

Handbook of Narratology

Narratologia

Contributions to Narrative Theory

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Preface

Over the last few decades, the field of narrative studies has been vastly expanded by a wide spectrum of original studies in the philologies and other disciplines including linguistics, history, theology, art history or psychology, and it has also seen a growing number of attempts to survey, order, and summarize the results of such studies in the form of collections of essays, encyclopedias, companions, dictionaries, etc.

Against this background, the present *Handbook of Narratology* offers a new type of systematic in-depth overview of recent and older research, taking into account different disciplinary and national traditions in narrative study. The 32 entries present international research regarding the key terms, categories, and concepts of narratology in the form of full-length original articles structured in a parallel manner: each entry starts with a concise definition followed by a more detailed explication of the term in question and then proceeds, in its main part, to provide a differentiated description and critical discussion of the various approaches, positions, and controversies in their historical development, concluding with topics for further research and a select bibliography. All entries are cross-referenced. They vary in length in accordance with the complexity of the respective concepts.

The *Handbook* will subsequently be made available as an open-access *Living Handbook* on the Internet by Hamburg University Press. The articles will be updated and new articles made available at regular intervals, both in the printed and in the online versions.

This handbook grew out of the work of the Narratology Research Group at Hamburg University (2001–2007) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Narratology (founded in 2007).

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Hamburg and Paris
June 2009

Peter Hühn
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Author

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1 Definition

The author (real or empirical) can be defined in a narrow sense as the intellectual creator of a text written for communicative purposes. In written texts in particular, the real author is distinguished from the mediating instances internal to the text (cf. 2.1) (→ mediacy and narrative mediation). Beyond linguistically created works, the term author is also used for works in other media such as music and the visual arts as well as for comics, photography, film, radio and television programs, and computer games.

A broader understanding of the term author is used in the following contexts, among others: as conveyor of action in a socio-cultural context (cf. 2.3); in the sense of specific cultural-historically relevant conceptions of authorship; as a unifying instance in the interrelation of works (*œuvre*); as a reference for classification in terms of epoch and canon; and as an important point of reference for the meanings ascribed to works through which the recipient can determine the author's intention and/or author-related contexts relevant to understanding a work (cf. 2.2).

2 Explication

During the 20th century, a broad spectrum of how the author is understood was developed in scholarly circles: for framing concrete contexts (e.g. “producer of cultural goods”); for abstract author functions (e.g. *causa efficiens*); for concepts of the author relevant for understanding such as the → implied author. Unlike the dominant tendencies in the intensive discussions conducted since 1990 on the status and understanding of the author, this analysis will focus on the author's narratological relevance.

2.1 Communicative Instances in Narrative Representations

As in other domains, it holds for narratological analysis that the real author is held responsible for the communicative intention and form of a narratively organized work (on the roles of the author in literary communication, see Okopień-Sławińska 1971; Fieguth 1975). In the case of narrative fictions, it has proved useful to assume that mediacy is transferred to text-internal instances (“voice”) including the → narrator to various degrees of explicitness and, possibly, → characters in the storyworld. To these there correspond addressee instances such as the narratee (→ reader) or figured addressees, respectively. The arrangements of autofiction (within literary autobiography, e.g.) constitute a special case.

2.2 Authorship and Reception of the Work

Authorship is to be seen as a status attributed to a work with culturally differing author constructs bound up with authorial self-reflection and self-presentation in a spectrum ranging from self-assurance to skepticism as to the validity and scope of claims to authorship. In the sphere of (fictional) literature, constructs such as the author as *vates*, *poeta doctus*, creative genius or “writer” can be found. Independent of such typologizing expressions, particular author constructs also hold good for the reception of works in specific periods (e.g. the image of Milton during the Romantic period). These types of construction can refer to the totality of an author’s work (cf. *œuvre* author or career author—Booth 1977: 11) or to representative individual works.

Since the 18th century, there has been a culturally significant need to fall back on the author for interpretative processes and value judgments of an artistic work based on the creative act, authenticity, individuality, originality, unity of the work and its depth of meaning. From this perspective, the definition of “authorialism” in Benedetti’s sense (1999: 8–12) is based on the experience that in the modern era it is “impossible for a work of art to exist except as a product of an author” (10)—as “being authored” (74–8). A culturally (and legally) important result of this is that the authenticity of a work is attested with reference to the real author as its originator, which is significant, for instance, in the editing of texts (cf. Bohnenkamp 2002).

An author-related reception focuses on the intention, attributed to the author, to convey a particular understanding of his work. In this sense, the work can also be seen as an expression of the author’s personality (including his feelings, opinions, knowledge and values). In particular, differing conceptions of author and authorship determine,

alongside the concerns of historiographic, classificatory and editorial practices, ascription of meaning to literary texts within scholarly (cf. Spoerhase 2007) and non-scholarly circles as a result of biographical reference to the author, e.g., or with reference to the author's intention, reconstructed in a largely hermeneutic manner. In practical criticism, inclusion of the author as a category for textual interpretation is accepted (cf. Jannidis et al. eds. 1999: 22–4), this approach often being adopted in the “author-critical” problematics of literary theory and methodology (Jannidis 2000: 8; Winko 2002).

An alternative concept is marked by the term “author function”: the author as an individual person is held to be external to his work—as is maintained by Foucault, for example—so that in the reception of the work, he can be ignored as a reference point for the ascription of meaning. In a way that varies historically and culturally, the author is integrated into (discursively ordered) functional contexts, such as proprietary or legal concerns, or into classifications of cultural communication. The resulting author functions are thus not to be related to concrete individuals, but rather assigned, for example, to discourses or to intertextual constellations.

2.3 Author as a Social Role

Creatorship gives rise to certain consequences in a social context such as legal implications regarding a claim to intellectual property (copyright) or the author's legal responsibility for the effects of his work. These and other aspects (e.g. origin, education, patronage, market and media dependency, author-publisher relationships, royalties and honors, author groups and interest groups) are the concerns of the social history of the author, broken down into subsections such as the history of producers and distributors (cf. Jäger 1992; Haynes 2005; Parr 2008).

2.3.1 Collaborative as well as Anonymous, Pseudonymous and Fictitious Authorship

Author collectives (with at least two partners) can be found in various combinations of media (cf. Detering ed. 2002: 258–309; for *belles lettres*, cf. Plachta ed. 2001). During Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, e.g., texts were produced, over and above those created by an author through transcriptions, additions, commentaries and compilations which were attributable to more than one author. Since the late 18th century, popular prose fiction has often been written by anonymous or pseudonymous groups of authors and highbrow literature by authors in cooperation, usually declared. New possibilities have arisen thanks to

electronically stored, collectively produced hypertexts published on CD-ROM and/or online (cf. Landow ed. 1994; Simanowski 2001; Ryan 2006). Collective authorship specific to the medium is the rule in musical theater, cinema (cf. Kamp 1996) and television.

Numerous historical and cultural variants can be found for anonymous, pseudonymous and fictitious authorship (cf. Schaff 2002); until well into the 20th century, these practices were often resorted to in literary publications by women authors.

3 History of the Concept and its Study

The following (European) overview focuses on the author as the creator of literary texts, and in particular of narrative fiction.

Since Antiquity, terminological ambiguity in the concept of author and competing concepts of author and authorship have been apparent (cf. Burke ed. 1995; Jannidis et al. eds. 1999: 4–11), as witnessed, e.g., in the variously defined conceptions of the heteronomy and autonomy of the author. The underlying tendency from Antiquity to the modern era can be described as a shift from an instrumental-performative understanding of authorship to personalization characterized by creative individuality (cf. Wetzel 2000: 480).

Author as a neutral term alongside scriptor/writer first began to dominate after the end of the 18th century in the context of an economic and legal situation specific to the period and as a neutralizing claim set up to counter the emphatic understanding of “poet.” The word “author” has developed into an umbrella term and now denotes all forms of creatorship for a work in the context of public communication.

3.1 Antiquity

Author in the literal sense is of Roman origin (*auctor*), and has no Greek equivalent. However, Plato had already devised for poetic productivity the concept of a speech guided by “enthusiasm” (literally “possessed by God”), to which the later model of the poet pleading for (divine) inspiration as well as the *poeta vates* can be assigned. Alongside the dominant idea of the production of poetic works by means of inspiration, a further author model was formulated in the *poietes* (“maker”; Lat. *poeta faber*) favored in Aristotle’s *Poetics*: poetic works are created out of *techné*, i.e. craftsmanship and technical skill (Lat. *ars*) (cf. Kleinschmidt 1998: 14–34).

New ways of conceiving of the production of poetic works arose as a result of the complex of meanings surrounding the term *auctor* in the

ancient Roman legal system: an *auctor* is the bearer of *auctoritas* (cf. Heinze 1925) who enjoys particular rights and/or who can transfer (and thus authorize) these rights in order to promote something or achieve some goal. This “authority” was founded on, and confirmed by, the special knowledge available to the *auctor*. In this respect, the author model of the *poeta faber* was upgraded to the *poeta eruditus* or *poeta doctus*.

3.2 Middle Ages

Use of the Latin term *auctor* (Eng. *author*; Ital. *autore*; Fr. *auteur*; Span. *autor*; Ger. *Autor*) was extended to cover the creatorship of factual and fictional texts. In general, it was only from the late 15th century onwards that scholars and occasionally poets were referred to as *auctores*, a practice that continued up to the early decades of the 18th century. Viewed from a cultural-historical perspective, the classical model of the *poeta vates* was re-interpreted as an extension into the sphere of knowledge of the promises and teachings of Christianity so that where this commitment was supplemented by poetological knowledge, the result was to link up the author model with the *poeta doctus*.

In contrast to scientific texts, literary texts in the broader sense (as in epics or in the *Minnesang*) were often handed down without the creator being named, so that individual or collective anonymity prevailed. Little distinction was made between the creators, copyists, editors, commentators and compilers of texts in favor of “original” creatorship in need of protection (cf. Minnis 1984), with far more emphasis being placed on group identity: e.g.—depending on the type of text—in the *imitatio veterum* (supported by the canon that provided a model) or—when mediacy-oriented—in the case of collective manuscripts.

3.3 Early Modern Period

With the invention of the printing press, a public sphere based on written language was established for which, both in the dominant scholarly literature and in the diversified sphere of *belles lettres*, the individuality of the author as well as the authenticity of the single work and reliable copies (guaranteed by printing) gained progressively in importance. In literature, the author model of the *poeta eruditus* and the *poeta doctus* dominated starting from the time of Humanism. For these texts, “interpretation” was not the appropriate form of analysis, but “commentary,” relating the text to previous sources backed up with “authority” (cf. Scholz 1999: 347–50). Also revived was the model of the poet moved by inspiration, sometimes in the sense of an *alter deus*

(cf. Scholz 1999). Initially, creatorship remained legally undefined. It was not until the turn of the 18th century that the first contractual arrangements between publishers and authors were devised concerning royalties, etc.

3.4 Early 18th Century until the Mid-20th Century

As a result of varying national cultural developments in Europe, the author developed into a legal instance in the course of the 18th century, acquiring material entitlements vis-à-vis publishers, requiring protection against unauthorized reprints and plagiarism, and bearing personal responsibility for the content of his publications (e.g. Bosse 1981; Hesse 1991; Jaszi & Woodmansee eds. 1994). With the development of the objective conditions linked to creating factual and fictional texts for market-led public communication, the term author became a value-free collective name to which professional designations such as writer (*Skribent*, *Schriftsteller*, *écrivain*, etc.) as well as evaluative classifications such as poet/*Dichter* could be assigned. A broad spectrum of patterns of individual and collective authorship developed (cf. Haynes 2005: 302–10) for the social roles that arose from these concrete author models, and they were often accompanied by the authors' reflections on their self-perception (cf. Selbmann 1994).

Additional criteria for artistic production regarding creativity and originality (genius) became important for the understanding of the author as poet/*Dichter* from the final third of the 18th century onwards. Thus, the author could be defined legally, materially and intellectually (cf. Haynes 2005: 310–13). In emphatic formulations such as “art as religion,” the life experiences, conceptions of style and work of the (god-like) poet were bound together into a whole and endowed with a special aura (cf. Bénichou 1973). In this process, narrative prose was enhanced with a literary status in the course of the 18th century and was put on an equal footing with the “classical” genres of drama, epic, and verse as a poetic art.

New facets of the concept of author emerged from scholarly engagement with works of the poetic art, their theory and history which got underway after 1820 (cf. Jannidis et al. eds. 1999: 9–11). The author together with the story of his life and work became a reference point for expert textual analysis (biographical criticism), scholarly editions, literary-historical (re)constructions and evaluations for establishing the canon with practical cultural consequences, particularly for education and teaching. Toward the end of the 19th century, methodological debates emerged which, in different ways, fell back on the au-

thor as an interpretative norm for ascribing meaning, above all in the scholarly handling of texts. In this process, plausibility was legitimized in a variety of ways on the basis for example of: (a) the author's ascertainable intention (cf. Hirsch 1967); (b) extensions of the intentional aspect through a critique of psychoanalytical or ideological assumptions to meanings of literary texts beyond the author's intention: "to understand the author better than he understood himself" (Strube 1999); (c) the author-oriented selection of relevant contexts.

Approaches to ascribing meaning to texts in scholarly circles were developed in competition with these concepts from the early 20th century onwards, based on the assumption that all information relevant to meaning could be drawn from the text in question alone (cf. close reading, New Criticism, *werkimmanente Interpretation*, *explication de texte*, formalist, structuralist and text-semiotic approaches). In support of such approaches, criticism remained wary of the "intentional fallacy" (cf. Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946), emphasizing the irrelevance of the real author's intention for scholarly interpretation.

It was in this context that categorial distinctions between the real author and speaker instances internal to the text (cf. narrator, lyrical I), advocated since the beginning of the 20th century (cf. Friedemann 1910; Susman 1910) and accepted in the 1950s, gained in importance. As a textual instance located above other instances and differentiated from the real author (also as a reference point for text immanent interpretations of works), the "implied author" was brought into the discussion by Booth in 1961 even though, in the following decades, it was often called into question as "not absolutely necessary" (cf. Kindt & Müller 2006); complementary to the "implied author" is the "implied reader."

3.5 Since the Mid-20th Century

In this phase, both author-centric and author-critical approaches to textual interpretation have been further clarified in scholarly debates on literary theory, and the resulting competition between them was intensified. Hence, the *intentio operis* or the *intentio lectoris* (Eco 1990), e.g., was placed in opposition to the interpretative norm of the *intentio auctoris*. For ascribing meaning to a text put at a remove from the author's creative process as a result of publication, decisive emphasis is placed on the activity of the "implied reader" constructed during the reading process, or the real reader. This position is taken up in various ways in the concepts developed by empirical literary criticism (cf. Schmidt 1982) and by → cognitive narratology.

The concept of *écriture automatique*, developed by the French Surrealists during the 1920s, was then added to the critique of the assumption that a work is authentic and autonomous, the author being understood merely as the executing instance (cf. Barthes 1968) of the autonomously productive literary language. In a further step, the boundaries of the author-oriented work were cancelled out in intertextual constellations (cf. Kristeva 1969) and in “discourse” (Foucault 1969), and the author function superseded the person of the author (author as “intertextual construction,” as “discourse function”): with a Nietzschean gesture, Barthes and Foucault announced the “death of the author” (cf. Burke ed. 1995). The debate on the curtailed potency of authorship was carried on through the concepts of poststructuralism and the New Philology. The broader the medial spectrum for communication with text and with representations analogous to text grew during the second half of the 20th century, the greater the interest in the contribution of the material conditions of production and communication to the ascription of meaning became: authorship is now often conceived of as arrangement, montage, bricolage and remix (Wetzel 2000: 486, 491–92). Complex constructions of authorship are assigned to cinematic works (cf. Chatman 1990), while specific author concepts for the theory and reception of the products of the so-called new media, such as in hypertexts and cybertexts, are still being disputed (cf. Winko 1999).

In contrast to these positions, a multi-faceted debate, extending beyond the methodological problems of textual interpretation, got underway in around 1990 in which restitution of various aspects of the author was advocated (e.g. Biriotti & Miller eds. 1993; Jaszi & Woodmansee eds. 1994; Couturier 1995; Ingold & Wunderlich eds. 1992; Jannidis et al. eds. 1999; Detering ed. 2002). The debate took place with reference to the problematic relevance of origin, biography and types of experience to the processes of writing and forms of expression in concepts of gender studies (e.g. Walker 1990; Hahn 1991; Lanser 1992; Haynes 2005: 299–302) and those of postcolonial studies. Interest in the circumstances of authorial creativity and its scholarly investigation has intensified (cf. Ingold 1992); and still unabated is the commitment, developed since the 1920s by the sociology of literature and, since the 1970s, by the social history of literature as well as by cultural materialism, to investigation of the social role of the author and of the social institutions and processes that affect his work (cf. Wolf 2002: 395–99; Haynes 2005: 291).

4 Topics for Further Investigation

Questions to be pursued from a narratological perspective concern primarily the interpretation of literary texts (cf. Jannidis 2000): is the ascription of meaning with reference to aspects of the real author theoretically legitimate and fruitful practically speaking? Which of the six empirically determined author-oriented interpretative strategies proposed by Winko (2002) are absolutely necessary, and to what extent can they be hierarchically ordered? At the same time, are references to the real author conceivable other than in the orientation of ascribed meanings toward the author's intention, such as the author-oriented selection of relevant contexts for textual interpretation? Must reference to the author's intention represent an alternative to the implied author, or can author's intention and implied author complement one another in the ascription of meaning (cf. Kindt & Müller 2006)? Should reference to the real and/or implied author in any way constrain the randomness of meaning/significances ascribed through reader activity? In the ascription of meaning to texts, which characteristic relations can be identified for the reader's construction of the real author, the implied author and the narrative instance (cf. narrator)? Is the implied author a meaningful analytical category only for literary texts, or also for journalistic and historiographical texts?

(Translated by Alexander Starritt)

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Character

Fotis Jannidis

1 Definition

Character is a text- or media-based figure in a storyworld, usually human or human-like.

2 Explication

The term “character” is used to refer to participants in storyworlds created by various media (→ narration in various media) in contrast to “persons” as individuals in the real world. The status of characters is a matter of long-standing debate: can characters be treated solely as an effect created by recurrent elements in the discourse (Weinsheimer 1979), or are they to be seen as entities created by words but distinguishable from them and calling for knowledge about human beings (cf. 3.1)? Answering the latter question involves determining what kinds of knowledge are required, but also to what extent such knowledge is employed in understanding characters. Three forms of knowledge in particular are relevant for the narratological analysis of character: (a) the basic type, which provides a very fundamental structure for those entities which are seen as sentient beings; (b) character models or types such as the *femme fatale* or the *hard-boiled detective*; (c) encyclopedic knowledge of human beings underlying inferences which contribute to the process of characterization, i.e. a store of information ranging from everyday knowledge to genre-specific competence. Most theoretical approaches to character seek to circumscribe reliance on real-world knowledge in some way and treat characters as entities in a storyworld subject to specific rules (cf. 3.2). One important line of thought in the anti-realistic treatment of character is the functional view. In this perspective, first established by Aristotle, characters are subordinate to or determined by the narrative action; in the 20th century, there have been attempts to describe characters in terms of a deep structure based on their roles in the plot common to all narratives (cf. 3.3).

At the discourse level, the presentation of characters shares many features with the presentation of other kinds of fictional entities. However, because of the importance of character in telling stories, these features have been discussed mainly in terms of character presentation. Among these features are the naming of characters, studied from the perspective of the function and meaning of names, and other ways of referring to characters, which contribute to the overall structural coherence of the text (cf. 3.4). Equally if not more important, however, is the process of ascribing properties to names which results in agents having these properties in the storyworld, a process known as characterization. Characterization may be direct, as when a trait is ascribed explicitly to a character, or indirect, when it is the result of inferences drawn from the text based partly on world knowledge and especially the different forms of character knowledge mentioned above. The term “characterization” can be used to refer to the ascription of a property to a character, but also for the overall process and result of attributing traits to a given character. The process of characterization can have different forms: e.g. a character is attributed specific traits at the beginning of a narrative, but other traits are subsequently added that may not conform to the original characterization, such subverting the first conception of this character (cf. 3.5).

Viewing characters as entities of a storyworld does not imply that they are self-contained. On the contrary, the storyworld is constructed during the process of narrative communication, and characters thus form a part of the signifying structures which motivate and determine the narrative communication. Characters also play a role in thematic, symbolic or other constellations of the text and of the storyworld (cf. 3.6).

For most readers, characters are one of the most important aspects of a narrative. How readers relate to a character is a matter of empirical analysis, but it is important to bear in mind that the way the text presents a character is highly influential on the relation between character and reader. Three factors in particular are relevant in this regard: (a) the transfer of perspective; (b) the reader’s affective predisposition toward the character—itself influenced by: (i) the character’s emotions, whether explicitly described or implicitly conveyed; (ii) the reader’s reaction to her mental simulation of the character’s position; (iii) the expression of emotions in the presentation—and (c) evaluation of characters in the text (cf. 3.7).

There has always been a need to categorize characters in order to facilitate description and analysis. However, most proposals seem to be either too complex or theoretically unsatisfying, so that Forster’s clas-

sification into flat vs. round characters continues to be widely used (3.8).

3 History of the Concept and its Study

Until recently, there was nothing like a coherent field of research for the concept of character, but only a loose set of notions related to it touching on such issues as the ontological status of characters, the kind of knowledge necessary to understand characters, the relation between character and action, the naming of characters, characterization as process and result, the relation of the reader to a character centering around the notions of identification and empathy, etc. The situation has changed over the past ten or fifteen years thanks to a series of monographs on character by Culpeper (2001), Eder (2008), Jannidis (2004), Koch (1992), Palmer (2004), and Schneider (2001), all of which are indebted to the ground-breaking work done by Margolin in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these studies draw on the cognitive sciences and their models of text processing and perception of persons (→ cognitive narratology). However, even though there is now a consensus on some aspects of character in narrative, many other aspects continue to be treated disparately.

3.1 People or Words

Characters have long been regarded as fictive people. To understand characters, readers tend to resort to their knowledge about real people. In this framework, an anthropological, biological or psychological theory of persons can also be used in character analysis, as in Freud's analysis of Hamlet where he claims "I have here translated into consciousness what had to remain unconscious in the mind of the hero" (Freud [1900] 1950: 164).

Another school of thought pictured character as mere words or a paradigm of traits described by words. A well-known example of this approach is Barthes's *S/Z* (1970) in which one of the codes, "voices," substitutes for person, understood as the web of semes attached to a proper name. In this view, a character is not to be taken for anything like a person, yet on closer examination these semes correspond to traditional character traits. Although he differs from Barthes in many regards, Lotman (1970), in a similar vein, describes character as a sum of all binary oppositions to the other characters in a text which, together, constitute a paradigm. A character thus forms part of a constellation of

characters who either share a set of common traits (parallels) or represent opposing traits (contrasts).

This was not the first attack against a mimetic understanding of character during the last century, a comparable approach to character having already been advocated by the New Criticism. Wellek & Warren (1949) claimed that a character consists only of the words by which it is described or into whose mouth they are put by the author. Knights (1933) had earlier ridiculed the tendency in British criticism to treat character presentations like the representations of people with the question "How many Children had Lady Macbeth?" Despite this criticism, the reduction of characters to words was not convincing, for it posed many practical problems in literary criticism and also seemed to some critics unsatisfactory for theoretical reasons. Hochman (1985), for example, defended the idea of character as human-like against structuralist and post-structuralist conceptions with moral and aesthetic arguments.

Given this situation, the series of essays by Margolin, by combining elements of structuralism, reception theory and the theory of fictional worlds, proved to be a breakthrough. For Margolin (1993), characters are first and foremost elements of the constructed narrative world: "character," he claims, "is a general semiotic element, independent of any particular verbal expression and ontologically different from it" (7). He further points out that characters can have various modes of existence in storyworlds: they can be factual, counterfactual, hypothetical, conditional, or purely subjective (1995: 375). Also taken up are questions such as how characters come into existence and what constitutes their identity (→ identity and narration), especially in storyworlds as a transtextual concept.

Philosophers, especially those with roots in analytical philosophy, have discussed the special ontological status of character under the label of incompleteness of characters. Unlike persons who exist in the real world and are complete, we can speak meaningfully only about those aspects of characters which have been described in the text or which are implied by it. Consequently, descriptions of characters have gaps, and often the missing information cannot be inferred from the given information. In contrast to the description of real persons in which a gap may appear even though it is assumed that the person is complete, characters have gaps if the description does not supply the necessary information (Eaton 1976; Crittenden 1982; Lamarque 2003).

Even though there is currently a broad consensus that character can best be described as an entity forming part of the storyworld, the ontological status of this world and its entities remains unclear. Narrato-

logical theory presently offers three approaches to addressing this problem: (a) drawing on the theory of possible worlds, the storyworld is seen as an independent realm created by the text (Margolin 1990); (b) from the perspective of cognitive theories of the reading process, character is seen as a mental model created by an empirical reader (Schneider 2001); (c) from the perspective of the neo-hermeneutical theory of literary communication, the text is an intentional object and character is a mental model created by an hypothetical historical model reader. This approach incorporates a number of insights into text processing, but focuses on the text (Jannidis 2004). The main differences between these approaches lie in how the presentation of character is described and in the use of principles borrowed from the cognitive sciences.

3.2 Character Knowledge

Even some of those who have claimed that character is a paradigm of traits assume that there exists a cultural code making it possible to perceive these traits as a meaningful whole (Lotman 1970), or *Gestalt*. This code is also resorted to in the perception of people in everyday life such that there is an interaction between the formation of (narrative) characters and the perception of people not only because the perception of people determines how plausible a character is, but also because the way characters are presented in narratives can may change the way people are perceived. At the same time, this cultural code contains information that is not applied to people but only to characters, especially stock characters and genre-based character types. Even so, the notion of a cultural code is probably too vague, since it encompasses different aspects or levels which should be distinguished: the basis type; character models; character schemas.

The concept of basis type adopts recent insights from developmental psychology. From early on, humans distinguish between objects and sentient beings. They apply to the perception of the latter a theory of mind which ascribes to them mental states such as intentions, wishes, and beliefs. Once an entity in the storyworld is identified as a character, this framework is applied to that entity, the basis type thus providing the basic outline of a character: there is an invisible “inside” which is the source of all intentions, wishes, etc., and a visible “outside” which can be perceived. All aspects of a basis type can be negated for a specific character, but either this is done explicitly or it results from genre conventions (Jannidis 2004: 185–95; Zunshine 2006: 22–7). On another, more concrete level, knowledge about time- and culture-spe-

cific types contributes to the perception of characters. Some are “stock characters” such as the rich miser, the *femme fatale*, or the mad scientist, while others draw upon general *habitus* knowledge in a society like the formal and laborious accountant, the old-maid teacher or the 19th-century laborer (Frevert & Haupt ed. 2004). Such figures serve as character models. Character models are often associated with standardized “character constellations” such as cuckold, wife, and lover. In popular culture, characterization frequently depends on character models, and the creative variation of these models is highly appreciated, while in high culture there is a strong tendency to avoid character models (cf. 3.8; Lotman [1970] 1977: 239–60).

It is important to note that basis type and character models do not exhaust the relevant knowledge forms for characters. In many instances of character description, encyclopedic knowledge—from both the real world and fictional worlds—comes into play, combining two or more items of character- (or person-)related information (e.g. “too much alcohol makes people drunk” or “vampires can be killed by a wooden stake driven into their heart”). In many cases, texts offer the reader only a fragment of information, prompting the reader to fill in the missing parts based on the appropriate knowledge. In text analysis, this kind of character encyclopedia is relevant more often than the other two, and differences in the interpretation of characters are frequently based on the fact that different entries from the character encyclopedia are resorted to.

3.3 Character and Action

One of the oldest theoretical statements on character reflects on the relation of character and action: “for tragedy is not a representation of men but of a piece of action [...]. Moreover, you could not have a tragedy without action, but you can have one without character-study” (Aristotle [1927] 1932: 1450a). What Aristotle said in relation to tragedy became the origin of a school of thought which claims that in order to understand a character in a fictional text, one need only to analyze its role in the action. This approach was put on a new foundation by Propp (1928) in a ground-breaking corpus study of the Russian folk-tale. In analyzing a hundred Russian fairy tales, he constructed a sequence of 31 functions which he attributed to seven areas of action or types of character: opponent; donor; helper; princess and her father; dispatcher; hero; false hero. Greimas (1966) generalized this approach with his actant model in which all narrative characters are regarded as expressions of an underlying narrative grammar composed of six act-

ants ordered into pairs: the hero (also *sujet*) and his search for an object; the sender and the receiver; the hero's helper and the opponent. Each actant is not necessarily realized in one single character, since one character may perform more than one role, and one role may be distributed among several characters. Schank's concept of story skeletons also starts from the idea that stories have an underlying structure, but in his model there are many such structures and therefore many different roles for actors, e.g. the story of a divorce using the story skeleton "betrayal" with the two actors: the betrayer and the betrayed (Schank 1995: chap. 6).

Campbell (1949) described in an influential work what he called, using a term coined by James Joyce, the "monomyth," which is an abstraction of numerous mythological and religious stories marking the stages of the hero's way: separation/departure; the trials and victories of initiation; return and reintegration into society (Campbell [1949] 1990: 36). According to Campbell, who bases his argument on Freud's and especially on Jung's form of psychoanalysis, the monomyth is universal and can be found in stories, myths, and legends all over the world. In contrast to these generalized model-oriented approaches, traditional approaches tend to employ a genre- and period-specific vocabulary for action roles such as *confidant* and *intriguer* in traditional drama, or villain, sidekick, and henchman in the popular media of the 20th century.

Most of the common labels for character in use refer to the role a character has in action. "Protagonist," in use since Greek antiquity, refers to the main character of a narrative or a play, and "antagonist" to its main opponent. In contrast to these neutral labels, the term "hero" refers to a positive figure, usually in some kind of representative story. In modern high-culture narratives, there is more often an anti-hero or no single protagonist at all, but a constellation of characters (Tröhler 2007).

3.4 Referring to Characters

Referring to characters in texts occurs with the use of proper names, definite descriptions and personal pronouns (Margolin 1995: 374). In addition to these direct references, indirect evocations can be found: the untagged rendering of direct speech, the description of actions (e.g. "a hand grabbed") or use of the passive voice ("the window was opened"). The role of names in interpreting characters has been treated repeatedly, resulting in different ways of classifying name usage (e.g. Lamping 1983; Birus 1987).

Narratives can be viewed as a succession of scenes or situative frames, only one of which is active at any given moment. An active situative frame may contain numerous characters, but only some of them will be focused on by being explicitly referred to in the corresponding stretch of text. The first active frame in which a character occurs and is explicitly referred to constitutes its “introduction.” After being introduced, a character may drop out of sight, not be referred to for several succeeding active frames, and then reappear. In general, whenever a character is encountered in an active frame, it is to be determined whether this is its first occurrence or whether it has already been introduced in an earlier active frame and is reappearing at a particular point. Determining that a character in the current active scene has already appeared in an earlier one is termed “identification.” A distinction is to be made between normal, false, impeded, and deferred identifications. A “false identification” occurs when a previously mentioned character is identified but it then becomes clear later that some other character was in fact being referred to. An “impeded identification” does not refer unequivocally to any specific character, and a clear reference to the character or characters is never given in the text, while in the case of “deferred identification” the reader is ultimately able to establish the identity of an equivocally presented character. Deferred identification can further be broken down into an overt form in which the reader knows that he is kept in the dark and a covert form (Jannidis 2004: chap. 4 & 6, based on Emmott 1997).

3.5 Characterization

Characterization can be described as ascribing information to an agent in the text so as to provide a character in the storyworld with a certain property or properties, a process often referred to as ascribing a property to a character. In the 19th century, critics spoke of the difference between direct and indirect characterization and of the preference of contemporary writers and readers for the latter (Scherer [1888] 1977: 156–57). Until recently, characterization was understood as the text ascribing psychological or social traits to a character (e.g. Chatman 1978), but in fact texts ascribe all manner of properties to characters, including physiological and locative (space-time location) properties. Yet some textually explicit ascriptions of properties to a character may turn out to be invalid, as when this information is attributable to an unreliable → narrator or to a fellow-character. Moreover, a textual ascription may turn out to be hypothetical or purely subjective. There are also texts and styles of writing (e.g. the psychological novel) which

tend to avoid any explicit statements of characterization. The crucial issue in the process of characterization is thus what information, especially of a psychological nature, a reader is able to associate with any character as a member of the storyworld and where this information comes from. There are at least three sources of such information: (a) textually explicit ascription of properties to a character; (b) inferences that can be drawn from textual cues (e.g. "she smiled nervously"); (c) inferences based on information which is not associated with the character by the text itself but through reference to historically and culturally variable real-world conventions (e.g. the appearance of a room reveals something about the person living there or the weather expresses the feelings of the protagonist). A systematic description of such inferences employed in characterization is given by Margolin (1983). Inferences can be understood in terms of abductions (Keller 1998: chap. 9, based on Peirce), so that the fundamental role of character models and of the character encyclopedia becomes obvious: the information derived from them is not included in the text, but is presupposed to a greater or lesser degree by it.

Another key problem concerns the limits and underlying rules of such inferences when they are applied to fictional beings. Ryan (1980), noting that readers tend to assume that a storyworld resembles the real world unless explicitly stated otherwise, adopts the philosopher David Lewis's "principle of minimal departure." In a thorough criticism of this and similar hypotheses, Walton points out that this would make an infinite number of inferences possible, and he comes to the conclusion: "There is no particular reason why anyone's beliefs about the real world should come into play. As far as implications are concerned, simple conventions to the effect that whenever such and such is fictional, so and so is as well, serve nicely [...]" (Walton 1990: 166). This approach, in turn, increases the number of conventions without necessity and without providing any convincing argument as to how readers go about accessing these conventions, aside from drawing on their real-world knowledge, despite the fact that many conventions apply only to fictional worlds. Even so, this does not invalidate Walton's criticism, which can probably be refuted only by including another element: the fact that characters are part of storyworlds which are not self-contained, but communicated. Readers' assumptions about what is relevant in the process of communication determine the scope and validity of inferences (Sperber & Wilson 1986).

The presentation of characters is a dynamic process, just as is the construction of characters in the reader's mind. A powerful model for describing the psychological or cognitive dynamics coming into play

here, based on the “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes observed during empirical studies on reading comprehension, has been proposed by Schneider (2001) building on concepts developed by Gerrig & Allbritton (1990). A top-down process occurs in the application of a category to a character, integrating the information given by the text into this category, while a bottom-up process results from the text information integrating a character into a type or building up an individualized representation. At the beginning of a character presentation, textual cues may trigger various types of categorization: social types (“the teacher,” “the widow”); literary types (the hero in a *Bildungsroman*); text-specific types (characters that do not change throughout the story). In contrast to the top-down processing that takes place in these forms of categorization is bottom-up processing. This occurs when the → reader is unable to integrate the given information into an existing category, resulting in personalization of the character. Personalized characters can also be members of a category, but this is not the focus of their description. Reading a text involves building up either categorized or personalized characters, but information subsequently encountered in the text may change their status and possibly decategorize or depersonalize those characters.

3.6 Character and Meaning

Characters can be seen as entities in a storyworld. However, this should not be understood to mean that characters are self-contained. On the contrary: they are at the same time devices in the communication of meaning and serve purposes other than the communication of the facts of the storyworld as well. This matter was discussed above in the relation between character and action. In many forms of narrative, however, action is not the organizing principle, but a theme or an idea, and the characters in these texts are determined by that theme or idea. An extreme example is personification, i.e. the representation of an abstract principle such as freedom or justice as a character, as found in allegorical literature. Another example is certain dialogue novels, where the characters’ role is to propound philosophical ideas. On the other hand, even the most life-like characters in a realistic novel can often also be described in light of their place in a thematic progression. Thus, Phelan (1987) has proposed to describe character as participation in a mimetic sphere (due to the character’s traits), a thematic sphere (as a representative of an idea or of a class of people), and a synthetic sphere (the material out of which the character is made). In his heuristic of film characters, Eder (2008) adopts a similar breakdown, but adds a

fourth dimension relating to communication between the film and the audience: (a) the character as an artifact (how is it made?); (b) the character as a fictional being (what features describe the character?); (c) the character as a symbol (what meaning is communicated through the character?); and (d) the character as a symptom (why is the character as it is and what is the effect?). The difference between characters as part of storyworlds and the meaning of character cannot be aligned with the difference between (narratological) description and interpretation because elements of a character or the description of a character are often motivated by their role in thematic, symbolic, aesthetic and other networks.

3.7 Relation of the Reader to the Character

Characters may induce strong feelings in readers, a fact often discussed under the label “identification.” Identification is a psychological process and as such lies outside of the scope of narrative analysis. On the other hand, it is widely recognized that to some extent identification results from and is controlled by various textual cues and devices. A first problem is the concept of identification itself, since it involves a variety of aspects: sympathy with a character who is similar to the reader; empathy for a character who is in a particular situation; attraction to a character who is a role model for the reader. To date, there is no means of integrating all of these factors into a satisfactory theory of identification. There are older, mostly outdated models of identification, based on Freud or Lacan, and newer models, some of which are based on empirical studies (e.g. Oatley & Gholamain 1997), while others seek to integrate empirical findings and media analysis (e.g. Eder 2008, part VII). Another problem is historical variation: much literature before 1800 aims more at creating an attitude of admiration for the protagonist than it does at immersing the reader in the situation of the character (Jauss 1974; Schön 1999).

Provisionally, the problem of identification with the character in narrative can be broken down into the following three aspects: (a) “transfer of perspective” works on different levels: perception (the reader “experiences” the sensory input of a character); intention (the reader is made aware of a character’s goals); beliefs (the reader is introduced into the character’s worldview). In narrative texts, such transfer occurs in part through the devices of → focalization and → speech representation; (b) the “affective relation” to the character is a complex phenomenon resulting from various factors. First is the information gleaned from the text bearing on the character’s emotions projected

against the backdrop of general, historical, and cultural schemas applicable to particular situations and the emotions “appropriate” for these situations. Second is mental simulation of the depicted events, which creates an empathetic reaction involving the reader’s disposition to respond to the emotion experienced by the character (a display of sadness creates pity), but may also activate similar emotions (a display of sadness generates a similar feeling in the reader). To what extent such simulations actually occur has been discussed extensively: proponents see support for their position in the discovery of mirror neurons (Lauer 2007), while opponents point out that this aspect plays a limited role if any at all (e.g. Mellmann [2006], who models the reader’s response on the basis of evolutionary psychology). Such responsive dispositions may be socially induced, but they may also exist in other forms, such as sadistic or voyeuristic arousal. In any case, reaction to simulated events is not constrained to characters, but includes events of all types. These reactions to events not directly related to characters can be used to “externalize” the character’s affects (e.g. a description of a storm which reflects the agitated state of mind of the protagonist watching the storm). The third factor in the affective relation is the expressive use of language or the presentation of emotions in texts using phonetic, rhythmic, metrical, syntactical, lexical, figurative, rhetorical, and narrative devices including free indirect discourse and similar strategies (Winko 2003); (c) “evaluation of characters” is based on historically and culturally variable measures of value. Evaluation can be explicit thanks to the use of evaluative vocabulary, or implicit due to behavior that implies evaluation according common social standards. This includes implicit comparison between the reader or spectator and the protagonist, already described by Aristotle. An evaluative stance toward a character creates such emotional responses as admiration, sympathy or repulsion, at the same time coloring the reader’s affective relation to the character.

3.8 Categories of Character

The most widely known proposal on how to categorize character is still Forster’s opposition between flat and round characters: “Flat characters [...] are constructed round a single idea or quality” ([1927] 1985: 67) while round characters are “more highly organized” (75) and “are capable of surprising in a convincing way” (78). Critics have long accepted this categorization as plausible, relating it to the way real people are perceived. However, the criteria Forster based it on are vague, especially the notion of development to explain the impression of a round

character (e.g. Scholes et al. [1966] 2006: chap. 5). A significant problem in this discussion results from the fact that all we know about a specific character is based on what can be learned from a text or another medium. Therefore, it is often not easy to distinguish between the character and the way it is presented, as can be seen, for example, with Rimmon-Kenan, who proposes three dimensions to categorize characters: “complexity, development, penetration into the ‘inner life’” ([1983] 2002: 41), thus mixing aspects of the character as an entity of the storyworld with those of its presentation. Similarly, Hochman (1985) proposes eight dimensions as a basis of categorization without distinguishing between these two aspects. To name but three of them: stylization—naturalism; complexity—simplicity; dynamism—staticism. One of the earliest attempts to distinguish clearly between these aspects in categorizing characters comes from Fishelov (1990), who combines the opposition between presentation and storyworld with the distinction between flat and round characters. Another problematic aspect of this approach is the fact that it is almost always combined with an evaluative stance valorizing the complex and devaluating the simple regardless of the requirements of different genres (as Forster already deplored), or deprecating those genres.

Stereotypes are often regarded as the prototypical flat character. With Dyer (1993), however, a distinction can be drawn between the social type and the stereotype. Social types are known because they belong to a society with which the reader is familiar, while stereotypes are ready-made images of the unknown. In fiction they differ, according to Dyer, to the extent that social types can appear in almost any kind of plot, while stereotypes carry with them an implicit narrative.

4 Topics for Further Investigation

All of the aspects outlined above deserve further investigation, but three problems are of particular interest in the current state of research. (a) Recent decades have seen a growing interest in the social construction of identities—national identities, gender identities, etc. Analysis of character presentation and formation plays an important part in any interpretation interested in identity construction in literature, but up to now those engaged in identity analysis have neglected narratological research on character; at the same time, narrative analysis has mostly ignored the historical case studies carried out on identity construction by specialists of cultural studies. (b) Evaluation in literary texts has been and is still a neglected field of research. There are many ways a text can influence or predetermine the evaluative stance of the reader,

and much systematic and historical work in this area remains to be done. (c) The question of how a reader relates to a character can only be answered by an interdisciplinary research bringing together textual analysis and the cognitive sciences.

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Cognitive Narratology

David Herman

1 Definition

Cognitive narratology can be defined as the study of mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices, wherever—and by whatever means—those practices occur. As this definition suggests, cognitive narratology is transmedial in scope; it encompasses the nexus of narrative and mind not just in print texts but also in face-to-face interaction, cinema, radio news broadcasts, computer-mediated virtual environments, and other storytelling media. In turn, “mind-relevance” can be studied vis-à-vis the multiple factors associated with the design and interpretation of narratives, including the story-producing activities of tellers, the processes by means of which interpreters make sense of the narrative worlds (or “storyworlds”) evoked by narrative representations or artifacts, and the cognitive states and dispositions of characters in those storyworlds. In addition, the mind-narrative nexus can be studied along two other dimensions, insofar as stories function as both (a) a target of interpretation and (b) a means for making sense of experience—a resource for structuring and comprehending the world—in their own right.

2 Explication

Cognitive narratology can be characterized as a subdomain within “postclassical” narratology (Herman 1999). At issue are frameworks for narrative research that build on the work of classical, structuralist narratologists but supplement that work with concepts and methods that were unavailable to story analysts such as Barthes, Genette, Greimas, and Todorov during the heyday of the structuralist revolution. In the case of developments bearing on cognitive narratology, narrative analysts have worked to enrich the original base of structuralist concepts with ideas about human intelligence either ignored by or inaccessible to the classical narratologists, thereby building new founda-

tions for the study of cognitive processes vis-à-vis various dimensions of narrative structure.

Still an emergent trend within the broader domain of → narratology, cognitive narratology encompasses multiple methods of analysis and diverse narrative corpora. Relevant corpora include fictional and non-fictional print narratives; computer-mediated narratives such as hyper-text fictions, e-mail novels and blogs; comics and graphic novels; cinematic narratives; storytelling in face-to-face interaction; and other instantiations of the narrative text type (→ narration in various media). Meanwhile, theorists studying mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices adopt descriptive and explanatory tools from a variety of fields—in part because of the interdisciplinary nature of research on the mind-brain itself. Source disciplines include, in addition to narratology, linguistics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, and other domains. Making matters still more complicated, because the term “cognitive narratology” is a relatively recent coinage (cf. 3), narrative scholars working on issues that fall within this domain do not necessarily identify their work as cognitive-narratological, and might even resist being aligned with the approach.

It should therefore not be surprising that, given the range of artifacts and media falling under its purview, its richly interdisciplinary heritage, and the multiplicity of projects relevant for if not directly associated with it, cognitive narratology at present constitutes more a set of loosely confederated heuristic schemes than a systematic framework for inquiry. Again, however, a trait shared by all this work is its focus on mind-relevant aspects of storytelling practices—where “mind” is shorthand for “mind-brain.” Insofar as stories constitute a target of interpretation, key questions for cognitive narratology include: What cognitive processes support narrative understanding, allowing readers, viewers, or listeners to construct mental models of the worlds evoked by stories? How do they use medium-specific cues to build on the basis of the discourse or *sujet* a chronology for events, or *fabula* (what happened when, or in what order?); a broader temporal and spatial environment for those events (when in history did these events occur, and where geographically?); an inventory of the characters involved; and a working model of what it was like for these characters to experience the more or less disruptive or non-canonical events that constitute a core feature of narrative representations (Herman 2009a: chap. 5)? Further, insofar as narrative constitutes a sense-making instrument in its own right, a way of structuring and understanding situations and events, still other questions suggest themselves for cognitive narratologists: How exactly do stories function as tools for thinking (Herman

2003)? Is it the case that, unlike other such tools (stress equations, deductive arguments, etc.), narrative is a mode of representation tailor-made for gauging the felt quality of lived experiences (Fludernik 1996; Herman 2007a, 2007b, 2009a: chap. 6)? More radically, do stories afford scaffolding for consciousness itself—in part by emulating through their temporal and perspectival configuration the nature of conscious awareness itself? In other words, are there grounds for making the strong claim that narrative not only represents what it is like for experiencing minds to live through events in storyworlds, but also constitutes a basis for having—for knowing—a mind at all, whether it is one's own or another's (Herman 2009a: chap. 6)?

Arguably, questions such as these could not have been formulated, let alone addressed, within classical frameworks for narrative study (but cf. Barthes 1966 and Culler 1975 for early anticipations). Cognitive narratology can thus be thought of as a problem space that opened up when earlier, structuralist models were brought into synergistic interplay with the many disciplines for which the mind-brain is a focal concern.

3 History of the Concept and its Study

3.1 A Partial Genealogy of the Term “Cognitive Narratology”

At the time of writing, the term cognitive narratology itself has been in use for only about a decade. As Eder (2003: 283 n.10) notes, the term appears to have been first used by Jahn (1997). (In a personal communication, Jahn confirmed that when he published this article he was not aware of any prior use of the term, but also that Ansgar Nünning must be credited with suggesting the second part of the article's title.) However, the issues and concerns encompassed by the term have been live ones for a considerably longer period.

Beginning in the 1970s, studies in a number of fields provided, *avant la lettre*, important foundations for cognitive-narratological research. In the domain of literary studies, and in parallel with a broader turn toward issues of reception or reader response (Iser 1972; Jauss 1977; Tompkins 1980), research by Sternberg (1978) and Perry (1979) highlighted processing strategies (e.g. the “primacy” and “recency” effects) that arise from the situation of a given event vis-à-vis the two temporal continua of story and discourse, or *fabula* and *sujet*. Events that happen early in story-time can be encountered late in discourse-time, or vice versa, producing different reading experiences from those set into play when there is greater isomorphism between the time of the

told and the time of the telling. (A still earlier precedent in this connection is Ingarden's [1931] account of literary texts as heteronomous vs. autonomous objects, i.e. as schematic structures the concretization of whose meaning potential requires the cognitive activity of readers.) Likewise, in the fields of cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence research, analysts began developing their own hypotheses about cognitive structures underlying the production and understanding of narrative.

Psychologists such as Mandler (1984), for example, postulated the existence of cognitively based story grammars or narrative rule systems. Such grammars were cast as formal representations of the cognitive mechanisms used to parse stories into sets of units (e.g. settings and episodes) and principles for sequencing and embedding those units (for a fuller discussion, cf. Herman 2002: 10–13). Roughly contemporaneously with the advent of story grammars, research in Artificial Intelligence also began to focus attention on the cognitive basis for creating and understanding stories. Schank & Abelson's (1977) foundational work explored how stereotypical knowledge reduces the complexity and duration of many processing tasks, including the interpretation of narrative. Indeed, the concept of script, i.e. a type of knowledge representation that allows an expected sequence of events to be stored in the memory, was designed to explain how people are able to build up complex interpretations of stories on the basis of very few textual or discourse cues (→ schemata). Whereas the term "scripts" was used to refer to kinds of world-knowledge that generate expectations about how sequences of events are supposed to unfold, "frames" referred to expectations about how domains of experience are likely to be structured at a given moment in time (Goffman 1974). Frames guide my expectations about the objects and decor that I am likely to find in a university classroom as opposed to a prison cell; scripts guide my expectations about what I can expect to happen while ordering a beer in a bar as opposed to defending a doctoral dissertation.

Although subsequent research on knowledge representations suggests the limits as well as the possibilities of the original frame and script concepts (Sternberg 2003 provides a critical review), this early work has shaped cognitive narratology from its inception, informing the study of how particular features of narrative discourse cue particular kinds of processing strategies. Indeed, Jahn's (1997) foundational essay in the field, mentioned above, draws on Minsky's (1975) account of frames (among other relevant research) to redescribe from a cognitive perspective key aspects of Stanzel's (1979) theory of narrative. In Jahn's proposal, higher-order knowledge representations or frames en-

able interpreters of stories to disambiguate pronominal references, decide whether a given sentence serves a descriptive or a thought-reporting function (e.g. depending on context “the train was late” might either be a thought mulled over by a character or part of the narrator’s own account of the narrated world), and, more generally, adopt a top-down as well as a bottom-up approach to narrative processing. A frame guides interpretation until such time as textual cues prompt the modification or substitution of that frame.

In a similar vein, other theorists have explored how experiential repertoires, stored in the form of scripts, enable readers or listeners of stories to “fill in the blanks” and assume that if a narrator mentions a masked character running out of a bank with a satchel of money, then that character has in all likelihood robbed the bank in question. Analysts have also discussed how literary narratives in particular involve processes of script recruitment, disruption, and refreshment (Cook 1994; Herman 2002: 85–113; Stockwell 2002: 75–89), depending on how critically and reflexively the narratives relate to prevailing scripts. For her part, Emmott (1997) focuses on how what she calls contexts, or spatiotemporal nodes inhabited by configurations of individuals and entities, constrain pronoun interpretation. Information about contexts attaches itself to mental representations that Emmott terms “contextual frames.” An action performed by (or on) a given configuration of participants is necessarily indexed to a particular context and must be viewed within that context, even if the context is never fully reactivated (after its initial mention) linguistically. For example, if a character in a short story orders a beer in a bar, then even if elements of the setting are not mentioned again readers can assume that subsequent verbal and nonverbal actions performed by the character continue to take place in the bar—until such time as linguistic signals cue a frame-switch (e.g. “Several days later, he saw his friend [...],” or “Later that night, when he had reached his apartment [...]).” Finally, Palmer (2004) also draws on elements of the early work on knowledge representations, studying how readers’ world-knowledge allows them to make sense of a variety of techniques for representing fictional characters’ minds. Palmer explores how readers construct inferences about fictional minds by using various textual indicators, including thought reports, speech representations, and descriptions of behaviors that span the continuum linking mental with physical actions.

More generally, a cluster of publications appeared in the second half of the 1990s, all of them adding impetus to the “cognitive turn” in narrative studies that had been prepared for by research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s and that had been directly anticipated by Turner

(1991). 1996 saw the appearance of Fludernik's richly synthetic account of natural narratology, which integrates ideas from literary narratology, the history of English language and literature, research on natural-language narratives told in face-to-face communication, and cognitive linguistics to isolate "experientiality," or the felt, subjective awareness of an experiencing mind, as a core property of \rightarrow narrativity. Turner's (1996) own extrapolation from cognitive-linguistic models of metaphor to account for human intelligence in terms of parabolic projections, or the mapping of source stories onto target stories to make sense of the world, was also published in 1996. The year before, the influential volume *Deixis in Narrative* had appeared (Duchan et al. eds. 1995); contributions to this volume characterize narrative comprehension in terms of deictic shifts, whereby interpreters shift from the spatiotemporal coordinates of the here-and-now to various cognitive vantage-points that they are cued to occupy by textual signals distributed in narrative discourse (Ryan 1991; Werth 1999).

This spate of publications over a five-year period (the list is by no means exhaustive) helps explain why the inaugural 2000 issue of the online journal *Image [&] Narrative* focused on cognitive narratology. It also helps account for the organization, just after the turn of the century, of a number of edited volumes, special journal issues, and conferences exploring intersections among cognition, literature, and culture as well as cognitive approaches to narrative in particular (e.g. Abbott ed. 2001; Richardson & Steen eds. 2002; Herman ed. 2003; Richardson & Spolsky eds. 2004). During the same period, theorists formulated a number of pertinent objections to (or at least reservations about) what Richardson & Steen termed a "cognitive revolution" in the study of literature and culture (Jackson 2005; Sternberg 2003). In particular, as noted in 4 below, scholars who remain skeptical about cognitive approaches to literature and culture in general, and about cognitive narratology in particular, question the degree to which work of this kind represents true interdisciplinary convergence—as opposed to the selective (and sometimes ill-informed) borrowing of ideas and methods tailored to problem domains in other fields.

3.2 Emergent Trends in the Field

It is still too early in the development of cognitive narratology to identify what its most important contributions to the broader field of narratology may eventually prove to be. Nonetheless, the present subsection provides a partial catalogue of pertinent studies, with the following subsections focusing on several areas in which research activity

has already been especially productive. Relevant research includes:

- (a) cognitively inflected accounts of narrative → perspective in fictional and nonfictional texts (van Peer & Chatman eds. 2001; Jahn 1996, 1999; Herman 2009b);
- (b) research on representations of the minds of characters and on the classes of textual cues that prompt readers to draw particular kinds of inferences about the contents and dispositions of those minds (Butte 2004; Cohn 1978; Herman 2007a; Palmer 2004; Zunshine 2006);
- (c) studies of emotions and emotion discourse and how they both illuminate and are illuminated by particular narrative texts as well as broader narrative traditions (Herman 2007b; Hogan 2003a);
- (d) research on the range of cognitive processes that support inferences about the spatiotemporal profile of a given storyworld, and about the degree to which a given text or representation can be assimilated to the category “narrative”—that is, assigned at least some degree of narrativity—in the first place (Fludernik 1996; Gerrig 1993; Herman 2002, 2009a; Hogan 2003b: 115–39; Jahn 1997; Ryan 1991, 2003);
- (e) research on the textual as well as cognitive factors underlying the key effects of narrative suspense, curiosity, and surprise, and more broadly on how the temporal order in which elements of a narrative are encountered can shape interpreters’ overall sense of a storyworld (Gerrig 1993; Perry 1979; Sternberg 1978, 1990, 1992);
- (f) research more generally on phenomena pertaining to the interface between narratives and the mind-brain of the interpreter, such as the activation of “identity themes” (Holland 1975) or the (potential) stimulation of empathetic responses (Keen 2007)—in other words, attempts to formulate what Eder (2003) terms “cognitive reception theories”;
- (g) studies of narrative as a resource for navigating and making sense of computer-mediated environments (Ryan 2001, 2006);
- (h) empirical studies that, relying on techniques ranging from the measuring of reading times to methods of corpus analysis to the elicitation of diagrams of storyworlds, seek to establish demonstrable correlations between what Bortolussi & Dixon (2003) term “text features” and “text effects”—i.e. between textual structures and the processing strategies that they set into play (Gerrig 1993; Ryan 2003; Herman 2005); and
- (i) intermedial research suggesting that narrative functions as a cognitive “macroframe” enabling interpreters to identify stories or story-

like elements across any number of semiotic media (→ mediacy and narrative mediation)—literary, pictorial, musical, etc. (Wolf 2003; Ryan ed. 2004; Herman 2009a).

Several of these initiatives can be singled out as especially generative for cognitive-narratological research: namely, study of the cognitive processes underlying interpreters' ability to construct (and immerse themselves more or less fully within) storyworlds; research on issues pertaining to consciousness representation; and, relatedly, analyses of emotion and emotion discourse vis-à-vis stories and storytelling.

3.2.1 Narrative Ways of Worldmaking: Cognitive Dimensions

Mapping words onto worlds is a fundamental—perhaps *the* fundamental—requirement for narrative sense making. Approaches such as deictic shift theory (Duchan et al. eds. 1995) and contextual frame theory help reveal the complex cognitive processes underlying narrative ways of worldmaking; they also suggest how configuring narrative worlds entails mapping discourse cues onto the *WHAT*, *WHERE*, and *WHEN* factors whose interplay accounts for the ontological make-up and spatiotemporal profile of a given storyworld. An approach based on shifting deictic centers indicates how narrative worlds are structured around cognitive vantage points that may change over the course of an unfolding story. Likewise, based on the assumption that characters will be bound into and out of particular contexts over time as well as the assumption that such contexts will be distributed spatially as well as temporally, Emmott's (1997) contextual frame theory points to the nexus of the *WHAT*, *WHERE*, and *WHEN* factors in narrative worldmaking.

Furthermore, reconsidered from a cognitive-narratological perspective, earlier narratological scholarship can be read anew, providing further insight into the cognitive processes underlying the (re)construction of narrative worlds. Genette's (1972) influential account of time in narrative, for example, can be motivated as a heuristic framework for studying the *WHEN* component of world creation (→ time). When Genette distinguishes between simultaneous, retrospective, prospective, and "intercalated" modes of narration (as in the epistolary novel, where the act of narration postdates some events but precedes others), these narrative modes can now be interpreted in light of the different kinds of structure that they afford for worldmaking. Retrospective narration accommodates the full scope of a storyworld's history, allowing a narrator to signal connections between earlier and later events through proleptic foreshadowings of the eventual impact of a character's actions on his or her cohorts. Simultaneous narration, in which

events are presented in tandem with the interpreter's effort to comprehend the contours and boundaries of the narrated domain, does not allow for such anticipations-in-hindsight; rather, inferences about the impact of events on the storyworld remain tentative, probabilistic, open-ended (Margolin 1999). In short, classical, structuralist accounts like Genette's suggest how a narrative world is "thickened" by forays backward and forward in time and throws into relief the processing strategies triggered by such temporal agglutination (Sternberg 1978, 1990, 1992).

3.2.2 Issues of Consciousness Representation

In her foundational study of strategies for representing consciousness in narrative fiction, Cohn (1978) draws on theories of → speech representation as the basis for her account of how narrative texts afford access to fictional minds. Just as narratives can use direct discourse, indirect discourse, and free indirect discourse to present the utterances of characters, fictional texts can use what Cohn calls quoted monologue, psycho-narration, and narrated monologue to represent the thought processes of fictional minds. Subsequent theorists, seeking to underscore even more clearly the assumed analogy between modes of speech and thought representation, have renamed Cohn's three modes as direct thought, indirect thought, and free indirect thought, respectively (Leech & Short 1981). As Palmer (2004) notes, however, this classical or "speech category" approach captures only some of the phenomena relevant for research on narrative representations of consciousness. For Palmer, the speech-category approach has induced analysts to focus solely on inner speech, with the result that theories of consciousness representation in narrative have been "distorted by the grip of the verbal norm" (53). Yet narrative understanding in fact hinges on a wide variety of inferences about the states, dispositions, and processes of fictional minds—including inferences about the felt, subjective nature of their experience (i.e. the "qualia" specific to their particularized vantage-point on the storyworld [Nagel 1974]) as well as their folk psychology, or method for framing inferences about what is going on in their own and others' minds.

When characters use folk-psychological models to explain their own and others' motivations and intentions, they are drawing on fundamental, generic processes by which humans attribute mental states, properties, and dispositions both to themselves and to their social cohorts. These processes have been described as the native "Theory of Mind" in terms of which people make sense of their cohorts' behavior (Zunshine 2006). At issue is people's everyday understanding of how thinking