

Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph Wang
Language and World. Part Two
Signs, Minds and Actions

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Volker Munz • Klaus Puhl • Joseph Wang

Language and World. Part Two

Signs, Minds and Actions



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Preface

This is the second of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Lower Austria, August 2009.

The first of these two volumes “Language and World” is solely dedicated to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Although several of the contributions collected in the present volume do refer to Wittgenstein, the articles published here also tackle central issues that are not directly related to his work. The five sections of this book deal with the following topics: „Theories of the Linguistic Sign“, „Language and Action“, „Language and Consciousness“, „Language and Metaphysics“, „Reality and Construction“. An additional interdisciplinary workshop was dedicated to Wittgenstein and literature. Wittgenstein himself saw close similarities between poetry and philosophy and was not willing to draw a distinction between the two. Furthermore his influence on literature and the arts is still very strong.

The editors would like to express their gratitude to all the contributors and to those who took part in the many and lively discussions during the conference. Without them this volume would never have happened.

We would also like to thank the board of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and our publisher Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for supporting us all the way through.

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Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl, Joseph Wang

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*Theories
of the
Linguistic Sign*

The Coherence Theory of Truth: Russell's Worst Invention?

Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic, Perth

Ralph Walker once attributed to Wittgenstein a coherence theory of truth, according to which the truth of a proposition is a matter of its relations, not to an extra-propositional reality, but to other propositions (Walker 1989). Of course, Wittgenstein is not so easily pinned down. We believe, though, that *none* of the philosophers usually labelled ‘coherence theorists’ actually held the view just described (which is how the coherence theory is nowadays thought of, with coherence understood as something stronger than consistency but weaker than entailment). Here, however, we will argue for a more modest conclusion. Our goal is to show that the coherence theory was the invention of Bertrand Russell and that those he accused of holding the view, now normally thought of as paradigm coherence theorists—the British Idealists—held instead an identity theory of truth. But the fact that prime candidates for coherence theorists are no such thing is more than a mere historical curiosity. Instead, as we shall argue in the final section, it’s a sign of something significant, namely, that the coherence theory, when thought through, inevitably emerges as but a subspecies of the identity theory of truth.

1. The British Idealists’ Theory of Truth

Whenever the coherence theory is attributed to any real philosopher, this is typically to the British Monistic Idealists Bradley and Joachim, and their American follower Blanshard. Yet, as we will argue, none of these philosophers actually held this view. How, then, did they come to be referred to as coherence theorists, and what did they in fact say about truth?

The *label*, ‘the coherence theory of truth’, seems to have come from Russell. In 1907 he published a seminal article, ‘On the Nature of Truth’¹ which criticized the views expressed in Harold Joachim’s 1906 book, *The Nature of Truth*. In that book Joachim defended metaphysical monism, attacked the correspondence theory of truth and argued that the essence of truth is ‘coherence’. He did not, however, use the label the ‘coherence theory of truth’. In contrast, Russell, although he starts out by designating Joachim’s account as the ‘monistic theory’ soon starts referring to it as a ‘coherence-theory’. One year later G. F. Stout (1908) also used the term ‘coherence’ of monistic idealist views of truth and F. H. Bradley (1908), responding to Stout, then dropped his own vocabulary of ‘system’ and adopted the term ‘coherence’. From that point on, the theory of truth held by the British Idealists came to be referred to as the coherence theory of truth. But it is very important to see that their real theory of truth is not at all what is these days thought of as the coherence theory. We can see this by retracing their arguments.²

Take Bradley as an example, since his views inspired those of the others. His thoughts on truth originate in his metaphysics: for him, reality itself is a coherent system. The label ‘coherence’ carries no special weight here; it is just a way of marking the refusal to give even everyday common-sense pluralism any metaphysical significance, while drawing back from a Parmenidean conception of the world as an undifferentiated whole. That is, in Bradley’s view, both everyday thought and extreme pluralist ontologies like Hume’s or Russell’s involve the abstraction of objects and facts from the situations in which they are embedded. His hostility to this abstraction is far-reaching enough to ensure that, according to his philosophical logic, at most one judgment can be true—that which encapsulates

¹ This article was first published in the 1906/07 volume of *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. In 1910 he re-published, under the title ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’, and with only trivial variations, the first two of its original three sections in his much-reprinted collection, *Philosophical Essays*, with the last part dropped and a new essay (Russell 1910c) put in its place. He chose to reprint a large slab of this 1907 essay in his widely read book of 1959, *My Philosophical Development*.

² Ayer (1952) also argued that the British Idealists did not hold a coherence theory of truth. Instead, he claimed, the ‘coherence’ label was actually applied to them in virtue of their theory of meaning.

reality in its entirety. He can account for falsehood as a falling short of this vast judgment and hence as an abstraction of part of reality from the whole. That judgment is the least true which is the most distant from the whole of reality.

But the consequences of his ontology are more extreme even than this. The one comprehensive judgment, even if possible, would still fall short. All judgments, in Bradley's view, distort reality by cutting it up into illusory fragments, tearing apart in their expression that which in experience is a unified whole. Accordingly, even this one gigantic all-encompassing judgment, for the very reason that it involves description, will be infected by falsehood unless it ceases altogether to be a judgment, abandoning the predicative and relational machinery of thought. The only way in which it can be adequate in its expression is by taking on the very nature of the reality it is meant to be about; and the only way to do that is by *becoming* that reality. This apparently bizarre claim becomes intelligible if seen as both the most extreme expression of his hostility to abstraction and a reaction to the most fundamental of his objections to the correspondence theory, which is the same as Frege's (1918, 3): that for there to be correspondence rather than identity between judgment and reality, the judgment must differ from reality and to the extent that it differs must distort and so falsify it. In a thoroughgoing monism, thought itself can't stand outside the all-encompassing whole.

Primarily, then, the monistic idealists had a metaphysics that forced them to adopt an *identity theory of truth*; that a truth-bearer can be true only by being identical with reality. And it's important to see that their view is an identity theory, and incompatible with what's standardly understood as a coherence theory. For the latter, as now understood, maintains that truth is a certain sort of relation that holds between truth-bearers (instead of between truth-bearers and reality) and that a truth-bearer is true if and only if it belongs to some specifiably coherent set of truth-bearers. This whole apparatus of terms in relation was anathema to the idealists, so that even in the final coherent system we can't talk of individual truth-bearers making up the system and each bearer being true. Furthermore, since truth is identity with reality, and it is possible to hold this view even if one does not think that reality is a coherent whole (as some pluralists might by, e.g., refusing to draw a distinction between true propositions and

facts), truth is only derivatively a matter of coherence. For the monistic idealists, coherence is part of the nature of truth because on their view truth is identity with reality and reality is coherent. It is this fact that explains why Joachim, and later Blanshard in *The Nature of Thought*, slip into saying that the nature of truth is coherence.

2. Russell and ‘The Coherence Theory’

We have seen how the British Idealists’ identity theory came to be labelled the ‘coherence theory’ of truth. But how did we come to identify their position with what we now think of as the coherence theory of truth? The answer, again, lies with Russell.

In Part I of his 1907 paper, Russell sets out the coherence theory and argues against it. The most influential aspect of Russell’s attack has been his objection that “it may be perfectly possible to construct a coherent whole of *false* propositions in which ‘Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder’ would find a place”³. Russell concludes that, from what the coherence theory tells us, this proposition would be true. In raising this as an objection to the ‘coherence theory of truth’, Russell implies that on this view the truth of a proposition consists in its being a member of some ‘coherent’ set of propositions. Thus, with this objection he, in effect, created the coherence theory as we now understand it. Moreover, since he held himself out to be criticizing the view of the British Idealists, he also implied that they were committed to this absurd view. The influence of his paper can be seen 20 years later in Ramsey’s discussion of the coherence theory, in which he says of it that “it is very easy to reduce to absurdity and after Mr Russell’s amusing essay on ‘The Monistic Theory of Truth’ it is difficult to see how anyone can still cling to it”⁴.

Russell’s 1907 paper is interesting in this context not only because it invents the coherence theory of truth and its now standard ‘refutation’, but also because it contains the first, tentative, version of Russell’s famous multiple relation theory of judgment. (We may call this the 1907 version,

³ Russell 1907, 136. It would have been well known to Russell’s audience that Bishop Stubbs was a highly respectable Anglican divine.

⁴ Ramsey 1927, 25. Ramsey was referring to the 1910 version of Russell’s original paper.

to distinguish it from the second and non-tentative version of 1910, and from Russell's 1912 and 1913 versions, both of them modifications of the 1910 theory in response to objections.) This co-incidence isn't mere coincidence, as we can see by looking at the dialectic of Russell's argument.

Having attacked the coherence theory in Part I, he argues in Part II against a certain view of relations, namely "that relations are always grounded in the nature of their terms" (28), and alleges that this view is "an axiom", "the axiom of internal relations", upon which is based the metaphysics in which the coherence theory is embedded. In Part III, he sketches "the kind of theory, as to the nature of truth, which results from rejection of the axiom" (loc. cit.).

The way in which he introduces this new theory is striking. His rejection of the view that "experiencing makes a difference to the facts" (44) is, he says, a consequence of the rejection of the axiom of internal relations. He goes on:

But from the point of view of the theory of truth, it is a very important consequence, since it sets facts and our knowledge of them in two different spheres, and leaves the facts completely independent of our knowledge. (45)

He assumes that this new theory of truth is going to require a theory of judgment—indeed, his writings in this period typically treat the two topics side-by-side—and he begins with the account of judgment that he had embraced in *The Principles of Mathematics*: judgment is a binary relation between one object, a mind, and one other, a proposition, understood as a unified entity not dependent on any mind for its existence. And he adds to that theory of judgment a variant of the theory of truth from the same work, what is now often called 'primitivism'; this variant moves the primitive property of truth from facts, where it had resided in 1903, to beliefs: "Truth, then, we might suppose, is the quality of beliefs which have facts for their objects, and falsehood is the quality of other beliefs" (45).

This variant is an anticipation of Russell's 1912 defense of the multiple relation theory of judgment against an objection from Stout, moving the property of relations he called 'sense' from the judged relation to the relation of judging. Although we might think of this account of truth as a form of primitivism, Russell himself thought it "a form of the correspondence theory" (loc. cit.). But he is uneasy about it, as the phrase "we might

suppose” indicates, because of a worry he had expressed as early as 1904 and which he immediately goes on to explain here (*loc. cit.*), that it is hard to confine falsehood merely to beliefs, so that the variant risks collapsing into the original account, which he now finds problematic:

But this simple view is rather difficult to defend against objections of various kinds, tending to show that there are not only mistaken beliefs, but also non-facts, which are the objectively false objects of mistaken beliefs.

And in this context, as a provisional solution, he comes up with the initial version of the multiple relation theory of judgment, which he thinks may enable him to retain the correspondence theory of truth while evading the implausibility of objective falsehoods. But, he says: “As between the above two views of truth, I do not at present see how to decide” (49).

To sum up, then: what we see emerging here, all at once, are the following. 1) The coherence theory of truth, pinned on the British Idealists and presented as readily refutable. 2) The correspondence theory of truth, seemingly thought of as essential to the idea that “facts [are] completely independent of our knowledge” (45). 3) The multiple relation theory of judgment, whose role at this stage is to preserve the correspondence theory of truth from problems about falsehood.

3. From Coherence to Identity

We have seen that the ‘coherence theory’ label was first provided by Russell in attempting to respond to the position held by the British Idealists, and Russell’s labelling and redescription of their position helped contribute to the construction of the coherence theory straw man which then took on a life of its own. But if Russell is to blame for creating the coherence theory of truth, his paper also contains the resources for removing that theory from its place of prominence. For if we follow through one of the more insightful criticisms he made of the theory he described, we can begin to see why the coherence theory leads inevitably to the identity theory of truth, and is in fact merely a subspecies of it.

However unfair it was to its intended targets, Joachim and Bradley, the following observation from Russell is acute:

And the objection to the coherence-theory lies in this, that it presupposes a more usual meaning of truth and falsehood in constructing its coherent whole, and that this more usual meaning, though indispensable to the theory, cannot be explained by means of the theory. (Russell 1907, 33; 1910b, 136.)

The acuteness of this observation lies in the fact that behind much discussion of the coherence theory seems to be the thought that, for the coherentist, there is something beyond the realm of judgment that we should like to talk about, but (perhaps because of epistemic problems), we can't manage it, or at least can't get it to function in a truth-making role, so we'll ignore it and instead confine ourselves to the realm of what we judge. But this coherentist rhetoric betrays a double-mindedness, since it wants to both keep the world beyond the realm of judgment *and* ignore it as irrelevant to truth. That is, coherentists seem to want to adopt what Putnam has called the internalist perspective, and yet the images of confinement suggest that there is, after all, a world beyond the coherent set of propositions.

This double-mindedness is hardly surprising. For consider the following *correspondence intuition* (sometimes, the *correspondence platitude*).

Correspondence Intuition: If something is true, it's true *because* of the way the world is.

Unlike the coherence theory, this thesis seems to survive a form of Moore's Open Question argument, which might be put like this: "I know that what you say corresponds to reality, but is it true?"—as opposed to, "I know that what you say belongs to the preferred set of judgments, but is it (or any of them) true?" What are would-be coherence theorists to say about this deeply embedded intuition? Should they accept or reject it? While it may seem odd to suppose that anyone opposed to the correspondence theory would accept the correspondence intuition, even as a surface platitude, historically it has been quite common. In fact, it is because they accepted the correspondence intuition that Bradley and Bosanquet have been mistaken for correspondence theorists—Bosanquet complained about this (1911, 263), as did Bradley.⁵ But both acceptance and rejection pose awkward consequences for those inclined to coherentism but not idealism: ac-

⁵ Deflationists, too, sometimes accept the correspondence intuition—see Horwich 1998, 104-5, for example.

cepting it seems to lead them directly to a form of idealism; rejecting it can look like a *reductio*.

The correspondence intuition displays a binary picture underlying much of the discussion of truth. If we put on one side complicating considerations arising from epistemological concerns, the picture involves a distinction between what we talk about, on the one hand, and what we say about it on the other. It appears time and again in different guises: the distinction between the realm of reference and the realm of sense; between facts and propositions; between truth-makers and truth-bearers; and so on. This picture sits very naturally with the correspondence theory of truth, but it's still influencing even those who have indulged in coherentist talk. Hence their double-mindedness.

And of course once one exposes this kind of double-mindedness, and instead takes the coherence theory completely seriously by insisting that our truth-makers belong in the realm of sense, then the other side of the binary divide really does drop out as irrelevant. All we are left with is the world of judgments: it is some preferred set in this world that we are *really* talking about, and which constitutes reality. Thus similarly acute, even though Russell himself underestimates its significance, is his observation from earlier in the same paper:

The view that truth is one may be called "logical monism"; it is, of course, closely connected with ontological monism, *i.e.*, the doctrine that Reality is one. (Russell 1907, 28; 1910b, 131.)

And now it's clear that coherence is neither here nor there. For a judgment to be true is just for it to belong to the set. That is the minimal sense in which Reality is one. And that is an identity theory of truth, available (on different grounds) to monists and pluralists alike.

So, when thought through, the coherence theory is but one special case of the identity theory of truth: it is not, therefore, the main rival to the correspondence theory that it is usually taken to be.⁶ But, as a species of identity theory, the coherence theory, with its idealist and monist metaphysics, is particularly hard even to comprehend. And it carries with it the

⁶ One can see this at work in McDowell 1994, who is sympathetic to the internalist perspective but wary of the double-mindedness we have spoken of. As a result, he too comes to rest with an identity theory of truth.

problem that led Russell to abandon his 1903 binary relation theory of judgment for the multiple relation theory. That problem is, giving a sensible account of falsehood. Such a view seems unlikely to have attracted many good philosophers in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. As we mentioned at the beginning, we think it in fact attracted none. But that is an argument for another paper.

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Names, Nonsubstitutivity and the Tanney Puzzle

Laurence Goldstein, Kent

I. Peter Hacker: the Name

Many propositions of the *Tractatus* are elusive; many are dubious. But one that seems so obvious as to be hardly worth expressing is ‘A name refers to (bedeutet) an object. The object is its referent (Bedeutung)’ (3.203). This claim about names is exactly the kind of philosophical ‘theory’ that, in later writings, Wittgenstein seeks to undermine by the simple expedient of looking closely at how words are actually used. How are names used – do they always serve to refer to their bearers?

Peter Hacker leaves the conference earlier than expected, on Wednesday, but, quite by chance, soon after he does so, another participant joins the conference and this person, though not the spitting image of Peter, resembles him quite strikingly. I am too lazy, so late in the day, to learn this new guy’s name, but, just for a laugh, when speaking with friends, I refer to him as ‘Peter Hacker’ and my friends start adopting this usage too. I never get close enough to the new guy to read his name badge, but you can see, even at a distance, that it is quite a long name. So my friends and I are using the name ‘Peter Hacker’ to refer to someone whom we know not to be the bearer of that name. Consider some further uses of the name ‘Hacker’:

- I see Peter across a crowded room and joyfully cry out ‘Hacker’, choosing the surname because I know there to be many Peters in the room but only one Hacker.
- I confide to someone ‘Hacker is so called because he breaks into other people’s computers’.

- I hear that the astonishingly prolific Professor Hacker has several new volumes coming out in November and tell a colleague ‘I shall have to clear more space for Hacker on my bookshelf’.
- I see James Conant emerging from a conference room in which he has just presented a paper defending the ‘resolute’ reading of the *Tractatus*. He is looking miserable, crestfallen, almost suicidal. Although I do not know who was in the evidently hostile audience, I can make an educated guess at the identity of one member most likely to have given the speaker a rough ride, and, nodding towards Unlucky Jim, I knowingly whisper to my companion ‘Hacker’.

In all of these cases I am using the name ‘Hacker’ to do something other than to name or refer to Peter Hacker, and in not all of these cases could I properly substitute the name ‘Peter’ for ‘Hacker’. My aim in this paper is to examine apparent cases of failure of substitutivity of co-referring expressions, with a view to showing how those that have proved tricky to understand can be understood quite easily once Wittgenstein’s reflections on the uses of proper names are grasped. It is to their use that we should be looking: ‘Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life? – In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its breath?’ (*PI* §432).¹

II. The Fragility of Intuition

In his recent book *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Timothy Williamson claims ‘that much contemporary philosophy is vitiated by supposing that evidence in philosophy consists of intuitions which successful theory must explain’ (Williamson 2007: 5). In an otherwise scathing (but witty) review of that book, Hacker writes ‘This is one point in Williamson’s book which

¹ Some may here see a contrast with the *Tractatus* which seems to suggest that names are stagnant signs that represent objects (3.21). But, according to the *Tractatus*, it is *in a proposition* (Satz) that a name is the representative of an object (3.22), and a proposition is a propositional sign *in use* (3.11, 3.12, 3.326). There *is* a genuine contrast, however, because, in the *Tractatus*, the use of a proposition is a matter of projecting a possible situation, presenting a possible state of affairs, whereas the later writings are an effort to explore the *multiplicity* of uses to which sentences can be put.

is dead right'.² The idea that the job of philosophy is to vindicate rather than to question commonsense intuitions is, indeed a repugnant one, and the eponymous school of philosophy that championed commonsense is rarely mentioned these days, even inside Scotland. However, in the case of *semantic* intuitions, matters are more problematic. Semantic intuition just is commonsense about what words mean, and what words mean is how they are commonly used. Except in the case of certain technical expressions for an authoritative verdict on the correct meaning of which we defer to experts, meaning just is common use. For an ordinary expression, it would be absurd to claim that how it is used on the street, especially when that use is recorded in reputable, up-to-date dictionaries, is not the (or, at least, a) meaning of that expression.³ So one would be right to be wary of a philosophical theory that entails that the meaning that almost all of us attach to a particular word is incorrect. There have been such theories. Tarski argued that our ordinary use of 'true' is confused; Dennett, to the same conclusion about our ordinary use of the word 'pain'; Churchland has argued that our ordinary conception of beliefs as being part of the furniture of the mind is mistaken. One ought to be suspicious of such theories – which is not to say that they should be rejected without a hearing.

What about our semantic intuitions as they relate to the meanings and, consequently, the truth-values of whole sentences? In the case of single non-technical words, community use is constitutive of their meaning, but, in the case of many sentences, most members of a reputable community may be *wrong* about their truth value. This is obviously how it is with empirical claims that seemed, once upon a time, to be commonsensical but which subsequent science showed to be false. But it is also true of rather pedestrian sentences, where no science, but just a little interrogation of our semantic intuitions, may cause us to reverse our original, intuitive, assignments of meaning and of truth-value (Bach 2002). What happens, then, when a semantic theory entails that a sentence that most of us would say is true is false? Do we insist that to hold fast to the theory and abandon intuition is to allow the theoretical tail to wag the dog of good sense, or do we

² See also Hintikka 1999.

³ For an interesting discussion of our intuitions regarding the correct use of factive verbs, see Steven Pinker 2007, 7-8.

say that to hold fast to a semantic intuition that a plausible theory has revealed to be questionable is dogmatic and antithetical to the advancement of knowledge?

III. The Tanney Puzzle

We present here a ‘case study’ that takes as its starting point the fact that most people would accept as true

1) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent.

but would reject as false

2) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Superman.⁴

We should note that even a linguistically competent individual who is well acquainted with the movie and who is fully aware that Superman just is Clark Kent would be willing to accept 1) as an accurate description of part of the action. Julia Tanney accepts this too, but is then struck by an apparent anomaly. She writes:

Normally, I would be very sympathetic with the claim that there was a time, *t*₁, at which Lois kissed Superman but not (yet) Clark Kent. I note however that the sense in which Lois (at *t*₁) had not (yet) kissed Clark Kent would be the same as that in which Oedipus, although having slept with Jocasta, had not slept with his mother. But Jocasta hanged herself and Oedipus gouged out his eyes because there was no question for them of not accepting substitutivity.

Apart from the change of *dramatis personae*, the apparently only noteworthy difference between the kissing claim 1) and

3) Oedipus slept with Jocasta before he slept with his mother.

is that less clothes and more action are involved, yet somehow, intuitively, we take 1) to be true and 3) false. So this is the Tanney puzzle, and the challenge is to find a plausible rationale for this difference in truth-value assignment.

⁴ Examples can be multiplied *ad libitum*. Most people, for example, would say that ‘Clark Kent entered the phone booth and, seconds later, Clark Kent flew out’ is false.

IV. Reports of Propositional Attitudes

Some semantic theorists would reject this puzzle on the grounds that there is no puzzle. They would claim that there is no difference in truth-value between 1) and 3); both statements, they would say, are false and that, if we have an inclination to say that 1) is true, this is a mistake and one that is easily diagnosed: Lois kissed Superman; since Superman is Clark Kent, she *ipso facto* kissed Clark Kent – there is no question of her kissing Superman *before* She kissed Clark. But let us look at another type of case – reports of propositional attitudes – for which this type of reply looks much less persuasive.

In direct quotation, the reporter or rapporteur (R) lets the reportee (E) speak for him/herself and, after introducing them as E's, simply reproduces E's words and mimics the force with which they were uttered by preserving the tonal features characteristic of that force. Of course, E is not literally speaking for him/herself, since it's the reporter, R, who is doing the speaking, but R, as it were, steps back and does not tamper with E's words (though R may sometimes sneer at those words or convey, by a stress or by some grammatical element, his/her belief that E was exaggerating, prevaricating or lying). In *oratio obliqua*, by contrast, there are certain changes of words that are obligatory. If Mick says (non-theatrically, non-ironically etc.) to Jerry 'Will you marry me?' then I report this episode correctly by saying 'Mick asked Jerry whether she would marry him', and if I do not alter pronouns appropriately when reporting Mick's proposal – suppose, for example, that I say 'Mick asked Jerry whether you would marry me' – then my report is unfaithful and, indeed, false.

One of the conventions, then, for the indirect reporting in English of what someone said, is that the reporter must make appropriate pronominal substitutions on pain of speaking falsely. It is easy to conceive, however, of a possible language in which reported speech requires much the same grammatical paraphernalia as English, but in which the pronouns that would be used in an *oratio recta* report are obligatorily retained unaltered.⁵ What about the conventions for reporting, in English, what someone *believes* or *thinks*? In belief reports in English, the same pronoun-shift rules

⁵ Unfortunately, I have not, so far, discovered such a language, but I would not bet against finding one.

apply as apply for reported speech. The rationale is obvious enough. Suppose that Mick believes that Jerry is a better person than he is. For a belief that *p* of which a person is conscious of believing it and is capable of articulating it, having that belief is approximately having a settled disposition to say that *p*. Mick, roughly speaking, has a settled disposition to say ‘Jerry is a better person than I am’, so, in reporting his belief, we are reporting what he *would say*, and therefore make the same pronominal adjustments as for reporting a saying. This suggests that, generally speaking and *ceteribus paribus*, a true report reports how a reportee would express his or her beliefs. This principle for reporting – that I call the Perspectival Principle – is not a recommendation as to literary style; it is not a principle of rhetoric but a prescription (albeit a *ceteribus paribus* prescription) for *true* reporting. The use of quotation, in a direct report is, as we have seen, another means for the reporter to stand back and let the reportee, *E*, speak in his or her own voice.

Confirmation that correct reporting requires, other things being equal, saying things as the reportee sees them, can be had from examining reports where the perspectives of *R* and *E* sharply differ. Let me inform you that my son believes that Santa Claus comes down the chimney every Christmas Eve. You have now been informed, even though I have used a referring expression that I believe refers to nothing and which is therefore co-referential, so far as I am concerned, with ‘The Man in the Moon’. It would be foolhardy in the extreme for me to impose my perspective in reports of my son’s Yuletide beliefs. Were I to say to you ‘My son believes that the Man in the Moon comes down the chimney every Christmas Eve’, then I would not only have misled you, but would also have told you something *false*. (My son is not so stupid as to believe that the Man in the Moon could be at two places at once – in the moon and half way down someone’s chimney.) Likewise, were I reporting to you Lois’ beliefs at a time before she became aware that Clark Kent is Superman I would be lying if I said to you ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent flies’⁶, or, better, only in unusual sur-

⁶ Lois is sitting in the newspaper office snatching furtive glances at Clark Kent. There is something about him that she can’t quite put her finger on. Then it occurs to her that, whenever there’s a Superman-sighting, Clark is not around. She stares hard at Clark, her mind races back over events of the last few days, and suddenly it

roundings ('Umgebungen' and 'Umstände' are terms Wittgenstein uses pretty much interchangeably, e.g. *PI* §§155, 250, 412) could I use a token of that sentence to make a true statement. Surely only those besotted by a theory to the point of insanity would claim that Oedipus, about to set sail on his honeymoon, believed that he was going off to have sex with his mother.⁷ In accurately reporting his beliefs, we have to say things as *he* sees them.

V. When Substitution Fails to Preserve Truth-Value

One object may have two or more names and many uniquely identifying descriptions. If we say something true about that object then, in making that statement, it should not matter which singular term (which name or definite description of the object) we use, in the sense that a true statement should not be transformed into a false one merely by substituting a different singular term for the one used in the original statement. This seems to follow, quite trivially, from the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Given that 'a' and 'b' are referring expressions (names or definite descriptions) that pick out the same object, then, for any predicate 'F' the truth-value of 'Fa' has to be the same as the truth-value of 'Fb'. Or so it would seem. Yet, as we have just observed, where for 'F' we have a predicate ascribing a propositional attitude of an agent towards some object, then the singular term chosen by the speaker to refer to that object may have an influence on the truth-value of the ascription. It will be useful to look at some other contexts in which failure of substitutivity occurs.

dawns on her that Clark Kent is Superman. Here is another example of the Perspectival Principle. Although identity is commutative, it would have been wrong (misleading, false?) of me to conclude the above story '... and suddenly it dawns on her that Superman is Clark Kent'. In my report on the revealed identity, I give prominence to, by placing it first, the name that Lois would have used to refer to the person on whom she was focusing.

⁷ Among the besotted are some 'Direct Reference' theorists who would claim that Oedipus believed that he was going off to have sex with his mother, and some Freudian theorists who claim that he not only believed it but, deep down, wanted it too. The Direct Reference theorist could, however, distance himself from the Freudian by adding '... not knowing, even subconsciously, that his mother was his mother'.

The most obvious example is *metonymy*. If a referring expression is being used in a statement to refer to something other than its normal referent, then it is no surprise that the truth value of that statement is unlikely to survive replacement of that term with another that denotes the normal referent. Two slices of bread with ham between them did not leave without paying the bill, though the ham sandwich (viz., the guy whom the waitress identified via a description of what he ordered) did. If one accepts that the intentions of its user may sometimes help fix the referent of an expression, then metonymy is only apparent failure of substitutivity of co-referentials because the terms switched are not really co-referential.

Consider next quotational contexts. Here is a clearly invalid argument:

“Beijing” contains seven letters.

Beijing = 北京

“北京” contains seven letters.

On the sort of theory of quotation pioneered by Donald Davidson (1979), quotation marks help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it; usually what is pointed out is an inscription, a physical token. That material is *displayed* (rather than being referred to).⁸ Hence exchanging the material pointed to in the first premise with some quite different material (such as the Chinese inscription) will result in reference being made to a different shape, and will result in a sentence with a different truth-value – unless, of course, that latter material is another assemblage of seven letters. On a classical alternative theory due to Tarski (1933), the grammatical subject of the first premise is the name of a name. But, again, while what is true of Beijing is true of that city by any other name, what is true of the name ‘Beijing’ will not generally be true of alternative names for Beijing; substitutivity *salva veritate* is not to be expected.⁹ But, again, this is not a case of failure of substitutivity of co-referring expressions, because, while ‘Beijing’ and ‘北京’ are co-referring names, the quotations of those names

⁸ For discussion of this, see Zemach 1985, 194.

⁹ There are several other competing theories of quotation. Failure of substitutivity in quotational contexts may be regarded as a datum against which to measure, in the manner of Cappelen and Lepore 2007, the adequacy of any such theory.

are not. So, in neither metonymous nor quotational contexts is there real failure of substitutivity because, in both cases, what may have seemed the referent of the singular terms involved is not the real referent.

As is well known, Frege thought this also to be the case with attitude-ascribing contexts; he said that, in such contexts the referent (*Bedeutung*) of a singular term is its normal *sense* (*Sinn*). We are not, however, taking the Frege route. In treating reports of propositional attitudes as reports of what a reportee would *say* when expressing his or her beliefs, hopes, fears, desires etc., we are assimilating an attitude report to a report of what a reportee would say if disclosing those attitudes to the reporter in the reporter's own language. The form of a report is 'E would say, Att-ingly, *qu* (p)', where 'qu' is the function that quotes and translates E's perhaps unvoiced utterances that disclose his or her attitude, e.g. 'Pierre would say, belief-ingly, *qu* (Londres est jolie)'.

There is a famous example, due to Quine, which, at first sight anyway, seems to be a case where co-referring expressions genuinely cannot be switched *salva veritate*:

Giorgione was so called because of his size.

Giorgione = Barbarelli.

Barbarelli was so called because of his size.

Although this example has generated a lot of discussion in the literature, it simply turns on a trick. Here is a naked exposure of the trick:

Richard the lionhearted was so described because of his exceptional bravery.

They say that Cedric was chicken-livered, though why he was so described, I don't know.

Ergo, Richard and Cedric have some property in common, viz., being so described!!

It is, I take it, obvious, what has happened here. There is no property of *being so described* that Richard and Cedric have in common.¹⁰ In the first sentence, the property ascribed to Richard is that of being lion-hearted.

¹⁰ Similar remarks apply to *being true of its own quotation*, which, equally, is not a property. There is, then, no well defined question as to whether 'heterological' has the property of being true of its own quotation.

Here, ‘so’ is operating as a proquo – a word that stands in for the quotation of an expression – and, in the statement about Richard, that expression is ‘lionhearted’. The *Giorgione* argument exhibits a simple fallacy of equivocation – in the first premise, ‘was so called’ abbreviates ‘was called “Giorgione”’; in the conclusion, the same phrase abbreviates ‘was called “Barbarelli”’. The first statement can be rewritten as

Giorgione was called “Giorgione” because of his size.

This is a true statement and its truth value survives substitution of the referring term; it is *true* that Barbarelli was called “Giorgione” because of his size. (As we saw previously, terms within quotation marks are not available for substitution.) So Leibniz Law that identical objects have all their properties in common is not threatened.

Modal contexts seem to resist substitution of co-referring terms. It is true that

9 is necessarily greater than 7

but we intuitively think it false that

The number of the planets is necessarily greater than 7.

Following Kripke, we can interrogate this intuition. What planets is the speaker referring to? It is a human speaker, so he is referring to the planets in our solar system. Let us then make that explicit:

The number of planets in our solar system is necessarily greater than 7.

Is that true? Someone might say it is not, on the grounds that there could have been 8 or 14 planets in our solar system. But is that correct? If there were 8 or 14 planets, that would be a *different* solar system. That would be the solar system of a possible world perhaps not too dissimilar to our own world. So long as we insist that reference be rigid (Kripke) we can substitute *salva veritate* ‘Dthat [the number of planets in the solar system of the actual world]’ for ‘9’ (Kaplan), and here we have genuine co-reference and substitutivity *salva veritate*.

VI. Return to the Tanney Puzzle

The Tanney Puzzle was why substitutivity fails in the Lois case but not in the Oedipus. An obvious answer would be that, according to the Perspectival Principle, we should report things as the reportee would say them. Oedipus would not say ‘I slept with Jocasta before I slept with my mother’, whereas Lois would say ‘I kissed Superman before I kissed Clark Kent’. But would Lois be right to express herself that way? I think she would. Most writers on the subject seem to agree that Superman is identical to Clark Kent. Yet, if they were identical then, by Leibniz’ law, all their properties would be shared. Superman is superhuman, his powers include the power of unassisted flight. Define

x is supermanic as x is superhuman and possesses all Superman’s other essential attributes.

x is kentic as x is human and possesses all Clark Kent’s other essential attributes.

Superman, though superhuman, cannot do the logically impossible; in particular, he cannot be human and superhuman at the same time. For simplicity, let us work with a fictionalized version of the movie in which there is only one Superman-to-Clark switch and that it occurs at time t_1 (and that Lois kissed the leading male character once before t_1 , and once after). In the movie, then, there is an x such that

x is supermanic before t_1 , and x is kentic after t_1 .

Consider, following Goodman (1955), a precious stone that, at t_2 , changes from being an emerald to being a ruby. Then there is a y such that

y is an emerald before t_2 , and y is a ruby after t_2 .

This precious stone is an emeruby and is clearly neither an emerald nor a ruby, though it possesses the essential attributes of each at different times. Likewise, the individual in our simplified movie is superkentic – he is not identical to either Superman or Clark Kent, though he possesses the essential attributes of each at different times. Lois kissed *Superkent* before and after t_1 , but, in so doing, she kissed Superman before t_1 , and a *different* individual, Clark Kent, after t_1 . Unfortunately for Oedipus, Jocasta always was his mom; her essential properties never changed. Whereas Lois was

merely promiscuous, Oedipus was incestuous and, in Greece of the 6th Century B.C., incest was regarded more dimly than it is today.

This escape from the Tanney puzzle may seem unsatisfactory because surely there are cases of apparent failure of substitutivity where the object to which reference is made does not undergo essential change. Consider, for example, the British glamour model Jordan who was born 'Katie Price', a name still used by friends and family and indeed by Katie herself when not in glamorous circumstances (Price 2004). Katie, except when stripped for professional action, looks rather unremarkable and unattractive. It is Ernest's birthday, and his wife promises to buy him, as a birthday present, an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan. We should think Ernest's wife wicked and deceitful if what she actually gives him on his birthday is an inflateable doll that looks like Katie Price. In these circumstances, truth is not preserved in substituting 'Katie Price' for 'Jordan' in the statement

Ernest wants an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan.

The Perspectival Principle suggests that we establish what Ernest would say if asked. What he would say is 'I want an inflateable doll that looks like Jordan' and, just so as to avoid all possibility of disappointment, might add 'and I definitely do not want one that looks like Katie Price'. He doesn't much like the look of Katie Price, but he loves the look of Katie Price when glamourised up – and Katie Price glamourised up is Jordan.

It may seem, at this point, that, having successfully identified the referents of the names 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent', we should now be looking for an answer to the question 'What is the referent of "Jordan"?'. It may even seem as if we have found one, namely that 'Jordan' refers to the fusion of those time-slices of Katie when she is glamourised up, just as (to borrow an example of David Pitt's) a stoat is called an ermine *when its fur turns white during the winter*. Pitt himself would take the view that 'Jordan' refers to an *alter ego* of the *primum ego* Katie Price, and he expends a lot of energy examining what kind of entity, metaphysically and legally, an *alter ego* is (Pitt 2001). The ease with which we were able to solve the Tanney puzzle has created a danger of thinking that, in all circumstances of use, a name must have a determinate referent, though not, perhaps, its standard one. But the very assumption that every name has to have a fixed referent needs to be questioned. The general philosophical claim that Witt-