

Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast



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Edited by
René Dirven
Ralf Pörings

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Preface

This volume intends to offer a relatively complete state of affairs in metaphor and metonymy research in cognitive linguistics and related research areas.

The editors want to express their thanks to all the contributors for their willingness to cooperate in this project and to take into account the views expressed in other contributions to this volume. Seldom before has there been a collective volume with so many internal cross-references.

Precisely for this reason, the reference formula "in this volume" would have been a permanent hindrance for the reader's fluent reading automatisms. Therefore we have introduced an iconic equivalent in the form of an asterisk (*). This may occur after the name of an author, after the year of publication, and before a page number, as, for instance, Turner & Fauconnier *474, meaning "p. 474 in this volume."

The editors also want to thank several other people, besides all the contributors. In the first place we want to thank the Mouton de Gruyter staff in the persons of Anke Beck, Birgit Sievert and Wolfgang Konwitschny for their quick and efficient handling of so many managerial problems. Next we want to thank all the publishing houses for granting us the permission to reprint the (heavily or slightly) revised papers. The list of the original publications is presented on the next pages.

Last but not least we want to thank Dipl.-Soz.-Wiss. Jörg Behrndt for his perfect technical handling of the formatting and the indexing of a collective volume of this size in all its manifold dimensions.

Duisburg, January 2002

René Dirven and Ralf Pörings

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Introduction

René Dirven

Whenever George Lakoff got bored with MIT in the sixties, he went across the place to Harvard University to listen to Roman Jakobson. Here we find the living link between the past and the present, between a long nineteenth century tradition and its rebirth at the end of the twentieth century. Jakobson's (1956) brief paper "The metaphoric and metonymic poles" was the first linguistic light signal in an age of objectivist structuralism and oncoming formalism. It came as an echo of a smouldering, but historically very strong belief in the power of metaphor and metonymy (see Nerlich & Clarke*). Even more remarkable is that Jakobson was the first to pay equal attention to both metonymy and metaphor. This balanced view was probably still impossible at the time of the metaphor revolution launched by Lakoff & Johnson's canon shot known as *Metaphors We Live by* (1980). It took almost another twenty years to fully redress the balance between metaphor and metonymy, culminating in Panther & Radden's *Metonymy in Language and Thought* (1999) and Barcelona's *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads* (2000). The present volume comes full circle again in that its contributions, mainly cognitive linguistic ones, look at metaphor and metonymy simultaneously, comparing and contrasting them all the time. It is intended to be a representative survey of combined metaphor and metonymy research during the last decade. Therefore this collection of papers contains both new papers and ones which are already published, but less accessible or heavily revised. The volume's overall theme is structured in four main sections:

Section 1: The metonymic and the metaphoric
(Jakobson, Bartsch, Dirven, Warren).

- Section 2: The two-domain approach
(Kövecses et al., Croft, Barcelona,
Panther/Thornburg).
- Section 3: The interaction between metaphor and metonymy
(Taylor, Goossens, Riemer, Radden, Geeraerts).
- Section 4: New breakthroughs: blending and primary scenes
(Turner/Fauconnier; Ruiz de Mendoza/Díez;
Grady/Johnson; Nerlich/Clarke).

Section 1 introduces and further examines Jakobson's distinction between the metaphoric pole based on similarity and the metonymic pole based on contiguity. By concentrating on categorisation and new concept formation, Bartsch underpins Jakobson's distinctions from a philosophical point of view. Dirven links Jakobson's poles with the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of linguistic structure and is in search of the meeting point of metaphor and metonymy on the conceptual continuum constituted by these two poles. And Warren exploits the notion of the syntagmatic to account for the typical characteristics of referential metonymy.

Whereas in Section 1 metaphor and metonymy are seen from an external viewpoint as two poles, different perspectives, or mental strategies, Section 2 groups papers taking an internal look into the structure of metaphor and metonymy. That is, the two-domain approach is first linked to its underlying philosophical claims and placed in a wider scientific context in a paper by Kövecses et al. One of the most criticised aspects of the Lakovian approach was the two-domain claim for metaphor and the one-domain claim for metonymy. This problem is tackled in the contribution by Croft, whose merit it is to have built up a very strong scaffolding for the domain theory. Barcelona's contribution applies Croft's distinctions to a number of vexing questions left unsolved in the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy. Whereas all these discussions and the Lakovian theory are mainly concerned with lexical conceptualisations, Panther and Thornburg apply the two-domain approach to an area of morphology, thus providing evidence for the basic similarity of all types of linguistic conceptualisation.

Section 3 groups a number of papers that deal with the interaction between metonymy and metaphor, and especially with the metonymic basis of a great many metaphors. Taylor discusses the internal variation between pre-metonymic and metonymic expressions, and has been the first to point out the metonymic basis of a number of metaphors. Goossens analyses the ways a metonymy and a metaphor can merge, captured in the term *metaphonymy*. Riemer, however, criticises the metaphonymy analysis and proposes to treat them as post-metonymies. Radden offers a broad canvas of all types of metonymic bases of metaphors. Geeraerts finally builds a prismatic model with syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes, charting the many ways metaphor and metonymy can interact in idioms and compounds.

Section 4 presents the two breakthroughs the nineties saw in the prevailing two-domain approach: a multi-domain (better a multi-space) approach and a pre-domain approach. The 'multi-space approach' was born when Fauconnier & Turner (1994) applied Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces to the analysis of metaphor and metonymy. Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez adopt this model, though rejecting one of its crucial aspects, and apply it to the interaction between metaphor and metonymy. This contribution could therefore equally well have figured in Section 3, except for its use of the multi-space model. A second breakthrough is Grady & Johnson's discovery of primary metaphors, based on the distinction between primary scenes and subscenes, which is at the basis of much domain mapping. The closing chapter by Nerlich & Clarke briefly introduces the technicalities of the multi-space model, and offers a broad view of the precursors of domain mapping, fuzziness, family resemblances and blending in 19th century non-mainstream linguistics.

For the sake of an optimum of accessibility, each of the contributions will now be characterised and summarised in a more detailed way.

Section 1: The metonymic and the metaphoric poles (Jakobson, Bartsch, Dirven, Warren)

Roman Jakobson (1971* [1956]) was convinced that the metaphoric and the metonymic are the two fundamental poles or manifestations of human behaviour, as he called it. His brief chapter "The metaphoric and metonymic poles" concludes other chapters all dealing with aphasia. The two extreme cases of aphasia are 'selection aphasia,' the disturbance of the ability of substituting words for other words, and agrammatism, the disturbance of the ability of making phrases and sentences. He also calls the former a 'similarity disorder,' and the latter a 'contiguity disorder.' More generally, he associates the metaphoric with the principle of selection and substitution, which both operate on the basis of similarity; the metonymic is associated with the principle of combination and contexture, which operate on the basis of contiguity. In line with the structuralist tradition – but Jakobson's brief text does not go into this, – the metaphoric can be associated with the paradigmatic axis in that metaphor offers alternative conceptualisations for the same phenomenon, whereas the metonymic corresponds with the syntagmatic axis in that it links phenomena which are somehow contiguous to each other. While fully concentrating on the two extreme poles and associating the metaphoric and metonymic with different styles of art (e.g. romanticism vs. realism, expressionism vs. cubism) or even with art forms (the film as a typically metonymic art), Jakobson was far more interested in opposing metaphor and metonymy and, in fact, he did not much bother about the idea of a continuum, on which metonymy and metaphor can be supposed to meet and to develop.

* * *

Jakobson's 1956 paper was visionary, but very brief and highly programmatic. He claimed the existence of the two poles based on similarity and contiguity, and by doing so implied the existence of a continuum between the two extremes. In fact, he left it to later research to show how the link of the metaphoric and the metonymic with conceptualisation was to be seen, and how the notion of the continuum was to be understood. The former question is explored in

the contribution by Bartsch, the latter in Dirven's and, to some extent, in Warren's contributions (and also, in some way or other, in each of the papers in Section 3).

The great merit of **Renate Bartsch's** contribution to the ongoing debate on metaphor and metonymy is that she offers a philosophical underpinning for and interpretation of Jakobson's visionary opposition of metaphor and metonymy, and their conceptual bases of similarity and contiguity. As a language philosopher, Bartsch is, of course, primarily interested in concept formation, the creation of new concepts, and their relation to linguistic expressions. Bartsch starts from the assumption of a very strong interaction and interdependence between concepts and their linguistic expressions. A concept is represented by a stabilised set of experienced examples or satisfaction situations for the linguistic expression. A linguistically coded concept that is not yet stabilised is a quasi-concept. Stabilisation of a concept means that the internal similarity of the representative set of examples for a concept is not decreased anymore by the addition of new examples. In order to maintain the stability of the growing representative set, a new example of use of the expression that does not fit into this set has to be taken as the starting example of a new set, which is metaphorically or metonymically linked to the old set and can grow into a set, representative of a new concept, but expressed by the old expression. Metaphor and metonymy in this way presuppose the existence of non-metaphoric and non-metonymic terms which can be transferred to new extended uses. Basing her line of argumentation on the notions of perspective and change of perspective, Bartsch sees a fundamental difference between two main sets of possibilities for extending linguistic categories, i.e. broadening and narrowing versus metaphor and metonymy. Broadening and narrowing are conceptual processes that do not involve a change of perspective. The real conceptual innovations are those that involve a change of perspective, which is based on a contextual change in interest or attention, and can be made explicit by a question, e.g. when speaking of a lion, by the question "What kind of animal is it," but when calling John a lion, by the question "What kind of behaviour is this."

Under the new perspective, either similarity (metaphor) or physical or mentally imposed contiguity (metonymy) is seen to hold between the new examples and the old examples of use of the linguistic expression.

Perspective is understood, not only in the every-day sense of "a way of regarding situations," but also and especially in the technical sense of a second-order concept for the various concepts that fall under it; for example, the concepts "having pain," "feeling sick," "being healthy" all fall under the perspective of health. Likewise, a polysemic complex is a concept of two or more concepts that come about after a first concept has been mapped onto a second concept by metaphor or metonymy. The concept of "lion" is in the default case seen under the perspective "What kind of animal is it," but under perspective change it relates to the perspective of "behaviour in adverse or dangerous situations," under which both animal and human behaviour are seen now. Perspective thus also accounts for the question of which source-domain features are mapped onto which target-domain features and which features of either domain are irrelevant in the transfer operation. For Bartsch, all transfer is subject to a very general, central constraint: the stability principle, which says that both the pre-existing categories and also the newly created ones must be allowed to remain stable, at least in the adults' world. Young children, on the contrary, may extend a category such as *dog* from the animal domain to domains such as "mummy's fur coat" (transfer from the dog's woolly coat) or to that of the buttons on her dress (transfer from the dog's eyes), but adults' categories tend to be stable and any extension only comes about if stability of categories is guaranteed.

Conceptually, the similarity and contiguity principles account for different areas of entities: the similarity principle accounts for the identity of the properties of objects and situations, whereas the principle of contiguity accounts for the identity of individuals and events. Thus the contiguity principle gives rise to historical concepts, especially event concepts and individual concepts.

Metaphoric concepts are, in line with Indurkha's theory of metaphors, divided into two groups: similarity-based metaphors as in

John is a wolf, and similarity-creating metaphors, as in the poet's view of the white flowering bushes of hawthorn on the slope of a hill as *an ivory, downhill rush of water*. Bartsch's criticism is that these across-domain mappings fail to mention the underlying principle, i.e. the change of perspective. In the similarity-based metaphor *John is a wolf* this is the perspective of social behaviour. All the physical properties of having a mouth, teeth, eyes etc. are not taken into account, but only the perspective of social behaviour counts. The same principle applies to similarity-creating metaphors: it is the poet who in our example transgresses from the natural kind perspective (Of what natural kind is it?) to the perspective of appearance (What does it look like?) and thus transfers the image of rushing water to masses of hawthorn flowers; so the reader can come to see things as the poet saw them for the first time. In a trivial sense all metaphors can be said to be similarity-creating, namely for those who have not yet thought of the similarity at issue. Also in metonymy there is a perspective change, going along lines of contiguity in a situation, usually from a part of something to the whole, from cause to effect etc., or the other way around. The perspective change relates to such questions as "which part of which object is concerned" to "which person is concerned," e.g. in a hospital situation the expression *the liver from floor 3* undergoes a perspective change to *the patient*.

Finally, in a number of cases it is not clear whether we have to do with metonymy or metaphor, and in fact both views are possible, which Bartsch labels as the metaphor-metonymy switch. Thus the transfer of feeling a cold temperature to cold colours or cold persons can be seen both as a metonymic and as a metaphoric transfer. More generally, in the numerous cases where similarity across perspectives is based on a relational identity, we can just as well speak of a metaphor based on that identical relationship, as of a metonymic transfer along this relationship in either direction, which results in a chain of metonymies.

René Dirven's (1993*) "Metonymy and metaphor: Different mental strategies of conceptualisation" explores the notion of a continuum on which the metaphoric and the metonymic are situated and may

meet. He proposes several steps from the literal to the figurative on this continuum. First there is a step from the literal to the non-literal and non-figurative; then we can make a step from the non-literal to the figurative; within the figurative we can distinguish between the metonymic and the metaphoric; finally within the metaphoric we can distinguish between low vs. high metaphoricity. Whereas metonymy can be either literal, non-literal, or figurative, metaphor can only be figurative.

The distinction within the metonymic is linked to the three different types of syntagm that are available to human thought: linear, conjunctive, and inclusive syntagms. A *linear syntagm* as in *Different parts of the country may mean different things when using the same word* is based on a linear subject-predicate relation. A *conjunctive syntagm* as in *Tea was a large meal for the Wicksteads* subsumes various elements such as tea, cakes, biscuits or sandwiches, or even, as in *high tea*, a cold evening meal. This extension of *tea* is non-figurative. A figurative conjunctive syntagm is found in *The Crown has not withheld its assent*. An *inclusive syntagm* underlies *good head* in *He's got a good head on him*, in which *head* stands for 'intelligence.' These elements *head* and *intelligence* form, together with the elements *brains* and *mind*, a metonymic chain, where head includes brains, brains include thinking, or thought processes, and the mind includes intelligence. This third type of metonymy is, just like metaphor, always figurative, so that we really seem to have a continuum. The difference between metonymy and metaphor is therefore not fully adequately caught if only discussed in terms of domains in reality, so it also needs to be approached in terms of conceptual closeness and conceptual distance. In the inclusive metonymy *Their brains work about half as slow as ours* the neurological domain of thought processes is closely related to the mental domain of intelligence. The distance is just wide enough for *brains* to mean figuratively "thought processes" and hence leads via the *mind* to "intelligence." If we compare this inclusive syntagm to a metaphor like *More brains!*, we see a very wide distance between the notion of "quantity" of brains and that of a greater creative intelligence.

The two different mental strategies underlying metonymy and metaphor are then, in the case of metonymy, the need for relevant and salient links of contiguity e.g. between “brains” and “thought processes,” on which also reference rests, and, in the case of metaphor, the need to make abstract concepts such as “creativity” more tangible, manageable and understandable. In these prototypical instances, metonymy serves a referential function, and metaphor an expressive function. In the three metaphors a) *have a problem on one's hands*, b) *have a problem on one's mind*, and c) *the problem is uppermost in his mind*, the various metaphoric locations designate different understandings of the abstract idea of “problem” requiring the interpretations of a') manual skills, b') emotional worry, and c') attention, respectively.

In his conclusions, Dirven sets up a more extensive continuum of literalness and non-literalness. The former is not at issue here. The latter stretches over modulation, frame variation, linear metonymy and conjunctive metonymy as non-figurative gradations. The figurative gradations are (figurative) conjunctive metonymy, inclusive metonymy, post-metonymy, and metaphor.

Of all the papers in the present volume, **Beatrice Warren's** (1999*) contribution “An alternative account of referential metonymy and metaphor” concentrates most deliberately on the comparison and contrast between the two processes. In fact, she sums up and analyses all the main commonalities and differences between metaphor and metonymy. These are the following:

- (i) Metaphor sees one thing in terms of some other thing and is thereby hypothetical (as if it were a journey), whereas metonymy is non-hypothetical.
- (ii) Metaphor is a rhetorical device or a meaning-extending device. Metonymy can but need not fulfil these functions.
- (iii) Metonymy operates at phrase level only, while metaphors may also operate at sentence level, or even beyond.
- (iv) Metaphor allows multiple mappings from the source to the target domain; metonymy never allows more than one relation.

- (v) Metaphor allows themes or chains of figurative expressions, but metonymy doesn't (but see Bartsch*, Dirven,* Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez*).
- (vi) Metaphor does not allow zeugma, but metonymy does.

Warren's thesis is that neither the traditional accounts nor the modern, cognitive accounts (both Lakoff & Johnson and Turner & Fauconnier*) are able to explain any of these differences beyond the first. Therefore she proposes an alternative, in essence syntagmatic, approach: metaphor is a property-transferring semantic operation, whereas metonymy is basically a construction of the modifier-head type. Thus in *The kettle is boiling*, *the kettle* is the modifier of the head *that which is in the kettle*. Here no new properties are transferred and the term *kettle* does not have to change in meaning as is necessarily the case with metaphor. Given the syntagmatic relation, only one mapping is possible, i.e. in this case, from container to the contained, whereas in metaphor any relevant source aspect can be mapped onto the target domain, and this allows whole chains of mappings to be formed. In metonymy, the source/target relationship is but the head/modifier relation, in which the intended referent as target (the water) is only implicit and the source as modifier is explicit. This also explains the possibility of zeugma in metonymy, e.g. *The kettle is on the stove and boiling right now*: with the first predicate *be on the stove* no metonymy is involved and the meaning is literal; with the second predicate *be boiling*, the non-literal meaning of a metonymy, i.e. the target referent *water* is meant. The author's conclusion is that metonymy is basically a syntactic operation, whereas metaphor is basically a semantic operation. Needless to say this view differs from that of most contributions. (Especially see Panther & Thornburg *281). Still, Warren sees some similarity between her approach and cognitive theories of domain mapping. In metonymies, sources and targets are experienced simultaneously and therefore necessarily fall within the same domain. In metaphor source and target may be experienced together, but the process may also encompass very distant domains, although the problem of domain boundaries remains a weak point in the domain approach.

Section 2: The two-domain approach (Kövecses et al., Croft, Barcelona, Panther/Thornburg)

Although few linguists are aware of this, the rise of the two-domain approach was, in a sense, a continuation of a traditional approach reaching back to the nineteenth century (see Nerlich & Clarke*). It was, however, at the same time revolutionary in that it was intimately linked to two other major claims: (i) the experientialist, bodily basis of metaphor and metonymy, and (ii) the universalist basis for conceptual metaphors and metonymies. Perhaps the best summary of the whole approach is to be found in a paper originally written by Kövecses & Palmer (1999*) and revised and abridged for this volume as "Language and emotion: The interplay of conceptualisation with physiology and culture" by Kövecses, Palmer & Dirven (abridged as Kövecses et al.). This wider topic goes beyond the proper scope of this volume, but it offers the invaluable advantage that here metaphor and metonymy theories are seen in their application to a given conceptual domain. This even has the further advantage that the Lakovian approach can be compared to emotion theories which are seen to be claiming just the opposite. Thus this wider scope reminds us of strongly differing scientific approaches to conceptualisation and invites a cautious relativisation of the role or importance of metaphor and metonymy in the development of thought and language.

Zoltan Kövecses, Gary Palmer and René Dirven (1999*) confirm, even more strongly than Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999), the inter-relatedness of the two-domain approach with the claims of experientialism and universalism. The source domain for emotional metaphors and metonymies is the physical domain (LOVE IS FIRE, THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURISED CONTAINER, HAPPINESS IS UP) and/or the physiological domain (PHYSIOLOGICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR ANGER, DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR). The surprising thing is, however, that most emotion researchers in anthropology and psychology have attached little or no importance to figurative aspects of emotional language. Also important linguists like

Ortony or Wierzbicka do not include metaphor or metonymy in their analysis of emotional processes.

The reason why in the Lakovian approach metaphor and metonymy are so all-pervasive is their philosophical stand of experientialism. Metaphors are said to be based on pre-conceptual image schemata like containment, bodily orientation, verticality, etc, whereas the basis of metonymy is formed by bodily, especially physiological, experiences. Whereas for Lakovians this experientialism is based on the bodily experiences of the individual, social constructionists such as Radcliffe-Brown (*avant la lettre*) and Lutz (1988) see emotions and emotional experiences as something learnt in the children's education by their parents and by society at large. Therefore Lutz claims that emotions are highly culture-specific constructs built up by people's social and geophysical context and conditions. As a consequence Lutz is concerned with denying universalities, which in her view are an error of Western philosophy and follow from its essentialism. In the Lakovian view, conceptual metaphors and metonymies must by necessity have a universal character, since they are strongly bodily-based and by the same token are fully experientially grounded. Since the human bodily experience is essentially a universal one, their experientialist orientation cannot but predict universalism. The various titles of the books by Lakoff and/or Johnson *Body in the Mind*, or *Philosophy in the Flesh* reflect this dualism of experientialism (through the body) and universalism (through the mind). In social constructionism, the basic starting point is the social and geophysical context so that metaphor or metonymy is not denied, but cannot possibly be attributed a special or central function. Further research of many more cultures along the lines of both the Lakovian experientialist and universalist two-domain approach and the social constructionist approach may bring more light, since both approaches may be complementary (but see Dirven 2001). Interestingly, a study of anger and love expressions in Chinese by Ning Yu (1998) revealed the use of the same conceptual metaphors which Lakoff & Johnson (1980) had discovered for English.

Bill Croft's (1993*) paper "The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies" offers one of the best justifications and clarifications of the two-domain approach. Croft shows that metaphoric sentences such as *Denmark shot down the Maastricht Treaty* receive a top-down interpretation, here by invoking the political domain, whereas in a non-metaphoric interpretation *shot down* is associated with the military domain and the sentence would receive a bottom-up compositional interpretation. This "conceptual unity of domains" also determines the interpretation of the metonymy *Denmark*: here the Danish voters are meant, not the army. In the view of cognitive linguistics, word meaning is encyclopedic and semantic space comprises the whole of a common sense experience or world knowledge. This knowledge is structured in domains, but the notion of domain itself has never been explored in great detail in cognitive linguistics. It is precisely what Croft intends to do in his paper and then to apply these insights to the demarcation of metaphor and metonymy.

In his endeavour, Croft starts from Langacker's distinction within a concept (as a semantic structure symbolised by a word) between a profile and a base. The concept or predication *arc* has as its profile "a curved line segment" and as its base "a circle." A circle itself is profiled against the base of "shape" and shape itself is profiled against the base of "two-dimensional space." Thus the base (or domain) is that aspect of knowledge which is necessarily presupposed in conceptualising the profile. In his own words, a domain is defined as "a semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile."(*166). From all this it follows that a particular semantic structure can be a profile in a given domain, or else a domain itself.

Some domains, e.g. space, are not profiled in any other domain and are therefore *basic domains*, as are matter, time, physical objects, etc. They emerge directly from experience and are not defineable relative to other more basic concepts. A non-basic domain is an *abstract domain* in the sense that it presupposes another domain, which need not be a basic domain, but can also be another non-basic domain as in the chain *arc-circle-shape-(two-dimensional) space*. The

domain that serves as the base for a profile, also called the "scope of a predication," is a *base domain* or just *base*.

Many concepts involve more than one domain, e.g. a human being can only be defined relative to the domains of physical objects, living things, volitional agents etc. All the domains presupposed by a concept constitute the *domain matrix*. The difference between domain and domain matrix is crucial for the demarcation of metaphor and metonymy. Thus the notion of "physical object" is, in fact, not a domain, but a domain matrix, consisting of the domains *matter*, *shape*, and *location*. A domain matrix comprises not only the base domains, but the entire domain structure. Thus the notion of "body" is profiled against the domains of physical objects, life (or living things), time (since subject to processes of birth and death), and cause. The activation of a concept does not *necessitate* the activation of more peripheral knowledge, but it only *facilitates* their activation. Still, the activation of the base domain of a profiled concept is necessary. Activation is thus a question of degree.

This complex scaffolding then serves to explore the conceptual domains involved in metaphor and metonymy. Croft explains the two-domain approach to metaphor as a conceptualisation of one domain in terms of the structure of another independent domain, whereby the two domains do not form a domain matrix for the concept involved. Thus in the example *She's in a good mood*, the emotional domain is conceptualised in terms of the domain of space, but the spatial relation itself is not encoded; the emotion *good mood* is only seen as having structure similar to space. The two domains involved here are base domains, i.e. they are the bases of the profiled predication. The domain of location in its three-dimensional form denotes containment and this is mapped onto the domain of emotion.

Whereas metaphor is *domain mapping*, metonymy is *domain highlighting*. It is less directly linked to the role of domains, but rather to the "schema" or ICM, structuring a complex domain or domain matrix. Metonymic mapping, therefore, occurs within a single domain matrix, not across domains. This leads to a *domain shift* within the domain matrix. In fact, domain shift is achieved as a form of domain highlighting. The domain matrix of "book" comprises the

domains of physical object, artefact, authorship, reading, etc. and a speaker may highlight any of these domains in the domain matrix: *Proust is a fat book*, *Proust is difficult to read*, *Proust is out of print*. Similarly, the domain matrix of *trumpet (playing)* comprises the domain of sound as in *We all heard the trumpet*, or the domain of the player as in *The trumpet could not come today*.

Croft finally links domain mapping with dependent predications and domain highlighting with autonomous predications. Autonomy and dependence relate to whether a concept is or is not a substantive in another concept. In most grammatical combinations, one predication elaborates a salient substructure of another predication, the autonomous one. Applied to *the mouth of the bottle*, *bottle* is the autonomous predication and *mouth* as a dependent predication fills a substructure of *bottle*. In other words, in domain mapping, it is the autonomous predication that induces the mapping. In domain highlighting, e.g. with *swear*, one can focus on the contents as in *He swore foully*, or on the manner as in *He swore loudly*. Here *swear* is the autonomous predication and *foully* or *loudly* is the dependent predication. So in domain highlighting it is the dependent element that induces the highlighting in the autonomous predication. Finally, the autonomous predication and the dependent predication are always to be interpreted in one single domain or domain matrix. The unity of domain reflects the hearer's assumptions that the sentences he hears are coherent, even when two different domains in the same domain matrix of metonymy are involved, as in *I cut out this article on the environment*, which combine the physical object and reading domains. In metaphor a predication may be dependent on more than one autonomous predications. Thus in *I won't buy that idea* the metaphor is dependent on the two autonomous predications *buy* and *I*: *buy* must be mapped on the domain of mental activity, and in *I* the domain of the mind must be highlighted.

Barcelona (1998*) takes up many of the points raised by Croft and others and discusses a series of problems left unsolved in the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor and metonymy (CTMM). In order to do so, he first presents the CL theory of metaphor and metonymy,

both the standard or two-domain theory and the multi-space approach. In a third part he develops a methodological procedure for the application of CL insights in metaphor and metonymy to text analysis.

In the two-domain theory of metaphor a number of elements of a source domain such as *seeing* are mapped onto corresponding elements in a target domain such as *understanding*. These elements may be of an ontological nature (the two acts of *seeing* and *understanding*, two persons, light, possible impediments), and of an epistemic nature (transparent objects corresponding to clearly expressed ideas). The main constraint to this mapping is that the two domains share, in part, their image-schematic structure, which is known as the "Invariance Hypothesis" (Lakoff 1990). Metonymy is a one-domain mechanism whereby one (sub)domain is understood in terms of another (sub)domain, included in the same experiential domain or domain matrix, i.e. all the domains that join in a given entity, e.g. a human being. Whereas Croft calls metaphor a cross-domain mapping and metonymy an intra-domain highlighting, Barcelona proposes that metonymy presupposes a form of mapping, too. Alongside this two-domain model, a new theory known as blending or multi-space approach has recently been developed by Turner & Fauconnier*. This is not incompatible with the two-domain model of metaphor, but what is more: it even presupposes it. However, Barcelona, just like Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez*, rejects Turner & Fauconnier's* analysis of the "smoke coming out of his ears" example, but accepts that in many cases the blend enables the development of new structure, not contained in the source and target input domains.

Barcelona then tackles the definitional problems in the CL notions, first of metonymy, and next, in the distinction between metonymy and metaphor. First, metonymy is often claimed to be a relation between entities, concrete and abstract, but in fact these always constitute domains, so metonymy is a relation between domains, not just between entities. Next, on the relation between metonymy and reference, Barcelona cannot see metonymy as necessarily restricted to the act of reference. Further, Barcelona accepts Croft's view of metonymy as highlighting or activation of a (sub)domain in a (matrix) do-

main. But it is also 'mapping' albeit an *asymmetrical* one, that is, one without a structural match between the (sub)domains. Metaphor, in contrast to this, constitutes symmetrical mapping. Two further questions are: what qualifies as a target in a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, and how do metonymies become conventionalised. The answer to the first question leads him to propose three degrees of metonymicity, with *prototypical* metonymies displaying the highest degree and (exclusively) *schematic* metonymies displaying the lowest degree.

Problems in the distinction between metaphor and metonymy relate to their fuzzy boundaries, their dependence on contextual or world knowledge, and their intricate patterns of interaction. Fuzzy boundaries may lead to the interpretation of *have a long face* either as a metonymic mapping of a physiological expression for the emotion of sadness, or as a metaphorical mapping of the domain of verticality onto emotions (HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN). The solution is that in metonymy the two domains may be in the same overall domain (bodily expression of emotions and the emotion itself), whereas in metaphor they may not (emotion is a mental domain, verticality a physical domain). However, this solution does not solve the problem of *John is a lion*, where the two domains (human being, animal world) are both included in the overall domain of living beings. The solution here is that the taxonomic classification recedes in the face of a functional superordinate domain. Although humans and animals are included in the same taxonomic classification, they are not included in the same superordinate functional domain and therefore the two-domain basis in the *lion* metaphor remains intact. On the other hand, *the White House* is both a building and the seat of a government: the functional superordinate domain includes both, hence we are dealing with a metonymy here.

Contextual or world knowledge may lead to the interpretation of *He fell in the war* as metonymy or metaphor. If one knows that the soldier got wounded, fell and died, this is a metonymy, but if during the night he was bombed to death while sleeping, it can only be a metaphor. The intricate patterns of interaction between metaphor and metonymy are extensively discussed, but we cannot go into them

here, because this would require a preliminary synthesis of the opinions expressed in the various papers of Section 3.

Finally Barcelona presents a methodological procedure for the analysis of metaphor and metonymy, which is applied to a fragment and sentence of *Romeo and Juliet*: *Young men's love then lies not truly in their hearts, but in their eyes*. Here the PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS, the HEART IS A CONTAINER, and the EMOTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES metaphors are contrasted to and combined with the *eyes* metonymy, and the paper meticulously works through the many differentiated steps and substeps leading to this conclusion.

Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda L. Thornburg (1998*) focus on morphology and, more specifically, on the roles and interactions of metaphor and metonymy in creating polysemy in *-er* nouns. While they largely agree with Croft's views, they offer a more constrained characterisation of the notions of conceptual metonymy and contiguity. They accept the Lakoff and Johnson view of metaphor as a cross-domain mapping but define metonymy as an intra-domain mapping based on a *contingent*, i.e. non-necessary, and therefore cancellable relationship between two conceptual entities. The metonymic target is usually relatable to its source though it may become completely detached from its source, resulting in post-metonymy (Riemer's* term).

Panther & Thornburg's main thesis in their contribution "The roles of metaphor and metonymy in English *-er* nominals" is that *-er* formations constitute a semantic network, having as their central sense that of "professional human Agent" embedded in a conceptual action schema that is multi-dimensional and whose parameters are scalar. The other senses of *-er* words are then metaphoric and metonymic extensions of this central sense. Moreover, the authors defend a non-syntactic approach to *-er* formations, considering e.g. both verb-based (*baker*) and noun-based formations (*hatter*) as realisations of the underlying action schema, where the former is derived from the verb *bake* in a direct, non-metonymic way, whereas the latter is formed from the Patient role *hat* on the basis of the metonymy PARTICIPANT FOR ACTION. The scalarity of the defining properties of

the central sense a transfer of energy from a professional Agent to a Patient (as in *baker* or *hatter*) allows for such non-prototypical formations as *owner* and *dreamer*. Consequently, the *-er* morpheme in *dreamer* does not have the prototypical sense of "professional human Agent," but only that of 'someone who is inclined to dream.'

The authors show that the processes of metaphor and metonymy operate equally well on the lexical stems and on the *-er* suffix itself. Concerning the latter, metonymic extensions of the *-er* suffix from Agent account for Instrument, Location, and even Patient referents of *-er* formations. Their analysis thus supports the view that derivational morphemes form symbolic units that are subject to the same conceptual operations of meaning extension as lexical morphemes.

The authors show that the motivated polysemy of *-er* nominals can often be demonstrated in individual lexical items. For example, the various meanings of *sleeper* can be explained as motivated metaphoric and metonymic extensions from its basic use to denote 'one inclined to sleep' or 'one sleeping.' There are metaphoric extensions of the stem *sleep-* as in the sense of 'someone with an unexpected success' (after a period of "sleeping") or in the sense of an 'inactive spy.' A metonymic extension of the suffix *-er* is found in the case of the interpretation of *sleeper* as 'sleeping pill,' where the Instrument is the contiguous element linking itself to an Agent-like role. This sense also involves the ubiquitous high-level metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE: The stem *sleep-* names the (intended) effect of the active ingredient of the drug. Instrument roles may themselves be further metonymically connected to what the authors call Quasi-instruments such as *sleeper* in the sense of 'baby's sleepwear,' or to a purposeful Location as in 'sleeping carriage in a train.' Metaphoric extensions of the whole nominal *sleeper* can by definition only apply to non-human entities and go in the direction of human-like plants, animals or objects. The latter is realised in *sleeper*'s sense of 'underground railroad tie.'

All the extensions of the central sense of *-er* discussed so far relate to object referents, be they humans, plants, or objects in the narrower sense. But *-er* nominals may also have a whole event as their referent. Just as agents transfer their energy onto patients, inanimate

causes may trigger off an event. Hence a metaphoric mapping is possible from Agent to Cause as another pattern of *-er* extension, realised in the sense of *sleeper* as 'boring event,' i.e. some event that bores you to sleep. Besides Agent/Cause event referents, other *-er* extensions based on the EVENTS ARE OBJECTS metaphor reflect the key semantic roles in an action scenario, namely Instrument and Patient, as seen in formations like *season opener*, or *keeper* as 'memorable event.' Events lacking a metaphoric semantic role can be denoted by *-er* via metonymic operations on a stem, e.g., *kegger*, *sundowner*, *tailgater* (all types of party events whose salient feature is named in the base) or on the suffix itself, e.g. *cliff-hanger* (via the PARTICIPANT FOR EVENT metonymy).

In their conclusions, the authors relate the productivity of *-er* nominals to their capability of undergoing an array of metaphoric and metonymic elaborations from the central meaning and their extended senses. They contrast the extremely diversified conceptual richness of *-er* formations with the relatively constrained meanings of *-ist* and *-ent/ant* nominals that are usually formed from non-native bases and are only productive in the human-agent sense (*-ist* and *-ent/ant*) and the instrumental sense (*-ent/ant*) with almost no metaphoric or metonymic extensions.

Section 3: The interaction between metaphor and metonymy (Taylor, Goossens, Riemer, Radden, Geeraerts)

Although John Taylor (1995* [1989]) discusses metonymy and metaphor separately, he is the first (in the cognitive linguistic world) to develop the idea of metonymy-based metaphors. He takes the concept of metonymy in a very broad sense, comprising, as a prototypical member, referential metonymy, either conventionalised cases or else conversationally relevant references such as 'the ordered part' for 'the customer domain' as the whole. But Taylor also links these metonymic cases with pre-metonymic [not his term] phenomena. Pre-metonymic phrases are expressions denoting activities to an object's part by naming the whole object as in *Could you fill, wash,*

vacuum-clean, and service the car? These are instances of conceptual “modulation” (Cruse) or “active zone highlighting” (Langacker). A transitional phase between pre-metonymic and metonymic expressions is constituted by “frame” concepts like *door* or *window*, which also allow frame variation or highlighting, but not combining of the two. One can hardly take a door off its hinges and walk through it. This causes zeugma (see also Warren *118). Conventionalised metonymy differs from modulation or frame variation in that it presupposes polysemy, as in *close the office*, which may mean ‘close the door of the office’ or ‘lock the office.’ Here the variation is minimal, i.e. between the container as such and its “closing” component. In more complex conceptual structures such as the metonymy *mother*, each of the many domains associated with a mother ‘s possible functions becomes a member of a polysemous network, for which the concept as a whole can stand such as the genetic function, the nurturance function, the birth-giving function, the marital function, and the genealogical function. Another source of metonymic polysemy is implicature. In a diachronic perspective, implicatures can become conventionalised and give rise to two or more senses of a word, as in *leave*: from “movement from inside to outside a room,” via the implicature “move from the things you had” i.e. “leave behind,” to “forget” (unintentional leaving behind). Taylor finally tries to identify very general processes of metonymic extensions, such as the many senses of prepositions. Thus the different senses of *over* derive from the fact that either the whole path it denotes can be highlighted or activated or else any single place on this path, especially the end-point (*across the hill*), which in fact are whole-part relationships. Whereas other authors tend to see such extensions as metaphoric processes, Taylor clearly takes the metonymic road.

Also in his view on metaphor, Taylor mainly explores an original avenue, i.e. to what extent metonymy forms a basis for metaphor. Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) suggested that most metaphors are based on image schemas such as containment, motion (e.g. a journey), proximity and distance, linkage and separation, front-back orientation, part-whole relations, linear order, up-down orientation, etc. Taylor’s thesis is that in many cases there is a metonymic relation

between the notion of verticality and the metaphoric extensions into notions of quantity, evaluation, and power (MORE IS UP, GOOD IS UP, POWER IS UP). As a pile gets higher, the quantity increases, so that the one aspect stands for the other. Purely metaphoric extensions as in *high prices* are an elaboration of this metonymic link, and a *high note* has no link any more with any metonymic base. Taylor therefore wonders to what extent metaphors are based on metonymies more generally. This question was systematically discussed by Goossens.

At the same time that Taylor (1989) developed his view of a strong interaction between metonymy and metaphor, **Louis Goossens** (1990*) built up the aptly named concept *metaphonymy*, which is entirely based on the conceptual structuring of the domain of communication, or in Goossens' terminology, *linguistic action*. Whereas Reddy (1987) had concentrated on the source domain of "conduit" imagery, Goossens' corpus-based study explored three other source domains: (a) body parts, especially the tongue, the mouth, and the lips, e.g. *bite off one's tongue*, but also other parts, e.g. the legs; (b) sounds produced by humans, animals, natural forces, instruments, etc., e.g. *blow one's own trumpet*; and (c) violent action such as *throw mud at* for "speak badly of." The first two source domains are perfectly natural, because they contain elements contiguous with linguistic action. The third source domain is not astonishing either, given that a great deal of linguistic interaction is of the violent type, aptly summarised in Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR.

In the domain of linguistic action, the frequency of metaphonymy is strikingly high. Goossens' sub-corpus of about 109 linguistic-action expressions using body parts contains 42 purely metonymic and purely metaphoric expressions, and 59 mixed cases, i.e. metaphonymies, which is more than 50 per cent. This label does not stand for one type of mixture, but is a cover term for four different types, i.e. (i) metaphor from metonymy, as in "*What's so funny,*" *I snapped*; (ii) metonymy within metaphor as in: *I could bite my tongue off*; (iii) metaphor within metonymy, as in *get up on one's hind legs*; and (iv) de-metonymisation, as in *pay lip-service to*.

Metaphor from metonymy is what Taylor (1989*) called a metonymy-based metaphor, which is systematically further explored by Radden*. Goossens discusses the example of *giggling* as in "Oh dear," she giggled, "I'd quite forgotten," but since the interpretation of a mixture of metonymy and metaphor is not accepted by all readers (see Riemer* and Goossens'* reply to it), we have selected Goossens' second expression, i.e. *snap at* 'say or answer in an angry or rude way.' The metonymic basis is the quick closing of the jaws, e.g. a dog biting at your ankles. If this were purely mapped onto the human domain, it would just be a metaphor as is the case with *bark* in *A captain barking orders to his soldiers*. But in the angry answer "What's so funny?" *I snapped*, Goossens can undoubtedly claim the actual, quick closing of the speaker's jaws, so that with human *snap* there is first of all a metonymy for speaking, and, on top of that, it is mapped onto the emotional domain of anger, and thus assumes metaphoric value.

Metonymy within metaphor is not a metonymy developed into a metaphor, but, on the contrary, a metaphoric expression in which there is still some remnant of a metonymy left. This type of metaphonymy typically refers to body parts such as *tongue* (*I could bite my tongue off*) and *mouth* (*Don't shoot your mouth off*). The hyperboles in both expressions are so strong that no literal interpretation, but only a figurative, metaphoric mapping can be invoked. Still, as organs of speech (or linguistic action), the metonymy of the organ standing for speaking is still present in the contiguous elements of the whole (mouth) or the salient part (tongue).

Metaphor within metonymy is just the opposite of the previous type of metaphonymy, which means that the expression for linguistic action is basically a metonymy, which also has a metaphoric flavour about it. In the expression *get up on one's hind legs* "stand up in order to say or argue something, esp. in public," the source domain of "getting or standing up" metonymically stands for claiming one's turn in public discussions. But the mixture with the domain of animal physiology of having fore and hind legs opens up a metaphoric (or anthropomorphic) window on this metonymic scene, so that the

whole expression is a mixture of basic metonymic elements with a metaphoric humorous point.

De-metonymisation inside a metaphor is the loss of the transparency of the image used in an expression such as *pay lip service to*, meaning "to support in words, but not in fact." The metonymic basis of this expression is the biblical source domain of "people expressing what they say with their lips (i.e. reciting words), but not with their hearts (i.e. meaning what you say)." The idea that *lips* in *lip-service* stands for "words" in this expression has faded so that this biblical metaphor-from-metonymy has got lost and only the metaphoric sense prevails in today's English.

Being such a clear corpus-based study, it is more than astonishing that thus far Goossens' approach has not yet been applied to other domains of human experience (but see Geeraerts*).

Nick Riemer concentrates, just like Barcelona, Taylor, Radden, Goossens, and Geeraerts, on the demarcation problem between metaphor and metonymy. Whereas Warren concentrates on the differences between metaphor and metonymy, and Goossens on their intertwining, Riemer is, just like Barcelona*, more interested in the ambiguities, overlappings and uncertainties of metaphor or metonymy status. For this purpose he concentrates on an area of great doubt, i.e. dead metonymies and dead metaphors, or in the terminology he proposes *post-metonymies* and *post-metaphors*. A post-metonymy is found in expressions such as *to kick someone out of his flat*, where the literal action of kicking could, in extreme cases, lead to expulsion. This is a dead metonymy in which it is not a real act of kicking, but (psychologically or juridically) forceful action that causes the effect of expulsion. In spite of this uncertain metonymic status, the notion of metonymy remains valid, since the action stands for the effect.

Even more doubtful is the metaphoric status of expressions such as *to beat one's breast*, meaning "to make a public confession of wrong-doing." Riemer rejects Goossens' analysis since it is based on a metaphor concept which only sees the substitution of one idea (breast-beating) for another idea (public confession of guilt). But in a cross-domain mapping theory of metaphor, there can be no mapping

in such metaphonymies: the breast-beating and its elements are not mapped on the idea of public confession, also see the definition by Barcelona (*246ff). The only thing that licenses the meaning 'confess publicly' is the original metonymic context of beating the breast while publicly confessing by saying *mea culpa* 'my guilt,' but see Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (*518–520). This metonymic meaning has been conventionalised outside the original context, so that there is a case of dead metonymy.

Dead metaphors are also found in the use (in some varieties of English) of *knock* in the sense of 'criticise,' e.g. *knock someone about their haircut*. Here the source domain (or the vehicle, a term of Richards' which much better fits the complex case) is no longer salient in its identification with 'criticise' so that in fact there is no longer a metaphor, but only a conventionalised meaning.

Some vague link with an image is still present in expressions such as *knock up and down all over the country* or *knock about all over the Pacific*. The *knocking* can be the hard contact with the road by travellers on foot, on horseback, in carriages or on a ship. So *knock* has assumed the meaning of a motion verb and the sense of motion is metonymically related to the contact and the noise while in motion on a surface. But there is also a metaphoric element about it, i.e. "the area in which the motion takes place is conceptualised as a container against the sides of which the moving body is striking" (*399). Riemer concludes that it certainly is not sameness versus difference of domain that decides on metaphor or metonymy status. In *slap someone to the ground* in the sense of 'knock to the ground' we find a mismatch between the inherent semantics of 'giving a slap with the open hand' and the extension to 'knocking,' which are in the same domain. The explanation may rather be a two-step process. First there is a metonymic extension: the physical contact of *slap* is metonymically extended from its root meanings to the meaning 'make move by slapping' (CAUSE STANDS FOR EFFECT), and then this new meaning is metaphorically applied to a situation in which there is no slapping but which is seen by means of understatement as involving far more force than it really needs. Although the two actions of slapping and knocking down are in the same domain of 'contact through

impact,' the expression cannot be seen as metonymy only, which is traditionally explained as intra-domain meaning extension. Post-metaphor and post-metonymy are thus further mechanisms of meaning extension in addition to pure metaphor and pure metonymy.

Although the total spectrum of the metonymy-metaphor continuum may be much more varied than the one category of metonymy-based metaphor may suggest, **Günter Radden's** (2000*) special merit is to explore this category in great depth. Radden sees four different types of metonymic basis for metaphor: (i) a common experiential basis, (ii) an implicature basis, (iii) a category structure basis, and (iv) a cultural model basis.

A common experiential basis of the two domains involved can consist of either a correlation between two domains or the complementarity of two counterparts. Correlational metaphors which have a metonymic basis are, for instance, MORE IS UP (as also shown by Taylor*), FUNCTIONAL IS UP, IMPORTANT IS BIG, ACTIVE IS ALIVE, SIMILARITY IS CLOSENESS (*close to the truth*), etc. Complementary elements like *lovers* or *body* and *mind* form a strong unity, which is at the basis of conceptual metaphors such as LOVE IS A UNITY or THE MIND IS A BODY as found in expressions such as *have a strong will* or *handle a situation*.

Implicature, as is well known, accounts for many historical changes and extensions. Thus, the meaning extension of *go* to the sense of futurity as in *It is going to rain* has been shown to involve stages of context-induced reinterpretations arrived at by implicature. Implicature may be based on sequential events as in seeing something and then knowing it, which gives rise to the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. Another type of implicature is based on the relation between events and their results, which gives rise to the metaphor HOLDING IS POSSESSION as in *to hold power*. The most common type of implicature may well be the metonymic link between a place and an activity performed at that place as in *to go to church* or *to go to bed*, which gives rise to the metonymy-based metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS.


Category structure is the relation between a category and its members. This relationship of inclusion is often exploited in metonymy so that a member of a category may stand for the whole category or vice versa (e.g. *pill* for *birth control pill*). This relationship is further exploited as metaphorisation process as in *to have a say in something*, in which one specific form of communication (*saying*) stands for the communication of one's opinion.

Cultural models are understood as widely shared models of the world and relations in it which influence members of a society in their understanding of the world and their behaviour. These cultural models are manifest, first of all, in physical forms, which are seen as an internal force or impetus in objects. Thus FORCE is metaphorically seen as A SUBSTANCE CONTAINED IN CAUSES, e.g. *His punches carry a lot of force*. The best known instance of a cultural model is perhaps that of communication, which – as Reddy (1993) analysed it – is seen as a conduit metaphor, i.e. the transmission of packages of meaning contents through a channel. Still another culturally modeled area is that of ideas and emotions: the former are seen as bounded objects in the mind container and coded as count nouns; the latter are seen as unbounded substances and coded as mass nouns.

Radden's strength is linking theoretical insights with many rich examples. He hopes that the many examples he added for each type of metonymy-based metaphor will be multiplied in future research so as to reveal the ubiquity of metonymic elements in metaphor.

Dirk Geeraerts concentrates on idioms and compounds, which he subsumes under the label *composite expressions*. His contribution "The interaction of metaphor and metonymy in composite expressions" discusses this topic in terms of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations. Whereas Dirven*, in the wake of Jakobson's ideas, linked the metaphoric pole to paradigmatic relations and the metonymic pole to syntagmatic ones, Geeraerts analyses both metaphor and metonymy in composite expressions along both their paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. Geeraerts sees paradigmatic relations not only between the total literal meaning of an idiom e.g. (*cast*) *pearls before swine* (Matthew 7: 6) and its figurative meaning (*give*) *valuable*

things to unworthy people, but also between their separate constituent parts, i.e. in the pairs *pearls/valuable things* and *swine/unworthy people*. The syntagmatic relations hold between the two constituent parts and the total expression, both at the literal level and at the figurative level. Given this intricate set of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, Geeraerts proposes a prismatic model for composite expressions, consisting of two triangles and the connecting lines between the six angle points.



Composite expressions can, like all linguistic combinations, be interpreted on the basis of the parts they are composed of. Such compositionality is a bottom-up operation. But more often than not, idioms and compounds may have to be interpreted both bottom-up and top-down, which is called isomorphism or syntagmatic transparency, since the constituents in the literal and the figurative interpretations all correspond, as shown for the idiom *cast pearls before swine*. In Dutch, which is the target language of Geeraerts' exploration, the figurative uses of the equivalent for *pearls* and *swine* also exist independently of this idiom and are thus motivated, or in other words, motivation constitutes paradigmatic transparency. In the Dutch expression *parels voor de zwijnen* (*gooien*) '(cast) pearls before swine' we thus have both isomorphism and motivation. In Dutch, *met spek schieten* 'to shoot with bacon,' i.e. "to tell a tall story, to boast," there is only isomorphism, but no motivation, since here the figurative meaning of *spek* 'bacon' is not transparent. In Du. *met de handen in*

het haar zitten 'to sit with one's hands in one's hair,' i.e. "to be at one's wits' end, to be in trouble," there is no isomorphism, but there is motivation (it is typical behaviour when in trouble). And in *Du. de kat de bel aanbinden* 'to bell the cat,' "to take the lead in a dangerous action" there is neither isomorphism nor motivation.

The interaction between metaphor and metonymy can occur in three different ways: in consecutive order, in parallel order, or interchangeably. Thus *Du. schapenkop* 'sheep's head,' i.e. "stupid person" can be analysed along each of the three options. In the consecutive interaction option, we can follow a route from 1) *sheep* and 2) *head* to 3) *sheep's head* and from here by metaphor to 4) *human head like that of a sheep*, which in turn by metonymy stands for *stupid person*. The second possibility of metaphor-metonymy interaction is a parallel operation. (Here one must think of a double prisma with three triangles and nine angle points instead of six). The parallelism holds between the metonymic interpretation of the constituent parts (i.e. between 1) *sheep*, 4) *sheep-like*, and 7) *stupid* on one hand, and between 2) *head*, 5) *head* and 8) *person* on the other) and it holds between the metaphoric/metonymic interpretation of the global interpretations of the literal and figurative meanings. (Here the metaphoric path runs from 3) *sheep's head* to 6) *(human) head like a sheep* and via a metonymic path to 9) *stupid person*). The third type of metaphor-metonymy interaction is interchangeability of metaphor and metonymy. Thus *Du. badmuts* 'swimming cap' can be jocularly used for "bald person." Either the object *swimming cap* leads metonymically to a person with a 'swimming cap' and from there by metaphoric similarity to someone who looks as if he is wearing a swimming cap, i.e. "a bald person," or else 'swimming cap' is directly metaphorised as 'a person who looks as if covered by a swimming cap,' i.e. "a bald-headed person." Both reconstructions are valid. Finally, Geeraerts compares his prismatic model to Goossens'* metaphonymy concept. The main difference is that Goossens sees mainly one path, i.e. from metonymy to metaphor, whereas Geeraerts exploits their interaction in all possible directions. The conclusion is that Goossens' approach, while being fully valid, covers a couple of

possibilities in the much wider array of paradigmatic and syntagmatic possibilities, revealed by the prismatic model.

Section 4: New breakthroughs: Blending and primary metaphors (Turner/Fauconnier, Ruiz de Mendoza/Díez, Grady/Johnson, Nerlich/Clarke)

The originality of **Fauconnier and Turner's** (1999*) application of mental space theory to the analysis of metaphor and metonymy is their insight that not just two, but many different domains are involved in metaphor understanding. Thus there are two or three input domains or spaces, a generic space, and a blended space or blend. The source domain and the target domain are input spaces whose relevant features are mapped into a generic space containing the common elements of both. This generic space is mapped onto a "blended space," which remains linked to the input spaces, but may contain elements of its own, not present in the source or target domains. Thus the input spaces for the emotion of extreme anger are the source domain of physical events like heat in a container and an orifice through which the steam or smoke can escape; or else the container would explode when it reached boiling point. The target domain is the psychological domain of anger, which is expressed metonymically in a third space, the physiological signs of body heat, perspiration, redness, acute shaking, loss of control, etc.. In the expression *He was so mad, I could see the smoke coming out of his ears* the blend contains the element *smoke coming out of his ears*, which is not present in the source domains, nor in the target domain, but it results from the multiple cross-mapping from the various input spaces.

Turner and Fauconnier lean on Lakoff & Kövecses' (1987) analysis, which "underscores the essential role of physiological reaction metonymies in the formation of the metaphoric system for emotions" (*476). Thus physical heat of the fire is not mapped on the physiological body heat and sweat but both are mapped onto one another in the blend such that heat is anger or anger is heat. The image of *smoke*

coming out of his ears is a further elaboration of the mapping of the orifice and the heat into the blend. Turner and Fauconnier suggest a further elaboration in the expression: ...(*I could see smoke coming out of his ears.*) *I thought his hat would catch fire.* The elements of *hat* and *catching fire* are not given in the source or target domains, but just arise from further cross-domain mapping in the blend. (For criticisms, see Barcelona* and Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez*).

In their contribution "Patterns of conceptual interaction," **Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez** (based on Ruiz de Mendoza 1997*) critically look at Lakoff & Johnson's two-domain model and Fauconnier & Turner's* multi-space model. From the two models they retain the well-known insights and analyse metonymy as consisting of a sub-domain and a matrix domain [not to be confounded with Croft's domain matrix], which can both be the source or target, so that we have target-in-source or source-in-target metonymies. In opposition to Croft*, the authors assume that both in metaphor and in metonymy we can have domain highlighting, but domain reduction and domain expansion typically occur in metonymy only. Although critical of the multi-space model, Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez adopt it for their descriptive analyses. What they reject is the view that blends may have structure which is not provided by or which is not compatible with that of the input spaces. According to Fauconnier & Turner (1995), the metaphor *landyacht* for 'a luxury car' does not predict, on the basis of the three input spaces *water vehicle*, *land vehicle* and *cars*, that this type of car is typically used on highways and owned by moderately rich people, but not by rich tycoons such as own yachts. But for Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez such features follow from pragmatic principles, especially the principle of relevance. The integration of the three input spaces into the generic space and the blend show which characteristics of yachts are applicable to cars. The authors assume that, once the fundamental correspondences have been grasped, an extra input space is created allowing further relevant applications, such as the use of these luxury cars on highways and the specific type of owners. This solution circumvents the prob-

lem of accounting for new elements in the blend, but this is certainly not the last word on this issue.

In their view, conceptual projection is a principle-regulated phenomenon which may follow four different routes: (i) interaction based on image-schemata, (ii) interaction between propositional cognitive models, (iii) interaction involving metonymic models such as double metonymy, and (iv) interaction between metaphor and metonymy.

Image-schema-based metaphors invoke schemata of container, path, contact, bodily orientation (front-back, up-down, centre-periphery), etc. Thus in the expression *Plans are now moving ahead*, a path schema is the source input-space for the target business-deal input-space. The generic space contains abstractions from the two input spaces which relate to the structure and logic of such a business deal, i.e. a source, a destination and various phases in the business negotiations one must pass through, and the time it takes. In the projection the plans are seen as travellers and the progress as movement towards the destination.

Interaction between propositional cognitive models links the features (expressed in propositions) of two or more ICMs such as those for judges and machines. Thus in *Judge Griffith is a deciding machine*, which rests upon the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE MACHINES, the features of machines (doing a lot of work, in a non-reflective way) contained in two input spaces (machines and judges) are mapped onto a target space (a certain judge is like a machine in the way he decides cases routinely). So all in all we have five spaces here: two source input spaces, a target input space, a generic space, and the blend.

Double metonymy is a repeated metonymic mapping of the same expression. Whereas in *Wall Street will never lose its prestige* we have a single target-in-source metonymy (PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION), in *Wall Street is in panic*, we have a double metonymy: A PLACE FOR AN INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE, which is a metonymic chain, as Bartsch* calls this phenomenon. Here the target domain *people* is reduced to the institution, which itself is reduced to its location. Alongside such domain reductions, metonymic chains

may also undergo domain expansion as in *His sister heads the police unit*, which as a source-in-target metonymy expands the domain HEAD into that of LEADER/AGENT and further into that of ACTION OF LEADING.

Interaction between metaphor and metonymy has as one of its types what Goossens* calls 'metaphor derived from metonymy' as in *to beat one's breast*. Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez analyse this 'metaphor-tonymy' as a metaphor whose source is a source-in-target metonymy (with the source of 'breast-beating' and the target 'breast-beating to show one's sorrow'); this source is mapped onto the target of 'a person making a show (or pretence-play) of showing sorrow for a situation.' Here the metonymy is part of the metaphor's source domain, but it can also be part of its target domain as in *Peter knitted his brows and started to grumble*. Here the source domain of knitting socks is mapped onto the target 'one's facial expression of anger,' which itself contains a target-in-source metonymy, i.e. the situation of 'frowning because one is angry' is expressed as the facial motion of drawing together the eyebrows.

Whereas Turner and Fauconnier propose extra phases in the elaboration of metaphor and metonymy after the two-domain-mappings, **Joe Grady and Christopher Johnson** (2000*) propose a kind of pre-domain-mapping approach. They argue that rich two-domain mappings such as the one proposed for the conduit metaphor for communication (LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION IS SENDING PACKAGES) may be overly detailed to account for observed patterns in the metaphoric data and are not clearly enough motivated by experience. They provide evidence that such mappings can be analysed into simpler ones motivated by basic experience types which they call "subscenes" and "primary scenes," much more fundamental units than the more familiar "domain." A subscene can be defined as a simple, irreducible chunk of experience such as seeing something or leaving a container. A primary scene is a still fairly simple, but somewhat more complex chunk of experience in which two or more subscenes are correlated, e.g. the perceptual level of seeing something and the mental level of being aware of what one sees. This primary scene underlies primary

metaphors such as BECOMING ACCESSIBLE TO AWARENESS IS EMERGING FROM A CONTAINER. This is based, on the one hand, on the correlation between "X in container, X not visible" and "X inaccessible to awareness," and, on the other hand, on the correlation between "X' out of container, X' visible" and "X' accessible to awareness." In each pair the perceptual level is correlated to a mental level.

A primary metaphor is consequently a correlation of an experience and an association, and hence a mapping of a perceptual onto a conceptual structure. That is, concepts such as "hidden/visible" are systematically associated with corresponding concepts such as "unknown/known." Such correlations may not only account for the way metaphoric mappings originate, but also for the way that children initially interpret certain linguistic expressions. The correlation between the perceptual level and the mental level of "knowing" can be seen in such ambiguous expressions as *Oh, I see what you wanted*. This may refer to the perceptual level of seeing the physical object, i.e. the toy, but it may also refer to the mental level of understanding (UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING), i.e. what it is that the baby wants. There is evidence that very young children do not distinguish the two senses of this ambiguous construction, whereas adults easily switch between both the perceptual and the "knowing" interpretations of *see*, indicating a clear distinction between literal and metaphoric uses of *see*. For children, the correlation between these interpretations forms a strong basis for learning the metaphoric meaning of *see*, a learning process which ultimately involves the "deconflation" of the perceptual and mental dimensions of the meaning initially assigned to the word. This is also a question of grammar since the two interpretations are matched by two different syntactic constructions. The perceptual sense consists of a reduced relative (*I see what (=the thing that) you want*), while the mental sense of *see* as 'understand' requires an embedded interrogative (*I see what you want (=what it is you want)*).

The strength of the approach in terms of primary scenes and sub-scenes further resides in the fact that it accounts not only for metaphoric mappings and their acquisition, but also for the non-

metaphoric phenomena involving children's preferred interpretations of adjunct PPs. Grady & Johnson discuss semi-idiomatic constructions of the type *What are you doing with that knife / What are you doing in my room*. In their idiomatic sense, these WXDY-constructions imply the notion of incongruity and may carry the implicature of "reproach." The idiomaticity also appears from the fact that *doing* denotes not an activity, but an abnormal situation, which is criticised by the speaker. The *with*-phrase is moreover not understood in its instrumental sense, but merely in a possessive sense as in *She stood in the doorway with a knife*. Similarly, the *in*-phrase does not denote location of an activity, but location of the subject ("Why are you in my room?"). Now the interpretation of possession of an object and location of a person or thing are the "simple" interpretations and correspond to subscenes. The interpretation of the instrumental and the location of activity are more complex scenes. Children have a preference for attributing simple subscene interpretations to such prepositional phrases. But the ways in which these subscenes fit into the more complex conventional interpretations of locative and instrumental adjuncts can provide the child with special opportunities to linguistically encode these relatively abstract meanings.

Thus this approach in terms of primary scenes and subscenes is a far-reaching refinement of existing insights into metaphor in that it not only accounts for part of the process of metaphoric mapping, but also for the process of metaphor acquisition and for non-metaphoric behaviour exhibited by the language-learning child.

Nerlich and Clarke's (2000*) contribution begins with a brief introduction into the more technical aspects of Turner & Fauconnier's blending theory, but is mainly historical in outlook. It forms the closing chapter since it opens a wider historical perspective in which blending theory and many other CL insights get their ultimate relevance. Blending theory can be seen as one of the summits of non-objectivist and non-reductionist phases in scientific evolution. But most of the ideas also flourished in nineteenth century German non-mainstream linguistics, philosophy and psychology. Still, they were swept away by a positivist wave in structuralism and by reductionism

in most of the twentieth century. It is only in the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially in the last decades (1980-2000), that the mentalist or cognitive wave gained momentum again and will probably be a vigorous factor in the twenty-first century. Nerlich and Clarke's historical guided tour is especially meant as an attempt to "give modern theories [of metaphor and blending] firmer roots, roots that might prevent the next wave of positivism and reductionism" (*585; 2000: 30).

Many of the insights of today's cognitive linguistics paradigm were, in some form or other, already present or pre-figured in inquiries into language, either by linguists, or by psychologists and philosophers in hermeneutics in the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century and up to the first part twentieth century.

Thus the idea of the ubiquity of metaphor or the basic metaphoric nature of our concepts was already recognised by John Locke (1689). Du Marsais (1730) even extended the central function of metaphor into "ordinary" thought and language, even in such terms that a text by Du Marsais can be directly mapped onto one by Lakoff & Turner in *More than Cool Reason*. Also the notion of "fuzzy meaning" is not an invention of the twentieth century, but was part and parcel of the thinking of nineteenth century theoreticians such as Whitney, Gerber, Wegener, Erdmann and Gardiner. Gardiner also comes up with a precursor of a network of family resemblances, of a prototype theory of meaning, and of the mixture or blending in the production and understanding of metaphor.

What up till then appeared as theoretical constructs were for the first time put to the test in the psychology research programme led by Karl Bühler (1907), founder of the Würzburg school of psychology. For Bühler, understanding is based on "integrating new structures into already existent structures of thought" [*577; 2000: 22]. This is a theory of blending, almost 90 years before its later re-invention. Applied to metaphor, one finds an almost identical formulation of blending: "A duality of spheres and ... a transition from one to the other can often be detected in the experience of understanding" [*578; 2000: 23]. This can now be rephrased simply by changing the lexis: "Two different domains and a mapping from the one to the other is

ubiquitous in the experience of (human communication and) understanding.”

As Nerlich and Clarke point out, the precursor theories lacked the linguistic, psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic support that today’s linguistics can recur to. Still, the roots are firm, and today’s trend-setters can only learn from these precursors to avoid future oblivion.

General conclusion

Recent metaphor and metonymy research as reflected in this volume has revealed three major facts.

In spite of early criticism against it, the two-domain theory of metaphor and metonymy now stands firm. This has been realised, not only by the many analyses along Lakovian lines (not reported here), but also by Croft’s strong theoretical foundation of the concept of “domain” and “domain matrix,” both borrowed from Langacker, and their application to the process of metaphor and metonymy.

The originally envisaged title for this volume was “The Metonymy-Metaphor Continuum.” It soon turned out, however, that this ambition was still premature. Hopefully, this Jakobsonian idea may become the research target for a new decade. Although most of the present papers are substantially revised versions of sometimes fairly recent papers, only one third embarked upon research in the area of a continuum between metonymy and metaphor. The papers by Barcelona, Croft, Dirven, Geeraerts, Radden, and Taylor have made inroads into this direction, but we do hope that many more will follow in the future.

What the present volume has abundantly revealed are two things: the ubiquitous presence and role of metonymy and, in a great many cases, its strong links with metaphor. The interaction between metonymy and metaphor has thus become the most salient focus in the research in metaphor and metonymy in the last decade. It is present in all papers, but most explicitly so in the papers in Section 3 by Taylor, Goossens, Riemer, Radden, and Geeraerts, and also in papers in other sections such as those by Barcelona and Ruiz de Mendoza &

Diez. It has become a new theory especially in the multi-space approach by Turner and Fauconnier. They all reveal a potentially new truth: In the beginning was the word, and then came metonymy and metaphor.

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Section 1

The metonymic and the metaphoric

The metaphoric and metonymic poles

Roman Jakobson

Abstract

Roman Jakobson is probably the last *homo universalis* in the human sciences, who both developed a theory of the mind and applied it to a panoply of disciplines. Jakobson sees the metaphoric and the metonymic poles as the two basic modes or ways of thought reflected in general human behaviour and in language. The metaphoric is based upon substitution and similarity, the metonymic upon predication, contexture and contiguity. These two ways of thought are linked, though not in this paper, but in several other papers of his collected works, to the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axes of linguistic expressions. The metaphoric and the metonymic poles do not only underlie metaphor and metonymy in language, but, in alternative ways, phenomena in all possible fields. such as language impairments, especially aphasia, child language acquisition, literature (similarity in poetry, contiguity in the novel), Freud's psycho-analysis, literary and art schools, the history of painting and art movements, folklore such as folk tales and wedding songs. In fact, Jakobson holds out a research challenge not only to linguistics, but to all areas of semiotics. [R.D.]

Keywords: combination, contexture, contiguity, dichotomy, language impairment, metaphoric pole, metonymic pole, predication, selection, similarity, substitution, synecdoche. [R.D.]

The varieties of aphasia are numerous and diverse, but all of them lie between the two polar types just described [i.e. similarity and contiguity disorders]. Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment, more or less severe, either of the faculty for substitution or for combination, and, contexture. The former affliction involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations, while the latter damages

the capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units. The relation of similarity is suppressed in the former, the relation of contiguity in the latter type of aphasia. Metaphor is alien to the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity disorder.

The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively. In aphasia one or the other of these two processes is restricted or totally blocked – an effect which makes the study of aphasia particularly illuminating for the linguist. In normal verbal behavior both processes are continually operative, but careful observation will reveal that under the influence of a cultural pattern, personality, and verbal style, preference is given to one of the two processes over the other.

In a well-known psychological test, children are confronted with some noun and told to utter the first verbal response that comes into their heads. In this experiment two opposite linguistic predilections are invariably exhibited: the response is intended either as a substitute for, or as a complement to, the stimulus. In the latter case the stimulus and the response together form a proper syntactic construction, most usually a sentence. These two types of reaction have been labeled SUBSTITUTIVE and PREDICATIVE.

To the stimulus *hut* one response was *burnt out*; another, *is a poor little house*. Both reactions are predicative; but the first creates a purely narrative context, while in the second there is a double connection with the subject *hut*: on the one hand, a positional (namely, syntactic) contiguity, and on the other a semantic similarity.

The same stimulus produced the following substitutive reactions: the tautology *hut*; the synonyms *cabin* and *hovel*; the antonym *palace*, and the metaphors *den* and *burrow*. The capacity of two words to replace one another is an instance of positional similarity, and, in addition, all these responses are linked to the stimulus by semantic similarity (or contrast). Metonymical responses to the same stimulus,

such as *thatch*, *litter*, or *poverty*, combine and contrast the positional similarity with semantic contiguity.

In manipulating these two kinds of connection (similarity and contiguity) in both their aspects (positional and semantic) – selecting, combining, and ranking them – an individual exhibits his personal style, his verbal predilections and preferences.

In verbal art the interaction of these two elements is especially pronounced. Rich material for the study of this relationship is to be found in verse patterns which require a compulsory PARALLELISM between adjacent lines, for example in Biblical poetry or in the Finnic and, to some extent, the Russian oral traditions. This provides an objective criterion of what in the given speech community acts as a correspondence. Since on any verbal level – morphemic, lexical, syntactic, and phraseological – either of these two relations (similarity and contiguity) can appear – and each in either of two aspects, an impressive range of possible configurations is created. Either of the two gravitational poles may prevail. In Russian lyrical songs, for example, metaphoric constructions predominate, while in the heroic epics the metonymic way is preponderant.

In poetry there are various motives which determine the choice between these alternants. The primacy of the metaphoric process in the literary schools of romanticism and symbolism has been repeatedly acknowledged, but it is still insufficiently realised that it is the predominance of metonymy which underlies and actually predetermines the so-called ‘realistic’ trend, which belongs to an intermediary stage between the decline of romanticism and the rise of symbolism and is opposed to both. Following the path of contiguous relationships, the realist author metonymically digresses from the plot to the atmosphere and from the characters to the setting in space and time. He is fond of synecdochic details. In the scene of Anna Karenina’s suicide Tolstoj’s artistic attention is focused on the heroine’s handbag; and in *War and Peace* the synecdoches “hair on the upper lip” and “bare shoulders” are used by the same writer to stand for the female characters to whom these features belong.

The alternative predominance of one or the other of these two processes is by no means confined to verbal art. The same oscillation

occurs in sign systems other than language.¹ A salient example from the history of painting is the manifestly metonymical orientation of cubism, where the object is transformed into a set of synecdoches; the surrealist painters responded with a patently metaphorical attitude. Ever since the productions of D. W. Griffith, the art of the cinema, with its highly developed capacity for changing the angle, perspective, and focus of 'shots,' has broken with the tradition of the theater and ranged an unprecedented variety of synecdochic 'close-ups' and metonymic 'set-ups' in general. In such motion pictures as those of Charlie Chaplin and Eisenstein², these devices in turn were overlaid by a novel, "metaphoric montage" with its "lap dissolves" – the filmic similes.³

The bipolar structure of language (or other semiotic systems) and, in aphasia, the fixation on one of these poles to the exclusion of the other require systematic comparative study. The retention of either of these alternatives in the two types of aphasia must be confronted with the predominance of the same pole in certain styles, personal habits, current fashions, etc. A careful analysis and comparison of these phenomena with the whole syndrome of the corresponding type of aphasia is an imperative task for joint research by experts in psychopathology, psychology, linguistics, poetics, and SEMIOTIC, the general science of signs. The dichotomy discussed here appears to be of primal significance and consequence for all verbal behaviour and for human behaviour in general.⁴

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1. I ventured a few sketchy remarks on the metonymical turn in verbal art ("Pro realizm u mystectvi," *Vaplite*, Kharkov, 1927, No. 2; "Randbemerkungen zur Prosa des Dichters Pasternak" *Slavische Rundschau*, VII, 1935), in painting ("Futurizm" *Iskusstvo*, Moscow, Aug. 2, 1919), and in motion pictures ("Úpadek filmu," *Listy pro umeni a kritiku*, I, Prague, 1933), but the crucial problem of the two polar processes awaits a detailed investigation.
 2. Cf. his striking essay "Dickens, Griffith, and We": S. Eisenstein, *Izbrannye stat'i* (Moscow, 1950), 153 ff.
 3. Cf. B. Balazs, *Theory of the Film* (London, 1952).
 4. For the psychological and sociological aspects of this dichotomy, see Bateson's views on "progressional" and "selective integration" and Parsons' on the "conjunction-disjunction dichotomy" in child development: J. Ruesch and O. Bateson, *Communication, the Social Matrix of Psychiatry* (New York, 1951),

To indicate the possibilities of the projected comparative research, we choose an example from a Russian folktale which employs parallelism as a comic device: "Thomas is a bachelor; Jeremiah is unmarried" (*Fomá xólost; Erjóma ne ženát*). Here the predicates in the two parallel clauses are associated by similarity: they are in fact synonymous. The subjects of both clauses are masculine proper names and hence morphologically similar, while on the other hand they denote two contiguous heroes of the same tale, created to perform identical actions and thus to justify the use of synonymous pairs of predicates. A somewhat modified version of the same construction occurs in a familiar wedding song in which each of the wedding guests is addressed in turn by his first name and patronymic: "Gleb is a bachelor; Ivanovič is unmarried." While both predicates here are again synonyms, the relationship between the two subjects is changed: both are proper names denoting the same man and are normally used contiguously as a mode of polite address.

In the quotation from the folktale, the two parallel clauses refer to two separate facts, the marital status of Thomas and the similar status of Jeremiah. In the verse from the wedding song, however, the two clauses are synonymous: they redundantly reiterate the celibacy of the same hero, splitting him into two verbal hypostases.

The Russian novelist Gleb Ivanovič Uspenskij (1840–1902) in the last years of his life suffered from a mental illness involving a speech disorder. His first name and patronymic, *Gleb Ivanovič*, traditionally combined in polite intercourse, for him split into two distinct names designating two separate beings: Gleb was endowed with all his virtues, while Ivanovič, the name relating a son to his father, became the incarnation of all Uspenskij's vices. The linguistic aspect of this split personality is the patient's inability to use two symbols for the same thing, and it is thus a similarity disorder. Since the similarity disorder is bound up with the metonymical bent, an examination of the literary manner Uspenskij had employed as a young writer takes on particular interest. And the study of Anatolij Kamegulov, who analysed

183ff; T. Parsons and R. F. Bales, *Family, Socialisation and Interaction Process* (Glencoe, 1955), 119f.

Uspenskij's style, bears out our theoretical expectations. He shows that Uspenskij had a particular penchant for metonymy, and especially for synecdoche, and that he carried it so far that "the reader is crushed by the multiplicity of detail unloaded on him in a limited verbal space, and is physically unable to grasp the whole, so that the portrait is often lost."⁵

To be sure, the metonymical style in Uspenskij is obviously prompted by the prevailing literary canon of his time, late nineteenth-century 'realism;' but the personal stamp of Gleb Ivanovič made his pen particularly suitable for this artistic trend in its extreme manifestations and finally left its mark upon the verbal aspect of his mental illness.

A competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest in any symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social. Thus in an inquiry into the structure of dreams, the decisive question is whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on contiguity (Freud's metonymic "displacement" and synecdochic "condensation") or on similarity (Freud's "identification and symbolism").⁶ The principles underlying magic rites have been resolved by Frazer into two types: charms based on the law of similarity and those founded on association by contiguity. The first of these two great branches of sympathetic magic has been called "homoeopathic" or "imitative," and the second, "contagious magic."⁷ This bipartition is indeed illuminating. Nonetheless, for the most part, the question of

5. A. Kamegulov, *Stil' Gleba Uspenskogo* (Leningrad, 1930), 65, 145. One of such disintegrated portraits cited in the monograph: "From underneath an ancient straw cap, with a black spot on its visor, pecked two braids resembling the tusks of a wild boar; a chin, grown fat and pendulous, had spread definitively over the greasy collar of the calico dicky and lay in a thick layer on the coarse collar of the canvas coat, firmly buttoned at the neck. From underneath this coat to the eyes of the observer protruded massive hands with a ring which had eaten into the fat finger, a cane with a copper top, a significant bulge of the stomach, and the presence of very broad pants, almost of muslin quality, in the wide bottoms of which hid the toes of the boots."

6. S. Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, 9th ed. (Vienna, 1950).

7. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*, Part 1, 3rd ed. (Vienna, 1950), chapter III.

the two poles is still neglected, despite its wide scope and importance for the study of any symbolic behaviour, especially verbal, and of its impairments. What is the main reason for this neglect?

Similarity in meaning connects the symbols of a metalanguage with the symbols of the language referred to. Similarity connects a metaphorical term with the term for which it is substituted. Consequently, when constructing a metalanguage to interpret tropes, the researcher possesses more homogeneous means to handle metaphor, whereas metonymy, based on a different principle, easily defies interpretation. Therefore nothing comparable to the rich literature on metaphor⁸ can be cited for the theory of metonymy. For the same reason, it is generally realised that romanticism is closely linked with metaphor, whereas the equally intimate ties of realism with metonymy usually remain unnoticed. Not only the tool of the observer but also the object of observation is responsible for the preponderance of metaphor over metonymy in scholarship. Since poetry is focused upon the sign, and pragmatical prose primarily upon the referent, tropes and figures were studied mainly as poetic devices. The principle of similarity underlies poetry; the metrical parallelism of lines, or the phonic equivalence of rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and contrast; there exist, for instance, grammatical and anti-grammatical but never agrammatical rhymes. Prose, on the contrary, is forwarded essentially by contiguity. Thus, for poetry, metaphor, and for prose, metonymy is the line of least resistance and, consequently, the study of poetical tropes is directed chiefly toward metaphor. The actual bipolarity has been artificially replaced in these studies by an amputated, unipolar scheme which, strikingly enough, coincides with one of the two aphasic patterns, namely with the contiguity disorder.

8. C. F. P. Stutterheim, *Het begrip metafoor* (Amsterdam, 1941).

Generating polysemy: Metaphor and metonymy

Renate Bartsch

Abstract

In this paper I want to show why metaphor and metonymy are, on the one hand, two distinct types of generating new meanings for existing expressions, and why, on the other hand, there are many cases which can either be viewed as metaphor or as metonymy, without the one way of understanding excluding the other. After having given a general characterisation of metaphoric and metonymic concept formation as part of the general method of concept formation, I shall show how two different kinds of perspective change are involved in the metaphoric and in the metonymic process, respectively. Metaphors involve a crossing between perspectives that select similarities (identical features) and differences under each of the perspectives chosen; metonymies involve a crossing between perspectives directed towards contiguous parts of situations and objects.

Keywords: concept formation, contiguity, linguistically expressed concepts, metaphor-metonymy switch, perspective, perspective change, polysemic complex, polysemy, quasi-concepts, similarity, stabilisation.

1. The theoretical framework

We will start with concept formation, as it is presented in Bartsch (1998), where metaphors are generated on the experiential level of concept formation, as well as on the theoretical level of linguistically explicated concepts. On the experiential level, linguistically expressed concepts are equivalence classes in stabilising series of growing sets of satisfaction situations for the use of these expressions, which are collected under a given perspective of attention, e.g.

in *John is a wolf* that of 'social behaviour.' The equivalence is determined by the common internal similarity of the sets of situations holding for animals and men, under the relevant perspective. On the theoretical level, linguistically expressed concepts are defined by the characteristic semantic distribution of the expression, i.e. the sentential complements of the expression used as a general term in universally quantified sentences. Thus the conjunction of the predications (e.g. "voracious, grabbing, or fiercely cruel" for *wolf*) that generally hold with respect to the term make up the features characteristic for the concept in a theory, i.e. in a coherent set of general sentences held true. Concepts on this level are theoretical concepts in a broad sense; they are linguistically explicated concepts, i.e. explicated within this coherent set of general sentences in which they are used as general terms. Concepts not yet stabilised are called "quasi-concepts;" a stabilised concept can again become a quasi-concept when it becomes destabilised by massive data, or data enhanced by special importance and great normative impact enacted in the situations of use of the respective expression.

Concept formation consists in the ordering, according to similarity and/or contiguity under perspectives, of growing sets of data, especially satisfaction situations for expressions, into stabilising sequences which are the (quasi-)concepts that form the basic experiential conceptual structure. These two principles, which figure in normal concept formation, also give rise to metaphoric or metonymic language use, which result in new concepts expressed by old (lexical) expressions. The preference of stability within an evolving conceptual structure induces force towards extending these structures by metaphor and metonymy whenever situations are met which do not fit into the concepts already established saving stability. Including cases of metaphoric and metonymic use of an expression into the already established concepts expressed by the expression would, in these cases, destabilise the already existing concepts.

Metaphor and metonymy do not only involve a mapping of a conceptual network from a source domain onto a target domain, as claimed by cognitive approaches, but also involve a shift in perspective which makes possible the mapping from the one domain to the