Beyond Eden

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Mohr Siebeck

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Beyond Eden

The Biblical Story of Paradise (Genesis 2–3)
and Its Reception History

Edited by

Konrad Schmid and Christoph Riedweg

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Preface

The essays in this volume began as papers delivered at a conference held on October 19–20, 2007 at the Istituto Svizzero di Roma and the Facoltà Valdese di Teologia in Rome. The topic of the conference was the anthropology and theology of the biblical "Fall" narrative (Genesis 2–3), whose intellectual and cultural-historical relevance can hardly be overestimated. Genesis 2–3 is certainly one of the best known texts in world literature, formulating the fundamental premises and problematics of human self understanding in Judeo-Christian thought. For what reason is the concrete experience of human life interpreted as "paradise lost?" Why is the human acquisition of knowledge considered problematic? Why is society organized patriarchally? To what degree is freedom an integral part of the *conditio humana?* Why does human existence have intrinsic temporal limits?

In addition to being one of the most famous narratives, Genesis 2–3 is also one of the most multi-dimensional narratives of the Bible. It is typically known as the story of Adam, Eve, the apple, the Fall, and the punishment of humankind with mortality. However, of these popular elements, only "Eve" actually appears in the biblical story itself. The other elements owe their existence to the productive reception of the story in the Intertestamental and New Testament literature as well as the later history of reception. The Hebrew narrative speaks of *ha'adam*, which – as a result of the definite article – does not signify the proper name "Adam" but instead the category of "human." The fruit of the forbidden tree is not botanically identified, but later becomes regarded as an "apple" as a result of a wordplay arising from its Latin adaptation (*malum*). Eating the fruit is never termed "sin" in Genesis ("sin" appears for the first time in the Bible in Gen 4:7), and the first humans were created mortal, as is shown by their creation from dust and the formulation of Gen 2:16f., which is similar to a law of capital punishment. The consumption of the forbidden fruit is therefore punishable by the death penalty, not with the penalty of mortality, a notion that first develops in the later reception history.

These preliminary observations already reveal the importance of analysis both of the Bible itself and of its diverse interpretive potential and impact in order to get to an adequate understanding of Genesis 2–3. In light of this challenge the conference adopted an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the historical meaning of the story itself as well as its variegated reception and influences. The goal was, on the one hand, to profile

the anthropological and theological perspectives of the biblical paradise narrative in its historical context and evaluate its cultural historical importance (without reducing its multidimensionality), and on the other hand to survey the productive potential realized throughout its history of reception. This approach makes visible both the fruitfulness of ancient, Medieval, and more recent exegesis and hermeneutics of Genesis 2–3 in word and picture, and also the manifold interactions between historically conditioned interpretive situations and this foundational text.

Jean-Louis Ska's (Rome) contribution, "Genesis 2–3: Some fundamental questions" reviews the introductory and fundamental exegetical problems in Genesis 2–3, taking the literary relationship with Genesis 1 into special consideration. He designates Genesis 2–3 as a post-Priestly addition to Genesis 1, which does not attempt to answer the question of how the world came to be from the perspective of Babylonian science, but rather from the indigenous Israelite tradition.

In "Heaven on Earth – or Not? Jerusalem as Eden in Biblical Literature," Terje Stordalen (Olso) offers an overview of the implicit and explicit representations in the Bible of Jerusalem as Paradise. This essay reveals the contours of the innerbiblical discussion of the question of the this-worldliness or otherworldliness of Paradise.

The article by Konrad Schmid (Zürich), "Loss of Immortality? Hermeneutical Aspects of Genesis 2–3 and Its Early Receptions," addresses the anthropological constitution of the first humans (namely, the question of their mortality) from the perspective of Genesis 2–3 and early Jewish texts such as Ben Sira, Wisdom of Solomon, Josephus, and 4.Ezra among others. He concludes that, contrary to the widely held position, the Bible and its earliest receptions assume that humans were created mortal. This conclusion also provides an important backdrop for the interpretation of central New Testament passages such as Rom 5.

Hermann Spieckermann (Göttingen) asks, "Is God's Creation Good? From Hesiodus to Ben Sira." In his answer he presents a *tour d'horizon* of the various conceptions of creation from the regions of ancient Israel and Greece, analyzing the convergences and divergences of different positions.

Thomas Krüger's (Zürich) essay, "Sündenfall? – Überlegungen zur theologischen Bedeutung der Paradiesgeschichte," provides an exegesis of Genesis 2–3 and contrasts it with traditional Christian interpretations of this text.

In her essay, "The Earthen Human, the Breathing Statue: The Sculptor God, Greco-Roman Statuary, and Clement of Alexandria," Laura Nasrallah (Harvard) traces the conception of the formation of the first humans in relation to Greco-Roman statuary sculpture and shows which conceptual profiles connect with works of sculpture.

Michael Stone (Jerusalem), shows in his contribution, "Satan and the Serpent in the Armenian Tradition," the diverse conceptualizations in the Armenian sources of how the Satan and the snake in Genesis 3 become connected. Many of the texts he examines are difficult to access. In this essay they are presented to the wider academic community for the first time.

In "Das Verbot, vom Baum der Erkenntnis von Gut und Böse zu essen (Gen 2,17): Zeichen eines missgünstigen Gottes? Kaiser Julian und Kyrill von Alexandrien in einer virtuellen Debatte," Christoph Riedweg (Zürich/Rome) first of all discusses the views held by the Emperor Julian, called the Apostate, who in his sharp criticism of Genesis 2–3 takes up and further develops arguments of his Platonic precursors Celsus and Porphyry as well as Gnosticism. Riedweg compares Julian's position to that of Cyril of Alexandria and also offers an in depth analysis of the Greek version of the Paradise story which is authoritative for both.

Michael Signer's (Notre Dame) contribution, "Coming to Consciousness: Knowing, Choosing or Stealing? Approaches to the Story of the Garden (Genesis 2–3) in Medieval Northern French Jewish Exegesis," discusses various Rabbinic perspectives on Genesis 3 (such as Kimchi). It focuses on the inter-religious contact with the Christian interpretation of this text at that time, showing that the Christian and Jewish exegesis did not operate in *splendid isolation* from one another, but instead often integrated one another's positions.

In "The Four Rivers that Flowed from Eden," art historian Nira Stone (Jerusalem) displays numerous iconographic examples of the motif of the four rives from Gen 2:10–15, which, especially in Christian art, has been juxtaposed with the resumption of the motif in the Johannine Apocalypse.

Emidio Campi (Zürich) investigates the relationship between "Genesis 1–3 and the Sixteenth Century Reformers." Giving special attention to Petrus Martyr Vermigli as well as Calvin, Campi profiles the exegesis of Genesis 2–3 during the Reformation. As a compliment to Signer's essay, Campi demonstrates how the current Jewish exegesis exercised a strong influence on the reformers' understanding of this text.

Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld) concludes the volume by asking the question "Wozu Paradiese?" Bittner's contribution offers a close reading of Genesis 2–3 from a philosophic perspective and inquires about the logical coherence and lacunas in this text.

The present volume as a whole documents the manifold convergences between the various historical, exegetical, and reception-historical approaches to Genesis 2–3. On the other hand, the different accentuations in theological profile between Genesis 2–3 and its various receptions emerge through their juxtaposition with one another.

The abbreviations in this volume follow S.M. Schwertner, *Theologische Realenzyklpädie,* Abkürzungsverzeichnis, Berlin/New York 1994 and P.H. Alexander et al., eds., *The SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies,* Peabody, MA 1999.

We thank our collaborators in Zürich and Rome for their commitment and their help with putting on the conference and preparing the essays for print, especially Ms. Luise Oehrli for the manuscript preparation. We would also like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation and the University of Zürich for their financial support, the editors of the series "Forschungen zum Alten Testament" as well as the publisher Mohr Siebeck in Tübingen for their cooperation.

Zürich and Rome, in July 2008   Konrad Schmid – Christoph Riedweg

Vorwort

Der vorliegende Band geht auf eine Tagung zurück, die am 19. und 20. Oktober 2007 am Istituto Svizzero und an der Facoltà Valdese di Teologia in Rom stattgefunden hat. Ihr Thema war die Anthropologie und Theologie der ausgesprochen wirkmächtigen Erzählung vom „Sündenfall" in der Bibel (Genesis 2–3), deren geistes- und kulturgeschichtliche Bedeutung kaum zu überschätzen ist. Genesis 2–3 ist wohl einer der bekanntesten Texte der Weltliteratur. Er formuliert fundamentale Prämissen und Problemfelder menschlichen Selbstverständnisses der jüdisch-christlichen Geistestradition. Weshalb wird die Erfahrung der realen menschlichen Lebenswelt als „paradise lost" interpretiert? Weshalb ist menschliche Erkenntnisfähigkeit problematisch? Weshalb ist eine Gesellschaftsordnung patriarchal organisiert? Inwiefern ist Freiheit ein elementarer Bestandteil der *conditio humana*? Weshalb ist menschliche Existenz notwendigerweise zeitlich begrenzt?

In dieser Eigenschaft gehört Genesis 2–3 gleichzeitig zu den mehrdimensionalsten Erzählungen der Bibel. Sie ist etwa bekannt als die Geschichte von Adam, Eva, dem Apfel, dem Sündenfall und der Bestrafung des Menschengeschlechts mit der Sterblichkeit. Von all diesen populären Elementen findet sich nur „Eva" in der biblischen Geschichte selbst, die restlichen verdanken sich der produktiven Rezeption der Geschichte in der zwischen- und neutestamentlichen Literatur sowie der späteren Wirkungsgeschichte: Die hebräische Erzählung spricht von *ha'adam*, was – ausweislich des Artikels – nicht den Eigennamen „Adam", sondern die Gattung „Mensch" bezeichnet. Die Frucht des verbotenen Baumes wird botanisch nicht identifiziert, sondern wird im Sinne eines Wortspiels erst in der lateinischen Wirkungsgeschichte zum „Apfel" (*malum*). Der Genuss dieser Frucht wird in Genesis nirgends terminologisch als „Sünde" fixiert (der Begriff fällt in der Bibel zum ersten Mal in Gen 4,7), und die ersten Menschen sind, wie ihre Erschaffung aus Staub und die Gestaltung von Gen 2,16f. als Todesrechtssatz zeigen, von allem Anfang an sterblich geschaffen. Der Verzehr der verbotenen Frucht wird mit der Todesstrafe belegt, nicht mit der Strafe der Sterblichkeit. Diese Vorstellung ist erst in der späteren Wirkungsgeschichte entwickelt worden. Schon diese Beobachtungen zeigen, wie wichtig für ein angemessenes Verständnis von Genesis 2–3 ein kritischer Blick auf die Bibel selbst, aber auch auf ihre vielfältigen Potentiale und Wirkungen ist. Die Tagung verfolgte deshalb einen bewusst disziplinenübergreifenden Zugang, um den historischen Eigensinn ebenso

wie die vielfältigen Rezeptionen und Wirkungen dieser Erzählung zu er-
kunden. Sie setzte sich zum Ziel, die anthropologischen und theologischen
Perspektiven der biblischen Paradieserzählung einerseits in ihren histori-
schen Kontexten zu profilieren und in ihrer kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeu-
tung zu würdigen (ohne ihre Mehrdimensionalität zu reduzieren) und sie
andererseits auf ihre produktiven Potentiale hin zu befragen, die sich in der
Wirkungsgeschichte dieses Textes realisiert haben. Deutlich wurden dabei
zum einen die produktiven Möglichkeiten antiker, mittelalterlicher und
neuzeitlicher Exegese und Hermeneutik von Genesis 2–3 in Text und Bild,
zum anderen wurden die vielfältigen Interaktionen zwischen historisch
bedingten Auslegungssituationen und diesem Text in ihren kulturmäch-
tigen Wirkungen sichtbar.

Jean-Louis Skas Beitrag (Rom) „Genesis 2–3: Some fundamental ques-
tions" bespricht die elementaren einleitungswissenschaftlichen Probleme
zu Gen 2–3 und diskutierte vor allem den literarischen Zusammenhang mit
Gen 1. Er bestimmt Gen 2–3 als nachpriesterschrifliche Ergänzung zu
Gen 1, die die Frage der Weltentstehung nicht aus der Sicht babylonischer
Wissenschaft, sondern von indigenen Traditionen her beantwortet.

Terje Stordalen (Oslo) bietet in „Heaven on Earth – or Not? Jerusalem
as Eden in Biblical Literature" einen Überblick über die impliziten und ex-
pliziten Vorstellungen in der Bibel, die Jerusalem als Ort des Paradieses
interpretieren. So werden Konturen einer innerbiblischen Diskussion zur
Frage der Diesseitigkeit oder Jenseitigkeit des Paradieses sichtbar.

Der Beitrag von Konrad Schmid (Zürich) „Loss of Immortality? Her-
meneutical Aspects of Genesis 2–3 and Its Early Receptions" behandelt die
Frage nach der anthropologischen Konstitution der ersten Menschen, na-
mentlich der Frage ihrer Sterblichkeit, in der Perspektive von Gen 2–3 so-
wie in einigen frühjüdischen Texten wie Sir, SapSal, Josephus, 4Esr u.a.
Entgegen einer weit verbreiteten Ansicht lässt sich zeigen, dass sowohl die
Bibel als auch ihre frühesten Rezeptionen davon ausgehen, dass die Men-
schen sterblich geschaffen worden sind. Daraus ergeben sich auch Konse-
quenzen für die Interpretation zentraler neutestamentlicher Passagen wie
Röm 5.

Hermann Spieckermann (Göttingen) fragt „Is God's Creation Good?
From Hesiodus to Ben Sira". Er präsentiert in seiner Antwort einen *tour
d'horizon* über verschiedene Schöpfungskonzeptionen aus dem Bereich des
antiken Israel und des antiken Griechenland und arbeitet Konvergenzen
und Divergenzen der verschiedenen Positionen heraus.

Thomas Krügers (Zürich) Beitrag „Sündenfall? – Überlegungen zur
theologischen Bedeutung der Paradiesgeschichte" entfaltet den inneren Zu-
sammenhang von Gen 2–3 und kontrastiert ihn mit den traditionellen
kirchlichen Auslegungen zu diesem Text.

Laura Nasrallah (Harvard) spürt in ihrem Beitrag „The Earthen Human, the Breathing Statue: The Sculptor God, Greco-Roman Statuary, and Clement of Alexandria" der Vorstellung der Ausbildung der ersten Menschen in Zusammenhang mit griechisch-römischer Bildhauerkunst nach und zeigt auf, welche konzeptionellen Profile sich mit Bildkunstwerken verbinden.

Michael Stone (Jerusalem) zeigt in seinem Text „Satan and the Serpent in the Armenian Tradition" an armenischen Quellen die Vielfalt der Vorstellungen auf, wie der Satan mit der Gestalt der Schlange in Gen 3 in Verbindung gebracht werden konnte. Viele der von ihm untersuchten Texte sind noch kaum publiziert oder schwer zugänglich und werden hier zum ersten Mal einer breiteren akademischen Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt.

Christoph Riedweg (Zürich/Rom) behandelt in seinem Aufsatz „Das Verbot, vom Baum der Erkenntnis von Gut und Böse zu essen (Gen 2,17): Zeichen eines missgünstigen Gottes? Kaiser Julian und Kyrill von Alexandrien in einer virtuellen Debatte" vor allem die Position des Kaisers Julian, genannt Apostata, der in seiner scharfen Kritik an Gen 2-3 Argumente seiner platonischen Vorläufer Kelsos und Porphyrios sowie der Gnosis aufgreift und weiterentwickelt. Riedweg vergleicht Julians Position mit derjenigen von Kyrill von Alexandrien und unterzieht auch die für beide massgebliche griechische Fassung der biblischen Paradiesgeschichte einer eingehenden Untersuchung.

Michael Signers (Notre Dame) Beitrag „Coming to Consciousness: Knowing, Choosing or Stealing? Approaches to the Story of the Garden (Genesis 2–3) in Medieval Northern French Jewish Exegesis" bespricht verschiedene rabbinische Perspektiven zu Gen 3 (u.a. Kimchi) und legt besonderen Wert auf die religionsübergreifenden Kontakte zur damaligen christlichen Auslegung dieses Texts. Er stellt dar, dass die christliche und die jüdische Exegese nicht in *splendid isolation* voneinander stattfanden, sondern vielfach untereinander interagierten.

Die Kunsthistorikerin Nira Stone (Jerusalem) zeigt in „The Four Rivers that Flowed from Eden" an zahlreichen Beispielen die Ikonographie des Motivs der vier Flüsse aus Gen 2,10–15 auf, das vor allem in der christlichen Kunst mit der Wiederaufnahme in der Johannesapokalypse zusammengesehen worden ist.

Emidio Campi (Zürich) untersucht das Verhältnis von „Genesis 1–3 and the Sixteenth Century Reformers". Mit speziellem Augenmerk auf Petrus Martyr Vermigli, aber auch auf Calvin profiliert Campi die Auslegung von Gen 2–3 in der Reformationszeit. In komplementärer Ergänzung zu Signers Beitrag kann auch Campi aufzeigen, wie stark die reformatorische Beschäftigung mit diesem Text von der zeitgenössischen jüdischen Exegese beeinflusst war.

Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld) fragt schließlich lapidar: „Wozu Paradiese?" Aus philosophischer Perspektive bietet Bittners Beitrag ein *close reading* von Gen 2–3 und fragt nach der logischen Kohärenz und den offenen Leerstellen dieses Textes.

Der vorliegende Band dokumentiert insgesamt die mannigfachen Konvergenzen zwischen den unterschiedlichen historischen und auslegungsgeschichtlichen Zugängen zu Gen 2–3 auf, so dass die theologischen Profile von Gen 2–3 und seiner Rezeptionen in unterschiedlichen Akzentuierungen deutlich werden.

Die Abkürzungen in diesem Band richten sich nach S.M. Schwertner, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Abkürzungsverzeichnis, Berlin/New York 21994 sowie P.H. Alexander u.a. (Hgg.), The SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies, Peabody MA 1999.

Zürich und Rom, im Juli 2008   Konrad Schmid – Christoph Riedweg

Genesis 2–3: Some Fundamental Questions

JEAN-LOUIS SKA

A short history of the research on Genesis 2–3[1]

There are innumerable studies on Genesis 2–3 and, as one can imagine, a variety of opinions exist in these studies along side an equal number of methods and approaches to the text. It seems appropriate to me, therefore, before initiating a study of these chapters and mapping out a personal itinerary in the *dark wood* (Dante) which the contemporary research in this field resembles, to make a brief foray into the history of the research in order to orient better the reader.

The critical study of the first three chapters of Genesis began, after the forerunners Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) and Richard Simon (1636–1722), with Bernhard Witter (1683–1715), who published in 1711 a thesis on Genesis 1–3.[2] His point of departure in the study was the difference in the use of the divine names, *'ĕlōhîm,* on the one hand, and *yhwh 'ĕlōhîm,* on the other. He came to distinguish two accounts in these chapters: Gen 1:1–2:4a and 2:4b–3:24. His avant-garde contribution would be, unfortunately, soon forgotten. One would have to wait for Jean Astruc, doctor to King Louis XV of France, and the publication of his work, *Mémoires originaux [... de] Moyse*, in 1753, in order to take up once again the same route. Astruc also based his study on the distinction in the divine names. He added, however, other criteria, in particular the presence of "doublets" within the Pentateuch, and he concluded his study with Exodus 2, for the simple reason that in Exodus 3 God reveals his name *yhwh* and therefore the distinction in the divine names becomes, according to Astruc, irrelevant. We have, therefore, in Genesis 1–3 two different sources. Next, the studies of Eichorn and Ilgen resumed and deepened the study of Astruc and, after some difficult years in which the critical reading of the Bible found itself under fire, one arrives at Hupfeld, who, in 1853, published a famous study on Genesis in which he defended the so-called "documentary hypothesis" against other theories and against a purely theological reading

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[1] For a summary of the history of research up until the eighties, see WESTERMANN, Genesis 1–11, 255–259; for the later years, see BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 9–11.

[2] For full bibliographical references, see the bibliography at the end of this article.

of the biblical text. It is interesting to note that, for Hupfeld and his prede-
cessors, the first account of Genesis 1 – called in that time the *Elohist* ac-
count because it used the divine name *'ĕlōhîm* – was considered to be older
than the second account, Genesis 2–3. The reasons for this conclusion are
not very clear. In part, however, it seems that the first chapter was consid-
ered to be older only because it preceded the second and, furthermore, be-
cause the passages written in the same style – the famous style of the
priestly account, as it would be subsequently identified – form the sup-
porting beam of the Pentateuch.

The chronology of the texts underwent a radical change with de Wette,
Reuss, Graf, Kuenen and Wellhausen. They discovered that the priestly
account, as it was called in that time, was late. The studies during this pe-
riod began with the law and then, under the impulse of Kuenen, went on to
examine the narratives. Wellhausen gave to the new theories their classical
and definitive form. From that moment, and for more than a century, the
priestly account of creation in Genesis 1 would be considered later than
Genesis 2–3, that would be called, beginning with Kuenen, the "yahwist"
account.

The following stage began in 1883 with the study of Karl Budde, which
made tremendous waves.[3] Budde applied to the yahwist account of Genesis
2–3 the same method which had been used to distinguish Genesis 1 from
Genesis 2–3. He discovered some doublets in the account: for example, the
presence of two trees, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil; or the fact that God places man twice in the garden (2:8 and
2:15); or again the double expulsion from paradise in 3:23–24. On this ba-
sis, he proposed to distinguish an account of creation from an account of
paradise. The first centers on the creation of man and woman, while the
second speaks of the fault which leads to the exile of Adam and Eve from
the garden of Eden. Budde's proposal would not be accepted by all, but it
had a resounding echo and it has its convinced supporters even today.[4]
Furthermore, it provides the basis of discussion for almost all the subse-
quent critical studies on Genesis 2–3.

The research took a new turn under the impulse of Hermann Gunkel and
the *Formgeschichtliche Schule* of the early twentieth century. The scholars
no longer sought to resolve the textual problems through the individuali-
zation of the sources and redactions, but rather through the study of the
oral tradition prior to their redaction. The research upon the oral tradition,

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[3] BUDDE, Urgeschichte; see also BUDDE, Paradiesesgeschichte. Among those who fol-
lowed him, see GUNKEL, Genesis, 25–28 (who insists rather on the substantial literary
unity of the actual text (26); SMEND, Erzählung, 18–21; PROCKSCH, Genesis, 19–22.

[4] The first – and rather severe – criticism, which few followed, was that of KUENEN,
Bijdragen.

however, could only start from the study of the written text and, therefore, the research on the text (*Literarkritik*) and the research on the oral tradition (*Formgeschichte*) crossed paths and often contaminated one another.[5]

One must wait for the crucial seventies in order to witness a profound change in the exegetical panorama of the Pentateuch. With the names F.V. Winnett, J. Van Seters, H.H. Schmid and R. Rendtorff, a new period began in the exegesis of the Pentateuch.[6] From that moment, the Yahwist, who lived peacefully in the court of David and Solomon, began a true *via crucis*. One could now speak of an exilic and a post-exilic Yahwist; or of a school, or of a redactor rather than of an author, whose existence Rolf Rendtorff would simply deny. There were, as always, various reactions. In short, it was no longer appropriate to locate the account of Genesis 2–3 at the beginning of the monarchy as it was the case for Wellhausen and his disciples.

The impulse given by the exegetes just mentioned above allows for – or demands – a reexamination of the question regarding the chronology of the texts. No one will be surprised, therefore, to see some scholars – such as Gordon J. Wenham or Joseph Blenkinsopp – proposing the overturning of the chronological order of the sources in Genesis 1–11, which had been established since the time of Wellhausen.[7] Genesis 2–3, for them, would be chronologically subsequent to the priestly account of Genesis 1, and not preceding it. Eckart Otto would later defend the idea in an often cited article.[8] For Otto, Genesis 2–3 was written intentionally to complete Genesis 1 regarding certain important points. Other exegetes resumed Otto's idea, but with some essential nuances regarding the relationship between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2–3 (E. Blum, K. Schmid).[9] In the vast range of studies on Genesis 2–3 a certain tendency recurs which leads us back to the first positions on the question. Once again, the redaction of Genesis 2–3 follows that of Genesis 1, just as exegetes thought it to be up until the time of Hupfeld and before Wellhausen.[10] It is necessary to add that sev-

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[5] See in particular VON RAD, Genesis, 70–75; W.H. SCHMIDT, Schöpfungsgeschichte, 194–200; STECK, Paradieserzählung.

[6] WINNETT, Tradition; ID., Re-examining; VAN SETERS, Abraham; H.H. SCHMID, Jahwist; RENDTORFF, Problem.

[7] See above all BLENKINSOPP, Pentateuch, 64–67; ID., Genesis 1–11; ID., Lay Source; WENHAM, Genesis 1–15, 53–55; ID., Priority.

[8] OTTO, Paradieserzählung.

[9] BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit; K. SCHMID, Unteilbarkeit; before them, R. Albertz had defended the unity of the text; see ALBERTZ, Gen 3,5.

[10] Following Budde, other important recent contributions seek to distinguish an older account in Genesis 2–3. See, for example, DOHMEN, Schöpfung, 34–36; CARR, Politics; LEVIN, Jahwist, 82–92; ROTTZOLL, Gen 2f., Teil I; ID., Gen 2f., Teil II; WITTE, Urgeschichte, 79–87, 151–166; PFEIFFER, Baum I; Baum II; KRATZ, Komposition, 254–256;

eral authors often declared themselves newly in favor of the literary unity of Genesis 2–3.[11]

This brief overview of the history of recent exegesis demonstrates that, among all the exegetical questions which we are able bring forward, there are some which require an answer more urgently. I cite three principal questions:[12] Is the text of Genesis 2–3 unified or not? When was it written? Why was it written?

The composition of Genesis 2–3: A unitary or composite text?

We begin with the study of Karl Budde (1883) and the reactions which it inspired. The question is simple: Are we able to find *two* accounts in Genesis 2–3, or is the account in its present form a unified text?[13] Since the time of Budde, four principal difficulties regarding the text have been singled out:[14]

(1) It is not easy to reconcile the initial description of a world where absolute dryness reigns (2:5) with that of the rivers in 2:10–14.

(2) It is said twice that Yhwh-God placed Adam in the garden (2:8 and 2:15).

(3) Yhwh-God sends the first couple out of the garden twice (3:23, 24).

(4) There are two trees, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (2:9; 2:16; 3:3; 3:24). The tree of life is mentioned only a few times, at the beginning and the end (2:9, then 3:22, 24). In 3:3, however, the tree which stands in the middle of the garden seems to be not the tree of life (cf. 2:9), but the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

There are some other minor difficulties. For example, the serpent and the first woman cannot know the prohibition against eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in 3:3, because they were not yet

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SPIECKERMANN, Ambivalenzen. For a summary of these attempts, see K. SCHMID, Unteilbarkeit, 24–27; BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 27.

[11] See, among others, KUTSCH, Paradieserzählung; W.H. SCHMIDT, Schöpfungsgeschichte, 194–229; STECK, Paradieserzählung. ARNETH, Adams Fall, 97–146, cancels from the original text only some late additions, such as 2:10–15 and 3:24. Following Otto, he considers the passage to be post-priestly (147).

[12] This contribution resumes a conference given during a convention entirely dedicated to Genesis 2–3. The more theological questions regarding the significance of the account were treated at length in other presentations which can be found in this volume.

[13] See WESTERMANN, Genesis 1–11, 255–259; PFEIFFER, Baum I, 487–488, n. 3; BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 9–11, for a more complete presentation of the problem. For the history of the research on Genesis 1–11, see WITTE, Urgeschichte, 1–16.

[14] See SCHÜLE, Prolog, 153.

created when God declared this prohibition (2:16–17).[15] The use of the divine name also varies in the account. For example, in 3:1, 3, 5, in the conversation between the serpent and the woman, one finds the divine title *'ĕlōhîm,* and not the complete name *yhwh 'ĕlōhîm* as in the rest of the account.

I am not able to resolve all these problems in this brief article. Others have already offered more complete studies on the question, and therefore I allow myself to direct readers to the studies of Paul Humbert and Gustave Lambert, published in the forties; or to the more recent studies of Eckart Otto, Erhard Blum and Konrad Schmid. I shall concentrate on some particular problems regarding special features of the narrative style of the account. I begin with the fundamental problem: Is it possible to imagine an account of creation apart from an account of paradise lost?

The story of creation and the story of paradise lost

The account of creation, according to Westermann, serves as an "exposition" for the account of paradise lost.[16] Joachim Begrich, on his part, affirms, in keeping with Budde, that the creation of the animals and the woman is superfluous and gives the impression of an overly long exposition.[17] Is this truly the case?

The problem, in my opinion, may be resolved only if we carefully consider the particularity of our account. It is true that there exist accounts of paradise which are not followed by a story of its loss. Ovid, for example, in the *Metamorphoses,* describes paradisiacal situations which do not end in tragedy, as in Genesis 3. One is clearly dealing here, however, with mythological accounts, distinct from the accounts which suppose, as ours does, a "primordial time." This is certainly not to say that the account intends to be a historiographical work in the modern sense of the term. I intend only to say that our account does not imagine "a time before time" but rather the very beginning of "time." It does not speak of divine beings or events which have preceded the arrival of humanity on the earth. Even

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[15] LEVIN, Jahwist, 86.

[16] WESTERMANN, 263: "die Erzählung von der Menschenschöpfung [wird] zur Exposition der Paradiesgeschichte"; cf. 265: "sachlich gehört [V. 25] zur Zustandsschilderung des Paradieses (V. 9 und 15), also zur Exposition." On the definition of "expostition," see, for example, SKA, Our Fathers, 21–25. The exposition provides the reader with indispensible information on the stable situation which precedes the action. The exposition, however, is not always (or entirely) located at the beginning of the narrative.

[17] BEGRICH, Paradieserzählung, 103: "[Die Schöpfung der Tiere und der Frau ist überflüssig]. Sie macht den Eindruck einer etwas zu lange geratenen Exposition."

God's frequent interventions in the narrative belong to the usual features of many ancient or biblical narratives.

The narrator of our story, nonetheless, faces a truly remarkable situation because the narrative begins in a desert: "In the day that the LORD God made the earth and the heavens, when no plant of the field was yet in the earth and no herb of the field had yet sprung up – for the LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth and there was no man to till the ground [. . .]" (Gen 2:4b–5).[18] Now, any account may begin only if there are actors, a scene, and some narrative element to create a dramatic situation. Thus, the narrator of Genesis 2–3 must literally "create" all the indispensable ingredients of the story since the world is still empty. And this is exactly what occurs in Gen 2:4–25. We are witnesses to the creation of the first character, the first human being (*'ādām*), and the "scene" of the account, that is to say, the garden of Eden. For the dramatic action, however, one character is not enough. The story sets off, therefore, in search of a second character and, after a first failed attempt, one is found: she is the first woman (2:18–25). The divine order in 2:16–17, as all the exegetes have noted, prepares the action of Gen 3:1–24. Gen 2:25, according to some, was added to prepare the following scene, and only insists upon the stability of the situation up to this point. We are therefore in a quiet and peaceful world, and such a situation will endure until a disturbing element will enter on stage.

One may object that we have already in Gen 2:4–25 a certain dramatic tension. For example, one question arises in 2:18 when God says: "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him." And it is true that one does not immediately find the right solution to the problem. After the creation of the animals, the narrator is forced to acknowledge: "but for the man there was not found a helper fit for him." It is necessary to say, however, that the dramatic tension is minimal. The reader knows that God cannot fail. Furthermore, Genesis 2 does not offer a progression that goes from one initial stable situation to a once again stable situation, as in every story. The initial situation of the account is neither stable nor unstable. It is a non-situation lacking any dramatic element. The only real purpose of Genesis 2 is to set up the scene.

One may add yet another reason, which was cited by E. Blum.[19] I present it here, but in narrative terms. The reader of Genesis 2 cannot but note the difference between the existence in the garden of Eden and the existence which he/she knows. The account must therefore explain why the reader knows a different situation. The explanation is found in Genesis 3.

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[18] I cite the translation of The Revised Standard Version (1989) in this article.

[19] BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 13.

In conclusion, we may say that it is difficult to imagine an account which only describes the creation of the first human beings and their existence in the garden of Eden. Such an account supposes, at the very least, a continuation, because it involves a typical "preparatory scene" which serves, in our case, as "the exposition" to the account of Genesis 3. In 3:1, in effect, the first truly disturbing element appears, the serpent, the element which will cause the crisis in the peaceful world created by God in Gen 2:4b–24.[20]

The doublet of vv. 8 and 15

The second serious problem involves the doublet in Gen 2:8 and 15. The first verse reads: "And the LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the East; and there he put the man whom he had formed;" and the second: "The LORD God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it." The differences are truly minimal. The second verse adds some particulars regarding the function or the duty of the human being in the garden. Do we have a real example of a doublet?

It is worth the trouble, I think, to reread with greater care the account of Gen 2:7–15, leaving aside for the moment the digression of vv. 10–14 on the four rivers. God models the first human being in 2:7. Verse 8 says two things. First, God plants a garden, and then he puts in it the recently formed human being. Next, in v. 9, God sets out to make the trees of the garden sprout from the soil. In fact, one is dealing with a repetition here since it was already mentioned in v. 2:8a: "God the Lord planted a garden in Eden [. . .]." The verse is more concise, certainly, but in substance it says exactly the same thing. How to solve the problem?

Yet again E. Blum proposed the better solution: to see in v. 8 a "proleptic summary."[21] In a few words, the narrator announces in a synthetic way

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[20] Few today seek to separate the account of creation from the account of the fall. In this sense, see GERTZ, Adam, 232–236 who allows only for some redactional insertions; in the same sense ARNETH, Adams Fall, 97–147. For another opinion, see, HUMBERT, Études, 59; LEVIN, Jawhist, 83–102; WITTE, Urgeschichte, 151–166. For example, Levin and others want to see in 3:20–21 the direct continuation of 2:22–23, because it is more natural to give a name to the woman immediately after her creation. For a critical examination of the proposal, see BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 12; K. SCHMID, Unteilbarkeit, 25 (with n. 29); GERTZ, Adam, 232–236.

[21] BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 18–19. For the concept of the "proleptic summary," see SKA, Sommaires; ID., exemples; KOENEN, Prolepsen. The same idea, but in a more generic manner, is found in the fifth rule of Hillel, *klal uprat*, "the general and the particular." The idea is rejected by GERTZ, Adam, 225–228; ARNETH, Adams Fall, 136–137. It is however supported by the fact that v. 15 interrupts the sequence between v. 9 and v. 16, which speak both of the tree of knowledge. Verse 15 reintroduces the first human being to whom the commandment of vv. 16–17 is addressed. Furthermore, v. 15 is in the

all that will be subsequently described with more details, the creation of the garden and its destination, or the "place" where the human being will now reside. The reason for the procedure is simple. The human being formed in 2:7, in order to live, needs food. The response is given for the first time in 2:8. The particulars of the garden will be given in 2:9. Finally, 2:15 logically completes the description. It is in that garden, now provided with trees, that the Lord God puts the human being, and God entrusts it to him. The human being, once established in the garden, may be instructed on the rules to be followed in his new situation (2:16–17). We do not have, therefore, a particular reason for considering vv. 8 and 15 as doublets.

How do the serpent and Eve come to know of the prohibition against eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge?

The fact that the serpent speaks to the first woman of a prohibition about which, in the story, neither the serpent nor the woman have any way of knowing, has led some exegetes to see here the sign of redactional work.[22] Is this in fact the case? I do not believe so. In effect, there are other examples of this phenomenon in biblical narratives. Many times the story supposes that a character knows certain things without being explicitly informed.[23]

In Gen 12:10–20, Abraham goes down to Egypt and asks his beautiful wife to pass herself off as his sister. And so it happens. The officials see Sarah and boast of her beauty to Pharaoh, who takes her as his wife and showers Abraham with gifts. The Lord, however, strikes Pharaoh with plagues. Immediately after, Pharaoh summons Abraham and rebukes him because he hid the true nature of Sara. She is not his sister, but his wife. The story, however, never explains how Pharaoh managed to know that the plague sent by God had struck him because he had taken Sarah into his harem, and that Sarah was in reality the wife of Abraham.

In Genesis 27, after the discovery of the subterfuge of Rebekah and Jacob, one reads that, "Now Esau hated Jacob because of the blessing with

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right place in the narrative sequence: God establishes the human being in the garden after having made the trees grow (2:9), and not before. It is, actually, the sequence announced in 2:8.

    [22] GUNKEL, Genesis, 15–16 had (evidently!) noted the fact. For him, the serpent possesses a "wunderbares Wissen" (16); regarding the woman, he notes nothing special, but see BUDDE, Urgeschichte, 48–50, who discusses only some difficulties inherent in the presence of two trees in the middle of the garden. LEVIN, Jahwist, 86, notes that the woman was not present when God prohibited the eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He concludes from this that the woman takes the fruit from the tree without knowing what she is doing.

    [23] SKA, ellipses.

which his father had blessed him, and Esau said to himself, 'The days of mourning for my father are approaching; then I will kill my brother Jacob'." The following verse says: "But the words of Esau her older son were told to Rebekah." Who conveyed the words of Esau to Rebekah? And how did this person manage to know that which Esau had said only "to himself," without communicating it to anyone, at least according to the text of Genesis 27? No one says.

The third example is also quite clear. In 2.Sam 4:1–12, two criminals kill Mephibosheth, son of Jonathan and potential claimant to the throne of Saul, during his siesta. They decapitate him and carry the head to David in Hebron. David, when he sees them, becomes indignant and says, among other things, that "they have killed an innocent man in his house, on his bed" (4:11). David, however, could not have known how the scoundrels killed Mephibosheth.

In all these cases, someone "knows" everything, and there is only one referent which is important to the narrator, i.e. the reader. The reader knows the commandment imparted by God to the first man, knows who Sarah is, understands Esau's plan, and sees how Mephibosheth was killed. To explain how the characters of the account are informed is, therefore, superfluous. It is, actually, more important to inform the reader than some character of the story. We must not forget that the principal addressee of the narrative is always the reader (or the hearer), not the character in the story.

Once again, in conclusion, we can say that the feature just analyzed is part of the art of biblical narrative and does not justify the operations of literary criticism, such as the search for sources or redactions.

Why is the tree of life mentioned only at the beginning and the end
of the account?

A question of grammar[24]

The commentaries and monographs on Genesis 2–3 often treat the question of the trees. It is the element which, more than all the others, has led to distinguishing two distinct accounts in the passage. The mentioning of the two trees are distributed in a sufficiently clear manner: we find them together only once, in 2:9. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil reappears only in 2:17. Then, it is spoken of implicitly in 3:1–12.17, although it is clear that the passage is dealing only with the tree of knowledge. Finally, God speaks again about the tree of life in 3:22, 24. Furthermore, it seems that a certain confusion reigns in regard to the tree which "stands in the middle of the garden." According to 2:9, it is the tree of life which

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[24] For a presentation of the problem, see SOGGIN, *Genesis*, 63–64.

occupies the center of the garden, while in 3:3 the woman undoubtedly locates the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in this place. Are they both in the center?

Let us respond to the second question immediately. A. Michel has noted that there exists in Hebrew a grammatical phenomenon which is called "interrupted coordination" or "an interrupted chain of coordinated terms."[25] This is to say that a series of coordinated elements may be interrupted by another element, for example, a circumstantial specification such as in Gen 2:9. A. Michel, after a careful study of the case, arrives at two important conclusions regarding the specification "in the middle of the garden." First, this determines the location of both trees, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Second, it is found after the syntagma "tree of life" because it is the most economic manner of showing that God planted many trees in the garden, but that he located two of them in the center of the same garden. Third, according to the rules of Hebraic prose, the shorter syntagma ("the tree of life") precedes the longer ("the tree of the knowledge of good and evil"), and the local specification ("in the middle of the garden") follows the shorter syntagma. A. Michel gives various examples of the procedure. Perhaps the closest example to the text of Gen 2:9 is 1.Sam 7:3:[26]

Then Samuel said to all the house of Israel, "If you are returning to the LORD with all your heart, then put away from among you the foreign gods and the Astartes [. . .]"

The part of the Hebrew text which is important to our discussion reads:

הסירו את־אלהי הנכר מתוככם והעשתרות

Literally it would be translated: "Put away the foreign gods from among you and the Astartes." The rules of Hebrew grammar, however, require the translation proposed above: "Put away from among you the foreign gods and the Astartes." The Hebrew language prefers to insert the local specification immediately after the first direct object and not before, as in English and other European languages. The impression is that the second complement is "added" because it arrives "too late." This impression, however, is only ours. Gen 2:9, to return to our argument, was written according to the

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[25] MICHEL, Theologie, 1–22, with a long and very instructive history of the research on the argument. One is struck by the fact that, among other things, several exegetes often consider the addition to be not the second element, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but the first, the tree of life. Now the second element "arrives too late." The argumentation of Michel is welcomed by BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 19–20; GERTZ, Adam, 228.

[26] See MICHEL, Theologie, 196. For some clearer cases see Gen 1:16; Exod 24:4; Josh 9:4.

habitual conventions of Hebraic grammar and stylistics – following to the careful study of A. Michel.

Another very clear example is found in Gen 1:16:

And God made the two great lights, the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the stars also.

The word "made" has three direct objects: the greater light, the lesser light, and the stars. The chain of objects is twice interrupted by the specifications which give precisions regarding the finality of the created works: "to rule the day," "to rule the night." The final object is therefore found isolated in the last sentence. The New Revised Standard Version sensed the difficulty and clarified the text by adding "and he made the stars also." The Hebrew text just adds ואת הכוכבים, "God made the two great lights: the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night *and the stars*."[27]

According to the rules of Hebrew syntax, the phrase is impeccable. It is true that, in other cases, one follows a stylistic rule according to which the shorter syntagma precedes the longer syntagma. In the case of Gen 1:16 the rule is not respected because it wishes to mention the stars according to a rather clear hierarchy, the sun, the moon, the stars.

In conclusion, and to return to our verse, neither the grammar nor the style of Gen 2:9 offer solid elements for the operations of literary criticism.[28]

A question of narrative style

A second element to keep in mind for the understanding of the text is a well-known law regarding popular stories in general, and regarding biblical accounts in particular, the law of economy, or "the law of thrift."[29] Stated briefly, popular stories always use the minimum number of characters and elements to develop action. They mention only those elements

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[27] MICHEL, Theologie, 222–223.

[28] GERTZ, Adam, 228–231, after a long discussion, attributes the insertion of the tree of life to a redactor. See also WITTE, Urgeschichte, 81. He does not take sufficiently into account, in my opinion, some rules of biblical narratives. I speak in what follows of the law of narrative economy. Moreover, an element is sometimes introduced early in the narrative and its function is revealed only later on. I am thinking of, among many examples, the tent of Abraham in Gen 18:1, 6, 9, 10; the wood for the sacrifice of Isaac in Gen 22:3, 9; the opposed characteristics of Esau and Jacob in Gen 25:25, 27–28 and 27:11; the blindness of Isaac in Gen 27:1, 18–29; the idols stolen by Rachel in Gen 31:19 and 30–34; the objects given as a pledge by Judah to Tamar in Gen 38:18 and 25–26; the left-handed Ehud and his peculiar knife in Judg 3:15–16 and 21–22; Absalom's long hair (2.Sam 14:26 and 18:9); the bitterness in the heart and in the liver of the fish in the Apocryphal (Deuterocanonical) account of Tobit 6:5 and 11:8.

[29] On this point, see LORD, Singer, 50–54; cf. SKA, Our Fathers, 70.

which are indispensable for the progress of the action. Other details remain "in the wings." Hermann Gunkel, along the same line of thought, had applied, among many other "epical laws" listed by A. Olrik, the law of the "unilinearity" or "single plot-line" (*Einsträngigkeit*), i.e. the account follows a single narrative thread and excludes, in general, any type of digression.[30]

In our case, the two trees are introduced for the first time together in Gen 2:9. Next, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil appears alone in 3:1–6. The reason is simple: only that tree plays a role in the plot at that moment. To mention the tree of life would uselessly distract the reader. The tree of life will be mentioned again at the end of the story (3:22, 24) because only in the conclusion does it become important to speak of it. Access to the tree of life would have allowed Adam and Eve to become immortal, exactly like the gods.[31]

Double conclusion in 3:23–24[32]

A final problem emerges in regard to the conclusion of the account which reads: "therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken. He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of Eden he placed the cherubim, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to guard the way to the tree of life."

From the time of K. Budde on, the discussion has centered upon whether or not we have a doublet in these two verses. Budde is the first to have argued in favor of the doublet, saying that the man is thrown out of the garden twice. The reaction was almost immediate. For A. Kuenen and A. Dillmann, for example, the verbs *šlḥ* and *grš* are not synonyms. There is therefore progression between "to send forth" in v. 23 and "to drive out" in v. 24.[33] Some texts support this opinion, as in Exod 6:1; 11:1, where the

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[30] GUNKEL, Genesis, xlv–xlvii, lii.

[31] For this reason, we agree with K. SCHMID, Unteilbarkeit, 31–32, and BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 19–20, and do not follow GERTZ, Adam, 228–230; SPIECKERMANN, Ambivalenzen, 366.

[32] For a recent discussion, see GERTZ, Adam, 225 who speaks, in regard to v. 24, of a "funktionale Dublette zu V. 23"; for a similar opinion, see, among others, GESE, Lebensbaum; WITTE, Urgeschichte, 82–83; PFEIFFER, Baum I, 489; GERTZ, Adam, 225; ARNETH, Adams Fall, 142–144.

[33] See, among others, KUENEN, Bijdragen, 134; DILLMANN, Genesis, 83; HUMBERT, Études, 36–39; LAMBERT, Drame, 1064 (there is progression: v. 23 shows the decision and v. 24 describes the execution); CASSUTO, Genesis, 173; GESE, Lebensbaum, 77; WENHAM, Genesis 1–15, 85–86; SEEBASS, Genesis I, 134: "Aber kann man dessen schweren Akzent am Schluß so einfach der Erzählung nehmen? Die Annahme [einer Bearbeitung in V. 24] ist zwar möglich, aber nicht notwendig"; BLUM, Gottesunmittelbarkeit, 18–19.

two verbs are clearly used to mean a progression: Pharaoh will allow Israel to depart; *moreover*, he will drive Israel out.

Next, to defend the integrity of the text, other exegetes added a content-based argument: the two verses describe two aspects of the same action. For P. Humbert, for example, v. 23 justifies the expulsion in a positive manner since the man was sent to cultivate the soil from which he had been drawn (cf. 2:7 and 3:23). Verse 24, however, explains the expulsion with a negative motivation because the human being cannot have access to the tree of life. For G. Lambert, God takes the decision in v. 23 and executes it in v. 24. A. Dillmann imagines that the first man, after v. 23, stopped and hesitated before the door of paradise, and that God was obliged to push him outside. E. Blum thinks that v. 23 describes the expulsion according to the perspective of the man who must go to work the soil, while v. 24 focuses instead upon the garden, since its access is now prohibited to mankind. The defenders of the "disunity" of the text, in general, continue, nonetheless, to affirm that we have a clear example of "doublet." The affirmation of C. Westermann, to take up a single example, is typical: "[Das Nebeneinander der beiden Verben] ist […] nach den Regeln der alten Erzählkunst ein sicheres Zeichen dafür, daß zwei ursprünglich selbstständige Darstellungen der Vertreibung aus dem Garten zusammenkamen."[34] For the great commentator on Genesis, it is ancient narrative art which obliges one to see a classic doubling in Gen 3:22–23.

In short, if one wishes to take a step forward in the discussion, it is necessary to find new arguments in favor of either one or the other thesis. A brief investigation will now require us to say that the double conclusion in Gen 3:23–24 is a common feature of biblical narrative art. The content of the verses is perhaps as complex, dense, and concise as the account itself. The style, however, must not surprise us. "God spoke once, I heard twice," says Ps 62:11. The repetition in the conclusion of a story is a simple manner of indicating that the proposed journey of the story has arrived at the end. Every story, as already said before, describes a journey from one stable situation to another stable situation. Gen 3:23–24 demonstrates that the stable situation, at the end of the account, is that of a humanity which must live outside of the garden of Eden.

Some more convincing examples will show that the case of Gen 3:23–24 is in no way an isolated one, and does not lend itself, at least stylistically, to any operation of literary criticism.[35]

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[34] WESTERMANN, Genesis 1–11, 372–373.

[35] The examples abound. The repetition can be of various types, a synonymous expression, an antithesis, a progression, a hendiadys . . . In some cases, even a narrative segment (a "scene") can be concluded with a certain type of repetition. Here are a few examples: Gen 8:21–22 (conclusion in prose and conclusion in verse; also see 8:21a and

I take up once again the examples from the so-called historical books because they are clearer.

Judg 9:56–57: Thus God requited the crime of Abimelech, which he committed against his father in killing his seventy brothers; and God also made all the wickedness of the men of Shechem fall back upon their heads, and upon them came the curse of Jotham the son of Jerubb'al.

The double conclusion describes the divine judgment in two steps. First it speaks of the punishment of Abimelech, then of the punishment of the inhabitants of Shechem. Finally, it resumes the whole in order to see in the punishment the fulfillment of the curse pronounced by Jotham. The repetition allows the narrator to insist upon the accuracy with which the prediction of Jotham, pronounced in Judg 9:20, is fulfilled (see also 9:24).[36]

   1.Sam 4:21–22 presents a clear case of repetition. This case enables us to pinpoint the difference between a real doublet and a double conclusion with progression:

And she named the child Ich'abod, saying, "the glory has departed from Israel!" because the ark of God had been captured and because of her father-in-law and her husband. And she said, "The glory has departed from Israel, for the ark of God has been captured."

8:21b); 16:13–14 (two etiologies); 17:26–27 (repetition of the key verb "circumcise" – a typical feature of the Priestly Writer); 18:15 (double mention of Sarah's laughter); 27:44–45 (double mention of Esau's anger; cf. however KUHN, Genesis 27:46); Judg 9:56–57 (double divine punishment); Judg 19:30–31 (LXX: double mention of the crime of Gibeah); 21:24 (hendiadys to describe the return home of the Israelites); 1.Sam 3:21 (double mention of the manifestation of Yhwh at Silo); 4:21–22 (double mention of the taking of the ark); 7:16–17 (double mention of the activity of Samuel as "judge"); 19:10 (double mention of the flight of David); 2.Sam 5:5 (double mention of the reign of David in Hebron and Jerusalem); 13:37–38 (hendiadys to mention the departure of Absalom); 15:6 (double conclusion on the intrigues of Absalom); 15:12b (double conclusion on the conspiracy of Absalom); 17:23 (hendiadys to describe the suicide of Ahithophel); 2.Kgs 10:31 (double mention of the blemishes of Jehu); 2.Kgs 23:3 (repetition of the root *'md* at the beginning and the end of the conclusion); Jer 38:13 (double description of the rescue of Jeremiah); Ruth 1:22 (double mention of the return of Naomi); 3:18 (discourse of Naomi with the double mention of the matter [דבר] which is about to be concluded)… In some cases, in particular in the Pentateuch, the repetition was used to distinguish the presence of two sources. The phenomenon is, however, too frequent to justify every time the presence of either sources or redactions.

   [36] See, for example, RICHTER, Untersuchungen, 303; BECKER, Richterzeit, 185, 200, and 205, who attributes these verses, along with v. 24, to the same DtrN (Deuteronomist "nomist," interested in the law); see also JANS, Abimelech, 405–419, who insists on the unity of the two verses and their connection with v. 24; ASSIS, Self-Interest, 170–171. MÜLLER, Königtum, 108–118, distinguishes two different hands in the verses 56 and 57. Verse 56 accuses Abimelech of the assassination of his seventy brothers, while v. 57 makes the Shechemites responsible. Verse 57, however, does not speak of the assassination of the seventy brothers, but speaks more generically of "all the evil which they have done."

The repetition manifests the tragic character surrounding the loss of the ark. In this case we have an example of redactional work or dittography.[37] In effect, the repetition is absolutely literal and does not add any new element, either informative or explicative. The difference with Gen 3:23–24 is evident.

1.Sam 19:10: And Saul sought to pin David to the wall with the spear; but he eluded Saul, so that he struck the spear into the wall. And David fled, and escaped.

The narrator's final affirmation establishes that, despite the attempt of Saul, David is safe and sound. The simultaneous use of the two roots *nws*, "to flee," and *mlṭ* (nif.), "to escape," "to exit unharmed," "to get away with" is found in Jer 48:6, 19; 51:6; Amos 9:1. The text insists on the final result, that is to say, the success of the flight ("he fled and, *therefore*, escaped").[38]

2.Kgs 10:31: But Jehu was not careful to walk in the law of the LORD the God of Israel with all his heart: he did not turn from the sins of Jerobo'am, which he made Israel to sin.

The sentence, in typical deuteronomistic style, establishes in two ways the fact that Jehu's fidelity to the law of God was not perfect.[39]

Jer 38:13: Then they drew Jeremiah up with ropes and lifted him out of the cistern. And Jeremiah remained in the court of the guard.

The double description of the exit of Jeremiah from the cistern aims at establishing that, with this gesture, the imprisonment of Jeremiah has definitively ended; he has thus escaped from a certain death. The first verb (*mšk* – "draw up") describes the action as such, and the second the final result (*'lh* [hif.] – "lift out").[40]

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[37] For a summary of the discussion, see STOEBE, 1 Samuel, 135 (with bibliography), who concludes: "Die Doppelüberlieferung beweist nur, wie stark volkstümliche Überlieferung an solchen Sprüchen interessiert war." MEIER, Speaking, 28, speaks of dittography because the repetition is literal. DIETRICH, 1 Samuel, 211 (with bibliography) considers v. 22 as an "Erweiterung" to demonstrate the cry of the mother and to create a connection with chapter 5, which speaks again of the ark.

[38] See FOKKELMAN, Narrative Art, 261.

[39] See DIETRICH, Prophetie, 34.

[40] See FISCHER, Jeremia 26–52, 337 who refers to Gen 37:28, a composite text. In the latter text, the two verbs, *mšk* et *'lh* (hif.), belong, however, to the same source, that in which the Midianites secretly drag Joseph from the cistern and carry him to Egypt. Only in this source was Joseph thrown into a cistern. See GUNKEL, Genesis, 403 ("vielmehr sind die Worte nach [Gesenius-Kautzsch] § 120d zusammenzunehmen »sie zogen herauf«"; the rule of grammar just mentioned does not exactly apply to Gen 37:28, however, because one is dealing rather with a hendiadys); WESTERMANN, Genesis 37–50, 34; SEEBASS, Josephgeschichte, 25–26; CAMPBELL/O'BRIEN, Sources, 224, 226, and 229. In Jeremiah 38 there is no reason to distinguish either sources or redactions.

The examples abound and it does not appear necessary to me to see the hand of a redactor in Gen 3:23–24. The account proceeds in a clear way. As some exegetes have said, v. 23 describes the fact under a more positive aspect: man is sent to cultivate the soil. Verse 24 adds an essential aspect because it definitively seals the expulsion from the garden. The introduction of new elements in v. 24, such as the cherubim and the flaming sword, reinforce the irrevocable character of the divine decision. As it has been noted many times, the cherubim belong to the image of the garden of Eden as, for example, Ezek 28:14 shows.[41] The motif has a different function in both texts, which will not surprise anyone familiar with popular stories.

In conclusion, it does not appear to me that there are sufficient motives to try to distinguish two accounts in Genesis 2–3 or, to put it more simply, to distinguish an older account reworked within a second. Apart from some redactional additions such as 2:10–14, the text is essentially unified. The comparison with other biblical narratives, in particular the study of some technical narrative characteristics of biblical accounts, do not encourage one to proceed to the dissection of the text on the sole basis of tensions in the content. We have come, therefore, to our second question: When was the text composed?

The date of composition[42]

For a long time, as we have seen, the account of Genesis 2–3 was attributed to the Yahwist. For the majority of the exegetes, one was therefore dealing with a pre-exilic text. With the crisis which began around the seventies, things changed a great deal. For J. Van Seters, as for C. Levin, the actual text is certainly post-exilic. Other exegetes go in this direction and the number of those who consider the text as late has increased in recent years.[43] I think that we have good reasons to go in this direction. I limit myself to the more convincing arguments.

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[41] On the relationships between Genesis 2–3 and Ezek 28, see GUNKEL, Genesis, 34–35; STORDALEN, Echoes, 332–356, 394–397, 478–479; WITTE, Urgeschichte, 241–242 (no direct relation between the two texts in their original substance); VAN SETERS, Prologue, 119–122 (Ezek 28 would be prior to Genesis 2–3); K. SCHMID, Unteilbarkeit, 36–37 (the two texts go in opposite directions: in Ezek 28, the primordial man loses wisdom, while in Genesis 2–3 he acquires it). See also NOORT, Gan-Eden, 22–25. According to Noort, it is possible to establish direct relationships only between the versions of the LXX of Ezek 28 and Genesis 2–3.

[42] For a brief reflection on the argument, see STORDALEN, Echoes, 205–213 (with bibliography). The author is thinking of the Persian period.

[43] See in particular the authors cited in the notes 11, 12 and 13, and WITTE, Urgeschichte, 204–205; ARNETH, Adams Fall, 230–236.