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Nietzsche as Political Philosopher

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Contents

Abbreviations — ix

Manuel Knoll and Barry Stocker

Introduction: Nietzsche as political philosopher — 1

I. The Variety of Approaches to Nietzsche's Political Thought

Rolf Zimmermann

The "Will to Power": Towards a Nietzschean Systematics of Moral-Political Divergence in History in Light of the 20th Century — 39

Rebecca Bamford

The Liberatory Limits of Nietzsche's Colonial Imagination in *Dawn* 206 — 59

Nandita Biswas Mellamphy

Nietzsche's Political Materialism: Diagram for a Nietzschean Politics — 77

II. Democratic, or Liberal, or Egalitarian Politics in Nietzsche

Paul Patton

Nietzsche on Power and Democracy circa 1876–1881 — 93

Lawrence J. Hatab

Nietzsche's Will to Power and Politics — 113

Barry Stocker

A Comparison of Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm von Humboldt as Products of Classical Liberalism — 135

Donovan Miyasaki

A Nietzschean Case for Illiberal Egalitarianism — 155

III. Aristocratic, or Anti-Liberal, or Non-Egalitarian Politics in Nietzsche

Renato Cristi

Nietzsche, Theognis and Aristocratic Radicalism — 173

Don Dombowsky

Aristocratic Radicalism as a Species of Bonapartism: Preliminary Elements — 195

Phillip H. Roth

Political and Psychological Prerequisites for Legislation in the Early Nietzsche — 211

Manuel Knoll

The “Übermensch” as a Social and Political Task: A Study in the Continuity of Nietzsche’s Political Thought — 239

IV. Ethics, Morality, and Politics in Nietzsche

Keith Ansell-Pearson

Care of Self in *Dawn*: On Nietzsche’s Resistance to Bio-political Modernity — 269

Daniel Conway

“We who are different, we immoralists...” — 287

Christian J. Emden

Political Realism Naturalized: Nietzsche on the State, Morality, and Human Nature — 313

Tamsin Shaw

The “Last Man” Problem: Nietzsche and Weber on Political Attitudes to Suffering — 345

V. Physiology, Genealogy, and Politics in Nietzsche

Razvan Ioan

The Politics of Physiology — 383

Tom Angier

On the Genealogy of Nietzsche's Values — 405

Evangelia Sembou

Foucault's use of Nietzsche — 431

Notes on Contributors — 449

Name Index — 455

Subject Index — 465

Abbreviations

Primary sources from Nietzsche are cited in the main text by abbreviation according to the standard conventions listed here. Nietzsche's works are typically cited by section number and, in the cases of EH, GM, and TI, an additional reference to the chapter title or essay number (see below). References to Z include the part number and chapter title (often abbreviated), e.g., Z I Reading. Prefaces of works are referenced by a "Preface" after the abbreviated title, e.g., TI Preface. All passages from Nietzsche's *Nachlass* are cited from KSA or KGW, starting with the abbreviation NL, followed by KSA/KGW, the volume number, the manuscript number, and then fragment number in brackets, e.g., NL, KSA 7, 5[103]. In some cases the page number of KSA was added. Nietzsche's letters are cited according to volume and letter number as they appear in KGB, e.g., KGB III/1, Bf. 213.

The English translations of Nietzsche's works used in the articles are listed in the respective bibliographies.

A	The Antichrist
AOM	Assorted Opinions and Maxims
BAW	Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke (5 vols., edited by Joachim Mette)
BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
BT	The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music [BT Attempt]
CW	The Case of Wagner
D	Daybreak
DS	David Strauss, the Writer and the Confessor
DW	The Dionysian Worldview
EH	Ecce Homo [EH Wise, EH Clever, EH Books, EH Destiny]
FEI	On the Future of Our Educational Institutions
GM	On the Genealogy of Morals (Cited by essay number followed by section number)
GS	The Gay Science
GSt	The Greek State
HC	Homer's Contest
HH I	Human All Too Human I
HL	On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life
KGB	Nietzsches Briefwechsel: Kritische Gesamtausgabe
KGW	Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe
KSA	Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe
NCW	Nietzsche contra Wagner
NL	Drafts, Fragments, and Sketches from the <i>Nachlass</i>
PPP	The Pre-Platonic Philosophers
PT	On the Pathos of Truth
PTAG	Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks

SE	Schopenhauer as Educator
TI	Twilight of the Idols [TI Arrows, TI Socrates, TI Reason, TI Fable, TI Morality, TI Errors, TI Improving, TI Germans, TI Skirmishes, TI Ancients, TI Hammer]
TL	On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense
TM	De Teognide Megarensi (= BAW 3, pp. 21–64)
WB	Richard Wagner in Bayreuth
WP	The Will to Power
WPH	We Philologists
WS	The Wanderer and His Shadow
Z	Thus Spoke Zarathustra

[Z I Adder, Z I Flies, Z I Goals, Z I Hinterworldly, Z I Idol, Z I Metamorphoses, Z I Prologue, Z I Teachers, Z I Virtue, Z I War, Z I Women, Z II Human Prudence, Z II Isles, Z II Priests, Z II On Self-Overcoming, Z II Redemption, Z II Scholars, Z II Tarantulas, Z III Convalescent, Z III Riddle, Z III Tablets, Z III Gravity, Z IV Beggar, Z IV Cry of Distress, Z IV Men]

Manuel Knoll and Barry Stocker

Introduction: Nietzsche as political philosopher

1 The scholarly debate about Nietzsche's political preferences and affinities

In the last decades the interest in Nietzsche's philosophy has become a truly global phenomenon. This has led to a huge amount of literature and different interpretations. In 2003, a German scholar even published a book on the different receptions and discussions of Nietzsche's thought in France, Italy, and the Anglo-Saxon world between 1960 and 2000 (Reckermann 2003). Until now, the interest in Nietzsche's philosophy has not decreased. On the contrary, scholars keep discovering new areas of his work worth examining. In 2012, an edited volume was published on Nietzsche's philosophy of science with contributions from numerous international Nietzsche-scholars (Heit/Abel/Brusotti 2012).

In the Anglo-Saxon world, it was in particular the achievement of Walter Kaufmann's and Arthur Danto's books that Nietzsche received the attention and recognition as a philosopher he is still enjoying today (Kaufmann 1950, Danto 1965). Kaufmann rehabilitated Nietzsche from his usurpation by the Nazis and the Fascists, and from the distorted interpretation he had undergone with the aid of the Nietzsche-archive and his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. However, Kaufmann's interpretation depoliticized Nietzsche's thought, which led to the assumption "that Nietzsche was not a political thinker at all, but someone who was mainly concerned with the fate of the solitary, isolated individual far removed from the cares and concerns of the social world" (Ansell-Pearson 1994, p. 1).

This view prevailed in Anglo-Saxon studies for several decades. It was mainly Tracy Strong's book *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, published in 1975, which opened the way for several monographs on Nietzsche's political philosophy (Strong 2000).¹ However, again in 1994 Keith Ansell-Pearson remarked in his *Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*: "Inquiry into the political dimension of Nietzsche's thought still remains the most contentious and controversial aspect of Nietzsche-studies" (Ansell-Pear-

¹ For an overview and summary of the content of the publications between 1960 and 2000 see Reckermann 2003.

son 1994, p. 2; cf. Ansell-Pearson 1991). In the meantime in Germany, one of the main centers of research on Nietzsche, Henning Ottmann's voluminous "Habilitationsschrift" on *Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche* had appeared in 1987. Like Ansell-Pearson's book, Ottmann's study concludes that Nietzsche is clearly a political thinker (Ottmann 1999; Ansell-Pearson 1994, p. 1).² This is also the argument of Daniel Conway's book *Nietzsche & the Political* from 1997, in which he took Nietzsche seriously as a political thinker (Conway 1997). According to Conway, Nietzsche's "commitment to the position known as *perfectionism*" is at the center of his political thinking: Nietzsche "locates the sole justification of human existence in the continued perfectibility of the species as a whole, as evidenced by the pioneering accomplishments of its highest exemplars" (Conway 1997, pp. 6f.; cf. Siemens 2008, p. 235).

One might think that after the publication of these three important monographs, among others, the issue of Nietzsche's relation to politics was settled. On the contrary, not only has this issue remained a topic for heated debates, but new disputes concerning Nietzsche and political thought arose. In 1998, Thomas Brobjer argued for *The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche's Writings* (Brobjer 1998). Along the same lines, Brobjer claimed in 2008 that Nietzsche was "not interested in or concerned with politics", or that he was an "a-, supra- and anti-political thinker" (Brobjer 2008, p. 205). Brobjer's text from 1998 received a critical reply from Don Dombowsky, in which he put forward several arguments against Brobjer's interpretation (Dombowsky 2001, cf. Brobjer's response 2001).

In 2002, Brian Leiter maintained that Nietzsche "has no political philosophy, in the conventional sense of a theory of the state and its legitimacy. He occasionally expresses views about political matters, but, read in context, they do not add up to a theoretical account of any of the questions of political philosophy" (Leiter 2002, p. 296). In line with Leiter, Tamsin Shaw claimed in her book on *Nietzsche's Political Scepticism* that Nietzsche "fails to articulate any positive, normative political theory" (Shaw 2007, p. 2).³ For Shaw, Nietzsche

2 Ottmann 1999, p. vii: "Vielleicht darf man auch in Zukunft zweifeln, ob Nietzsche zu den 'Klassikern' der Politik gerechnet werden wird. Nicht zweifeln darf man an der politischen Wirkung seiner Gedanken, und nicht zweifeln sollte man am politischen Gehalt des Werkes selbst. Es gibt bei Nietzsche eine politische Philosophie. Man darf sie nur nicht suchen wollen auf der Heerstraße der politischen Strömungen der Zeit".

3 According to Shaw, it is a "fact" that Nietzsche abstains from developing his insights into morality, culture, and religion "into a coherent theory of politics" (Shaw 2007, p. 1). Similarly, already Bernard Williams had claimed that Nietzsche "did not move to any view that offered a coherent politics" (Williams 1993, p. 10). The politics Williams has in mind and asks for is a politics "in the sense of a coherent set of opinions about the way in which power should

“articulates a deep political skepticism that can be best described as a skepticism about legitimacy” (Shaw 2007, p. 2). As a consequence of the process of secularization, modern pluralist societies cannot reach a consensus on values and normative beliefs, which makes “a form of politics that is genuinely grounded in normative authority” impossible (Shaw 2007, p. 3). Therefore, the political authority we need cannot be based on a consensus and a normative authority. However, for their stability modern states require some shared values and normative beliefs. Hence, they have to produce the consensus through coercive means and ideological control. This dilemma is the basis for Nietzsche’s skepticism about legitimacy.

In 2008 the voluminous edition *Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought* was published (Siemens/Roodt 2008). In this volume several authors claim that Nietzsche is a “suprapolitical” (*überpolitisch*) thinker. These interpretations gave rise to questions regarding the content and extent of the traditional concept of politics. According to the editors of this volume,

it is no exaggeration to say that Nietzsche’s significance for political thought has become the single, most hotly contested area of Anglophone Nietzsche research: Is Nietzsche a political thinker at all – or an anti-political philosopher of values and culture? Is he an aristocratic political thinker who damns democracy as an expression of the herd mentality – or can his thought, especially his thought on the Greek *agon*, be fruitfully appropriated for contemporary democratic theory? (Siemens/Roodt 2008, p. 1)

In the Anglo-Saxon world, the controversial issue of Nietzsche’s political preferences and affinities has been debated since the late 1980s. Already Tracy Strong had attempted a “left-wing” reading of Nietzsche in his book, and reflected on a political stance that could be based on Nietzsche, though avoiding the aristocratic elements of his thought (Strong 1975). Contrary to such an understanding, a continued reading among scholars of various countries interprets Nietzsche as an aristocratic political thinker, and characterize his politics with the term “aristocratic radicalism”, which Georg Brandes created for Nietzsche’s position in 1887 and which Nietzsche himself approved of in a letter to Brandes as “the shrewdest remark that I have read about myself till now” (Middleton 1996, p. 279). In his book *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, Bruce Detwiler announced:

While aristocratic conservatives and egalitarian radicals have been plentiful in recent times, it is difficult to think of another modern of Nietzsche’s stature whose political ori-

be exercised in modern societies, with what limitations and to what ends” (Williams 1993, pp. 10f.).

entation is both as aristocratic and as radical as his. Among modern philosophers Nietzsche stands virtually alone in his insistence that the goal of society should be the promotion and enhancement of the highest type even at the expense of what has traditionally been thought to be the good of all or of the great number. (Detwiler 1990, p. 189)

In his monograph of 1999, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*, Fredrick Appel argued that Nietzsche displays a “radically aristocratic commitment to human excellence”, and tried to show “how Nietzsche’s politics emerge out of his concern for the flourishing of the ‘higher’, ‘stronger’ type of human being” (Appel 1999, pp. 2, 13). Don Dombowsky associates Nietzsche’s political theory “with conservative or aristocratic liberalism (Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacob Burckhardt and Hippolyte Taine)”, and understands him as “a disciple of Machiavelli” (Dombowsky 2004, pp. 3, 5). Other aristocratic elements of Nietzsche’s political thought are his judgment that people are fundamentally unequal and have unequal value, and his aristocratic conception of distributive justice, which is based on this anthropological fundament, and which is embodied in Nietzsche’s early and late conceptions of a good social order (Knoll 2009a and Knoll 2010; cf. Appel 1999, p. 2).

Other scholars spotted in Nietzsche affinities to democratic, or liberal political views. In his book *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, Mark Warren understands Nietzsche as the “first thoroughgoing postmodern” in the sense that Nietzsche does not simply break “with modernist categories and ideas”, but that he “reconceives central ideals of modern rationalism”, and thus should be viewed as “critically postmodern” (Warren 1988, p. X). According to Warren’s argument, “Nietzsche did not give his own philosophy a plausible political identity. He failed to elaborate the broad range of political possibilities that are suggested by his philosophy in large part owing to unexamined assumptions about the nature of modern politics” (Warren 1988, p. 246). This judgment leads Warren at the end of his book to speculate about a way how “to supplement Nietzsche’s insights with a positive political vision” (Warren 1988, p. 246). William E. Connolly holds his perspective on Nietzsche to be “pertinent” to Warren’s study (Connolly 1988, p. 189). At the close of his book on *Political Theory and Modernity*, Connolly reflects on the need for a radical or “radicalized liberalism”, which he defines by enumerating several features: “Such a perspective would stand to Nietzsche as Marx stood to Hegel: in a relation of antagonistic indebtedness. It would appreciate the reach of Nietzschean thought as well as its sensitivity to the complex relations between resentment and the production of otherness, but it would turn the genealogist of resentment on his head by exploring democratic politics as a medium through which to expose resentment and to encourage the struggle against it” (Connolly 1988, p. 175).

Contrary to Warren and Connolly, David Owen and Lawrence J. Hatab argue that Nietzsche doesn't belong in the liberal tradition. According to "the central thesis" of Owens's book *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity*, "it is at the very least plausible to argue that Nietzsche's political thinking offers a significant critique of liberalism and articulates an alternative vision of politics which has much to give" (Hatab 1995, p. 169; cf. Owen 1994). Hatab stresses in his monograph *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy* that "we cannot hide or ignore Nietzsche's antidemocratic argument and its potent challenge to traditional political principles" (Hatab 1995, p. 2). However, he tries to show "that democracy is compatible with Nietzsche's thought, that democracy can be redescribed in a Nietzschean manner" as "an ungrounded, continual contest" (Hatab 1995, pp. 2, 4; italics by Hatab). For Hatab, we can find features of an "agonistic democracy"⁴ in Nietzsche's works. While these are essential for Hatab's understanding of democracy, for him democracy doesn't depend on "such problematic notions as the universal 'human nature', a 'common good' and especially 'human equality'" (Hatab 1995, p. 4). Hatab's study is more than simply an interpretation of Nietzsche, but a Nietzschean and postmodern approach to democracy, which he defends as the best political system.

Surprisingly, Frederick Appel doesn't include Hatab's book among the interpretations he mentions in *Nietzsche contra Democracy*. However, he puts forward several arguments against all "progressive" and "left-wing" readings of Nietzsche. One of his "central claims" is that Nietzsche's "radically aristocratic commitments pervade every aspect of his project, making any egalitarian appropriation of his work exceedingly problematic" (Appel 1999, p. 5). Why bother with adapting Nietzsche's political thought for democratic purposes "when there are so many other thinkers past and present with less dubious credentials who could provide ready inspiration?" (Appel 1999, p. 5). Like Appel, Don Dombowsky opposes and criticizes "efforts in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy to read Nietzsche as consonant with liberal democratic pluralism" (Dombowsky 2004, p. 2). To be sure, the controversy filled debate about Nietzsche's political preferences and affinities will continue. Many of the papers included in this volume are instructive contributions to this debate (cf. part 5 of this introduction).

⁴ The term "agonistic democracy" was first introduced by William Connolly (1991, p. X; cf. Hatab 1995, p. 263, fn. 1). Hatab acknowledges that much of Connolly's work "is a precedent for my efforts" (Hatab 1995, p. 263, fn. 1).

2 A brief overview of Nietzsche's political philosophy

Though not all scholars acknowledge this fact, Nietzsche's multi-faceted works undoubtedly contain a political philosophy. According to his aphoristic and anti-systematic style of thought and presentation, Nietzsche nowhere gives a comprehensive account of his political philosophy. The only exception is his early essay *The Greek State*, which was published posthumously as a part of a collection of five short essays entitled *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books* which Nietzsche offered to Cosima Wagner for Christmas 1872. This essay is an almost exact copy of a part of a long fragment Nietzsche had written for an early version of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which came out at the beginning of 1872 (NL, KSA 7, 10[1], pp. 333–349). *The Greek State* can be understood as a complementary work to *The Birth of Tragedy*, because in it Nietzsche reflects on the social and political bases of his theory of art and culture. The essay is a well elaborated text and most of its basic ideas are repeated in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Antichrist*.

Nietzsche understands his essay as an interpretation of Plato's perfect state, in whose general conception he recognizes the “marvelously grand hieroglyph of a profound secret teaching of the connection between state and genius, which is to be interpreted eternally” (GSt, KSA 1, p. 777). For Nietzsche, as opposed to some modern contractarians or contractualists, the origin of the state is not a contract, but a violent conquest and a sudden subjugation. Accordingly, he calls the “original founder of the state” the “military genius” and the “conqueror with the iron hand” (GSt, KSA 1, pp. 775, 770). The foundation of the state leads to the enslavement of the conquered people and to the abolition of “the natural bellum omnium contra omnes” (GSt, KSA 1, p. 772). In line with his early account of the origin of the state, he pronounces in *On the Genealogy of Morality*:

I used the word ‘state’: it is obvious who is meant by this – some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race, which, organized on a war footing, and with the power to organize, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace which, though it might be vastly greater in number, is still shapeless and shifting. In this way, the ‘state’ began on earth: I think I have dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a ‘contract’.
(GM II 17)

In the *The Greek State*, Nietzsche conceives of the state as a means of coercion in order to initiate the social process and to uphold it. In his view, this is the true meaning of the state. Through the “iron clamp of the state” the masses of people are squeezed together and are also well separated, which constitutes a

social structure that has the shape of a pyramid (GSt, KSA 1, p. 769). Analogously, war produces a separation of the estate of soldiers in military castes, which constitute a pyramidal order of rank. In the estate of soldiers, which for Nietzsche is “the image [*Abbild*], even perhaps the archetype of the state”, as well as in society, the lowest stratum is the broadest, while the top of the pyramid is constituted by one or a few men only. The fundamental goal of the “military proto-state” is the generation of the military genius (GSt, KSA 1, p. 775). The general purpose of every state is for Nietzsche the “Olympian existence and the constantly renewed generation and preparation of the genius” (GSt, KSA 1, p. 776). Nietzsche criticizes Plato for putting only “the genius of wisdom and knowledge” on top of his perfect state and for excluding the ingenious artist under the influence of Socrates. In opposition to Plato, Nietzsche proclaims that the purpose and meaning of the state is to generate the genius “in its most general sense” (GSt, KSA 1, pp. 775f.). For Nietzsche, the existence of a “small number of Olympian men”, who produce the high culture, presupposes slavery. According to his provocative and generalizing thesis, slavery belongs “to the essence of a culture” (GSt, KSA 1, p. 767). The estate of the slaves, the lowest stratum of the social pyramid, has to do the additional work, which is necessary in order to exempt the few ingenious producers of culture from the struggle of existence. With the term “slavery” Nietzsche not only means the slaves of the ancient world but the contemporary “anonymous and impersonal” “factory-slavery” (WS 288, cf. D 206).

The ultimate basis of Nietzsche’s early theory of the state is the “artists’ metaphysics” that he developed in *The Birth of Tragedy*, which was inspired by Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* (BT Attempt 5, cf. BT Attempt 7). According to this “artists’ metaphysics”, the last causes of the state are the Apollinian and Dionysian art impulses of nature, in which exists “an ardent longing for illusion, for redemption through illusion” (BT 4, KSA 1, p. 38). In order to achieve redemption through art, nature forges the “conqueror with the iron hand” as a tool for the establishment of the state. While the state is the means of nature to “bring society about”, society is its means to bring the genius and art about. The final goal of nature and its “omnipotent art impulses” is its “redemption through illusion”. Nietzsche talks about “how enormously necessary the state is, without which nature would not succeed in achieving, through society, her salvation in illusion [*Erlösung im Scheine*]” (BT 4, KSA 1, p. 38; cf. GSt, KSA 1, p. 767).

Though in his later works Nietzsche moves away from his early “artists’ metaphysics”, he takes up central thoughts of *The Greek State* in a slightly modified form. State and society must not be an end in itself, but have to be means for the goal of the “elevation of the type ‘man’” (BGE 257). In his later

works, Nietzsche speaks hardly any more of the generation of the genius, but rather of the production or breeding of a higher type of man or overman, which his Zarathustra is teaching together with the “eternal recurrence of the same”. The generation of a higher type of man is only possible in an aristocratic society, “which believes in a long ladder of order of rank and difference in worth between man and man and that needs slavery in some sense” (BGE 257). According to Nietzsche, a “good and healthy aristocracy” is not a “function” of the commonwealth, but its “meaning and supreme justification” (BGE 258). Its “fundamental faith” has to be that the whole society and thus the masses of common people serve as an “instrument” and “substructure and scaffolding”, which allows “a selected kind of being to raise itself to its higher task and generally to a higher existence” (BGE 258).

For Nietzsche, a true aristocracy is not concerned with descent or ancestry. The honor of the “new nobility” that he is aspiring to doesn’t originate from where its members are coming from, but from where they are going (Z III Tablets 11 and 12). As an elite of higher men the “new nobility” should distinguish itself from the masses by affirmation of life, strength, health, self-mastery, spirit and free spirit, creative power, magnanimity, and courage. One of the main tasks of the “new nobility” is to counteract “nihilism”, which is for Nietzsche a necessary development and consequence of occidental values. In its essence “nihilism” means the process that “the highest values devalue themselves” (NL 1887, KSA 12, p. 350). The “new nobility” should counteract nihilism through the creation and positing of new values and a new morality that should be created by the philosophers of the future are an expression of their “will to power” (BGE 210–211, BGE 202–203). Nietzsche desires the “new nobility” to be a European and Europe ruling nobility which should pursue a “grand politics” of global creation, education and breeding of man in the tradition of Plato. This “grand politics” should replace the “petty politics” of the nation states and “the divided will of its dynasties and democracies” (BGE 208, 209–212).

In *The Anti-Christ* Nietzsche presents once more his vision of a good social and political order. He finds the model for this vision in the old Indian legal code of Manu.⁵ The good order of Manu is a hierarchical and pyramidal order of castes, which distinguishes between three castes in analogy to the natural inequality of men. This is why Nietzsche understands the “order of castes” as the “sanctioning of a natural order, a natural law of the first rank”: “Nature, not Manu, separates from one another the predominantly spiritual type, the predominantly muscular type and temperamental type, and a third type distin-

⁵ For Nietzsche’s source and reception of the legal code of Manu, and for the debate about whether it constitutes Nietzsche’s political ideal, see fn. 32 in Knoll’s essay in this volume.

guished neither in the one nor the other, the mediocre type – the last as the great majority, the first as the elite” (A 57). One of the tasks of the highest caste, which Nietzsche glorifies, is to rule the political community. Nietzsche conceives of the second caste in rank as the “noble warriors”, and as “the executive of the most spiritual order” (A 57). The members of the lowest caste, the caste of the “mediocre”, have to specialize and to do the work which is necessary for the sustenance of the whole society (A 57). According to Nietzsche’s interpretation, Manu’s good social order is very similar to the good and just city that Plato outlines in the *Politeia*, which is also based on the fundamental inequality of men. In the end, as in his early works, Nietzsche identifies the goal of society and state as the creation of grand individuals and a high culture:

The order of castes, order of rank, only formulates the supreme law of life itself; the separation of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible higher and highest types, – inequality of rights is the condition for the existence of rights at all. – A right is a privilege [*Vorrecht*]. The privilege of each is determined by his sort of being (*Art Sein*). [...] Injustice never lies in unequal rights, it lies in the claim to ‘equal’ rights. (A 57)

The last statement demonstrates that Nietzsche rejects the liberal and socialist thought on equality of his epoch as well as democracy as a political system. He derives the political “poison of the doctrine ‘equal rights for all’” from Christian value judgments, and in particular from the “lie of equality of souls”, by which the “aristocratic basic convictions [*Aristokratismus der Gesinnung*] have been undermined most deeply” (A 43). The “democratic movement”, which “inherits the Christian”, is, for Nietzsche, “not merely a form assumed by political organizations in decay but also a form assumed by man in decay, that is to say in diminishment, in process of becoming mediocre and losing his value” (BGE 202–203). Nietzsche holds the “democratization of Europe to be “unstoppable [*unaufhaltsam*]” (WS 275).

Already in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche states his prognostic conviction, that “modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the state” (HH I 472). Contrary to “absolute tutelary government”, democratic government cannot counteract the decay of religion, which is caused by Enlightenment. If the “belief in a divine order of political matters” fades away, and if the state thus loses its religious foundations, in the long run the “attitude of veneration and piety towards it” will be shattered. Another “consequence of the democratic conception of the state” is “the liberation of the private person”, who regards the secular state only under considerations of utility, which, connected with a too rapid changing of competing men and parties, with the

“distrust towards everything that rules”, and with the empowerment of private societies and private enterprises, leads to the decay and death of the state. However, Nietzsche is not troubled by this outlook. The fact that “prudence and self-interest of men” are highly developed, prevents chaos from ensuing, rather, “an invention more suited to their purpose than the state was, will gain victory over the state” (HH I 472).

Human, All Too Human is the first book of Nietzsche’s middle period, in which his thought is oriented more towards the positive sciences and Enlightenment, and in which he is less radical and more willing to compromise. In this period, which ends with *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche not only criticizes democracy, but reflects on it in a subtle and nuanced way (WS). He even publishes thoughts that are close to liberalism, which he usually rejects to a great extent. For example, Nietzsche states that “the” individual is the “original purpose of the state”, which he defines as “a prudent institution for the protection of the individuals against each other” (HH I 235). Against socialism, which, similarly to despotism, “desires an abundance of state power”, he phrases the motto: “As little state as possible” (HH I 473). Nietzsche’s thoughts on liberalism and democracy from his middle period are hardly compatible with the non-egalitarian and aristocratic political views of his early and late writings. Maybe the most likely explanation for this incompatibility is that Nietzsche’s views shifted over the course of his life. In regard of the close similarities of Nietzsche’s early and late political views, however, such an interpretation implies that Nietzsche moved away from his early political preferences in the late 1870s and then back to them in the later 1880s.

In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche criticizes the state as the “new idol”. The various aspects of this critique are difficult to interpret. After “the death of God”, after “the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable”, the State occupies the empty place which was held before by God (GS 343). The consequence is an esteem and veneration of the State which Nietzsche holds to be unjustifiable. He designates the State as a cold and compulsively lying monster, which tries to lure men to render him services. However, the state does not deserve people serving him and make him the purpose of their lives. According to Nietzsche, also wealth, power, and the satisfaction of manifold desires, the aims of life in a state, are not worth striving for. As an alternative, he advises leading a free life far from the state. While he usually conceives of the state as a means for a higher type of human being, he states in *Zarathustra* that “where the state ceases” the “rainbow and bridges to the Overman” are to be seen (Z I Idol).

For the liberal and democratic political thought that prevails today, Nietzsche’s “aristocratic radicalism” might appear at best as an anti-modern provo-

cation or as a reactionary utopia. To be sure, Nietzsche's radical non-egalitarianism is in central aspects incompatible with contemporary, mostly egalitarian, political philosophy. However, his view that the state has to serve culture and should be regarded as a means for the generation of outstanding individuals is not without interest for today's politics. Nietzsche's views prompt the questions of whether modern democracies are spending enough money to promote culture and whether the promotion of culture shouldn't be stipulated as one important purpose of a state. Likewise, one could ask, going back to Nietzsche, whether modern states shouldn't contribute more to promote elites, and through which qualities these elites should be singled out. Of remaining actuality is Nietzsche's critique of Europe's "petty politics" of nation states and of nationalism, which he holds to be "the most anti-cultural sickness and unreason there is" (EH CW 2).

3 Nietzsche's Relation to some of the Political Ideas of his Time

Nietzsche did not write a treatise of political philosophy and he dismissed the political ideologies of his time, particularly liberalism (HH I 304), socialism (HH I 473), and nationalism (HH I 475). He condemned the modern drive to egalitarianism, but did not support any concrete program of political reaction, that is for the restoration of the aristocratic-monarchical world as it existed before modern egalitarianism. His thought was largely directed against the religious beliefs which political reaction placed at the centre. His criticisms of slaves (GM I), or any kind of lower class, were also criticisms of the religious beliefs that the priests, a category of masters, encouraged the slaves to follow (GM I 6). One problem Nietzsche faced, in any desire he might have had for a reactionary political process, was that – as will be argued in this section – it would be likely to lead him into the world of modern egalitarianism, at least in the sense of equality of individual rights.

This section does not attempt a comprehensive survey of the political doctrines and thinkers of Nietzsche's time who had some influence on him, as that would be an entire monograph in itself. Such work would need to cover the historical-sociological and political thought of Hyppolite Taine, the liberal social Darwinian Herbert Spencer (whose Darwinism expressed itself with regard to selection of social structures not racial selection), the more racist social Darwinians such as Ernst Haeckel, the political thought (including anti-Semitism)

of Richard Wagner, the political aspects of Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy and so on.

Nietzsche admired Napoleon (HH I 164, TI Skirmishes 44), and may have sympathised with French Bonapartists of his time (Dombowsky 2008, Dombowsky's essay in this volume), but Napoleon started off as a Jacobin, and always claimed to carry on the values of the French revolution, which he achieved by spreading the Civil Code throughout the nations he conquered. Dombowsky's essay in this volume acknowledges the connection between Napoleon and the Civil Code, but claims its egalitarian liberal aspects were undermined by Napoleon's demand for the final role in interpreting its laws. However, the supremacy of the sovereign over judges in interpreting law is a constant of the civil law tradition going back to its origins in Roman law, and carrying on through the democratic era. In the democratic era, sovereignty belongs to the national assembly rather than the monarch, but structurally this is the same and makes no difference to the citizen facing the state law courts. Though Napoleon was taken as an enemy by the leading French liberals, he was also the enemy of the conservative aristocracies and monarchies of Europe; and in the Hundred Days following his escape from Elba, he worked with Benjamin Constant on a more liberal version of Bonapartism. His nephew Napoleon III undermined republicanism and liberal democracy, but kept many of the forms, and favoured social welfare reforms. His career ended in ignominy when Bismarck tricked him into starting the Franco-Prussian War.

Nietzsche's other obvious hero, and representative of an old aristocratic Europe was Goethe (TI Skirmishes 49–51), but again we find that the nearest thing Nietzsche could find to an anti-liberal hero was entangled in liberalism in his own time, and through his later influence on liberal thinking. Goethe stood for an old Germany of a mosaic of small and large states with all different kinds of traditional governments and laws, under the loose sovereignty of the Habsburg Emperors in Vienna. These emperors exercised direct sovereignty mostly in their personal lands partly without and partly within the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the strange and archaic sounding name for this peculiar system of multiplied traditional laws and political forms. Goethe himself was the chief minister of the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar. So we can see Goethe as the great representative of a pre-democratic, pre-liberal and pre-egalitarian Europe, because of his political role in an absolutist princely state and the links he makes between freedom and heroes of the medieval world in his literary output. Is that the sum of his influence? A glance at Ludwig von Mises' brief book of 1927, *Liberalism*, intended to revive the liberalism of the classical liberals, shows that Goethe appears with Schiller in the aesthetic aspects of liberalism, in an appreciation of the great individual, and so of the greatness

of the inner individual, and of all individuals in general. Mises notes Goethe's positive attitude towards commercial life including a rather un-Nietzschean enthusiasm for double-entry book keeping (Mises 1985, p. 97). In Mises' view: "Liberal thinking permeates German classical poetry, above all the works of Goethe and Schiller" (Mises 1985, p. 196). We might take Goethe backwards into the pre-egalitarian world, but he was taken up in the egalitarian world, and he was part of its emergence.

The very idealisation of the medieval world in Goethe, Schiller and other German writers of the Enlightenment and Romantic eras as one of heroic individuality and the pluralism of states, itself undermined the customary nature of that world, and the sense of belonging to a hereditary order rather than possessing a self-founding individual excellence. Nietzsche's own thought is formed by awareness of that transition, which he projects back into Ancient Athens in *The Birth of Tragedy*. In Nietzsche's account, the bourgeois world is already emerging in Euripides and is very apparent in Menander (BT 11). The Platonic dialogue is the route to the novel (BT 14), where the insights of tragedy have disappeared under tendencies to naturalism and logical schematism.

Looking at other anti-egalitarian heroes in Nietzsche, we find Julius Caesar (TI Skirmishes 38), whose power was based on a kind of democratic dictatorship, which sounds peculiar writing now when democracy is so associated with liberalism and separation of powers. However, it used to be widely thought that there was a complicity between the power of the democratic mob and the absolute ruler who ignores the restraining power of the aristocracy, laws and ancient offices, as when Caesar subordinated the Senate and other republican institutions to his will. There was an element of democratic revolution in Caesar's rise to power, and the institutionalisation of his power by Augustus, at least in the sense that the will of the Roman poor was given more weight than in the republican system compared with the senatorial class. Some of Nietzsche's remarks about aristocracy and the virtues of Rome might lead us to think that he admired the aristocratic power of the republican period, but even if we do accept this then we have a model for Nietzsche in the Roman Republic, which was the model for both the French and American Revolutions.

Nietzsche quotes Charles the Bold of Burgundy, referring to his enemy Louis XI of France as the universal spider, in the context of the hubris of self-examination (GM III 9). The universal spider with which Nietzsche contended in politics was not a king, but was democracy, in the sense of equality and of political participation, which he could not resist and which he contributed to in resisting. If this sounds like a strange claim, let us look at some of the words of the great prophet of democracy, of its virtues and its vices, Alexis de Tocqueville, in the Introduction to the first volume of *Democracy in America*.

Once the work of the mind had become a source of power and wealth, every addition to knowledge, every fresh discovery, and every new idea became a germ of power within reach of the people. Poetry, eloquence, memory, the graces of the mind, the fires of the imagination and profundity of thought, all things scattered broadcast by heaven, were a profit to democracy, and even when it was adversaries of democracy who possessed these things, they still served its cause by throwing into relief the natural greatness of man. Thus its conquests spread along with those of civilisation and enlightenment, and literature was an arsenal from which all, including the weak and poor, daily chose their weapons. Running through the pages of our history, there is hardly an important event in the last seven hundred years which has not turned out to be advantageous for equality. The Crusades and the English wars decimated the nobles and divided up their lands. Municipal institutions introduced democratic liberty into the heart of the feudal monarchy; the invention of firearms made villein and noble proud on the field of battle; printing offered equal resources to their minds; the post brought enlightenment to hovel and palace alike; Protestantism maintained that all men are equally able to find the path to heaven. America, once discovered, opened a thousand new roads to fortune and gave any obscure adventurer the chance of wealth and power. If, beginning at the eleventh century, one takes stock of what was happening in France at fifty-year intervals, one finds that each time a double revolution has taken place in the state of society. The noble has gone down in the social scale, and the commoner gone up; as the one falls, the other rises. Each half century brings them closer, and soon they will touch. And that is not something peculiar to France. Wherever one looks one finds the same revolution taking place throughout the Christian world. Everywhere the diverse happenings in the lives of peoples have turned to democracy's profit; all men's efforts have aided it, both those who intended this and those who had no such intention, those who fought for democracy and those who were the declared enemies thereof; all have been driven pell-mell along the same road, and all have worked together, some against their will and some unconsciously, blind instruments in the hands of God. (Tocqueville 1988, pp. 11f.)

Nietzsche himself fits well into much of what Tocqueville discusses. Nietzsche's own claims to represent an aristocratic point of view, this son of a provincial pastor, is an effect of the coming together of noble and commoner status to which Tocqueville refers. The works of written imagination referred to by Tocqueville celebrate aristocracy in the first place, but then as he says are taken to cover the natural greatness of man, a greatness that can be inside anyone. Nietzsche's father was a Lutheran pastor, and as Tocqueville says it is Protestantism that spread the idea that all humans are equal in finding a way to salvation.

Nietzsche felt special because of a legend that his family was of aristocratic Polish origins (Frenzel 1966, p. 10), but there is no independent confirmation, and the whole idea is really a fantasy belonging to an age in which the commoner-noble status distinction is questioned. Thomas Hardy's novel of 1891, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, refers in its title to a rural lower class family which decides that it should replace its plebeian name of Durbeyfield with d'Urberville like a local aristocratic family, because of a rumoured Norman aristocratic

ancestry deep in the Middle Ages. The comical self-elevation to the aristocracy is followed up by the trauma of Tess' rape by the son of a family which had purchased the d'Urberville name, as part of its own self-elevation from merchant class to aristocracy. Hardy was both a very philosophical novelist, and a great social observer amongst writers, and does capture with some wit and some pathos the reality of the lower and middle class wish to approach aristocratic status in the nineteenth century. Hardy himself was a reader of Nietzsche. Though there seem to be positive echoes of Nietzsche's philosophy in Hardy's literature, his direct remarks on Nietzsche's thoughts were mostly critical, and he was one of those who thought Nietzsche to blame for Prussian-German militarism and nationalism (Williamson 1978). There is no reason to believe he was aware of Nietzsche's own tendency to assume aristocratic antecedents, but he would probably have been amused to find he had accidentally satirised them in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*.

Following Tocqueville's classic account, Nietzsche's own criticisms of democracy add to the growth of democracy, as his own poetic exploration of inner individuality is itself serving the democratic ideal of the individual. As Tocqueville argues in *Democracy in America*, democracy both brings about a respect for the rights of the individual and a self-centred individualism which threatens the moral coherence of the democratic society. In some respects, Nietzsche's exploration of immoralism and self-determining individuality is an example of that dangerous individualism, though it has a concern with the cultivation of the self and self-mastery, distinct from the vulgarity that Tocqueville associates with democratic individualism.

The aristocratic feudal world of the Middle Ages itself creates the conditions for democracy through the growth of cities with political institutions of self-government, wars which undermine the nobility, a church which promotes spiritual equality and provides a career path for poor but clever children. The culture of that world, including the spread of imaginative literature, spills over into all parts of society, so that those who are below the aristocracy become part of the world of literary culture, which itself tends to cultivate empathy and egalitarian individualism, even if it does begin with the adventures of knights. It is in this context that we should think of Nietzsche's enthusiasm for Goethe, the poet and thinker who stood between feudalism and liberalism, that is between admiration for the heroism of some medieval knightly figures, and the more bourgeois liberties of the modern world. Nietzsche himself notes the growth of empathy, of concern for the welfare and sensitivities of others, for example with what he suggests is a changing attitude to the sufferings of Don Quixote in Cervantes' novel (GM II 6). The main topic of *On the Genealogy of Morality II* is of how morality and legal codes are descended from customs and

codes requiring punishments of extreme physical cruelty, and it is surely hard not to see Nietzsche as repelled as well as fascinated by that cruelty itself, and in any case preferring the individual who rises above urges for cruelty which are the source of *ressentiment*.

Who does Nietzsche look to as his heroes in the era of growing democracy and equality? Is it a list of ultra-reactionary conservatives, or at least conservatives suspicious of democratic enthusiasm? In such a case we would expect an appreciation of Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre on the literary side, and an appreciation of Klemens von Metternich and Otto von Bismarck on the political leadership side. Burke and de Maistre are completely absent from Nietzsche's writings, as is Metternich. Only Bismarck gets any attention (D 167, GS 104), and that is of a negative kind, since Nietzsche does not support the German nationalist aspects of Bismarck's politics, or Bismarck's style of government. For Nietzsche, Bismarck was a symbol of vulgarity and opportunism. One monarch of Nietzsche's time gets some appreciation, and that is the briefly reigning Kaiser Friedrich III (EH Z 1), the one Hohenzollern Emperor who favoured the liberals at home and Anglophile policies abroad. The first edition of *Human, All Too Human* was dedicated to Voltaire, who Nietzsche finds to be an Olympian alternative to Rousseau (HH I 463), but who nevertheless was a popular hero of his time due to his defiance of monarchical absolutism. Mirabeau the Younger, a prominent figure on the moderate liberal side of politics in the early stages of the French Revolution, is mentioned with admiration (GM I 10). Another French revolutionary, the rather more resolutely republican Lazare Carnot, gets an admiring mention (D 167). Carnot survived into the Empire period as a senior figure in the state, but kept his distance from the Emperor system.

Looking beyond European writers, Nietzsche took a great interest in Ralph Waldo Emerson, the Transcendentalist who promotes a kind of individualism based on historical progress towards perfection, which had a strong influence on American literature (including Herman Melville and Nathaniel Hawthorne), educational ideas, and political thought, as well as philosophy (SE 8, TI Skirmishes 13; cf. Zavetta 2008, Conant 2001, Cavell 1990). Emerson was an inspiration to the Abolitionist movement in America, and strongly associated with a democratic form of veneration of the individual and the individual search for perfection, though he was not an enthusiast for democracy. The universalism of Emerson's thought made it influential on the shape of democratic thinking. His influence can be seen even now in "democratic perfectionism", a strain of liberal political philosophy in which liberalism is seen as connected with moral ideas of virtue and self-perfection, rather than value neutrality in morals. Melville's *Moby-Dick* takes a great deal of inspiration from Emerson with regard to

Transcendentalism and the idealisation of the common man seen as part of the process of self-perfection, alongside the darker visions Melville explores.

The literary and political ways of taking Emerson in a democratic direction parallel what happens when Nietzsche is taken up politically, in a way that goes beyond a focus, however scholarly, on his gestures towards a version of Platonic elitism. Those who have done the most work on Nietzsche's connections with twentieth century totalitarianism do not find that his thought was well understood by totalitarian leaders; and that while parts of Nietzsche's thought anticipate parts of totalitarian thought, much of it undercuts totalitarian ways of thinking (Golomb/Wistrich 2002).

4 Selected Influences of Nietzsche on Political Thought

Given the vast quantity of material on Nietzsche from the point of view of political thought, along with the huge amount of material by political and social thinkers to some degree influenced by Nietzsche, including controversies about how far and in what way these thinkers have been influenced by Nietzsche, this part tries to illuminate the general issues, by concentrating on a contrast. That is the contrast between the fragmented and tentative ways in which Nietzsche influenced later authoritarian conservative elitism in the form of "Traditionalism", and the more complete and systematic ways Nietzsche has influenced those who wish to be engaged with liberal and democratic thought, in order to deepen and extend it. For the former group, some traditionalist thinkers will be discussed briefly, while for the latter group three major Nietzschean French philosophers will be discussed in comparative detail.

The influence of Nietzsche on political theory has not been towards Platonic elitism or political autocracy on the whole, largely the influence has been the opposite direction. The most obvious way that we can link Nietzsche with elitist and autocratic politics is the way that Nietzsche's name was used by Fascist and Nazi totalitarians, but there is no reason to believe that Nietzsche would have approved of mass political movements based on extreme nationalism, belief in racially pure populations and militarism, all things condemned by Nietzsche. In addition, Fascism and Nazism were mass movements whose leaders manipulated the masses, and so never completely left mass democratic politics behind as they always refer to national or people's will of some kind. The best known Nazi leaning commentator on Nietzsche, Adolf Baeumler, has not become a central reference in Nietzsche studies after his work of the twenties and thirties.

Thomas Mann was very attached to Nietzsche during his ultra-conservative years, but the influence is still clear in his later more liberal years. Some similar comments apply to W.B. Yeats, who had rather “traditionalist” esoteric-authoritarian-elitist interests in combination with his appreciation for Nietzsche. Further links can be made between Nietzsche and “traditionalist” ultra-conservative thought in Julius Evola, Stefan George, and others, but this has not resulted in any great academic study of Nietzsche’s work, and the esotericist aspects of Traditionalism are at odds with the materialism and empiricism of Nietzsche’s thought. Leo Strauss, who was broadly speaking traditionalist in orientation throughout his career, and was sympathetic to Fascism for a while, had some encounter with Nietzsche’s thought, but of a very critical kind. Mircea Eliade makes some references to Nietzsche in his philosophy of religion and history, and was a pro-Fascist Traditionalist for a while, but the connection with the extreme right in Romania was finished by the time of his major intellectual achievements. Traditionalism, as with all other possible bridges between Nietzsche and totalitarian and extreme elitist political thought, provides some possible lineages, but nothing that can be taken as a systematic connection.

Since Traditionalism is the closest posture in the modern world to a movement for the Platonist dominance of an intellectual-aristocratic elite, its lack of fit with Nietzsche studies must have a qualifying effect on how we regard the Platonist form of elitism in Nietzsche. Another qualification is that the Platonist politics is at odds with Caesarism and Bonapartism, as the later phenomena refer to rule by someone of political and military strength, not rulers blessed with access to higher truths. In metaphysics Nietzsche argues for a dissolve of Platonism, and this must be in some tension with the metaphysical assumptions which underlie any belief in a guiding intellectual aristocracy with access to pure truths. This complete distance from Platonism is expressed most succinctly by Nietzsche in “How the Real World Became a Myth” in *Twilight of the Idols* (TI Fable), and passages of those kind must be taken into account in any discussion of Platonist politics in Nietzsche. On this basis, as we shall see, Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida arrive at a less “Platonist” reading of Nietzsche’s politics. It is not so much that we should deny any leanings in that direction from Nietzsche, but that we must be very conscious of how it does not fit well with other parts of his thought, and this might be why he never published the text where the Platonist politics is most clear, *The Greek State*. Themes from *The Greek State* appear in later writings, but not as a fully developed account of the state.

One way of thinking about Nietzsche’s politics is how it influenced the political thought of the most important of those thinkers, who have been deep-

ly concerned with Nietzsche. Max Weber is an intriguing example, but the nature and extent of Nietzsche's influence is controversial. Weber's biographer Joachim Radkau minimizes this influence (Radkau 2009, pp. 167f.), but several authors have argued in detail that Weber's work is inspired by Nietzsche's thought (Eden 1983, Gerner 1994, Peukert 1989, Schwaabe 2010). For Wilhelm Hennis, the problem of the fate of humankind under the conditions of modernity is a leading question of Weber's thought. Hennis argues, that Weber takes up this question from Nietzsche, and that this problem is also at the centre of Nietzsche's thought (Hennis 1987, cf. Knoll's essay in this volume). Weber himself writes of politics that it is a "self-evident fact" that "the will to power is a driving motive of the leaders in parliament" (Weber 1988, p. 350), as well as: "Politics is: struggle [*Kampf*]" (Weber 1988, p. 329; cf. Weber 1988, p. 335, 337). Tamsin Shaw's contribution to the current volume deals with Nietzsche's influence on Weber, so readers can find more information and supporting argument on this topic there.

Other aspects of democratic and liberal ways of thinking about Nietzsche can be found in contributions to the present volume by Lawrence Hatab, Donovan Miyaski, Paul Patton, Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, Barry Stocker, and Rolf Zimmerman. As suggested above, any attempt to summarize the whole of the reception and reworking of Nietzsche's political thought is an impossible task within the space available, so the more democratic and liberal ways of thinking about Nietzsche will be examined in this section through a limited group of linked thinkers who themselves offer important challenges to democratic and liberal politics.

The class of those who have much to say about Nietzsche, and about political thought in ways that have much influence, notably includes three French thinkers who knew each other and had mutual influence: Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida. While it is not a straight forward matter to classify the political thought of these three, they are all in some way democratic and egalitarian in questions of political rights, and are far from Platonic aristocratic-elitism. They all take from Nietzsche a concern with difference, pluralism, conflict and change in the sphere of politics, so that in their thinking Nietzsche becomes the source of critique of fixed forms, rigid hierarchies, and submission to political sovereignty of any kind. Nietzsche becomes in these philosophers the source of the most persistent critique of authoritarianism and despotism, in a mode of a joyful celebration of multiplying differences and dissolving identities. Foucault's more politically significant texts include *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977), which has many overtones of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which – as explained above – is very compatible with "liberal" horror at legalised cruelty, particularly in the second essay. Thoughts about how Foucault carries on from

Nietzsche's theory of Will to Power and transforms his idea of genealogy can be found in Evangelia Sembou's contribution to the current volume. Foucault's Nietzsche inspired thoughts in this context include the following passage:

[...] the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are not adequate to describe, at the very centre of the carceral city, the formation of the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties, small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, 'sciences' that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual. In this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instruments of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration', objects for discourses that are themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle. (Foucault 1991, p. 308)

As with Nietzsche, there is a mixture of fascination and horror with regard to past cruelties, combined with the suggestion that human Enlightenment values may have produced as much cruelty in more dispersed and less dramatic ways. Foucault's whole critique of the understanding of theories of legal sovereignty clearly includes a taking up of Nietzsche, and while it is directed against a large current of "liberal" theory, it is articulated in the service of a critique of unrestrained state and social power which can itself be taken as a contribution to "liberal" thought of another kind. Liberalism since the Enlightenment is portrayed, by Foucault, as deeply complicit with a power of control through visibility and rationalisation, but in the service of a resistance to the cruelty of power which extends liberal sensibilities. The book that made Foucault famous, *History of Madness* (also known as *Madness and Civilisation*), has a Nietzsche influenced respect for the insights of madness, as something connected with tragedy, in opposition to the confinement, constraints, and rational controls placed on it later.

The world of the early seventeenth century is strangely hospitable to madness. Madness is there, in the hearts of men and at the heart of things, an ironic sign blurring the distinction between the real and the chimerical, but with barely a memory of great tragic threat. (Foucault 2006, pp. 42f.)

As with the critical attitude to modern punishment, there is both a challenge to liberalism, taken up in the more left wing interpretations of Foucault, and a suggestion of how liberalism can be deepened, expanded, and pluralized through liberal encounters with Foucault. Foucault's own political engagements included a period of participation in the Maoist left, but he denies that he was a Marxist in any of his writings. Other periods of his life include engagement with a wide range of protests against power, and towards the end of his writing career a growing engagement with liberal, or liberal related, concepts (Foucault 2001, Foucault 2003, Foucault 2010).

Gilles Deleuze wrote one of his earlier books about Nietzsche (Deleuze 1983) and had an enduring interest in Nietzsche's thought. In his Nietzsche study, he does not present a Nietzschean political philosophy, or deny that Nietzsche might favour some Caesarist or Platonist form of government, but his way of writing about power and force in Nietzsche takes the reader's attention from such approaches to Nietzsche to an idea of Nietzsche as philosopher of pluralism, difference and becoming.

Deleuze's later work suggests that such metaphysical, or naturalist, pluralism is a model for social and political action and ways of thinking.

Thus reactive force is: 1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitation; 2) force which separates active force from what it can do, which denies or turns against itself (reign of the weak or of slaves). And, analogously, active force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to the limit of what it can; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation. Forces are only concretely and completely determined if these three pairs of characteristics are taken into account simultaneously. (Deleuze 1983, p. 61)

It is no surprise, therefore, to find that every Nietzschean concept lies at the crossing of two unequal genetic lines. Not only the eternal return and the Overman, but laughter, play and dance. In relation to Zarathustra laughter, play and dance are affirmative powers of transmutation: dance transmutes heavy into light, laughter transmutes suffering into joy and the play of throwing (the dice) transmutes low into high. But in relation to Dionysus dance, laughter and play are affirmative powers of reflection and development. Dance affirms becoming and the being of becoming; laughter, roars of laughter, affirms multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity; play affirms chance and the necessity of chance. (Deleuze 1983, pp. 193f.)

From the political point of view, Deleuze's emphasis on limits, difference, affirmation, laughter, play, dance, becoming, multiplicity, chance, enjoyment, and transmutation, can be taken against authority, hierarchy, sovereignty, rationalism, and elitism in the state and in political life. Society can be seen as something conditioned by the multiplicity of constantly transforming forces, in which hierarchies and sovereignty relations can only be temporary, and are always under challenge. So whatever Nietzsche advocated in the way of Platonist politics or Caesarism can be seen as itself challenged by the Nietzschean emphasis on difference, becoming, and multiplicity. Forces flow through social organisations in ways which constantly disorder them, and suggest a politics of anti-authoritarian self-transformation, along with existential challenges to authority. This understanding of social and political thought can be seen in Deleuze in a series of later texts beginning with *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze 1984), which he co-authored with Félix Guattari. These texts use references to Nietzsche, along with Freud, Marx, and many others. The overall effect is that of a

form of libertarianism strongly influenced by Marxist theory and revolutionary politics, confirmed by Deleuze's own political interests.

Derrida, unlike Foucault and Deleuze, did write directly on the political aspects of Nietzsche's thought, most significantly in *Politics of Friendship* (Derrida 1997)

Shall we say that this responsibility which inspires (in Nietzsche) a discourse of hostility towards 'democratic taste' and 'modern ideas' is exercised against democracy in general, modernity in general; or that, *on the contrary*, it responds in the name of a hyperbole of democracy or modernity to come, before it, prior to its coming – a hyperbole for which the 'taste' and 'ideas' would be, in this Europe and this America then named by Nietzsche, but the mediocre caricatures, the talkative conscience, the perversion and the prejudice – the 'misuse of the term' *democracy*? Do not these lookalike caricatures – and precisely because they resemble it – constitute the worst enemy of what they resemble, whose name they have usurped? The worst repression, the very repression which one must, as close as possible to the analogy, open and literally *unlock*? (Derrida 1997, p. 38; italics by Derrida)

So Derrida presents two ways of taking Nietzsche's criticisms of democracy and modernity: we can take them straight and literally; we can take them as a strategy for attacking the bad imitations of democracy and modernity. When Derrida states two apparently opposing options, a common gesture of his (Stocker 2006, ch. 8), he prefers the second option, but always argues that the two options can never be completely separated from each other, and there can never be a complete triumph of the one over the other. So Derrida offers us a model for interpreting Nietzsche on democracy, which is that he is both the harshest critic of bad democracy and the greatest admirer of the real thing. Other passages from *Politics of Friendship* look at how, for Nietzsche, this is an alternative between the relation that neighbours and the relationship that friends have, to be found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The relation between neighbours is a relationship of mutual dependency between the mediocre, which is non-conflictual to the point of banality. The relation between friends is one of tension between two isolated individuals seeking their own elevation in character through struggle. This is such an ideal and difficult relationship to find that Derrida puts it in the context of the idea, going back to antiquity, that there is no such thing as a friend (Derrida 1997). He traces it back through the republican thinkers Montaigne and Cicero to Aristotle, so that the ideal of the friend is embedded in the ideal of the republic, which is appropriate to antique republicanism, the precedent for modern ideas of republicanism, democracy and liberty.

The implication of what Derrida says is that we take Nietzsche as someone contrasting the heroic republicanism of antiquity with the modern imitations,

which even fail to be modern in their weak forms of repetition as poor imitation. There is a lot Derrida leaves unsaid here, even throughout the book as a whole, as he concentrates on the typically deep engagement with, and interlacing of, particular texts by Nietzsche, Aristotle, Montaigne, Blanchot and so on. What is left unsaid includes the whole field of the relation between what Constant referred to as the liberty of the ancients and the liberty of the moderns (Constant 1988). Constant thought of ancient liberty as more concerned with citizenship of a republic with shared institutions and customs, independent of external powers; and considered modern liberty to be defined by individualism, freedom from the state, and commercial life. Stocker's essay in this volume on Humboldt and Nietzsche explores some of the issues around the way that modern liberalism emerges from this sense of a less heroic, more self-centred version of the heroic forms of liberty in the past based on constant existential struggles with tyrants, enemy states, nature itself, and divine forces. Alternatives to "egalitarian liberalism" within current political theory such as "communitarianism" and "republicanism", itself are still formed within that contrast, and the same applies even for "Marxism" in modern theory, which has often become an attempt to reconcile egalitarianism and collectivism with capitalist political economy and individualism, particularly under the label of "Analytic Marxism", but also of "post-Marxism".

We can find some direct indications in Nietzsche that he is concerned with a contrast between heroic antique republican liberties and modern liberties of comfort. He gives a big indication that this is the way he is thinking in *On the Genealogy of Morality* I, when he quotes from the Funeral Speech of Pericles to the ancient Athenians (GM I 11), as recorded and possibly to some degree invented by Thucydides. Nietzsche quotes favourably from Pericles on his pride in how the wickedness of the Athenians is known to the world as well as their goodness. That is in the middle of a speech which is in praise of democracy as it appears in Athens. This is an instance of the heroic republicanism of the ancients, heroism in the sense that is disturbing to the moderns of pride, which is the power of a people, its toughness and unity of will, may be known to other peoples in painful ways, though maybe that pride is still there in more submerged forms.

Pericles represents the opposite pole to Platonic philosophical rule on the face of it. He was elected constantly by the Athenian people to provide military and governmental leadership. That is in a democracy where all free men who were descended from Athenians on both sides had the votes, so it was an electorate where day labourers and the owners of tiny farms had more votes than aristocrats and philosophers combined. Plato, however, appears to have respected Pericles as a leader and an individual, and since Pericles was a man

of great culture, connected with the most famous families in Athens, he had some of the qualities of Plato's ideal ruler. That raises the question of how far democracy is the opposite of Platonic philosopher rule. Of course, Plato, like other aristocrats and oligarchs of the time, identified democracy with irrational passions, economic greed and corruption of the law, but even so the *Laws* at least show some appreciation of participatory government, as does Aristotle in the *Politics* (cf. Knoll 2009b). Even these critics of democracy found that it often had to be tolerated in at least limited form, in order to establish an enduring state. That idea was fully developed by the later Roman republicans, Polybius and Cicero. Polybian and Ciceronian republicanism aims to combine democracy with aristocracy and monarchy in a mixed government, extending the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. In the early modern age, Machiavelli's republican ideal of the mixed constitution is composed of exactly these three elements (Knoll/Saracino 2010). That understanding of a republic as a mixed form of government indicates that separation and opposition of democracy in relation to aristocracy and monarchy is not a straightforward operation.

Moving into Nietzsche's own time, enthusiasm for democracy could be combined with aristocratic suspicion of the uneducated majority, and of uncontrolled majorities in general. Those anxieties were expressed in the idea of the tyranny of the majority in Tocqueville (1988) and then in John Stuart Mill (*On Liberty* in Mill 1998). For Mill, democracy had to be combined with education of the poorer classes and barriers against abuse of power by temporary majorities, driven by plebeian ignorance and indifference to liberty (*Considerations on Representative Government* in Mill 1998). Despite the scorn heaped on Mill by Nietzsche, we can see there was much in common between them. Dana Villa discusses the relation between Mill, Nietzsche, Max Weber, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt, with regard to antique citizenship and focused on Socrates in *Socratic Citizenship* (Villa 2001), showing an important way to deal with Nietzsche's place in political philosophy. That is unless we wish to consign him to some place irrelevant to most contemporary political thought, that of a very reactive nineteenth century ultraconservative railing against democracy and equality, with no contribution to make to the design of modern political institutions, modern political thought, and modern political culture.

Even if we are to take Nietzsche's most elitist and pro-slavery comments as definitive of his political thinking, he was concerned with liberty, in a manner focused on the maximum flourishing of the highest kind of self, and concern with liberty for a few tends to spill over into ideas of liberty for all. The spill over process, of course, refers to the effects of the thought of Nietzsche and others, rather than the intentions of the authors concerned. That is all part of the process Tocqueville describes of the inevitable step by step triumph of

democracy. John Locke wrote from the point of view of the Whig aristocracy, but his political theory was taken as an inspiration for democratic revolution. The English barons forced King John to sign *Magna Carta* for their own selfish reason in 1215, but demanded rights for all free men within England, rights which eventually applied to the lowest in status as velleinage, a form of serfdom, declined and disappeared. This spill over from an elite to the whole population in mass democracy has been repeated many times over, and when Nietzsche writes about the Overman, at least in some respects his presentation provides a model, willingly or not, for citizenship in a mass democracy, in the forms of political engagement suggested by Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida. We can think of Nietzsche's famous comment about liberal institutions betraying liberty in *Twilight of the Idols* (TI Skirmishes 38), and reflect on how that applies to the liberty of all members of a political community.

In this context it is particularly important to consider Nietzsche's friendship with Jacob Burckhardt, and the kind of aristocratic liberty Burckhardt discusses in *The Greeks and Greek Civilization* (Burckhardt 1998) and *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (Burckhardt 1944). Though his thought is aristocratic in orientation, it includes an awareness of the cost for the lowest classes in the formation of aristocratic dominated political communities, and that has been compared with the liberalism of Mill and Tocqueville (Kahan 1992). Particularly in that context, we can see that Hannah Arendt is a prime source of thought about how antique and aristocratic concepts of liberty can become part of a participatory mass democracy (Arendt 1990, Arendt 1998), and therefore an important source of thought about how to take up Nietzsche's political theory, as Villa suggests (Villa 2001, Villa 2008). In the field of Nietzsche commentary, the key references here, apart from Villa, are Lester Hunt in libertarian thought (Hunt 1993) and William E. Connolly in egalitarian liberal thought (Connolly 2002, Connolly 2008), along with authors in this volume such as Hatab, Patton, and Miyasaki. However, the democratic and liberal ways of thinking about Nietzsche constitute only one side of the controversy filled debate about Nietzsche's political preferences and affinities. In the present volume contributions by Bamford, Cristi, Dombowsky, Roth, and Knoll present arguments for the more radical aristocratic and anti-liberal interpretations of Nietzsche's politics.

5 Organisation and Contents of the Book

The book begins with a section on the variety of possible approaches to Nietzsche's political thought, starting with Rolf Zimmermann's *The "Will to Power"*:

Towards a Nietzschean Systematics of Moral-Political Divergence in History in Light of the 20th Century. Zimmermann offers a broad survey of the ways of thinking about Nietzsche politically and using his ideas to analyse politics. Zimmermann looks at the different possible political readings of Nietzsche's own texts, the ways he is taken up politically, and how we can use Nietzsche's thought to understand political movements in the twentieth century. There is an authoritarian elitist element in Nietzsche's thought that can be taken in an anti liberal-democratic direction, but does not have to be, since respect for elites can be part of liberal democratic thought. The First World War had a major effect on the way that Nietzsche was understood politically, since it suited both sides to present Nietzsche as the inspiration for a German anti-liberal attitude as opposed to the liberal democracies on the Allied side. After that it was then possible to go further and see Nietzsche as the inspiration for Nazism. However, we can see in Max Weber's turn to liberal republicanism after the war a way of incorporating Nietzsche's belief in a political elite within democratic thought. Nietzsche's relation to totalitarianism of all forms is more that he diagnosed their possibility than that he advocated such systems.

In *The Liberatory Limits of Nietzsche's Colonial Imagination in "Dawn"* 206, Rebecca Bamford looks at *Dawn* as example of a therapeutic approach by Nietzsche to philosophy, which reaches a limit to its applicability in its attitude to colonialism, leading us to the anti-egalitarian Nietzsche. Nietzsche suggests that European workers should either become "Chinese" in obedience and willingness to work, or should migrate out of Europe. Nietzsche treats the land to be colonized as empty, so suitable for the European working class. There is an indifference both to working class Europeans and to the people living in the lands to be colonized. The acts of colonization are therapeutic for the colonisers and the European elites, and they are indifferent to the concerns of the native populations negatively effected by colonization. Nietzsche's notebooks are full of the merits of colonialism for a while, so this is not a small scale thing for him. The colonization makes the grand unity and future of Europe possible.

In *Nietzsche's Political Materialism: Diagram for a Nietzschean Politics*, Nandita Biswas Mellamphy looks at the political implications of Nietzsche's thought through François Laruelle's encounter with Nietzsche, an encounter which is functional rather than engaged in close reading. That is Laruelle seeks to clarify the conflicting consequences of Nietzsche's thoughts, rather than aim at an interpretation governed by coherence. This follows the ways that Foucault, Deleuze and others had read Nietzsche through bending and reusing his ideas, and goes beyond them in examining Nietzsche's thought as the intersection of two poles, which can be called Dionysian and Apollinian, and which

produces a space structured by four points. In that way of reading Nietzsche, we can see that he produces both fascist and anti-fascist readings. The apparently fascist ideas in Nietzsche come from following a way of thinking until it is undermined, so that the strongest result of Nietzsche's thought for politics is a positing followed by undermining of fascism. This refers to the Dionysian non-identity pole of Nietzsche as opposed to the Apollinian pole.

The book then moves on to those contributions which emphasize a more democratic, or liberal, or more egalitarian politics in Nietzsche. In *Nietzsche's Will to Power and Politics*, Lawrence Hatab argues that the Nietzschean understanding of politics is based in the struggles of the Will to Power, and that the agonistic nature of politics on this basis has implications for democratic politics. Hatab's argument is that while Nietzsche was not a democrat, he could not avoid the reality that political ideas of struggle and hierarchy enter into democratic politics. There are two ends to this. At one end is the argument that Nietzsche's political thought is not as antithetical to democracy as he liked to claim; the other end of the argument is that democratic politics is not as egalitarian and free of violent oppositions as it is often taken to be. On this point, Hatab takes Locke as an example of an early democratic thinker whose attitude to land in North America is that it is wasted by the native population and is therefore open to development by more advanced peoples. Hatab also refers to Foucault as part of the argument for understanding the dark side of democracy and Enlightenment, where Nietzsche's ideas can be seen to be relevant.

In *Nietzsche on Power and Democracy circa 1876–1881*, Paul Patton examines three texts from the late 1870s and early 1880s, where Nietzsche is most sympathetic to democracy: *Daybreak*, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, *Human, All Too Human*. There is an idea of "democracy to come" in these texts, where Nietzsche suggests a hope for forms of democracy in which the worst aspects of political life have been overcome. Negative aspects of democracy include the existence of political parties for Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, parties aim to force individuals to accept an idea of the common good which cannot be real, since all parties have different views of it. Nietzsche believes that what is good is not what forces individuals into a restrictive form of common good, but is rather what will enable citizens to realise differences from others and maintain distance. Nietzsche takes a critical view of the state as oppressive and restrictive of human growth, but it is wrong to assume that Nietzsche takes that thought in an anti-political or anarchistic direction. Nietzsche aims for better forms of organisation and power in the future.

In *A Comparison of Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm von Humboldt as Products of Classical Liberalism*, Barry Stocker argues that the anti-liberal interpretations of Nietzsche both give too much importance to a literal interpretation

of Nietzsche's most provocatively anti-egalitarian statements; and attribute too much of an egalitarian and anti-heroic way of thinking to liberal thought. That is such interpretations assume that classical liberals from Locke to J.S. Mill are more egalitarian and anti-heroic than they are in reality. Stocker takes up a comparison between Nietzsche and Wilhelm von Humboldt to demonstrate compatibility between at least some part of Nietzsche's political thinking and a large part of classical liberal thought. The comparison refers to Humboldt's rejection of anything more than the most minimal state and his admiration for ancient heroic virtues, both of which attitudes Humboldt shared with Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Humboldt regarded the modern focus on minimizing suffering and avoiding war with suspicion, since such an attitude detracts from the kind of strength that ancient peoples had. Both share a vision of the greatness of the human individual when set free of conformity and an interventionist state.

In *A Nietzschean Case for Illiberal Egalitarianism*, Donovan Miyasaki argues that we can accept Nietzsche's illiberalism while rejecting his anti-egalitarianism. Though it is illiberal egalitarianism, Miyasaki has a starting point in the liberal egalitarianism of John Rawls, in order to show how Rawlsian ways of thinking can be adapted to ends which are not entirely those of Rawls himself. So while Rawls argues that the principle of social and economic organization should benefit the worst off in that society, Miyasaki proposes that we adopt the principle that the best off will not be harmed. The argument is that the highest kind of people will benefit from egalitarianism. Their exceptional qualities will not be threatened by the possibility of the lower kind of people unifying against them, if the lower people have nothing to gain in terms of redistribution of economic goods. This is egalitarianism which is normative rather than descriptive, because while it prescribes equal social and economic outcomes, it does not assume equality of value between different humans.

The book then moves on to a section which contains a sequence of contributions that emphasize the aristocratic, or anti-liberal, or non-egalitarian view of Nietzsche, beginning with Renato Cristi's *Nietzsche, Theognis and Aristocratic Radicalism*. Cristi suggests that a decisive moment in the history of Nietzsche's political thought can be found in his reading of the poetry of Theognis, which laments the triumph of plebeians who have acquired commercial power, and political power through democracy, over the Megarian aristocracy. So everything across Nietzsche's development can be contextualized through Theognis along with Homer as a poet of early aristocratic values. Cristi also refers to the label of "aristocratic radical", which Georg Brandes suggested to Nietzsche and that Nietzsche accepted. So all of Nietzsche's comments on social and political matters can be seen as the expression of belief in the rule by an aristocra-

cy or oligarchy, which would be the rule of the best over the valueless lower orders. Any attempt to think of Nietzsche as an apolitical cultural thinker, as Walter Kaufmann suggested, or as someone whose ideas can be used for democracy, as Lawrence Hatab argues, ignores the radical commitment of Nietzsche to aristocratic values.

In *Aristocratic Radicalism as a Species of Bonapartism: Preliminary Elements*, Don Dombowsky makes the case for a Caesarist-Bonapartist reading of Nietzsche's politics, which he regards as one form of Nietzsche's "aristocratic radicalism". This is justified through the use of Napoleon's own preferred symbols in connection with the figure of Zarathustra, along with the suggestion that Zarathustra's multiplicity of selves makes him structurally similar to Bonaparte. Dombowsky argues that the Civil Code was given a very conservative interpretation by Bonaparte, and he only allowed his own views to serve as interpretations. The plebiscitary-democratic aspect of Bonapartism was only allowed to intrude very occasionally. Bonapartism can be regarded as a return of the old regime for these reasons, and as aristocratic, because of the role of the nobility in it. Bonapartism emphasizes patriarchy and the militarization of the whole of society, views we should then attribute to Nietzsche.

In *Political and Psychological Prerequisites for Legislation in the Early Nietzsche*, Phillip H. Roth looks at the early Nietzsche as an aesthetic thinker attempting an inversion of Plato. The inversion of Plato comes in the replacement of metaphysical ideals with aesthetic ideals. This still leaves Nietzsche as a political Platonist who believes in the rule of an elite over the rest of society. However, in Nietzsche the elite is aesthetic according to values expounded in *Birth of Tragedy*. For Nietzsche, Socrates is anti-Greek, so the proper polity will not be based on the Socratic values which lead Plato to expel poets from the ideal state. The aestheticism fits with an ideal of deception, in which the purpose of laws is concealed behind the wish to benefit the psychological preservation of artistic geniuses and to allow them to rule. Nietzsche simplifies the three fold structure of the hierarchy of Plato's republic, so there is just a two-fold distinction between rulers and the lower classes who serve them. The rulers make up laws which suit themselves and impose them on the lower classes in the spirit of deception which an aesthetic perspectival view promotes.

In *The "Übermensch" as a Social and Political Task: A Study in the Continuity of Nietzsche's Political Thought*, Manuel Knoll takes issue with the scholarly tradition of an individualistic understanding of the "Übermensch". Knoll argues that the idea of the "Übermensch", which Nietzsche introduces in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, is continuous with Nietzsche's thought from beginning to end, and is consistently focused on the idea of a higher kind of human. This continuity starts with an early interest in Plato's politics, which are the inspira-

tion for Nietzsche's own political thought, even as he rejects Plato's metaphysics. Nietzsche believed that for Plato the guardians of the ideal state are a higher kind of human, and Nietzsche stayed true to this vision while taking Platonic metaphysics as a major object of attack. This continuity ends with *The Anti-Christ*, in which Nietzsche conceives of the social order, as in *Beyond Good and Evil*, primarily as a means for making possible higher and highest men. The idea of the "Übermensch" strictly speaking in Nietzsche begins with the idea of the death of God, so that something else has to be found to give meaning to the world. That something emerges as the *Übermensch* who is the "meaning of the earth", existing as *Übermenschen*, who are the different kinds of higher humans in all fields of human life.

The book then moves on to contributions concerning Nietzsche's moral and ethical thought in relation to politics. In *Care of Self in "Dawn": On Nietzsche's Resistance to Bio-political Modernity*, Keith Ansell-Pearson looks at Nietzsche's thoughts about ethics and the self in *Dawn* in relation to Foucault's views about care of the self and biopolitics. For Foucault, care of the self refers to an art of living which precedes law and absolute moral requirements, and in which the self creates itself. Biopolitics refers to Foucault's concerns that the state had become a means of imposing the prolongation of life on individuals, which becomes an instrument of interference and control. Nietzsche, like Foucault, goes back to the ancient ethical thinkers, not in order to follow any of them, but to look at examples in Epictetus, and others, of care of self. Epictetus provides an example for Nietzsche of a kind of ethics in which we do not subordinate ourselves to concern with others, but are focused on perfecting *our* self. Nietzsche's aim is to draw our attention to the pleasure of existence, so a kind of liberty outside state and law.

In "*We who are different, we immoralists...*", Daniel Conway concentrates on "immoralism" at the end of Nietzsche's writing career, particularly with regard to *Twilight of the Idols* and *Ecce Homo*. He argues that Nietzsche's thought on morality after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is committed to an "immoralist" position, not so much as a rejection of morality, but rather as a challenge to the way that moral concepts are deep inside our sense of historical identity. Immoralism becomes more a means of contesting morality as moralism. But immoralism does not completely reject morality. Morality as moralism is caught up in a narrow intolerant assumption of what morality is, which excludes different possibilities. The more immoralist position favours plurality of what morality means, combined with a grand conception of the salvationist role of immoralism for humanity. Nietzsche's criticisms of "morality" have a particular target which is the Christian church, and Nietzsche wishes to show that the church cannot live up to its own morality, so undermining its claims to have a compelling morality.

In *Political Realism Naturalized: Nietzsche on the State, Morality, and Human Nature*, Christian J. Emden considers the relation of Nietzsche's naturalism to his morality and his realism in politics. Emden extends the discussion of political realism from the role of states in international relations to a general claim regarding politics as a struggle for power distinct from morality. He puts that forward as part of Nietzsche's view of politics and combines it with Nietzsche's view of moral community as dependent on political power relations. Emden argues that this analysis is dependent on Nietzsche's philosophical naturalism, because it is in naturalizing moral concepts that Nietzsche is led to understand humans as power seeking. Though Nietzsche is a realist with regard to politics, it is a mistake to see him as a moral anti-realist. Nietzsche refers to the different moral standards of masters and slaves. That argument in Nietzsche rests on a capacity of masters to recognize their own advantage. The morality of masters rests on epistemic privilege with regard to understanding how to follow self-interest through moral codes. The epistemic superiority as a basis for morality introduces a realist aspect into Nietzsche's moral theory.

In *The "Last Man" Problem: Nietzsche and Weber on Political Attitudes to Suffering*, Tamsin Shaw discusses the fear of the "last man" in Nietzsche and brings his wish to overcome it into comparison with the hope for a charismatic leader in Weber. Both Nietzsche and Weber are concerned with a loss of the acceptance of sacrifice and suffering, for ourselves and for others, as modern societies move towards eudaimonic ideas of minimizing suffering. In earlier stages of history, humans could accept suffering as necessary to some overall good. Nietzsche's and Weber's concern with this problem has its roots in the religious discussion of theodicy, that is the justification of the existence of God in relation to the suffering in the world. The problem Nietzsche and Weber discuss appears because there is no God to justify suffering, and a non-heroic rejection of all suffering is spreading. The growth of utilitarian and hedonistic thought confronts Nietzsche with the possibility of human decay when suffering can no longer be accepted, the mentality of the "last man". Weber's idea of the charismatic political leader is an attempt to provide a positive alternative to Nietzsche's "last man", but should be seen as unnecessary within Weber's own thought because of his acceptance of materialist causation in history.

The collection concludes with some contributions on the methodological side of Nietzsche, with regard to how the uses of genealogy and of physiology appear in Nietzsche's use of political concepts, and how such methods can be applied to the understanding of Nietzsche's thought. In *The Politics of Physiology*, Razvan Ioan follows the interaction between Nietzsche's study of physiology and his political ideas, and the way this interaction changed over time. He argues that we cannot reduce all of Nietzsche's thought to physiology, and that

some part of his references to physiology are metaphorical. However, not all such references are metaphorical, some are symptomatic and some are causal. The place of physiological explanation is causal in relation to politics, in the sense that Nietzsche thinks physiology should be used in politics to select better humans. Nietzsche studied the major books of that time in the discipline. At the time of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, this led Nietzsche to an interest in the hierarchy of the organism, of the rank of different cells in the body, which connected with his views of the social hierarchy of master and slave. Nietzsche's later research into physiology led him to a more radical view of hierarchy, which requires the destruction of the lower forms of life in war.

In *On the Genealogy of Nietzsche's Values*, Tom Angier raises questions about Nietzsche's use of genealogical method, concluding that it is fatally flawed by a failure to distinguish between the value of moral concepts and the origin of those concepts, so that there is a genetic fallacy. However, there is a proper way of using genealogy, and we see how this works by using the work of Norbert Elias on German culture in the time of Nietzsche. German culture of that time is troubled by a split between values of power and aesthetic values. Power is concerned with war and the might of the state, while the aesthetic is concerned with the beauty of art objects, and non-power related values. Elias showed how the nineteenth century German Middle Class was divided between those values and was concerned with the relationship between them. We can see that tension in Nietzsche, as he gives value both to power and to art, leaving Nietzsche commentators in an awkward situation as they try to decide whether Nietzsche's values are more oriented to creativity through power or through art.

In *Foucault's use of Nietzsche*, Evangelia Sembou draws attention to the differences between Foucault and Nietzsche, and the need to understand that though Foucault learned from Nietzsche, his thought is often more distinct from Nietzsche than early acquaintance might suggest. Overall, Foucault was a modernist who continued the project of Kantian Enlightenment, even though coming after Nietzsche. It is Nietzsche, the earlier thinker, who was more the post-modernist who opposed Enlightenment. We cannot understand the modernist/postmodernist distinction as defined by succession in time, but by different reactions to Enlightenment, so that a critical early attitude to Enlightenment can be said to be postmodernist, while a later positive attitude to Enlightenment can be said to be modernist. That is why Nietzsche can be postmodernist and Foucault can be modernist. In Foucault there is an endlessness of interpretation in his understanding of "genealogy", while in Nietzsche genealogy goes back to will to power as the final point of reference, and therefore has a natural basis. Foucault creatively misreads Nietzsche when he fails

to distinguish between the place of origin and the place of purposes in genealogy. There is a real origin for Nietzsche, in a way there is not for Foucault, and what Nietzsche focuses on is the changes in purpose of the meaning of existing practices. Foucault sees the changes in meaning and purpose as showing that the practice has no origin, so that for Foucault it is the change which is everything.

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I. The Variety of Approaches to Nietzsche's Political Thought

Rolf Zimmermann

The “Will to Power”: Towards a Nietzschean Systematics of Moral-Political Divergence in History in Light of the 20th Century*

Clarifications of the central concepts of Nietzsche’s work represent a never-ending task. The “will to power” in particular is ambiguous in various respects. Without an explication of its meaning or its different meanings, there can be little success in developing the moral and political relevance of Nietzsche’s thought. In the following, I attempt to integrate two main lines of interpretation. In the first section, I take up Nietzsche’s plea for a historical view on morality as a frame for all further considerations. Within this general approach, I give clarifications of Nietzsche’s view of man as a value-driven animal and I analyze “will to power” by distinguishing individual and collective meanings. Political implications, on the collective level, can be discussed with regard to two conceptions that may be explicated in the sense of a liberal and an authoritarian ideal type. At the same time, we must face the problem as to whether Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarianism could be consistently integrated into a constitutional democracy of whatever kind. This problem has to be considered anew when we direct our attention to the 20th century.

The second section deals more specifically with moral-political developments in the 20th century, by analyzing in outline form the new moralities of Bolshevism and Nazism as foundations for socio-political orders. On the one hand, such a reading of moral development can demonstrate in terms of historical experience the importance of Nietzsche’s insight into divergent moral-defining “wills to power”, thereby denying any hope for objectivist foundations of morality. On the other hand, however, there is, within a Nietzschean paradigm, the crucial question as to how to cope with experiences of the 20th century not available to Nietzsche himself. This question, I think, points to distinctions in respect of antithetic conceptions of equality, one group under a totalitarianism heading, the other under the heading of a individualistic meaning of equality compatible with constitutional democracy. Against this background the shortcomings of Nietzsche’s critique of liberal egalitarianism can be recognized not only conceptually, but also historically. A Nietzschean systematics of moral-political divergence in history, however, remains fruitful.

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