

UNIVERSALS IN SECOND SCHOLASTICISM

BOCHUMER STUDIEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE

Herausgegeben von
Kurt Flasch – Ruedi Imbach
Burkhard Mojsisch – Olaf Pluta

For an overview of all books published in this series, please see
<http://benjamins.com/catalog/bsp>

Band 54

DANIEL HEIDER

Universals in Second Scholasticism

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA

Universals in Second Scholasticism

A comparative study with focus on the theories of
Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548–1617),
João Poinset O.P. (1589–1644) and
Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602–1673)/
Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600–1676)

DANIEL HEIDER

Faculty of Theology

University of South Bohemia

Institute of Philosophy

The Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA



TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heider, Daniel.

Universals in second scholasticism : a comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), João Poinset O.P. (1589-1644), and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O.f.M. Conv. (1602-1673), Bonaventura Belluto O.f.M. Conv. (1600-1676) / Daniel Heider, University of South Bohemia.

p. cm. -- (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, ISSN 1384-668X ; Bd. 54)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Neo-Scholasticism. 2. Universals (Philosophy) 3. Suárez, Francisco, 1548-1617. 4. John of St. Thomas, 1589-1644. 5. Mastri, Bartolomeo, 1602-1673. I. Title.

B839.H45 2014

III'.209--dc23

2013043334

ISBN 978 90 272 1464 5 (HB; alk. paper)

ISBN 978 90 272 7067 2 (EB)

© 2014 – John Benjamins B.V.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 ME Amsterdam · The Netherlands
John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 · USA

To Tereza, Vojtěch, Magdaléna and Tadeáš

Acknowledgments

I would above all like to thank David Svoboda, Ph.D., (Faculty of Theology, Charles University & Institute of Philosophy, The Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic) for carefully reading the text and for his numerous remarks and comments that significantly helped me improve the final shape of the work in which I was engaged for more than six years. Many thanks are due to Mgr. Světlá Jarošová (Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia) for her thorough proofreading based on in-depth understanding of the problematic. I would also like to express thanks to doc. Tomáš Machula, Ph.D., Th.D. (Dean of the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice), for granting me the sabbatical term I spent at the University of Regensburg where I could do the substantial research on the book. Thanks also to Prof. i. R. Dr. Dr. Ulrich G. Leinsle (University of Regensburg) for providing me with the excellent research conditions I found at the University of Regensburg and for his inspiring review of the publication which I submitted as “Habilitationsschrift” at the Philosophical Faculty of Palacký University (Olomouc) in January 2013. Thanks are due also to Prof. Paul Richard Blum (Loyola University Maryland) and Doc. Michal Chabada, Ph.D. (Faculty of Philosophy, Comenius University in Bratislava) for their stimulating comments on the monograph. I cannot forget to thank the librarian ing. Eva Křížková (Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia) for tirelessly hunting for uneasily available secondary literature. I would further like to thank Daniel D. Novotný, Ph.D. (Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice) and Lukáš Novák, Ph.D. (Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice & Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague) for their notes on some parts of this book. My thanks are due also to the greatest living expert on the philosophy of Second Scholasticism John P. Doyle (Professor Emeritus of philosophy at St. Louis University, Missouri) for his encouragement and appreciation. Last but not least I thank my wife Tereza for her constant support.

The book has been elaborated with the support of the Grant Project no. P401/10/0080 “Univerzálie v raně novověké univerzitní filosofii” (Czech Science Foundation/GAČR), which was realized in the years 2010–2013.

Table of contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1

- 1.1 The issue of universals in Scholasticism 1
- 1.2 Historical context: Thomism, Nominalism, Jesuit philosophy and Scotism 8
- 1.3 Goal and methodology 14
- 1.4 State of research 18

CHAPTER 2

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) on universals

23

- 2.1 Universals in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* and *De Anima* 23
- 2.2 The metaphysics of universals: Formal and individual unity 24
 - 2.2.1 Nomenclature and historical point of departure 26
 - 2.2.2 Scotus on the common nature according to Suárez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae* VI, s. 1 28
 - 2.2.3 Suárez's "nominalization" of Scotus 32
- 2.3 Formal and universal unity 35
 - 2.3.1 Suárez on the distinction between formal and universal unity 35
 - 2.3.2 Fonseca on universal unity and the aptitude to being in the many 37
 - 2.3.3 Suárez's dismissal of Fonseca's unity of precision 41
 - 2.3.4 Suárez on the aptitude to being in the many 43
- 2.4 The metaphysical grades and their distinction 47
 - 2.4.1 Scotistic arguments for the distinction *ex natura rei* 48
 - 2.4.2 Suárez on the distinction between the metaphysical grades 52
- 2.5 The epistemology of universals 58
 - 2.5.1 Features of Suárez's cognitive psychology: Intellectual knowledge 58
 - 2.5.2 Intellectual cognition of material singulars 71
 - 2.5.3 Direct and comparative acts of the intellect 77
 - 2.5.4 The first/second intentions and the "quiddity" of the logical universal 80
- 2.6 Hurtado's "confundism" and Suárez's moderate realism 87
- 2.7 Summary 95

CHAPTER 3

João Poinsoot (1589–1644) on universals 99

- 3.1 Universals in *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* 99
- 3.2 Different meanings of *universale* 101
- 3.3 *Universale materialiter sumptum* 102
 - 3.3.1 Rejection of Platonism, Ultrarealism and Nominalism 102
 - 3.3.2 Formal unity and negative community 104
 - 3.3.3 Formal unity and the aptitude to being in the many 110
 - 3.3.4 *Distinctio virtualis intrinseca* and the metaphysical grades 113
 - 3.3.5 Individuation, subsistence, existence and universals 120
- 3.4 *Universale metaphysicum* 135
 - 3.4.1 Some features of Poinsoot's cognitive psychology 136
 - 3.4.2 Knowledge of material singulars 146
 - 3.4.3 The metaphysical universal: Representational and cognitional aspect 153
 - 3.4.4 The extrinsic denomination and the first objective intention 157
- 3.5 *Universale logicum* 165
 - 3.5.1 The "quiddity" of the logical universal: *Esse in* or *dici de*? 166
 - 3.5.2 Formation of the logical universal 168
- 3.6 Summary 171

CHAPTER 4

Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola (1602–1673)/

Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) on universals 177

- 4.1 Universals in *Cursus ad mentem Scoti* 177
- 4.2 Division of *universale* 179
- 4.3 *Universale metaphysicum remotum* 183
 - 4.3.1 Anti-Nominalism and Anti-Platonism of Mastri's/Belluto's Doctrine 183
 - 4.3.2 Objective precision, formal distinction and the metaphysical grades 187
 - 4.3.3 The extramental character of the community of the common nature 198
 - 4.3.4 Community *per indifferentiam*, or *per inexistentiam*? 208
 - 4.3.5 Formal unity of the common nature: Essential and existential order 215

4.4	<i>Universale metaphysicum proximum</i>	227
4.4.1	The unity of precision and the extrinsic denomination	228
4.4.2	Intuitive and abstractive cognition: Principles and terminative objects	235
4.4.3	<i>Cognitio singularis</i>	250
4.4.4	<i>Cognitio universalis</i>	261
4.5	<i>Universale logicum</i>	270
4.5.1	The logical universal as the complete universal	271
4.5.2	The logical universal: Its community and unity	275
4.5.3	Formation of the <i>universale in actu</i>	287
4.6	Summary	296
CHAPTER 5		
	Concluding comparison and evaluation	301
APPENDIX		
	Bio-bibliographies	313
	Bibliography	319
	Index of names	333
	Subject index	337

Introduction

1.1 The issue of universals in Scholasticism

Aristotle's inconsistency and its disambiguation

The problematic of universals, in its ontological core, is concerned with the question of the extramental foundation of our common concepts (terms) or, viewed more from the logico-semantic point of view, with the problem of the reference or meaning of common terms such as “man”, “cow”, etc. The issue is not difficult to motivate. How can one entity be common to more individuals? How can we explain the phenomenon that things agree in one attribute? What is the ontological basis for the predication of a common property of a multitude of things? All those questions, no matter how *a priori* and *perennial* they may sound, are deeply rooted in the history of philosophy and their origin can be traced to Plato and Aristotle, or, more specifically, to Aristotle's critique of Plato. Speaking of the issue of universals in Second Scholasticism at the end of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century with special focus on the stream called moderate realism, the proper theme of this book, one can get an adequate understanding of this subject matter only when it is considered in continuity with the previous tradition, i.e., with the tradition of medieval scholasticism ramified into the various schools and “-isms”. Although the long and admirable scholastic tradition starting from the 11th century up to the beginning of the 18th century¹ underwent several more or less significant “paradigmatic” changes – let us mention the advent of the *via moderna* with its 13th century or the genre transfer from commentaries on Aristotle *per modum quaestionis* via *disputationes* to the elaboration of the all-comprising systematic manuals or *cursus* in the 17th century –, it still provides the historian of scholastic philosophy with a unified systematic body, in which (in particular in the context of the issue of universals) recurrent references to the same textual *loci*, links to identical *auctoritates* and to similar arguments employed in the substantiation of analogous conclusions of the very same doctrines may be observed. It is common knowledge that the medieval discussion of universals, just as its postmedieval counterpart, is fundamentally determined by Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of general ideas separated from sensible singulars. Although Aristotle's critique based on the premise of the existence of essence in the things themselves is regarded as the point of

1. In the texts of Second Scholasticism 12th century authors are much less represented.

departure by the majority of medieval scholastics, the Stagirite's own solution to the ontological issue of the extramental foundation of common concepts and terms, as the *Corpus Aristotelicum* makes entirely clear, is full of Platonic relics rendering Aristotle's teaching scarcely consistent.² Apart from this procreative tension inherent in the ontological core of the topic, the Stagirite's statements on universals are also important because they consider the various definitions of the fully-fledged or the logical universal viewed by Aristotelians as the final point in the formation of the universal. Despite the problem-driven character of philosophical analysis in Second Scholasticism, not dissimilar to that of contemporary analytical philosophy, these Aristotle's formulations became an important referential frame for post-medieval scholastic discussions as they had been for medieval authors. Apart from this ambivalent legacy of Aristotle's teaching, mediated to medieval scholasticism chiefly by Porphyry's *Isagoge*³ and Boethius's two editions of *In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum*,⁴ the *status quaestionis* in postmedieval scholasticism was also determined by Avicenna's doctrine of the indifference of essence,⁵ conceived by the Arabian philosopher as being independent of universality. This doctrine, again in virtue of its (fertile) ambiguity, incited various interpretations of the common nature and essence starting from the 13th century up to the early modern authors of the 18th century. It may be summed up that the ontological issue of universals in Second Scholasticism cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account Aristotle's formulations indicating the doctrinal tension in his ontologico-logical doctrine and without a brief characterization of Avicenna's doctrine of the nature, which from the 13th century on can be considered as the "place" crystallizing minds and schools.

2. On this thesis see for instance De Libera 1996, especially the sub-chapter "L'incohérence de l'aristotélisme ou d'une ambiguïté destinale", 29–34.

3. One, of course, has in mind Porphyry's unanswered questions whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals and whether they are separated or immanent to sensibles and have their reality in connection with them, which largely determined the medieval and also postmedieval scholastic debates. See Porphyrius, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca. Pars prima: Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, Chapter 1, 1a9–14 (Berlin 1887). On the systematic Platonic background in Aristotle's conception see De Libera 1996, 34–41.

4. It is especially Boethius's conception of abstraction, according to which the mind is capable of considering things in a manner different from that in which they exist. By abstraction the intellect is able to form universality, even though formal universality does not exist in the thing. See Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta*, § 11 (Vienna/Leipzig 1906, 164–167).

5. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V–X, Tractatus quintus: Capitulum de rebus communibus et quomodo est esse earum* (Louvain/Leiden 1980, 227–245).

One of the most quoted texts regarding the definition of *universale* can be found in Aristotle's logical treatise *On interpretation*, where he says: "Of things there are some universal and some individual or singular, I mean, as their nature is such that they can or they cannot be predicates of numerous subjects, as 'man', for example, and 'Callias'."⁶ Assuredly, Aristotle's reference to "things" (*hekaston*) is not evidence, to use a paradoxical expression, of Aristotle's Aristotelianism. If universals were things, how could they be predicated? This thing-like interpretation of universals is confirmed in the classical text of *Categories*, where Aristotle speaks about species and genera as about secondary substances: "But we *do* speak of secondary substances – those within which, being species, the primary or first are included, and those within which, being genera, the species themselves are contained."⁷ However, a couple of lines before that formulation in his exposition of the so-called ontological square Aristotle states as follows: "... you can predicate some of a subject, but they never are present in one. You can predicate 'man', for example, of this or that man as the subject, but man is not found in a subject."⁸ If "man" does not inhere in a subject and – contrary to primary substances, which do not inhere and are not predicated of subjects – it is predicable of this or that man, it is difficult to see in which sense the species "man" can be a thing. It is well-known that Aristotle's formulations are not entirely compatible with his statements from *Metaphysics*. In the 13th chapter of *Metaphysics Z* the Stagirite says as follows: "For it seems impossible that any universal term can be substance. First, the substance of an individual is the substance which is peculiar to it and belongs to nothing else; whereas the universal is common; for by universal we mean that which by nature appertains to several things."⁹ In *On the Soul* he is quite explicit in his claim about the non-extramental character of universals: "This is because actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals; these in a sense exist in the soul itself."¹⁰ Similar tension can be observed even within one formulation from *Posterior Analytics*: "And experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul – the One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present in them all – provides the starting-point of art and science ..."¹¹ From this quotation one can learn, on the one hand, that the

6. Aristoteles, *On Interpretation*, 17a39–b2 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 125).

7. Aristoteles, *Categories*, 2a13–15 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 19).

8. Ibidem, 1a20–23 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1938, 15).

9. Aristoteles, *Metaphysics*, 1038b9–12 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1933, 377).

10. Aristoteles, *On the Soul*, 417b22–24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1936, 99–101).

11. Aristoteles, *Posterior Analytics*, 100a7–10 (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1960, 259).

universal is in the soul, on the other, however, that it exists extramentally as being identical in the many. Moreover, this formulation is also at odds with the definition of *universale* from *De interpretatione*. The essence of the universal is defined by two aspects – “being in” (*esse in*) and “being said of” (*dici de*). However, as Aristotle’s two formulations from the *Organon* make clear, the Stagirite was far from clear about their exact distribution. While in *On Interpretation* we learn that the definition of *universale* consists in “being said of” (*dici de*) or, more precisely, in the potential (aptitudinal) “being said”, in *Posterior Analytics* the emphasis is laid on the “being in”, i.e., on the actual presence of the one in the many. Thus it may be concluded that Aristotle’s legacy, as received by medieval scholasticism, is not free of ambiguities both *in puncto* of the ontology of universals and the definition of the fully-fledged universal.

Important historical disambiguation of the notion of *universale* comes from two well-known sources. The first is the distinction, formulated probably by the Neoplatonist Ammonios Hermeiou (about 440–517), between universal *ante rem*, universal *in re* and universal *post rem*.¹² Roughly speaking, it may be said that this distinction accommodated both Plato’s (universal *ante rem*) and Aristotle’s (universal *in re* or universal *post rem*) teaching. The second is connected with the above-mentioned distinction between universality and essence, originally introduced by Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd–3rd c. BC),¹³ and later developed by Avicenna. In order to make sense of Aristotle’s assertions, we have to conceive universality only as an accidental modification of the nature as such. Nature or essence in itself thus can be constituted only by essential (quidditative) predicates. The properties universality/singularity and unity/plurality can accede to it only from outside as its “accidents”.¹⁴ The procreative ambivalence in Avicenna’s statement was caused mainly by the claim that although this essence, the immediate referent of our common concepts (terms), does not have any unity, it possesses its proper being (*esse proprium*), which is ontologically prior to singulars.¹⁵ This asymmetry between being and unity, implausible for authors of the Latin medieval tradition, became important for 13th century authors who *either* started to ascribe some unity to the essence, *or* inclined to deny it had any being, which

12. See Wöhler 1992, “Nachwort. Zur Geschichte des Universalienstreites”, 320–321.

13. See above all Tweedale 1984.

14. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina* V–X, 228: “Equinitas etenim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitate, sed est cui accidit universalitas. Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim in se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima ...”

15. Ibidem, 233–234.

consequently led *either* to the ontological, *or* the epistemological interpretation of Avicenna's dictum.¹⁶

The web of sub-issues

Medieval and postmedieval scholasticism share not only the ontological nucleus of the issue of universals but also an array of sub-issues revolving around this ontological core.¹⁷ Because of the enormous complexity of the question of universals, which, as Alain de Libera notes, makes this problem a problem full of problems (*un problème saturé*),¹⁸ the related topics present problems and sub-problems pertaining to many philosophical and theological disciplines. Apart from ontology and logic (semantics and semiotics), it is also epistemology (or cognitive psychology), natural philosophy and theology, both natural theology in case of divine cognition and revealed theology of the Trinitarian doctrine in case of the commonality of divine essence to the three Divine Persons. The valuable contribution of the second scholastics is that they picked out all those issues, treated by medieval scholastics often dispersedly and fragmentarily in largely theological contexts, and put them in systematic order framed by the tight textual interrelatedness within the all-comprising *Cursus philosophici*.

Not surprisingly, the crucial bunch of problems complementary to the ontological issue of universals is connected with the notions of *individuality* and *individuation*. *Universale* as what can be communicated, shared, multiplied, exemplified or instantiated can be defined only in opposition to the non-communicable, non-sharable, non-exemplifiable singulars. Accordingly, in medieval scholasticism the issue of universals was often treated together with or within the immediate context of enquiry into the principle of individuation. The doctrine of universals constituted either the starting point for the ensuing ontological treatment of individuation (in Duns Scotus's elaboration¹⁹), or a short (more or less useless) appendix to a treatise on universals (as in the texts of nominalists who considered the issue to be a pseudoproblem). Not differently from the ontological or physical treatment of individuation (in fact, if substantial matter or quantity is designated as the principle of individuation, then the issue of the principle of individuation is a question pertaining rather to natural philosophy than to metaphysics), the

16. On these two different interpretations see Owens 1971. See also Honnefelder 1984, 495. Regarding the medieval context of Avicenna's philosophical "discovery" see Klima 2003. Concerning the ontological and epistemological interpretation of Avicenna see Pini 2004.

17. As regards this metaphor see Galluzzo 2008.

18. De Libera 1996, 11–65.

19. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 391–516).

epistemological issue – both on the level of intellectual and sensory cognition of material singulars and universals – also epitomizes the related bundle of sub-issues closely affiliated to the central ontological problem. The complexity of the epistemological question of the formation of universality fundamentally based on the notion of abstraction and cognition of material singulars becomes even greater if one takes into account the fact that the questions of *cognitio singularis* and *cognitio universalis* were in scholasticism often addressed in connection with the problem of the *primum cognitum*, i.e., whether the knowledge of singulars is prior to the apprehension of universals or vice versa.²⁰

Apart from the broad complex of issues related to the aspects of individuality and individuation, another important query concerns the question of *definition* and its *parts*. It is well-known that a definition spells out the content of the *universale*, in case of the specific definition dividing it into its parts, i.e., genus and specific difference. One important assumption inherent in the peripatetic traditions and “domesticated” chiefly in Thomism, is the premise that the categorial concepts (the so-called predicables) have a foundation in the thing, in the hylemorphic principles. In what sense can then those predicables be said to be taken from those principles? What is meant when it is said that genus is taken from the matter of a material substance and the specific difference from its form? At first glance, it is clear that those statements cannot be meant literally. Genus and difference must be considered as a whole because they are actually predicated of their subject. They cannot be thought of as parts because parts are never predicated of the whole. But matter and form *are* two physical principles composing a material substance. Consequently, not speaking of immaterial substances such as angels, it seems clear that the predicables cannot literally be taken from the individual physical parts but must be related to them only analogically.²¹ Even though some, especially the Scotists, replace this hylemorphic foundation in the thing with the metaphysical composition “common nature/haecceity” being distinct by formal distinction,²² the Thomists retain this hylemorphic foundation as the key extramental foundation for our concept-formation.

Besides the sub-issues classifiable under the notion of cognitive psychology analyzing the mechanism of a cognitive act with its principles and terms, an important part of the second scholastic debates follows the bulk of problems

20. Concerning the replies and solutions to the above-mentioned questions and problems in medieval scholasticism and partly in the postmedieval one as well see especially Bérubé 1964.

21. See also Galluzzo 2008.

22. As it shall be made clear, the general theory of distinctions constitutes one of the most important backdrops of the ontology of universals as well.

concerning the question of *intentionality* or, more precisely, of the fact how and why our concepts can be *about* extramental things. In this context, where the subject matter is the so-called *universale in repraesentando*, the notions of formal concept (*conceptus formalis*), which is the cognitive act by which things are apprehended, and objective concept (*conceptus objectivus*), the thing *qua* apprehended, are of the utmost importance, taken as both first and second intentions. While first intentions signify objects in their own right, i.e., independently of human thought, second intentions are based on previous notions and signify them only insofar as they are cognized. The thematic bunch connected with intentionality is important also for ontological reasons. Are first intentions beings of reasons (*entia rationis*), or real beings (*entia realia*)? How are we to ontologically evaluate second intentions with universality at the cutting edge? Do they have only intentional being in the mind, or can they be also somehow regarded as existing independently of the intellect's negotiation?²³

Apart from inquiries into intentionality or the ontology of intentions, another important part of the problems related to the issue of universals is linked also to *theological* considerations of the *universale ante rem*. When essence as such has its proper being (as Avicenna says) prior to the being of the singular, what is its relation to the divine idea, which is the *exemplar* of divine production? Can it be said that the assumption of the *universale ante rem* eliminates the need for the *universale in re*? If so, how can the human intellect reach its cognition? What is the ontological status of the *universale ante rem*? What is its relation to possible being and to essential being (*esse essentiae*)? How can one establish the very possibility of those essences?²⁴ Moreover, the problematic of universals in theology is not limited only to the matter of essential beings and exemplary causality but pops up also in the context of the Trinitarian dogma. The Trinitarian tenet stating that the numerically one divine essence is instantiated by three divine persons (supposits) strongly evokes comparison with the instantiation of human nature in Peter, Paul, etc. Can ontological treatment of the community of created human nature be somehow inspired by the Trinitarian model? Or is this type of community entirely irrelevant to metaphysical exploration of common natures *in creatis*?²⁵

23. On the different models of intentionality in medieval scholasticism see Perler 2002.

24. For a quick overview of representative medieval conceptions of divine ideas see Renemann 2010b, 17–58.

25. As regards the non-applicability of the Trinitarian model to the issue of universals in Aquinas see Borgo 2007. As regards the application of the model of the divine essence to the ambit of created substances in patristic authors see Cross 2002. For a historical and systematic introduction to the issue of universals see also Heider 2012c.

1.2 Historical context: Thomism, Nominalism, Jesuit philosophy and Scotism

Postmedieval scholasticism (academic philosophy) or Second Scholasticism²⁶ is dated by historians approximately from 1500 till the first half of the 18th century when the Thomistic bastion at the Benedictine university in Salzburg still manifested apparent signs of intellectual activity.²⁷ Even though its beginnings are commonly associated with the Hispanic Thomism of the School of Salamanca, namely with authors such as Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546) and Domingo de Soto (1495–1560), its ideological roots can be traced back to the non-Hispanic Renaissance Thomism of Italian provenance represented by the works of Dominicans such as Tommaso de Vio, known as Cajetan (1468–1534), or Chrisostomus Javellus (1470–1538). Both are known not only as authors of commentaries on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* but also because of their shorter systematical treatises such as *De nominum analogia* (Cajetan) and *De transcendentalibus* (Javellus),²⁸ which in their all-embracing form were to become the typical genre of philosophical and theological production in the first decades of the 17th century. An important factor of the constitution of postmedieval scholasticism, nevertheless, is not only Renaissance Thomism, which took its profile predominantly vis-à-vis the doctrinal

26. I prefer to use these two labels with the variation of the word scholastic/academic philosophy because both are sufficiently extensive to cover the whole period from 1500 up to the first half of the 18th century. In case I want to specify this period, I will use a temporal determination such as “the first half of the 17th century”. When employing the designation “Second scholasticism” I do not have in mind the ideologically-laden meaning introduced by Carlo Giacon. For Giacon the expression “first scholasticism” basically signified the 13th century – the Golden Age of scholasticism – reaching its climax with Aquinas, which in the 14th century was followed by the unwelcome Scotistic decline. Analogously, Second scholasticism, then, was to mean above all the 16th century Thomism represented by the School of Salamanca culminating in Suárez, who was regarded as one of the (though obviously unorthodox) Thomists. For this exposition see Giacon 1946. I shall not use the labels “Renaissance scholasticism”, “Baroque scholasticism”, “Early modern scholasticism”, “Late medieval philosophy”, either, partly because they are temporally too restrictive, partly because they are straightly misleading. For an interesting discussion of the labels of the period see Novotný 2009, 212–218 and Forlivesi 2006a, 106–110.

27. For a detailed exposition of the philosophy (especially metaphysics) of the *Salzburgenses* see Bauer 1996.

28. Cajetan's Commentary to Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* (being a part of the Leonina edition) was published in 1508 (I), 1511 (I–II), 1517 (II–II) and 1522 (III) in Venice. The systematical treatise *De nominum analogia* came out in Pavia in 1498. Javellus, a less known Thomist, drew up only a commentary to the *Prima pars* of the *Summa* published in Venice in 1588. His systematical treatise on the transcendental properties *De transcendentalibus* was published in 1555. For an analysis of this important treatise in its relation to Suárez's doctrine of transcendentals see Heider 2012b.

challenge represented by the Scotism of authors such Antonio Trombetta (1436–1517) and jointly with reaction to secular Aristotelianism inspired by the strong Averroist current.²⁹ It is also the nominalizing eclecticism exemplified by the figure of John Major (1467/9–1550) and his colleagues/students at the famous Collège of Montaigu in Paris in the lead with Thomists such as Peter Crockaert (ca. 1465–1514) and Juan de Celaya (1490–1558), who was later to become the teacher of Francisco de Vitoria. It is not historically inappropriate to say that the conciliatory attitude to nominalism, no doubt the result of humanist critique of scholasticism in general, which was apparent in the works of the early second scholastics such as Domingo de Soto,³⁰ is historically conditioned by the performance of Major and his school.³¹

Except for Pedro Fonseca (1528–1599) – the author of the monumental four-volume work *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*,³² which, according to Fonseca's intention, was to serve as the first part of the *Curso Conimbricense* (commentaries to the complete *Corpus Aristotelicum*),³³ who was significantly influenced by Scotism and strong realism more than any other of the early Jesuits,³⁴ this conciliatory attitude to nominalism can be observed also

29. In this context I have in mind especially Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) and his interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima*, in which the author endorses the thesis of the non-demonstrability of the immortality of the human soul (being the issue of Renaissance philosophy) by natural reason. For an edition of this text see Pietro Pomponazzi, *Tractatus de immortalitate animae: Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (Hamburg 1990). It is well-known that at the end of his career Cajetan also rejected such demonstrability by comparing the issue of the immortality of the human soul to the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. See Fraile 1978, 399–400. For Suárez's critical reaction to Pomponazzi see South 2012 and Heider 2011c.

30. Domingo Soto, *In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione commentaria* (Venice 1587; reprint: Frankfurt 1967, 28): "Quo circa qui inter Nominales nati sumus, interque Reales nutriti ..."

31. Concerning this claim see also Caruso 1979, 19–24. As regards Major and his followers see Broadie 1985.

32. *Commentaria in libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (vol. I–II, Rome 1577; vol. III, Cologne 1604; vol. IV, Lyon 1612).

33. The series of the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu*, realized by Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), Baltasar Álvares (1561–1630), Cosmas de Magalhães (1551–1624) and Sebastião do Couto (1567–1639), comprises the following commentaries: *In octos libros Physicorum* (1591), *Parva Naturalia* (1592), *De Caelo* (1592), *Meteororum* (1592), *De generatione et corruptione* (1597), *De anima* (1598), *Tractatus de anima separata* (1598), *Tractatio aliquot problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium*, *In universam dialecticam Aristotelis* (1606). On the genesis of those texts, initiated by Jerónimo Nadal (1507–1580), the Vicar General of the Jesuit Order, see Martins 2006.

34. Concerning the strong realism of Fonseca see Menn 1997.

among the first members of the Society of Jesus, who actually can be regarded as the key inaugurators of Second Scholasticism. Even though Second Scholasticism was “officially” initiated by the Thomists of the School of Salamanca, who (with the important exception of Soto) were engaged predominantly in drawing up commentaries on the *practical* and *theological* parts of Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*, largely stimulated by the challenges of the discovery of the New World (the problem of the natural rights of Native Americans and the issue of international law became the “hot issues” of the period) and by the protestant *sola fides, sola Scriptura*,³⁵ the real breakthrough in theoretical philosophy (not speaking of the enormous Jesuit contribution concerning the theological issue of *De auxiliis* attempting to harmonize free human will with divine foreknowledge), influenced by the nominalizing eclecticism of Major’s school, came with members of the Society of Jesus such as Cardinal Francisco de Toledo (1534–1596).³⁶ This tendency, which had impact on Suárez’s metaphysics and epistemology, grew stronger in the post-Suarezian Jesuit generation represented by authors such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641), Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) and Francisco de Oviedo (1602–1651), who – unlike authors of the 16th century still drawing up commentaries on Aristotle’s writings or on Porphyry’s *Isagogé* – set out to present their philosophy in systematic manuals comprising all the theoretical philosophical disciplines (i.e., with the exception of ethics usually elaborated in a different work) called *Cursus philosophici*. Despite their veneration of Suárez – as Arriaga says: “Inter quos, ut et in ceteris materiis, longe altius extulit caput huius saeculi in Scholasticis Gigas Franciscus Suarez aureis illis duobus in metaphysicam tomis, quam alii postea gloriose imitati sunt”³⁷ – all those Jesuits not only substantially shifted Suarezianism in the direction of nominalism or, precisely speaking, of conceptualism, historically speaking, they were also one of the causes of the doctrinal fission within the Society of Jesus itself. Even though the Jesuits’ *Ratio studiorum* published in 1599 – the well-known statutes of education at Jesuit colleges and universities³⁸ – explicitly prescribe

35. See the systematic treatise on theological sources *De locis theologicis* (important for the reformation of the theological curriculum at universities) written by Melchior Cano (1509–1560), an advisor of the Council of Trent. About this text see Heider 2009, 22–23.

36. Franciscus Toletus, *Opera omnia philosophica* I–III: *Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam* (Cologne 1615; reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1985, 29): “Possunt autem omnes opiniones [those of nominalists, moderate realists and Platonists; D.H.] ex parte quadam conciliari ...”

37. Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus, Praefatio ad lectorem* (Paris 1639).

38. For a general overview of the Jesuit’s *Ratio studiorum* see Koláček 2006 and Heider 2009, 32–35.

Aristotle and Aquinas as the two key authorities in philosophy and theology,³⁹ the creeping influence of nominalism constituted an invariable of Jesuit philosophizing. It is not surprising that this doctrinal and methodological constellation led, *inter alia*, to the strongly conceptualizing interpretations of Aquinas's philosophy in Hurtado de Mendoza's exposition.⁴⁰ No wonder that in the first half of the 17th century the doctrinal division of Jesuits into Thomists represented by Thomas Compton Carleton (1591–1666) and the above-mentioned nominalizing Jesuits, critical of all sorts of moderate realism, became a historical fact.⁴¹

It was not only nominalism originally imported from Major's school to Second Scholasticism but also Scotism that must be regarded as an important doctrinal factor in the constitution of the philosophical orientation of Jesuit philosophy in the 16th and 17th century. The significance of Scotus's philosophy, largely due to the coexistence of chairs dedicated to a specific speculative orientation at the faculties of theology, most frequently *in via Thomae* and *in via Scoti*, is evident also in Suárez's metaphysics and epistemology. With a slight exaggeration it can be said that Scotism in the second half of the 16th century is represented, apart from Fonseca, mainly by Suárez's philosophy. Nevertheless, if the second half of the 16th century is not the strongest period in the history of Scotism, the situation in the 17th century is quite the reverse. The Jesuit school with its nominalizing orientation, the progressive line of the Jesuits, who were up to the scientific standards in natural sciences and widely open to modern philosophy and science in general,⁴² and the Thomism endorsed by Dominicans (headed by Francisco de Araújo (1580–1664), professor at the *Cathedra de prima* in Salamanca in 1621–1648, and Ioannes a Sancto Thoma, by civilian name João Poinset, Benedictines (besides the *Salzburgenses* especially José Sáenz de Aguirre /1630–1699/) and Discalced Carmelites (the most well-known are the so-called *Complutenses* from the College

39. Claude Pavur, *The Ratio Studiorum. The Official Plan for Jesuit Education* (Saint Louis 2005, 99): "In rebus alicuius momenti ab Aristotele non recedat, nisi quid incidat a doctrina, quam academiae ubique probant alienum; multo magis, si orthodoxae fidei repugnet"; ibidem, 100–101: "Contra vero de Sancto Thoma nunquam non loquatur honorifice, libentibus illum animis, quoties oportet, sequendo; aut reventer et gravate, si quando minus placeat, deserendo". See also Ariew 1992, 63–69.

40. Concerning the nominalization or conceptualization of Aquinas by Hurtado see Heider 2010b.

41. Caruso 1979, 81–99.

42. For the development of various streams (conservative, semi-conservative and progressive) within the Society of Jesus in the 17th century see Jansen 2004.

of St. Cyril in Alcalá de Henares, the *Complutum*⁴³) all no doubt constituted important scholastic force in the intellectual life of the 17th century. However, speculative superiority, detail of analysis, strength of argument, overall number of protagonists,⁴⁴ and – last but not least – manifest (though largely mediated) influence on the canonical early modern philosophy, represented by authors such as René Descartes,⁴⁵ were on the side of the Scotists.

Even though signs of Scotistic revival are noticeable already at the beginning of the 17th century,⁴⁶ the extraordinary blossoming of Scotism was mainly caused by two decisive factors in the first decades of the 17th century. The first was the defamation of Duns Scotus published by the Polish Dominican Abraham Bzovius (1567–1637), the author of nine volumes devoted to church history called *Annales ecclesiastici*. Advancing the work on the *Annales* after Cardinal Cesare Baronius (1538–1607), Bzovius presented the worst legends about Scotus's life and character, that he was buried alive, was of quarrelsome character, was a sophist, etc. Predictably, this denigration provoked apologetic reactions from aggrieved Franciscans. Among the most famous apologies belongs *Apologia pro Joanne Duns Scoto vindicando ab injuriis allatis per Abrahamum Bzovium* composed by the well-known Irish Franciscan Hugh Cavellus or McCaghwell (15171–1626). The second impulse was the popularity of the theological tenet of the Immaculate

43. The so-called *Complutenses* are authors of commentaries on Aristotle's *Logica* (Alcalá 1624), *Physica* (Alcalá 1625), *De generatione et corruptione* (Madrid 1627) and *De anima* (Madrid 1628). The author of *Logica* is Michael a SS. Trinitate (1588–1661), the other three were written by Antonius a Matre Dei (1583–1637). A couple of years later *Metaphysica*, composed in 1640 by Blasius a Conceptione (1603–1694), was added to the series. This series can also be well understood as a Thomistic counterpart to the Jesuit series of the *Collegium Conimbricense*. Concerning this Carmelite series see Risse, "Vorwort", in: *Complutenses Discalceati, Disputationes in Aristotelis dialecticam*, Lyons 1668 (reprint: Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 1977, v–vii).

44. Concerning this statement of Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682) see Bak 1956.

45. On Scotistic influence on Descartes, among others, see Ariew 1999. For many Scotistic antecedents of the Cartesian notion *realitas objectiva* see especially Marrone 2008. Worth seeing is old but still valid Dalbiez 1929.

46. The following significant events can be mentioned: in 1586 the Franciscan Juan de Rada (ca. 1545–1608) released his influential *Controversiae theologicae inter S. Thomam et Scotum* in Salamanca; in 1587 the Pope Sixtus V. (1585–1590) founded the College of St. Bonaventure famous as *Collegio Sistino*; in 1602 the Conventual Filippo Fabri (1564–1630) set out his systematic *Philosophia naturalis I. Duns Scoti ex quatuor libris sententiarum et quodlibetis collecta* (published together with *Tractatus in formalitatibus emendatus et ampliatus*), which in the following 20 years was to live through five editions. For bio-bibliographical information on Fabri, an important Scotist of the turn of the 16th and 17th century, see Scapin 1976, 510; Jansen 1936, 150–152; Schmitt 1979 and Montanari 1883, 68–72.

Conception, of which Scotus was a resolute advocate.⁴⁷ One of the leading figures in this apologetic movement was the Irishman Luke Wadding (1588–1657), who studied in Coimbra and became rector of the Irish College in Salamanca in 1617. Studies of Scotus's theology and philosophy were especially stimulated by two Wadding's exploits. In 1618 Wadding founded the College of St. Isidore in Rome, where he assembled quite a large number of industrious collaborators recruited mainly from Ireland.⁴⁸ Apart from the well-known John Punch (1599 or 1603–1661), by the Latin name Poncius, it was mainly Anthony Hickey (1586–1641) and Francis Relly (d. 1651). However, by far the most important achievement was Wadding's publication of the first complete edition of *Opera omnia* of Duns Scotus in 12 volumes in Lyon in 1639, which made massive expansion of Scotus's philosophy and theology all over Europe and Latin America possible.⁴⁹

The overview of conservative scholastic intellectual currents at the end of the 16th and in the 17th century is not exhausted by the classification into Thomism, Scotism and Jesuit philosophy, comprising the influence of both schools and as well as elements of nominalism.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, compared to the above-mentioned three schools, the other speculative lines of thought appear like secondary stream-lets, which observed from afar are hardly noticeable. If we are to draw a representative picture of the scholastic discussion of the issue of universals at the end of the

47. On these two factors see Rivera de Ventosa, "§ 8. Der Scotismus", in: Schobinger 1998, 377–378. A detailed exposition of those two factors can be also found in Grajewski 1946, 58–61.

48. On the significance of Irish Scotism in the Scotist revival of the 17th century see Stone 2009. On Irish Scotists at St. Isidore's College see Millett 1968.

49. Concerning Wadding's greatest achievement see Mooney 1958, 231–232. Jacob Schmutz remarks that his edition was one of the first attempts at a critical edition. See Schmutz 2002, 59. One of the greatest names of Latin-American colonial scholasticism is the Scotist Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668), born in Santiago de Chile, who spent most of his life in Peru. On Briceño see Pich 2012.

50. One cannot leave out the teaching of St. Bonaventure often introduced especially among the Capuchins in the lead with the Bohemian Valerian Magni (1586–1661) and his famous *De luce mentium et eius imagine ad contemplandam lucem increatam*. Regarding Magni's philosophy see Sousedik 2009, 114–139 and Sousedik 1983. The most renowned member of the order of Servites Angelus Ventura (d. 1738) in his *Magistri Fr. Henrici Gandavensis Philosophica Tripartitio doctrinarum et rationum* (1701) follows the philosophy of Henry of Ghent. Others look for inspiration in the streams of medieval philosophy claiming allegiance to Raymondus Lullus (ca. 1232–1315). Especially the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680) with his *Polygraphia nova et universalis ex combinatoria arte detecta* (Rome 1663) became famous for this orientation. Many of these authors were engaged with writing courses *Ad mentem S. P. Augustini* or *Ad mentem B. Aegidii Romani*. For a list of those authors and the titles of their works see Fraile 1978, 429–432 (Augustinianism), 438–439 (Bonaventurianism), 470–473 (Lullism).

16th and at the beginning of the 17th century, the selected representatives must not be taken from those lateral “tributaries” but from the three main streams. No doubt the most representative authors of those schools, as a wide range of secondary literature confirms,⁵¹ are the *Doctor Eximius*, the Jesuit *Francisco Suárez*, the Dominican and Thomist *Ioannes a S. Thoma* (further in the main text only *Poinsot*) and the *Princeps Scotistarum*, the Italian Conventual *Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola* and his Sicilian collaborator *Bonaventura Belluto*.⁵²

1.3 Goal and methodology

The goal of this work is to *present*, *interpret* and *compare* the highly complex and systematic doctrines of universals of the above-mentioned representatives of the three central orientations in Second Scholasticism, presented not in the pure form of commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon* or Porphyry’s *Isagogé* but in systematically elaborated texts dealing with ontological and epistemological (sub)issues of the *universalia*. Apart from metaphysical treatises the issue is often presented in the logical questions called *De universale in communi*. In the context of the ontological issue of universals, the main criterion of comparison will be the aspect of the *degree* and *character* of the extramental foundation of universal concepts. At the epistemological level, complementing the metaphysical plane, the enquiry is guided, above all, by the dichotomy *cognitio singularis/cognitio universalis*. It is concerned not only with *how* this or that cognition is realized, but also with the issue of the “chronology” of this or that type of cognition. In the logico-ontological context of the issues of the ontology of first and second intentions, the defining criterion is the doctrinal polarity “*rationalist* conceptualism/*realist* conceptualism”, supplemented by the psychologism peculiar to Hurtado de Mendoza’s doctrine. The investigation is regulated by the question of the ontological status of first and second intentions, i.e., whether they are to be assessed as real beings, or rather as beings of reason and if so, in which sense.⁵³

51. This representative selection is confirmed by Jansen 1936, 48: “... was die Disputationes metaphysicae des Suarez für die Jesuiten, später die vielberühmte *Cursus philosophicus* des Johannes a S. Thoma für die Thomisten waren, das bedeutet diese Sammlung [*Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, D.H.] für die Franziskaner”. It is not surprising that also Sven Knebel bases his exposition of the entry on “Universalien” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* on the theories of Suárez, Poinsot and Mastri/Belluto (see Knebel 2001b).

52. Their brief bio-bibliographies are presented below in the Appendix.

53. This polarity is viewed as the main criterion of comparison also in Hickman 1980.

Accordingly, overall emphasis will be placed on the ontological and epistemological facets of the broad issue commonly associated with the three kinds of universals at the level of the *universale in re* and the *universale post rem*, i.e., with the *universale in essendo*, the *universale in repraesentando* and the *universale in praedicando*.⁵⁴ As far as possible, I leave aside systematic enquiry into the *universale ante rem* usually connected, apart from divine ideas with their exemplary causality, with the *universale in causando* equivalent to a singular being(s) (God, heavenly bodies) having a plurality of heterogeneous effects. Because of the disproportionate distribution of logical texts in the philosophical production of the selected authors – due especially to the absence of logical texts or commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon* in Suárez⁵⁵ – the *universale in significando* and the different kinds of supposition, the treatment of which belonged in Second Scholasticism especially to the so-called *Summulae* called also *Logica minor* or *Dialectica* (corresponding to what we call today formal logic⁵⁶), is dealt with only peripherally.

54. The inclusion of *universale in praedicando* does not imply that apart from the first mental operation, i.e., the simple apprehension (*simplex apprehensio*), I shall equally delve into issues related to the second mental operation (*judicium*). Even though the conception of predication, no doubt, guides the overall character of the logical universal, predicability, let alone actual predication, is not usually considered to be the essence of the logical universal but only its property (*passio*). The dominant part of epistemological and logical analyses thus shall be enacted on the level of *simplex apprehensio*.

55. Concerning the destiny of Suárez's logical treatises, most likely written during his stay in Segovia in the first half of 1570s, see De Scorraile 1911, 1: 416. Suárez himself informs of his intention to draw up a logical treatise on predicables in *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disputation VI, section 8, n. 5 (Paris 1861, 233). Further I shall quote from this Paris's edition set out by L. Vivès in the following way: *DM* VI, s. 8, n. 5 /Vivès, vol. 25: 233/. This textual disproportion is also the reason why I leave aside specific questions dealing with the individual predicables such as genus, species and difference, such as the question of the predicable and subjectable (*subicibilis*) logical species of angelic natures, i.e., the issue whether there can be more numerical instances of the same angelic species and specifically different angels of the same genus. Regrettably, similar textual disparity afflicts also Poinso's textual *corpus*. It is well-known that his *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* does not contain a part on metaphysics. It may be argued that with respect to the goal of this book this disproportion is nothing else but fatal. Fortunately, that is not the case. Admittedly, as far as the ontology of universals is concerned, comparatively to Mastri/Belluto and Suárez, Poinso's *Logica major* is a fairly modest piece of work but it still includes the significant part *De universale in communi* devoted to the same ontological subissues as those treated in the metaphysical texts of Suárez and Mastri/Belluto.

56. For the tradition of logical treatises of postmedieval scholasticism were of significance mainly *Summulae* written by Domingo de Soto (came out first in 1529; the second edition was published in 1547). Compared to their medieval model – the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain – they are (especially in the author's second edition) substantially modified, systematized and shortened. For an exposition of this see Risse 1964, 329–332.

Salient attention is paid to detailed textual analysis of the ontological foundation of *categorial* predicates.⁵⁷ By focusing on categorial universals I intend to lay aside the issue of the disposition of transcendental predicates going beyond the highest *genera*. The solution to this issue is mentioned only for the sake of illustration of the general theory of distinctions and for doctrinal contrast with the categorial universals. Of the bundle of categorial universals I deal primarily with *substantial monadic* predicates constituting the essence or quiddity of a *material* substance. The focus on mundane material universals, again, does not mean that I ignore analysis of the issue in the application to immaterial substances such as angels or God. Equally, the treatise on *monadic* substantial predicates does not entirely exclude the relative predicates from our field of vision. Not only is the relation of similarity, as it were, the ontological milieu in which the ontology of universals is firmly rooted, the notion of the fully-fledged universal itself is actually essentially relational. That makes clear that the issue of relation constitutes an important element in the complex issue of universals.

The upshot of the comparative study should be a *differentiated* picture of the various kinds of theories of the issue of universals within the doctrinal frame of moderate realism, which can be preliminary defined by the assumption of the so-called objective precision (*praecisio objectiva*).⁵⁸ It is beyond all question that this task can best be realized in the context of the second scholastic discussions standing at the peak of the long scholastic tradition, for which doing philosophy was basically of systematic character. The promising nature of this enterprise is underlined by the fact that there was both obvious continuation and progressive critical reactions to the above-mentioned three (four) authors. Not only are they the typical and key representatives of their schools, the historical sequence Suárez–Poinsoot–Mastri/Belluto, in which they are presented, makes clear that while Poinsoot, deeply influenced by Suárez, critically reacts to Suárez,⁵⁹ Mastri/

57. Categorial predicates were also the original context of the treatment of universals. Porphyry's *Isagoge* is an introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, not to *Metaphysics*.

58. By the objective precision I mean the intellectual separation of two predicates in the way that one predicate (*rational*), or rather its counterpart *in re* can be cognized *without* the formal and immediate cognition of the other (*animal*). Especially in 2.6 I develop this definition when comparing the theories of Suárez and Hurtado de Mendoza.

59. As for Poinsoot's excellent knowledge of Suárez, cf. Beatus Reiser, "Editoris Praefatio", in: Ioannes a S. Thoma, *Cursus philosophicus Thomisticus* (further *CPT*), vol. 1 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, xi). Poinsoot's extraordinary knowledge of Suárez's philosophy is also confirmed by the no less excellent knowledge of Joseph Gredt (1863–1940). Gredt's familiarity is not incidental if one takes into account that his *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* are (apart from the work of Cajetan, the *Complutenses* and the *Salzburgenses*) largely based on Poinsoot's

Belluto critically respond both to Poinsoot and in depth and almost congenially to Suárez, by whom they were also strongly influenced.⁶⁰ This continuity, showing that the history of philosophy is not only a collection of disparate opinions craving for originality, also manifests that Suárez is not conceived in this work (as it is often the case) as “the last” or “a very late scholastic” but rather as “the first scholastic” of a venerable scholastic tradition in the 17th century. Accordingly, the method used in the book can be pointedly called “the accumulative method”. I proceed cumulatively so that my comparison will become more complex every time I pick up a new author and a new doctrine on the way to the final comparison and evaluation.

Although the comparative task will be of primary significance, the historical dimension cannot and will not be neglected. While the *objectum formale* of the enquiry in the theories of Poinsoot and Mastri/Belluto will be determined by the “projection screen” of Suárez’s (and Poinsoot’s) standpoint – particularly in the interpretation of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory that viewpoint will give us an important methodological guideline necessary for sailing the ocean of the doctrines, opinions and arguments found in their enormously detailed exposition –, the Jesuit’s theory will be exposed, at least basically, in the context of the classical medieval and renaissance scholastic *auctoritates* such as Aquinas, Scotus, Cajetan and Fonseca. Apart from this historical context, in order to distinguish Suárez’s theory from what can be called pure conceptualism of the post-Suarezian Jesuit philosophy of the first half of the 17th century, *I ex professo* also introduce the metaphysical conception of universals of the post-Suarezian Jesuit Hurtado de Mendoza (2.6). The doctrine of this “Father of modern scholastic conceptualism” will serve as the negative complement showing the borders of moderate realism as such.

Each chapter is structured by a “from bottom to top” grid. This procedure copies another commonly shared division into the threefold universal corresponding to the individual phases of the “actualization” of the universal nature, which begins with the ontological foundation determined by the particularized natures or the potential universal (*universale in potentia*) via the abstracted (absolute) nature to the logical (relational) universal usually designated as *universale in actu*. This division intersects with two other above-mentioned divisions into *universale in re/universale post rem* and *universale in essendo/universale in repraesentando/universale*

Cursus. It is also not incidental that Beatus Reiser, the editor of Poinsoot’s *Cursus*, was Gredt’s student. Cf. Martin Walter, “Einleitende Bemerkungen”, *CPT*, vol. 1, xviii. Concerning Suárez’s influence on Poinsoot see also Pereira 2007, 156–171.

60. This also points to the non-individualistic and non-self-referential way of doing philosophy among the scholastics of the era, which was produced with regard to teaching in large communities and institutions. For this aspect of Second scholasticism see Blum 1998, 253–262 and Novotný 2009, 225–226.

in praedicando, with which it is almost identical. This phasing will enable us to pick out and gradually analyze in a well-ordered manner all the important aspects of the complex issue of universals cohering with other aspects of the philosophical systems (including the broad context of cognitive psychology) of the authors compared, leading from the ontology of universals based on the enquiry into the *in re* foundation, *via* the psychology and epistemology of the absolute universal acquired by the abstractive act of the intellect, *up to* the respective character of the logical universal characterized by predicability.

1.4 State of research

Despite the long and extensive research on the issue of universals in medieval scholasticism spearheaded by De Libera's comprehensive *La querelle des universaux* and the booming scholarship in the field, the literature on the issue of universals is meager. Above all, there is *no* monograph inquiring into the *comparative* analysis of the *complex* issue of universals in Second Scholasticism. Admittedly, there is a fine publication by Ester Caruso called *Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento* dealing with the issue of universals in the scholasticism of the 16th and 17th century. For all its merits, it treats the issue neither in its complexity nor comparatively, i.e., with the same attention devoted to all the authors compared. As the title suggests, Caruso's book presents the conceptualist theory of universals of Hurtado de Mendoza in the scholastic context of not only medieval nominalists such as William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347), Gregory of Rimini (ca. 1300–1358), Gabriel Biel (ca. 1425–1495) and of the pseudo-Aquinas's treatises *De universalibus*, but also of later authors and schools such as Cajetan, the Collège de Montaigu (with John Major and his followers), Domingo de Soto and the Jesuits including Francisco Toledo, Pedro Fonseca, Antonio Rubio (1548–1615), the *Conimbricenses* and Suárez. The significance of Hurtado's theory is shown both in his immediate positive influence on the Jesuits such as Arriaga,⁶¹ Oviedo and Antonio Bernardo de Quirós (1613–1668) and less on Sebastián Izquierdo (1601–1681),⁶² the Cistercian Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–1682) and also in the critical reactions (Thomas Compton Carleton) it provoked. The overall emphasis on the nominalist tradition that at the end of the 17th century proved to be largely the winning force especially in

61. Arriaga's theory of universals, interpreted as a radicalization of Hurtado's theory toward sensualism, is presented in Sousedík 1998 and 2009, 88–96.

62. Concerning Izquierdo's theory see Di Vona 1994, 253–266 and Novotný 2012.

extra-scholastic philosophy,⁶³ however, entails some lacks in Caruso's publication as well. While Punch's theory (partly influenced by nominalism) is evaluated positively, the theory of Mastri/Belluto (called falsely Antonio⁶⁴), seen as of "un piú rigido atteggiamento",⁶⁵ gets a raw deal on mere two pages. The same holds also for Poinso's theory, which is seen as unoriginal and dealing only with fundamental elements suitable at most for undergraduate students.⁶⁶ Caruso's book cannot be called "a comparative study" since not only the doctrine of the two Scotists but also Suárez's doctrine and the theories of other authors (except that of Hurtado) are introduced briefly and unsystematically.

A relevant contribution to the issue constitutes the chapter *Universalien- und Distinktionlehre* in Emmanuel J. Bauer's book (having almost 900 pages) *Thomistische Metaphysik an der alten Benediktineruniversität Salzburg*, focusing on detailed exposition of the philosophical (especially metaphysical) production of the professors teaching at the Benedictine university in Salzburg in 1617–1742.⁶⁷ The book is important for our research especially because of doctrinal parallelism with Poinso's theory. The theories of orthodox Thomists, of which Ludwig Babenstuber (1660–1726) stands out, are in fact much like that of Poinso. Babenstuber's and other Thomists' teaching on universals are presented (apart from being directed against Platonism) as being of principally anti-Scotistic (often including also Fonseca), anti-Jesuit and anti-nominalist (often crossed with anti-Jesuit) orientation. Scotism is rejected by the deep-rooted dismissal of *distinctio formalis* considered either useless or even a contradictory item. Jesuit philosophy is found implausible because of its overall subjective rationalism or *Ich-philosophie* leading to undesirable modern philosophy fundamentally incompatible with Thomistic *Seinsphilosophie*. Bauer's explication of the doctrines of the *Salzburgenses* also casts important light on Suárez's doctrine, especially on his advocacy of the so-called *praecisio objectiva*,⁶⁸ which can be viewed as an important litmus paper of the doctrinal difference between moderate realism and nominalism (conceptualism). Although Bauer's exposé is focused on moderate realism and takes into account

63. Ignacio Angelelli quotes the opinion of Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) and Pierre Nicole (1625–1695), representatives of the Port-Royal school, about the obsolescence of the *universale in essendo*. See Angelelli 1998, 296 and also Bolton 1998, 186.

64. Caruso 1979, 104.

65. Ibidem, 106.

66. Ibidem, 92–93.

67. See Bauer 1996, 116–193.

68. See also his conclusion "Der Salzburger Thomismus als philosophie-geschichtliches Phänomen", 735.

also other scholastic streams and authors, it cannot be called properly “a comparative study” either. In the centre of its attention stands Salzburg Thomism in its intrinsic continuity and dynamics of the 125-year long tradition supplemented by *Fragestellung* concerning the relation of the *Salzburgenses* to the genuine Aquinas (*Thomanische philosophie*).⁶⁹

Leaving aside a large number of titles (both books and articles) treating various aspects more or less connected with the complex issue of universals, which will be quoted *passim*, it may be said that the article production (again not large) dealing explicitly with the issue of universals in Second Scholasticism in the second half of the 16th and the first half of the 17th century can be roughly divided into two main categories. The first consists of articles on the theory of universals of Suárez. The majority are written from a Thomistic perspective viewing Suárez critically as a “shy” nominalist.⁷⁰ According to such interpretation, Suárez’s rejection of the universalizing abstraction of the agent intellect connected with the *primum cognitum* of a material singular grounded in the rejection of the material principle of individuation can lead to nothing else than to nominalism. Albeit quantitatively this kind of interpretation can be called majoritarian, it was also accompanied by a different viewpoint seeing Suárez less ideologically as “a renegade Thomist” and considering him more from the Augustinian perspective⁷¹ or on the basis of careful historical textual analysis compared with Aquinas⁷² or Ockham.⁷³ This last approach is of the significant help for getting a more differentiated picture of Suárez currently leading to a different evaluation of his teaching.

The second bunch of papers treats other second scholastics’ theories of universals. Significant research has been done on the “exotic” tenet of universals of Pedro Fonseca whose theory of unity of precision was sharply rejected not only by Suárez but as early as by his immediate colleagues and followers at the university in Coimbra. In the paper “The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals (1577–1606)” Mário de Carvalho suggests that Fonseca’s philosophical divergences had been

69. Bauer 1996, 37. The same traits can be observed also in Ulrich Leinsle’s exposition of the *Disputationes* at the Swabian Jesuit University in Dillingen. See Leinsle 2006, 111–119. Contrary to the *Salzburgenses*, the theories of the *Dillinganes*, predictably, bear witness of the great doctrinal plurality within the Jesuit order.

70. See Mahieu 1921, 523; Manser 1934; Giacón 1941, 679–689; Peccorini 1972 and 1974. For a critique of Peccorini’s interpretation see Heider 2011d, 400–415. The nominalizing interpretation of Suárez’s teaching can be also found in Freddoso 1984; Mertz 2004, 130; Ross 1962; of recent ones see also Åkerlund 2009.

71. See Hoeres 1961; De Vries 1949; Roig 1961; Teixidor 1912.

72. See South 2002. The breakthrough work is the old but still valid Alejandro 1948.

73. Cf. Noreña 1981.

one of the reasons why by 1591 the “Portuguese Aristotle” was not involved any more in the long-term project of the Jesuits’ Coimbra *Course*, which he himself initiated and catalyzed by his *Metaphysics*. Sebastião do Couto, the author of the *Course*’s part *In Aristotelis Logicam* (1606), is shown as one of many authors who dismissed the conception of the *unitas praecisionis* as the kind of extramental unity.⁷⁴ Apart from the fine paper “Domingo de Soto on Universals and the Ontology of Intentions” written by Ria van der Lecq, discussing Soto’s synthesis of nominalism and realism,⁷⁵ there are some publications viewing Poinso’s theory of universals within the frame of his intensively researched semiotics. Poinso’s moderate realism is exposed as a realistic complement to his theory of signs largely elaborated in the *Tractatus de Signis* of his *CPT*.⁷⁶ Despite a number of publications on Mastri/Belluto’s philosophy (to mention, at least, the recent volume *Rem in seipsa cernere. Saggi sul pensiero di Bartolomeo Mastri* edited by Marco Forlivesi⁷⁷), interpretation of the Scotists’ extensive theory of universals is as yet undeveloped.⁷⁸ A brief but useful overview of Mastri’s/Belluto’s theory of universals is offered by the encyclopedic entry “Universalien” drawn up by Sven K. Knebel in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (Bd. 11: U–V).⁷⁹ Occasional references, especially to the Baroque Scotistic plurality in the issue of the community of common nature can be found in the oldish book *Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus O.F.M. von der Natura communis* written by Johannes Kraus.⁸⁰

74. De Carvalho 2007, 538–539. Regarding Fonseca’s theory of universals see the old Uedelhofen 1916, 24–35; Menn 1997. See also the dissertation of Madeira 2006, 51–105. There are also many papers in Portuguese. See especially Abranches 1956.

75. Van der Lecq 2000; for Soto’s conception of universals see also Di Liso 2000, 269–278 and Svoboda 2012b.

76. See Ioannes a S. Thoma, *CPT*, vol. 1, *Artis Logicae Secunda Pars: Tractatus de Signis*, qq. 21–23 (Hildesheim/Zürich/New York 2008, 646–749). Apart from John Deely’s translation and detailed commentary on the treatise and his numerous other works (e.g. Deely 2008, 29–46), see also Rasmussen 1994 and Furton 1997. Cf. also the comprehensive and clear exposition in Meier-Oeser 1997, 213–235. There are also some, purely expository, papers such as Beuchot 1989 and Heider 2010a. For an exposé of Poinso’s doctrine of universals in the context of his theory of predication see Bondi 1966.

77. Of the papers included in the volume, sc. Renemann 2006, is of special relevance to the issue of universals.

78. One of a few exceptions is Heider 2010c, 2011e and Novák 2012.

79. Knebel 2001b.

80. Kraus 1927. Concerning the issue of the plurality of opinions in the school of Scotus in the Baroque Bohemia see also Sousedík 2005, 155–156.

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) on universals

2.1 Universals in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* and *De Anima*

Francisco Suárez elaborates his theory of universals in the 6th disputation *De unitate formali et universali* of his two-volume *Metaphysical disputations*.⁸¹ The *DM VI* constitutes, in order, the second disputation in which the Jesuit takes up the issue of kinds of transcendental unity. The first one, i.e., *DM V* entitled *De unitate individuali et eiusque principio*,⁸² is concerned with the question of individual unity that – as compared to the other two kinds of unity – is regarded as ontologically privileged. Although it mainly focuses on the metaphysical aspect of the problematic, the epistemological (psychological) and logical topics regarding the ontology of logical intentions are taken into account as well. The issues of psychogenesis of universals and evaluation of various kinds of intentions are explicitly discussed also in *De anima* (further only *DA*) in the second part of the 3rd question *Utrum in rebus materialibus cognoscat intellectus noster singularia* of the 9th disputation.⁸³ Contrary to Scotus, whose treatment methodologically (even though not doctrinally) determines Suárez's procedure in *DM VI*, the Jesuit approaches the theme of universals only after having treated the convoluted issue of individual unity.⁸⁴ The methodological inversion of Scotus's key text concerning universals (*Ordinatio* 2.3.1),⁸⁵ having the existence of the common nature as its point of departure, clearly foreshadows the opposite setting and “tuning” of Suárez's theory.

Given the thematic orientation of Suárez's *DM VI*, I focus on the metaphysico-epistemological core of the query supplemented by an outline of the author's ontology of logical intentions. This thematic kernel can be found especially in the first

81. Francisco Suárez, *DM VI* (Vivès, vol. 25: 201–250).

82. *DM V* (Vivès, vol. 25: 145–201).

83. It is especially the block of paragraphs 12–30. I shall quote *De anima* from the following Salvador Castellote's critical edition: Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis “De anima”* available at URL: <http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/investigacion.htm>.

84. The above-mentioned complementarity of the issues of universality and individuality is also the reason why *DM V* will need to be considered as well.

85. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vat. VII, 391–516).

six sections and partially also in the 7th and 8th section of the *DM VI*. Nevertheless, the issue of the so-called metaphysical parts (grades), i.e., the extramental counterparts of the predicates represented in the Tree of Porphyry, and their distinction elaborated in the 9th and partially also 10th section of *DM VI*, must be taken into account as well.⁸⁶ I present the upshot of the 11th section devoted to the topic of the physical principles (matter/form) of formal and universal unity only in passing in the context of other questions.⁸⁷

In this chapter I proceed in the following steps. In 2.2, on the background of Suárez's "settling accounts" with Scotus, I bring forward the Jesuit's definitions of two kinds of transcendental unity immediately relevant for the metaphysics of universals, sc. that of individual and formal unity (*unitas individualis et formalis*). In 2.3 formal unity is distinguished from universal unity (*unitas universalis*). In 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 I present the theory of universal unity and the aptitude to being in the many of Pedro Fonseca, which constitutes an important antipode to Suárez's thought. In the following 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 I bring in Suárez's critique of Fonseca's doctrine. In 2.4 I expound Suárez's theory of the nature of the distinction among the metaphysical grades. In 2.5 I come to the issue of Suárez's epistemology of universals. Prior to the exposition of the issue of the essence and genesis of *universale logicum* analyzed in 2.5.3 and 2.5.4, I introduce those Suárez's epistemological views that are relevant for the psychogenesis of universality (2.5.1) with special focus on intellectual cognition of material (sensible) singulars (2.5.2). In the penultimate Section 2.6 I compare Suárez's theory with the doctrine of universals of Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza with the intention of providing the reader with a doctrinal contrast to Suárez's theory.⁸⁸ In 2.7 I summarize the main features of Suárez's doctrine that constitute the *comparanda* with the theories of Poinset and Matri/Belluto.

2.2 The metaphysics of universals: Formal and individual unity

Suárez's terminology is traditional. Individual unity, the property of a singular entity, is defined by means of the incommunicability or indivisibility of many instances, which are of the same kind as the original (divided) entity. Universal unity,

86. *DM VI*, s. 9 (Vivès, vol. 25: 236–244); *DM VI*, s. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 244–247)

87. *DM VI*, s. 10 (Vivès, vol. 25: 247–250).

88. One of the main reasons for the "insertion" of the section on Hurtado de Mendoza's theory of universals is also to show how unfounded or one-sided are the interpretations of Suárez's theory that make him a supporter of (Hurtadian) conceptualism.