

THE LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONS

THE LANGUAGE OF EMOTIONS

CONCEPTUALIZATION, EXPRESSION,
AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Edited by

SUSANNE NIEMEIER

RENÉ DIRVEN

Gerhard Mercator University, Duisburg

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Table of Contents

Introduction	vii
<i>Susanne Niemeier</i>	
 I. Theoretical issues in the analysis of emotion	
Is the "psychologic" of trust universal?	3
<i>Jan Smedslund</i>	
The expressive function of language: Towards a cognitive semantic approach	15
<i>Ad Foolen</i>	
Toward a semiotic theory of affect	33
<i>John W. Oller, Jr. and Anne Wiltshire</i>	
Emotions as cause and the cause of emotions	55
<i>René Dirven</i>	
 II. The conceptualization of emotions in specific cultures	
Dholuo emotional language: An overview	87
<i>Lucia Omondi</i>	
The prepositions we use in the construal of emotions: Why do we say <i>fed up</i> <u>with</u> but <i>sick and tired</i> <u>of</u> ?	111
<i>Meredith Osmond</i>	
Space, reference, and emotional involvement	135
<i>Carlos Inchaurrealde</i>	
Surprise, surprise: The iconicity-conventionality scale of emotions	155
<i>Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky</i>	

III. Developmental approaches to emotions

The acquisition of verbal expressions for internal states in German: A descriptive, explorative, longitudinal study <i>Christina Kauschke and Gisela Klann-Delius</i>	173
On the usage of emotional language: A developmental view of the tip of an iceberg <i>Péter Bodor</i>	195
Emotion talk(s): The role of perspective in the construction of emotions <i>Michael Bamberg</i>	209
A response to Michael Bamberg <i>Anna Wierzbicka</i>	227

IV. Emotions in discourse

French interjections and their use in discourse <i>Martina Drescher</i>	233
The contextualization of affect in reported dialogues <i>Susanne Günthner</i>	247
Nonverbal expression of emotions in a business negotiation <i>Susanne Niemeier</i>	277
Emotions and emotional language in English and German new stories <i>Friedrich Ungerer</i>	307
Subject Index	329

Introduction

Susanne Niemeier
Gerhard Mercator University of Duisburg, Germany

1. The LAUD symposium on "The language of emotions"

The present volume is based mainly on contributions to the 21st LAUD symposium, which took place in Duisburg (Germany) on April 10-11, 1995. Further contributions on closely related topics have been invited, especially from scholars who were not able to attend the symposium. These papers are a welcome complementation to the selection of symposium contributions, since they especially deal with the language of emotions as studied in children or special groups.

The symposium was organized in honour of Anna Wierzbicka, the eminent linguist of the Australian National University at Canberra. Anna Wierzbicka had won the Alexander von Humboldt Prize in 1994, which she subsequently received in 1995. Therefore, she was invited to spend an academic year in Germany, affiliated to the Gerhard Mercator University in Duisburg. The symposium marked the date of her planned visit to her future work place, but for personal reasons she had to postpone her longer stay for another year. As her research project for that year was "Emotions across cultures", she suggested holding a small but very intensive symposium on emotionology. In the end, the symposium turned out to be a much bigger event than planned, which was due to the surprising number of scholars interested.

Due to the many contributions, the organizers decided to divide the proceedings up into two volumes: one volume along purely cognitive linguistic lines edited by A. Athanasiadou and E. Tabakowska (to appear), *Speaking of Emotions*, and one with a variety of theoretical and practical approaches, which constitutes the present volume, *The Language of Emotions*. It was not, however, our intention to present a global overview about emotions in language in general, but we preferred to concentrate on special fields of interest.

2. "Emotionology" as a thriving research domain

Undoubtedly, the domain of *human emotions* is most important for mankind, emotions being right in the center of our daily lives and interests. Nevertheless, this research domain, which is now increasingly referred to as *emotionology*, is a very controversial one because there hardly seem to be any objective methods of evaluating or comparing emotions intersubjectively or even interculturally. Therefore, the scientific status of emotionology tended to be criticized, especially among psychologists.

In the last two decades, however, the evaluation of *emotions* in scientific research has undergone a radical change. The domain of *emotions* has recently reappeared on the scene of scientific discussion and has been rehabilitated while becoming again one of the fashionable topics in separate or joint endeavours in psychology, philosophy, ethnology, sociology, and linguistics. The interdisciplinarity and new impetus in emotionology is mirrored in the increasing number of conferences, periodicals, journals, books, papers, etc. devoted to *emotions*. The present volume is in fact but one new step in this scientific quest and therefore finds itself in good company.

Anna Wierzbicka claimed in her contribution to the symposium that this renewed interest in emotionology is the result of the 1972 celebration of the 100th anniversary of Darwin's book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872). Researchers from the most diverse disciplines studied Darwin's theory of emotions and tried to evaluate his hypotheses. The interest was so big that it seemed like a self-propelling force, research spreading into different directions.

Nevertheless, very soon it became clear that the study of emotions could not be confined to only one of the above-mentioned disciplines because only in an interdisciplinary approach researchers could hope to arrive at results. Emotions are not solely based in anatomy or biology, nor can psychology alone explain their characteristic features or their effects upon others.

Emotions are of equal interest to other disciplines. In philosophy, a vital question is whether emotions can be accounted for as a separate faculty, or whether they are intrinsically interwoven with reason and logic. Sociology wants to find out about the role of emotions in our daily lives and even more fundamentally, about the way children develop concepts of emotions and the question of emotions as innate feelings or as social constructs. In ethnology, the questions are whether we can compare emotions cross-culturally and whether there is anything *universal* involved in emotions. And linguistics concentrates especially on the ways how emotions are differently *conceptualized* in various languages and cultures. These approaches to emotions have to interact and to generate new hypotheses and theories.

A key-role in the renewed scientific debate has been accorded to the study of the language of emotions. How can one discuss any scientific topic without defining exactly what one is talking about? How can one define the notion of *emotion* in general, and single *emotions* in particular? This orientation on *the language of emotions* is where Anna Wierzbicka's views may become very fruitful because she warns researchers to beware of ethnocentricity. In her opinion, it is not possible to say whether there are universal emotions, as claimed by the psychologist Ekman, because all concepts of emotions are culturally based. Thus, what an Englishman labels as "anger" is not exactly the same feeling as what an Italian means by "rabbia". Anna Wierzbicka tests her claims by using her natural semantic metalanguage, also known as NSM method: she uses a list of semantic primitives, occurring in every language world-wide, to describe the components of each language-specific emotion concept and to compare the different concepts of emotions. With this method she is able to demonstrate that researchers such as Ekman (e.g. 1990) or Osgood (1966) could never show the existence of "universal emotions" which were seen as inborn and genetically determined: they tested reactions of people from different cultures, but these tests were always administered on the basis of the terminology as found in the English language. Thus, they did not know whether they were testing the same "feeling" (*feeling* is a semantic primitive, whereas *emotion* is not) and their results are highly questionable. As several contributions to the present volume show, Wierzbicka's theory is beginning to find wider acclaim among researchers.

This development is clear evidence of the very important role the study of the language of emotions is to play in research on emotions. Even the expression *emotion* itself has to be closely scrutinized on the basis of analyses of different languages, and the same holds true for other basic psychological terms such as *mind*, *self*, *mood*, as well as the different "feelings" *per se* (cf. Lutz 1985, Wierzbicka 1993). There has so far not been sufficient research on cross-linguistic differences, and only on the basis of this kind of research can cognitive psychology as well as the psychology of emotions discover new dimensions in emotionology.

However, the "language of emotions" so far has not been examined systematically by linguists. Therefore, the desideratum of theoretically sound research of both the lexicon and the grammar of emotions from a single-language or a cross-linguistic perspective remains. The present volume offers a new approach to this overall goal insofar as it presents theories from very different perspectives which form in themselves pieces of a giant jigsaw puzzle that may eventually fit together nicely. Although many pieces may still be missing, we hope that readers may profit from the new insights and find stimuli for further research.

3. Structure of the volume

For the sake of internal coherence, the present volume has been divided into four sections:

- I. Theoretical issues in the analysis of emotions in language.
- II. The conceptualization of emotions in specific cultures.
- III. Developmental approaches to the language of emotions.
- IV. The language of emotions in discourse.

I. Theoretical issues in the analysis of emotions in language

The first section presents some theoretical approaches to emotion research which may build the foundation for other fields of study. Thus, before theories about emotions and about the language of emotions can be applied to diverse areas, we must know more about what the various concepts of emotion are in general, or how a particular emotion can be approached, understood, and analyzed. Furthermore, the role of emotions in everyday life and communication has to be related explicitly to their conceptualizations and to the folk-models they are based upon. (According to Wierzbicka, we should not even talk of *emotions* here because this is not a universal concept. But since the study of emotions and *emotionology* are such firmly established labels, we prefer - with Wierzbicka 1995 - to stick to them instead of creating new terminological problems.)

Such analytical issues are treated in the four contributions to the first section. The section starts with a question asked by Jan Smedslund, a psychologist from Oslo, Norway, who over the last years has developed a theory and terminology of his own called "psychologic". "Psychologic" is a formal language for psychology which is claimed to be quite close to Wierzbicka's natural semantic metalanguage (NSM). It has been developed to predict for example people's reactions. Here, it is used to test the universality of the concept of *interpersonal trust* for speakers of six unrelated languages (Arabic, Ewe, Norwegian, Tamil, Turkish, and Vietnamese). Smedslund describes how he used "psychologic" to find out if the concept of *trust* is translatable across the six languages under discussion and thus might claim the beginning of the status of a universal, and what degree of validity the "psychologic" derivations have in each language. Furthermore, Smedslund addresses the relationship between "psychologic" and NSM as well as their possible co-operation.

Ad Foolen (Nijmegen, Netherlands) then aims at an analysis of the expressive function of language. He is especially interested in the question

whether cognitive semantics can be used as a framework for an exploration of the expressive function of language. Starting with a historical overview of expressive semantics, Foolen proceeds to discuss research results from psychology which lead him to claim a basic distinction between cognition and emotion in the functioning of the human mind. Both domains can be shown to have their own channels and codes of communication. In this context, Foolen offers an analysis of the connection between expressive, cognitive, and epistemic meanings of language.

The contribution by John W. Oller and Anne Wiltshire (New Mexico, USA) uses semiotics as a theoretical basis to analyze the language of emotions. Oller & Wiltshire's theory of affect is grounded in Peircean logic. They propose to study the hypothesized role of affect in guiding the attention of the developing sign-user throughout child development, ordinary language acquisition, and discursive inference, and they claim that a comprehensive basis for this type of research can be found in the broader, logically deeper, and actually more detailed perspective offered by semiotics. Oller & Wiltshire's analysis is based on data from autistic children. The authors argue that the special relevance of autism is owed to the pervasive tendency across all its levels of severity toward social, and especially affective, isolation.

The contribution by René Dirven (Duisburg, Germany) is an attempt to understand aspects of the conceptualization of emotions by relating them to spatial conceptualizations. The author tries to find out how emotional causality is conceptualized by looking at English prepositional expressions denoting the interrelationship between emotions and causality. Dirven shows that the conceptualization of emotions as cause and of the cause of emotions in English is determined by the specific characteristics of the spatial concepts, and consequently that these spatial concepts organize to a large extent the way the domain of emotional causality is structured. His conclusion is that the conceptualization of emotional causality in English is largely determined by the way English has conceptualized space.

II. The conceptualization of emotions in specific cultures

The second section is devoted to the conceptualization of emotions in different cultures. Thus, it is no longer the question of concepts of emotions *per se*, but of their actual conceptualization in various languages. Different languages and cultures are being analyzed and compared with respect to their emotional expressivity, i.e. to the way they express emotions either directly or indirectly.

Although there are quite a few studies of emotional concepts in exotic

languages like the Philippine language Ifaluk (Lutz 1982) or the aboriginal language Yakunytjatjara (Goddard 1990), emotional understandings and misunderstandings in our immediate surroundings must not be forgotten, either. Therefore, also linguistically closely related languages like English, German, French, or Polish - to mention only a few - should be analyzed and tested for their way of expressing concepts of emotion and emotions. The results might help to explain cultural prejudices and/or clashes to a certain extent. One tends to be so deeply rooted in one's own culture that it is difficult to account for subtle differences in other cultures. The second section offers a selection of papers devoted to these problems from different perspectives, i.e. either aiming at analyzing emotional concepts in a specific language, or at a cross-cultural comparison.

The section begins with an overview of how emotion concepts are construed in the African language Dholuo. Lucia Omondi (Nairobi, Kenya) analyzes her mother tongue in order to find out how here emotions are expressed in images taken from everyday experiences such as for example contacts with animals and with the environment in general. She does not only refer to verbal communication but considers nonverbal elements as well. Omondi comes to the conclusion that nearly every aspect of a Dholuo utterance can be charged with emotional meaning.

Meredith Osmond (Canberra, Australia) is interested in another aspect of language construal, namely in the choice of prepositions in English used for the expression of emotions: why do we say *fed up with* but *sick and tired of*? She shows how these different construals of emotions in language come about and claims that the prepositions used in the construction *emotion + preposition* are meaningful. Unlike Dirven she is not interested in the spatial conceptualizations in which these prepositions are grounded but in the semantic differences involved. Osmond's contribution aims at identifying the underlying semantic conditions required by the eight prepositions most frequently used with emotions: *by*, *with*, *at*, *about*, *of*, *to*, *for*, and *over*. She demonstrates by her analysis that the conditions of usage of these eight prepositions are predictable.

Carlos Inchaurrealde (Zaragoza, Spain) looks at speakers' general emotional involvement in relation to different spatial situations as expressed in morphology. First, he analyzes emotional involvement concerning space regions and space dimensions as emotion activators and discusses this by looking at Spanish morphology, and especially at the Spanish diminutive. Then he goes on to syntax and analyzes interpersonal reference as reflected in a special use of the Spanish dative which indicates emotional involvement by means of the so-called *ethical dative* (as in *Me lo creo* [I believe it] instead of *Lo creo* [I believe]). Furthermore, he looks at temporal reference and its connection to realis/irrealis space and emotional activation, as well

as at the interaction between emotional involvement and lexical choice. He gets to the conclusion that emotional involvement in language is mainly due to our conception of space as divided into "good" and "bad" areas.

The section is closed by Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky (Vienna, Austria), who is looking at the language forms used in the conceptualization of a very particular emotion, i.e. "surprise". She analyzes expressions of "surprise" in three languages, namely English, Polish, and German, focussing on pragmatic particles, phrases, and entire sentences as well as on some less conventionalized forms. The linguistic means of expressing "surprise" as well as their conditions of use and the relevance of pragmatic factors such as politeness or directness are discussed in connection with expressions of unpleasant surprise. The results are then compared cross-linguistically. Subsequently, Kryk-Kastovsky develops a scale ranging from iconicity to conventionality with which these expressions of emotion can be judged in order to show their degree of conventionalization as well as cross-linguistic differences in conceptualization.

III. Developmental approaches to the language of emotions

The third section takes a different inroad into the language of emotions. It looks into different theories of how children acquire this complex kind of language. If we cannot prove that emotions are universal, we cannot claim that they are genetically based and innate. But how then do children develop emotions? How and when do they learn to talk about their feelings? How do they acquire the social norms concerning emotion talk? These and related questions are dealt with in approaches differing strongly by the theoretical assumptions underlying them, but which nevertheless all constitute some evidence that the acquisition of the language of emotions is a social achievement that simultaneously determines our experience of these emotions.

Gisela Klann-Delius (Berlin, Germany) and Christina Kauschke (Potsdam, Germany) have undertaken a longitudinal study in which they closely followed the acquisition of verbal expressions for internal states in German. Their study is a follow-up of different studies undertaken in America, analyzing the capacity of 20-month-old children to verbalize internal states. The American studies found out that genuine reference to mental states cannot be observed before the age of 2;8 years. Klann-Delius & Kauschke were interested in the validity of these studies for the German cultural environment. They set up an experiment with very young children which were separated from their mothers for a short time, and then filmed and taped the reactions of these children. Another aspect of their analysis focusses on the

balance between the children's affective state and their cognitive functioning. The results of the study confirm the American studies to a very large extent.

Péter Bodor (Budapest, Hungary) is interested in the social construction and usage of emotional language and takes "a developmental view of the tip of an iceberg", to use his own words. Like Klann-Delius & Kauschke, he is mainly dealing with emotional development through the development of the linguistic expressions for the emotions. His description is based on the Social-Constructionist approach in a Vygotskyan sense and he aims at a solution for the Natural-Conventional transition problem, which focusses on the question of how the natural expression of an emotion, e.g. a baby crying when left alone, can turn into an action, be it a linguistic or a non-verbal one, or something equivalent, for example an adult stating that he is sad. Bodor tries to approach a solution for the Natural-Conventional transition problem in that he regards expressions of emotions not as labels referring to inner experiences, but as performative devices which tell others how the speaker wants to be interpreted.

Finally, Michael Bamberg (Clark University, USA) offers an intriguing view of the role of perspective in the construction of emotions. First of all, he presents his standpoint in the study of the language of emotions, whereby he explicitly disagrees with Wierzbicka and prefers to take sides with Harré. He makes children and adolescents talk about their own emotional experiences, i.e. they narrate events when they were angry and when they made others angry. Interestingly enough, there is a different perspective between these two kinds of narratives insofar as the narrators present themselves as personally involved when they were made angry, but as the victim of circumstances when they made others angry. Bamberg connects these findings with aspects from his earlier studies.

Anna Wierzbicka was invited to write a response to Michael Bamberg's premises and she agreed, so that this response follows Bamberg's paper.

IV. The language of emotions in discourse

The fourth section of this volume makes the step from the theoretical foundations of the construal of emotions to emotional language in action, i.e. the contributions analyze how emotions are referred to and expressed in discourse. The examples come from very different types of texts such as interviews, dinnertable conversations, business negotiations, and newspapers.

The section starts with a contribution by Martina Drescher (Bielefeld, Germany), who looks at interjections in French and Franco-Canadian

corpora of spontaneous oral discourse and analyzes them in order to see what interjections there are in French, how they are distributed in discourse, and what they express. Interjections are regarded as part of a much more complex expressive technique. Drescher comes to the conclusion that the emotional impact of interjections is very high and that they can serve as a kind of "indicator" of expressivity.

Susanne Günthner (Konstanz, Germany) looks at the way emotions - or in her own terms, affect - are/is contextualized in reported dialogues. She distinguishes between five different constellations of reported complaints in informal conversations and shows how affect is contextualized verbally and paralinguistically, whereby the intonation is very often a decisive cue to the speaker's emotional attitude. In reconstructing past dialogues, speakers not only quote the verbal actions but also comment upon these actions, mainly through prosodic means. These recontextualized utterances are emotionally loaded.

The contribution by Susanne Niemeier (Duisburg, Germany) goes further in this direction because in addition to the paralinguistic expression of emotions she also considers the nonverbal expression of emotions. Taking as her point of departure Hofstede's well-known views of different cultural values as well as Hall's theory of *high-context* and *low-context* cultures, she shows that these differences - so far only analyzed in verbal communication - are also reflected in nonverbal communication. This hypothesis is tested in the analysis of a business negotiation between participants from two different European cultures, the *high-context* Italian one and the *low-context* Dutch one.

The section closes with an analysis of emotions and emotional language in English and German news stories undertaken by Friedrich Ungerer (Rostock, Germany). In considering the different ways emotions are evoked by different newspapers, Ungerer is able to very clearly differentiate between popular papers, which try to evoke "basic" emotions by often very drastic ways of reporting, and quality papers, which rely more on evoking so-called "secondary" emotions linked to cultural norms. Furthermore, he hints at intercultural differences between German and English newspapers because German newspapers seem to be more explicit in their emotion-related strategies than English newspapers. As a test case, Ungerer takes reports on the Tokyo poison gas attack and analyzes how the different papers present the same story in diverging manners to their readers.

4. Epilogue: A *laudatio* for Anna Wierzbicka

René Dirven has asked me to say a few words in celebration to our guest of honour, Anna Wierzbicka. Fortunately, she is very easy to celebrate, so I was happy to accept this pleasant task. Currently of the Australian National University and a Humboldt Fellow in Germany for the present academic year, Anna spent her early life in her native Poland, where all her school and university education took place. She left Poland in the early 1970's, becoming a foremost member of what we might call the Polish academic diaspora.

Hazarding a guess - speaker's privilege - I would imagine that Anna's linguistic training, much like my own, was a heady mixture of European philology and American structural, and later generative, linguistics. She even spent a year in the late 1960's at the feet of Chomsky at M.I.T., but it doesn't in fact seem to have spoilt her, nor to have deflected her from what became an abiding interest in semantics. Semantics in Anna's view has always involved the conceptualization of meaning, rather than being something derived from formal logic. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to claim that single-handedly she more or less invented the discipline of Cognitive Semantics. Her book *Semantic Primitives*, to my amazement, was published as long ago as 1972.

Semantic Primitives drew the attention of the linguistic world - then much smaller than now - to a different way of considering meaning: not as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather as a collection of actual conceptual elements. This had always in fact been one possible way of interpreting Katz/Fodor-type 'semantic features' in their 1963 paper, but on the whole the linguistic community tried to "do semantics" in the way that had been so successful for syntax - that is, structurally. Apart from the early, and abortive, Standard Theory model of generative linguistics, this also led to a major schism at the time: the Generative Semantics movement, McCawley's prelexical syntax, and Fillmore's Case Theory, all of them exploring semantics as a structural phenomenon. These ultimately fed into today's Cognitive Linguistics, which is conceptual rather than structural, but in the 1970s, it seemed as if very few people, apart from Anna, were looking at meaning in that way. Indeed, Cognitive Linguistics is only now beginning to catch up with the full range of Anna Wierzbicka's interests: emotion, time, space, direct and indirect discourse, and the interaction between language and culture.

The actual number of semantic primitives in *Semantic Primitives* in 1972 was rather small - I believe it did not even reach double figures. Of course, the claims made by such a theory are extremely strong - nothing less than the expression of the whole human conceptatorium with under a dozen ele-

ments (on the other hand, DNA has only four). Perhaps this was too ambitious; at any rate, her current list now has in the region of 50 elements, which allows an astronomical number of combinations. These semantic primitives are conceived of as innate building blocks of meaning (perhaps innateness is all that survives from Anna's year at M.I.T.!). They are claimed to account for all possible lexical expressions in human language, and perhaps all human meaning as well. Whether this turns out to be the case or not, the semantic primitives are certainly at once a powerful and delicate tool for the study of human conceptual life.

Anna Wierzbicka has devoted over twenty years of her life now to the study of human cognition. The next twenty years will certainly be as rich, successful, and crowned with academic merit as the last twenty have been. Anna, thank you for all the pleasure and linguistic insight you've given us over the years. We look forward to much more in the years to come.

Paul Werth

The editors, and certainly all the participants of the "Language of Emotions" symposium, support Paul Werth's congratulations and wishes, and hope that the present volume is proving to be a step in the direction of diversifying our knowledge in the framework of emotionology. All of us have been and still are influenced in one way or the other by Anna Wierzbicka's theories and we are all looking forward to keeping up the fruitful discussions that thrived on impulses and input from her work.

The speaker-author Paul Werth died at the end of 1995, and we posthumously want to thank him very much for his permission to include his speech in this book, and we want to express our sorrow about his early death, which signifies an enormous loss for the scientific community. We miss Paul as a scholar, as a colleague, and as a friend, who was always full of new ideas and could at the same time appreciate the great ideas of other scholars, as he shows in this *laudatio*.

Duisburg, November 1996

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 1995 "The relevance of language to the study of emotions", Manuscript read at the 21st LAUD-symposium in Duisburg.

I. THEORETICAL ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS OF EMOTIONS IN LANGUAGE

Is the "psychologic" of trust universal?

Jan Smedslund
University of Oslo, Norway

1. Introduction

The project of "psychologic" (Smedslund 1988, 1991a, 1991b) is an attempt to formalize a technical language for psychology. This language "psychologic" contains primitive terms, axioms, definitions, and logically derived corollaries and theorems. Among its concepts are "person", "want", "think", "feel", "act", "can", "try", and so on. "Psychologic" takes its departure in the semantic constraints of language. Ordinary language concepts are not independent of each other. Certain combinations are excluded, and, hence, certain others are necessary. For example, given what a person wants and thinks at a certain moment, what the person feels follows necessarily. Also, if a person can do something, and tries to do it, then the person actually does it. If a person can do something and does not do it, then the person does not try to do it, and so on. In this way, the semantic constraints of language allow the development of a psychological calculus, namely "psychologic". The usefulness of this system depends on its predictive capacity, much in the same way as, for example, it is the case with Euclidean geometry or Newtonian mechanics. A geometrical theorem states, for example, that "a diameter divides a circle into two equal halves", a mechanical equation specifies, for example, the trajectory of a projectile under given conditions, and a proposition in "psychologic" states, for example, that "a person becomes surprised if and only if he or she experiences something unexpected." Geometry would not be useful if diameters through real circles did not divide them into approximately equal halves, mechanics would be unpopular if projectiles did not tend to arrive near predicted impact areas, and "psychologic" would be worthless if people did not become surprised when something unexpected happens.

The analogies to Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics are used to characterize "psychologic" because all three have a rather similar meta-theoretical status. Trigonometry and mechanics function as calculi without being sensitive to, and constantly revised by, empirical evidence, and so does "psychologic". Deviations are always explained by the failure of some

auxiliary hypotheses. Yet all three are expected to be, and are, highly predictive of real outcomes. How this can be understood is not discussed here.

In this article, I want to explore the usefulness of "psychologic" in the specific domain of interpersonal trust. Does it apply to people who speak other languages than English, is it part of a universally applicable conceptual system?

2. Twelve propositions relating to "trust"

The following analyses are based on the system of "psychologic", hereafter referred to as PL. Only a few directly relevant concepts and propositions of that system are introduced here. The reader is referred to Smedslund 1988, 1991a, 1991b.

The specific topic is the PL of "trust", that is, the logical network of concepts referring to that domain of psychological phenomena. The analysis of this network allows one to formulate propositions about the conditions and consequences of "trust" which ought to be valid in real life situations.

In what follows, "P" and "O" are persons, and "in S at t" is an abbreviation for "in situation S at time t".

In each of the sentences to follow it is to be assumed that P thinks that it is *possible* for O to harm P, that is, P is *vulnerable* when relating to O. This will be referred to as assumption (a).

Note that the possibility of O harming P must not be confused with the likelihood of O harming P. The possibility merely refers to what P thinks O *can* do. Hence, to think that one is vulnerable does not imply that one expects to be harmed.

Note also that "trust" refers to what a person *thinks* about another person and must not be confused with whether that other person is actually trustworthy.

Finally, it remains to introduce a definition of "trust":

Definition 1: "P in S at t trusts O" = df "P in S at t thinks O will not do anything bad to P" (from a revised, unpublished version of PL).

This definition has the merit of being simple and using terms from Wierzbicka's "Natural Semantic Metalanguage" (Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994). So far it has not created problems in the calculation of plausible outcomes.

The propositions selected for study are the result of a process of tentative analyses and explorations. Propositions 1-5 consist of implications of trust

for what a person thinks about another person, and 7-12 consist of implications of trust for how a person behaves toward another person. Proposition 6 deals with the interrelation of two of a person's wants. Eight of the propositions are provable in PL and four are not.

- (1) If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that O will try not to harm P in S at t.

Proof: According to Definition 1, if P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks O will not harm (do anything bad to) P in S at t. According to (a), P thinks that O can harm P in S at t. But, according to Corollary 4.1.1 (PL), if O does not harm P in S at t, then O cannot harm P in S at t, or O does not try to harm P in S at t, or O neither can nor tries to harm P in S at t. Since 4.1.1 is a valid proposition, it follows from Axiom 5.7.6 (PL) (For every valid psychological proposition X, there exists a valid psychological proposition Y, where Y="Every person takes it for granted that X is valid for every person") that P takes 4.1.1 for granted. But, since P takes 4.1.1 for granted, and P thinks that O can harm P in S at t, and P thinks that O will not harm P in S at t, it follows that P thinks that O will not try to harm P in S at t.

- (2) If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that O wants to care for P in S at t.

This proposition is not provable in PL. The definition of trust does not exclude cases where O does not harm P for some ultimate purpose, other than wanting to care for P.

- (3) If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that other persons cannot dictate what O does to P in S at t.

Proof: If P thinks that other persons can dictate what O does to P in S at t, then P thinks that other persons can dictate O to harm P in S at t. But from this and Definition 1, it follows that P cannot trust O in S at t. Hence, proposition 3 follows.

- (4) If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that O has self-control in S at t in matters concerning P.

Proof: If P thinks that O does not have self-control in S at t in matters concerning P, then P thinks that O may inadvertently harm P in S at t. But, if P thinks that O may harm P in S at t, then it follows from Definition 1 that

P cannot trust O in S at t. Hence, proposition 4 follows.

- (5) If P trusts O in S at t, then P thinks that O knows what P thinks and wants in S at t.

Proof: If P thinks that O does not know what P thinks and wants in S at t, then P thinks that O may inadvertently harm P in S at t. But, if P thinks that O may harm P in S at t, then it follows from Definition 1 that P cannot trust O in S at t. Hence proposition 5 follows.

- (6) If O wants P to feel good in S at t, then O wants to know what P thinks and wants in S at t.

Proof: If O wants P to feel good in S at t, then O wants to know how to make P feel good in S at t. But, what makes P feel good in S at t depends on what P thinks and wants in S at t. Since this is a valid proposition, it follows from Axiom 5.7.6 (PL) that it is also a valid proposition that O thinks that what makes P feel good in S at t depends on what P thinks and wants in S at t. Since O wants to know how to make P feel good in S at t, it follows that O wants to know what P thinks and wants in S at t. Hence, proposition 6 follows.

- (7) If P's trust in O decreases, then P's concern with the potential danger from O increases.

Proof: If "concern with the potential danger from O" is interpreted to mean "expectancy of being harmed by O", then proposition 7 follows directly from Definition 1.

- (8) If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then P performs less well, in S, on tasks where O is involved.

Not provable in PL. The definition of trust does not exclude cases where P overcompensates for the decreased trust and, hence, performs better than before, on tasks where O is involved.

- (9) If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then P's tolerance of ambiguity in matters having to do with O, in S, decreases too.

Proof: According to proposition 7, if P's trust in O decreases, then P's concern with the potential danger from O increases. But, if P's concern with the potential danger from O increases, and P wants more strongly to be pre-

pared for that danger, then it becomes increasingly important for P to know whether or not the danger is imminent. This means to become less tolerant of ambiguity. Hence proposition 9 is proved.

- (10) If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then P will act more guardedly toward O, in S.

Proof: If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then, according to proposition 7, P's expectancy of being harmed by O increases. If to act "guardedly" means to act in anticipation of being harmed, then the proposition 10 follows directly.

- (11) If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then P will try out fewer novel acts in the presence of O, in S.

This is not provable in PL. The definition of trust does not exclude cases where P tries out more novel acts when O is present, for example, in order to re-establish the trust.

- (12) If P's trust in O, in S, decreases, then P becomes less creative, in S, in the presence of O.

This is not provable in PL. The definition of "trust" does not exclude cases where P becomes more creative in the presence of O, for example, in order to re-establish the trust.

Next, I will describe a study of the "psychologic" of trust in six languages. The purpose of the study was to explore in a preliminary way the applicability of parts of the "psychologic" of trust across a number of unrelated languages. I wanted to study how propositions are judged when translated into different languages and what kind of exceptions are described when a statement is judged as not always true. But, above all, I will use the study to discuss some basic conceptual issues relating to translatability and validity.

3. Procedure

The twelve statements presented above were used in the study. As has been shown, eight of them are provable in PL and four are not. In the study the statements were presented without their proofs. The statements which cannot be proved in PL were used as controls because, at first sight, they may appear to be almost as plausible as the provable ones. Hence, I tried to

ensure that differences in judgment would only occur if participants were able to disregard superficial plausibility and focus on logical necessity. Four native speakers of each of six languages (Arabic, Ewe, Norwegian, Tamil, Turkish, and Vietnamese) participated as informants. All were present or former university students. They were paid an equivalent of approximately 70\$. All meetings with the participants were conducted in English.

Two of the participants for each language were given a booklet with the twelve English statements. On the first page were the following instructions:

Try to translate each one of the following sentences into your native language ... In each of the sentences to follow it is to be assumed that P thinks that it is *possible* for O to harm P, that is, P is vulnerable when relating to O. The expression "in S at t" is an abbreviation for "in situation S at time t".

On the last page of the booklet were the following instructions:

Try to judge the truth-value of each of the 12 sentences, as translated into your native language. Do you think that the sentence is always true, or can you imagine cases where it does not apply? If a sentence has the form "if A then B", is it always true that when A is the case B is the case, or can you imagine instances covered by the sentence where A is the case, but not B. Write either "always true" or write down examples of possible exceptions.

For each language, the two first participants independently translated the propositions from English into their native language, and judged whether the resulting statements in their native language were always true or not. This work was done at home. The informants then met with me and presented their translations and evaluations in English. After this, two other informants were given booklets containing the translated sentences, but *not* the English originals. The translations of one informant were given to one of the latter informants and the translations of the other initial informant were given to the other latter informant. The booklets had the same instructions as the initial ones and the latter two informants also worked at home. Finally, they too met with me to present and explain their judgments.

In talking with the informants, I sometimes asked questions in order to understand their reasoning. Very occasionally, an informant spontaneously changed a translation or a judgment as a result of listening to the other informant.

4. Results

The material consisted of 288 judgments, given by 24 persons, about the 12 statements. The judgments were scored in three categories:

a = "always true". 191 responses were scored "a".

b = "not always true", but the suggested exceptions violated at least one of the given preconditions, namely that the person is vulnerable, and/or that the trust is limited to a given situation at a given time, and/or that the statements are about what the person *thinks* and not about reality. But, if the suggested exceptions contradict the given premises, they have to be discarded. As a result, no exceptions remain, that is, the sentence must be regarded as having been judged always true. In the final analysis, the 34 b-responses were, therefore, counted as "a".

c = "not always true" and the suggested exceptions did not violate the given preconditions. The exceptions either seemed to result from interpretations of the terms differing from PL, or were incompletely or not at all explained. 63 responses were scored "c".

The main findings are presented in Table 1. The propositions which are provable in PL are judged to be "always true" (a+b) in 97% of the cases, whereas the propositions not provable in PL are judged to be "always true" (a+b) in only 41% of the cases. This trend is uniformly present among the informants of each of the languages.

Table 1. *Truth value of 12 statements about trust and related concepts as evaluated by 24 informants (native speakers of Arabic, Ewe, Norwegian, Tamil, Turkish, and Vietnamese). Items marked with* are not derivable from PL.*

"Always true"	24	15	23	24	20	24	24	7	23	24	9	8
Item no.	1	2*	3	4	5	6	7	8*	9	10	11*	12*

Another finding is also clear: if the person who made the translation from English to his/her own native language interprets the translation to be "always true", then the second informant who interprets that translation, without seeing the English original, also judges it to be "always true" in 96% of the cases. If, on the other hand, the initial translator has judged the resulting proposition to be "not always true", then the second informant also judges it to be "not always true" in 55% of the cases. The informants who translated the English sentences had slightly more "c"-judgments (38) than the informants who only saw the sentences in their native language (25).

The c-judgments ("not always true") in the case of the four items not provable in PL were accompanied by examples generally compatible with Definition 1, which states that "P thinks O will not do anything bad to P". In the case of proposition 2, the intelligible c-judgments all pointed out that you may, sometimes, trust a person merely because you know that he or she has a personal advantage of not harming you. Hence, no care may be involved. In the case of propositions 8, 11, and 12, the intelligible c-judgments all pointed out that, in the case of decreasing trust, a person may, sometimes, try to perform better in order to re-establish a relationship or to compensate for its loss. Hence, no deterioration in performance may occur.

The quantitative findings should be understood in the light of the informal comments from the participants. Some of these were fairly frequent and general.

Some participants pointed to the "logic-like" and "artificial" flavour of many of the propositions. Although all the informants were university students, many reported that they had to work hard to concentrate on the logical aspects of the task. Some of them stated that these kinds of sentences would rarely occur in normal life, even though they are grammatically correct. A number of aspects of this artificiality were mentioned. One was the emphasis on the subjective aspects of the assignments. Some informants reported difficulty keeping in mind that the sentence was about what the person thought, and not about the reality which he or she thought about. They also reported an inner struggle in order to judge implications without regard for their relation to reality. Furthermore, they reported a tendency to disregard the specification "in S at t". After all, they said, you seldom trust a person only at a moment and in a given situation - often it is a relatively stable and generalized attitude. In view of these and other comments, the high degree of order in the findings therefore indicates the ability of the informants to resist their intuitive tendencies and to follow the unusual instructions.

5. Discussion

What do the findings tell about PL's translatability and validity? What is the relation between translatability and validity? Is it possible to envisage, for example, an untranslatable, but highly valid "psychologic" of a given language? Conversely, is it conceivable that a "psychologic" of a given language has low validity, yet is perfectly translatable?

Consider first the notion of *translatability*. A translation from language L1 to language L2 is correct to the extent that logical relations between terms are preserved. Hence, if A1 and B1 are terms in L1, and A2 and B2 are terms in L2, and A1 implies B1, and A2 is a correct translation of A1, and B2 is a correct translation of B1, then A2 must imply B2. It follows that if A2 does not imply B2, then either A2 is not a correct translation of A1, or B2 is not a correct translation of B1, or neither A2 nor B2 are correct translations of A1 and B1, respectively. The same reasoning applies to the case where A1 and B1 in L1 are logically unrelated. If A2 and B2 are correct translations in L2, of A1 and B1 respectively, then A2 and B2 should also be logically unrelated. Hence, as long as a PL is correctly translated, its propositions should retain their logical status in every language. A direct consequence of the preceding argument is that if a sentence is judged to be "always true" in one language, then a correct translation of the sentence into another language should also be judged as "always true". Similarly, a correct translation of a sentence judged to be "not always true" should also be judged as "not always true".

What is meant by the *validity* of a "psychologic"? The answer is that it has to do with the relationship between a "psychologic" and the corresponding ordinary language. More specifically, validity has to do with the degree of correspondence between formal logical relationships in PL and inferences in ordinary language. Consider first the simple case of surprise. If "surprise" is defined in English PL as "the state of a person who has just experienced something unexpected", then PL permits such inferences as "if P is surprised, then P has just experienced something unexpected" and "if P experiences something unexpected, then P becomes surprised". The validity of these statements may be tested by asking native speakers of English questions such as, "If someone is surprised, do you think he or she has or has not experienced something unexpected?" and "If someone has just experienced something unexpected do you think he or she is or is not surprised"? One may also ask informants to tell how one goes about surprising someone. Finally, one may ask whether statements such as "if P is surprised, then P has experienced something unexpected", and "if P experiences something unexpected, then P becomes surprised", are "always true" or "not always true".

The latter procedure was followed in the present study of "trust". The validity of PL in a given domain and in a given language is measured by the correlation between the logical status of the propositions (provable - not provable in PL) and ordinary language judgments (always true - not always true). This means that, if a sentence is provable in PL, then speakers of ordinary English should judge it as "always true", and, if a sentence is not provable in PL, then speakers of ordinary English should judge it as "not always true". Generalizing the preceding discussions, it means that the validity of PL in any given language is measured by the correlation between formal derivations and direct judgments by native speakers.

In conclusion, the translatability of PL is measured by the degree of preservation of directly judged logical relations from one language to another, whereas the validity of PL within a given language is measured by the correlation between formal-logical derivations and direct judgments. Hence, translatability and validity are independent measures. The findings of the present exploratory study indicate that the PL of "trust" has a high degree of translatability across the six languages, and, also, that the formal derivations have a high degree of validity within each of these languages.

There is an asymmetry in the findings which needs to be understood. The sentences which are provable in PL are judged by almost every informant to be "always true". However, the sentences which are not provable are still judged to be "always true" in about 45% of the cases. Hence the correlation, although high, is not perfect. The results for these four propositions can be explained by the way they were constructed. They were intended to appear highly plausible, and, hence, they invite an uncritical judgment of "always true". The task of imagining exceptions is quite difficult and the alternative of judging "always true" may therefore be tempting. It may be predicted that with less plausible-appearing non-provable propositions, where exceptions are easy to find, the frequency of judgments of "always true" will decrease. The definitions in PL have so far been developed largely on the basis of intuition. Consider the proposed definition of trust: "P in S at t thinks O will not do anything bad to P". The terms in this definition correspond to some of the primitive terms of Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). I think there are good reasons for believing that the ongoing constructions of NSM and PL can profit from each other. More specifically, NSM provides guidelines for the selection of primitives, whereas PL focusses on the logical system formed by higher order concepts and its applications in psychology.

One final comment: an important outcome of the study was that all the propositions about "trust" seemed to be treated by the informants as *descriptions of psychological realities* rather than as reflecting conceptual or semantic relationships. This corresponds to how, for example, Thales'

theorem "A diameter divides a circle into two equal parts" is experienced by people as descriptive of the real world. What is logically true at the level of meanings and concepts, is empirically true at the level of fact. Human language is such that semantic/logical links tend to correspond to empirical ones and that real judgments and actions can be predicted from it (see also Brown & Fish (1983) and Semin & Fiedler (1988). "Psychologic" will be useful to the extent that there are reliable semantic constraints.

List of abbreviations

PL	"psychologic"
S	situation
t	time
P and O	persons
X, Y	possible propositionss
L1, L2	languages
A1, B1	terms in language
NSM	Natural Semantic Metalanguage

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The expressive function of language: Towards a cognitive semantic approach

Ad Foolen
Catholic University of Nijmegen, Netherlands

1. Introduction

Cognitive semantics studies the way people conceptualize the world. It thus focuses on the '*Darstellungsfunktion*' of language to use Bühler's (1934) term. In this respect, cognitive semantics is not different from logical semantics or generative grammar, which also concentrate on the propositional, referential, or ideational function of language. But cognitive semantics differs from the other approaches in that it stresses the active role that the human mind plays in representing the world. This is why I prefer to use the term 'conceptualizing function' here, instead of propositional, referential, or ideational function.

What about Bühler's two other functions of language, '*Ausdruck*' and '*Appell*', or 'expression' and 'direction'? The directive function of language has received a lot of attention in the last two decades from pragmatics, in particular in the framework of speech act theory. But the 'pragmatic turn' has not freed the expressive function from its rather marginal position in linguistics.

The present paper is meant as a first exploration of the question whether cognitive semantics could be used as a framework to look at the expressive function of language. This might sound counter-intuitive at first sight, because cognitive semantics calls itself 'cognitive', that is, it focuses on the cognitive-conceptual(izing) function of language. Nevertheless, I hope to show that the analytical tools of cognitive semantics, like metaphor, metonymy, polysemy, grammaticalization, etc., can be of use in the study of the expressive function, and, the other way round, that the study of the expressive function of language might contribute to cognitive semantic theorizing.

The expressive function has to do with emotions. It is the emotional feeling of the speaker that is expressed and communicated in the expressive function. Although the topic of emotions and their relation to language and

language use has not been central in linguistic studies of the past, it has not stayed out of the picture altogether either. A first short overview shows that the language-emotion relation has been studied from such rather diverse perspectives as the following:

- There is lexicographic research on words that refer to emotions, cf. Omondi (this volume, in particular section 2.2. on the emotional lexicon of Dholuo). Nepl & Boll (1991) is a more methodologically oriented paper, and van Ginneken (1912-1913) can be mentioned as an early example of this kind of research. An important issue for lexicographic work is, of course, the universality or culture-relativity of human emotions (cf. Solomon 1995, Wierzbicka 1995).
- From a syntactic point of view, attention has been paid to the behavior of emotion verbs like *to fear*, etc., cf. Nissenbaum (1985) and a special issue of *Langue Française* (Nr. 105, 1995).
- Emotion can be conveyed by certain types of language use, like hyperbole, repetition, the use of strong metaphors (like *I am exploding*, to express anger, cf. Braun 1992). I consider the study of this type of language use as belonging to the field of stylistics.
- Emotion is expected to be expressed in certain phases of social and conversational interaction. The rules that regulate the occurrence of expressive emotional behavior in interaction has been studied in the field of conversational analysis (cf. Fiehler 1990, Drescher this volume).
- Languages are full of conventionalized metaphors that are related to emotions. You can be *in* love, love can be *burning*, etc. The study of such ways of talking about emotions can be very helpful in the study of how languages conceptualize emotions. In the framework of cognitive semantics, extensive and excellent work has been done by Kövecses (1990, 1995), Wierzbicka (1995), and others. Note that we are dealing here with the conceptualizing function of language, not with the expressive function. The question of how emotions are conceptualized in languages is in principle not different from the question of how reasoning, color, time, etc. are conceptualized (cf. Volek 1977, who stresses the importance of distinguishing emotion as a notional domain from emotion as it appears in expressive language).

Interesting as each of these perspectives on the language and emotion question may be, I will ignore them here, and concentrate on the expressive function in its strict sense, i.e. the direct expression of emotion through language.

What this paper should lead to in the end is a perspective from which the expressive value of linguistic forms like interjections, intonation, sentence types, etc., can be analyzed. But before we come to such linguistic matters in section 5 and 6, we will first make three preliminary excursions. Section 2 leads us into the history of linguistics, section 3 into psychology, and section 4 into the general problem of how emotions and ideas are communicated.

2. Expressive semantics: A historical excursion

Expressive semantics - as I will call the work of semanticists who have pleaded for or practised the study of the expressive function of language - has always been a minor line of study, see Rosier (1992) for the 13th century and Bologna (1995) for the interest that the 19th century historical linguist Pott had in the expressive function.

At the beginning of the 20th century, linguists like Erdmann (1900), Bally (1905, 1910), Sperber (1914) and, last but not least, the Dutch linguist van Ginneken (1907) criticized the strong ideational orientation of semantics in their time, and they pleaded for doing expressive semantics, in addition to 'rational semantics'. Van Ginneken even considered emotional meaning as primary. In his view, conceptual meaning and function words (conjunctions, prepositions) were derived from forms with a primarily emotional meaning.

Sapir, in his book *Language* (1921: 38-39), strongly opposed the expressive semanticists, and in particular van Ginneken. In fact, van Ginneken's is the only name of a colleague linguist which Sapir mentions in his whole book (he calls him "the brilliant Dutch writer Jac. van Ginneken"). In Sapir's view, "ideation reigns supreme in language, (...) volition and emotion come in as distinctly secondary factors" (Sapir 1921: 38-39).

This is not the place to deal extensively with the interesting linguistic historiography of the cognition-expression controversy. Hübler (1987: 357) points at the interest that members of the Prague Linguistic Circle had in the expressive dimension of human communication (he mentions Mathesius, Jakobson, and Havránek; cf. also Daneš 1994). In 1955, Jakobson and Sperber took part in an interdisciplinary conference on expressive aspects of language activity (cf. Werner (ed.) 1955).

In recent years, there seems to be a revival of interest in the expressive function of language. An indication of this interest is given by the special issues that journals devoted to the topic (*Text* 9: 1, 1989, on 'The pragmatics of affect', and *Journal of Pragmatics* 22: 3/4, 1994, on 'Involvement in language').

Finally, I would like to point out the valuable work by Fries, who, in a series of papers, has investigated the expressive function of language and who has proposed a model for the description of expressive meanings in which two dimensions are distinguished: intensity on the one hand and positive-negative affect on the other hand (cf. Fries 1995: 155).

In summary, expressive semantics has existed as a side stream in a linguistic landscape in which representational semantics formed the main stream.

3. Cognition and emotion: The psychological distinction

In a recent paper, Brown states that "Somewhere between Leibniz and Kant the mind was divided into three parts: Cognition, affection, and conation" (1994: 169). We recognize here, of course, Bühler's three functions of language. This classical trichotomy of the mind was discussed in Ullmann (1952: 146) in a way that fits the argument of this paper quite well. He argues that a reduction of the tripartition into a bipartition, namely cognition and emotion, is defensible, because volition (or 'conation') and emotion have a strong affinity and thus can be taken together. Cognition vs. emotion thus seems to be the main psychological distinction, and I will concentrate here on that opposition.

Psychology has a long tradition of emotion studies, cf. Frijda (1986) for one of the recent contributions to this long tradition. The question of how far distinctions should be made *within* the area of emotion has been extensively discussed. How many emotions should be distinguished? And should one distinguish between emotion, feeling, and affect? Damasio (1994: 150), for example, takes feeling as the general term, which covers at least three subtypes: (a) feelings of basic universal emotion, which are innate (for example happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust); (b) feelings of subtle universal but not innate emotions, which are variations of the basic feelings: euphoria and ecstasy as variations of happiness; melancholy and wistfulness as variations of sadness, etc.; (c) background feelings, related to mood. Although such distinctions are perhaps relevant in relation to the study of the expressive function of language, in this paper, with its global approach, I will use terms like feeling and emotion interchangeably as catch-all terms.

The psychological distinction between cognition and emotion is supported by neurological research (cf. LeDoux 1989: 284): "Affect and cognition are separate information processing functions mediated by different brain systems". Emotions are located in the limbic system, an older part of the brain, that is fully present in animals, cf. Masson & McCarthey (1995: