

ETHNIC RELATIONS
AND NATION-BUILDING
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ETHNIC RELATIONS AND NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Case of the Ethnic Chinese

edited by
Leo Suryadinata


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Preface

Ethnic/racial relations have been a perennial theme in Southeast Asian studies, and current events have highlighted the tensions among ethnic groups and the need to maintain ethnic/racial harmony for nation unity. The Singapore Society of Asian Studies (SSAS) organized an international conference at the end of November 2002 focusing on an analysis of ethnic/race relations in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, with special reference to the roles of ethnic Chinese in nation-building. It brought together a group of established Southeast Asian scholars to critically examine some of the important issues such as ethnic politics, nation-building, state policies, and conflict resolution.

The plan of the SSAS Conference Committee was to have the issues analysed from various perspectives. It therefore invited scholars of different ethnic origins, so that each could present the perspective from his own ethnic background. The arrangement does not imply that scholars cannot offer an accurate analysis of those outside their own ethnic group. Rather, the conference was to provide an opportunity for the scholars to deal with different facets of the issues involved as experienced or witnessed in their lives. Based on this objective, the committee invited nine scholars from three countries.

From Indonesia, the Committee invited Dr Mely Tan, a senior sociologist, to deal with the issue of Chinese ethnicity and nation-building; A. Dahana, an indigenous historian, to see the problem from a *pribumi* perspective; and Frans Winarta, a *peranakan* lawyer and an activist, to look at the legal aspect of the problem.

From Malaysia, the Committee invited Dr Lee Kam Hing, a historian who has done a lot of work on Chinese Malaysians to deal with nation-building from the perspective of a Chinese Malaysian; P. Ramasamy, a political scientist of Indian descent, to deal with Indian Malaysians; and Shamsul A.B., a prolific Malay anthropologist, to give a Malay's perspective of the ethnic Chinese.

From Singapore, three scholars were invited. Eugene Tan, a young scholar trained in both law and political science, recounted the experience of nation-building in the island state; and Tan Ern Ser, a sociologist, presented a paper discussing current ethnic relations in Singapore based on survey data; while Sharon Siddique, also a sociologist, commented on Chinese Singaporeans from an outsider's point of view.

The Committee also invited Professor Wang Gungwu, a leading authority on the history of Chinese overseas and a historian of China and Southeast Asia, to address the general issue on ethnic Chinese and nation-building in Southeast Asia, thus providing a crucial framework for the conference.

These ten interesting and most up-to-date articles were later revised to become this volume. I have not only edited this volume but also provided the concluding remarks to draw the various views together.

Leo Suryadinata

30 May 2003

CHAPTER 1

Chinese Ethnicity in New Southeast Asian Nations

WANG GUNGWU

This topic is one that has been important for me all my life. The longer I live in this region, the more important this topic seems to be. In my experience, two of the most difficult words to understand are words such as “ethnic” and/or “race relations”, on the one hand, and “nation-building”, on the other. The important difference between the two is that ethnic and racial relations have been with us since the beginning of human history while nation-building is new. The concept of ethnicity, the evolution of culture and our self-awareness, the kinds of changes that enable different groups of people to communicate, live, and deal with one another in war or in peace, has a very long history. Nation-building, however, is a more specific phenomenon that has arisen in more recent times. Of course, there are many ways of defining the word “nation” and, in some older usages, it is difficult to distinguish “nation” from ethnicity and even race. But if we do not try to draw distinctions between them, we are really hard put to explain what building a nation could mean or even envisage how this is possible. Clearly, to avoid misunderstanding we must try to use these words correctly and consistently.

I cannot promise to clarify these concepts for everyone, but I will

say what I mean when I use the terms. I take the long view about culture being one of the key components of ethnicity. I shall not use the word "race" because I prefer to reserve the word for occasions when there is a need to stress physical differences.¹ It is, of course, possible to include the word "race" as another component in ethnicity, but that is not always the most important consideration. For me, ethnicity would normally be centred on culture, on the core of ethnic self-consciousness that manifests itself in the awareness of one's own cultural roots.² This is something ongoing and has been with us ever since human beings became aware of their cultural roots and began to think about the significance of having such roots.

The idea of "nation" in the specific context of the nation-states that we are encouraged to build and defend is something very new. It is different from the legal entity, the state, in that a nation that did not observe state boundaries would consist of people who lived in different states, and states could function and were recognized as such even if they included people who saw themselves as belonging to different nations. The bringing together of the two words "nations" and "states" as "nation-states" in a systematic way for all countries in the world only began in the twentieth century with the establishment of the League of Nations. Today the usage has the support of all the members of the United Nations. They may each consider themselves a nation-state in a distinctive way. The states are at different stages of nation-building. Some claim that their people are their nationals in the fullest sense while others admit that while their states consist of many "nations", they are in fact fully integrated. But all agree that they have one important feature in common: all are committed to behaving internationally as if they were all nation-states.

The nation-state is based on the modern phenomenon that first emerged in Western Europe about two hundred years ago.³ In its ideal form, it was defined to mean that every state should consist of people who believed that they belonged to a single nation. Such a nation of a united people would be the foundation of the state. Or, if a state already existed, then the people who saw themselves as being a nation would seek to determine the proper borders of that state. The coming together of the words "nation" and "state" became the model for new states that

set out to build their nations and also for some putative “nations” to seek to establish their own states.⁴ The model also outlines the parameters of such nation-states and makes it easier for us to understand the idea of nation-building and the limits of the concept of nation-state.

Thus the two concepts of ethnicity and nation-state are obviously different.⁵ One is a long-standing, historical, evolutionary concept that all humans have experienced. Each ethnic group has its own culture, or a sense of cultural identification. The other is a modern phenomenon that describes something that has been constructed over time and can be built afresh.⁶ It can be shaped and controlled by institutions such as the bureaucracy and political and legal systems and, if properly structured, may be recognized in international law as a member of the United Nations organization.

With that as background, the three countries of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia face the same question. How should each build its nation in the context of a world of nation-states? Nation-building immediately assumes two things. One is that the three countries are not yet nations, and therefore the need for nation-building. Secondly, it assumes that “nation-state” is something that you can actually build. There is a way of building it, like constructing a house or laying a road or starting a work of engineering. This assumes that we already know exactly what we are trying to build. The original nation-states evolved in Europe among people who had lived together for a long time and shared a lot together. Most notably, they had shared their language, a single religion, a sense of common history, in short, a single dominant culture. They consisted in the main of people of a single physical stock. Over time, they also created the modern institution of the state, and combined this oneness of identity with the structure of the state. Thus occurred a marriage of cultural similarity and self-consciousness with the borders and institutions of the modern state.

For the earliest examples of such states in Western Europe, notably those of Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, there was really no such thing as nation-building. They came to see themselves by the end of the eighteenth century as self-conscious nations. Their success in projecting themselves as better organized, coherent, united, and effective states that brought new standards of prosperity and confidence to their nationals

made them the model for all others who aspired to the same standards of achievement. Thereafter, those new nations that were created in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even in Western Europe itself, had to go through a process of nation-building. Compared with countries in our region, these new states were nation-building with more manageable material. On the whole, people simply remained roughly where they were and new borders were drawn, and people were asked to identify with that state through a common language, religion, and historical experience, and asked to show how much they would like to make themselves a nation. Building the nation was not so much an externally induced act of construction, but more one of self-construction, self-identification by people who had already experienced much together and who wanted to become or belong to the new nation-state. This may seem an over-simplification, but it can be said that in Western Europe, many new nations were formed by following a particular formula drawn from clear models. This is not to say that wars were not fought in the attempt to gain land for some states.

In Asia, we know that some of our nation-states are more artificial.⁷ This is true not only of Asia, but also in Africa and other places as well, places that had come out of recent imperial and colonial experiences during which borders were drawn by outside interests. These external factors have created conditions that have made the borders meaningless for some people and meaningful for others, but all are bound by the concept of strict national borders. Once there was the concept of borders, then you have, as scholars like Benedict Anderson have suggested, imagined national communities, or people seeking to re-imagine themselves as a nation within borders already drawn.⁸ The drawing of the borders may not have been done with the interests of the people concerned in mind. These people, on the whole, had to take it as given that the borders are thus inviolate.

With decolonization, the process of nation-building within these given borders began. The models were those of Western Europe in the context of modernization, nation-states that had proved during the last two hundred years to have been the most successful political institutions the world had ever seen. Before that, the confusion and lack of precision about borders, or the lack of the concept of sovereign states, had led to

continuous disputes that were only settled by displays of might. The new nation-states, however, are backed by laws that regulate international behaviour. Experience had led the nation-states to establish international institutions to supervise the behaviour of states. These institutions are expected to enable nation-states to live in peace with one another as much as possible, and ultimately make for a more peaceful world. The high ideals underlying these developments were formulated by the Western Europeans after centuries of bitter fighting among themselves, centuries during which some had virtually self-destructed. But having learnt their lesson, they set about to create a larger framework in which more peaceful ways could be found for all nation-states to live and work with one another. The new nation-states in Asia sought independence by driving out the colonial powers and have embraced the nation-state as something good for everyone.

Nevertheless, this is an ongoing process for everyone. Even in Europe some of the nation-states are very new. Some of the national boundaries, following the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,⁹ have only recently been changed with very serious consequences. Even the Europeans are still struggling with questions as to who belongs to which nation and what in the end is the ideal form of the nation-state. So we must recognize that the form nation-states take is by no means straightforward. Nevertheless, there is a historical model that is derived from the western part of the European continent that the rest of the world has looked to for guidance. Whether we like it or not, the majority of the countries in Asia are committed to that model, if only as one of the measures to help us achieve international peace and harmony. That has become the basic framework for the development of states in this part of the world.

Let me now turn to the three countries, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. They all face problems as to how to deal with their respective nation-building tasks. This book focuses on the case of the ethnic Chinese in each of them. And indeed this is particularly difficult, not least because most Chinese have inherited a deep-rooted, demanding, and distinctive culture.

Most of the people in the three countries have traditions and cultures of which they are proud. Most of them would like to preserve as much

of their culture as possible. At the same time, we also know that cultures can change and that nothing is static. Most people want the right to decide what they want, and they have to make hard choices from time to time. They can decide what part of their culture they want to preserve and what they would fight to preserve. Beyond that, they may be willing to give up bits of their culture as being no longer relevant or useful to their lives. They would then be willing to accept new ideas, institutions, and value systems that would make their lives more meaningful. All human beings are capable of doing that and in fact do that all the time. They often do so naturally, not self-consciously, but may also do so quite deliberately if they have to. Sometimes, they do that because of the very persuasive methods that are used to make people adapt to different circumstances.

I take it as given that the three countries are committed and will continue to be committed to the process of nation-building. They thus accept all the difficulties that flow from it. What is immediately obvious is that the nation-building tasks of these three countries are also very different. The conditions they started out with are different; the historical experiences are vastly different. Of course, it is possible for us to find similarities and try to ignore the differences. But, if we study the countries carefully and objectively, they offer three examples of nation-building that are more different than they are similar. That is a fact that we have to accept.

Where the ethnic Chinese are concerned, those of us who have lived through the last few decades will be familiar with how difficult the problem of nation-building has been for them. To understand that, we would need to go back to the questions of culture and nation. I had begun by suggesting that most people have difficulties moving from a culture-based way of organizing communities, that is, grouping people according to inherited cultures, to a state-based way of doing so, where the state sets out to make nations out of diverse peoples. The two are quite distinct. Therefore, for people to change from one way to the other requires, if not time, certainly a shift in mental processes to allow them to adapt and adjust to the new conditions. I do not know whether the Chinese are more committed to a culture-based background than other people. It is very hard to evaluate that. But it is possible to say that

the Chinese have been very much a people historically rooted in their multi-layered cultures, something they have recognized as their civilization. They have always talked in terms of cultural identification rather than of identification with any state.

In fact, the concept of a state itself is a very modern one, and may be said not to have existed in Chinese history. What most Chinese identified with was the culture of their own local region, and this provided them with a strong link with the culture of a unified and larger community under the Son of Heaven. The culture had no territorial boundaries but the extended identification tied them to the civilization of the Han people that was based on various religions and philosophies, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and others, integrated by their élites into the Great Tradition. As for the Little Traditions of their local communities, these knit them closely to their own dialect groups, clan associations, kinship structures, and local temple communities.

But a nation-state defines all these commitments and loyalties differently. Indeed, for most people, moving from a cultural identification to a national identification is easier said than done. Whether you make the move over time, or do so by having certain ways of doing things institutionalized in such a way that forced people to accept a new political form, would vary from one country to another. The historical experiences we have seen in Europe show that it is entirely possible to take some models and apply them directly to the three countries that we are talking about today. But we have to recognize that this is a process of change from a culture-based people to a nation-state based people. Among individuals, of course, the change can be made but a whole community cannot make such changes easily. All communities have their own characteristics, their sources of authority, and the associations to which people are committed and are loyal. These do not change overnight. They require time and that can be very painful if the conditions are unfavourable. It could also be a very smooth process if communities with different cultural heritages share that painful experience with understanding and compassion, and sympathize with each other's difficulties. Under certain conditions, they could reach a state of nationhood or build their nation-states together in harmony.

But the function of a modern state, so different from the state in the

past, has to be taken into account. The modern state is a very intrusive institution. It is also expected to be a very responsible institution. If we compare it with the earlier polities before the nineteenth century, we will find that the early states were extremely selfish institutions (there are still many examples of such states today) dominated by a person or a family, or a small group of oligarchs or élitist bureaucrats, or military men as praetorian guards. They remind us that states have rarely done anything for people directly in the past. But today people expect the state to be responsible for its citizens. It should be responsive because it is supposed to serve its citizenry.

The intrusive modern state demands that we rethink our responsibilities and our differences. The demands have not always been understood and have thus led to many of the difficulties that the new states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have experienced over the last few decades.¹⁰ Until the beginning of the twentieth century, most Chinese people did not feel any attachment to any particular state. They had an emperor, they had certain communal commonalities which they brought from China to various parts of Southeast Asia, and they tried to maintain their traditional values and lifestyles as much as possible. They were prepared to make modifications and changes in their lives and adapt to local conditions where necessary.¹¹ But, on the whole, they stayed loyal to their families in their home villages and towns and to the religious practices they brought from China. That had been the tradition.

Then came changes that began with the twentieth century, notably those that emerged with the new kind of post-colonial nation-state. This has been a confusing experience, with leaders like Sun Yat-sen, Liang Qichao, and their followers not being able to capture precisely what was meant by the concept of nation.¹² In fact, the concept of *minzu* 民族 and that of *minzu zhuyi* 民族主义 have not been helpful and have led to considerable difficulty among the Chinese people themselves. Nevertheless, it was the start of an inevitable process. It was a demand for the Chinese people to make a commitment to something more than simply cultural heritage, for them to make a commitment to the modern concept of a *guojia* (nation). This called for an interruption in how the Chinese saw themselves, if not a dislocation from their earlier traditions. It was expected that more and more Chinese in the region would make

that commitment to China, not China as a dynastic family affair, under the old rubric of *jiatianxia* 家天下, but China as a modern country, with sovereign borders, with the notion of citizenship or nationality and all the accoutrements of other modern states comparable to the powerful imperialist powers dominating this part of the world. Thus most Chinese in the region began to reorient themselves to this new nation-state, the *Zhonghua minguo* (Republic of China).

The difficulty was that for most Chinese in Southeast Asia, the process of learning about this nation-state was very indirect. The people of the three countries were all outside China; they had different “political” loyalties, either to the colonial powers who administered the areas they worked in, or to local indigenous rulers of one kind or the other whose right to rule they had learnt to recognize. In that context, the concept of a nation-state somewhere else, that is, in China, was rather abstract, even though the idea of China being bullied by foreign powers and of Chinese people being discriminated against by European officials could still be emotionally powerful. It is interesting how many Chinese in the colonies did not readily accept the idea of a meaningful Chinese nation-state, but continued to recognize the local authority of the colonial government.

In Malaya and the East Indies, the two local authorities were the British and the Dutch. Even the formulation of what a nation-state should be like was taken from the Dutch and British models, which were incidentally two of the oldest in Europe. The Dutch were very early in establishing their sense of national identity by fighting for their independence against the Spanish. And the British, because their island was separated from the European continent and they had long defended their territory from continental enemies, had also developed their national identity early. Thus the Chinese sojourners in their colonies were dealing with two countries that already had a strong sense of their own national identity.

But for most of the sojourners themselves, the ideal of nation was much more difficult to imagine. It was therefore not surprising that the Chinese were divided about who they should pledge loyalty to. How could they be loyal to either the British or Dutch nation, since neither would accept the Chinese as their nationals? They were not members of

any nation-state that could be directly concerned with their daily lives, something that they could identify with that had clear national symbols and national leaders that they could look up to.¹³ On the other hand, their awareness of a new China could be dramatized in many ways and indeed patriotism for China was dramatized so that even sojourners far away from China were emotionally aroused.¹⁴ The idea of a Chinese nation emerging from a period of being bullied and humiliated but now with the prospect of being saved from destruction and having its civilization revived was welcomed. But, for the earlier settled Chinese who had never lived in China, and for the majority of the sojourners who now live outside of China, it is still unclear what a Chinese nation-state would be like. This was the period before World War II, before the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia had developed any clear concept of a Chinese nation-state, but were nevertheless inspired by the thought of what a new China could do for them.

It was followed by the process of de-colonization and the emergence of new nation-states in the region. This process alone has taken over twenty years, from the 1940s to the 1960s. While it was going on, all peoples in these territories were encouraged to use their imagination to think about what the task of nation-building would be like. Nobody was sure how that would proceed, but it was quite clear that whoever held power would shape and mould the future of the nation-state. It was primarily a matter of who inherited the state that the colonial powers had established during the years prior to independence. That modern colonial state would be taken over by new groups of local modern people who had their own ideas about how nation-states should be built. They would remove the colonial officials, replace them with their own supporters, take on their new responsibilities and begin the work of building the state afresh.

Ideally, if people had a chance to play a role in that process, most would readily accept what eventually emerged. It was not a coincidence that when nation-states first emerged in Western Europe, they were associated with a democratic process at the same time. It was not always straightforward, but national awareness often coincided with a people's self-conscious desire to have a say in what its government does and who should represent them in it.

When I was a student, I was very impressed by Seymour Lipset's book, which describes America as "the first new nation".¹⁵ In some respects, this was a correct interpretation of America's early history. It was the first time that people had consciously set out to build a nation out of the colonies that had fought for independence together. After their victory, the leaders of the revolt had to build their nation. One after another, these leaders of the American Revolution listed all the things that a nation should have, and drew up blueprints like those that engineers and architects use to construct buildings and roads. When Lipset's book came out, I was struck by the contrast between how earlier nations had evolved and what the United States had actually built. Perhaps the United States model was more appropriate than the European ones for this part of the world.

The first thirty years of the history of the United States after their war of independence is certainly worth reading for people who are trying to build a nation-state. The process did not begin as one that was fair to everybody. As has often been pointed out, at the time of independence, large sections of the population were slaves. On the other hand, the British colonists who led the rebellion came mainly from one cultural background, and more or less shared a single religion. Some of them did have slightly different languages, but only one dominant language was recognized as the national language, and this was to be the only one for the new country.¹⁶ Thus the ingredients that went into the new state were all helpful to the process of building the nation.

They were certainly much more helpful than the ingredients that were present when Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore first set out to build their nations.¹⁷ We all know how complex the religious, linguistic, and cultural mix was for the three countries. For the ethnic Chinese, including many who had lived in the countries for generations, they had to face the prospect of transforming their culture-based community into one that had to demonstrate loyalty and commitment to the respective nation-states. This was a very different process of adjustment from that experienced by most of the people of Europe. The process represented a major change in direction that asked the ethnic Chinese to accept a totally new political framework. It is to be expected that most of them would need time to understand what it meant to change

from a culture-based people to a nation-building people. And this was especially bewildering when the concept of nation itself was still weakly conceived in all three countries.

We now recognize more clearly than ever that the process is an intricate and difficult one, and that it calls for great effort of imagination on the part of the different peoples living in the countries. As I mentioned earlier, this was not so much of a problem for the individual. Each person could make a choice and simply decide one way or other. It could even be a more dramatic act, something like a conversion, and a deeply felt change of loyalty. But for the larger Chinese community, involving hundreds of thousands if not millions of people, such a change would not be so easy.

This process has been made even more complicated by yet another stage of modernization, one that is leading the world to what is now called globalization. This is another kind of interruption. It is an interruption because, as the Chinese are taking steps to change towards a nation-based identity, they are now invited to adjust to yet further changes that place an emphasis on global relationships. In short, while the ethnic Chinese are in the process of accepting new ideas of nationality, they are also being asked to look beyond national borders and even return to cultural identifications. They are under pressure to respond to different and possibly contradictory challenges. These challenges of globalization are particularly complicated. We can have at least three ways of looking at globalization and each shows how the ongoing process of nation-building today is facing different processes of change. Let me identify the three kinds of globalization.¹⁸

There is neo-globalization. I called it that because the world has been gradually globalizing for many centuries. What is new is that the process now involves more people, and it is more extensive. Also, communication around the world is much faster and therefore the pressures on change are greater. This has taken the form of a dominant market economy acting on all our lives. It has become a kind of informal economic empire, with multinational corporations linked together by forces beyond the control of anybody and even of any state by itself. This neo-globalization is very powerful and something new to us, and we still have to learn how to cope with it. It certainly has the potential to

create a kind of multinational, economic empire. And that is why there is growing opposition to it either because of ideology or because of fear.

At another level, some national polities are able to make globalization serve their own interests. These countries do so because they are economically strong enough and confident that they have the strategies to deal with the forces unleashed by globalization. They would have to be powerful nations that can limit and control these forces, they must know how to fight for their interests, while also knowing how to co-operate among themselves so that this neo-globalization can be made to serve those interests. At this level, national politics would have to be united in purpose, mature, and sophisticated, and capable of acting with other like-minded polities to determine the way this globalization serves them.

At the third level, there is the local level of ethnic groups, minority groups, who try to take advantage of the transnational aspects of globalization and use them to defend their minority or ethnic interests in the larger nation-states that they belong to. The local ethnic transnational groups do this through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many kinds of associations are then linked together and formed into international networks to enable the groups to transcend their problems within their country. At this level, local responses to globalization become part of the tactics of survival, of dealing with discrimination or injustices that minority ethnic groups feel about their position within the nation-building process.

Thus globalization is not all positive or negative, and there can be different responses to this phenomenon. It is relevant here because it is taking place in our region at the same time as nation-building. When the work of building nations is still going on, or in some cases have barely begun, there is simultaneously the temptation and pressure to transcend national boundaries and act beyond the narrower interests of the nation-state. One may well ask, how are people to concentrate on nation-building while all this is going on? Are these contrary forces working against the nation-building process, making it all the harder to produce a smooth and peaceful transition to nationhood? Will it not aggravate some of the difficulties that the nations are already experiencing while they are still in the midst of building?

For the ethnic Chinese, this may be a temptation for them to slow down their commitment to nation-building. I am not suggesting that it is happening. But because globalization beyond the narrow confines of national boundaries provides new escape hatches, a mechanism is being provided that can allow them to avoid those parts of nation-building that they do not like. So those who are not committed, or particularly loyal, to the kind of nation-building process that is prevalent, could be easily tempted by these new forces to resist nation-building itself.¹⁹ This may not yet be consciously acted on, but we cannot rule it out as a force that would make nation-building an even more complicated process than it already is.

Let me end with an analogy, albeit not an exact one. Nation-building may be likened to a marriage, which is supposed to be a life-long commitment. Traditionally, marriage certainly was such a commitment. The relationship had to be worked at to ensure that the marriage survived. But with modernization, there are so many temptations. It is now so much easier to get a divorce. Globalization can be said to have a similar impact in that it makes nation-building more complicated. There is no simple way to build a nation and there is no way to guarantee that there will be a perfect nation. It is not yet clear how the ethnic Chinese in the three countries will respond if more global and transnational opportunities become open to them. These may demand career or professional choices, or they could be linked with the pull of Chinese culture and ethnicity now that China is committed to joining the modern world. While these temptations may interrupt their commitment to nation-building, let us hope that not too many will give up too easily and abandon marriage and turn to divorce as a solution.

NOTES

1. Sociologist Richard Burkey, for instance, argues that "Race is essentially defined by biological characteristics; Ethnic group is defined in terms of behavior, culture and language, in addition to an occasional reliance upon phenotype ..." (Burkey 1978, p. 19).
2. I am aware that there is no general agreement on the definition of ethnicity (or "ethnic group"). Max Weber, for instance, defined an ethnic group in terms of "a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or

of customs or both" (Hutchinson and Smith 1996, p. 35). R.A. Schermerhorn also argues that it is "a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of the peoplehood" (Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12). Both scholars stress the elements of "assumed common ancestry" as well as common culture, but I prefer to stress the common culture aspect.

3. For an earlier study of European nations and nationalism, see Kohn (1944). More recent books have been written on the making of nations such as British nation/ Britons and French nation. See, for instance, Colley (1992) on the rise of the British nation and Bell (2001) on the French nation. Strictly speaking, with the recent migrations, both the United Kingdom and France are facing the problem of nation-building again. Nevertheless, the problem is different from that of Southeast Asia where there was no established "nation" to begin with.
4. For a brief and useful discussion on nation, state, and nation-state in the last century, see Guibernau (1996).
5. Some scholars differentiate nation, state, and ethnic group, but many tend to use them interchangeably, resulting in confusion. See Walker Connor, "A Nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a ..." in Connor (1994, pp. 90–117).
6. In fact, there are two types of nation; one is ethnic nation, which is based on one ethnic group, the other is social nation (civic nation), which is based on multi-ethnic groups. See Kellas (1991, pp. 2–3).
7. For early studies on the rise of nation-states in Asia (and Africa), see Emerson (1960) and Kedourie (1971).
8. Anderson (1983).
9. On the ethnic situation in the former Soviet Union, see Smith (1996); with regard to Yugoslavia, see Cohen (1993); and on the question of nationalism in Europe after the breakup of the Soviet Union, see Kupchan (1995).
10. There are very few book-length studies in English dealing with nation-building in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Below are some of the titles. Regarding Indonesia, see Kahin (1960), Bachtar (1972, 1974), Suryadinata (1998), especially chapters 3 and 4. On Singapore, see Chan Heng Chee (1971), Hill and Lien (1995). Regarding Malaysia, see Ongkili (1985), Shamsul (1996), *The Bonding of a Nation* (1985), Cheah (2002).
11. I have discussed the phenomenon in my earlier works, for instance, "The Origins of the Term Hua-Ch'iao" (1976), republished in Wang (1981); "Chinese Politics in Malaya" (1970), also republished in Wang (1981); "Sojourning: The Chinese Experience" (1996), republished in Wang (2001, pp. 54–72); and "Chineseness: The Dilemma of Place and Practice", republished in Wang (2002, pp. 182–99).
12. See Levenson (1953) and Huang (1972) regarding Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. See Sun Yat-

- sen (1927), Schiffrin (1968), and Wang (1959), republished in Wang (1981) with regard to Sun Yat-sen.
13. Both British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies did not encourage nation-building. On the contrary, both colonial powers perpetuated the concepts of indigenism and race, arguing that ethnic Chinese was a separate race from the so-called indigenous population. See, for instance, Wertheim (1959), Suryadinata (1994), and Coppel (2002) on Indonesia; on Malaysia, see Purcell (1948).
 14. Wang (2002).
 15. Lipset (1963).
 16. For a brief discussion of the nation-building process in the United States, see Gleason (1982).
 17. While using the American model, I am aware that only Singapore is an “immigrant state” while both Indonesia and Malaysia are “indigenous states”. This poses more problems in nation-building in these two countries. See Siddique and Suryadinata (1981–82), Lau (1990), Suryadinata (1997).
 18. Like ethnicity and nation, there is no general agreement on globalization. The most widely cited definition was the one by Anthony Giddens: “the intensification of world-wide relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice-versa” (Giddens 1990, p. 64). However, I use the term to mean a stage of modernization that involves the whole world.
 19. There are not many studies regarding the challenge of globalization to the Chinese overseas. I have briefly discussed the issue in my paper “Migration and New National Identities” (1998), republished in Wang (2001), also my other article (June 2002). Suryadinata (2002) also discusses this issue with special reference to Indonesian Chinese.

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