significance of bodily action.

According to Nakamura (1996), the cosmological way of thinking views place (or space) differently from universalism. In the latter case, place is understood to be monolithic and universal. In the cosmological view, each place possesses an organic order, constructing a meaning-existing territory. In such a place, locality-based particularities and *topica* (as a location of problematics) become meaningful.

Symbolism refers to the principle that linguistic and related signs are understood to realize multiple meanings. The polysemous nature of things is accepted as a norm, and meanings are customarily interpreted from multiple viewpoints, and not from a single, autonomous perspective. Performance refers to more than the body that performs. Nakamura states that “performance requires, more than anything else, the interaction among the person who acts, the partner who views the actor, as well as partners situated in the same place” (1992: 135, my translation).<sup>2</sup>

Nakamura’s three pillars associated with the Knowledge of *Pathos* are closely associated with Vico’s humanism. I read in Nakamura’s conceptualization of knowledge the following tenet as it relates to language in particular. First, language and place are inherently connected and they always interact. Second, meanings are multiple, that is, polysemy is the norm, and third, linguistic action occurs in interaction, always enacted together with someone else. Although the Knowledge of *Pathos* may be applied to various disciplines, the points listed above are particularly significant to the kind of linguistics advanced in this book. In my construction of the Place of Negotiation theory, I incorporate Nakamura’s conceptualization of knowledge. Of particular importance, the theory (1) must incorporate the recipient’s passive point of view, (2) must be sensitive to the interactional nature of language, and (3) must perceive the meaning to be multiple.

As made evident by Nakamura’s use of the term, the Knowledge of Dramatic Model, Nakamura integrates Burke’s (1969) work on dramatism into the Knowledge of *Pathos*. In *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke conceptualizes five terms (i.e., Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose), and based on how these elements interact, he characterizes different types of drama. What interests Nakamura is the thesis Burke develops surrounding the Greek proverb *ta pathemata mathemata*, i.e., one learns by experience. In a section titled Dialectic of Tragedy, Burke (1969) explains in the following way. *Mathemata* refers to things learned in general, and the mathematical sciences in particular. A *pathema* refers variously to a suffering, misfortune, passive condition, situation, and state of mind. But another element is required for tragedy, namely, an action. Thus, Burke’s version of the complete proverb is *poiemata, pathemata, mathemata*.

*Poiemata, pathemata, mathemata* refers to the motive that the act organizes the opposition, that the “agent” thus “suffers” this opposition, and as the agent learns to take the oppositional motives into account, the agent has “arrived at a higher order of understanding” (Burke 1969: 40–1). If one reaches a deeper understanding by acting on opposition, it implies a dialectic paradox. Burke himself phrases:

Grammatically, if a construction is active, it is not passive; and if it is passive, it is not active. But to consider an *act* in terms of its *grounds* is to consider it in terms of what it is not, namely, in terms of motives that, in acting upon the active,

would make it a passive. We could state the paradox another way by saying that the concept of activation implies a kind of passive-behind-the-passive; for an agent who is “motivated by his passions” would be “moved by his being-movedness,” or “acted upon by his state of being acted upon.” (Burke 1969: 40, original emphasis)

To understand dramatism, and, more relevantly, to understand human interaction crystalized in drama, one needs to take into account the active-passive relationship itself. This position challenges strictly formal linguistic theories in that they account for the language in abstract, while giving little regard toward the passive recipient side of the interaction. To fully understand that action implies being passive-behind-passive, a Knowledge of *Pathos* is necessary. Here lies the motivation for Nakamura to incorporate, in his understanding of *pathos*, Burke’s grammar of dramatic motives. Both Nakamura’s and Burke’s works are reminders that linguistic theories must be able to account for the principle of *poiemata*, *pathemata*, *mathemata*. Effective linguistic theories must not only capture the emotivity within language, but also must be pursued as a part of the Knowledge of *Pathos*.

#### 2.4 *Sensus communis*

I now turn to the philosophical concept of *sensus communis* that lies at the very foundation of the Knowledge of *Pathos*. Following the understanding of Vico’s *sensus communis*, Nakamura, in his series of writings (1975, 1982, 1992, 1993b, 1996), resurrects and renews this concept. The concept of *sensus communis*, though not developed specifically in relation to a linguistic theory, can be applied to linguistics as well. And as will be explored in the course of this book, *sensus communis* is of particular significance to the Place of Negotiation theory. *Sensus communis* offers the philosophical foundation for the Knowledge of *Pathos*, which in turn legitimatizes the analysis of linguistic emotivity. It also offers insight to psychological and social understanding of language both on the individual and societal levels.

As will be explained, in the Place of Negotiation theory, meaning is interpreted through interpersonal negotiation. Meaning is negotiated between speaker and partner, to the extent the potential meaning of linguistic signs allows. To integrate the meaning in the negotiation process, however, some operational motivation is necessary. *Sensus communis* offers a means and motivation for the integration of various semantic elements inherent in interaction. This motivation operates internal to the person, as it evaluates multiple semantic elements, ranks them, and integrates them. At the same time, *sensus communis* facilitates the integration of meanings expected in a given society. This *sensus communis* as intuitive social knowledge makes it possible to integrate and interpret meaning appropriate to the cultural occasion, by selecting, weighing, connecting, and combining multiple factors. *Sensus communis* may also take the form of social

sentiment commonly acknowledged among a group of people sharing the same culture. This aspect of *sensus communis* enables the interpretation of emotives in socioculturally meaningful ways.

To elucidate on the concept of *sensus communis*, I follow the way Vico understood it, under the guidance of Nakamura's (1975) further elaboration. Nakamura (1975:91) summarizes the basic meaning of *sensus communis* as a process where "many senses within the body (i.e., what is sensed in the body) by themselves meet each other, are tied together, are arranged in an orderly manner, are clustered together, and are formed into a system" (1975:91, my translation).<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the case of "common sense" which was eventually censored from philosophy and other academic disciplines, historically, *sensus communis* has functioned in terms of psychological, physiological, as well as, social factors. For example, according to Nakamura (1975), Aristotle understood *sensus communis* as the human ability to distinguish the senses, the ability to identify the very process of sensing. Aristotle also identified *sensus communis* as an operation that human imagination requires when re-enacting the passive side of experience. On the other hand, for Descartes, although he clearly separated thought from sense, and mind from body, *sensus communis* was something that could bridge the two.

*Sensus communis* is a sense-based intuition, i.e., unreflected judgment, but it also functions to organize and integrate senses, whose process requires rational function. In short, *sensus communis* is predicated upon the rational. This sense-to-concept process is experienced not only by an individual, but also by a group of people sharing similar cultural values. In this way *sensus communis* presses forward the patterning of sentiment shared by a group of people. More relevantly to the current study, *sensus communis* operates as a motivational force for the socio-culturally endorsed way of interpreting meaning in the Place of Negotiation theory.

Vico, in Naples of the early 18th century, was witnessing Cartesian rationalism challenge the three-hundred-year ascendancy of the humanist rhetoric. Faced with this crisis, Vico found in *sensus communis* the necessary epistemology. According to Schaeffer (1990), by the 18th century, *sensus communis* had become the locus of a whole cluster of meanings, including the following; an organizing sense, an unreflective opinion shared by most people, manners or social values of a community, the first principle of reflection, an innate capacity for simple, and even logical reasoning. In the context of this intellectual landscape, Vico advanced his concept of *sensus communis*. In his 1709 work, Vico emphasizes the importance of *sensus communis* in the education of the young by saying that "young people are to be educated in common sense, we should be careful to avoid that the growth of common sense be stifled in them by a habit of advanced speculative criticism" (1965 [1709]: 13). In fact for Vico, *sensus communis* is "besides being the criterion of practical judgment," "the guiding standard of eloquence," and he warned us by saying that "(T)here is a danger that instruction in advanced philosophical

criticism may lead to an abnormal growth of abstract intellectualism, and render young people unfit for the practice of eloquence" (1965 [1709]:13).

More concretely, given the importance of *sensus communis*, Vico incorporates it into his rhetoric. Lamenting that the art of "topics" (*topoi*) has been ignored, Vico advocates it by pointing out that *topica* allows one to find where arguments are. In other words, one can find the line of reasoning along which the discussion of the subject is to be conducted. Therefore, those who know the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to be used, are able "to grasp extemporaneously the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case," and "(I)ndividuals who have not achieved this ability hardly deserve the name of orators" (1965 [1709]:15).

Now how exactly does *sensus communis* work in oral speech? Vico's answer is the following. Equipped with *sensus communis*, the person speaks in a language the audience knows, with meanings they share, and with images, rhythms, and emotions that support those meanings. This commonality supported by the *sensus communis* keeps the individual rooted in the community both culturally and historically. An individual experiences the *sensus communis*, when language provides him or her the imagination and aesthetic power pertinent to that particular language.

It is significant that when Vico thinks of rhetoric, he refers to oral ability. Vico found in the art of oratory the importance of the relationship between speaker and listener. In fact as Schaeffer (1990) wrote, "(I)n Vico's account, language begins, not with men speaking, but with men listening. Their first linguistic act is not speech but hermeneutic, the interpretation of the thunder's meaning" (1990:87). This view of linguistic interaction will be shown to be of particular interest to the Place of Negotiation theory.

It should be added that Vico's insistence on the importance of orality was motivated, in part, by the political situation in which Vico found himself. Oral performance dominated the culture of Vico's Naples, but that culture was under attack from the intellectual forces of the Enlightenment. He was thrown into the controversies over reform of the university and the legal system which suggested the shift of importance from orality to written text.

In *New Science*, his 1725 work, Vico's idea of *sensus communis* develops into an epistemological principle that relates language to cultural development. In *New Science*, *sensus communis* is not predicated upon an individual; rather, it refers to judgments (including unreflected judgments) shared by community. As Schaeffer (1990) puts it, *sensus communis* in *New Science* is "simply a practical judgment concerning needs and utilities around which a community has formed a consensus" (1990:84).

In opposition to the Cartesian desire for reaching truth, Vico's idea of truth is expressed in his concept of *verum-certum*. According to Vico, what is *verum*, true, is that which the human mind can know by itself, because the human mind can construct the truth by itself. But the world out there, what is outside the mind,



can only be known as being certain (*certum*). This is because the mind can only know an object as an object. Thus, physical nature can never be grasped as “true” because its structure and origin lie outside of the human mind. As for the world outside of one’s mind, in Vico’s view, only God, who created nature, can know it truly. Understanding language in use, then, requires the concept of *certum*.

To recognize the differences between certitude and truth is compatible with the interpretation of emotive meanings. Because flexibility is recognized in the concept of certitude, one can construct a theory of meaning accountable for the fluctuating polysemous nature of language. Meanings expressed by language are abundant, multiple, and sometimes even contradictory. Interpretive theories of meaning also follow the concept of *certum*. It is the certitude reached between speaker and partner, and not the truth, that is key to coming to terms with semantic interpretation.

The concept of certitude also allows for the approximation of meaning negotiated between partners. Obviously as in the case of metaphor and metonymy, but in many other linguistic signs as well, literal interpretation is hardly enough for accounting for the totality of meaning. Meaning of language is not monolithic; it is manifold and changing. The meaning exists only to the extent that it is negotiatively interpreted, within the boundaries of potential meanings of linguistic signs, to reach the possible level of approximation. *Sensus communis* allows multiple interpretations of meaning including *logos* and *pathos*; it legitimizes and is legitimized by the Knowledge of *Pathos*.

Overall, Vico’s *sensus communis* offers a humanistic holistic model. In his view, the speaker and partner are placed in a particular place and time, while language keeps them rooted in cultural heritage and in social community. Self, other, and language are placed in balance within this world. Note also that in oral speech, as advocated by Vico, *sensus communis* simultaneously provides invention, organization, and expressivity required for performance. This process involves the totality of self, of both mind and body. In terms of comprehension as well, the unreflected judgment of *sensus communis* involves more than decontextualized autonomous *logos*. It is a judgment involving all senses.

Although *sensus communis* is likely to be criticized by many, I, for one, agree with Schaeffer (1990) who recognizes its significance.

Vico reminds us that our civilization is built upon a *sensus communis* that is essentially oral, communal, and practical, and he challenges us to redraw the cultural history of the West from within its rhetorical tradition rather than from within the traditions of Greek philosophy or Enlightenment rationalism. (1990: 160)

The concept of *sensus communis* offers a foundation for understanding linguistic emotivity. *Sensus communis* provides psychological motivation for integrating meanings associated with the place of communication, both on individual and social

levels. Vico's prioritization of certitude over truth offers support for the interpretation of meanings based on negotiation. Vico's oral rhetoric supported by *sensus communis* also bears testimony to the prioritization of orality to writing. It reminds us that language is an action, an event, rather than an abstract static system.

Of particular significance of *sensus communis* is the recognition of the intuition of the speech community. Language is endorsed by the community and its culture, and this leads to the understanding of emotives as being endorsed in a community according to its cultural heritage. This relationship between *sensus communis* and culture suggests the hermeneutic potentials, but it also suffers from limitations. For, *sensus communis*, as a source of cultural identity, is likely to influence the process of the linguistic theory-building itself. I will discuss this issue under the term "linguistic ideologies" in Chapter 18. For now it is perhaps sufficient to mention that, despite expected criticism, the current work is designed to pursue the Knowledge of *Pathos*, with *sensus communis* at its foundation, for reaching the certitude of linguistic emotivity.

## CHAPTER 2

# Background

## Emotion, expressive function, and culture

### 1. Studies on language and emotion

Although historically, dominant linguistic theories have followed an ideology of *logos*, this historicity has not completely precluded an ideology of *pathos*. In fact studies addressing emotion and language, and those that touch upon *pathos*, have been published within linguistics and surrounding areas in the West and elsewhere. This chapter reviews some of these previous studies, with the intention of locating the concept of linguistic emotivity, the Place of Negotiation theory, and the Knowledge of *Pathos* in a historical perspective.

First, I review the relationship between language and emotion as conceived by Rousseau, by scholars of the Prague Linguistic Circle, by Bally in his exploration into linguistic stylistics, and by researchers in pragmatics. I also review studies on metaphor from the cognitive semantics perspective. Although the kind of study I pursue in this book is not in complete theoretical agreement with the cognitive approach, their view of linguistic meaning is something to be noted, and therefore, I briefly touch upon some representative works in and association with cognitive studies. Additionally, the relationship between emotivity and grammaticalization is briefly mentioned.

In Section 2.1, I review traditional Japanese studies. More than 200 years ago, Japanese language scholars of the *Edo* period (1603–1868 AD) approached language in a way radically different from modern Western linguists. In fact, to view language *as* emotion was rather common among Japanese language scholars, and aspects expressing linguistic *pathos* have consistently been considered precious and central to Japanese language studies. Through this review, we realize that steps toward the analysis of linguistic emotivity had been taken long ago by some *Edo* scholars. In addition, in Section 2.2, I briefly review representative works of contemporary Japanese linguistics. Scholars I review in this section, based on insight gained from syntactic and semantic studies of the Japanese language, have challenged linguistics of *logos* from within.

Section 3 expands the horizon to emotion discussed in the cultural context. Included are discussion on sociocultural dimensions of emotion, concepts of “affect,” and “involvement.” Finally in Section 4, a critical assessment of past studies is presented.

### 1.1 Rousseau and the origin of language

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is an important writer on the relationship between emotion and language. In *On the Origin of Language* (1966), Rousseau argues that language does not derive from people's primary needs (such as hunger and thirst), but derives from people's needs motivated by morality and passion. It was love, hatred, pity, and anger that drew the first words from human beings, Rousseau insists. It was the language of human passion, and not the language of instinctive desire, that human beings initially voiced.

Rousseau's example is illustrative. Imagine a situation where someone is in pain. This is fully known. But as one watches this afflicted person, one may not weep. Yet, Rousseau says, "give him time to tell you what he feels and soon you will burst into tears. It is solely in this way that the scenes of a tragedy produce their effect" (1966:8). As made clear in this statement, emotions are profoundly experienced when they are expressed in and through language. Language is essential for feeling.

Naturally, not all linguistic expressions express the speaker's emotion straightforwardly. This is evident when one considers that linguistic emotivity often involves strategies specifically used to persuade the partner. But, Rousseau was convinced that passion was inherent, and indeed fundamental, to language. He intuitively sensed the significance of emotion in language. Thus, as controversial as Rousseau's treatise on the origin of language was, well before the development of modern Western linguistics, language was conceived as an emotional experience, rather than as a system of *logos*.

In Rousseau's view, language of desire is used in social conflict, but language of passion is used for interpersonal empathy, and it encourages the commonality of passion among its people. Language that pursues emotional involvement with others is expressive, figurative, as well as poetic, and it contrasts with the language of *logos*. Moreover, Rousseau takes the position that the language of *logos* has derived from the language of passion. This point is emphasized particularly in Chapter 2 of *On the Origin of Language* when Rousseau states that "(O)ne does not begin by reasoning, but by feeling" (1966:11). Against another theory of the origin of language (which advocates that human beings invented speech to express their primary needs), he insists that such a view remains untenable. Rousseau viewed the origin of language as being, in essence, emotive expressivity. The ordinary language is a figurative language based on this language of passion, and language of *logos* has emerged as a result of its expansion. In retrospect, despite the dominance of rationality in academia, language's emotivity has been recognized within the Western scholarship, one of the most powerful (if not controversial) being the position taken by Rousseau in the 18th century.

## 1.2 The Prague Linguistic Circle

Turning to linguistics per se, perhaps linguists most keenly aware of the linguistic emotivity were scholars associated with the Prague Linguistic Circle. Among them are Jakobson (1960) and Bühler (Innis 1982), who introduced poetic and expressive functions of language. Limiting our discussion to the central tenet of the Prague Linguistic Circle, let me start with the view of its founder, Mathesius.

The philosophical foundation of the Prague Linguistic Circle is stated in the lecture Mathesius gave in 1929. Significant to our discussion is Mathesius' emphasis on the functional principle which prioritizes function over form. In his words:

Whereas earlier linguistics, which primarily relied on the interpretation of texts, started from ready-made language structures and inquired about their meaning, thus proceeding from form to function, the new linguistics, relying on its experience with present-day language, starts from the needs of expression and inquires what means serve to satisfy these communication needs in the language being studied. It thus proceeds from function to form. (Mathesius 1983 [1929]:123)

The idea that language responds to needs is significant in that the language user is brought to the fore. Language does not consist of ready-made forms; rather, our linguistic experience involves experiencing language as “linguaging.” The motive of the speaker is critical for understanding the form itself. For Mathesius, language is “something living” (1983 [1929]:122) and underneath the words, lies the speaker or writer whose communicative intentions are expressed in language. In addition, Mathesius reminds us that in most cases “words are aimed at a hearer or reader” (1983 [1929]:123), advocating the importance of the recipient side of language in communicative interaction.

As indicative of the phrase “needs of expression” appearing in the citation above, the Prague School functionalism does not ignore the speaker (or the partner) in its theory-building. This is because language per se does not possess function, but rather, function arises because the language users (or, more accurately, communication participants) have functional needs. This paradigmatic shift, from language-as-form to language-as-function, presupposes a speaker and partner, and their expressive intentions. And in this understanding, linguistic emotivity is naturally understood as a part of the communicative needs. Within this paradigm, the speaker is no longer the thinking subject of *cogito*, but rather, a person who speaks, talks, participates, interacts, and above all, *feels*, in communication.

Following Mathesius, Trnka (1983 [1948]) advocates the view that language is best understood as “language experience.” Citing Bally's work which is in basic agreement with the tenet of “language experience,” Trnka laments that Bally concentrated on the emotional aspect of language only. In the Prague School,

Trnka insists, the concept of language experience has a broader meaning, “because it includes the experiencing not only of affective but also of intellectual elements of language” (1983 [1948]:226).

Trnka (1983 [1948]) continues. For Prague School scholars, it is important to combine both the system of language and the language experience. Because these are mutually related, “language lacking experience would be no more than an unchanging system of relations with no possibilities of development” and, on the other hand, “without the values of logical order, language would only be equal to an accumulation of unanalyzable phonic utterances” (1983 [1948]:227).

Trnka’s position indeed resonates with the theses of the Prague Linguistic Circle presented to the First Congress of Slavists held in Prague in 1929. Under the section titled “problems of research into languages of different functions, especially Slavic,” we find the following statement.

Features important for the characterization of language are the intellectuality and the emotionality of language manifestations. Both these features either interpenetrate each other or one of them prevails over the other. (Vachek and Dušková 1983:88)

As if predicting the formal linguistics that was to prosper in North America in the latter half of the 20th century, Trnka, along with Prague School linguists, insisted on the kind of linguistics that incorporates both *logos* and *pathos*. Such a creative desire, however, has not materialized so far, and extensive analyses of broad-based data from the Praguean perspective remain unavailable.

As a representative of the contemporary Prague Linguistics Circle, Daneš brings to the fore the issue of language and emotion. Daneš (1987) advocates the interactive approach to emotion expressed in discourse, and states that the study of emotion in communication must include the speaker and the hearer as well as the situation. And at least initially, the researcher must take into account all the various means by which emotions are manifested. Most significantly, Daneš maintains that we must “abandon the traditional notion of ‘emotional neutrality’ and assume that any utterance and higher discourse unit has an emotional value” (1987:169).

Inheriting Trnka’s and the Prague School’s idea of language experience, or more explicitly, the concept of living in one’s language, Daneš points out that emotion is the most typical and natural manifestation of people’s involvement with language. For Daneš, emotion (including feeling and affect) is something constantly experienced. And “the essential character of human experience is *affective involvement* with the object being experienced” (1994:256, original emphasis). Daneš emphasizes that we are constantly experiencing affective involvement toward the object of our cognitive intentionality. This is because feelings provide information about the things we are confronted with.

Following Daneš' view on language and emotion, I take the position that language and emotion are inseparable. Although one may associate linguistic emotivity directly with intonation and other emphatic features, in reality, language in general is imbued with emotion. Indeed, no expression in language is totally void of emotive meaning. Let me borrow Daneš' words:

Emotion, however, does not constitute a level or layer (. . .), but an aspect — and a substantial and omnipresent one — of the message conveyed by an utterance. It is a specific aspect of the overall linguistic behavior of speech participants, that permeates the whole discourse, which is thus 'imbued' with it. And it belongs to the specificity of emotion that it is experiential and 'interactional', rather than 'communicative'. (Daneš 1994:262)

Because of this understanding of the emotive meaning, Daneš (1987, 1994) opposes attributing emotion to markedness only. If we associate emotion with marked expressions only, then we must conclude that expressions without markedness bear no emotive meaning. And this, Daneš opposes. All expressions are emotive in one way or another. Pointing out that our brain functions as a hybrid mechanism with both digital and analog coding, Daneš (1994:257) insists that emotion is a matter of degree. Emotion is omnipresent, although in different shades and colors, sometimes spontaneous, and at other times, strategic.

Theoretical positions taken by the Prague Linguistic Circle remind us that language is something that responds to the needs of its users, including the emotional need. Language realizes the need of the person who thinks, talks, participates, interacts, and always experiences emotion and feelings. I find in the works of the Prague Linguistic Circle one of the earliest theoretical elucidations concerning linguistic emotivity. Their theoretical position is in agreement with that of the Knowledge of *Pathos*. As a specific study of linguistic emotivity, I will later examine Volek's (1987) work, which falls into the Prague School functionalism.

### 1.3 Stylistics

One of the disciplines that has contributed to the understanding of the emotive aspect of language is stylistics, or linguistic stylistics. Bally, known as one of the editors of de Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*, singlehandedly developed this field. Although Bally was a student of de Saussure, his theoretical position was not in total agreement with his teacher, as made evident below.

Bally was unsatisfied with the Prague School functionalism which advocated the linguistic sign's multi-functions. Instead, he proposed *dictum* and *modus*, the two levels of functions, the latter of which is his (and my) primary concern. *Modus* expresses the speaker's attitude toward *dictum*, and Bally was drawn to it, as evidenced by Bally's characterization of *modus* as *l'âme de la phrase*.

Simply put, Bally insisted that language and life are mutually dependent, and both require more than *logos*. Bally phrases this as “(I)f language is not a logical creation, it is due to the fact that life, whose expression it represents, does not simply produce pure thoughts” (1965 [1925]:15, based on Hübler [1998]:5). Bally continues:

Those thoughts which sprout in the fullness of life are never of an essentially intellectual make-up: they are movements accompanied by emotions which sometimes lead me to and sometimes detain me from actions: they are releases or contractions of desires, volitions, vital impulses. Admittedly, it is only through my intellect that I become aware of these multifarious movements, yet it does not represent the essence but is only the vehicle, the stage director, and the mechanic. (Bally 1965 [1925]:15–16, based on Hübler [1998]:6)

Accordingly, Bally makes the distinction between *mode vécu* (the affective mode) and *mode pur* (the intellectual mode). *Mode vécu* refers to the performative mode involving the whole person with all his or her senses and feelings, while *mode pur* refers to the analytic mode of description. In expressing the speaker’s emotional attitude, *mode pur* offers its description, producing a report of one’s inner sensations, as in *I am getting mad*. *Mode vécu*, on the other hand, enacts a live performance of the sensation, as in *Damn it!* In the *mode vécu* performance, one senses personal authenticity. Bally treated *mode vécu* and *mode pur* as complementary. This is because the emotivity of *mode vécu* is foregrounded in the context of *mode pur*, and vice versa. Consequently, it is critical to understand that language provides both means.

Bally was also concerned with individual versus social aspects of language. Unlike de Saussure who separated *langue* and *parole*, Bally took the position that real-life language involves both *langue* and *parole* simultaneously. In communication, one desires to express individual subjective feelings, and yet the communication must be achieved by socially accepted means. Language functions as a sort of go-between, adjusting the two contradicting forces, i.e., one toward individualization, and the other, toward socialization. Bally could not rest easy by analyzing *langue* only, and conducted textual analysis focusing primarily on various affective functions. For Bally, linguistic stylistics is the discipline concerned with “the expressive facts of language from the viewpoint of their affective content, in other words, the expression of feelings through language and the action of language on feelings” (based on Caffi and Janney 1994b:333).

According to Caffi and Janney (1994b), Bally distinguishes between two types of expressive processes, i.e., direct and indirect. Direct processes involve lexical choices, and indirect processes involve prosodic and syntactic choices that go beyond single words. It is significant that Bally recognizes emotivity in grammar and beyond. In fact, Bally’s stylistics includes different types of dislocation,



including that of the thematic progression of texts often analyzed in the Prague School functionalism (Functional Sentence Perspective, in particular).

#### 1.4 Pragmatics

Pragmatics is another area of language studies that has demonstrated interest in the elucidation of linguistic emotivity. No established pragmatics theory for emotivity, however, is available at this point. It is fair to say that linguistic emotivity is yet to be established as the main area of pragmatics research. This is evident in Verschueren's (1999) overview of pragmatics which lists expressive function along with other functions of language. Emotion is mentioned only in passing, and no substantial discussion is offered. Let me follow Caffi and Janney (1994a, 1994b) for an overview of pragmatics of emotive communication, while paying attention to the problems and themes they suggest for future research.

The first issue is theoretical. How is emotive meaning identified? What is the basis for emotivity? If we consider markedness as a feature of emotivity, what happens in the case of unmarked, neutral form (if such a form exists)? Assuming that the recognition of emotive markedness involves certain norms and expected schemata, Caffi and Janney (1994b) list the following anticipatory schema that potentially involves the marking of emotive contrasts.

Linguistic anticipatory schemata offer guidelines as to what are normally expected in language behavior. For example, if we assume that a syntactic question requires a rising intonation, a question with a falling intonation represents a divergence, with implications for emotive meaning. Contextual anticipatory schemata refer to expected global and situational assumptions. For example, if parents usually call their children by their first name (e.g., *Johny, stop that!*), when a parent does not (*John James Smith, stop that!*), this generates notice. In such a case, some emotional motivations are presumed. Cotextual anticipatory schemata handle cases where there are expectations about types or successions of verbal and/or nonverbal activities that are likely to occur in particular stretches of discourse. For example, against a background of formal speech, informal speech demonstrates a contrast, and therefore an emotive reading is expected.

Also to be noted is that emotivity-based contrasts are analogic phenomena, characterized in terms of more or less, and require the appreciation of gradation. Caffi and Janney (1994b:354) take the position that it is possible to conceive of potential ranges of emotive choices as existing on the more/less scale. In concrete terms, Caffi and Janney (1994b) list a variety of devices that are expected to carry emotive meaning. They include devices of evaluation, proximity, specificity, eventuality, volitionality, and quantity.

Additional fundamental problematics in the pragmatics of emotive interaction involve analytical approaches. For example, one may view emotive communica-

tion as a process, while another may view it as an interactive achievement. Caffi and Janney (1994b) seem to advocate the latter view. To view emotive communication as an interactional achievement is consistent with theoretical positions advocated by scholars in interactional sociolinguistics, and this has been and is my position as well. Particularly noteworthy is Caffi and Janney's characterization of the interactional view when they state that this latter view is dialogical, and the "significance of emotive signals is regarded as a matter of negotiation between the participants" (1994b:358). This language-as-interactional-achievement position takes a dynamic view, in contrast with the language-as-product position which maintains a static view. If a researcher views emotive communication essentially as a product, then he or she observes the product in the ⟨I-it⟩ relationship. Discourse, text, and interaction are viewed as static product available for analysis. Recall that linguistic stylistics, in principle, assumes this theoretical position, and analyzes written texts exclusively. If a researcher views emotive communication essentially as an interactional achievement, he or she must pay attention to the intersubjective ⟨I-you⟩ relationship, which necessitates a philosophical position such as the Place of Negotiation theory.

Other problematics raised by Caffi and Janney (1994b) regarding pragmatics of emotive communication include the issue of identifying and prioritizing certain units of analysis (e.g., utterance, speech-act, turn, stretch of discourse, text, and so forth) as well as certain loci of analysis (i.e., speaker, addressee, content, discourse management). As pointed out earlier, although these problematics are presented, no overall theoretical solution is offered. In the course of this book, through introduction of the Place of Negotiation theory, and in the process of analyses, I address some of the issues raised by Caffi and Janney (1994a, 1994b).

## 1.5 Cognitive semantics

The approach to linguistic emotivity in cognitive linguistics, with special regard to the study on metaphor, is best characterized as a study of *mode pur*. Among works in cognitive semantics (e.g., Kövecses 1990, 1995; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987), let me focus on Kövecses (1995) because it includes the discussion of the anger metaphor in Japanese. Kövecses (1995) focuses on the "hot fluid in a container" metaphor of anger, and tests its applicability to Chinese, Japanese, and Hungarian. As for Japanese data and interpretation, he mainly relies on Matsuki's (1989) analysis of *ikari*. Citing examples such as *Ikari ga karadajuu ni juuman shita* 'My body was filled with anger', *Kare wa ikari o buchimaketa* 'He exposed/expressed/showed his anger', and *Ikari o uchi ni himeru* 'I contained my anger' (Kövecses 1995:119), Kövecses argues that indeed the "container" metaphor is not only useful for conceptualizing Japanese anger but also it captures a great number of aspects and properties associated with anger.

For example, the container metaphor allows us to conceptualize intensity (*filled with*), control (*contain*), loss of control (*could not keep inside*), dangerousness (*brim with*), and its expression (*express/show*) associated with anger. Kövecses proposes to understand anger in four cultures (English, Chinese, Japanese, and Hungarian) as a process of five stages: cause → anger → attempt at control → loss of control → expression (1995:132). Cultural differences seem to exist, however, in the kinds of causes and different expression stages. In Japanese, the metaphor also takes on an added characteristic that a (hot) fluid is located primarily in the stomach/bowels area (*hara*), and this “*hara* as container” metaphor only marginally implies a pressurized container. The *hara* metaphor has an elaborate control aspect. For example, an increase in the intensity of anger is indicated by *hara* rising, the chest (*mune*) getting filled with anger, and eventually anger reaching the head (*atama*). Kövecses (1995) also mentions that in the discussion of Japanese *ikari*, a suggestion is made that the Japanese model (possibly the more traditional kind) gives the angry person more chance to exercise control over anger than the Western model does.

All these observations add to our understanding of Japanese emotivity. However, cognitivists’ approach to emotivity aims to understand human cognitive processes by way of descriptive linguistic signs. It does not directly address the theme of this volume, that is, an inquiry into how one *expresses* and interprets linguistic emotivity. The significance of cognitive semantics to the current work lies in the expansion of the semantic possibility, specifically to the emotive richness of metaphor and metonymy. However, I must point out that their approach to expressivity fails to take into full account the interactionality and the situationality of communication. Language is analyzed as being apart from the partner, and their approach essentially sustains the ⟨I-it⟩ relationship. And as a result, although different from formal linguistics per se, in many cases language is analyzed as object, giving the impression that their approaches generally fall into the linguistics of *logos*.

Another approach to Japanese emotive vocabulary should be mentioned here. Wierzbicka’s work does not directly fall into cognitive semantics, but, among her works (e.g., 1991, 1997), study on (Japanese) key words, in particular, shows some methodological resemblance to the cognitivist approach. For example, Wierzbicka (1997) uses semantic primitives to account for semantic similarities and differences among cultural key words across languages, including Japanese.

One of the key concepts within Japanese culture is *amae* ‘dependence, indulgence’. *Amae*, since its inception by Doi (1971), has been known to pose problems in its translation into other languages, into English, in particular. Faced with this notoriously problematic task, Wierzbicka defines *amae* in the following terms.

- (a) X thinks something like this about someone (Y):
  - I know:
  - (b) when Y thinks about me, Y feels something good
  - (c) Y wants to do good things for me
  - (d) Y can do good things for me
  - (e) when I am with Y nothing bad can happen to me
  - (f) I don't have to do anything because of this
  - (g) I want to be with Y
- (h) X feels something good because of this (Wierzbicka 1997:241)

It is true that circular definitions found in ordinary dictionaries fail to truly “define” words. Failing to explicate complex and obscure meanings in terms of simple and self-explanatory ways, too often dictionary definitions are more obscure than the word being defined. As Wierzbicka (1997) advocates, semantic primes can avoid this circularity. However, again, as in the case of cognitive semantics, Wierzbicka’s study is that of *mode pur* (words describing emotions), and not of *mode vécu* (direct performatory expression of emotions).

Other studies on expressive functions of language associated with cognitive semantics include Drescher (1997), Foolen (1997), Günthner (1997), and Werth (1998). Studies discussing Japanese data are also available, for example, Hasada (1998), McVeigh (1996), and Travis (1998). Approaches mentioned above are encouraging, particularly because they go beyond a proposition-based semantic interpretation, and thus, open up possibilities of interpreting different dimensions of grammatical meanings on a broader spectrum.

## 1.6 Grammaticalization

The issue of language and emotion has emerged in the context of another theoretical development in linguistics, that is, in association with the theory of grammaticalization as advanced by Traugott (1982, 1989). The grammaticalization theory attempts to establish a diachronic process that grammatical elements often evolve from lexical sources, and semantically shift from propositional to textual, and then to attitudinal meanings. Linguistic devices become more personal; in theoretical terms, the language change goes through the process of subjectification. The study that substantiates this view, for example, is Hübler’s (1998) study on English expressivity. Hübler (1998) examines six grammatical phenomena in English (possessive dative, ethic dative, expanded form, present perfect, periphrastic *do*, and the *get*-passive) through Old, Middle, and Modern English, and concludes that the indexicalness of a single grammatical device could be shown to undergo the grammaticalization process identified by Traugott. Although the unidirectionality of the development cannot account for every case, and therefore, a more

flexible view is required, Hübler (1998) reports that generally the development from propositional meaning to attitudinal/emotive meaning is recognized.

As for the Japanese grammaticalization phenomenon, Onodera's study (1993) substantiates Traugott's grammaticalization process. Onodera (1993), based on the analysis of the Japanese language spanning over 1,200 years, explores the pragmatic change that conjunctions (*demo* and *dakedo*) and interjections (*ne* and its variants) underwent. Onodera observes that functional and semantic changes in these forms roughly follow the direction from ideational, to textual, and to more expressive. This confirms Traugott's (1982, 1989) hypothesis on semantic change, i.e., less to more personal. Onodera (2000) states that *demo* type connectives (including *dakedo*, *dakara*, *datte*, *dewa*, and *de*) underwent both grammaticalization and pragmatization, while *na*-elements (a group of interjections) underwent pragmatization (independent of grammaticalization). In both cases, contemporary use of these markers has taken on increased varieties of expressive functions. For example, *demo* as a conjunction functions for (1) point-making, (2) claiming the floor, (3) opening the conversation, and (4) changing the topic/subtopic. The historical shift toward increased varieties of expressive functions provides support to the argument that linguistic emotivity is an important element for understanding language and its change.

The historical shift Onodera (1993, 1995, 2000) observes does not imply that language as a whole is shifting from less to more personal or expressive. In fact, the decline of Japanese *kakarimusubi* 'particle/adverb-predicate correspondence' after the *Heian* period (794–1192 AD) bears testimony to the fact that emotivity, at least the kind expressed by *kakarimusubi*, has severely declined. *Kakarimusubi* which prospered during the *Heian* period, and gradually declined since the *Kamakura* period (1192–1333 AD), are practically extinct today. One may interpret this phenomenon as a shift toward the less expressive. Furthermore, the opposite direction of language shift, i.e., from attitudinal to propositional meanings, has been suggested for Japanese. For example, Yamaguchi (1990:129) points out that Japanese interrogatives have gradually shifted from more emotional to less emotional. Yamaguchi's position is based on the advancement of certain emotive interrogative particles and the consequent rise of the less emotive question marker *ka*. Yamaguchi's point does not directly address the semantic or pragmatic shift of an identical device, but rather, use and disuse of related devices.

These observations do not necessarily contradict Onodera's findings, which are based on the grammaticalization and pragmatization processes of a set category of Japanese words. The above observations only illustrate that emotivity in language undergoes multidirectional changes. Different devices and strategies may fill the void, and those devices themselves may undergo shifts from less personal to more personal. My speculation is that different aspects and levels of language may shift toward different, or even opposing, directions, so that they

compensate among themselves. Through time, different needs are met in different ways. Although the current study does not address the issue of grammaticalization or pragmatization, its significance to the understanding of emotivity is noted.

## 2. Emotion in the Japanese language

### 2.1 Traditional Japanese studies: Language *as* emotion

So far we have concentrated on Western theories and views on language and emotion. We now shift our attention to Japanese language studies. Partly because traditional Japanese language studies are mostly available only in Japanese, the significance of their studies has been consistently slighted in linguistics and related fields outside Japan.

It is fair to say that serious Japanese language studies started during the *Edo* period (1603–1868 AD). *Edo* scholars, however, were not directly interested in constructing a theory of language, nor offering a systematic analysis of the Japanese language structure. Their concerns were more immediate, i.e., how to compose and how to appreciate great *waka* (a 31-mora poem). In short, they approached language studies from expressive and interpretive perspectives, and not necessarily on the basis of theoretical interest. Two scholars should be mentioned in relation to linguistic emotivity, Nariakira Fujitani (1738–1779) and Akira Suzuki (1764–1837).

Fujitani is known for his *Kazashi-shoo* (1934 [1767]) and *Ayui-shoo* (1960 [1778]). In the *oomune* ‘summation’ section of *Ayui-shoo*, Fujitani divides Japanese words into four basic categories, *na*, *kazashi*, *yosoi*, and *ayui*, which he defines as the following.

1. *na* ‘nouns’ identify objects;
2. *kazashi* ‘pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, exclamations, affixes’ assist other parts of speech;
3. *yosoi* ‘verbs’ and ‘adjectives’ describe objects;
4. *ayui* ‘auxiliary verbs, particles, suffixes’ assist other parts of speech.

As is widely known, a literal translation of the last three terms reveals Fujitani’s intention to associate his categorization with the linear order of Japanese expressions; *kazashi* means head decoration (appearing at the beginning), *yosoi*, clothing (often the middle part of the sentence), and *ayui*, the footwear (appearing at the end of the sentence).

According to Nakada and Takeoka (1960), Fujitani essentially understood language as follows. When viewing language from expressive and interpretive perspectives, the most important aspect is how socially conventionalized words

and grammar are creatively used by each individual. This is because conventionalized patterns of language restrict individual expressivity. In fact language exists at a precarious balance between this conventionalized restrictive force and individual creative desire. Fujitani identified the abstract level of language as *yuu* ‘ghost/phantom’ and the actual individually-enacted expressive level as *arawashi* ‘appearance/manifestation’, and found the relationship between the two critically important.

The language realized by an individual involves a number of aspects; (1) speaker’s intention, (2) speaker’s interaction with a partner, (3) situation where the interaction takes place, (4) materials related to expression, and (5) individual particularities. Just as the patterns of classic *Noh* performances and *Kabuki* plays thrive on individual creativity by mastering and transcending rigid traditional patterns, language consists of *yuu* as a convention, and *arawashi* as creation. Fujitani was keenly aware of the language’s creative possibility, which inevitably expresses personal emotivity.

Perhaps I should cite some examples here. On the abstract level, an event may be referred to as *Hana ga saku* ‘Flowers bloom’, but when it is actually used as a part of an interaction, the expression becomes individualized, situated, and particularized, resulting in expressions such as *A, hana!* ‘Oh, flowers’, *Saita!* ‘Bloomed!’, *Saita yo, hana ga* ‘In bloom, aren’t they, those flowers’. The variability observed here results from sociolinguistic factors, individual intention and style, as well as genre distinction, and most significantly, in association with different types and intensities of linguistic emotivity. Variability also results from different kinds and degrees of human emotions. These differences are expressed in Japanese by *kazashi*, *yosoi*, and *ayui*, as well as the lexical correspondence within sentence (which Fujitani called *uchiai* ‘echoing’).

With this fundamental view toward language, Fujitani concentrated on the study of *kazashi* and *ayui*. Of importance is that Fujitani knew the poetic significance of *ayui* and *kazashi*. Given that *waka* is imbued with deep emotion and sentiment, it seems natural that Fujitani finds *ayui* and *kazashi* most critical. *Ayui-shoo* lists 164 particles, auxiliary verbs, and suffixes, which are divided into 50 types. These 50 types are further categorized into five, and then finally into two basic groups. For example, one of the basic groups, *ayui* that immediately follows nouns, is the *zo*-family. Within this *zo*-family, particles *so*, *koso*, and *koso wa* are included. These categories are differentiated not by concrete words but by abstract semantic and emotive meanings. Notably, Fujitani has little to say about the informational meaning the language conveys. Instead, he chose poetics of *pathos* as his central concern. We witness here that the study of linguistic emotivity had existed in Japan at the early dawn of Japanese language studies.

Prominent among emotive devices Fujitani paid attention to is *uchiai* ‘echoing’. *Uchiai* refers to the echo effect among different words within a sentence. When

interpreting *waka*, a mere understanding of each word is insufficient. One must grasp the larger framework within which one word echoes with another, creating a resonance that reverberates throughout the *waka*. This echo effect is achieved as a result of two or more corresponding words functioning in combination.

Curiously, Fujitani (Nakada and Takeoka 1960) mentions cases where the rules of *uchiai* are violated. In such cases, there are two recognizable types, i.e., *nabikizume* and *kakusu uchiai*. *Nabikizume* refers to cases where the *zo* corresponding predicate is absent. When this occurs, the poet “cast one’s exclamation out there with one’s heart along with it” (*kokoro o fukumete nagame-sutsuru*) (Nakada and Takeoka 1960:97). In such cases, often, *koto yo*, *koto kana*, or *mono o* (all of these are combinations of nominalization and particle) follow. Fujitani’s above explanation, i.e., cast one’s exclamation out there with one’s heart along with it, is of particular significance to Japanese emotivity, but for now it suffices to say that Fujitani did not ignore the emotivity of language; in fact, he treasured it. To cite Fujitani:

As I will explain in each chapter of this book, *uchiai* is regulated by a particular type of corresponding *ayui*. However, two additional types of *uchiai* exist that should be explained separately. First is *nabikizume*, and the second, *kakusu uchiai*. *Nabikizume* refers to the use of pre-nominal forms of adjectives and *ayui* when they are not accompanied by corresponding particles or other corresponding *kazashi* and *ayui*. This happens when one admiringly exclaims with pre-nominal forms (rather than ending the sentence with usual verb endings). Such a case should be interpreted by adding phrases that express exclamation such as “how . . .” “what a . . .” and “I wish . . .” ( . . . ) *Kakusu uchiai* occurs when one avoids using corresponding sentence-final particles. In this case the *uchiai* is suggested by the accompanying original poem or poetry citation, or by the *kakekotoba* ‘punning phrase’ which hides the corresponding *ayui*.<sup>1</sup> (Nakada and Takeoka 1960:97–8, my translation)

The concept of *uchiai* is similar to *kakarimusubi* ‘particle/adverb-predicate correspondence’. *Uchiai*, however, covers a broader spectrum of phenomena than *kakarimusubi*. In essence, *uchiai* is an expression of personal feelings and emotion that cannot be fully explained by a mere compilation of word meanings.

Fujitani’s work was further advanced by students of Norinaga Motoori, such as Haruniwa Motoori and Akira Suzuki. And it was Akira Suzuki who immortalized the emotional aspect of the Japanese language by the phrase *kokoro no koe* ‘voices from the heart’. In his *Gengyo Shishuron* (1979 [1824]), Suzuki introduces the classification of four word categories; *tai no shi* ‘nominals,’ *arikata no shi* ‘adjectivals,’ *shiwaza no shi* ‘verbals,’ and *te-ni-o-ha* ‘*te-ni-o-ha* particles’. Suzuki groups the first three into one large category, i.e., *shi* ‘referential words,’ and deems *te-ni-o-ha* to be an opposing category.

One may rightfully criticize Suzuki for being overly zealous about the concept of “voices from the heart.” For, Suzuki’s characterization in *Gengyo Shishuron*



includes the alleged superiority of the Japanese language, in comparison to languages of other countries (particularly China which has served as the Other to many *Edo* period scholars). He glorified the Japanese language's refined features, particularly, the voices from the heart, and one cannot escape from the impression that Suzuki seems to have engaged in celebrating the "uniqueness" of the Japanese language.

Suzuki delineates the contrasting characteristics between *shi* versus *te-ni-o-ha* as follows:

*Sanshu no shi* 'three types of referential words':

1. They have referential function;
2. These are referential words;
3. They refer to objects and thus become referential words;
4. They are like precious beads;
5. They are like containers;
6. They fail to operate (function) without *te-ni-o-ha*.

*Te-ni-o-ha*:

1. They have no referential function;
2. They represent voice;
3. They are voices from the heart and are attached to *shi*;
4. They are like strings that connect precious beads;
5. They are like hands that use or operate the containers;
6. Without *shi*, they have nothing to be attached to.

Suzuki (1979 [1824]:23–4) summarizes that the voices of *te-ni-o-ha* distinguish and express states of one's heart, and nominals and other words distinguish objects and describe them.

There is no other term in the history of Japanese language studies that proclaims the importance of emotivity as strongly as Suzuki's "voices from the heart." This expression implies many things; orality, speakerhood, particularity, linguistic action, situatedness, and above all, expressivity and emotivity. It is true that the phrase "voices from the heart" is metaphorical and somewhat unclear, and, as I point out shortly, has indeed been criticized for this reason (e.g., Yamada 1908). However, together with Fujitani, Suzuki recognizes the importance of language's emotivity, the emotive voices from the heart. "Voices from the heart" resonates with Bally's (1965 [1925]) term *l'âme de la phrase*, with which he captured the essence of *modus*.

Another interesting point found in *Gengyo Shishuron* is Suzuki's treatment of the origin of language. Toward the end of *Gengyo Shishuron*, we find a section titled "the origin of language or how four types of words were created." He explains as follows. We hear voices in the heart that express human emotion, and

these voices are the origin of *te-ni-o-ha*. *Te-ni-o-ha* is the essential spirit of *shi*, and by using this *shi*, people named things, which resulted in the creation of nouns. When nouns were connected like a strand of beads, two types of words were created, and this resulted in adjectives and verbs. If one traces the history of all words, one reaches two kinds of voices, that of *te-ni-o-ha* and that of nouns. The voice of *te-ni-o-ha* expresses “by dividing and presenting the states of one’s heart” (*waga kokoro no sama o wakachi arawashi*), and the voice of nouns expresses “by dividing and presenting things and events” (*banbutsu no monogoto o wakachi arawasu*) (1979 [1824]:23–4). Similar to Rousseau, Suzuki thought that at the origin of language were the voices one hears from the heart, that is, the deep feelings (including passion). Similar to Rousseau who found language of passion as the origin of language, Suzuki understood emotional voices of *pathos* as the source for parts of speech. Indeed, Suzuki found the essence of the Japanese language in the voices from the heart, that is, the Japanese *pathos*.

When discussing language and emotion in Japanese, one cannot ignore Yoshio Yamada (1873–1958), a prominent Japanese language scholar of the *Meiji* (1868–1912 AD), *Taishoo* (1912–1926 AD), and *Shoowa* (1926–1989 AD) periods. His commitment to emotivity is symbolized by the term he introduces, i.e., *kantai no ku* ‘vocative–emotive phrase’. Yamada states that what he calls *bunpoogaku* ‘study of grammar’ is “a study of methods in which one expresses one’s thought and emotion” (*bunpoogaku wa ningen no shisoo kanjoo o gengo nite arawasu hoo hoo no kenkyuu*) (1936:888). Note that he explicitly includes emotion as something that language expresses, and considers emotion as a part of research concern. Interestingly, Yamada was attempting to distinguish linguistics from logic, and specifically states that “studies of grammar (i.e., linguistics) examines any and every phenonemon as long as it is expressed by language; it includes not only logical operation, but also emotion, desire, and imagination” (1936:890, my translation).<sup>2</sup> For Yamada, the thoughts expressed through language include knowledge/information as well as emotion and desire. For example, *Hana uru-washi* ‘The flower is beautiful’ expresses knowledge/information, *Hana uruwashiki kana* ‘The flower is indeed beautiful’ expresses emotion, and *Hana yo, uru-washikare* ‘Oh, the flower, be beautiful!’, the desire. It was this view of language which led Yamada to the recognition of the concept of *kantai no ku* ‘vocative–emotive phrase’.

Yamada divides his linguistics into a theory of words (*go*) and theory of phrases (*ku*). Phrases involve combination of elements, and therefore, they represent structural, central, and organizational phenomena. One fragment of thought hangs together by one base point, and this structural point is necessary for every thought. This is what Yamada calls *tookaku sayoo* ‘(lit.) operation of integrated senses’. The sentence is, according to Yamada, “the expression, via the linguistic form, of the thought organized through the operation of integrated