

The background of the book cover is a black and white photograph of a formal meeting. At the top, a large, ornate chandelier hangs from the ceiling. Below it, a large framed portrait of Abraham Lincoln is mounted on the wall. In the foreground, four men are seated at a long table. On the left, a man in a dark suit and glasses stands and speaks into a microphone. The other three men are seated, listening. The table is set with microphones, glasses, and floral arrangements.

THE NATION DECLASSIFIED

India and the Cold War World

Vivek Prahladan

The Nation
Declassified

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HAR-ANAND
PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD

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Published by Ashok Gosain and Ashish Gosain for:

HAR-ANAND PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD

E-49/3, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi-110020

Tel: 41603490

E-mail: info@haranandbooks.com/haranand@rediffmail.com

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Preface

‘Archives exceed expectations when they reveal decisions at their best they reveal the decision maker.’

A SUITABLE HISTORY: WRITING INDIA’S COLD WAR EXPERIENCE

The first cause of the project came through looking for Japan related material in the Indian archives. The debate on Article 9 in Japan had created a slight urge to look at the impact of the cold war on the non ‘super-powers’ but there was as yet no foreboding of the crackled archival path waiting ahead. There was a recollection of coming across certain newly minted catalogues of foreign office files in the course of dissertation work on political history of the Indian Constitution. However, the original sin of any history scholar i.e. being tempted by files that seem to have little to do with the specific research that one is in the process of drawing up. Next, came across Vojtech Mastny writing about the significance of writing cold war history of a country using its own documents. In about 2010, Mastny had called out for a ‘methodical’ research on India’s cold war history. Bharat Karnad had also written at about the same time about the non-availability of documents and secrecy shrouding Indian decision making. How do we understand Indian decision making culture? A further incitement came by the fact that cold war studies remain predominantly a Western historical art form and an extension of the claim as ‘victors’ of the cold war if you will. Lastly, the work seeks to Ramachandra Guha’s call to arms (intellectual arms) by for ‘a movement by historians to end obsession to document colonial nationalism by historians and to focus on contemporary history.’

Within a matter of days at the archives, a pristine spring of declassified top secret Prime Minister Office and foreign office diplomatic files containing delegation records, intelligence reports, briefs for visits of Heads of state, nuclear history, etc. kept flowing

almost unending. It was glorious, intimidating and also one rollicking mess. Initially the count stood at 2000, then it went up to 5000, 8000, peaking to about an unhealthy 10,000 (pages that is). GOI, PMO and MEA have been generous in opening up a vast cache for scholars of contemporary history. Initially the idea in MEA was to send these files to Indian Council of World Affairs but eventually it was decided to send it to National Archives of India (NAI). The invoice at the back of the files were blank and the author's name was the first to be entered on hundreds of these files and the secret thrill generated by chancing upon a pristine archive is unmatched. I owe immense gratitude to archival officials and staff at the National Archives of India for allowing this research to go ahead uninterrupted for the most part.

Once the logistical exercise of tackling the files coalesced into a discernible pattern, the next question as what kind of history can be written with all this material? My initial thoughts, as with any other researcher was to bundle it into research papers. The only problem was of maintaining relative secrecy of the material and the nature of information contained therein. The only course was to incorporate the entire material into a single book. Meeting with Prof. Yuichi Hosoya (Keio University, Japan and Member of Prime Minister Advisory Panel), a pillar of Japan cold war history and policy was one turning point in the project. In this conversation, the ease with which he went back and forth between contemporary history and policy left a distinct impression on the link between ends and means of this project. Prof. Hosoya also explained on method of writing cold war history which helped evolve the research objectives. It was clear, that for this history to shape into its inherent purpose would mean trying to speak to public discourse that hatches in the vacuum of collective historical consciousness even at the risk of failing. Second, writings of Eliot Cohen and John Gaddis further clarified the explanatory method that could make this happen. A rigorous limit was imposed on citing and discussion of secondary literature, instead focusing upon incorporating about 10,000 pages of pristine documents in order to keep intact the stream of historical consciousness emerging

from this archival find. The quantity and substance of the find acquire meaning if we consider Ramachandra Guha's statement; 'one of the most important challenges in documenting contemporary history is the lack of density of sources. While Guha is speaking about a frontal history of the modern political biographer type, he also has in mind other strands of contemporary history writing.

The idea was to shepherd the documents and embed the voice of the author within the historical experience captured in these documents revealing the intensity of decision making and dilemmas of decision makers. The oral history accounts amplify the theater of cold war practices. The method has been to construct the complexity in the design of the project rather than introduce it into its execution so that the non-security specialist, a general history reader can go through it with ease. Not to leave out the specialist, the complexity is embedded in the structure of the work.

Years of archival research through the dissertation and M.Phil phase ensured that I was prepared to risk the weight of this entire collection which essentially held 60 years of India's international history. Along with oral histories, they offer the best view inside the world of India's Prime Ministers and their advisers that an outsider can have. This work has nothing to add to international relations theory which, to borrow words from John Gaddis is 'a field that has troubles enough of its own without my adding to them.' Ramachandra Guha wrote on the vacuum in historical writing on 'any aspect of Indian democracy can be counted on the fingers of one's hand.' In this regard, a section on India's internal politics being discussed between confidants of Indira Gandhi and Soviet leaders might be of interest to Guha. The historical vacuum has real world implications for the manner in which historical enquiry ferments in fragments of the popular. If one were to go by Frederic Jameson who wrote, 'history is what hurts', then there is plenty of hurt out there and turning away from this is reflective of an unhealthy indulgence in pre-independence history. The involuntary conceding of historical ground to the 'news image' is compounded by a voluntary self-denial of contemporary enquiry. Perhaps history and historians can move

forward by introducing separate departments/centers for 'Contemporary History' rather than append them as special laboratory exercises within the spectrum of modern history.

Instead of writing a linear progression, the material lent itself almost in auto-mode to four parallel channels of enquiry. The only risk of doing this would be the time required and separating the documentation into these channels required familiarization with each page of the documentation to determine its 'voice' or valence.

My heaviest debt is to my parents and my father whose fight with cancer took him into the sweet horizons beyond about mid-way through the project. On a personal note, thanks to David and Cindy Peace as well as the extended Sunday group. His personal interest in political history grounded my worldviews more than any classroom. Many thanks to Prof. Bhagwan Josh for being a pillar of support through the dissertation phase and facilitating the transition to a post-PhD clean slate from where one can still begin to work on something new. I express sincerest gratitude to Prof. Fumio Shimpō, Prof. Jun Murai, Prof. Kimio Uno, Prof. Yuichi Hosoya and Prof. David Litt from Keio University Japan. Note of thanks to Amb. Aftab Seth. Special note of thanks to Prof. Naoko Shimazu (Birkbeck College UK) for the friendship and guidance in research objectives. Earnest goodwill and encouragement by Amb. Shiv Shankar Menon built resolve at a critical point in the research and facilitated research without which the nuclear history chapter would not have been able to cover the ground that it has. His insight into various aspects of research had the sharpness of a seasoned Professor. Thank you to Joseph Nye Jr. for responding to my initial queries on India and Iran relating to his role as Chair of National Security Council on Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Carter Administration and also responding to some follow up questions. Thanks to Dr Vijay Sakhuja (Director, National Maritime Foundation) for discussion on my project and providing reference points and questions to consider further on nuclear naval aspect. I would also like to extend thanks to Dr Rajesh Basrur (RSIS, Singapore) for some discussion on relevance of cold war history. A heartfelt thanks to Dr M.R. Srinivasan and also Mrs Srinivasan for the two lunches which included rice from fields of

Kalpakkam. I was worried about radioactive levels of the rice but I felt reassured that it wasn't a problem. Dr M.R. Srinivasan is the sole link we still have to the early years of the Dr Homi Bhabha setting up India's nuclear program which makes him a national treasure. Dr Bhabha was an original visionary who left behind a generation of visionaries that carried the nuclear program through the cold war era and the years beyond. Thanks to former Naval Chief who has also helped in intellectual transition that was needed to connect strategy to the wider historical experience. The historical significance of India not scrambling towards Faustian cold war deals even in its most difficult moments. This aspect was also gone into in conversation with Amb. Eric Gonsalves. Thanks to Dr S.K. Sikka for taking time out on the eve of his departure outside India. The support of Amb. K.V. Bhagirath (Secretary General Indian Ocean Rim Association) was an important lynchpin of this project. Thanks for putting up with everything. There are few other significant people to thank but neither their names nor affiliation can be mentioned. At the National Archives of India, I would like to thank many of the officers and staff; Dr Jaya Ravindran, Ms Anumita Bannerjee, Shekharan; Rakesh and Sandeep at the Research Room and others who ferry the files up and down. The working knowledge with archival staff who may not even have college degrees is remarkable; they can counsel researchers better than anyone else on archival methodology, best practices and impact everyday efficiency of research in quantum terms. The staff works with hazardous dust and chemical laced files and they could benefit with basic protective gear. The work is physically demanding and in old days, staff directly handling files used to be allotted 'gur' to recover energy. With some additional certified training, besides the ones they already receive, they can have institutionalized status which can only add to the long term assets to the Archives and its passionate users. Thanks to Dr Jyoti Atwal (JNU, Delhi) Thanks to Dr Marina Martin (Goethe University, Frankfurt). Many thanks to Dr Alexander Evans (British Deputy High Commissioner to India, New Delhi) on explaining his experience of using documents for training of diplomats and the role of oral history in security environment. Dr Evan's input on oral history became increasingly

relevant as the research made progress. Dr Alexander Evans also impressed upon the author the significance of a single authored book as well as the first book on India's cold war history. Thanks are due to Ambassador Deepa Gopalan Wadhwa. I owe debt of gratitude to the Director and Staff of ICWA, IDSA and USI. Thanks also to Dr R.K. Sinha (Former Director, BARC) for a couple of phone conversations and the encouragement on Dr Bhabha's history. Thanks to Dr Anil Kakodkar for taking out time late in the evening inspite of a long day to field the questions. Lastly, thanks to Christian Ostermann and Charles Kraus from Woodrow Wilson Centre Washington who had been given a synopsis of this project in its early stages. They described the new archival collection in this project as a 'treasure trove.' Woodrow Wilson Centre had indicated interest in hosting the entire collection as part of their Cold War History Project and Nuclear Non-Proliferation History Project but the author has shared some of the material with them on condition that secrecy be maintained throughout the duration of my project, and secondly, the views of the author shall be respected. Of course, this work is an independent project.

VIVEK PRAHLADAN

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I

Introduction

INDIA'S PRIME MINISTERS AND THE COLD WAR WORLD

The cold war map brought old nations with new histories to meet new nations with ancient histories. Even by 1960, the cold war had not quite commissioned the subcontinent into its shadow death game. The subcontinent lay in the strategic wastelands of the doomsday machinery of the red star and the red stripes. The post second world war saw US and Soviet Union seeking a new balance of power and working out a place for the defeated powers, leaving the playing field open for erstwhile colonies to find national focus and identity. Controlled reconstruction and political control of post-war Germany and Japan through security treaties while keeping an eye on inner politics and strategic potential of these countries in check was the main task. The subcontinent had not yet shown traits of becoming a proxy theatre. Despite the domino theory, no communist threat had developed in the subcontinent. The criteria of gaining business class seats in the cold war map was that there should be some possibility, even if a distant one, of US and USSR having a direct military confrontation. A threat of something spilling over beyond the diplomatic threshold into the pure military domain but the subcontinent showed no signs of being one. US State Department Memo from 1957 read as follows; "in Pakistan we (the U.S) had certainly gone much too far, the more so because attacks by the Soviet Union will not be made in these countries (of South Asia), nor would the U.S ever be likely to fight in India or in Pakistan." (Department, 1957) Eisenhower was waiting and not-watching. In National Security Council Meeting of 3 January 1957, US President commented on his conversations with Nehru and came away with the

impression that “Nehru did not want Russia running his country.” (Department, 1957) India was not yet a full bodied ‘Diplomatic State’ that could impact the cold war this way or that. Eisenhower was sure that “the area (South Asia) was simply too peripheral to our vital interests.” (Department, 1957)

THE BEGINNING

Like a wall of Doppler waves, PLA soldiers walking into Indian territory changed everything. In 1971, Chou En-Lai told Kissinger that the MacMohan line “was a line that no Chinese Government ever recognized (which) included more than 90,000 square km of our territory in India.” (House, 1971) Chou En-Lai also felt that Khrushchev, by arguing that India’s heavier casualties indicated Chinese aggression “as the first such anti-China statement from the USSR.” (House, 1971) Thus, the Sino Indian conflict was not merely a question of Asian balance of power but had implications for cold war continental drifts assuming that the conflict had potential for further aggravation.

US was not sure as to what price it should ask for to extend military support to India. But it was sure that Krishna Menon must be out. The American perspective held Krishna Menon as the first obstacle to cooperation and his removal figured in the internal diplomatic dialogue of the US at the highest levels. Ambassador Galbraith had written to the White House inquiring on “the immediate question (that) concerns Menon. Does important American assistance require his effective elimination from the Defense-UN scene?” (State Department, FRUS Document 185, 1962) It is abundantly clear from the conversations that the US were waiting for elbowing out of Krishna Menon however, taking care that no specific demand was placed by the US Ambassador to PM Nehru in this regard since “the wind suggests that Indians themselves will take care of Menon sooner rather than later” (State Department, FRUS Document 185, 1962) It The subject of Krishna Menon was also proposed to be discussed in 1956 when “President Eisenhower attempted to get Nehru to bring up the subject of Krishna Menon (but) Nehru skilfully avoided the subject.” (Barrett, 2011, p. 373)

On the larger price for its support, some like Ambassador Galbraith understood that there was no room for political conditions to be tied up with the support but others in the US administration thought that this was an opportunity to work India into a de-facto alliance with the US. Ambassador B.K. Nehru wrote to Foreign Secretary Y.D. Gundevia in December 1963 that among the range of expectations by the US were “(either) an abandonment of non-alignment or a modification of it as to make it meaningless.” (Kaul, Subject File 15, 1964)

Ambassador J.K. Galbraith recalled in his writing in 1969 that he did his best to assure New Delhi that “someone in Washington gave an exaggerated version to B.K. Nehru ... (giving) the impression of a virtual alliance.” (Galbraith, 1969) Even the entry of the seventh fleet was initially sounded out through B.K. Nehru before it was taken up by Maxwell Taylor with Jawaharlal Nehru in Delhi later. B.K. Nehru expressed concern in Washington that it would “seeming to place India in position of fearing attack from Soviets as well as from Chicoms ... affect Soviet policy toward India and ... push Soviets and Chicoms closer together.” (Secretary of State, FRUS Document 344, 1963) There were shades of opinion in Indian establishment as well. Gundevia felt that the *7th Fleet* was effective to keep China in check. Nor did Nehru turn down the proposal for *7th Fleet* coming into Indian Ocean. Soviet Union was surprised by this; Political Counsellor Soviet Embassy New Delhi met with AS Chib and enquired “What has happened to your Government’s policy?” (MEA, US Seventh Fleet’s proposed Operations in the Indian Ocean-I, 1963) Foreign Secretary was told by Ambassador Chester Bowles that “we could say (to press) that the ocean was open to anybody, after all” to which the FS responded “we would not repeat nor say this.” (MEA, 1963) The correspondences make clear that India was not going to say anything critical publicly in the *Seventh Fleet* although privately they claimed to be communicating their concern to State Department. Nehru acquiesced in US plan to send the *Seventh Fleet* in Indian Ocean. Sukarno and Subandrio were concerned that the *Seventh Fleet* would be used in Indonesia Malaysia conflict but US

Ambassador in Jakarta told Sukarno that “the 7th fleet is posted in the Pacific area to operate against the Chinese and not against Indonesia.” (MEA, 1963) Soviet Ambassador conveyed to FS Gundevia the dangers of cold war dynamics entering into the Indian Ocean. Indian acquiescence is further revealed by the evasive response by FS to Soviet Ambassador stating “we had no connection whatsoever with this proposal...we will take a view in this matter should further developments impinge on our policies.” (MEA, 1963) Nehru underplayed the *Seventh Fleet* in his statement in Parliament on 21 December 1963 where he essentially repeated the argument that was suggested by Amb. Chester Bowles reflecting the US view. According to Nehru “the Ocean outside the territorial waters of India is open to the naval vessels of the United States as to naval vessel of any other country.” (MEA, 1963) Nehru aimed to disarm the criticism in Parliament by stressing that “it would be wrong to suggest that a cruise by a few US naval ships in the Indian Ocean either threatens our freedom or imperils our policy of non-alignment.” (MEA, 1963)

The cold war convulsions of the early sixties exposed the absence of a coherent strategic heritage in defense of homeland and its place in post WWII world. Ideologies of total conflict had bypassed Indian political thought, making it difficult to understand that the erstwhile era of linear and irregular frontier conflicts had aligned themselves to cold war logic. National interests were built in an environment of political convergence where Nehru with ‘unrestricted diplomacy,’ good intentions of integrating the developing world and cooperation with military nuclear powers could not stitch up anything more than a purely reactive self-assessment that was compelled by factors of survivability than by any notion of political and strategic ascendance. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, with a ‘restricted diplomacy’ and specific goals for subcontinental ascendance of Indian national interests was transformative in institutionalizing strategy which impacted the super power positions in Asia in real terms. Thus, the practices of Indira’s ideas allowed her to shape India’s environment in a way that the grand scheme of Nehru could never do. Indira Doctrine

of restricted diplomacy with restricted use of force also repaired some of the shortcomings of her predecessors' decisions; Nehru in the conventional military defense and Shastri's idea of a denuclearized India under umbrella of Western and Soviet nuclear protection. However, where Nehru did excel was after he being (post-1962) compelled onto a path of securing short-term national survivability, Prime Minister was able to initiate long term planning of national interests by introducing a strategic urgency into the industrial foundations of the state. In danger of mortal permutations of annihilation and attrition from the People's Liberation Army, Nehru's actions indicate his awareness that India had to acquire attributes of a 'war state' and thus had to have machines of war although his immediate preference was to draw from the Western war chest. The basic blue print of a long term strategic awakening was laid out in the planning exercise around Nehru's first five-year defense plan of 1964-69. But Nehru had only enough time to begin the board room level exercise.

NEHRU ERA

Spending much of the fifties leavened by the solace of democracy coupled with spirited internationalism of peace in almost all directions, for Nehru the kindling fires of cold war remained a phantasmagoria. Edward Luttwack wrote at a general level of "the psychological impact of the collision between optimistic expectations and harsh realities." (Luttwak, 2003, p. 7) A vast array of interconnected triggers imagined, then fabricated in mainspring of strategic board rooms of Washington and Kremlin shaped this era of ultimatums and show downs. The unintended accumulation of frontier fencing among Asian nations accentuated by their simultaneous discovery of civilizational accents initially shrouded the cold war meta-doctrines of containment and encirclement. The contemporary era alchemy of modern industrial national strategy of war and diplomacy was still in the foundries of the newly independent nations. The beginning by India was bold in intent with the Nehruvian order seeing India going up to the cold war mined world

with open arms. In hindsight, critics have cited lack of strategic due diligence as hallmark of this era of Indian leadership. Nehru's India was contrarian at inception to the trending logic of balance of powers theory of international politics and it did not survive a day beyond October November 1962. While there is nothing disagreeable about Rudra Chaudhuri's argument that a binary between idealism-realism in Nehru's as well as Indian foreign policy with 1962, Rudra's work did not have benefit of accessing the archival material as presented in this work. Rudra writes about "familiar historiography of this period...as a move away from its (India's) so called idealistic phase to the hard-nosed reality of power politics." (Chaudhuri, 2014) The issue is more with the question raised by Rudra within as limited a framework as Indo-US relations which cannot be understood in a cold war theatre without linking it to many other variables of the balance of power. Moving ahead, 'realism' (i.e. strategic and institutionalized at the level of doctrine and practice) only emerged within the framework of the 'Indira Doctrine' that is discussed later. Read along with MEA files, an entirely novel portrait emerges for post-1962 Nehru. The historical point is to be judged not on mere perception but on the record of discussions that have been revealed in these unprecedented archival collections and the rich material on post-1962 can allow a detailed discussion of the many variables that made up the 'compelled-realist' Nehru's world view after 1962. Nehru did not want to provoke the Chinese any further nor increase the area of conflict. That China could enter as deep as it did without even use of air power must have only been ominous for Nehru. Nehru was reacting to a crisis and not reformulating strategy and in this he was willing to concede ground to the American administration that would have been unthinkable prior to 1962. i.e. entry of Seventh fleet carriers into Indian Ocean being just one of these. The vault of history has remained closed to impressionists and expressionists alike of contemporary Indian leadership who have desired to break through the mist of popular modern national-lore built up by allies and rivals of the leader in question. The top secret documents merit a revised history of Indian Prime Ministership and the international statecraft

practiced by them in the closed corridors of power where heads of States talk to each other without the presence of advisers. Till now, almost nothing has been penetrable of the veil of secrecy shrouding the Indian cold war era practices to the outside world which is restricted to diversionary press releases with the occasional memoir thrown in every few years.

POWER AND THE CASE FOR HISTORY

How are the experiences of power in the past relevant for power in future? Does the passage of previous Prime Ministers have some role to play in the one being taken currently or in the future? The 'push' electronic feed is impacting contemporary history writing, the line between a rigorous historical judgment and political drivel is disappearing. That being said, the first task in order to make a historical case for a history of power would require an intimate access to decision making that is simply not available ordinarily like other subject matters of history i.e. colonial history, political sociology/political anthropology where a handful of field sources can be the basis of an entire work. One can always chronicle a philosophical exegesis but to probe the very essentials of decision making of Prime Ministers of India, a certain access to documentation and oral history accounts is required. Although the promise of returns in terms of a historian making a portrait of a certain Prime Minister or a number of them is high but the risks are even higher as documentation are sometimes deliberately written to deceive and oral history accounts have their own inherent biases besides even the historian has their own problems in short changing the history reader. Sometimes due to lack of availability of sources, a historian will pursue a rather vague source and try their best to make a direct link to certain important decisions of the Prime Minister. A recent biographer of a Prime Minister believed that this Prime Minister made a death-bed confession of his nuclear secrets to a prominent newspaper editor. The writer also claimed that this editor had unprecedented access to the nuclear establishment. Another problem has been that those writing these histories have been so

thoroughly embedded themselves with the sources that a critical approach to whatever information is being fed is absent. However, the field of contemporary political history is a nascent one and Kinetics of contemporary history are propelled by the vaulted top secret files declassified and demitted to the office of historical judgment. In an era of soundbites and text-bites, the notion of what constitutes historical taste is also a problematic exercise where information vandals pose the gravest challenge to the history book as a classical platform of public interest. Attributing status of history to Vojtech Mastny wrote in his essay on the lessons to be drawn by decision makers from history written using the country's own documents (Mastny, 2010) But why does any serving national leader and his policymakers need history? Is there real time value of history to practitioners of statecraft? The question may seem incredulous to the artisan of time and space but it would be the first thing that comes up to the mind of a national leaders and their strategists? But in the heyday of cold war the historian was an important member of the boardroom in the US policy machinery. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. was appointed as Special Assistant to the President. Can 'the essential matter of history' find its way into decision making? The involvement of the historian in statecraft is another question and a less important one. It may be equally pertinent to see how open are historians to anchoring their ebullient narrative loom from aspiring to grand treatises governing or comprehending continental balances to the specific outcomes and logics of hardboiled strategic chessboard. The national leader is always at the centre stage and 'power history' must meet the officeholder and the strategists more than half way if it has to prove its worth. History cannot be applied to a specific outcome, Edward Luttwak, wrote that this is best left to "those who have powers of decision in a specific time and place." (Luttwak, 2003, p. 258) The idea is to lay out the parameters of decision making such that the national leaders and the strategic hive can have the long view of the shortest path to threat assessment, enemy engagement or signalling alliance or carrying covert intra-border ops. To take a theatre level scenario, if Pakistan were to use a low yield tactical

nuclear device in response to an Indian military build-up that has withstood and broken down a high intensity armoured incursion intended by Pakistan military and militia, would Indian response be to respond in equal measure or to absorb this first strike and instead of an 'overwhelming retaliatory' nuclear response, make conventional penetrative strikes on nuclear establishments of Pakistan thereby disrupt/destroy strategic logistics, couple it with political decapitation nuclear strike and give political orders to the Indian army to cross the border and enforce an irreversible territorial dismemberment of the aggressor, lastly negotiating with the international community and opposition elements within Pakistan to work out a new interim government. The argument must assume that it would not be in China's interest to engage itself at nuclear level in India Pakistan nuclear escalation. To take another example, Pakistan had (post-Op Brasstacks) embarked on a policy of low cost and high effective intrusion through militia and cultivating insurgents in Kashmir, but over a period of time Indian army has learnt to control this low intensity war by making it a high cost and low effective proposition for Pakistan military establishment and thus crossing the border in a conflict scenario is considered to be less cost effective and strategically non-pragmatic than this local level containment of insurgents and guerrilla fragments. Thus, at least one retired Director General Military Operations Indian Army felt that this policy of containment has worked well for India even though others clamour for a more aggressive posturing and penetrative strike options which may have a political cost that no Indian leader may be able to bear in international opinion. A more historic example can be of Pakistan getting weaponry from US in their status as a formal ally to the Western bloc, this lulled it into an assessment on the eve of 1965, as testified by former Ambassador Chester Bowles to a US Congressional hearing, that it would allow them to occupy key Indian territory and the Indian military acted more on the principle of resourcefulness and also choosing the time and site of the battle. Even the US State Department felt that the outcome would be in favour of their ally. In part the Pakistan decision may also have been owing to

Indian strategists over stating the Chinese threat and the US India negotiations geared more towards a build-up of mountain regiments and equipment that would have little use in battle at plain level. There was compounded by assessment in Islamabad that India was politically vulnerable after 1962 and Chinese assistance may also have been relied upon though Chinese were always careful to assist Pakistan in a conflict period even though they would help arm them in the long term. The confluence of historical rhythms within the frantic hive of cold war era gives a firm soundboard for decision making dilemmas of an Indian Prime Minister and the team of advisers, geopolitical strategists working around him/her. The thin red lines even within a strong alliance such as the Indo-Soviet one would have novel issues to grapple with, for instance on technology transfers. In 1975, India offered Soviets access to any Western military technological equipment that they may receive and for their part, Soviets also offered to reverse engineer the British Sea Harrier for the Indian Navy provided Indian navy could secure one or two units of Harriers. By mid-seventies, Indian navy was seeking (vertical take-off and landing) VTOL aircrafts for its carrier force but Soviets did not have anything that could fill the stable. This matter was sensitive enough that it would be left to the highest offices to authorize such a technical coup.

Where does the morsel of past stand in a country with a grand history of democratic political aspiration? The hourglass of freedom was tipped on 15 August 1947 when Nehru roused the Nation to a new promise and declared that “the past is over and it is the future that beckons to us now.” (Nehru J. , 2010, p. 101) The canvas was not an open one to begin with and the tenor of statesmanship through unbridled poetics was deceptively dissonant from the world that inherited this free India. The balance of power had settled the new and old nations to a cagey and unwinnable peace. A challenge descends upon chroniclers of the Prime Ministerial Chair and the national journey of survival at a time when this nation is at the dawn of new era where the denseness of past stands indicted, guilty by association with the Nehruvian frontier spirit. It is being considered

in some corridors, whether the past be simply euthanized on plea of mercy and the taxidermist let loose to facilitate a quiet encasement of the erstwhile ferocious political vertebrae as a sterile exhibit in a Nehruvian museum glass box? Or alternatively, the recent past of modern statecraft be stowed away and a purposeful renaissance of ancient political and moral wisdoms invoked as the new civilizational posturing that an Indian leader reaching out to the world will now stand upon? The race for novel historical claims primed to create a new political archetype has, in popular discourse, begun in earnest.

The spindle of popular and *nouveau* intelligentsia's historical disillusionment in quest of a new spirit of the past has turned to what it considers as its first task, controlled demolition of the Nehruvian anima. Perhaps the intent is to undertake a 'grand unweaving' of this political past and carry out a re-awakening of civilizational bonds that will renew the national spirit with India's sure steps into greater engagement at the world stage. Thus, invoking a new alliance with the past which holds Nehruvian 'modern-nativism' as a panoply of broken promises of transcendent democratic life. The palpable struggle for anchoring newly held political power despite all the aura and regalia of the modern state and postmodern electronic media still necessitates that the timber of this ligneous castle of power be book matched to its historical habitat. An essential habit of a rising and a risen power is to have a broad consensus in foreign policy, bipartisanship; seeing all its Prime Ministers/Presidents, irrespective of party of origin, as collective national heritage i.e. bipartisan historical consensus on foreign policy achievements at a general level.

HOW MUCH DO WE NOW KNOW?

The limits of documents must be acknowledged. The most important decisions were never put on paper. Only the closest of advisers in the sanctum sanctorum would know what was really happening and the PM would even put subterfuge for the Cabinet members and for the Parliament. There were good reasons for doing so and one of them were moles. They were closer to the PM than anyone thought. In the time of Rajiv, according to a PMO official, there were two US moles of

which one was within the Cabinet and the other at a lower level. Secondly, successes, especially the big ones, would be deliberately admitted as failures to put up a smoke screen for the world. Even the image of a Prime Minister as a young inexperienced was also deliberately put out when in practice this Prime Minister was well in the saddle for all key decisions. A former Naval Chief commented that as a junior officer he had seen the then Naval Chief dictate notes which was not in the least commensurate with the discussion that had taken place. Sometimes if not more often than not, notes and file contents are even an internal balance of force and can serve as cover for the concerned official in case a decision-making audit were to be done. The file may not even be written in accordance with the stated objective of generating that file. Thus, it will always be difficult to say 'now we know.' Lastly, the rotating structure of official positions meant that if one were to take two decades of PM's decision making in international politics then not more than one or two people would have had the fortune of holding critical positions at places witnessing the moments of transitions and it can be taken for a given that this sort of witness to state secrets is never going to write an expansive memoir. What this sort of person holds is more than what ten Generals, Admirals, Cabinet Secretaries or even a Prime Minister or two will hold within themselves. So ultimately, what do we get from the documents? As one such holder of secrets told me 'you will get zilch from documents.' For the Indira term of the 1980s, this PMO official said that 'You will not find any papers, we knew there was leaking to the Americans at high levels.' Subterfuge and deception has been built into the documents. Some of this is in line with what, as written by Odd Arne Westad, game theorists argue that "it is precisely the information most necessary for explaining an event that decision makers will face the strongest incentives to obscure or misrepresent." (Wolfhorth, 2013) For instance, during Brezhnev visit the main discussion between PM Indira and Brezhnev was on Afghanistan but the Joint Declaration did not even mention Afghanistan and instead mentioned South West Asia. Taking another example, it can at the same time be said that Indian documents show that Nehru did not

accept the request from McNamara to land reconnaissance planes from Thailand on to remote air field in North East but merely allowed them to fly over Indian air space but Bruce Riedel has stated that American U-2 planes, in the immediate aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict were using airstrip in Charbatia Orissa.

History has never been murkier than now as documents are surfacing from their stealth mode and the kind of documents finding their way into the open are not without intent from the repository holders and the material is more likely to feed one line of thought than the other or at least the context in which it is being cracked open is itself open to a line of questioning. These emerging network of ‘power archives’ are framing the declassification in a manner that the documents are available in a news feed format that is opening an unprecedented resource for policy makers and historians. History is now part of information warfare and how the historian responds to this call would determine even the form which history as a knowledge system would have to take to survive through the current era where principles of data and data sharing are being applied to historical information. But even zilch is a beginning for the historian who, unfortunately like the empirical sciences, cannot resort to ‘something out of nothing’ theory to write history. This zilch is enough for the historian to begin furrowing into the lair of national secrets. Even during Indira’s term in the 1980s it was known that matters were being leaked.

Even primary documents like diaries are not absolutely reliable as being closest to authentic representation of the person writing it. To take an example; Bruce Riedel used US Ambassador to India J.K. Galbraith’s published diaries for his work on JFK’s role in Tibet and in course of a public lecture on his work, Riedel stated that “diaries are a gold mine for historians because what you write in your diary that day is what you thought that day.” (Riedel, IntlSpyMuseum, 2016) It may just be one of thing you thought among many other options in the course of the day. The option that eventually made it into the diary may be what best allows the event to be balanced out in the mind of the decision maker and he may take action contradicting the

diary entry. An example from Japan illustrates unwritten ambiguity of diaries. Prof. Yuichi Hosoya explained about the diary of Prime Minister Sato in regard to his entry relating to Kissinger's visit to Peking. In this diary PM Sato wrote that Sino-US rapprochement was good for stability in Asia. Prof. Hosoya expressed surprise at this entry especially given that the event was seen overwhelmingly in Japan as an act of betrayal by USG. Prof. Hosoya tried to get explanation for this from Secretary to PM Sato. PM Sato's Secretary said that when Japan was informed of plans for Kissinger's visit PM Sato was explicitly upset but by the time he wrote his diary he had changed his perspective. PM Sato was attempting to reconcile with the event at the time of his diary entry, especially since the PM wrote in diary as a mode of relaxation rather than recording impressions. Diaries also have cultural and personality moors and it is not easy to deconstruct the process of the diary writer.

The new documentation from India also has implications for what renowned commentators on world politics have written about the 'Empire' systems to which they aspire to belong. For instance, the Indian declassified documentation on US China rapprochement has a different take than the one taken by Kissinger in *Diplomacy* where he imperiously wrote of US conduct as characteristic of "Empires (that) have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system." (Kissinger, 1994, p. 21) If one were to go by an Indian Embassy Peking brief from 1972 to New Delhi titled 'Tentative Assessment,' it singles out Nixon's efforts to placate China and appealing to "Maoist Goddess of Mercy" in search of a "potential ally of America in Asia." (MEA, Nixon-Peking, 1972) Similarly, another brief from Indian Embassy Moscow wrote of Nixon's speech in Moscow as "made to flatter and please" the Russians "unlike that of Brezhnev." (MEA, Nixon Moscow, 1972) The golden pen of memoirs fraught with its own contradictions can be critiqued through the documents and oral history accounts based on the framework emerging from the documentation. The Indian documents reveal a much more vulnerable and anxious 'great power' decision making. For instance, in months prior to 1971 Indian

officials outfoxed US authorities and successfully achieved the element of surprise for their military campaign in East Bengal. Prior to the 1971 Bangladesh campaign, Indian Embassy Washington had succeeded in tweaking US public opinion on the human rights crisis unfolding in East Bengal in its favour by lobbying with influential Senators and press which also publicised some of the secret shipments by Pakistani freighters visiting US ports carrying back ‘non-lethal spares.’ Certain Cold War histories have not drawn from the rich moments of international humility for ‘the West’ that can be readily pointed to and Indian documents give them a second shot at their own nostalgic cold war histories by looking at how cold war worked at the ground level in the Indian subcontinent. Bruce Riedel wrote in *Avoiding Armageddon* that “humility is in order in thinking about grand projects in South Asia.” (Riedel, *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the brink and back*, 2013, p. 199)

‘THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT’

The private life of the idea of ‘homeland’ exists in the inner-scape of national leaders, Generals and Admirals, security strategists, etc. The cold war dynamics gives a new way of looking at Indian notions of what constituted ‘homeland,’ referred to as ‘national territory’ in the constitutional jargon. The Soviet terminology for the region was ‘the Indian subcontinent.’ To cite, Soviet Academy of Sciences wrote in 1973 that “the Shimla Agreement had caused alarm in Peking in as much as it reduced the scope for Chinese interference in *the Indian subcontinent*.” (emphasis mine) (MEA, Soviet Union, China and India, 1973) Addressing the region as ‘Indian subcontinent’ was of regular practice by Soviet Union academies, press and accredited duly by the Soviet party machinery. At one time the issue of terminology was discussed in cable from Indian Embassy Moscow Cable stating that Soviet press ad had begun to use the term ‘South Asian subcontinent’ instead of their previous convention of using ‘Indian subcontinent’ or ‘Hindustan subcontinent.’ (MEA, USSR-Pakistan, 1974) According to the cable, the new term could be traced to the Soviet Pakistan Joint Communiqué. Indian officials had also been

able to ascertain that during Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's visit to Moscow, "the Bangladesh Delegation had expressed a strong preference to the Soviet side for referring to our region as the South Asian subcontinent." (MEA, USSR-Pakistan, 1974) The shift in the use of nomenclature by Soviet Union appeared to have become normal practice by beginning of 1973. The Indian side persuaded Soviets to use 'Indian subcontinent' in the joint statement issued at the end of Indian Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow. Indian officials themselves never use the term South Asia in any of the communications as far as can be discerned thus far. As for the Indian Ocean, Lok Sabha had debated President Sukarno's reference to it as 'the Indonesian Ocean' as well as Ambassador Moynihan calling it 'the Madagascar Sea.' (Misra, 1986, p. 52) The nation of oceans being even less tangibly defined as demonstrated by ancient and modern mariners, that "a nation with a navy is neighbour to all." (CNS F. C.) American strategists such as Walt Rostow were scripting their own versions of Asia for the US administration. W.W. Rostow saw the subcontinent as one collective unit for Defense against the Communist main lands. This idea was also present in Kennedy's reply to Nehru's letter, Kennedy wrote on 9 December 1962 that "the Chinese threat is to the entire subcontinent and thus, Defense of the subcontinent has to be seen collectively." (Krishnamacahari, 1963) Successive American administrations methodically inflicted injuries to their own possible approaches by over reliance on British advice for all regions from where either the British had already or were in the process of receding. This tradition of coordination that continues even today, even on India. General McArthur, in his farewell address to the US Congress remarked that "while Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia." (Imparato, 2001, p. 50) These are the maps that are sowed in the stream of civilizational consciousness which carry into the geography of international political theory through strategically driven terminology. Jorge Luis Borges wrote of "unconscionable maps that no longer satisfied." (Jorge Luis Borges, 1998) A former Indian Ambassador to United States conveyed to the author that "we seem

to have a complex about calling this region, the Indian subcontinent. This term 'South Asia' sticks in our throats. We don't call Indian Ocean as 'the Ocean,' do we?" (USA, 2016) A former Naval Chief also commented in the context of Afghanistan, as being a historical part of the natural sphere of influence of subcontinental power and thus Indian interests there are direct. Kashmir as the Kohinoor of independent India became the preeminent concern of all Indian Defense efforts in the initial years. The position taken by any country on Kashmir was the litmus test for friendly relations with India and it was on Kashmir more than anywhere else that Soviet Union gained traction with Indian political leadership. Even PM L.B. Shastri had conveyed to Brezhnev that "Indian people have appreciated greatly Soviet Union's attitude on Kashmir." (Kaul T., Subject File 15, 1963-64) President Kennedy had referred to the 'Kashmir problem' in his reply to Nehru's letter Nehru's diplomacy was built on the confidence that any threat from Pakistan was by itself manageable and the Goa Liberation Struggle of 1961 would have reinforced this assurance of being able to defend Indian territory but the PLA incursions deep into NEFA territory put a red flag on the entire Himalayan range that was a natural frontier to the subcontinent. Comparing the Nehru Kennedy correspondence, the influence of the strategists is writ large in Kennedy's letter to Nehru although Nehru's own letter appears to be drafted more on his own terms. For this book, India entered the Cold War with the Sino-Indian conflict since the aim of China in 1962 was not restricted to empirical territorial disputes but, first, to bring US military presence into the region. The US Polaris nuclear submarines prowling the Indian Ocean could target territories of Soviet Union. Second, China was staking claim to Asia as belonging to its sphere of influence. India did not enter the cold war on its own terms unlike Mao's China "which entered the Cold War as a revolutionary country, in its own terms-defining many key aspects of the Cold War in Asia." (Chen, 2010, p. 278) India's strategic condition in the aftermath of 1962 October became symbolic of the Sino-Soviet rift. Between 1962 and 1965 India prepares for the rites of passage into the Cold war. The Sino-Indian war necessitating a

comprehensive effort on the part of Government of India in filling up its arms basket and the first intensive emergency Military Assistance Programs (MAP) with US and partly UK rolled out shortly. But a larger decision would have to be made by Indian leadership, who could it trust to reliably supply heavy arms equipment in its battles with Pakistan and China? What would be the political conditions attached to offer of military assistance from US and USSR? Mao was having to face questions of his own with threat of a Soviet armoured thrust into China along the border. Kissinger wrote that Nixon administration concluded that "Soviet military action in China would signal the most serious challenge to global balance of power since the Cuban missile crisis." (Kissinger H., 1994, p. 714) As the chapter on nuclear history discusses, paper by K.R. Narayanan from 1964 anticipated Sino-US rapprochement. This was a good three years before Nixon wrote, as pointed out by John Gaddis that "taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours." (Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 1982, p. 295) Perhaps Nixon meant, China's threatening potential in the neighbourhood could be linked to US national interests in the region more effectively. For its part, Soviet Union had not yet clarified its interests in the subcontinent. It is interesting to note here that a Japanese official from 'the China School' of Japan Foreign Office had prepared a memorandum on possible Sino-US rapprochement at about the same time but this did not find its way to the Japanese Prime Minister with the consequence that the Kissinger visit to Peking came as a shock and a betrayal to Japan. John Gaddis explains how this was based on Kissinger's idea that "a triangular relationship to side with the weaker instead of the stronger antagonist." (Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 1982, p. 296) Gaddis also highlights what Kissinger wrote in *White House Years*, that Nixon had authorized Kissinger to communicate to the Soviets through East European sources on possible Sino-US rapprochement. At the same time India and Soviet Union also moved into 'Treaty mode' which was discussed and ready for approval by 1969 but due to Indian elections it was

decided by Indira that it should wait. The history of this Treaty was not directly linked to the Sino-US rapprochement but was an outcome of security dialog and military supply integration between India and Soviet Union that had begun to cover significant milestones starting in 1964. It was inevitable that the Sino-US rapprochement would have got channelled into it at some level. The Soviet Asian Collective Security proposal seems to be a more direct challenger to Sino-US rapprochement. This Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was formally concluded in 1971. The question of history goes beyond identifying national culture including its strategic culture. In a cold war world with 'no war and no peace,' a country undertaking armed operations had to know these three things—targets, on the ground intelligence, intentions and capability of enemy. If these variables are not accounted for, then no amount of armchair strategizing with scientific terminologies will help win a war. These three things were present in Indian operations in Bangladesh, 'island hopping' strategy of General MacArthur would never have worked in that conflict. The second half of twentieth century has few examples of clear cut military campaigns. The same ops in Bangladesh if given to another country, albeit one with a much more advanced and heavier armoured strength could have turned into a quagmire. Edward Luttwak wrote how "strategy has become fashionable in the United States." (Strategy and History Vol-II, p. xi) But even the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka in 1987 showed that India was not immune to potential quagmires of its own. Any specific action for strategic ascendancy must be accompanied with firmer patterns of stability and inherent potential for chaos in the implications of the strategic activation. Chaos has its own nature. Perhaps military schools may emphasize more on withdrawal than on winning, not many wars are there to be won although many are there to be fought. The preponderance of long term political objectives entangled with short term military objectives of grand strategy has been done by countries at immense cost, reduction of endangering soldiers through technological infusion will only increase the cost. To be sure, the cold war did not show anything in way of a collapse of

military will or capabilities of the Soviet Union. Addressing the misplaced reporting of declining standards of Soviet armed forces upkeep and preparedness, Edward Luttwak wrote in 1985 that Soviet military should not be judged on efficiency since that was not the basis of Soviet Union's rise to power. "Drunk they defeated Napoleon, and drunk again they defeated Hitler's armies and advanced all the way to Berlin." (Luttwak, p. 230) Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in mid 90s, a former CNS visiting Black Sea spoke with Russian naval Commanders of the Black Sea fleet who were visibly distressed about NATO ships probing into the Black Sea, however, repeated attempts to get the attention of Kremlin in the matter had failed, Yeltsin was not interested.

A retired Indian DGMO explained Soviet philosophy, 'the one with last tank standing won the war' and their weapons design was built on this idea. A former Indian Chief of Naval Staff had written a paper on 'Design philosophy of the Petya boats,' explaining design virtues of these Petyas which had five water tight compartments and could remain afloat even with a good part of it torn off. These were virtually indestructible and secondly, they were heavily armed i.e. usable as pure offensive machines. Even the Foxtrots were a significant acquisition for the Indian navy and questions had been raised on India's decision to go for foxtrots. It was not without reason that Admiral Rickover, while at Honk Kong in 1987, wanted to see the Indian Foxtrots that were on their way to Vladivostok for repair and he did see them. Indian planners cared little for where their equipment came from, the political decision was dependent upon whether any political conditions were attached to the agreements and secondly, a technology transfer agreement which would allow them to breed the technology locally within a wider industrial framework. Lastly, the financial consideration must not be overlooked, one of the main lure of Soviet offer was that much of the equipment was never really paid for and very little if at all any in actual money. Much of it came under foreign trade arrangements where Indian manufactures were shipped to Soviet Union in lieu of military equipment. Sometimes ships were paid for in bananas. But returning to the Soviet

anchoring of Indian Defense capability during the cold war era, a close bond had developed at the military level besides at the leadership level but there were moments when the question was revisited. During early part of Morarji Desai's term, George Fernandez made a suggestion to the Indian PM that "India do a Sadat" by going 'cold turkey' towards Soviet Union and opt for weapons from the Western countries. (CNS) The Indian Chief of Army Staff was consulted by PM Desai and CAS in turn said that the decision was for the Prime Minister to take but he added that "the Indian military would not be able to fight for at least the next three years" and this seemed to have made an impression. CAS said that it was not simply a matter of buying different tanks, even the tank transporters were Soviet and thus having different tanks would not mean much if you could not even transport them. The documents incorporated in this work reveal records of discussions at the highest levels between the two countries. The oral history accounts of key decision makers reveal the inner working of India's special relationship with Soviet Union. It reveals facets of Soviet peace counsel and also its war counsel to India.

THE PILLARS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Nehru established the first pillar for any Indian Prime Minister's decision making i.e. Kashmir as non-negotiable. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara tried their best to sound out Nehru for compromise on Kashmir by settling with President Ayub but Nehru never relented in spite of the military requirements from Western countries to defend Indian territory from Chinese pressure from 1962 onwards. Traditionally the Indian mainland was susceptible to invaders through the North West Frontier and thus, the British legacy of leaving the North East frontier largely undefended with nominal military presence remained with Nehru. The security of Kashmir within a larger security of the Himalayan roof was not present. The same can be said of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. During the second world war, the Japanese sailed with practically no resistance into the Islands because the Royal Navy thought that sea presence (without

calculating for fire power) was sufficient to hold territory. The Chinese could have sailed into the Andamans in 1962. We do not know if and to what extent Mao and the PLA studied Japanese military manoeuvres in North East Frontier of India for their India campaign in 1962.

The first chapter on 'Cold War Statecraft in South Asia' begins with Nehru's 'Note' from Cabinet Secretariat (21 October 1960) when President Ayub told him that he "wanted to talk to me about Kashmir." (Krishnamachari T.) Both heads of State agreed to speak privately while the advisors were asked to wait outside. The documents reveal a Nehru gripped by 'realism' after 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. Nehruvian half-illusion of pure diplomacy came to a complete end when the PLA army walked into Indian territory. In a way imagining everything meant imagining nothing or at least ending up with very little even in terms of paper gains of diplomacy. On the other side of the Himalayan wall, Mao was also interested in discovering India. In an instant, 'helter-skeltered' Nehru opened talks with both the principal military powers to secure India's immediate Defense requirements with China. Washington was his first and perhaps his only preference, the figure of 12 squadrons of fighter aircrafts requested to President Kennedy is enough to show that Nehru thought that the very integrity of India was endangered. A deeply vulnerable Nehru had called up Admiral Earl Mountbatten in the third week of Sino-Indian war to seek his opinion on how far would the Chinese go into India. The Cabinet Ministers were of the opinion that the Chinese would go further, but Mountbatten told Nehru that Chinese had come too far and would go back. One of the main issues in any account of the Sino-Indian conflict is the lack of use of air power by either side. Mountbatten Nehru talks reveal that Indian assessment in the immediate aftermath of 1962 was that Chinese MIG-19s could air raid on an "axis nearer to Delhi with a view to causing uneasiness in the capital and bringing pressure on the Government to negotiate on Chinese terms." (Krishnamachari T., 1963) Mountbatten told Indian Military Affairs Committee that PLAF could undertake tactical attack NEFA and Ladakh-Kashmir-

Jammu areas and launch strategic jet light bombers against cities in Northern India including Calcutta. History has shown that restraint by Indian leadership, strategists and military planners both in war and post-war has hurt Indian interests in the Cold war era. Between reactive improvised offensive ops and building overall defense preparedness, Nehru went for the latter. Mao had succeeded in his surprise military move, in turn Nehru was clever enough not to be clever and did not try a surprise move of his own. Some of the heaviest military defeats are based on failed efforts at surprise. i.e. 1917 Nivelle offensive in the first world war. Nehru knew his limits and made two immediate decisions; resolving not to provoke Mao any further into expansion of the area of conflict and second, seek immediate military supply reinforcements in the short run through military assistance programs. This short term necessity pushed the long term question of who would be India's ally and who would not. The cold war hastened the inevitable Indian decision on question of military attributes that could be supported through doctrine and leadership. If not for the cold war, this decision would have reflected the events unfolding within Japan on the question of amendment to Article 9 at the present moment. Japan has studied this decision for a long time and careful planning has undergirded the security transition of Japan. India would have gone through a similar process if not for the exigencies created by PLA forces in 1962.

Nehru's preference for Western military support to India is revealed by another outcome of his decision with Kennedy administration-entry of Seventh Fleet into Indian Ocean. Why did Nehru say yes by not saying no to General Maxwell Taylor on proposal for entry of 4 to five carriers of the 7th Fleet into the Indian Ocean and thereby opening its waters to US naval presence which evolved into a nuclear presence within a couple of years? Eventually the immediate nature of Chinese threat receded and turned into a long term one. US and Indian governments also differed on the imminence of the Chinese threat to India and its possible scale. US-Indian talks also show the loaded nature of political conditions put forward by the US authorities not least among them was Indian

involvement in Vietnam. Thus, at this early stage in post 1962 talks, Nehru did not show particular proclivity towards the Soviet Union and in fact, he clearly tried to get umbrella security arrangement with Kennedy. The papers also refer to perspective of the Pentagon in Kennedy Nehru talks. Besides the lone agreement on MIG-21, even Soviet special relationship to India was not entirely evident during this phase, we do not know if Soviets may have possessed intelligence on Chinese military build-up on India's borders prior to October 1962. Papers of T.N. Kaul regarding B.K. Nehru's talks in Washington show that Galbraith and Kennedy as well as Pentagon and Kennedy saw India's MIG-21 deal with the Soviet Union differently. Kennedy was open to the suggestion of India buying from both sides but Ambassador Galbraith and Pentagon weren't. The chapter shows why despite Nehru's approach towards Kennedy primed with pragmatism there was no deal between their respective administrations.

India's first serious approach towards Soviet Union was only in October 1965, after the use of US arms by Pakistan in 1965. This historic moment which becomes the basis for next sixty years of close strategic cooperation is captured through a Memorandum titled 'India's Defense Requirements.' This came on the back of another milestone which was struck in 1964 after the visit of Y.B. Chavan to Moscow. Note by L.K. Jha from PM Secretariat referred to this visit of Indian Defense Minister's to Moscow and the "willingness and desire of Soviet authorities to help build up a submarine arm." (Kaul T., 1964) The momentum created by Chavan's talks with Soviet leadership can be gauged through what was said by Admiral Gorshkov to Rear Admiral Dawson in October 1964. Even on Navy, India tried to secure latest British submarine class but instead they were only offered a vintage class. Cold war dynamics began to play out slowly, US gave Pakistan a submarine. But the main difference reduced to just one i.e. Kashmir, on which US and India could not see eye to eye. US did not understand the significance that Kashmir carried not only for the Indian Government but for the country at large. Kashmir was non-negotiable for India.

The second pillar of Nehru's security outlook was an Indian nuclear program which included the capacity for nuclear weapons program. The nuclear weapon option was kept open by Nehru more than by Bhabha. The documents indicate that Bhabha was cautious on the strategic component till at least 1958 but some change had come upon thereafter. At one point, Bhabha had even recommended Nehru to accept disarmament proposals but Nehru kept the political decision on weapons open. By 1963, the strategic option had begun to dawn upon Bhabha and Nehru due to developments in China. In 1963, after having visited the assembly plant for HAWK ground to air missiles, he recommended establishing one plant in consultation with Raytheon for control and guidance systems that could be used for different types of missiles. Bhabha had also visited the Bedford Missile Division plant and spoke with Dr Schilling. Around the same time, the idea of minimum deterrence was put forward by Bhabha himself although there was no institutionalization of a strategic program. Introducing newly unearthed correspondences between Bhabha and Nehru, the chapter 'A Few Good Bombs' shows India's emerging nuclear ideology in the shadow of Chinese nuclear capability. As early as 1960, Nehru had discussed reports of Chinese nuclear program with Chou En-Lai but the latter responded vaguely. Bhabha was in a hurry to establish the nuclear program, and his vision can be appreciated even more when placed in context of India's overall industrial poverty in 1947. By 1948, AEC had already begun prospecting for uranium although no large uranium deposits were found. In these early days of the Indian nuclear program, the CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence report stated that "nuclear energy development has captured the interest of Nehru and therefore enjoys governmental support, possibly in excess of what is necessary for its immediate needs." (Intelligence C. O., 1958) The foresight of Nehru and Bhabha on nuclear technology can be discerned when one looks at nuclear programs in Brazil and Argentina which failed to make headway despite the initial surge of political support for the nuclear program in these countries. The young scientists nurtured by Bhabha were to shepherd the nuclear program including its strategic

component into the late eighties and early nineties, ensuring a remarkable continuity in nuclear innovation. India could have been a nuclear weapon state formally in late eighties but it had to wait another decade.

INDIRA GANDHI: 'THE ENFORCER'

"My God, that woman had a will of iron. You talked to her and you realized immediately that she was tough." (Reedy, 1985)

This was George Reedy, a long-time aide of President Lyndon Johnson reflecting upon a conversation he had had with Indira Gandhi. In her early days in office as Minister of Information and Broadcasting, the note struck by Indira Gandhi with world leaders can be glimpsed from a conversation between her and Chairman A.N. Kosygin on 30 October 1964 discussing Indian nuclear capability. Indira Gandhi conveyed to Chairman Kosygin that "all sorts of pressures were beginning to be felt in India from the situation created by the Chinese nuclear test." (Kaul T., 1964) The rest of this conversation is available in the chapter 'Hunters of Unquiet Skies.' The possibility of Indira emerging as a long term Indian leader at the time was not apparent to everyone or perhaps many. In 1966, at a dinner gathering, some leading newspaper editors and political commentators who unanimously considered that "Mrs Gandhi, who had been the head of Government for less than three months, would soon be ousted." (Masant, 1976) She was only the second woman to be Prime Minister to a country. Whereas Nehru contacted Kennedy and also dialog was opened with Soviets by late 1964 on Navy, he did so under 'compellance' rather than choice. He considered it in the national interest to expand the military and acquire hardware from US based on a reactive response to the overhanging Chinese military threat. Thus, these post-1962 realist actions of Nehru were not borne out of realist principles per se but more out of a perception of national interest in a broad sense in a given threat scenario. In the absence of this threat scenario, Nehru would not have taken the hasty steps to enter into military supply agreements with US, UK, Canada initially and at a later stage, with the Soviet Union at a more comprehensive

level. The fact that a nuclear explosive device team was beginning to form in 1968, i.e. within two years of her coming into PM chair, indicates that she was going to shape national interest strategically and consciously rather than just let the strategic establishment work with certain natural choices of strategy such as minimum requirements of self-Defense etc. Indira was thinking offence albeit in a way that would shape the subcontinent and its place in the cold war. She would not wait and watch which side of the chaos of cold war would India find itself as the next crisis unfolded and instead, labour on core principles of national interest that would define the terms of reference for military ascendancy of the Indian state aligned with diplomatic objectives. William Scheuerman wrote that, “national interest was itself a deeply historical concept.” (Scheuerman, 2009) (Scheuerman, 2009) In so far as she was making a choice and initiating strategy, Indira had a clean slate albeit a dusty one to draw the first line of what constituted national interest and means to pursue it. National interest in a broad sense has some inherent characteristics such as preserving territorial integrity, safety of citizens, etc. Indira eschewed the principle of self-denial and goodwill which only contributed to self-containment. Indira’s India still believed in non-violence (in principle) but it could act violently to bear this principle. The desire for military ascendancy, will to use force, will to cross national boundary, desire to shape power and thereby India’s interests made her independent India’s first Machiavelli certified statesman. Morgenthau wrote about political realism as “concept on interest defined in terms of power.” (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 5) Power makes peace and annuls peace, in other words, Indira understood that power has its own nature irrespective of good intentions and motives. The distinction between actionable good intention and just abstract ones is parsed by this hand of power. According to a former Naval Chief, Indira had issued a ‘Strategic Directive’ in 1968 which mentioned (nuclear) submarines which is discussed in the chapter ‘A Few Good Bombs.’ The true submarine was a nuclear submarine and the conventional one was a submersible. Thus, according to this former CNS, this submarine was

a nuclear submarine. This also fits well with P.N. Haksar's articulation of a nuclear triad for India in the same year. Further, information was always larger than the record, the record would merely state a general position. For instance, Indira's letter to MGK Menon from 1972 on space and Defense is referring to ballistic missiles, reconnaissance satellites, etc. The institutional formations on record also bear this out.

But Indira's choice was not so much owing to the 'rational essence' ascribed by Morgenthau to account for the 'realist' practitioner but inscribing a long term view of strategic interests which took its first steps covertly in 1968 and overtly in December 1971 and May 1974. She kept India out of a collision course with the US in any direct or indirect manner but she insured herself with the 1971 Treaty with Soviet Union. The Soviet insurance was a double insurance as it acted as a stabilizer for China who was in fact being gently goaded by Nixon-Kissinger into intervening in India's East Pakistan campaign. Diplomacy would have power and vice versa. This also meant that Indira's advisers and the PM were in a position to realistically assess national interest of primary adversaries, secondary ones and the major powers involved. A key point in this 'Indira Doctrine' was that India had to take up the so-called 'power vacuum' left by the withdrawal of the British from the subcontinent. India would have to assume the role of a subcontinental power and her military expansion and nuclear decision was hinged to India's strategic ascendancy. No matter how India thought, there was a theory of balance of powers at play in the region and if India did not become a sort of 'enforcer' to fill the power vacuum then someone else would keep trying to fill that role either directly or through a ramshackle collective of sorts which would be even more dangerous. A shift of cold war azimuth a little towards the East vindicates this view. British were looking for ways to address the withdrawal from South East Asia but the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia along with the status of Singapore had held this up. The main concern of the US in the region was that "they did not want Hanoi or Beijing to assume that Western Defense was weakening." (Thompson, 2014)

US also did not want Singapore and Malaysia seeking links with China. Thus, Indira and Haksar saw this, it was already happening in the Indian Ocean and this sea rivalry would deliberately run itself aground at some point. If US would succeed in establishing itself pre-eminently in the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent, then Indira would have no choice but to turn closer towards the Soviet Union. The 1971 Treaty had a limited objective and that was to accomplish December 1971 and some short term joint interests but this had its limits as shown by Indira administration's lukewarm response to the Asian Collective Security proposal. Neither did India want Soviet Union to have ascendancy in the region or in the Indian Ocean and this was agreed to by them even in their meeting with US officials on at least one occasion. In this particular meeting Indian officials accepted the US view that no superpower should gain ascendancy in the Indian Ocean. Morgenthau wrote that "as an ideal, collective security is without flaws" but he also knew, as argued by Robert Art that the only problem with it "is that it does not work" even if it was a limited concept as the Brezhnev proposal was. (Art, 2003, p. 92) Indira knew the implications of not acting or not actively shaping, then the strategic tide turns against you to the point where you seek a powerful ally which in itself is an entanglement which comes at a heavy price. India got Soviet support in critical national moments and domestic political and economic issues but Indira wanted to be able to break away clean or at least have some strategic distance in national interest when required by circumstances. In fact, it would have helped the cause of US if India were to align more concretely with the Soviet Union as this would have the effect of justifying the entire history of US approach to the region in hindsight. At the same time, while Soviet Union was the best ally India had, it would not be beneath the Soviet leadership to see India draw closer to them on their own terms rather than India's. The India Soviet Union relationship in the eighties was different from the seventies because Soviet Union had opened the Afghanistan front and India's support behind the scenes was indispensable. This allowed India to turn the relationship in its favour. While Shastri and L.K. Jha had considered a nuclear umbrella

for India against China by the major nuclear powers, Indira's thinking resonated an idea best taken from a MEA report from November 1964 by someone who went on to become President of India, that "India is too great a nation to dwindle by consent into an international protectorate." (MEA, 1964) Incidentally, this paper from 1964 titled 'India and the Chinese Bomb' is also the first comprehensive proposal for India to go in for a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Returning to Indira, the war of 1965 had proven the Indian argument of Pakistan as aggressor and that no accommodation was possible especially with China colluding with Pakistan. The Indira years saw not only the opening of option to use offensive and outright force as an instrument in its own right but also a more conscious strategy of securing Indian interests. The changes that had taken place since 1962 required a leader conscious of the cold war grand strategies being played out- increasingly, India China problems were seen by China as part of its overall world policy and not strictly in bilateral terms; the push for nuclear maritime supremacy in Indian Ocean initially by US and then by USSR and expansion of Diego Garcia base for accommodating long range bombers by US; Gulf countries were emerging as major buyers of sophisticated armament from France in particular; Vietnam war was unfolding; after 1965 war Pakistan was seeking to rearm itself and in particular was seeking long range bombers from US and Mirages from France; China had kept its nuclear weapons program going through the Cultural Revolution and tested a thermonuclear device on a missile in 1967; it was clear that Soviet Union would be the main source of Indian Defense expansion in the near and short term; Sino-Soviet chasm was widening; some within the Indian strategic community had already begun to anticipate China-US rapprochement by 1965.

In the talks on 28 March between Johnson and Indira Gandhi, the US President conveyed the similarity of circumstances between his and Indian PM's in taking over the office after the demise of Kennedy and Shastri respectively. On Kashmir, US had dropped the idea of plebiscite after the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 and backed the Tashkent

process. Overall assessment from Indian side was that President Johnson had undertaken a major reappraisal of US policy in Asia with US willing to support local governments with arms through pacts with Thailand, Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. It had also made total security commitment to Australia including Joint US-Australia strategy in Indian Ocean. Kissinger, when he came with President Nixon to India in 1969, conveyed to PM Gandhi that there was a shift in US approach whereby “US did not want to make any choices between India and Pakistan.” (MEA, President Nixon’s Visit to India, 1969)’ Kissinger also addressed Indian concern over disproportionate US Defense security commitments in Asia. Nixon had also stated in the delegation meetings that US “did not wish to impose American pattern on Asia” and reiterated that US was a Pacific power. (MEA, President Nixon’s Visit to India, 1969)’ In other words, what Kissinger’s words effectively implied were, India had to decide if it had the will to shape the patterns in the subcontinent and by extension in Asia. But India would have to do this with US actively pursuing its interests everywhere around but some of the earlier presumptions held by US administrations in their approach to subcontinent such as idea of military parity between India and Pakistan would now be dropped. Even Kissinger would have known that the subcontinent region as naturally lent itself to Indian influence and this was inevitable but the question was whether India would have a leader with ‘political radar’ and a military that could get it done. Also Indira would have to find ways of using the military in a clean way, i.e. she would have to know through intelligence whether in conflicts with Pakistan on East or West would lead to direct involvement of US or China. Indira recognized that India would need offensive weaponry. In 1971, D.P. Dhar had handed over an Aide Memoire from the PM to Soviet leadership on the TU-22 strategic bomber and the Soviets had agreed to do so. However, ultimately the bomber did not come to India since the IAF seemed unable to think beyond the Mirage threat of Pakistan. Why did the IAF leadership, throughout the cold war era, not acquire long range strategic bombers and keep only vintage Canberra in those years is a legitimate question? Even Pakistan had been seeking B-57s from US,

perhaps if Pakistan had succeeded in getting these then the IAF may have gone for the TU-22s. These TU-22s would have allowed IAF to undertake geo-strategic aviation as early as 1971. A report emerged in 1971 that President Yahya Khan had made a request for B-57s in their role as high altitude reconnaissance but with a six-ton bomb load, as pointed by Ambassador Chester Bowles in 1971 during testimony to the Congress, "it would be used for bombing Indian cities." (MEA, Vol.II, 1971) There was another report in July 1971 regarding Pakistan querying about purchase of seven units of sophisticated B-57s. Even Marshal Grechko had conveyed his surprise and disappointment to D.P. Dhar that IAF did not seem to have understood the relevance of having strategic bombers like the TU-22. Beyond doubt, the Prime Minister and her closest advisers were clear on Indian forces have greater striking capacity, something which had crept into the Indian strategy through Soviet interactions. At the same time, India resisted Soviet ideas for Asia such as the proposal called 'Asian Collective Security' floated by Brezhnev. Soviet Union was a late entrant in subcontinent but by late sixties it thought it could at least make useful suggestions to Indian leadership that could help turn some of the tide against US presence in the region. Despite the close dialog and the culmination of the Treaty of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship of 1971, PM Gandhi left the Soviet Collective Proposal in the cold. During the late sixties, Soviet navy had entered into warm waters from cold waters and the Soviet strategy was following the same course through the Brezhnev proposal. Soviet navy had become a force of global deployment. Its strength in the Mediterranean had increased from 10 in 1967 to 46 in 1968. By 1968 there was a rapid increase in naval presence in Mediterranean from 10/12 in 1967 to 46 in 1968 which also included 4 guided missile cruisers and 1 missile firing destroyer. According to Admiral Gorshkov, global deployment of the Soviet navy had crated new logistical issues with 'rear services' having to supply long range distances. Soviet Union wanted to wall-in China.

Meanwhile, an unscheduled meeting took place between Nixon and Brezhnev without the presence of their respective advisors. Indian Embassy Moscow reported that the overriding concern

between Nixon and Brezhnev was to reduce risks of direct confrontation between each other. Nixon's speech was looked at carefully by the Indian officials in Moscow. Nixon's argument of 'special responsibility' of superpowers to collaborate in any region of the world was looked at with concern by Indian officials. Thus, in Indira's time the cold war was itself changing and entering its mature phase in the 1970s. The two 'superpowers' worked out an understanding that would leave room for conventional escalation without direct nuclear confrontation. Indian concern was that behind the cold war mist, the two powers considered it their "entitlement to reach understandings covering the entire world" although how the two perceived the role of China was not clear. (MEA, Nixon Moscow, 1972) Nixon-Kissinger engagement with Peking had "helped Kissinger obtain important concessions from the Soviet Union during the Moscow Summit (May 1972) and after." (MEA, Kissinger India, 1974) Indian brief from Peking assessed that China had displayed unusual realism during Kissinger's visit in 1973. China had also begun to engage Thailand, Manila and Malaysia to counter Soviet influence. New Delhi had to determine whether Indian security would be affected more through the Nixon-Peking outcomes and or those of Nixon-Brezhnev. Mao had taken the decision to de-escalate with the US and escalate anti-Soviet sentiment at home and away. Mao had decided that he would fight only proxy wars with the US, Soviet Union and US decided that they would not let direct confrontation come about through proxy wars with each other. Despite the rhetoric, Mao kept a defensive posture militarily towards Soviet Union choosing not to provoke it directly but through proxy diplomacy. What would and could Indira do in the transition of the cold war?

BEHIND THE 'INDIRA DOCTRINE': P.N. HAKSAR
AS INDIA'S KENNAN OR NITZE?

What shape India would take through Indira had much lot to do with the counsel that she relied on in her initial years. The stage for Indira's avatar as a cold warrior was set up by P.N. Haksar. Haksar wrote, "a

nuclear stand-off with China is essential as soon as possible.” (Haksar P., Subject File 290, 1968) Haksar also wrote that the first test device for India would have to be equal in yield if not more than the one that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki otherwise it would not have appropriate impact. The core dilemma of Indian policy was how to secure security interests in the short and the long run. Even though Soviet Union was assisting Indian Defense build-up by 1967-68, continuing the ‘Tashkent leverage’ in the subcontinent meant it would have to give something to Pakistan as well and this it did in 1968. Second, Haksar got rid of the nuclear pacifism of his predecessor L.K. Jha which had seen PM Shastri petitioning world capitals for a nuclear guarantee but to no avail. We do have information that Prime Minister Harold Wilson discussed the idea of nuclear guarantee in his talks with President L.B. Johnson but no details were available for these talks. (MEA, 1965) India would have to break through its own encirclement inflicted by Nehruvian unrestricted diplomacy and also the nuclear protectorate approach of PM Shastri and Secretary L.K. Jha. The direct outcome of 1962 was that India was shown to the world as encircled and Indian approach to the world powers also confirmed the idea to these powers that India was encircled by the Chinese by threatening it where it was most vulnerable, the Himalayan terrain which embedded Kashmir. Haksar understood that no amount of friendship with any superpower nor any quantity of weaponry imports could end India’s own strategic embargo. This embargo was compounded by emergency of a strong Chinese nuclear weapons program which could now hit Indian cities with IRBMs and within a few years ICBMs. For China, Indian targets were only 1000 miles away whereas for India, Chinese industrial heartland were more than 2000 miles away and thus, India had no means of threatening vital targets within China. Haksar drafted what was later to be collectively called ‘the triad.’ In 1968, Haskar wrote about ballistic missiles capable of hitting Chinese population and industrial centres, nuclear propelled submarines with nuclear missiles, air delivery and nuclear stockpiling. The same year PM Indira issued a ‘strategic directive’ which mentioned submarines. As

told to the author by the head of the thermonuclear device team of 1998 Pokhran tests and who was also one of the first persons to be recruited for the 1974 explosives project, Dr S.K. Sikka informs that team to work on nuclear explosive was formed in 1968 and designs were being worked on. The same year, as we know from Ashok Mitra papers, funds were allocated by Planning Commission for Purnima-I (zero research reactor) that became the basis for the 1974 test. The 1974 device was a deliverable device. As explained by Dr Anil Kakodkar, one channel of weaponization was through the 1974 device. BARC had begun to work on nuclear propulsion in 1976 although naval engineers had begun working on it before. A compact reactor idea had been drafted in 1975 by Admiral Tandon from Marine Engineering Directorate and P.N. Haskar as Chairman of the Apex Committee-II decided to bring the program under DAE and also issued funds for the same. M.G.K. Menon had stated that the submarine would have to be built around this reactor. Ultimately the Russians would be involved with the making of India's first two submarines of which one has undergone trials i.e Arihant. Russian designers and technicians were involved in the greatest detail for these first two submarines and the component of indigenization would increase from the third submarine onwards. Whether the hull, reactor core, reactor, missile compartment, launchers, etc. the Russians worked on every detail. According to former Naval chief; Payments were made, contracts were signed, technical documents received, parts received for the ATV project from 1995 onwards though a more specific cooperation developed after June 1998 when Russians also agreed to lease six Akula-II nuclear submarines to India over ten years from their reserves which were around 20 submarines out of a total commission of 70 submarines in the Russian navy. As to why the navy has not gone ahead with these six submarines which would give it an order of deterrence and instant nuclear maritime ascendancy given China's maritime push is best known to naval thinkers. On the ATV project, the other side of the argument as given by Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon which is also the publicly taken line, that Soviets were in an advisory role and not involved hands on

in either designing or fabrication. According to this view, the ATV work (fabrication and design) was carried out almost entirely by Indian team itself.

Nevertheless, 1968 was a watershed moment; PM Gandhi and Haksar had decided that India would cross the no-bomb line and rudimentary work had begun on delivery platforms. The roadmap was established to becoming a nuclear weapon state with minimum deterrence. P.N. Haksar was at the strategic epicentre of the transformation in Indian security with a nominal doctrine in place although the institutionalization of doctrine would begin a decade later. Part of the reason for the lull in nuclear weaponization and development of technology platforms was the emergency crisis and entry of PM Morarji. Former AEC Chairman Dr M.R. Srinivasan also told the author that he had been sounded out on the nuclear explosives program even as early as 1966. Bhabha had established the basic capacities and even doctrinal decision of when to cross the no-bomb line. As stated earlier, Bhabha had written to Nehru that repeated tests and delivery demonstration by China would need to be responded to by India itself acquiring minimum deterrence since then the question would cease to be merely of psychological posturing and require a military response. In fact, Bhabha's same letter to Nehru predicted that the time for such a decision may occur by 1968. Secondly, Bhabha also wrote here that nuclear weapon capability would have to be developed within. DAE document from 1970 also noted that minimum deterrence would require capability of developing delivery platform such as bombers and missiles within. In 1974, Admiral Gorshkov in discussions with Admiral Kohli stated that Soviet Union was prepared to enter into strategic dialog with India. Both got along well despite the age difference. Both decided to go off the itinerary in the Black Sea Resort. For Gorshkov, the Indian Ocean was a pet subject in his talks with Indian naval side. On returning, Admiral Kohli gave a note on his discussion with Gorshkov to Defense Minister and also met with PM Gandhi and PN Haksar. Gorshkov had mentioned two (nuclear) submarines. In 1976, Gorshkov had talked about IN having a fleet of nuclear submarines.

The true submarine is a nuclear submarine and the non-nuclear are technically called submersibles but in popular parlance have come to be known as submarines. The warm waters around India were particularly lethal for submarine operations since sound waves would be internally reflected at a specific depth i.e. detection is difficult unlike the long range sound detection is possible in Atlantic, Pacific, etc. Submarines are practically immune to detection including from satellites. In exercises, even conventional submarines are able to get within 6-8 km of aircraft carriers, fire torpedoes and come away. Even conventional submarines are practically impossible to detect. A note had been sent to the PMO from a naval officer who had gone as part of naval delegation to Soviet Union in 1975 and later become CNS stating “we must introduce a factor of uncertainty in the calculations of the super powers in the Indian Ocean.” (CNS F. C.) The note was taken up by PM Gandhi. One can see that a convergence of strategic choices coming together almost immediately after the 1974 PNE but the tracks were laid much before. Doctrine/thinking was in place, in 1974 PM Indira formally started the ATV project, gave direction for highest priority to ISRO, a carte blanche was given to ISRO. Morarji Government was strongly anti-Soviet Union and all plans were dropped. However, even Morarji was compelled to turn to Soviet Union for heavy water in 1978 to run Indian reactors due to Western nuclear cooperation embargo after the PNE.

1972 was the next watershed moment when the space program was tangibly given a Defense dimension as indicated by letter from PM Gandhi to M.G.K. Menon in that same year. By mid-1973 orders came from PMO to dig an underground shaft in the Pokhran range and the chapter ‘A Few Good Bombs’ refers to a PMO document that records this decision. Indira resumed the ‘triad’ on her return to power in 1980. Agni project was stalling on the cryogenic engines and around 1982 designs, technical documents for these engines desperately needed by ISRO were smuggled out of Soviet Union by someone from the Indian Embassy Moscow. These designs and documentation for cryogenic engines would also be used for the engines that went into the PSLV and GSLV. On submarine, Admiral

Gorshkov again sounded out the strategic cooperation. It must be noted that in 1980, Pegov had already mentioned nuclear submarine offer along with MIG-27 to V.K. Ahuja and T.N. Kaul. Writing in December 1981, AMS Division Under Secretary and current Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar wrote about collapse of détente balance and re-emergence of super power confrontation, particularly Soviet Union's concern over "rapprochement (2nd time) between US and China which it sees as an attempt to isolate and encircle it." (MEA, 1981) Under Secy. S. Jaishankar wrote about Soviet perception of upgraded relations between Islamabad and Washington which, according to Soviets was "re-establish American military superiority over it from the Pacific to the Atlantic." (MEA, 1981) In 1982 when Gorshkov came to India, Soviet Naval C-in-C stayed at the Rashtrapati Bhavan. This was unprecedented, no naval chief had ever been a guest at Rashtrapati Bhavan. The chapter 'A Few Good Bombs' submerses deeper into the submarine and naval history of the cold war from the perspective of Soviet strategic cooperation. This chapter establishes history of the Indian nuclear triad through unprecedented documentation and interviews covering missile, strategic aviation as well as nuclear submarine. Without the Soviet/Russian hinge, there would be no Indian nuclear triad today. Had India been following the Soviet political system, it would have been a nuclear weapon state by early to mid-eighties but even despite the convergence of decision making required in a cabinet centric democratic set-up, weaponization was possible in late eighties to early nineties but the Bofors issue froze Rajiv's strategic resolve and the subsequent governments had to juggle with economic crisis and fallout of collapse of Soviet Union. The political will remaining a constant, the other variables of political stability and economic growth returned only by the time Vajpayee returned for a second term as Prime Minister. PM Rao had the political will but the economic clouds had not completely cleared and Manmohan Singh as Minister had sounded him a note of financial caution on the nuclear decision.

Haksar was 'the founding hawk' of Indian strategic realism, and doctrine-level architect of the Indian nuclear triad. Any future notion

of Indian Grand Strategy would be on stilts standing in quick sand if it does not anchor itself around the thoughts/writings of P.N. Haksar whether on nuclear arsenal, tactical weapons, military expansion, foreign policy, naval diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy, etc. Although his years in office were few but those years were marked by a strategic transformation and doctrinal thresholds had been crossed. He began more as a 'Nitzean' (Paul Nitze) and ended as more of a 'Kennanite' (George F. Kennan) although there were elements of both to be found in his writings. Some of the problems in getting the parallel channels of nuclear weapon capability not coming together after the 1974 tests may have well to do with his exit as Secretary to PM Indira although he remained influential through membership of crucial committees on Defense, planning, etc. It's also another question whether emergency law would not have been enacted if Haksar was still Secretary to PM but that is a what if question.

INDIRA'S 'CHURCHILLIAN' MOMENT

“How long can Mrs Gandhi act as a dyke against the rising floods of communalism?” D.P. Dhar to A.N. Kosygin

Nixon would “extend the policy of Vietnamisation to the subcontinent” A.N. Kosygin to D.P. Dhar

Indira seemed to think that peace worked best after surrender and this was her approach with Pakistan and avoiding being in such a position was her resolve with China. It is a historical question of a high order to know what Mao thought of Indira. It may not be surprising that he may not have thought much if any before 1971 but surely 1971 Indian military campaign would have got him to make an assessment of Indira Gandhi. What Pakistan could not see was that Indira's clear ambition was to establish Indian hegemony in the subcontinent and military upgrades/expansion would be part of this and the very existence of Pakistan as it was, to begin with in the East but also in West, would be threatened. Indira was wise enough not to wait until 1971 after she had established herself electorally. Seeking a larger national awakening including intense economic nationalization and agricultural regeneration, not even the US

foresaw Indira's 'Churchillian' moment in December 1971. The US was caught flat footed and its reaction on the seventh fleet was too late, the Soviets were tracking the US fleet from satellite above and with submarines which, going by what Marshal Grechko said to D.P. Dhar, got twice below USS Enterprise without being traced. Indian strategists knew that the seventh fleet would not arrive in time and even the US would have known that. Time was on Indira and Sam Manekshaw's side. Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw was able to explain the implications of military plans to PM Gandhi, the same war fought a few months before would have turned into a quagmire. Sam was no political general and was clear in his advice to the PM. The extra time was used by India to prepare the diplomatic ground work, work public perception in international opinion as well as keep a close watch on whatever hardware was going in and out of Pakistan.

Reports had emerged of secret US shipments to Pakistan despite the official arms embargo in place since 25 March 1971. Three Pakistani freighters (Padma, Sunderbans and Kaukahla) had left the US with unspecified military supplies. Yahya Khan had visited DC and placed request for B-57 bombers. The shipments included re-conditioned military aircraft, capable of as much offensive action as new aircrafts. Indian Foreign Ministry communicated to US authorities that "US has special responsibility to restrain Pakistan" but in fact they were "helping Pakistan to continue its military atrocities in Bangladesh." (MEA, 1971) L.K. Jha, Indian Ambassador US wrote to Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul on 9 November 1971 on his meeting with Kissinger. On L.K. Jha's charge that US was interfering in the domestic affairs of India, Kissinger responded "we have not the slightest desire to exercise pressure on you ... if we have to do ... we shall leave you in no doubt about it." (MEA, 1971) US Senator Edward Kennedy was an important voice in criticism of the US administration's policy on Pakistan at this time. He had visited India and described the selective killings in East Bengal as "genocide." During his visit to Parliament, Vajpayee asked 'when Senator Kennedy is going to become the President of the US.' The Senator jocularly replied 'I like this kind of question.' Cabinet Secretariat

(Research and Analysis Wing) note provides information on shipments aboard the ship M.V. Kaukhali which had arrived at Karachi on 16 June 1971. Senator Kennedy released two documents i.e. the letter of offer on USAF was accepted by Military Attache in Pakistan Embassy, Washington on 1 June, 1971. Second offer from US Navy on Naval minesweeper was accepted on 30 June 1971. In connection with Pakistan, Indian authorities were watching the military supply of Arab countries and Iran in particular.

Like Churchill, Indira also needed an Eisenhower and this would be A.N. Kosygin. Kissinger wrote in *Diplomacy* “historically, alliances had been formed to augment a nation’s strength in case of war” but this was a case where one party had already made up its mind and planned for war and came forward for an alliance, albeit a long pending one, to underwrite this war. The 1971 Treaty made Soviet Union into India’s insurance policy particularly with possibility of China opening a front. D.P. Dhar felt that Yahya Khan had gained prominence by acting as mediator between Kissinger and Chinese leaders and in East Pakistan “Yahya Khan is flirting with the idea of war.” (Haksar P., 1971) Kosygin also informed that Yahya Khan had asked for his Special Envoy to be received by them but they had turned this down. On US attitude towards the Treaty, Kosygin stated that “President Nixon will be completely against the Treaty.” (Haksar P., 1971) Kosygin added that Nixon was attempting to “extend the policy of Vietnamisation to the subcontinent.” (Haksar P., 1971) The US is also engaged in financing and supporting “elements in your country which are engaged in a struggle against Mrs Gandhi.” (Haksar P., 1971) The security element of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty can be discerned from the conversation between D.P. Dhar and A.A. Gromyko. Indian PM’s special envoy stated “an assessment of the military situation as it confronted India and Soviet Union in Asia would have to be made” including joint assessment of the strength and capabilities of China and Pakistan, attitude of the US, etc. (Haksar P., 1971) Dhar also put forward proposal for security consultation framework in the present environment when “the threat of attack (on India) is absolutely apparent” and that there was “an

obligation to enter into consultations as to how such a threat should be removed.” (Haksar P., 1971) Completing the war as well as the policy objective through the Shimla Accord established her credentials. The political risk taken by PM Gandhi should not be underestimated, a long drawn out military campaign would have opened a window for either China or the US to intervene and even allowed Pakistan to recalculate its response. She pulled off war and imposed a just peace as opposed to a humiliating peace on a surrendered Pakistan. The swift military victory did not veer her off into making unacceptable impositions on Pakistan as she knew that for the peace to hold good, international perception of the terms would have to be favourable. Indira perhaps also understood and perhaps this may have been her impression from conversation with Nixon of not putting into question the viability of West Pakistan as it could involve the Americans. The entire public propaganda was built on East Bengal humanitarian problem and any holding of territory within West Pakistan would wash that away and open the doors to US intervention. The extent of public opinion in effect in India’s favour can be made out from the visit of Senator Edward Kennedy to India. Secondly, this is also borne out by the series of so-called ‘Dissent Cables’ coming from the US Consulate in Dacca. Indira-Haksar also saw through Kissinger’s words as they would have had their own sources of information on US talks with Pakistan. They knew that Kissinger’s assurance that “under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would back India against any Chinese pressures.” (NSA, 2002) In fact, Kissinger had met with Chinese Ambassador at UN Hung Hua where he suggested that China activate her front against India. Why didn’t China do this? First reason was Soviet intervention on China’s borders. In any case, Chinese would have considered this action on their own without any suggestion required from Kissinger. Second, Mao may have decided not to do it also to let Nixon Kissinger know that China had its own interests and configuration of means to attain them but we cannot say for sure. We do know that Indira also considered the option of China doing what Kissinger had suggested. Also one may explore whether the decision