

Stéphane A. Dudoignon (Ed.) ·
Devout Societies vs. Impious States?

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von

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von

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Devout Societies vs. Impious States?

**Transmitting Islamic Learning in Russia, Central Asia
and China, through the Twentieth Century**

**Proceedings of an International Colloquium
held in the Carré des Sciences,
French Ministry of Research,
Paris, November 12–13, 2001**

Edited by Stéphane A. Dudoignon



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Foreword

It would be very naive indeed to consider, or to act as if considering that the most striking (i.e., given the biggest media coverage) political events of the past fifteen years have had no influence upon research on Islamic societies — up till the second Intifada, the September 11 attacks and the current Iraqi war, all aftermaths of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989. In less than one generation, researchers have been invited, several times, to global reappraisals of the paradigms of their work, if not of its very philosophy.

In the same time, since the late 1980s opportunities have been appearing in Islamic as well as in Soviet studies for extensive fieldwork and archive or library rediscoveries in the USSR and in mainland China. This new situation has offered researchers a unique chance for questioning these paradigms — e.g., for nuancing the lasting neo-colonialist, substantialistic postulate of a medieval, immutable, trans-historical, and rather abstract Islam as a vector of resistance and opposition to change¹ under modern, alien, atheistic states. This position, rooted in a two-century old tradition of European and Russian Orientalism, still determines a great deal of research in the West as well as in the CIS or in China.² It presently serves to justify neo-imperialist interventions in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, whence offering precious arguments to repressive policies implemented since 1992 by most of the local states in both regions.

Since September 11, 2001 the revelation to a large audience of the lasting connections between the CIA and al-Qā'ida, between the Mosad and the Hamas or the

¹ On these representations and on their lasting influences in the media and expert discourse on Islam, cf. Edward W. SAID, preface to the second edition of *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* [New York: Random House, 1999 (1st ed. 1981)]: XXXII).

² E.g., Marsel FARKHSHATOV & Christian NOACK, "Research Trends in Studies on the History of Islam and Muslim Peoples (Bashkirs, Volga and Siberian Tatars) Conducted in European Russia and Siberia ca. 1985-2000," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon & Hisao Komatsu, eds., *Research Trends in Modern Central Eurasian Studies (18th-20th Centuries)* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2004), in print (see 1.2.2. The national republics).

Islamic Jihād, or between the FSB (ex-KGB) and handfuls of Caucasian Jihadists has contributed to the launching of the current public debates about the existence of strategic connections, if not deep cultural analogies between neo-puritanical America and Wahhabi Arabia,³ or about the presence of massive borrowings from Western thought- and value-systems in most violent Islamist trends.⁴ Such debates encourage scholars to rethink, in a comparatist mind, the typology of relations between “Islamic” societies and “impious” states in the vast regions ruled, during most of the past century, by Communist regimes. The need for new approaches is all the more felt since Hegelian philosophies of political struggle, focused on an inevitable opposition of societies and states, are still dominating Northern Eurasian studies — where proponents of these philosophies have been asserting, since the last years of the Soviet period that all Islamicate societies or minorities, from the Balkans to mainland China are bound to finally triumph over “alienation,” and to return fatally to their pre-Communist “authenticity,” in a spirit of permanent confrontation with the hegemonic cultural systems built up during the twentieth century.

This most common opinion has been revisited in the present volume in the light of the complex typology of mutual relations, and in a huge majority of cases mutual negotiations or accommodations between various segments of Northern Eurasian Islamicate societies, on the first hand, and on the second hand the imperial,⁵ then Communist⁶ states which have been dominating this immense region of the world

³ Cf. Abdelwahab MEDDEB, *La maladie de l'islam* (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 76 [English translation: *Islam and Its Discontents* (New York: Basic Books, 2003)].

⁴ Olivier ROY, *L'islam mondialisé* (Paris: Seuil, 2002), 15, 120-126.

⁵ E.g., Edward J. LAZZERINI, “Local Accommodation and Resistance to Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Crimea,” in Daniel R. Brower & Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997): 169-187; Allen J. FRANK, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia. The Islamic World of Novonizensk District & the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910* (Leiden: Brill, 2001): passim; HAMADA Masami, “Jihād, hijra et ‘devoir du sel’ dans l’histoire du Turkestan oriental,” *Turica* 35 (2003), in print.

⁶ On phenomena of (mutual) accommodations between the Soviet society and political institutions, at different moments of the history of the USSR, and on the manyfold implications, not only scientific, of such a re-orientation of our perceptions, see for instance Moshe LEWIN, *Russia's Twentieth Century. The Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) [French translation by Denis Paillard & Florence Prudhomme: *Le siècle soviétique* (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), e.g., 436-440]; Alain BLUM

during the long twentieth century. The question has been treated through the evolutions that can now be observed in the transmission of Islamic learning and authority in Russia, Central Asia, and China throughout this period — the theme of a colloquium held in Paris, in 2001 by the Research Team ESA 7043 “Cultures and Societies in Europe” of the CNRS (Strasbourg), of which the present volume offers the proceedings.

Geographical and Disciplinary Scopes

The ensemble that we call here Northern Eurasia — in opposition to Western Europe, the Near- and the Middle East, South- and South-East Asia — includes most of Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China: a huge region indeed, not yet recognized an entity of area studies in spite of the recent fortunes of Central Eurasian studies,⁷ a region which shares many features and memories of a common contemporary history, through respective experiments of state Communism.

Over the longer duration, moreover, since the eve of modern times this region has been a place of encounter between Islam and other universal religious systems, especially with Orthodox Christianity — whether in a position of hegemony, as in the Balkans after their conquest by the Ottoman Empire, or in a position of submission as in the Middle Volga Region after the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Afterwards European-born value-systems have been spread towards the East and South, alongside with territorial losses by the Ottomans, and expansion of the Russian Empire. The co-existence of these systems and religions has been problematic in many instances, with violent clashes between adherents of the different creeds, especially Christians and Muslims — up till the current war in Chechnia, or the recent expansion of various reformed Christian churches in several Central Asian countries.⁸

& Martine MESPOULET, *L'anarchie bureaucratique. Statistique et pouvoir sous Staline* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 340-348.

⁷ Gregory GLEASON, “The Centrality of Central Eurasia,” *Central Eurasian Studies Review* 2/1 (2003): 2-5.

⁸ The unnoticed (since given no media coverage, even local) bombing of the “Corean Church” in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on October 1, 2000 (10 peoples killed, and some 80 severely injured) can be

The twentieth century has been characterized by the transition from a culture of lust to a culture of resentment towards non-Islamic hegemonies — a sentiment linked here not with globalization,⁹ but with the violation of local societies by totalitarian systems,¹⁰ and beforehand with the continuation by Communist regimes of colonization policies previously led by early modern imperial states.¹¹ Exchanges, however, have been more intimate here than in any other part of the worlds of Islam — as shows the impact of Russian Populism on nascent Muslim intelligentsias (*see infra the paper by T. Uyama*), or the integration by Central Asian peoples of ethnographic representations on them,¹² or still current posterities of the Soviet or Chinese-Communist cultures of nationalities (*papers by C.-H. Halfon-Michel, A. Khalid, D. Is'haqov, S. A. Dudoignon*).

Local Lore: Answer to Globalization?

The upheavals of the decade have accustomed us to think in terms of globalization the modern quest for specificity by proponents of re-Islamization. It is in fact since the early twentieth century, if not earlier (*paper by T. Uyama*) that non-hegemonic — in our case, non-Russian, non-Chinese — community identities have been formulated, mainly through borrowings from the dominant cultures of Russian or Chinese significant

regarded as a founding drama for new Central Asian reformed-Christian communities (notably through narratives of miraculous healings), and as an event characteristic of an era of growing confrontation between Islamist trends now de-legitimized by their collaboration with the local government, and aggressive neo-Christian proselytism. (Personal observations and interviews by the author, Dushanbe, Summer 2003.)

⁹ Or “Americanization”, as in most parts of the worlds of Islam since WWII: e.g., MEDDEB, 49 ff.

¹⁰ Stéphane A. DUDOIGNON, “Islam et nationalisme en Asie Centrale, au début de la période soviétique (1924-1937). L'exemple de l'Ouzbékistan, à travers quelques sources littéraires,” *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 95-98 (2002): 127-165.

¹¹ On this basis, strong sympathies for the neo-Wahhabism promoted by the Sa'udi dynasty appeared among Muslim reformists in the USSR in the 1920s: an aspect generally ignored by the historians of modern currents of Islam in Northern Eurasia.

¹² On the Qazaqs, see some astute remarks by Bruce G. PRIVRATSKY, *Muslim Turkistan. Kazak Religion and Collective Memory* (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2001), 9-10.

others (*papers by T. Uyama, A. Khalid, D. Is'haqov, S. Trebinjac*). The same overall conditions can drive to inter-ethnic conflict, as well as to the co-existence, however problematic, of different value systems articulated through juxtaposition or ambivalence (*papers by S. A. Dudoignon, S. Trebinjac*).

In contexts of economic transition, from the early twentieth-century development of industrial capitalism to the current upheavals in the CIS and in China, we have tried to see what kind of secularization, and eventual loss of traditional values can be brought about by sedentarization, economic growth, and technologies of communication A secularization characterized, in countries deprived of strong traditional religious hierarchies after long submissions to atheistic regimes, by the prominent role played by “semi-literati”¹³ open to a wide range of Islamization trends (*papers by R. Möhämätshin, L. Chérif-Chebbi, A. Khalid, B. G. Privratsky, S. A. Dudoignon*).

We have tried to see how modern Northern Eurasian states have shown able to draw lasting alliances with these semi-educated people with a strong contempt for traditional spiritual authorities, as well as for modern, russified or sinicized intelligentsias (*papers by L. Chérif-Chebbi and B. Babadjanov*). We have still seen what kind of roles these antagonistic categories of spiritual authorities — traditional religious leaders, intellectuals, proponents of political Islam — do play in the permanent redefinition of community identities (*papers by T. Uyama, A. Khalid, S. A. Dudoignon*). Conversely, we have been seeing how various social groups traditionally in charge of the transmission of learning tend to forget their usual conflicts for re-asserting, as a homogeneous status group, one's religious rights through the promotion of modern, literate knowledge of religion (*paper by B. G. Privratsky*).

“Learned” / “Male” vs. “Popular” / “Female” Culture?

Revisiting the cleavage between “ritual” and “learned” Islam, and the stereotype of an “everyday religion” with rituals but no teachings, we have studied the effects that a change of attitude towards written culture could have, in different times and places, for

¹³ The “*semi-lettrés*” vigorously denounced by MEDDEB, 116 ff., and remembering Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's opposition between the mere “educated ones” (*obrazovantyy*) and intellectuals capable of critical thought.

the social status of spiritual and intellectual authorities — with a special interest in the distribution of roles between male and female actors in the transmission/captation of learning and authority, under a non-Islamic domination which brought about considerable loss of prestige by the ulama (*papers by E. Allès, C.-H. Halfon-Michel, B. G. Privratsky, S. A. Dudoignon*).¹⁴

The roles played by women have been approached also through the evolution of religious practice — e.g., through the current contests of the role played by women in magical rituals which have long been considered by ethnographs a permanent feature of Northern Eurasian societies. Such contests, and the toleration by neo-Communist states of Muslim female preachers of fundamentalist trends unveil key issues of both nationalization — e.g., sinicization — of Islamic teaching and its centralization — instead of the Persianate, and dispersed teaching dispensed by traditional, autonomous women's mosques (*papers by L. Chérif-Chebbi and E. Allès*).

Such interpretations stress the need for diachronical analysis, through the identification and typology of relations between the social and the spiritual. Fortunately, such an approach is now possible, thanks to the passing of time (we have now a panoramic view of the long twentieth century), to direct access to field work and documentation, and to a better, much expected articulation of the work of social scientists, inspired by an ever-growing inter-penetration of history and anthropology.

Acknowledgements

The present volume offers the proceedings of a colloquium held at the *Carré des Sciences*, French Ministry of Research, Paris, on 12-13 November 2001, with the support of the *European Foundation for Science* (EFS, Strasbourg), the *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme* (MSH) of Paris, the *Islamic Area Studies Project* of Japan (Tokyo), and the *Centre National de la*

¹⁴ See also, e.g.: Agnès KEFELI, "Constructing an Islamic Identity: The Case of Elyshevo Village in the Nineteenth Century," in Daniel R. Brower & Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997): 271-291; Annette KRÄMER, *Geistliche Autorität und islamische Gesellschaft im Wandel. Studien ueber Frauenälteste (otün und xalfa) im unabhängigen Usbekistan* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2002 [Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 246]), passim.

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The author would like to thank *Prof. Marc GABORIEAU* (CNRS/EHESS, Paris, Director of the Research Group GDR 122 of the CNRS and General Editor of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, third edition) and *Prof. Jean-François DOMENACH* (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris), who have initially permitted this colloquium to take place. All our gratitude also goes to *Prof. Patrick WATIER*, the Director, Research Team ESA 7043 of the CNRS; *Mrs. Madeleine BLUMENROEDER* in the EFS; *Prof. Maurice AYMARD*, the President of the MSH; *Prof. SATŌ Tsugitaka*, the President, and *Prof. KOMATSU Hisao*, the Secretary General of the IASP, *Prof. W. A. L. STOCKHOF*, the Director, and *Mrs. Josine STREMMELAAR*, the Executive Manager of the Asia Institute. It is also a pleasure for us to express our gratitude to *Prof. François GEORGON*, *Prof. Alexandre POPOVIC*, and *Prof. Alain ROUSSILLON* (all from the CNRS, Paris) who beside *Prof. GABORIEAU* have accepted to chair the sessions of the colloquium. Our gratitude also goes to *Mrs. Caroline CUIAT* in the Carré des Sciences for her generous attention during the preparation of the colloquium.

We specially thank all the participants in the meeting, in particular our French colleagues who have accepted to give and write their papers in English — which, for a colloquium in history and social sciences held in Paris, was a innovation of its kind —; *Dr. Bruce G. PRIVATSKY* who has accepted to present us a major paper although circumstances had prevented him to come to Paris in the fatal Autumn 2001; and *Dr. Adeb KHALID* who has very friendly accepted to offer us, beside a masterly paper, his brilliant translation from Russian of two contributions to this volume. Our very special thanks go to *Dr. Xavier LE TORRIVELLE*, who took in charge the difficult task of administering the colloquium, and whose friendly assistance before, during, and after it was an invaluable help.

On Transcription

Due to the variety of languages dealt with in the present volume, authors have been free to use the transcription system of their choice. However, the orthograph of place

names has been uniformised, and sympathy preferred whenever possible: diacritical signs have been proscribed except in two papers (*by T. Uyama and B. G. Privratsky*) dealing with Qazaq documents in various alphabets (*see tables infra*).¹⁵ Common Pinyin has been implemented for Chinese; a simplified version of the Hepburn system for Japanese; a common transcription of Cyrillic script for Russian and Turkic languages; and the official Latin orthograph for Uzbek language. In order to underline the Persianate character of references in the paper on Tajikistan, proper names and references in that text have been given in a transcription from the Arabic alphabet, except proper names documented in the Western press which follow a transcription from the Cyrillic.

1. Cyrillic alphabets

Cyrillic	Qazaq	Latin	Cyrillic	Qazaq	Latin
А а	<i>A a</i>	<i>A a</i>	Р р	<i>R r</i>	<i>R r</i>
Б б	<i>B b</i>	<i>B b</i>	С с	<i>S s</i>	<i>S s</i>
В в	<i>V v</i>	<i>V v</i>	Т т	<i>T t</i>	<i>T t</i>
Г г	<i>G g</i>	<i>G g</i>	У у	<i>Ū / u</i>	<i>U u</i>
Ғ ғ	<i>G ğ</i>	<i>Gh gh</i>	Ү ү		<i>U u</i>
Д д	<i>D d</i>	<i>D d</i>	Ү ү		<i>U u</i>
Е е	<i>E e</i>	<i>E e</i>	Ү ү		<i>Ū ū</i>
Ә ә	<i>Yo yo</i>	<i>E e</i>	Ү ү	<i>U u</i>	<i>U u</i>
Ж ж	<i>J j</i>	<i>Zh zh</i>	Ф ф	<i>F f</i>	<i>F f</i>
Ж ж		<i>J j</i>	Х х	<i>H / h</i>	<i>Kb kb</i>
З з	<i>Z z</i>	<i>Z z</i>	Х х		<i>H h</i>
З з		<i>Dh dh</i>	Һ һ	<i>H h</i>	<i>H h</i>
И и	<i>y / iy / i</i>	<i>I i</i>	Ц ц	<i>Ts ts</i>	<i>Ts ts</i>
Й й	<i>Y y</i>	<i>I i</i>	Ч ч	<i>Ch ch</i>	<i>Ch ch</i>
Й й		<i>I i</i>	Ч ч		<i>J j</i>

¹⁵ PRIVRATSKY, *Muslim Turkistan*, XIX-XX.

К к	<i>K k</i>	<i>K k</i>	Ч ч		<i>J j</i>
Қ қ	<i>Q q</i>	<i>Q q</i>	Ш ш	<i>Sh sh</i>	<i>Sh sh</i>
К к		<i>Q q</i>	Щ щ		<i>Shch shch</i>
Ғ ғ		<i>Q q</i>	Ъ ъ		'
Л л	<i>L l</i>	<i>L l</i>	Ы ы	<i>I i</i>	<i>Y y</i>
М м	<i>M m</i>	<i>M m</i>	І і	<i>I i</i>	
Н н	<i>N n</i>	<i>N n</i>	Ь ь		'
Ң ң	<i>ng</i>	<i>Ng</i>	Э э	<i>E e</i>	<i>E e</i>
О о	<i>O o</i>	<i>O o</i>	Ю ю	<i>Yu yu</i>	<i>Iu iu / Yu yu</i>
Ө ө	<i>Ö ö</i>	<i>O o</i>	Я я	<i>Ya ya</i>	<i>Ia ia / Ya ya</i>
П п	<i>P p</i>	<i>P p</i>			

2. Arabic alphabets

ا	<i>A a / I i / U u</i>	ض	<i>Z z</i>
ب	<i>B b</i>	ط	<i>T t</i>
پ	<i>P p</i>	ظ	<i>Z z</i>
ت	<i>T t</i>	ع	'
ث	<i>Th th</i>	غ	<i>Gh gh</i>
ج	<i>J j</i>	ف	<i>F f</i>
ح	<i>H h</i>	ق	<i>Q q</i>
خ	<i>Kh kh</i>	ك	<i>K k</i>
د	<i>D d</i>	ل	<i>L l</i>
ذ	<i>Dh dh</i>	م	<i>M m</i>
ر	<i>R r</i>	ن	<i>N n</i>
ز	<i>Z z</i>	و	<i>W w / U u</i>
س	<i>S s</i>	ه	<i>H h</i>
ش	<i>Sh sh</i>	ة	<i>a</i>
ص	<i>S s</i>	ي	<i>Y y / I i</i>

The Editor

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I. ‘High’ and ‘Popular’ Culture

“Devotion to the People” and Paternalistic Authoritarianism among Qazaq Intellectuals, from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1917

UYAMA Tomohiko

Intellectuals always have ambivalent relations with political authority. On one hand, they can present views alternative to those of political rulers and criticize them. On the other hand, they possess cultural authority and often cooperate with, or even join, the political elite. A similar ambiguity applies also to their relations with ordinary people. Intellectuals often claim that they help the masses, but they are distinct from ordinary people and often regard themselves superior to them. This paper will examine problems of authority in the relations between intellectuals and the people in the Qazaq society under Russian rule in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. While pre-Revolutionary Qazaq intellectuals, as well as other Russian Muslim reformers, have been either denounced as reactionary bourgeois nationalists or idealized as heroes who struggled for national liberation and democracy, we will try to disclose more the complicated character of the intellectuals and of situations which surrounded them.

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Proto-intellectuals in the pre-modern Qazaq society were, in most cases, closely connected with political authority. *Bis* were orators and experts on customary law and, at the same time, tribal leaders. *Jirais* (epic-tellers and improvisers of didactic poems) served khans and were treated like high-ranking officials, although they sometimes criticized khans' decisions and admonished them against being arrogant, as Būqar Jirau

did to Abılay Khan in the eighteenth century.¹ *Aqıns* (bards) were closer to the masses, but they also carried out political functions, as they compete with each other in improvising witty poems in the capacity of representatives of their tribes.² Some *aqıns* in the first half of the nineteenth century, such as Makhambet and Nisanbay, led or participated in revolts against Russian or Qazaq rulers and stirred the fighting spirit of rebels.³ In addition, various types of Islamic intellectuals (many of them were not ethnic Qazaqs), especially leaders of Sufi orders, maintained close ties with khans and other political rulers.

The first Qazaq modern intellectuals appeared from among politically influential families. The most notable of them, Shoqan Wälikhanov (1835-1865) was Abılay khan's great-grandson. He was a friend of many prominent Russian intellectuals, Fedor Dostoevskii being one of them. In 1856, Dostoevskii proposed to Wälikhanov to become a bridge between Russia and the Qazaq society: "In eight years or so, you could work out your destiny in such a manner that you would be extraordinarily useful to your homeland (*rodina*). For example, to be almost the first person who explains in Russia what is the Steppe, what it and your people mean to Russia, and at the same time to serve your homeland as an enlightened intercessor for it among Russians — isn't it a great purpose, a sacred deed?"⁴

Wälikhanov tried to play precisely the role Dostoevskii proposed. In 1864, in the midst of the "Great Reform" in Russia, he submitted to a note on the judicial reform ("Zapiska o sudebnoi reforme"), declaring his resolve to serve his homeland: "Considering that such important changes are being prepared for my homeland (*rodina*), I believe it is my duty to present some of my opinions . . ." But at the same time, he did not expect that ordinary people themselves could propose the best way to reform

¹ BUQAR JIRAU, *Ay, Abılay, Abılay! Tolgäñlar* (Almaty: Jalin, 1993).

² Edyge D. TURSUNOV, *V'ozmikenovienie baksy, akynov, seri i zhyrañ* [The Appearance of *baksy*, *aqıns*, *seri* and *jyrañ*] (Astana: Foliant, 1999), 109-119.

³ *Narodno-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie kazakhov v 1836-1838 godakh* (*Dokumenty, materialy, stat'i*) [The Movement of Popular Liberation of the Qazaqs in 1836-1838 (Documents, Materials, Papers)] (Alma-Ata: Gylym, 1992); NISANBAY JIRAU, "Kenesan – Naurızbay (Dastan)", in: *Khan Ken: Qazaq khalqyny tüüelsizdigi üshin küresken khan-batırlar turalı tarıkhı tolgamdar men piesa, dastandar* (Almaty: Jalin, 1993): 16-55.

⁴ Chokan Ch. VALIKHANOV, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh* [Collection of Works in Five Volumes], vol.5 (Alma-Ata, 1985), 178-179.

their society. He said: "Opinions of the people (*narod*) are nothing more than prattles of a thoughtless child," and "Opinions of the people, especially of an ignorant and half-savage people, cannot always be taken as expressions of their true need." The people, like children, needed to be protected. By whom? By rich and influential men? Although Wälikhanov himself belonged to the rich, he denied them any positive role: "One has to look at opinions of the privileged classes of the society as nothing else than reverse expressions of the genuine necessity of the people, because the interests of the notables and the rich are, even in highly civilized societies, mostly hostile to the interests of the masses, the majority."⁵ Objectively, neither ordinary nor rich Qazaqs could reform their society under Russian rule solely by themselves. The fact that Wälikhanov addressed his note to the Russian administration indicates that he considered that reforms for the sake of the people had to be carried out by Russians with the advice of Qazaq intellectuals.

Wälikhanov is also famous as a collector and researcher of Qazaq and Qyrghyz oral literature and legends. This reminds us of the phenomenon which Peter Burke calls the "discovery of the people."⁶ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe (especially in its periphery), intellectuals began to be interested in folktales, folksongs, popular festivals and other genres of folk culture. This phenomenon was intertwined with nationalism and gradually spread outside Europe. The elite suddenly realized that they were "brothers" of ordinary poor people of the same region with peculiar folk culture, rather than of elite of distant regions who share with them aristocratic high culture.⁷ The modern elite, or intellectuals, had to lead and help ordinary people, who together with them formed a "nation."

The dual paternalism by Russia and intellectuals was later expressed in the *Dala Wälayatının gazeti*, a weekly published by the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe Territory in cooperation with many Qazaq intellectuals. Its editorial staff told the Qazaq readers that "the superior officials of [the regime of] the great White Tsar" had decided to issue the bilingual newspaper in Russian and Qazaq "in order to know your

⁵ Ibid., vol.4 (Alma-Ata, 1985), 77-80.

⁶ Peter BURKE, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1978), 3-22.

⁷ To be precise, in the case of the Qazaqs, who did not have developed written culture, the elite and the masses were culturally closer to each other than in early modern Europe.

life more closely, to go into your situation, to know your necessities and to take useful measures.”⁸ The newspaper often published circulars and orders of the Governor General and the *oblast’s* (province’s) governors, forbidding officials (especially, native officials) to squeeze money and food from the population.⁹ Qazaq intellectuals who contributed to the *Dala Walayattıny gazeti* — among others, Asılqoja Qırmanbaev — worried about those Qazaqs who were cheated by usurers, and also criticized rich Qazaqs who disdained physical labor and indulged in factional strifes.¹⁰

From the viewpoint of the Qazaq intellectuals and the Russian administration, the Qazaq masses had to be defended not only from Qazaq exploiters, but also from other ethnic communities, especially the Tatars. This question was raised earlier by Wälikhanov, who regarded Islam as “a religion hostile to all kinds of knowledge,” and Tatar mullahs who propagated Islamic dogmas among the Qazaqs as “impostors.”¹¹ Qırmanbaev argued that one of the reasons of the moral degeneration among the Qazaqs was that healers (*tabıbs*) and mullahs from Kazan and Bukhara showed them the power of money.¹² He also claimed that those books Tatars edited for Qazaqs were written in a mix of the Tatar and Qazaq languages and related “imaginary deeds of fictitious heroes of the Prophet Muhammad’s era”; therefore, such books could not serve as models for Qazaq literature. He strongly advocated development of the native (Qazaq) language.¹³

Resonating with Qırmanbaev, the editorial staff wrote: “Tatars who come into the Steppe are, in the interests of dark religious fanaticism, trying to decolor the original features of the Qazaqs’ life, to distort their national legends or replace them with silly

⁸ “Omsk, 1-go ianvaria 1888 goda [At Omsk, 1 January 1888],” *Dala Walayattıny gazeti* (Omsk) 1 (1 January 1888): 2.

⁹ E.g.: *Dala Walayattıny gazeti* 7 (12 February 1888): 1-2; 49 (9 December 1888): 1-3; 23 (8 June 1890): 1.

¹⁰ Asılqoja QÜRMANBAEV, “Qazaqlardıñ qamsız erinsheklik tuğrasında ayılğan birneshe söz,” *Dala Walayattıny gazeti* 7 (13 February 1894): 2-3; Idem, “Qazaqdıñ jay qara jümısqa qanshalıq köñil qoyıp jahat qılğanı tuğrasında,” *Ibid.*, 8 (20 February 1894): 3.

¹¹ VALIKHANOV, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, vol.4, 74, 100.

¹² QÜRMANBAEV, “Qazaqlar qanday adamdı jaqsı kisi dep aytadı,” *Dala Walayattıny gazeti* 26 (3 July 1894): 2-3.

¹³ Idem, “Qazaq tili turasınan,” *Ibid.* 27 (10 July 1894): 1-2.

stories they fabricated.”¹⁴ The newspaper appealed to its readers to send to it pieces of Qazaq oral literature and descriptions of customs that reflected “moral purity,” and published many articles about Qazaq folk culture. Here, we can observe further development of the “discovery of the people,” as well as similarity with a then influential educational method known as the “Il’minskii system.” Although this system’s primary aim was to propagate Russian Orthodoxy among non-Russians through education in their native tongues, it also tried to prevent Tatarization of those peoples who lived close to the Tatars. Its founder Nikolai Il’minskii himself was impressed by the richness of the Qazaq language when he worked at the Orenburg Border Commission in 1858-1861, and hoped to prevent its Tatarization.¹⁵ His Qazaq disciple, Ībiray [Ibrāhīm] Altınsarin (1841-1889), compiled textbooks in Qazaq to replace Tatar textbooks.

The desire of Qazaq intellectuals to serve the people was basically similar to that of Russian intellectuals. Many Decembrists, Petrashevtsy, Narodniks, etc., were being exiled to the Steppe Territory and making friends with Qazaq intellectuals. Älikhan Bökeykhan (1866?-1937), the future top leader of the Alash Orda autonomous government, made the acquaintance of Narodniks and other Russian revolutionaries during his studies in St. Petersburg and participation in Shcherbina statistical expedition (1896-1903). Recommending a young intellectual for a job at a court in 1917, he wrote: “Just as the majority of the young Qazaqs whom I know closely, he is a Narodnik in the spirit of those in the 1870s.”¹⁶ One of Bökeykhan’s fellows in the Qazaq national movement, Mir-Ya’qub Dulatov (1885-1935), passionately appealed to intellectuals to serve the people in his book *Oyan, Qazaq! [Awake, Qazaq!]*.¹⁷ His poem “Shagım

¹⁴ “O neobkhodimosti sobiraniia proizvedenii narodnogo tvorchestva u kirgizov [On the Necessity to Gather Works of Popular Creation among the Qyrghyz (i.e., Qazaqs)],” *Ibid.* 29 (24 July 1894): 1-2.

¹⁵ P. ZNAMENSKII, *Istoriia Kazanskoi dukhovnoi akademii za pervyi (doreformennyi) period ee sushchestvovaniia (1842-1870 gody)* [History of the Kazan Spiritual Academy during the First Period of Its Existence (Before the Reforms: 1842-1870)], 2 (Kazan: Tipografiia Imperatorskogo Universiteta): 430-431.

¹⁶ Mämbet QOYGELDIEV, *Alash qozghalısı* (Almaty: Sanat, 1995), 243.

¹⁷ For more details, see: UYAMA Tomohiko, “20 Seiki shoto-ni okeru kazafu chishikijin-no sekaikan [The Wellanschauung of the Qazaq Intelligentsia at the Beginning of the 20th Century],” *Surau Kenkyu* 44 (1997).

[Appeal]" expresses his humble attitude toward the people and firm determination to sacrifice himself for them:

I am a short tree growing in a hollow,
Not a fine tree with a lot of fruits.
I am yours as far as my half or splinter is left,
If it is of service to you, use me, Alash!¹⁸

However, there was a marked difference between the idea of "devotion to the people (*sluzhenie narodu*)" of Russian Narodniks and that of Qazaq intellectuals. While the former strove to learn the "true national spirit" from ordinary people and searched for a way of development alternative to Western Europe's, the latter intended to serve the people by enlightening them on European culture and admonished them to adapt themselves to the modern world. Admonitions often bore a didactic and even scolding tone, reflecting the Qazaqs' rich tradition of didactic literature, which includes such genres as *nasihat*, *terme*, *ösiel*, *naqıl söz*, *sheshendik söz*, etc., as well as a part of proverbs (*maqal* and *mätef*). Qürmanbaev pointed out the Qazaqs' easygoingness and tendency to make false oaths.¹⁹ The great poet Abay Qūnanbaev (1845-1904) wrote in his series of precepts that "Qazaqs have evil intentions toward each other, they do not share others' wishes, they seldom speak truth, they like to compete for positions, they are lazy."²⁰ He urged them to learn much from Russians, Tatars and sedentary people of Central Asia. Dulatov also condemned Qazaqs for ignorance and lack of desire for honor and competitive spirit,²¹ although he criticized rich and influential people much more than ordinary people.

In critical situations, admonitions bore a very harsh tone. When the imperial ukase on labor conscription shocked the Qazaqs in 1916, the editorial of the *Qazaq* newspaper (edited by Ahmed Baytūrsīnov (1873-1937) and Dulatov with cooperation

¹⁸ Mirjaqip DULATULI, *Shıǵarmaları*, 1-tom (Almaty: Ǵılim, 1996), 94. Alash is another name for the Qazaqs.

¹⁹ QÜRMANBAEV, "Qazaqlardıń qamsız erinshekklik tuǵrasında ayılǵan bimeshe söz" (see note 10); Idem, "Qazaqlardıń ant ishıp jan bergen khūsusında," *Dala W'alayatınıń gazeti* 11 (13 March 1894): 2-3.

²⁰ "Ushinshi söz," in Abay, *Shıǵarmalarınıń eki tomdıq tolıq jıynadı*, 2-tom (Almaty, 1995), 160.

²¹ Mir-Ya'qub DULATOV, *Oyan, Qazaq!* (Ufa, 1910), 36.

of Bökeykhan) wrote that, although the fear of young people to go to the front was understandable, punishment by the authorities would be more dangerous, and the “shallow idea” to escape would ruin the people²². Soon a revolt against the ukase erupted, but *Qazaq*’s editors explained that it was a result of people’s “ignorance and lack of understanding.”²³

Observing that the rebellion in Torgay and Irghız *uezds* (districts) were intensifying even after uprisings in other regions were pacified, Baytürsinov, Dulatov and others, who were natives of these *uezds*, appealed to the population: “Don’t shed blood, don’t resist!” “If you think that what we say is no good for you because we are educated in Russian and live among Russians, hand us over to God and to the *aruaq* (ancestors’ soul)!” “Don’t be double-faced to God’s indication and the Emperor’s orders!”²⁴ Such authoritarian wording was very rare for these intellectuals, but at the same time, was not accidental. The consciousness of the threat that Tsarist punitive forces brought to the Qazaqs, added to the intellectuals’ conviction of their righteousness, made their wording unusually harsh.

The next year, most Qazaq intellectuals greatly welcomed the February Revolution as the arrival of an era of freedom. However they advocated continuing the labor behind the front until the end of the war, saying that the Qazaqs must support the new Provisional Government, which has given them freedom and equality with Russians.²⁵ Moreover, they took a very severe attitude toward abuses of freedom. The Qazaq Committee of the Semipalatinsk *oblast*’, which formed that *oblast*’s Executive

²² “Onnbor, iyul 8,” *Qazaq* (Orenburg) 188 (8 July 1916): 1. For more about Qazaq intellectual’s attitudes toward the revolt, see: UYAMA Tomohiko, “Two Attempts at Building a Qazaq State: The Revolt of 1916 and the Alash Movement,” in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao, eds., *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries)* (London – New York – Bahrain: Kegan Paul International, 2001): 77-98.

²³ “Onnbor, iyul 22,” *Qazaq* 190 (22 July 1916): 1. Probably, they used the word “ignorance” partly because they knew that Tsarist censors were the newspaper’s first readers and wanted to show them that Qazaqs were not intentionally resisting Russia.

²⁴ Akhmed BAYTÜRSINOV, Seyd’azım KADIRBAEV, Mir-Ya’qub DULATOV, Mühamediyar TUNGHASHIN, “Torgay hām Irghız ueziniñ khalqına!” *Qazaq* 207 (30 November 1916): 2-3.

²⁵ Ghali Khan (= Ä. BOKEYKHAN), Müstafa (=M. SHOQAEV), Mir-Ya’qub (=M. DULATOV), “Alash üluna,” in Älikhan BOKEYKHANOV, *Shıǵarmalar* (Almaty, 1994): 234-236.

Committee together with Russians, warned the population against interpreting freedom as freedom of doing evil, plundering caravans, making *barmita* (driving away of another nomad's livestock) and cutting trees without permission. It said that, different to the old time when one could escape from punishment by offering bribes, now criminals would be duly punished.²⁶ The Russian chairman of the Executive Committee also made a similar appeal,²⁷ but the Qazaq appeal bore a more ethical tone.

In Vernyi (Almaty), members of the Turkistan Committee of the Provisional Government, Orest Shkapskii (a Russian Socialist Revolutionary) and Mühamedjan Tinışpaev (a Qazaq intellectual), got angry when a crowd attacked a transport party and a storehouse. According to them, Vernyi's citizens did not answer the expectation that they would maintain order in the great moment of preparation for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, and the event showed that citizens were "not able to maintain order in the city themselves." The two placed the city again under martial law that they revoked some ten days earlier.²⁸ Ironically enough, in another article on the same page of the newspaper that published the martial law, the Vernyi *uezd* Committee on Introduction of *Zemstvo* stated: "Our *zemstvo* will be free from the State, because in renovated Russia one believes in your, citizens, ability, strength and devotion to your own fatherland. One believes that you will not do anything harmful to yourself and, especially, to our fatherland, and on the contrary, you will sow only good and useful seeds everywhere and every time."²⁹

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²⁶ Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA RK), f.840 (Upravitel' Sarybulakskoi volosti 2-go Krest'ianskogo uchastka Karkaralinskogo uyezda Semipalatinskoi oblasti), op.1, d.1, l.91.

²⁷ TsGA RK, f.840, op.1, d.1, l.92.

²⁸ "Postanovlenie Turkestanskogo Komiteta Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," *Semirechenskije vedomosti* (Vernyi) 225 (10 October 1917): 2.

²⁹ "Ot Vemenskogo Uezdnogo po vvedeniiu zemstva Komiteta," *Ibid.* Self-administration in the framework of *zemstvos* was one of the main objectives of Qazaq intellectuals before the October Revolution.