

"WHO ARE THE HUNS?"

THE LAW OF NATIONS AND ITS BREAKERS

BY

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M. P.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY THE TRANSLATOR

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A FOREWORD.

The dispassionate historian of the future, of a future not far distant, striving with proper intellectual honesty to ascertain the truth that underlay and accompanied the titanic world war, will be forced to delve among mountains of material. But dead material is not and cannot be living evidence. Indeed, under the circumstances it may be said that the vast accumulations of printed news, reports, documents and what not are in many cases the absolute negation of evidence.

This war has produced not only a falsification of facts, of causes, of motives, of representations, on a scale never before approached in the history of the world, but it has produced the hypnosis and intoxication and even the persistent poisoning of entire peoples. The influences that were formerly confined to small, restricted circles have, through the monopolizing of the press and the cables by one party of belligerents, spread until they have created all-pervading mental atmospheres and climates, not only among the warring powers but among the neutral.

That truth is entirely relative has once more been proved in this tragedy of civilization. That falsehood may usurp its place and powers is appallingly evident. But it is no less apparent that the immortal vitality of truth will assert itself despite the most desperate and extensive attempts to slay, distort or smother it.

I believe that among the few reliable documents of the World War, which have been compiled during its progress, the conscientious historian cannot fail to yield a high place to this work by Dr. Ernst Müller-Meiningen, which is now given to the world in an English translation. Dr. Müller-Meiningen is not only a prominent personality of the Reichstag, in which he represents a Bavarian constituency, but he is likewise one of the

most brilliant judicial minds of Germany, and a man of that incorruptible intellectual honesty which another German, Friedrich Nietzsche, lifted to the level of a great ideal. His work upon the world war and the breakdown of international law has been acclaimed as one of the most significant and authoritative in Germany—where the national thoroughness and love of exact truth have been nobly maintained through all the stress and distress of war—in sharp and luminous contrast to the *debâcle* of reason, justice and logic shown in the countries of her enemies, and also, alas, in many so-called neutral lands.

The original work, “Der Weltkrieg und der Zusammenbruch des Völkerrechts,” of which this English edition is an abridgment, has passed into the third edition in Germany. Each successive edition has been carefully revised by the author and all necessary corrections made in the light of subsequent events and official testimony up to about July, 1915. All inaccuracies or doubtful statements have been eliminated in so far as this has been possible. Dates, names, places, when not forbidden by the military censorship, have been given, and where American or English sources have been quoted and the original texts were not available, these have been retranslated, as plainly marked, from the German translation.

The work is a tremendous and an incontrovertible indictment of the entire Entente in diplomacy, intrigue and warfare and at the same time a simple and logical justification of Germany's cause. It is not propaganda but protest, it is not even protest so much as an appeal to that sense of justice and sanity which, despite the terrible inroads made upon it by the violences and asperities of war, must remain the fundament of all civilization. It approaches the great question of international law and morality not so much from the viewpoint of the patriot, as from that of the jurist and the historian. And in those passages in which an added emphasis or feeling are encountered, Dr. Müller-Meiningen speaks rather as the inclusive humanitarian than the exclusive patriot.

The book possesses a special interest for us Americans. Its appeal is quiet, proud, almost unexpressed, and if we will only give ear to it, it cannot but redound to our intellectual and national advantage—provided the dissipation of erroneous conceptions

and the destruction of false ideas insidiously inculcated into our minds, be considered an advantage by us.

As an American at present in Germany and one proud of the privilege of living in the midst of a great and noble people in the exalted hour of its destiny, the position of my own country has been a source of constant grief and much shame. These feelings are shared, I know, by all true Americans who understand the real motives behind this giant catastrophe to civilization and who have had the privilege of knowing the real Germany and the real German people. By them America is seen as a land helpless in the clutches of vast and evil forces, financial, journalistic and political, a people abandoned as a prey to those very influences that fetter and destroy all real freedom. They behold their native land, from the first an instrument in the hands of these evil elements, turned into a weapon of death against a friendly people struggling heroically for those very possessions, those priceless liberties for which the men of 1776 fought and died. They behold vainglorious, nay, bloodthirsty demagogues such as Roosevelt openly inciting with a fanaticism that amounts to delirium, the American populace to a war that would surpass in infamy and cowardice any that has ever been waged on this unhappy earth. They behold with amazement the patience, the dignity and the calm magnanimity of the German people in the face of these monumental wrongs.

Alas, no land ever had a more golden, a more splendid opportunity for rising in moral grandeur above the nations involved in the dire and tragic toils of war. No nation has ever flung away its glorious privilege more recklessly or for more ignoble and sordid ends. The great masses of our people, we know, are not to blame. But we must either confess that these lie helpless in the grasp of a tiny minority of financiers and politicians, and that our democracy is therefore a cruel and monumental failure, or that they are indifferent to the fate of half mankind. Have we not ventured to judge in the twilight of our ignorance? — and shall we not be judged in the cold, white light of History — implacable and just?

As an American I am able to speak with greater frankness to my countrymen than it is possible for Dr. Müller-Meiningen

to do. And I hold the dissipation of error to be the duty of every true American, irrespective of his descent. To all those who hold intellectual integrity to be one of our noblest gifts and the realization of truth to be the most elevating function of the mind, I would commend the reading of the work of this German scholar in an open and hospitable spirit.

The vexed and murky question of Belgian neutrality, that cunning cry and device that won our sentimental American sympathies above all other pleas or principles, is revealed in its true aspects and relations. The growing rancor and bitterness of warfare on sea and land is proved to be the natural and inevitable result of England's disregard for the laws of nations and Germany's enforced retaliation by the means at her disposal. The fictitious and hysterical tales of those famous Belgian atrocities sown and shouted through the world by the millions of miry mouths and organs at command of the Allies, are opposed by countless and authentic instances of the most revolting cruelties perpetrated upon German soldiers and civilians under the impulse of that blind and fanatic hatred engendered by the press of London, Paris and St. Petersburg. For it is not only secret diplomacy which constitutes so terrible a danger to the welfare of all nations, but the still greater danger of a corrupt and vicious press such as that of Lord Northcliffe in London — a man who, even in the judgment of his own countrymen, must be held up to lasting infamy by mankind as one of the chief instruments in bringing about the gigantic disaster.

Since this book has been compiled, a still stronger and entirely non-partisan light has been thrown upon the roots of the great struggle by the publication of the correspondence of the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin which, despite desperate attempts at silence and suppression, has been published in many neutral papers. The revelations and opinions of these Belgian diplomats have all the fascination of a portentous drama and prove once more that the Entente Powers are the living negations of all those things for which they are pretending to do battle. The latest proof of this is their lawless and uncalled-for outrage upon the rights of Greece. Once more actions speak louder than words.

The author's final indictment of those responsible for the great crime and conspiracy must sink like a flame into the hearts of all who are capable of sympathizing with the cause of a traduced, heroic and outraged people. There is a deathless and indestructible essence in truth which must at length leaven the great masses of falsehood, distorted fact and misrepresentation which have been heaped up to hide the causes and the consequences of this war. I am persuaded that this clear and conscientious work of Dr. Müller-Meiningen's will help to set the cause of Germany aright before the world of to-day as surely as history will set it aright before posterity.

Berlin, Oct. 25. 1915.

R. L. ORCHELLE.

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PART ONE.

Rules and Regulations of Warfare on Land.

CHAPTER I.

The Neutrality of Belgium.

Motto: If three confederate highwaymen lie in wait for a traveller whose business takes him through a forest, and pounce upon him from behind, is it the traveller whom we must arrest?
Frederick the Great, in his 'Apology for My Political Attitude'.

Let us openly confess to-day, we German fanatics for strict legality, that we were really alarmed when we heard of the violation of Belgian neutrality through the attack on Liège. To-day, in the light of ensuing events, there is no one, especially no German jurist, who is not filled with the deepest conviction that we could not have done otherwise! We were bound to take the course we did. In the name of all that is valid in history our right so to act was indisputable and absolute.

I recall the repeated debates of the Budget Commission of the Reichstag upon the neutrality of Belgium, especially with regard to the last great military measures. These discussions always resulted in a declaration by the German Imperial Government that it would never violate Belgian neutrality, except in the case of some other state first violating this neutrality, which would force the Government to ignore it on the score of military necessity.

One may now be permitted to mention the fact that this was for many years the point of view adopted by the Foreign Office in its private conferences. It was upon this standpoint that the Government based its action when, to the infinite surprise of the whole German people, from the Kaiser to the

poorest workman, the forces of war were unleashed against us in a single night.

As England based her declaration of war entirely upon the breach of Belgian neutrality by the German army, this question of international law shall be threshed out at once.

I. The Vienna Congress of 1815 incorporated the Belgian territories with Holland by agreement of the latter and the four allied Great Powers, as the kingdom of the Netherlands. This created a barrier against new efforts by a restless France towards expansion in a northerly direction. When Belgium declared herself independent after the Revolution of 1830, this standpoint was recognized by the Powers, and the newly-established kingdom of Belgium was neutralised by the treaties of November the 15th, 1831. The course pursued towards Holland was dictated by the same political purpose as that towards Belgium. The resistance of Holland was broken by the armed intervention of France, and Belgium's new position was recognized by Holland in the Treaty concluded in London, April 19th, 1839.

On that day the two countries signed an agreement in which, in Article 7, it is stated:

"Belgium forms an independent and permanently neutral state. It is bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other states."

On the same day France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia signed treaties both with Belgium and the Netherlands, in which the agreement between these two countries was inseparably incorporated. It is upon these treaties that the independence of Belgium is based.

The German Empire has now become the guarantor of Prussia.

As previously indicated, the kingdom of Belgium was originally founded by the other Great Powers as security against France. For various reasons, similarity of language, descent and so on, there was a gradual *rapprochement* of the Walloon Belgians towards France. We elders may recall that already in 1870 there were strong protests against the anti-German demonstrations on Belgian soil. Bismarck was even obliged on one occasion, as we may read in his "Reminiscences," to "throw cold water" on the fever that prevailed in Brussels

in favor of everything French, which showed itself in the form of gross insults to the German refugees during the war. The manoeuvrings of Paris and London to overthrow the neutrality of Belgium have become more and more determined ever since the Treaty of Frankfort. That these eternal machinations met with some success, and that Belgium allowed herself to be enmeshed in the Franco-British net, was plainly shown by the fortifications erected by Brialmont—in destroying which the German army has won such laurels.

A glance at the fortifications of Liège, Namur and above all, Antwerp, reveals the fact that the whole idea of the Brialmont fortifications was directed in the first place against Germany. A comparison with Holland tells heavily against Belgium. Holland would also have been drawn into this game of sham-neutrality, had the Dutch statesmen been no wiser than the Belgian. The fortifications at Flushing and Terneuzen at the mouth of the Scheldt prove that Holland took her neutrality seriously, above all in regard to the blockade of the Scheldt, a matter of the greatest political importance. Belgium, on the other hand was, as we now know, not only complacent, but had been well prepared for decades for a breach of her neutrality. It may justly be recalled at this juncture that Colonel Ducarmé once declared that France intended to annex Belgium on the strength of the speech made (1895) by the French Secretary of War, Zurlinden. Belgium has long been aware of France's intentions.

The existence of the Brialmont fortifications was a visible proof of that policy of Belgium which has perhaps cost her her very existence as a state.¹ Of course this *rapprochement* towards the two Great Powers was bound to become closer after the break-up of the old historic enmity between England and France and the formation between them of the Entente in 1902. The "Encircling Policy" of Edward VII. had to reckon upon Belgium as a base of operations. Against all these plottings and flatteries the young King Albert set up still less resistance

¹ In a pamphlet entitled "Bismarck and Belgium," Dr. Pius Dirr, Brussels, 1915, again points out that France in 1852 persistently entertained the project of annexing Belgium. Bismarck has given a direct proof of this in reference to Napoleon III. (1866 and 1869).

than the old King Leopold had done. The State was driven irresistibly forward along the crooked path of a one-sided anti-German policy.

II. The German Government had been perfectly aware for a long time of the existence of this state of things.¹ Therefore the formula—justly dictated by a legitimate feeling of distrust: "We will respect Belgian neutrality as long as other nations respect it." This could also have been worded: "We will respect Belgian neutrality if Belgium herself respects it."

One must realize all this, if one is rightly to estimate the attitude of Germany during those first days of August, 1914.

The German Government deserves all the more praise in that, in spite of all this evidence against Belgium, it nevertheless regarded the marching of German troops into Belgium during the night of the 3rd of August (according to the state of affairs as then understood) as objectionable and a breach of the agreement of 1839. It admitted this to be an "injustice" for which it promised full satisfaction and restoration of the *status quo ante*. This recognition seems all the greater since at that time the outrageous excesses committed by the Belgian population, particularly in Antwerp and Brussels, against German fugitives, were already known in Berlin, and these excesses proportionately increased, as soon as the entry of the German troops into Belgian territory became known.

The speech of the German Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, was as follows, according to the shorthand report:

¹ The press also pointed with perfect justice to the Belgian legislative projects in 1905 concerning the extension of the harbor works and the defences of the town of Antwerp, and the motives thereof, as demonstrable proof that for ten years past England and Belgium had played their cards against Germany. It may be stated thus: "Antwerp is not only the metropolis of our commerce and navigation, but she is also destined to figure as the most important fortification in the country — a *role* which she never sought and of which no other town is envious. It is Antwerp which, in the event of war, must be the last bulwark of our independence and the last refuge of our nationality." The projected plans on the lower Scheldt were not carried out, as it was understood that Antwerp figured as an English bridge-head. After the declaration of war, England still made frantic endeavors to induce Holland to break her neutrality, so that the English army could advance through Antwerp and its safe retreat to the town be assured.

"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, perhaps they are already treading Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium if its enemies will do the same. But we knew that France was in readiness for an invasion. France could afford to wait, but we could not! A French attack upon our flank on the lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. We were thus forced to disregard the justifiable protest of the governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. This wrong—I speak quite openly,—which we hereby commit, we shall endeavor to make good as soon as our military purpose is attained. He who is threatened as we are threatened and is battling for all that is dearest to him, has the right to think of only one thing: how he is to hew his way through!"¹

¹ In a speech in the German Reichstag on the 2nd of December, 1914, the German Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, to a certain extent rectified his position of the 4th of August and at the same time supplemented and thoroughly illuminated it. He said, among other things:

"The neutrality of Belgium, which England pretended to protect, was a mere mask."

On the 2nd of August, at 7 o'clock in the evening, we communicated the fact in Brussels that the military plans of France were known to us, and that we were thereby compelled, for the sake of our own self-preservation, to march through Belgium. But as early as the afternoon of the 2nd of August, that is to say, before the least news of our *demarche* in Brussels was known or could have been known in London, England had promised France her support, and an unconditional support at that, in the case of an attack by the German fleet upon the French coast. Not a single word was mentioned with reference to Belgian neutrality.

"This fact is confirmed through the declaration made by Sir Edward Grey in the Commons on the 3rd of August, a declaration which, on account of the difficulties of telegraphic communication, was not known to me *in extenso* on the 4th of August. This fact is further confirmed through the Blue Book of the English Government itself. How then could England assert that it drew the sword because we had violated Belgian neutrality? (Laughter and cries of "hypocrisy!") And how could English statesmen, who must have been well-acquainted with all that went before, have the presumption to talk of Belgian neutrality?

When on the 4th of August, I spoke of the wrong that we had committed through our invasion of Belgium, it was not yet certain whether the government

The prolonged and vociferous applause of the whole house showed plainly that all the representatives of the German people—nay, the German nation itself, stood behind these words of the Chancellor.

From a strictly legal standpoint there is something like a contradiction in the Imperial Chancellor's words. But he was not speaking precisely as a jurist, or as a professor of international law, but as a politician, and as the spokesman of the German Empire. It was his intention at that time to hold out to Belgium a golden opportunity of resuming friendly relations, with the object of restraining and dissuading the Belgians from any act of war. At that time the Imperial Chan-

in Brussels would not, in the hour of need, determine to spare the country and withdraw under protest to Antwerp. You may remember that on behalf of our army leadership, I directed a new proposal to be made in this sense to the Belgian Government, after our occupation of Liège. It was necessary for military reasons to keep the possibility of such a development on the 4th of August in mind under all circumstances.

Even at that time there were various proofs of the guilt of the Belgian Government. Positive written proofs were not yet available for me, but the English statesmen were fully aware of these proofs. Now that the documents found in Brussels have been given full publicity through me, and the manner and degree in which Belgium had given up its neutrality in favor of England have been fully confirmed, there are two facts that must be proclaimed to the world.

Firstly, that when our troops entered Belgian territory on the night of the 3rd of August, they stood on the soil of a land which had long since discarded its neutrality: and secondly, that England did not declare war against us on account of Belgian neutrality, which she herself had long since rendered a dead letter, but because she believed that, in combination with two great military powers, she would be able to gain complete mastery over us. Since the 2nd of August, on which date England gave France her promise of co-operation in war, England ceased to be a neutral, and, in actual fact, stood ranged with our enemies. Her motive in basing her declaration of war of the 4th of August, on the violation of Belgian neutrality, was to mislead neutrals and also her own people as to the real motives of the war. It was a piece of bluff. Now that the Anglo-Belgian war-plan, with all its carefully-planned detail, lies open before us, the policy of English statesmen is for all time laid bare to the eyes of history. To this English diplomacy has added another stroke. England calls upon Japan to snatch from us heroic Kiao-Chow, thereby violating the neutrality of China. Has England taken any measures against this breach of neutrality? Has she shown in this instance her scrupulous consideration for neutral states?"

cellor was not fully informed of the evil part which the supposedly neutral state had played for so long, as we shall presently proceed to show. He therefore made a discrimination between the necessary state of self-defence against France and the necessary precautionary measures, which he defined as "illegalities," against Belgium. Of course his words, "France could wait, but we could not," gave his hearers plainly to understand that the co-operation of other powers with France was, under any circumstances, to be expected. He did not indicate whether the third power was to be Belgium herself or—England.

The speech of the Imperial Chancellor on the 4th of August was, therefore, undoubtedly dictated by diplomatic courtesy. In his opinion the Belgian Government and population were still open to influence—as by the open admission of the objective fact of a breach of neutrality by the advance of the German troops. Hence the admission of "the wrong that we are doing, for which we shall try to make amends." It was not the jurist who spoke thus, but the responsible politician, the statesman.

A few days sufficed to prove that neither the *bona fides* nor the goodwill that the Imperial Chancellor had anticipated had any existence in Belgium. Neither was there any sign of the good results which the Chancellor had hoped from his friendly advances. In fact, quite the contrary!

The development of affairs during the next few days (from the 4th to the 7th of August) also proved that it would have been sheer insanity to expect Germany to await the incursion of French or English troops into Belgium, in order to make good the advantage gained by our foes at the expense of streams of German soldiers' blood, and in order thereupon to plead a condition of necessity and defence before a court which from the very beginning, was hostile and partisan. This would, *in praxi*, have been the case, and the court would have been the forum of the English Government, which would have maintained a benevolent silence and uttered no word regarding a breach of neutrality—had France still more openly broken this neutrality than she had already done with the consent and according to the wishes of the English Government. Before what other court should Germany have accused herself? Possibly before

the Hague Tribunal? After the French had stood in their thousands at Namur and Liège, a verdict such as this—delivered after many months—would scarcely have set the air a-tremble.

Germany acted according to the necessity of which she was conscious, and, as the further developments of military events have shown, in justifiable defence against Belgium, which had broken its own neutrality, as well as against France, guilty of the same breach of agreement.

The preservation of the German Empire, in view of the conditions described below, made it a matter of dire necessity temporarily to violate the duties of agreement in the matter of neutrality, which had passed from Prussia to the German Empire. And this even though Belgium had not broken the pact of neutrality with respect to the German Empire. The preservation of its own existence, its integrity, independence and position as a world power rendered it necessary that the German Empire should *in concreto*, adopt the legality of this condition of necessity.

It would already have sufficed that neutral Belgium had *tolerated* the mere threats of France against the existence of the German Empire, or the mere *neglect* of such negotiations as would have been necessary to obviate these threats on the part of France, in order to give Germany the right to protect herself against France and Belgium, even though this necessitated her violating the neutrality of the latter country.

Belgium, under the state of necessity imposed upon the German Empire would, like Luxemburg, have been fully entitled to demand complete compensation for the actions enjoined by this state of necessity—a right which was repeatedly and expressly acknowledged by Germany and which she has promptly and dutifully fulfilled in the case of Luxemburg. Germany was not obliged in this state of impending danger, first to establish by discussions this point of international law.

A state of necessity and defence demands deeds and not words. The compensation for damage committed was a matter for later and subsequent negotiations, both from the point of view of material and legal aspects, as applicable to the land whose neutrality had been broken.

Had not Belgium for more than a generation accustomed

itself to the idea of a struggle against Germany and devoted its entire military and other policy to this idea, it would have been able to gain complete compensation and an increase of its financial, economic and political position from the merely temporary disturbance of its neutrality, instead of annihilation and the ruin of its independence.

III. That Belgium itself was convinced that such a condition of necessity would immediately dissipate its stipulated neutrality, may be seen in the following:

As early as 1845, the "Revue Militaire Belge" published an article whose author does not in the least take Belgian neutrality seriously, and considers it to be a mere empty phrase. (Similar views are held by Frank, ("Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten" of the 20th of August.) It was all very well to proclaim this during peace but it became of itself null and void at the outbreak of war. Belgium, like every other state, would then be confronted by the question as to which party was to have its support.

The Belgian author Grandgagnage likewise declares that conditions are mightier than men, and that despite all treaties, Belgium, in case of war, would be the field in which European quarrels would be decided. Should Belgium seek to oppose them, it was to be foreseen that it would not only risk defeats, but might even be in danger of losing its independence.

The *Pandectes Belges*, (Vol. 68) contain several passages which, it is true, are opposed to such an interpretation. They nevertheless acknowledge in an unqualified manner two instances in which the neutrality of Belgium need not be observed: that is to say, the declaration of war by all the five guarantee powers and the non-observance of its neutrality by Belgium itself.

This Belgian view must undoubtedly be recognized as unobjectionable, both from the standpoint of the nation and that of international law.

Both instances, as we shall show, have been confirmed.

Firstly, the treaties of the 15th of November, 1831, regarding the neutralization of the Kingdom of Belgium, were signed by England, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and Belgium. In 1871 Prussia was succeeded by the German Empire.

Thus, condition I. is fulfilled, namely that all signatory powers should be at war. At the beginning of August it was only England which *apparently* and formally stood outside the sphere of conflict.

However, it is of peculiar interest to observe what Professor Rivier, a celebrated Brussels *savant*, in his text-book of international law, (2nd edition, 1899, page 184) says regarding the state of necessity.

"A state is entitled to violate the sovereignty of a third state, should this be too weak to hinder the possibility of its territory from serving the attacking nation as a basis." One might almost believe that these words had been written in August 1914! We see that a state may violate a treaty of neutrality, when a subject of the treaty does not possess the power to prevent the enemy of the first state, that is to say, of the neutral state, from using its land as a basis of operations. This is the case in the present instance. Is there anyone who would venture to dispute the fact that Belgium was too weak to defend its territory against a French attack? Even though Belgium had the best intentions—which of course, were lacking—of asserting its sovereignty and neutrality, France would simply have overwhelmed it.

This fact in itself is in reality, the only moral excuse which Belgium could offer for the violation of its own neutrality. It was upon this assumption that the policy of Baron Lambertmont, a policy which, unfortunately, was ignored by King Albert, was founded. Lambertmont held that it was only necessary for the Belgian army to occupy the frontiers of the country in the defence of its neutrality; he held that it would be folly to take up arms against a stronger opponent. The new "Jungbluth tactics"—to take up a one-sided attitude—proved to be the ruin of King Albert.¹

¹ In the Year Book of the d. V. R. I. 1127 there are published extracts from reports on the Belgian "Projets de Loi sur la Malice" (the Belgian Ministry, after the election of June 1912, had proposed an increase in the war footing of the army to 350 000 men) as follows:

"Il ne faut pas oublier que la neutralité de la Belgique a été proclamée non pas comme un bienfait pour la Belgique, mais exclusivement dans l'intérêt de l'équilibre européen . . . "

We thus see that even authoritative Belgian legal experts have recognized that Belgian neutrality may be abrogated in the event of necessity, which would also be the case if Belgium would *in concreto* prove to be too weak to defend it with success. Of course in that country, one had reckoned that France would have urged the plea of necessity, against which neither Belgium nor England would have ventured to offer any objections.

This fact has been recognized by a number of influential English politicians, such as Ramsay Macdonald, Sir Arthur Ponsonby and others. They have not only conceded this point, but have because of it directly reproached Sir Edward Grey and his henchmen, Sir Francis Bertie and Sir Arthur Nicolson.

But of course, that which is right for one should naturally be just for the other. This is especially true in the case of a quick surprise attack on two fronts, made overnight, by two of the strongest of the Great Powers, as happened in the case of Germany. We repeat in the most emphatic manner, our declaration, based upon our absolute knowledge of essential conditions, and pledge our word, as every other Reichstag deputy could do, *that prior to July 31st no one in Germany had any thought of war*. No preparations for mobilization took place in Germany before the 1st of August. While Russia and France, as has now been proved, had for months been arming themselves for the great war which England had been preparing for years, Germany had no suspicion of the possibility of such complications and up to the 1st of August, still cherished the hope that it might be possible for her to pursue her way in peace.

There is an historical interest attached to the fact, which is expatiated upon in this report (I, 1129) that in the year 1840—that is to say, immediately after the treaty of the 19th of April, 1839—when the Oriental question had already once threatened to provoke a European war, France had communicated the following to the Belgian Government: Should this government (the Belgian) not be in a position to defend its integrity and its neutrality, France might find itself obliged, in the event of a war with Germany, to occupy Belgium.

This declaration vividly reminds one of the opinions which the English military attaché incautiously expressed to the Chief of the Belgian General Staff—as revealed through the publication of documents from the Belgian archives in the “Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung”.

As a proof of how heavily the burden of "extreme necessity" lay upon Germany and forced her to the breach of neutrality, one might cite the first proclamation of the German Government which clearly guaranteed Belgium complete damages and restoration of the complete freedom and independence of the country, as soon as the temporary military necessities had been met. See the Note which the German envoy von Below-Saleske, handed to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monsieur D'Avignon, on the 2nd of August, 1914. (Belgian Grey Book, No. 20, page 26.)

On the 4th of August, Germany delivered another note to Belgium, in which it gave notice that, "au besoin de la force des armes", it was forced to adopt certain measures of security which, in view of the French threats, had become necessary, ("indispensable"). Belgium, on its part, as soon as the Germans had marched over the frontier, had on the 4th of August, handed his passports to the German Minister. (Grey Book, No. 31 and 44. The answer of Belgium on the 3rd August, No. 22.) On the same day, King Albert of Belgium appealed to England for *diplomatic* intervention. (See English White Book, No. 153, and Grey Book, No. 25.)

The proclamation of the 12th of August, 1914, may also be cited for further important evidence, as follows:

... "The German Government deeply deplores the fact that, owing to the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany, a bloody conflict has taken place. Germany does not come as an enemy to Belgium. It is owing entirely to the pressure of circumstances, due to the military measures taken by France, that it has been brought to the serious conclusion to march into Belgium and to occupy Liège as a base for its further military operations. After the Belgian army had vindicated the honour of its arms by offering an heroic resistance to our large and superior army, the German Government *begs* his Majesty the King of Belgium, and the Belgian Government, to spare their country the further terrors of war. The German Government *is willing to make any compromise* with the Belgians, which may be compatible with its negotiations with France. Germany once more solemnly pledges its word that it has no intention of acquiring Belgian territory and that

nothing could be farther from its purposes. Germany is still prepared to evacuate Belgium without delay as soon as the military situation permits of this."

The answer which the Belgian Government delivered to this on the 13th of August was in the nature of a curt refusal.¹ (See Belgian Grey Book.)

Is this the language of a greedy "militarism," hungering for world-power? Here the government of the victorious, most powerful military state of the world, *begs* the government of a small, impotent nation to call a halt to the farther terrors of warfare. Has there ever in the history of the world been a similar case of the making of such advances as border on the limits of self-respect? And this, despite the fact that one was pretty firmly convinced by the 12th of August of all that Belgium had brought about in the violation of its own neutrality! Not only are we conscious of a desire to make good every injustice, however trivial, but also of the state of absolute necessity which forced Germany to take measures against Belgium.

Of course, if the revelations of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" during the beginning of the month of October, 1914, regarding the personal attitude of King Albert toward the Triple Entente, revelations which moreover, are in perfect accordance with the views here expressed and perfectly confirm them,—be correct, it becomes clear that this continued insolent and haughty attitude of the Belgian Government must be looked upon as a mere result of the attitude of its king.

King Albert, according to these reports, had already concluded a sort of military convention with France and Eng-

¹ It is characteristic of the attitude of the Belgian Government, which was hostile from the very beginning, that this extraordinarily important proclamation to the Belgian people was completely suppressed—and that by public notices in the press and elsewhere, the false report was spread that Germany wished to compel Belgium to take arms against France and England under the Prussian command. This dishonest attitude also proves that the whole Belgian policy from the beginning had been so directed as to range itself on the side of the Triple Alliance, as the apparently stronger factor, through thick and thin. Even later, the Government perpetrated the most grievous wrong upon its own people by an attitude of the most unexampled untruthfulness.

land in the spring of 1914, and, as the representative of the Triple Entente, had undertaken to create a league among the neutral states of Europe in order completely to isolate Germany. This plan was wrecked by the resistance of Holland. Thereupon the King despatched a message to the King of England behind the back of the Belgian ministry, beseeching him to protect the neutrality of Belgium.

However this may be, one thing is absolutely certain. If ever there was a case in which one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality was justified in abrogating this neutrality, it was in this instance.

The hypocrisy of the entire behavior of England and Belgium in this question of neutrality may, for example, be seen in the following characteristic Belgian expression of opinion:

In the "XXe Siècle" of Brussels, of August 20th, 1914, the leading article is a lecture given by the Abbé de Lannoy, before the "Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de L'Institut St. Louis" in October 1913, that is to say, ten months before the outbreak of the war. The neutrality of Belgium is the subject of this lecture. After a general survey of the history of the development of this neutral state, the Abbé de Lannoy sought to make clear that to-day this neutrality was threatened only by Germany. This neutrality was first conceived as a protective measure against France in 1850, since England would under no conditions have permitted it to possess Antwerp: but now the positions were changed. *England would defend Antwerp against Germany.* Under these changed conditions, *Belgium had no longer any further interest in adhering to its neutrality...* In diplomatic parlance, Belgian neutrality will still remain a sort of formula to which everyone will appeal according to his immediate interests, and which everyone will interpret according to his own desire, until that day when tragic events will make clear that it was only a formula...."

"From this it appears that England could no longer confine herself to merely being the defender of our independence. *If England intends to defend us, it will not be as a guarantee power, but as a belligerent power.*"

De Lannoy, with prophetic vision, is thus able to foresee that England would in all events participate in the war, and

that the breach of Belgian neutrality was merely a pretext for engaging in the war.

Therefore all Belgium was of the same opinion as the well-known Abbé and acted accordingly. On the other hand, similar views are expressed in the book of the American writer, Homer Lee,—“The Day of the Saxon,” who declares that the neutrality of small states that lie between large ones, is a mere anomaly. Holland and Belgium were to become military annexes of Great Britain. Then England could be attacked only from the mouth of the Elbe, and Germany’s expansion along the sea-coast would be impossible. Silvio Pietro Rivetta makes a very just observation upon this point: “No other nation has so frequently occupied neutral territory and broken its pledges, as England. Whenever a small neutral country lies between two large ones, it is extremely important to acquire possession of this state at the very beginning of the war, so that it does not fall into the hands of the enemy.”

IV. If the question of legalisation through necessity, according to the foregoing exposition, is theoretically and in principle to be answered in the affirmative in favor of international law, so the concrete example is naturally decided only by the responsible authorities of that state which lays claim to the law of necessity, that is to say, in the case at hand the German army leaders in connection with the foreign policy of the German Empire. Any other solution is unthinkable. An appeal to a non-partisan court would be impossible for legal, and, above all, practical military reasons.

The state of necessity for Germany was based upon the following: that according to the views of the German army leadership, an irruption of French troops through Belgian territory into Germany was an immediate threat and that this irruption for Germany, involved in a world war, would have been fatal. Subsequent events have confirmed this view. This fact is of considerable significance.

More than once the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: “We knew that the French plans of war contemplated a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected Rhine provinces!...” It was this fact which gave birth

to the condition of necessity by virtue of which Germany had the right of ignoring the neutrality agreement of 1839. Germany is justified in making this appeal to necessity, not only with regard to a Belgium quite willing to act as a participant, but also with regard to the guarantee powers, one of which,—that is to say,—France, is naturally no longer entitled to be considered as such. He who does not wish to concede that Germany acted under a stress of necessity, must, as Miltner and others so justly point out, accept the monstrous doctrine that Germany should have first awaited the violation and then protested. And what then?

Not even the "Daily Mail" or the "Temps" could suppose that Germany would be so naively simple.¹

V. In the first days of August, the German Government still adhered to the assumption, as proved by the speech of the Imperial Chancellor on the 4th August, that the Belgian Government was averse to a French penetration of Belgium in order to reach Germany. In the note which the German Chancellor sent to the German Minister in Brussels on the 2nd of August, he expresses his anxiety lest Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, should not be able to resist the French advance successfully without assistance. Germany must therefore anticipate the French attack.

According to the present situation, it is obvious that Belgium had no such intention. The French irruption into Germany was something that had already been agreed upon between France and

¹ The English conception of a state of necessity and self-defence may be shown by the classic example of the notorious onslaught made upon Copenhagen in 1807. This was made because, as the English declared, they feared that Denmark might possibly range itself on the side of Napoleon. Wellington at that time spoke the historic words: "Great Britain had only put into exercise that law of self-preservation, that needed no learned and intricate disquisitions to justify!"

That was sufficient for England in order to set the Danish capital in flames by a bombardment in the midst of peace — to reduce 300 houses to ashes and to drag away the whole Danish fleet. And only because Denmark did not break its neutrality! And to-day we have this English fanaticism regarding neutrality, although the justification of Germany is a hundred times stronger.

Belgium, as well as prepared for by military measures undertaken on both sides.

The facts and evidence in this direction are still accumulating. The entire official material which has been collected will be published at a later date.

Not only from considerations of a state of necessity, but also from another point of view, which had been foreseen, as shown above, by the "Pandectes belges," the proceeding of Germany against Belgium must be conceived as *fully justified and unobjectionable with regard to international law.*

In the passage from the "Pandectes belges" quoted above, it is declared that the violation of Belgium's neutrality by herself would automatically destroy it. Not the slightest objection can be urged against this. *Article 7 of the Agreement of 1839, Clause 2, which stipulates that Belgium is to observe the same neutrality towards all states, has been grossly violated by her.*

In common with France and England, she prepared military operations against the other guarantee powers of the agreement of 1839, that is to say against Prussia, and thereby against the whole German Empire and its ally, Austria. Thereby was the neutrality of Belgium destroyed. She has no right to make further demands upon the advantages of her neutrality.

Military and political facts furnish the most authentic confirmation of this. Among other things, Belgium, prior to the 4th of August, which was the day on which the German troops first crossed the frontier, that is to say, during the time from the 1st to the 3rd of August, had permitted numerous French military automobiles to proceed through Belgium towards the frontier, and French military airmen to fly above Belgian territory without hindering these breaches of neutrality, or even making any serious attempt to do so. It is further confirmed by a great number of witnesses that, as early as the afternoon of the 2nd of August, numerous French officers were officially on duty in Brussels. The 45th Regiment of French Infantry was despatched on the 31st July to Namur in military motors, as is attested by unprejudiced French witnesses. On the 2nd of August, French troops were stationed in the Belgian village

of Erqueline.¹ (See French Yellow Book, Nos. 146 and 147: Violations of the frontier of Belgium and Germany through French troops on the 3rd August, 1914, as established by the German Ambassador in Paris, followed, of course, by refutation—146, 148, 149.)

According to declarations on oath before a protocol in the German courts, there were strong French detachments in Charleroi at the end of July. According to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," a German gas-worker gave witness that Kerdavain, the Conseiller du Departement du Nord, officially acknowledged that 150 000 men were in Maubeuge on the 1st August, and the same number at Givet, in order to force a way into Germany through Belgium. (Onnaing on August 1st, 8 o'clock P. M.)

The methodical arming of the whole Belgian people with military rifles, converting them into *franc-tireurs*, as well as the preparations for resistance from the first village upon the frontier on, proved conclusively that the entire resistance against Germany had been organized and made ready, precisely as in France, where it had been officially propagated for some years.

It is also further established by the declarations of French prisoners that French officers were professionally active in Liège and Brussels some weeks before the outbreak of the war. Before the declaration of war, the Belgian soldiers were given prints of various French and British regiments, in order that they might thus be able to distinguish their future allies. An arsenal was discovered at Maubeuge containing—English ammunition, which had been stored up there long before the declaration of war! The denials of the English, in view of the revelations regarding the "Conventions," are absolutely not to be believed, and cannot furnish the slightest proof in refutation. France and Belgium had, on that day on which Sir Edward

¹ The "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 18th of January, demonstrates on a basis of sworn testimony that as early as the 24th July, 1914, some two companies of French infantry from Paris detrained at Erqueline. Countless witnesses under oath regarding the Belgian and French cruelties towards civil prisoners, confirm the opinion which prevails here that already in July all preparations for a common war against Germany had been settled between Belgium and France.

Grey thought himself able to play off the guarantee of Belgian neutrality officially as a trump card against Germany, already violated the so-called neutrality in every possible form.

Thus, through all her proceedings, of which more and more come to light, Belgium had broken her neutrality in the grossest manner, and had thereby herself annulled the contract of 1839.

VI. It is instructive to consider how the English Government itself to-day regards the question of a violation of the law of neutrality under necessity. The official edition of the rules of war, by Colonel Edwards and Professor Oppenheim, and published by order of His Majesty's Secretary of State for War for the guidance of officers of His Majesty's army, declares in article 468, page 101, Clause 3:

"However, should a belligerent violate neutral territory by marching troops across it and should the neutral power be unable or unwilling to resist this violation, then the other belligerent is entitled to attack the enemy in this territory." Lawrence, the most prominent English authority upon international law, designates in his "Principles of International Law," 1910, page 136, the occupation of Egypt as "justified by the vital interests of Great Britain." On page 69 he declares that "extreme necessity will justify a temporary violation of neutral territory." Other English authorities on international law, such as Hall, Edmonds and Oppenheim, are of the same opinion.

In the volume, "The Royal Navy, A history from the Earliest Time to the Present", we find the following:

"The (English) attack upon Copenhagen in 1807, (see above) was, without doubt, a wise and at all events, necessary measure. In times of general war, small weak nations that are not able to protect their own neutrality and might be used as tools by one of the stronger combatants, become sources of danger for the other belligerent. It is no more than wise if the opposed party should use the first opportunity to deprive these neutrals of their weapons which, though comparatively harmless in the hands of small and unambitious states, might, under the leadership of great and aggressive states, become most formidable." (*retranslation.*)

One of the collaborators in this book, Mr. Theodore Roose-

velt, has now become one of the most frenetic of these "neutrality" fanatics.

Therefore, as soon as the French had crossed the Belgian frontier, the German Empire, even from an English point of view, was undoubtedly justified in moving troops into Belgium. This was what really happened. The country was not obliged to wait for this moment. Yet, in spite of all this, it did wait. When, in the first days of August, it saw that, on account of the toleration by Belgium of her violated neutrality, airmen, automobiles, single officers, and larger detachments of troops, would be bound to be followed by the French army, the German General Staff simply performed its duty. It had the right to choose the manner of defence, which, according to its opinion, was necessary to avert the immediate threatening and illegal attack of France, which had in effect, already occurred. This right was rendered the more apparent, since the neutral power of Belgium had proved to be "unable and unwilling" to defend itself against the French incursion and breach of neutrality and had in fact, of its own accord, surrendered it.

Thus Germany, even according to French, English and Belgian¹ authorities, was, both from a point of international law and military practice, justified in acting as she did.

VII. A great mass of facts still remains convincingly to substantiate our presentation of this long-prepared attack,

¹ In the "Pandectes Belges," 68, which we have already cited, I find on page 104, No. 34, the following remarkable statement regarding the Belgian conception of neutrality and the present German procedure:

"On peut se demander si dans ces deux hypothèses, la Belgique devrait attendre, l'arme au bras, l'attaque de son adversaire; s'il ne lui serait pas permis de prendre le devant et d'aller attaquer l'ennemi chez lui, alors que les préparatifs faits par ce dernier, ne laissent aucun doute sur son intention de nous envahir? Nous répondons, que cela lui serait permis, car dans le cas indiqué, l'attaque n'est qu'une forme de la légitime défense. Elle prévient l'aggression imminente. C'est la force employée pour éviter le préjudice irréparable que produirait l'attente." — Further, regarding the neutrality of Belgium, in the same work, No. 20:

"Au premier signal de la guerre tombe la neutralité" (Page 98); No. 23: "tous les engagements ne tarderaient;" No. 22: "conventions, qui ne deviennent définitivement obligatoires," see also Page 90, No. 137.

but of these we shall here quote only such as are publicly and personally vouched for by reputable witnesses.

These are documents of the greatest importance, not only on account of the false statement that the breach of Belgian neutrality by Germany was England's reason for her declaration of war, but also for the truth of the statement that England, from the very beginning, had intended to co-operate with France and Belgium. That England had made her calculations with both lands, and was bound to them by the 1st August either by compact or through the personal undertakings of the responsible leader of English foreign policy, is proved by the following facts and documents which complete and verify themselves. First of all, the Prime Minister, in a speech made in Cardiff at the beginning of October, revealed the fact that England, as early as 1912, had refused to declare its neutrality to Germany in case of a war. Let us first take the despatch of Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Goschen on the 1st August, 1914. It says:

"He (the German Ambassador) asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

(See No. 106, No. 85, 87, English White Book, and Blue Book.¹)

¹ The greatest Roumanian Teutophobe, Take Jonsescu, declared that Prince Lichnowsky was firmly convinced, at least up to the 27th July, that

Let us take in addition to this, the representation of Ambassador Prince Lichnowsky, which appeared in the "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of September 4th, 1914, and gives a resumé of all the events from the 1st of August. Among other things we may here read: "In answer to my question whether he would give me a decisive answer regarding the neutrality of Great Britain if we should agree to respect Belgian neutrality, the Minister replied that *he was not able to do this*."¹

Thirdly, we should add that Sir Edward Grey, on the 3rd August, declared in the House of Commons that as early as the afternoon of August 2nd, he had promised the French Ambassador the complete support of the English Fleet in the event of the German fleet attacking the French coasts or the French merchant marine. It was not until the night of the 3rd and 4th of August that the breach of Belgian neutrality by German troops occurred.

The German Government went to the utmost possible limits in order formally to assure the neutrality of England, as may be seen in a communication from Grey to Goschen. But invariably in vain. And this is perhaps the best proof that a plan of co-operation between the three states against Germany had been resolved upon and prepared for long beforehand.

VIII. In support of the correctness of this view one might quote much more evidence. This confirms us in the opinion that political difficulties of a domestic nature, above all, the civil war threatening on account of the question of Ulster, made it appear desirable to produce a feeling of unity in England through the provocation of a great continental war. This is publicly confirmed in an interesting interview with Senator Count Di San Martino, in the "Giornale d'Italia." Sir Edward Grey, on his part, acted in this way because of the ancient hate that he bore Germany. His policy had constantly taken its source from the fixed idea that Germany was the Alpha and

peace would not be disturbed. Even on the 28th he had advised him to continue his cure in Aix-les-Bains.

¹ See the formal and repeated assurance of Germany to England that Belgium's territory would remain inviolable if England were to remain neutral, and France respect this neutrality. (See White Book, No. 157.)

Omega of all obstacles with regard to England: Winston Churchill was his faithful henchman, the *enfant terrible* of the present unholy ministry.

An official document has been found at Tourcoing, near Lille in France. It is a poster, signed by the Burgomaster, Gustav Dron, a member of the French Senate, and it bears the date of the 1st of August, 1914. It is a proclamation addressed to the people with regard to the outbreak of the war. In this proclamation we find the following:

"England, our friend, has no thought of yielding up the dominion of the seas and the supremacy in world trade to German control. It was determined to put an end to this madness of armaments, which is ruining all the great nations of to-day."

This proclamation is of the utmost importance for the historian, for it proves that England was already determined on the 1st of August to take part in the war on the side of France and Russia.

"The Nation," an American pro-English weekly of considerable reputation, publishes certain interesting communications of its London correspondent, J. Ranken Towse.

Towse declares that since the 1st of August, that is, three days before the declaration of war, feverish military preparations were observed by him, such as the continuous transport of troops to the coast, and the requisition of horses, motors and motor-lorries. He further declares:

"It has now become obvious that preparations for the war had been made three months ago. I know for a certainty that several Naval Reserve officers had already been appointed to their ships at that period, and I am assured by a personality whom I regard as a responsible authority, that Lord Kitchener had, some weeks ago, made a secret trip to Belgium in order to confer with the Belgian General Staff with regard to our Expeditionary Corps." ¹ (*retranslation.*)

¹ "The Daily Mail Year-Book for 1915" confirms in all details that England was the first of the warring states to have its fleet completely mobilized, as early as the 27th of July, before anyone in Germany thought of war, or a single man or horse stood ready. (See also "Freisinnige Zeitung," No. 2, 1915.)

IX If these facts, as attested by witnesses, are correct, the whole contemptible trickery of which Sir Edward Grey was guilty towards the unsuspecting representatives of the German Government, Ambassador Lichnowsky and the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, from the 1st to the 4th of August, becomes clear as day. This despicable jugglery with the representatives of a great power is certainly unparalleled in history for its absolute dishonesty.

But M. Sasonow and Sir Edward Grey would convince us that the "Marine Convention" which turned the heads of the All-Russian War Party, was an idea that existed only in the editorial office of the "'Berliner Tageblatt' and in the moon." They are unable, however, to dispute the evidence of the documents cited above—which are in accordance with the official English Blue Book—that within a few days, Grey at one time declared the question of Belgian neutrality as not decisive, and again, in answer to the assurance of the German Government that it would preserve this neutrality if England preserved hers, refused to agree to this. This, of course, was merely playing for time, so that, after the Germans had marched into Belgium, he might finally adopt the role of the protector of the right. Two days before this, however, Grey already had his declaration of war complete, since he declared the threatening of the French coasts and of the French merchant marine as a *casus belli*. This certainly is a true example of English double dealing. (See the English White Book, No. 123, 126 and the French Yellow Book, Nos. 144, 143.)

Of what the recognized leaders of English foreign policy are held to be capable, even in England, may be seen by the manifest of the English Independent Labour Party, issued in August, 1914. According to an undisputed press communication, the following sentiments were expressed:

The import of this is similar to a statement issued by Herr Erzberger, a member of the Reichstag, based upon a communication from an "absolutely reliable source," that on the 2nd of August, under the very eyes of the Antwerp police, a German steamer had been demolished and that Belgian troops had penetrated into German territory at Aix-la-Chapelle. ("Der Tag," October 7th, 1914.)

"Neither the Serbian Question nor that of Belgian Neutrality has plunged England into this terrible war. England is not fighting for oppressed nations or for Belgium's neutrality. If France had penetrated into Germany through Belgium, what man believes that England would therefore have declared war upon France?"

Sir Edward Grey has made secret concessions behind the back of Parliament and the people. But when he was asked about them, he denied the existence of these concessions. And for that reason, our land is to-day confronted by universal ruin and the iron necessity of war.

Alliances and agreements have forced France into the bondage of despotic Russia, and now England is being dragged in by France. All this is now coming to light. The men who hold responsible posts must now be held to account. England has now placed itself in the service of Russia,—Russia, the most reactionary, the most corrupt and the most despotic power of Europe. If Russia's territorial desires are to be gratified and its Cossack dominion be extended, then civilization and democracy will incur the most serious danger. And it is for this that England has drawn the sword!" (*retranslation.*)

In a similar manner Keir Hardie and Clifford Allen in pamphlets in which they praise the honest confession of the German Imperial Chancellor, "Necessity knows no law," lay the entire blame at England's door. ("Daily Citizen.")¹

¹ See also the exposition by Professor Sieper, in the "Berliner Tageblatt," (January 1915) regarding Asquith's exclamation, "No war! no war!" which prove that the Harmsworth press, Sir Edward Grey, Churchill, and the well-known ambassadorial *agents-provocateurs* (Sir F. Bertie, Cambon, Barrère, etc.) had driven the English nation, Parliament and the ministry ("These damned treaties have done it all") into this war.

The same clear judge of English conditions writes thus of Winston Churchill:

"The attitude of Winston Churchill is so repulsive for the reason that it is in shrieking antithesis to the former acts and speeches of this political renegade. He was present during May in 1906 at a reception at the Eighty Club, in honor of German visitors. Among the toasts was one that was devoted to "The Two Nations" and Winston Churchill was the speaker. He began his toast with the following words: "There are people who go about declaring that the German and English people hate one another. The prattle of these people—most of them fire-eating editors who are no longer capable of

X. Even the fanatic participation of the entire Belgian population in the war,—a population well armed with military rifles and abundantly supplied with ammunition from the first day on—is an indisputable proof of the fact that the passing through of French and, no doubt, English troops, through Belgium, and with it the surrender of Belgian neutrality, had been resolved upon. This is further confirmed by the hostile acts committed against German subjects before the declaration of war on Russia, and before the beginning of war with France, and three or four days before the German troops had stepped upon Belgian territory.

The shameful acts of cruelty committed in Brussels, Antwerp and other cities of Belgium, above all things, the demolition of German ships, especially the Lloyd steamer "Gneisenau," by Belgian gendarmes, as early as 9 o'clock on the 3rd of August, would alone have sufficed to justify before the whole world the entry of German troops into Belgium.

In a drastic communication of Bismarck's, dated 1870, the great Chancellor had threatened Belgium with an invasion by German troops, based upon acts of hostility which were comparatively mild. There is no doubt that on hearing of the Antwerp horrors of the 3rd and 4th of August, he would not have hesitated a moment to assume full responsibility for all consequences. Even from the point of view of the self-respect of the German Empire, there can be no question of "a wrong" on the part of the Germans.¹

The whole world knows to-day that it is not fidelity to agreements nor to neutrality, which was the leading motive of

military service, may be dismissed with a smile by sensible folk, but their barking day after day, should nevertheless warn responsible men to be on guard."

The speaker then began to talk upon the economic rivalries of both lands: "Has there ever been a trade war which increased dividends by 6 d in the £? The first days after the mobilization the trade of a country will suffer more damage than could ever be compensated for by a successful war." And in conclusion he remarked: "Mother Earth has room for us all . ." (*retrans.*)

¹ See the Spanish newspaper, "El Debate," of the 4th of October, the opinions of the Bishop, Dr. Ruelsen-Zürich, in the "Augsburger Abend-Zeitung," the expositions of Houston Stewart Chamberlain in the "Internationale Monats-Schrift," Vol. 9, No. 1, Dr. Harris Aal, in the "Christiania Dagbladet," etc.

the declaration of war by England, but jealousy and a striving for the dominion of the world.¹ Egypt, India, South Africa, Ireland and Persia would have given the British people plenty of opportunity for interceding on behalf of freedom and justice. The one end in view here is the hoped-for destruction of German trade, of German industry and the threatening German naval programme.

And Belgium? It owes its ruin to the English policy by which it was blinded. In the face of this temptation, it should have insisted upon a strict adherence to its neutrality, or demanded its natural freedom of action, or else proclaimed openly to the world its inability to defend this neutrality against the Great Powers, and that the agreement of 1839 was therefore rendered null and void.

It owed it to itself and to the Guarantee Powers to clear up the situation either in one way or the other. But Belgium refused to adopt the first expedient, by means of which Switzerland and Holland worthily and out of their own resources preserved their neutrality, Holland especially going so far as to make it a punishable crime for its citizens to violate neutrality. But this splendid example of two really neutral nations was not followed by Belgium, nor did it attempt to release itself from the agreement of 1839. "It chose the wrong path and under the mask of neutrality, made common cause with the Triple Entente." (Miltner and others.)

Only ignorance or wilful calumny would venture after all this to accuse the German people of a violation of international law. German statesmen and German generals would have made themselves guilty in the eyes of history of the grossest neglect of duty had they not reckoned with the existing conditions.

But, as has been clearly proved in the foregoing, Germany was justified, through Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, and in accordance with the dictates of international law, in

¹ C. H. Norman, of the "National Labour Press" in April, 1915, declares: "The alleged reason for England's participation in the war, the violation of Belgian neutrality, was only a pretext. The real reason was the desire of England to destroy German progress. . . . Grey is the Autocrat of Great Britain. . . . Parliament exercised no control whatsoever over the warlike cabinet. . . . The actions of these men will call for a terrible retribution." (*retrans.*)

choosing Belgium as a base for her warlike operations, and in case of resistance, in making war upon the land itself.

This point is thoroughly understood and discussed by the famous thinker and playwright, George Bernard Shaw, in a letter written to the London "Nation" some time in February, 1915. Germany, said Mr. Shaw, in effect did not violate the neutrality of Belgium. What she did was something quite different. *She declared war upon her*, after having made her a perfectly justifiable offer, which she refused. In this brilliant letter, Mr. Shaw likewise annihilates with unerring aim several of the favorite misconceptions and prejudices of the English.

The German Government finally did everything in its power, even after these forcible but justifiable acts, to guarantee the integrity of Belgium's sovereignty and territory and to restore these as soon as the "state of necessity" had been done away with.

Even though yielding to "force majeure," had Belgium adopted the same attitude as that of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, it would have been spared the terrors of a modern war, and it would have had to complain as little of serious damage or alleged further violations of international law, as Luxemburg. This is proved by Germany's strict observance of Holland's neutrality. But as Belgium, fully aware of the international obligations it had disregarded, made one-sided and treacherous preparations in favor of the Triple Entente, it must bear all consequences of its foolish and unlawful attitude. In accordance with the desire of England, it had made itself, in the language of Lord Burleigh in the "Morning Post," "a counterscarp for Your Majesty's kingdom," and must therefore be treated as an English bridge-head.

The Revelations of the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 12th of October:

The explanations above found an almost classic confirmation in their entirety in the revelations of the German Government as to the preliminaries of the Alliance between Belgium, France and England, published in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 12th of October. They read, literally:

"Through Sir Edward Grey's own declarations, the statement of the English Government that the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany induced the participation of England in the present war is proved absolutely untenable. The pathetic moralistic indignation over the German invasion of Belgium, which was used by the English for the purpose of arousing sentiment against Germany in neutral lands, is given a new and peculiar illumination by certain documents which the German army authorities have discovered in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in Brussels.

It is proved by the contents of a portfolio which bears the inscription: "*Intervention anglaise en Belgique*," that as early as the year 1906, the despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium had been decided upon in case of a German-French war. According to a letter written to the Belgian Minister of War, bearing the date of April 10th, 1906, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, upon the repeated solicitation of the English Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston, in the course of frequent consultations worked out a plan regarding the common operations of an English expeditionary corps of 100 000 men in conjunction with the Belgian Army against Germany. The plan was approved by the Chief of the English General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Staff was given all information as to the strength and disposition of the English troop divisions, as well as the composition of the expeditionary corps, the points of disembarkation, an exact estimate of the time required for transportation, and the like.

On the basis of this information, the Belgian General Staff had prepared for the transport of the English troops into Belgian territory, as well as for their shelter and sustenance. This co-operation had been carefully worked out to the smallest details. For instance, a large number of interpreters and Belgian *gendarmes* were to be placed at the disposition of the English army, for which purpose the requisite cards were to be delivered. Even provision for the care of English wounded had already been thought of.

Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were intended as ports of disembarkation for the English troops. Thence they were to

be transported by Belgian railways to their destination. This intentional disembarkation in French harbors and the transport through French territory proves that the Anglo-Belgian agreements had been preceded by similar ones made with the French General Staff. The three powers had thoroughly prepared the plans for the co-operation of the "allied armies," as they are called in the document. This is further confirmed by the discovery among the secret archives of a map showing the French line of march.

The document in question contains several observations of a special interest. In one passage the fact is mentioned that Lieutenant Major Barnardiston had noticed that at that time one could not count upon the support of Holland. He had further confidentially communicated the fact that the English Government had the intention of removing the base for the English supplies to Antwerp, as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. Further, the English military attaché advised the establishment of a service of Belgian spies in the Rhine province.

The military material thus discovered is completed in a most significant manner by a report which was also found among the secret papers. This is the report of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindl, who had seen long years of service there and is addressed to the Belgian Foreign Minister. With great acuteness, Baron Greindl analyses the English offers, and reveals the hidden intention behind them. The Minister utters a most solemn warning as to the serious position in which Belgium would find herself were she to adopt a one-sided attitude in favor of the powers of the Entente.

In this very thorough-going report, which is dated the 23rd of December, 1911, and the complete publication of which has for the present been withheld, Baron Greindl declares that the plans of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian neutrality in a Franco-German war, as communicated to him, occupied themselves solely with the question as to what military measures were to be taken in case Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium nevertheless had just as much probability. The Minister then proceeds, literally, as follows:

"From the French side, the danger threatens not only to the south of Luxemburg. It threatens us along our whole common front. We are not reduced to mere assumptions for making this declaration. We have the most positive basis of proof.

The idea of an encircling movement from the north is, without doubt, a part of the combinations or arrangements of the Entente Cordiale. If this were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such howls in Paris and London. No one there thought of concealing the reasons for wishing to keep the Scheldt in an unfortified state. Behind this lay the purpose of being enabled without hindrance to transport an English garrison to Antwerp, and therefore the purpose of establishing a base of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine, and thus sweeping us along in the current, which would not, I think, have been difficult. Because, after the surrender of our national city of refuge, we would, through our own fault, have deprived ourselves of every possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors, after we had been so unwise as to permit them to enter.

The perfidious yet naïf overtures of Major Barnardiston at the time the Entente Cordiale was concluded, have given us a plain indication of what was in the wind. After it had been proved that we were not to be frightened by the alleged danger that threatened us through the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not given up but merely altered. The English auxiliary army was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French sea-ports. This is also proved by the revelations of Captain Faber, against which no *dementi* has been issued, any more than against the reports of the newspapers which stated and in various points supplemented them.

The English army which was to land in Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our borders towards Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately penetrate our country from the north-west. It would thus secure the advantage of being able to enter into action at once, and to meet the Belgian army in a region in which we would not be supported by a fortress, if we should wish to risk a battle. It would also render

it possible for this army to occupy provinces which are rich in all kinds of natural resources, and in all cases to hinder our mobilization, or to permit it only after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry out this mobilization only for the advantage of England and its allies.

It is urgently necessary to draw up a battle-plan for the Belgian army which also has regard to this eventuality. This is rendered necessary, not only by the interests of our military defence, but also through the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of war between Germany and France."

These expositions on the part of one who was without prejudice, establish in the most convincing manner the fact that the self-same England which now poses as the champion of Belgian neutrality, had determined to make Belgium adopt a one-sided partisanship in favor of the Entente Powers, and that, at one stage of the game, it had even considered the violation of the neutrality of Holland. From this we see further that the Belgian Government, by listening to the whisperings of the English Government, rendered itself guilty of a serious breach of the duties which appertain to it as a neutral power. The fulfilment of these duties would have necessitated that the Belgian Government in its plans of defence should also have foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and that it should have taken measures in agreement with Germany for this event as it had already done with France and England.

The documents that have been discovered form written proofs of a fact which had been well-known in authoritative German circles long before the outbreak of the war, regarding the Belgian connivance with the powers of the Entente. They serve as a justification for our military procedure, and as a confirmation of the reports which had been made to the German army authorities regarding the intentions of the French. They may also serve to open the eyes of the Belgian people as to whom they may thank for the catastrophe which has now overtaken their unhappy land.

Unfortunately the warnings of Baron Greindl were of no avail. The young king was entirely in the hands of the Triple Alliance—and thus his fate and that of Belgium was sealed.

And what was the answer of England to these revelations