Laura Basu

Ned Kelly as Memory Dispositif

Media and Cultural Memory/ Medien und kulturelle Erinnerung

Edited by / Herausgegeben von
Astrid Erll · Ansgar Nünning

13

De Gruyter

Laura Basu

Ned Kelly as Memory Dispositif

Media, Time, Power, and the Development
of Australian Identities

De Gruyter

Ned Kelly, portrait taken before his execution, 1880.
(State Library of Victoria)

Acknowledgements

Firstly I must thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), who made this project financially possible. Next, huge thanks to Ann Rigney, my excellent PhD supervisor, whose guidance throughout has been invaluable. Thanks also to Rosemarie Buikema, Frank Kessler, Paulo de Medeiros, Susannah Radstone, and to Felicity Collins. My thanks to Astrid Erll and Kiene Brillenburg-Wurth for their great support and input.

The Research Institute for History and Culture (OGC) has provided much needed administrative assistance, and Jose van Aelst in particular has been somebody to whom I have always felt I could turn with any question. I give special thanks to the entire Dynamics of Cultural Remembrance group – Paul Bijl, Alana Gillespie, Jesseka Batteau, David Wertheim, Chiara de Cesari, and Nicole Immler – who have provided a greatly appreciated support network throughout.

My trips to Australia have been crucial to the completion of this book. I would like to thank all the people at the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University who gave me such organisational and intellectual support. Thanks too to Rachel and Gordo for putting me up and putting up with me, and to the entire Hardley family for their wisdom, enthusiasm, and hospitality. Thanks also to Darry Bowes for his time and important input.

Thank you to my friends, wherever in the world they may be, who have supplied me with an endless amount of much appreciated distraction, and to Erik, for your giant loveliness this year. Thanks to all the family in India, and to my Grandparents, who I wish could be here to read this. Most of all, thanks to my family, the Basus – Ann, Dipak, and Jay – and Tamara, who couldn't have given me more love and support and who have been with me every step of the way. And here's to Sprout on the way!

Contents

Introduction

Nineteenth-century outlaw Ned Kelly is perhaps Australia's most famous historical figure. Ever since the commencement of his outlawry in 1878 his story has been repeated time and again, in every conceivable medium.[1] In 1942 Clive Turnbull wrote, "Ned Kelly is the best known Australian, our only folk hero. The explorers, the administrators, the colonial politicians, are little more than names on the map […] In a community whose vista is still cluttered with the shoddy and the second rate only one figure is larger than life-size […] Surely it is a remarkable man who can thus impress himself upon the national consciousness, who in sixty years can pass into legend!" (1). In the seventy years that have passed since this statement was made there has been no diminution in the strength or force of the memory of this young Australian bushranger; on the contrary, if anything there has been since the turn of the millennium a veritable explosion of all things Kelly, epitomised by the appearance of a plethora of dancing Kellys in the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. His latest incarnation, according to some Australian newspapers and magazines, is even as fellow-Australian "cyber outlaw" Julian Assange (Lowry 2010; Izzard 2010). Although the value of his memory has been hotly contested – indeed arguably because of this contestation – he remains perhaps *the* national icon of Australia.

"Julian Assange is the Ned Kelly of the digital age"
Article on the age.com.au

---

1 Several bibliographies and overviews of Ned Kelly representations exist. See *Ned Kelly's World*; McDonald; Innes; Seal 2002.

This book will show how the cultural memory of Kelly has always functioned in both radical and highly conservative ways, sometimes both at once. It appears to exist in an eternally contradictory state, a multistable figure, an image – like the famous duck-rabbit – that contains multiple and competing images. This curious condition is linked to a series of complex and contradictory contributions the Kelly memory has made to the national identity, playing a part in the many inclusions and exclusions entailed in the formation and negotiation of such an identity. Ever since his outlawry and his execution in 1880 (even before Federation in 1901), the identities invested in the Australian nation and those invested in Kelly have, in a two-way dynamic, fused into and strengthened each other, so that Kelly is in many ways a symbol for the national identity. Kelly has come to stand for an anti-imperialist, working-class subaltern Irish-inflected national identity. At the same time he has come to represent and enforce the whiteness, hyper-heterosexual masculinity, and violence of "Australianness".

The roles Kelly's memory has played in formations and negotiations of identity are occasioned, as I would like to prove here, by specific sets of relationships that have composed the memory over time. Enduring cultural memories are never made by politicians, monuments, or individual media representations alone, although both media and politics – or power relations – are essential to their existence; they are formed and develop through tangles of relations that reach back and forth across time. The captivating case of Ned Kelly furnishes a very useful opportunity to examine in detail the specific and multiple relationships of media, power, and time that form a cultural memory over a period of 130 years, and how their particular constellations inform identity constructions. Questions of media, temporality, and power have all been crucial to the emerging field of memory studies, and the case of Kelly provides a way in which to identify and analyse how they are all interwoven in what I term *memory dispositifs*, which are central in the assembling of cultural identities.

1. Sites and Dispositifs

When I began this project, I was thinking of Ned Kelly in terms of being a *memory site* or *lieu de mémoire*, as described by Pierre Nora. Although I have since moved away from this conceptual framework, it remains an important starting point from which to understand the constituency and nature of cultural memories. Nora describes *lieux de mémoire* as places (literal or symbolic) where "memory crystallizes and secretes itself". Lieux de mémoire develop in the wake of the erosion of *milieux de mémoire*. These latter are "real environments of memory" associated with tradition, custom, and "the repetition of the ancestral". The former, on the other hand, are constructed sites of extern-

alised or "false" memory, which arise due to "a movement toward democratization and mass culture on a global scale" (Nora 1989: 7). According to Nora, we are, with the help of mass media, distanced from "the realm of true memory", and it is precisely because of this distance or externalisation that we feel compelled to construct sites of memory: "if we were able to live within memory, we would not have needed to consecrate *lieux de mémoire* in its name" (8).

What exactly are *lieux de mémoire*? Nora's category is very broad. He tells us that there are concrete memory sites such as cemeteries, museums and anniversaries, and more "intellectually elaborate ones" such as the notions of generation and lineage. Memory sites can be portable, topographical, monumental; there are public sites of memory and private ones, "pure sites" and "composite sites", sites that are dominant and sites that are dominated. The list goes on. What is clear is that "the most fundamental purpose of the *lieu de mémoire* is to stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, to immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial – just as if gold were the only memory of money – all of this in order to capture a *maximum amount of meaning in the fewest of signs*" (19, my emphasis). Memory sites can be "anything administering the presence of the past within the present", and they only exist to the extent of their capacity for metamorphosis, "an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation of their ramifications" (19-20).

Using Foucault's scarcity principle, Ann Rigney shows that memory sites function by virtue of the fact that they "elicit intense attention on the part of those doing the remembering and thereby become a self-perpetuating vortex of symbolic investment (this process recalls Foucault's reference to an 'internal proliferation of meaning')". Sites of memory help to reduce "the proliferation of disparate memories" and provide "common frameworks for appropriating the past" (Rigney 2005: 18). They serve to concentrate or conflate memories, whereby "memorial layers" are formed; Rigney gives as an example of this the celebration of 11 November in Britain, which has now become an occasion "not just for commemorating the end of World War 1 in its specificity, but more generally an occasion for commemorating British casualties in various wars" (19). Rigney, like many other cultural memory scholars now, moves on from Nora's notion that sites of memory, with all the mediatisation and externalisation they entail, are somehow "false" or "unnatural", asking instead "what if uses of 'external' sources of information are no longer seen as regrettable manifestations of memory loss, but as the order of the day?" (14).

Rigney's development of the concept is valuable in its rejection of any straightforward distinction between "real" and "false" memory. It also provides important insights into how cultural memories work, which are highly applicable to the Ned Kelly case study. As will become apparent, the Kelly

memory, forged and sustained in large part by mass mediatisation, has be-
come a "self-perpetuating vortex of symbolic investment". It does function
as a site of conflation and layering of memories, and though, like all memo-
ries, it involves a degree of stability, it is also always in flux, constantly being
remade and adapted. However, while the term remains a useful starting
point, it needs to be developed from new perspectives to allow for a fuller
understanding of exactly how memories are formed and function: the pre-
cise processes, elements, and relations that compose them and make them
work, and the nature of the work they do.

In order to do this, I would like to turn to the concept of the *dispositif*,
as described by Foucault and Deleuze, and to see the memory of Ned Kelly
as a *memory dispositif*. The term dispositif emerged as a theoretical concept in
the 1970s with Foucault and with Jean-Louis Baudry. It is usually translated
as "apparatus". This translation might account for why the exact nature of a
dispositif as used by Foucault has received relatively little attention in Eng-
lish language scholarship, given the enormous amount of attention his work
has received in general. The translation "apparatus" is problematic because
it has connotations of the mechanical and of fixity. Also, as Frank Kessler
points out, "apparatus" does not cover the aspect of a "disposition" implied
by dispositif, "both in the sense of 'arrangement' and [of a] 'tendency'" that
the arrangement brings forth (Kessler 2006: 1). The term dispositif usually
refers to a constellation of heterogeneous elements within a system, and the
relationships between them, which produce a particular "tendency". It has
been developed mainly in the fields of media studies and especially film
studies. Baudry, the founder of "apparatus theory", uses it to analyse the
way the film apparatus positions the spectator, both topologically and ideo-
logically. Within television studies the term dispositif can refer to a number
of different phenomena, including "the format, the type of enunciation, the
set-up in a studio, the structure of the program etc" (7). Noel Nel claims
that there are multiple televisual dispositifs: technical, economic, and semi-
otic and aesthetic. Jacques Aumont extends the concept to encompass
painting and panoramas, describing the dispositif as that which regulates the
relationship of the spectator with the image in a certain symbolic and social
context (8). Outside the field of media and communications, it is used as an
analytical concept and as a technical term in all kinds of areas such as psy-
cho-therapy, education, traffic flow management, and international develop-
ment (1).

Different media are very important aspects of what I conceive as mem-
ory *dispositifs,* however I will not be using the term to talk about specific
types of media dispositif, nor will I be using the work of Baudry or others
who have cultivated the concept within film or media studies. Rather I will
take as a starting point Foucault's work on the model along with Deleuze's
essay "What is a *Dispositif*?", and develop it using a range of ideas drawn

from memory studies, at the same time trying to introduce the term to that field. I hope that bringing together these two areas of thought will shed new light on both, and prove fruitful in considering the dynamics between stability and flux, the simultaneous concretising and dissolving of identities, that are involved with all cultural memories, as well as dispositifs.

Foucault writes, "What I'm trying to pick out with the term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus [here dispositif is translated as apparatus]. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I'm trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements" (Foucault 1980: 194). The first point, then, is that a dispositif is a particular constellation of elements and the system of relations between them, which are relations of power and knowledge and, importantly, which constitute subjectivities. As Giorgio Agamben explains in his book *What is an Apparatus?*, "apparatuses [...] always imply a process of subjectification, that is to say, they [...] produce their subject" (Agamben 2009: 11). Foucault discusses, among others, the dispositif of sexuality and the medico-legal dispositif, whereby psychiatry and the penal system became co-dependent.

Secondly, Foucault makes it clear that a dispositif has a strategic function, though the strategy has no one subject. He writes, "I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of [...] formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an *urgent need*. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function" (195). As an example he describes the emergence of the dispositif of mental illness and its treatment as fulfilling the function of assimilating a floating population which had become "burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy". The relations within a dispositif, though strategic, can however have utterly unpredictable outcomes to which the dispositif must adapt and which it must reappropriate.

Thirdly, a dispositif is a historical formation, and the relations which compose it change over time. Foucault tells us that between the ensemble of elements "whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary widely" (195). The dynamics within dispositifs, however, remain "relatively stable" (200). Deleuze's dispositif is less stable than Foucault's. He uses the idea of *lines* to convey its thoroughly relational nature: "But what is a *dispositif?* In the first instance it is a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature." Further, "the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their

own right […] but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together, and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to *changes in direction*, bifurcating and forked, and subject to *drifting*. Visible objects, affirmations which can be formulated, forces exercised and subjects in position are like vectors and tensors. Thus the three major aspects which Foucault successively distinguishes, Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity, are by no means contours given once and for all, but series of variables which supplant one another" (Deleuze 1992: 159, original emphasis). The different lines which make up a dispositif are, therefore, always moving, they can change direction, double back on themselves and can branch off, multiply or break. As I will argue, the tensions within dispositifs between stability and movement are especially strong within memory dispositifs.

For Deleuze, the dispositif is a method as well as a concept: "Untangling these lines within a social apparatus [translation of *dispositif*] is, in each case, like drawing a map, doing cartography, surveying unknown landscapes, and this is what he [Foucault] calls 'working on the ground'" (159). Siegfried Jager and Florentine Maier (2001) have also written about "dispositive analysis", as a development of discourse analysis and a way to analyse the relations between a wide range of phenomena. It would mean identifying the constituent elements within a given dispositif, the relations between them, and the subject positions they bring about.

This book will show how the concept and method of the dispositif can be very valuably used in the study of cultural memory. In a specifically mnemonic dispositif, as I will demonstrate, the systems of relations are organised around particular *historical figures*. Jan Assmann argues that cultural memory forms and fixes around "figures of memory": "fateful events of the past", which a culture responds to differently each time they are revisited, and around which identity arranges itself. Figures of memory are maintained by "festivals, rites, epics, poems, images etc": in short, all forms of media. Assmann calls these figures the "fixed points" of cultural memory, anchoring and stabilising it (Assmann 1995: 129). If this category were to be expanded to include historical personages as well as events, we would find in it the core of a dispositif of memory. Via specific sets of relations, particular meanings or identities are attached to particular figures, which then become loci for the transformation and proliferation of those identities. The memory dispositif can help us move the discussion of memory sites forward in important ways. It can be a method for exploring cultural memories in enough detail to get a grip on exactly what they are made of and how they function. It can shed light on the processes by which cultural memories are galvanised and develop over time. An analysis of 130 years in the life of one memory dispositif will show us how cultural memories can

contain potential or latent meanings which can become operative within different constellations, both by design and unintentionally.

In order to explore the workings of memory dispositifs I look in detail at the particular case of Ned Kelly. Within the Ned Kelly memory dispositif, I identify three types of relation, referred to in my opening paragraphs. These relations are medial, temporal, and political. These three aspects are all thoroughly entangled and shift over time. They invest certain identities in the figure of Kelly which, in turn, proliferates and alters those identities. Matters of media, temporality, and politics, or power, have all been central to recent investigations into cultural memory, and seem to be some of the main constituencies of all cultural memories. In many analyses these three domains overlap; however, the exact nature of their interaction in the formation and development of cultural memories and the work those relations compel the memories to do in terms of identity construction have not yet been the subject of thorough investigation. This book is such a study, and will hopefully shed new light on the consistency and functions of cultural memories at a time when matters of memory are more urgent than ever.

I will begin here by introducing the most important ways (for my purposes) that media, temporality, and politics have been dealt with so far within the field of memory studies, then I will introduce discussions of identity and specifically Australian national identity, and lastly I will give a summary of the Ned Kelly affair and the ways in which he has been remembered.

2. Media

Since the explosion of interest in cultural memory beginning about three decades ago, media have been acknowledged to be crucial not only in the transmission but also the construction of memories. Scholars have taught us how different media work differently in the building and shaping of memories. The specificity of media can work at the level of both technology and genre. Andreas Huyssen writes, "We do know that the media do not transport public memory innocently. They shape it in their very structure and form. And here – in line with McLuhan's well-worn point that the medium is the message – it becomes highly significant that the power of our most advanced electronics depends entirely on quantities of memory. Bill Gates may just be the latest incarnation of the old American ideal – more is better. But 'more' is now measured in memory bytes and in the power to recycle the past" (20). Andrew Hoskins writes of "digital network memory", brought about by Internet technologies: "Contemporary memory is principally constituted neither through retrieval nor through the representation of some content of the past in the present. Rather, it is embedded in and distributed through our sociotechnical practices […] [S]o called 'Web 2.0' platforms include file sharing

systems, for example *Flickr* and *YouTube,* which mesh the private and the public into an immediate and intensely visual and auditory present past. The very use of these systems contributes to a new memory – an emergent digital network memory – in that communications in themselves dynamically add to, alter, and erase, a kind of living archival memory" (Hoskins 2009*:* 91). On film, Verena-Susanna Nungesser writes, "the technical possibilities afforded by the medium of film have also played a role [in the interest of film in memory], by allowing film-makers to thematize memory not only in the stories they tell but in the very form in which they do so" (Nungesser 2009: 31). She describes the possibilities offered by film flash-backs, voice-overs, and analeptic narration for exploring and structuring memories. Aleida Assmann, meanwhile, discusses cultural memory in terms of "the text in its written and printed form", considering concepts of writing with regard to cultural memory in the Renaissance, the eighteenth century, and "in our age of mass media and electronic technology" (124).

It is not only media technologies but also genres that shape cultural memory. John Frow tells us that "textual meaning is carried by formal structures more powerfully than by explicit thematic content; […] what texts do and how they are structured have greater force than what they say they are about; and […] genre – by which I mean the kinds of talking and writing, of imaging and structured sound – is perhaps the most important of the structures by which texts are organised" (129). It follows that memories can also be generated generically. Ann Rigney, for instance, considers novels from this perspective, asking, "what role do literary texts play in the formation of cultural memory?" (Rigney 2004: 362). She writes of Walter Scott, "Through his public role as 'author of Waverley' […] Scott's work can be said to have worked as a channel for local memories, both living and inherited, whereby various accounts of the past could converge into a common frame of reference, or what Halbwachs (1994 [1925]) called a 'social framework' of memory […] Benedict Anderson (1991 [1983]) and, more recently, Jonathan Culler (1999) have pointed out the ways in which the very form of fictional narrative meant that novels could create the sense of a shared social space and a shared historical time" (374). Rigney argues that the literary qualities of a historical novel may make it more memorable than a history book, more able to help fix and stabilise certain memories, more able to transpose and conflate memories, to give moral values to them, and to help recycle them across generations. She concludes that, "'artificial' – even patently false – memories crafted by writers may prove more tenacious in practice than those based on facts which have not been submitted to the same creative reworking. An uncomfortable idea for historians, perhaps, but an interesting challenge for the literary scholar" (391).

Others consider sub-genres and hybrid genres in their mnemonic specificity (see Radstone 2008; Kuhn 2000). Astrid Erll links literary forms to

what she terms "modes of remembering", arguing, "In the course of 'memorial history' (that is, the history of how events or persons are recalled by social communities) it is to a great degree the mode of remembering which effects changes in the shape and meaning of the past. Modes of remembering are modes of re-presenting the past" (Erll 2006: 163). Erll maps the changes in how literature has recalled the so-called "Indian Mutiny" over time. To give three examples, her first mode is "the experiential mode of remembering", which came with early eyewitness accounts and whose function was to narrativise the events and convey experience. The second mode is "the monumental mode", when the historical occurrences became mythologised through the genre of juvenile literature. A later mode of remembrance is "the demythologising mode", which deconstructed the myth that had been established through the monumental mode. Erll does not associate this mode with a specific genre but with a particular novel, J.G. Farrell's *The Siege of Krishnapur* (1973). The novel works by "taking up many of the literary topoi developed over more than a century of 'Mutiny' writing and then deconstructing them one by one", and by refusing to establish a hero (176).

A single representation in itself can exemplify a mode of remembering; however, no text, genre, or technology works alone to form a cultural memory. Most cultural memories are made up of many different representations in a variety of genres and media. Moreover, it is not only a collection of representations that makes a memory but their constellation: their positioning in relation to each other. Relations might be, among many other things, incorporative, deconstructive, or hostile. *The Siege of Krishnapur*, as an exemplifier of Astrid Erll's demythologising mode of remembrance, might have all three of these relationships with the "Indian Mutiny" literature that preceded it. It hostilely incorporates mythologizing strategies in order to deconstruct them. These media constellations make up overarching discourses, and interact with the temporal and political forces together making up memory dispositifs, as will be seen here in the case of Ned Kelly.

3. Time

These medial relationships are also necessarily all temporal ones. Different media technologies and genres are associated with different temporalities, and of course temporality is essential to any analysis of memory. Texts relate to each other back and forth across time to form cultural memories and all memories involve a complex of multiple temporalities. For Andrew Hoskins, the distinguishing features of the types of memory brought about by television and the Internet are their unique temporalities, be it "real-timeness" or continual digital emergence. Radstone discusses the different generic tempo-

ralities of the confessional novel and the memoir, in *The Sexual Politics of Time* (2007). She quotes Francis R. Hart to sum up: "'Confession' is a personal history that seeks to communicate or express the essential nature, the truth, of the self […] 'Memoir' is personal history that seeks to articulate or repossess the historicity of the self […] 'Memoir' places the self relative to time, history, cultural pattern and change. Confession is ontological […] memoir historical or cultural" (17).

Much attention has been paid to the revolutionary changes in temporality brought about with the shifts from the "pre-modern" to "modernity" to "postmodernity"; shifts which have changed the shape and structure of memory and which, according to some, have been the very cause of the recent surge of interest in matters of memory. In his influential book *Futures Past*, Reinhart Koselleck argues that, with the advent of "modernity" in the late eighteenth century, the experience of time was radically transformed, and that the past and the future became "relocated" in relation to each other. According to Koselleck, the ever-accelerating pace of modern life left people with briefer periods of time in which to assimilate new experiences and adapt to social and technological changes. This led to an unprecedented increase in the demands that were placed on the future: the promise of progress offered by modernity produced hopes that broke free of the present and projected utopian visions of unbounded opportunity onto the future.

Andreas Huyssen observes a shift from Koselleck's "futures past" to the temporal condition of "present pasts", beginning in the 1980s. He claims that there has been a recent "turning towards the past", in contrast to the privileging of the future that was characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century. He links the phenomenal increase in concerns with memory to an augmented fear of amnesia, brought about by the new technological and social changes associated with globalisation, not least advances in media technologies. He asks, "Could it be that the surfeit of memory in this media-saturated culture creates such an overload that the memory system itself is in constant danger of imploding, thus triggering fear of forgetting?" (Huyssen 2003: 17). He argues that the current obsession with remembering and dread of forgetting are related to a shrinking of the expansion of the present, positing "a great paradox: the more the present of advanced consumer capitalism prevails over the past and the future, sucking both into an expanding synchronous space, the weaker its grip on itself, the less stability of identity it provides for contemporary subjects […] There is both too much and too little present at the same time" (23). This has brought with it a malaise engendered by "a significant entropy of our sense of future possibilities" (25). We see that what Erll calls "memorial history" – defined above – is itself shaped by alterations in our perceptions of time.

One feature of the recent "postmodern" interest in memory has been a rise in the popularity of "presentism". This is the idea that the past does not determine the present but that contingencies in the present determine our perception of the past. Erll describes "the selectivity and perspectivity inherent in the creation of versions of the past according to present knowledge and need" (Erll 2009b: 30), while Olick and Robbins point out that "the past is produced in the present and is thus malleable" and that "groups use the past for present purposes" (Olick and Robbins 1998: 128). Others have rejected the notion of the absolute malleability of group memory: "traditional patterns of belief and conduct […] are very insistent; they will not wholly release their grip on those who would suspend or abolish them" (Shils 1981: 200). This debate indicates the tension between the persistence and malleability of the past, one which, along with a series of other tensions, could be usefully explored using the model of the memory dispositif. Crucially, as will be seen, while all dispositifs shift and adapt, memory dispositifs are simultaneously anchored in the past, the historical figure at their centre providing a sort of inertia.

Questions of temporality are very much involved with matters of national identity. In Benedict Anderson's (1991 [1983]) account, the emergence of print capitalism caused a transformation of temporality that made it possible to "think the nation", initiating the "empty, homogenous time" of the nation-state. Imagined communities were secured across wide territories by newspapers and novels, which produced a shared culture and a simultaneous experience of time among people who had never met. These ideas about the homogeneity – or heterogeneity – of time are profoundly political, whether about relations within or between nations. Johannes Fabian, for instance, persuasively argues that the denial of temporal homogeneity, or "coevalness" between nation-states is the "scandal" of anthropology. Anthropology is guilty of "allochronism" – the perception that people in other places inhabit other, earlier times. Allochronism, a central term in this work, is the strategy that accompanied imperialist domination and that continues to underlie the politics of "foreign aid". It can work within as well as between nation-states, as in the present case. Many scholars are critical of the notion of homogenous time, seeing it as an ideal rather than a reality. Homi Bhabha (1990) argues that national narratives tend to be split into double time, so that on the one hand people are continually in the process of becoming identified with the nation, and on the other hand are positioned as always already identified with the nation. Partha Chatterjee claims that "people can only imagine themselves in empty homogenous time; they do not live in it" (Chatterjee 2005: 927). He argues that in the real space of the modern nation time is "heterogeneous, unevenly dense." He cites a number of examples of heterogeneous time from the "postcolonial world" such as "industrial capitalists delaying the closing of a business deal because

they hadn't yet had word from their respective astrologers, or industrial workers who would not touch a new machine until it had been consecrated with appropriate religious rites." However, he does not condone internal allochronism any more than he does homogeneity: "To call this the co-presence of several times – the time of the modern and the times of the pre-modern – is only to endorse the utopianism of Western modernity. Much recent ethnographic work has established that these 'other' times are not mere survivals of a pre-modern past: they are new products of the encounter with modernity itself. One must therefore call it the heterogeneous time of modernity" (928).

This brings us back to our earlier questions about the epochal upheavals in memorial history, from the pre-modern to the modern to the postmodern, categories that require a homogenous and linear conception of time. Radstone writes, "Epochal temporality constitutes only one line […] in what might be conceived of as the symphonic score of time – a figure that may be loosened from the reductiveness of linear and progressive models of time if we remember that scores, or parts of a score, *may* fold back upon themselves through infinite repetitions and reprises" (Radstone 2007: 9). This is not necessarily to dispense with the category of the modern altogether, since that would be "tantamount to foreclosing on modernity's potentially universal project of enfranchisement and empowerment" (11). Epochal time might, then, be seen as one line in a *dispositif* of relational lines. Looking at the workings of a memory dispositif over a period of 130 years would enable us to map what states of time and what temporalities are at work within one cultural memory at a given time and how they relate to each other *across* time. It would show how temporalities themselves can be forces that govern how a memory is made and functions, and how they intersect with other forces to create subject positions. The case of Ned Kelly is ideally suited to such a project. He became a popular hero during the late nineteenth century, at the moment when industrial capitalism had given rise to powerful nation-states with empires – of which the Australian colonies were part – and to mass culture as we know it. A first generation, mass-media national celebrity, Kelly is both a product of the technological and social changes that were seen to epitomise his era, and a symbol of resistance against them.

4. Power

Questions of power are absolutely central to any discussion of cultural memory, as seen in the above references to nation-building. In the nineteenth century, memories were made and instrumentalised in attempts to forge cohesive and fixed national identities in the control of the nation-state. According to