Dag Nikolaus Hasse,
Amos Bertolacci (Eds.)

THE ARABIC, HEBREW AND LATIN RECEPTION OF AVICENNA'S METAPHYSICS

The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics

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edited by

Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci

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Preface

The articles of this volume are presented by scholars who convened in 2008 to discuss their research on the influence of Avicenna's metaphysics in the Villa Vigoni, Centro italo-tedesco, Menaggio, Italy. We are grateful to the participants and chairs of the congress who do not contribute to this volume: Rüdiger Arnzen, Gad Freudenthal, Dimitri Gutas, Maarten Hoenen and Andreas Speer. Special thanks go to two research assistants at the University of Würzburg: Anna-Katharina Strohschneider, who prepared the papers for type-setting, and Jon Bornholdt, who extinguished mistakes in the texts of contributors who are not native speakers of English. We gratefully acknowledge the generous and unbureaucratic funding of the conference by the VolkswagenFoundation, as part of the Lichtenberg professorship grant to Dag Nikolaus Hasse. Finally, we would like to thank Gregor Vogt-Spira and the staff of the Villa Vigoni who created an ideal atmosphere for the discussion of a research issue of considerable complexity.

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Contents

Introduction

Many centuries passed after the composition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* before a metaphysical work of similar size and ambition was written in the Peripatetic tradition: Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* (*Metaphysics*, or: *Divine Things*), the fourth and last part of the summa *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ (Book of the Cure)*, dating to 1020–27 CE. The *Ilāhiyyāt* is only one of more than a dozen metaphysical works by Avicenna, but in terms of comprehensiveness, systematic effort and influence, it is his most important metaphysical text. It is rivaled only by the *Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (Book of Pointers and Reminders)*, a late summa dating to ca. 1030–34 CE that contains a substantial metaphysical section of considerable influence in the Arabic tradition.

The study of Avicenna's metaphysics has made important progress in the past few years, due in part to the appearance of studies in monograph format.[1] Much, however, remains to be done. Above all, critical editions of Avicenna's metaphysical works are still lacking,[2] and the study of their manuscript tradition is still at a preliminary stage.[3] The present book sheds light on Avicenna's metaphysics itself, but its proper theme is the reception of his metaphysics in three different cultures: Arabic, Hebrew and Latin.

In the past few decades, it has increasingly become recognized that Avicenna's philosophy, and in particular his metaphysics, was of overwhelming influence in the Arabic-speaking world from the eleventh to, at least, the

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1   Among recent studies, particularly important are R. Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, London: Duckworth, 2003, and A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' in Avicenna's 'Kitāb al-Shifāʾ'*, Leiden: Brill, 2006. A helpful tool is the collection of articles by M.E. Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy*, Binghamton: Global Academic Pub., 2005, as well as recent translations of the *Ilāhiyyāt* into English by M.E. Marmura (Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of 'The Healing'*, Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005) and Italian by O. Lizzini with a preface by P. Porro (Avicenna, *Metafisica: la scienza delle cose divine*, 2nd edn, Milan: Bompiani, 2006) and A. Bertolacci (Avicenna, *Il libro della guarigione: Le cose divine*, Torino: Utet, 2008).
2   See the list of Emendanda of Anawati's Arabic edition of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (Avicenna, *al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt*, Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma, 1960) in Bertolacci, *The Reception* (as in n. 1).
3   On the *Ilāhiyyāt*, see A. Bertolacci, On the Manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Šifāʾ*, in A. Akasoy, W. Raven, eds, *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 59–75, and on the *Šifāʾ* in general, the papers presented at the International Colloquium *The Manuscript Tradition of Avicenna's Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ: The Current State of Research and Future Prospects*, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 22–24 September 2010 (proceedings forthcoming in *Oriens*, 40, 2012).

sixteenth century. Even those thinkers who fundamentally disagreed with Avicenna often developed their intellectual standpoint in confrontation with the Avicennian tradition. Indications of the scope of Avicenna's influence in Arabic are the many extant commentaries on his works, the lively reception of his metaphysical theories by Islamic theologians, and the reading of his philosophy in the madrasa.[4] Research on the later period of Arabic philosophy after Avicenna is still in its infancy. This is particularly true of the centuries after Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who died 1210 CE. Lists have been drawn up of the authors and works that should be studied and researched, but since the details of the intellectual history of the period are still unknown, the time has not yet come for generalizations. It is an open question, for example, which of Avicenna's texts transmitted which theories. As in the case of al-Lawkarī, it may well be that an author read several metaphysical texts by Avicenna: *Ilāhiyyāt*, *al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād*, *Išārāt*, *Ta'līqāt*, etc. (see the article by Janssens in this volume). Also, it can be shown that interpretations of Avicenna were often influenced by previous readers (see the articles by Wisnovsky and Menn). Turning to thirteenth- and fourteenth-century sources, one realizes that Avicennian theories were often transmitted through intermediate sources, such as the influential works of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, or through philosophical handbooks (see the articles by Adamson and Eichner). Despite the fact that so much remains unknown about this period, it is already apparent that the reception of Avicenna's metaphysical theories in later Arabic thought gave rise to a wealth of metaphysical discussions of impressive intellectual quality.

The textual transmission of Avicenna's metaphysics in the Latin speaking world is better known. There are solid grounds for believing that Dominicus Gundisalvi, also called Gundissalinus by the scholastics, an archdeacon and canon of the cathedral of Toledo, was the translator of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* from Arabic into Latin between 1150 and 1180.[5] The Latin title was *Liber de*

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4   Recent studies: D. Gutas, The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca. 1350, in J. Janssens, D. de Smet, eds, *Avicenna and His Heritage*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002, pp. 81–97; R. Wisnovsky, The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100–1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations, in P. Adamson et al., eds, *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004, vol. 2, pp. 149–91; G. Endreß, Reading Avicenna in the Madrasa: Intellectual Genealogies and Chains of Transmission of Philosophy and the Sciences in the Islamic East, in J.E. Montgomery, ed., *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, Leuven: Peeters, 2006, pp. 371–422; H. Eichner, Dissolving the Unity of *Metaphysics:* From Fakhr al-Din al-Razi to Mulla Sadra al-Shirazi, *Medioevo*, 32, 2007, pp. 139–97.

5   Dominicus Gundisalvi is identified as the translator in the colophon of three of the 25 manuscripts. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, I–IV, ed. S. Van Riet, Louvain/Leiden: Peeters/Brill, 1977, p. 123*, n. 2.

philosophia prima sive scientia divina. This text gradually found its readers in the Latin West (see the article by Bertolacci) and reached the high point of its influence in the period from Thomas Aquinas to John Duns Scotus (as evidenced in the articles of Richardson, Porro, Galluzzo, Pickavé and Pini). The manuscript transmission of the *Philosophia prima* thins out considerably after 1400 CE: 15 manuscripts are extant from the thirteenth century, 7 from the fourteenth, 3 from the fifteenth.[6] But Avicenna's doctrines continued to be discussed in the Renaissance (see the article by Hasse).

The Latin reception of Avicenna's metaphysics was also influenced by the translation of al-Ġazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa (Intentions of the Philosophers)* into Latin. The *Maqāṣid* are to a large degree an intelligent reworking of Avicenna's Persian *Dānešnāme-ye ʾAlāʾī (Philosophy for ʿAlāʾ-al-Dawla)* and thus exhibit basic teachings of Avicenna, though not always faithfully. Since, until the early fourteenth century, this was the only text by al-Ġazālī known in the Latin West, the scholastics read al-Ġazālī as a *sequax Avicennae.* Another influence on the Western reading of Avicenna's metaphysics was Averroes' *Long commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, which contains several passages that engage in criticism of Avicenna's metaphysical theories.

There exist a good number of in-depth studies on the reception of Avicenna by individual scholastic authors and on the reception of certain Avicennian theories, e.g. on the primary notions or the subject matter of metaphysics,[7] but scholarship has not yet arrived at a comprehensive picture of Avicenna's influence on Latin metaphysics. The present volume is meant as a contribution to such a picture. The importance of the issue is widely recognized, in view of the pivotal significance of Avicenna for the formation of metaphysical thought in high scholasticism.

The *Ilāhiyyāt* of *The Cure* was not translated into Hebrew, but Avicenna's metaphysics nevertheless influenced medieval Jewish thought.[8] This influence

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6   Avicenna, ibid., p. 127*.
7   To mention only a few studies: J. Aertsen, Avicenna's Doctrine of the Primary Notions and its Impact on Medieval Philosophy, in Akasoy, Raven (as in n. 3), pp. 21–42; A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert; Texte und Untersuchungen*, Leuven: Peeters, 1998; J.F. Wippel, The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics, *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 37, 1990, pp. 65–72. See the bibliography in P. Porro's preface to Lizzini's Italian translation of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (as in n. 1) and J. Janssens' *An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sīnā*, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991, with its *First Supplement*, Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 1999. See also the collection of articles on the Latin transmission of Avicenna's works by M.-Th. d'Alverny, *Avicenne en occident*, Paris: Vrin, 1993.
8   S. Harvey, Avicenna's Influence on Jewish Thought: Some Reflections, in Y.T. Langermann, ed., *Avicenna and his Legacy. A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2009, pp. 327–40.

occurred through Jewish philosophers reading Avicenna in Arabic, the partial translation of Avicenna's *Kitāb an-Naǧāt (Book of Salvation)* into Hebrew, and – indirectly – the Hebrew translations of Averroes and al-Ġazālī, in particular the translation of al-Ġazālī's *Intentions of the Philosophers* (see the articles by Zonta). Some topics of this reception have received detailed attention in scholarship, such as Maimonides' usage of several Avicennian doctrines: the proof of God's existence, the concept of the necessary being, and the distinction between essence and existence.[9] Other issues remain to be settled, such as the identification of the Avicennian texts read and quoted by Jews directly from the Arabic, for example by Abraham ibn Daud, the Andalusian philosopher of the twelfth century (see the article by Fontaine), or the transportation of Avicennian ideas through Hebrew commentaries on al-Ġazālī's *Intentions of the Philosophers.* An important question is whether there is evidence for a current of 'Jewish Avicennism' in the fourteenth century rivaling the dominant philosophical current influenced by Averroes, as Mauro Zonta has suggested.[10] It is clear, however, that Avicenna's overall influence in Hebrew philosophy was never on the same scale as that of Averroes.

Some articles of the present volume are devoted to the textual transmission of Avicenna's metaphysics in different cultures (Janssens, Zonta, Bertolacci). Others study the reception of several prominent doctrines of Avicenna: the distinction between essence and existence (Wisnovsky, Eichner, Porro); the doctrine of primary notions (Menn, Pini); the theory of individuation and universals (Galluzzo, Pickavé); emanation theory and the related topics of the necessary being, the emanation of the intelligences, the nature and function of the giver of forms, and the origin of evil (Adamson, Hasse, Richardson, Fontaine). It is the explicit aim of the present volume to facilitate the comparison between the reception processes in distinct cultures and times, thus contributing to our knowledge both of Avicenna's metaphysics itself, through the lenses of his medieval readers, and of its culturally complex reception history.

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9 Among the many studies on this topic, only two shall be mentioned: M. Zonta, Maimonides' Knowledge of Avicenna. Some Tentative Conclusions About a Debated Question, in G. Tamer, ed., *The Trias of Maimonides/Die Trias des Maimonides. Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture of Knowledge/Jüdische, arabische und antike Wissenskultur*, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2005, pp. 211–22; and the chapter on the influence of Avicenna's metaphysical proof of God in the classic study by H.A. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 378–406.

10 M. Zonta, The Role of Avicenna and of Islamic 'Avicennism' in the 14th-Century Jewish Debate Around Philosophy and Religion, *Oriente moderno*, 80, n.s. 19, 2000, pp. 647–60, and M. Zonta, Avicenna in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, in Janssens, De Smet (as in n. 4), pp. 267–79.

The Avicennian doctrines studied in this volume are important, but they also represent a somewhat accidental choice, since they reflect what several contemporary scholars in the field are currently working on. Equally important issues of Avicennian metaphysics (for example, the subject-matter of metaphysics, the proof of God's existence, the metaphysically grounded prophetology, and the theory of substance and accident) are only treated cursorily. In this connection it is important to remember that Avicenna's metaphysics is very rich in content and coherent in structure and ought not to be reduced to a sample of famous doctrines. There are many chapters in the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Išārāt* that still await more detailed analysis – not to speak of studies on the reception of these chapters. On the other hand, the reception history shows that two doctrines in particular were extremely successful in all three cultures considered here and in both philosophical and theological milieus: the distinction between essence and existence, and the concept of the necessary existent by itself. The medieval readers of Avicenna thus testify to the remarkable philosophical originality of these doctrines.

Al-Lawkarī's Reception of Ibn Sīnā's Ilāhiyyāt

Jules Janssens

Al-Lawkarī, who was born at Lawkar near Merw (Iran) at an unknown date and who died most likely at the beginning of the twelfth century (in 1123 at the latest), is presented by al-Bayhaqī as a disciple of Bahmanyār, a first-generation student of Ibn Sīnā[1]. If this is correct, he is a second-generation student of the Šayḫ al-raʾīs. However, if he really died in 1123, it would be surprising that he had been a direct disciple of Bahmanyār, who died in 1066 at the latest. Whatever the case, he is known as the author of a *fihrist*, i. e. a list, of Ibn Sīnā's *Taʿlīqāt*, but, above all, as the author of a major philosophical encyclopedia, entitled *Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq*[2]. This latter encompasses three major parts: logic, physics and metaphysics. The latter divides into two major parts, i. e., *al-ʿIlm al-kullī (Universal Science)*, and *Rubūbiyyāt (Lordly Things)*, followed by *al-Risāla l-mulḥaqa bi-ʿilmi al-rubūbiyyati*, the appended exposition of the lordly science, and *al-Fuṣūl al-muntaḫabat min ʿilm al-aḫlāq*, the selected chapters of the moral science. The basic division into 'universal science' and 'lordly science' is, as such, not mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of his *Šifāʾ*, but might ultimately stem from his *al-Mašriqiyyūn*[3]. As to the appellation 'lordly science', it probably derives from the prologue to the *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*[4]. In any case, al-Lawkarī's division differs substantially from that of Bahmanyār, which distinguishes between metaphysics, *mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa*, and science of the states of the essences of the existing beings, *al-ʿilm bi-aḥwāl aʿyān*

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1   See al-Lawkarī, *Bayān. Manṭiq. al-Madḫal. Muqaddima*, pp. 57–71. For Bayhaqī's affirmation, see al-Bayhaqī, *Tarīḫ*, pp. 145–6.
2   For a more detailed survey of al-Lawkarī's life and works, see Marcotte, Life and Work of al-Lawkarī, pp. 134–57.
3   See Ibn Sīnā, *al-Manṭiq al-mašriqiyyīn*, pp. 8, 9–10 (but note that Ibn Sīnā uses the expression *ʿilm ilāhī*, not *rubūbiyyāt*). Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'*, pp. 188–9, stresses that the bipartition in question breaks with the unitary view of the *Šifāʾ*, but can be regarded as the expression of the more original and independent way of exposition that Ibn Sīnā avowedly follows in the *Mašriqiyyūn*. Regarding the names of metaphysics as a discipline, as well as of its parts, see *ibid.*, pp. 599–605.
4   See Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, pp. 1, 7–8, where it is stated that 'the fruit of the branch of metaphysics is *Theology*, which treats [the subjects of] lordship, i. e., the First Principle, and the relationship which beings bear to it according to their rank' (translation, slightly modified, taken from Gutas, *Avicenna*, p. 31).

al-mawǧudāt[5]. However, both Ibn Sīnā's *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* and Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl* are largely used as sources in these basic parts, as is already shown by Dībāǧī in his edition of the *Bayān*. In the part entitled *Universal Science*, they even constitute the only sources. He reproduces *verbatim* entire chapters or, at least, large parts of them of both works. With respect to the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, the following correspondences come to the fore:

Bayān	*Ilāhiyyāt* of *Šifāʾ*
c. 1–4	I, 1–4 (metaphysics as science)
c. 14	III, 1 (accidental categories in general)
c. 18–21	III, 7–10 (quality and relation)
c. 24	IV, 3 (complete/incomplete)
c. 29–37	V, 5–6, 8–9; VI, 1–4 (species, *differentia* and definition)[6]
c. 40–41	VII, 2–3 (refutation of Platonic Ideas).

As to Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*, one may point out these derivations:

Bayān	*Taḥṣīl*
c. 6–13	II, 1, 3–4, 7–8, 11–13 (truth, substance, matter and form)[7]
c. 15–17	II, 2, 3–5 (quantity)
c. 22–3	II, 3, 1–2 (anteriority/posteriority; potency/act)
c. 25–8	II, 4, 2–5 (universal/particular; genus/matter)
c. 38	II, 5, 3 (chance/fortune/final cause)
c. 39	II, 6, 1 (unity/multiplicity).

It has to be noted that many of these chapters drawing on Bahmanyār are clearly influenced also by Ibn Sīnā's *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, as indicated by al-Dībāǧī. Some sources have escaped the editor: regarding chapter 7 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 1, 4) there exists, besides an inspiration from *Ilāhiyyāt*, II, 1, a strong influence from the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifāʾ* (I, 4). On the other hand, one looks in vain for any

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5   See Bahmanyār, *Taḥṣīl*, pp. 277 and 567. Regarding the significant deviation from Avicenna that is involved in this distinction, see Janssens, Faithful Disciple, pp. 188–9.

6   In his *Bayān*, al-Lawkarī has surprisingly reversed the order of the chapters 6 and 8 of the *Ilāhiyyāt*. Moreover, he has divided the text of c. 3 (on the compatibility between the efficient causes and their effects) over two chapters, presenting the second part as a detailing (*tafṣīl*) of the basic affirmation of the first.

7   Despite the fact that the title of c. 6 of the *Bayān* is derived from the *Ilāhiyyāt* of his *Šifāʾ*, I, 8, the text of the chapter reproduces *Taḥṣīl*, II, 1, 2, pp. 291,12–293,5. C. 13 corresponds to c. II, 1, 13 of the *Taḥṣīl*, not 3 as indicated in al-Lawkarī, *Bayān. al-ʿIlm al-ilāhī*, p. 70, n. 1. Finally, it has to be observed that c. II, 1, 11 of the *Taḥṣīl* (corporeal matter is not devoid of form) has been copied in c. 10 of the *Bayān*, except for its end (see Bahmanyār, *Taḥṣīl*, p. 336,1–12 – on the natural form), a literal copy of which constitutes c. 11.

reference to *Ilāhiyyāt*, II, 4, with respect to chapter 12 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 1, 12), or to V, 6, 8 and 9 regarding chapter 28 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 4, 5). Finally, chapter 38 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 5, 3) has not only been inspired by chapter 14 of book 1 of *al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī* of the *Šifāʾ*, but also by chapter 13 of the same book[8].

As to chapter 5, it is also based on both works, but it is distinctive insofar as it first (pp. 27,2–28,9) quotes the very beginnings of I, 5 (regarding the primary concepts and principles) of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* (*Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, pp. 29,3–30,4), and then continues (pp. 28,9–32) with the reproduction of chapters from Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl:* the entire chapter II, 1, 2 (on *šayʾ*, thing, as distinguished from being and non-being) and the beginning of chapter II, 1, 3 (on possibility, impossibility and necessity; *Taḥṣīl*, pp. 290,14–291,11)[9]. In Bahmanyār's wording one easily detects several direct links with *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, I, 5.

Surveying the totality of these derivations, one sees that al-Lawkarī covers almost the entirety of books 1–7 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*. Only four chapters seem to have been completely omitted, i.e., I, 6–7 (on the Necessary Being); III, 3 (on unity and multiplicity, and the accidentality of number) and V, 4 (what among the things contained in the genus render it a species or not a species?). The omission of the former two is certainly not by chance, since a treatment of the very idea of the Necessary Existent evidently has its natural place in the section on lordly things, not in that of the general ontology of the universal science. As to chapter III, 3, it does not so much offer new ideas as rather study in depth the difficult issues of unity and accidentality of number. In fact, it deals with the aporetic nature of the notions of unity and multiplicity and moreover proves the inseparability of unity and substance (despite the fact that unity does not constitute the quiddity of the substance) by way of diaeresis and *reductio ad absurdum*[10]. Similarly, chapter V, 4 can be considered as dealing with a particular examination of a difficult topic, i.e., the relation between a genus and its differentiae, both notions being dealt with in other chapters. In ignoring them, al-Lawkarī wanted perhaps to avoid too *technical* questions. For

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8 I have limited myself here to mentioning only the most important omissions or mistakes by al-Dībāǧī. For more details regarding Bahmanyār's derivations from Avicennian texts regarding the chapters II, 1, 4–13 and II, 2, 3–5, see Janssens, Revision, pp. 99–117 (102–4 and 110). In c. 28 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 4, 5), one detects an inspiration of *Ilāhiyyāt*, V, 8; V, 6 and V, 9 on pp. 185–7 in the order as indicated here. As to c. 38 (*Taḥṣīl*, II, 5, 3), the inspiration of elements of c. 13 of *al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī*, see Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, *al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī*, pp. 63–6 (detectable on pp. 239–41 of the *Bayān*). It has to be noted moreover that the opening paragraph is also identical with the final paragraph of *Ilāhiyyāt*, VI, 4, see Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, p. 283, 4–9.

9 The rest of c. II, 1, 3, which deals with truth and nullity, will be reproduced in c. 6 of the *Bayān*.

10 Lizzini rightly stresses this double method of analysis in the given context, see Ibn Sīnā, *Metafisica*, pp. 207–9.

the very same reason, he might have dismissed the last part of VI, 3 (*Šifā*ʾ,
Ilāhiyyāt, pp. 274,5–278,8), where a rather technical objection against the
theory that the recipient of an act cannot be equal to its agent – one is more
burnt when one puts one's hand in molten metal than in fire, hence the molten
metal is hotter than fire, although it became hot by the fire – is discussed.
However, in this case the omission can be explained (perhaps primarily) by Ibn
Sīnāʾs remark that this discussion more properly belongs to the art of physics
(*Šifā*ʾ, *Ilāhiyyāt*, pp. 275,18–276,1)[11].

But why has he preferred on occasion reproducing Bahmanyārʾs rewording
to giving the very text of the related chapters of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā*ʾ? One
could be tempted to answer: in order to avoid being shown up as a plagiarist.
But why has he then not modified Ibn Sīnāʾs text more significantly? Moreover,
one may not forget that in his lifetime authors' rights did not exist, and scholars
were constantly copying large extracts from their predecessors' works. Certainly,
al-Lawkarī has taken the practice to an excess. So, could it be that he, in acting
this way, wanted to partake in what I have qualified elsewhere as a *revision* of
Ibn Sīnāʾs metaphysics? The inclusion of two chapters, one of which is linked
with the *Maqūlāt*, the other with *al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī* of the *Šifā*ʾ, as indicated
above, might at first sight suggest that this is the case. Indeed, it seems to blur
the limits between metaphysics, on the one hand, and logic and physics, on the
other, just as Bahmanyār had done.

However, as soon as one looks more carefully, it appears immediately that
this is anything but evident. Indeed, when Bahmanyār in his *Taḥṣīl*, II, 1, 4,
used rather *Maqūlāt*, I, 4 than *Ilāhiyyāt*, I, 2 of the *Šifā*ʾ, he simply followed Ibn
Sīnāʾs own indications. The Šayḫ al-raʾīs, in the latter text says: 'This (i.e., to
claim that something can be both a substance and an accident with respect to
two things) is a grave error. We have discussed it fully in the first parts of *Logic*.
For, even though it was not the [proper] place [for discussing it], it was there
that they committed this error'[12]. The reference is clearly to the *Maqūlāt*, which
is the second book of the logical section of the *Šifā*ʾ[13]. The exact identification
of the chapter referred to is not easy, but Bahmanyār obviously has identified it
as I, 4 – and in contemporary scholarship M. Marmura fully agrees with him[14].

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11 The omission of a great part of *Šifā*ʾ, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VI, 5 (pp. 288,12–300,9) is undoubtedly
    due to the reliance on Bahmanyār, but can as well be explained in a similar line.
12 Ibn Sīnā, *Šifā*ʾ, *Ilāhiyyāt*, II, 1, p. 58,14–16; English translation of Marmura (Ibn Sīnā,
    The Metaphysics of 'The Healing', p. 46,29–31).
13 The explicit reference to the *first* parts, seems to have misled Van Riet (Ibn Sīnā, *Liber de
    philosophia prima,* V–X, p. 66, n. 37–8). She offers what is in my view a mistaken
    reference to *Logyca. Prima pars* (i.e., *Isagogè*), Venice 1508, fol. 4ʳ. This reference has
    been taken over by Lizzini in Ibn Sīnā, *Metafisica*, p. 1080, n. 11.
14 See Marmura (Ibn Sīnā, *The Metaphysics of 'The Healing'*, II, 1, p. 389, n. 4). Contrary to
    him, Horten (Ibn Sīnā, *Metaphysik*, p. 91, n. 6), Anawati (Ibn Sīnā, *La métaphysique du*

As to the introduction of two chapters of *al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī*, it once more has an explicit basis in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, this time VI, 5, where one reads: 'Regarding coincidence and its being an end, we have finished [discussing] it in the *Physics*.'[15] This time, there is no doubt about the *locus referentiae*, i.e. I, 13, to be complemented naturally with I, 14, insofar as this latter chapter refutes mistaken conceptions regarding luck and coincidence that had been exposed in the former[16]. So, in both cases the introduction of textual materials that are foreign to the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* are supported by Ibn Sīnā's own words. Moreover, it has to be noted that al-Lawkarī never quotes a chapter of Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*, where this latter deviates perceptibly from Ibn Sīnā's basic perspective. In this sense, it is most relevant that he, contrary to Bahmanyār, does not mention in the present context any of the other categories than the four (i.e., substance, quality, quantity and relation) treated by Ibn Sīnā himself in the context of metaphysics. Herein I detect a fidelity to the original metaphysical project of the venerable Master, i.e., Ibn Sīnā, and, at the same time, a rejection of the revised version elaborated by one of the latter's most important immediate disciples, i.e., Bahmanyār.

However, thus far I have only dealt with the part on universal science. Hence, one may wonder whether the above conclusion remains also valid for that on the lordly things. It is immediately striking that in this part, one finds, with the exception of two small fragments, no reference to Bahmanyār's *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl*. The vast majority of the chapters (which are enumerated anew from 1) are once again a literal, or, at least, almost literal quotation of chapters of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*:

Bayān	Ilāhiyyāt of Šifāʾ
c. 1–2	VIII, 1, 3 (finitude of causes)
c. 3–7	VIII, 4; I, 7; VIII, 5–7 (Necessary Existent and attributes)
c. 8	IX, 1 (activity of God)

Šifāʾ, I–V, p. 334, n. 58,14) (based on the commentary of Mullā Ṣadrā al-Šīrāzī) and Bertolacci (Ibn Sīnā, *Libro della guarigione*, p. 231, n. 11), refer to I, 6 (Horten adds moreover II, 1–3). Based solely on its title, this latter chapter appears to be the best candidate, but if one looks at what is really at issue I, 4 may be preferable. To settle this delicate issue clearly exceeds the limits of the present paper.

15 Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VI, 5, p. 284,8–9; English translation of Marmura (Ibn Sīnā, *The Metaphysics of 'The Healing'*, p. 220,28–9).

16 Among contemporary scholars, Lizzini (Ibn Sīnā, *Metafisica*, p. 1187, n. 178), and Bertolacci (Ibn Sīnā, *Libro della guarigione*, p. 549, n. 162) refer to both chapters, whereas Marmura (Ibn Sīnā, *The Metaphysics of 'The Healing'*, VI, 5, p. 410, n. 3) and Van Riet (Ibn Sīnā, *Liber de philosophia prima*, p. 327, n. 76) refer to the sole c. 13. As to Horten (Ibn Sīnā, *Metaphysik*, p. 416, n. 3), he refers to chapters 12–13. Anawati offers no reference.

A few remarks have to be made:

1. Inside chapter 1 (pp. 272,6–273,2), a fragment is inserted into the text of *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VIII, 1[17]. It starts with the words 'according to another way of consideration, he says'. This is surprising, insofar as before one looks in vain for a previous occurrence of 'he says', let alone an explicit mention of a particular author. But given that what precedes is a literal quotation of Ibn Sīnā's *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifā'*, one suspects that the reference is to this latter. This turns out to be correct, since the fragment reproduces – once again almost *verbatim* – part of a text of the Šayḫ al-ra'īs, taken not however from the *Šifā'*, but from *al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*. More precisely, it concerns the chapters 12–15 of *namaṭ* 4 of part II[18].

2. At the end of chapter 7, two passages of Bahmanyār's *Taḥṣīl*, i.e., one (*Bayān*, pp. 316,10–317,9) covering III, 1, 1, pp. 576,12–577,16 (on absolute perfection), another (*Bayān*, pp. 317,10–320,2) covering II, 6, 3, pp. 559,10–561,14 (on pain and pleasure, sensible and intellectual), have been added[19]. They seem to have been inspired by *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VIII, 7, pp. 368,13–369,10.

3. Chapter 9 opens with a proof that a celestial motion cannot be by force. This proof is explicitly linked with Aristotle's *On the Heavens*, designated by its common Arabic title (*fī*) *al-Samā' wa-l-'ālam* (*On Heaven and Earth*). The passage (*Bayān*, p. 333,5–14) is not a literal quotation, in spite of its opening word *qāla* ('he has said'), but offers a paraphrase of a fragment of the latter

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17   The quotation of Ibn Sīnā, *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, VIII, 1 ends at *Bayān*, p. 272,2 with the reproduction of line 2 of p. 329 and reopens at p. 273,2 (starting with *fa-qad*) with that of line 3 of the very same page (not at p. 273, 4 with line 7, as indicated by al-Dībāǧī, see al-Lawkarī, *Bayān*, p. 273, n. 4).

18   The former of these chapters is characterized as a *šarḥ*, the remaining ones are designated as *išāra*, see Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārat*, III, pp. 23–7.

19   Al-Dībāǧī seems to have forgotten to indicate the beginnings of this second fragment on p. 310,10 of his edition of al-Lawkarī's *Bayān* (at p. 320, n. 5 he remarks: 'this is the end of what has been transmitted from the *Taḥṣīl*', but this cannot be the end of the former fragment, the only one to which he is referring to on p. 316, n. 14).

work, i.e., I, 2, 269a9–18. Al-Lawkarī agrees with this, but adds that Ibn Sīnā
has surpassed the Philosopher in adding a proof that such motion is not natural
either. Somewhat later in the chapter (pp. 335,9–336,4), al-Lawkarī introduces
a saying of (pseudo-)Ptolemy's *Kitāb al-Ṯamara* (*Book of the Result*), which states
that there is no difference between what chooses the best and the natural. The
saying is followed by an explanation due to a certain Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn
ʿAlī al-Iṣfahānī[20]. In doing this, al-Lawkarī wants to stress that Ibn Sīnā was right
– in spite of refuting radically any natural circular motion – to accept that
somehow circular motion may be called natural, namely insofar as what moves a
body in a circular motion is not alien to that body (*Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 2,
p. 383,1–3).

4. The second part of chapter 17 corresponds to pages 362,8–364,9 of the
Bayān. The first part (p. 362,1–8) shows affinities with *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 5,
p. 413,1–7, but stems ultimately from another source as immediately after-
wards will be indicated.

All the remaining chapters of the part on lordly things, except for two of
them, have their ultimate source in another Avicennian text, i.e., his *Kitāb al-
Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*:

Bayān	al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād
c. 10–13	II, 1–4 (emanation from the One; *ibdāʿ*; first caused is one and is intellect; multiplicity out of first intellect)
c. 16	II, 5 (generation of what is beneath the spheres)
c. 17 (1. part)	II, 6 (evocation of a certain theory on the generation of elements)
c. 18–19	II, 7–8 (providence, especially regarding beings of generation and corruption)
c. 23–7	III, 16–20 (prophecy, and related issues).

Very close resemblances with the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ* are present in chapters 10
(pp. 339,4–340,4; *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 3, pp. 402,6–403,13); 12 (pp. 345,3–
346,5; *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 4, pp. 403,13–404,8), 13 (pp. 347,6–353,13; *Šifāʾ*,
Ilāhiyyāt, IX, 4, 405,10–409,20), 16 (pp. 359,3–361,6; *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 5,
pp. 410,4–12 and 411,16–412,15) and 17, as has already been noted[21]. With
respect to chapters 23–7, a doctrinal similarity shows up – at least, in a broad
sense – with *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, X, 1–2, and this in spite of the absence of any literal
correspondence. It looks as if al-Lawkarī has opted for the version of the *Kitāb
al-Mabdaʾ wa l-maʿād* because of its being more detailed (e.g., the three

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20 I was unable to identify this scholar.
21 Dībāǧī (see al-Lawkarī, *Bayān*, p. 343, n. 1; p. 365, n. 2 and p. 391, n. 2) refers also – in
    my view in an unjustified way – for the chapters 11, 18 and 23 to parallels in the
    Ilāhiyyāt of the *Šifāʾ*.

properties of prophecy are presented in an elaborated way, not just briefly referred to, as was the case in *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, X, 1, p. 435,14–15). In a similar vein, one can explain the use of the *Kitāb al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād* in chapters 18–9 as a more detailed exposition of the definition of providence given at the beginnings (pp. 414,17–415,7) of *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 6 (including a specification with regard to corruptible beings).

With respect to chapter 15, I looked in vain for a precise source. The chapter contains a question: 'does the soul's desire cause only the motion of the spheres, nothing else?', and offers a mistaken answer ('motion originates in the spheres when its soul desires to assimilate with the intellect in perfection, in the same way as it originates in us, humans, when we desire our beloved, hence as a kind of upsurge') as well as the correct one ('the soul's desire to imitate the intellect makes the motion the perfection itself, insofar as it brings into act what was in potency in a continuous, eternal manner'). One easily detects elements of resemblance with *Šifā'*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 2, pp. 389,4–392,6, but there is no word-for-word correspondence. The formulation might therefore be al-Lawkarī's own, although I do not exclude that it copies a fragment of still another – Avicennian or Avicennian inspired – work.

The probability that this is the case significantly increases as soon as one realizes that a passage of Ibn Sīnā's *Commentary on the Theology* constitutes the source of chapter 22. It has to be noted that al-Lawkarī, contrary to his usual habits, avows (*Bayān*, p. 388,3–4) that he is quoting Ibn Sīnā, and more precisely the latter's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*. As is well known, this work had been lost during Ibn Sīnā's own lifetime, but fragments of it survived, among which the *Commentary on the Theology*[22]. Al-Lawkarī quotes the beginning of Ibn Sīnā's commentary on *Mīmar* 2, where it is stressed that the soul, after its separation from the body, understands all things, both universals and particulars, all at once, since it grasps the particulars from their causes, i.e., as universals[23]. This way of intellection in a universal way is strongly stressed and sharply contrasted with the bodily mediated perception of (material) particular things in the ten last lines of the chapter (pp. 389,14–390,7), which, as far as I can see, are not present in the edited version of Badawī[24]. Whatever be the case, they are fully

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22 With respect to the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, see for more details Gutas, *Avicenna*, pp. 130–40. Regarding the *Theology*, I may refer to Adamson, *Arabic Plotinus*, *passim*.

23 See Ibn Sīnā, *Šarḥ Kitāb Uṯūlūǧiyā*, pp. 35–74 (47,8–49,2). Despite the explicit reference to the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, al-Dībāǧī has not identified any specific passage as a source. Even more surprisingly is the affirmation by Marcotte, Life and Work of al-Lawkarī, p. 146 that 'it is unclear what may have been Lawkarī's source for the passage from *al-Inṣāf* to which he refers and quotes (in the Metaphysics) on the posthumous life of the soul'.

24 Although one cannot a priori exclude the possibility that al-Lawkarī has himself added these lines, it looks nevertheless more probable that he quotes a longer version than the

congruent with what precedes. They reflect moreover a genuinely Avicennian spirit. In this respect, one may point to the Šayḫ al-ra'īs' *Risāla l-aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād*, where the universal character of the *perception* of the rational soul, as well as the specification of the object of its perception in terms of the *stable intentions (al-maʿānī l-thābita)* are both clearly expressed[25]. However, there remains one fundamental question: why has al-Lawkarī inserted this passage of the *Commentary on the Theology?* As far as I can see, he considered it in all likelihood a natural complement to the preceding chapter – and hence to *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, IX, 7. Indeed, the passage specifies the true happiness of the fully accomplished soul in the hereafter. But, more importantly, he himself stresses in the introduction to the section on divine science (pp. 3–4) that he wants to limit his exposition to the basic principles, except for one topic, i. e., the nature of the knowledge of the soul in the hereafter. Al-Lawkarī emphasizes that he does this because the usual manuals do not pay any attention to this topic (in fact, they are always restricted to the issues of punishment and reward, pain and joy). But this does not mean that he includes among these manuals Ibn Sīnā's works. On the contrary, al-Lawkarī is aware that the latter, in his writings, has dealt with it in a significant manner and, hence, makes clear that he owes this idea to his *ultimate master* by the explicit mention of the latter's name, followed by a formula of great blessing: 'May the spirit of God cover him and sanctify his soul (or: him)' ('*rūḥ Allāh ramasahu wa-qaddusa nafasahu*'; p. 388,3).

Surveying both basic parts, one must admit that there is no real originality in al-Lawkarī's work. It is more than just *inspired* by the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*; in fact, it quotes *verbatim* many chapters, or parts of them, of the latter. On occasion, it replaces some of them by other fragments, taken from elsewhere in Ibn Sīnā's œuvre, or in the *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl* of the latter's disciple, Bahmanyār – once again by way of literal copying. But even then, there is no appearance of a single rupture with the exposition of the *Metaphysics* of Ibn Sīnā's major encyclopedia. It is therefore surprising that al-Lawkarī (p. 3) qualifies this part of his work as being both in the way of a *talḫīṣ*, concise exposition, and a *šarḥ*, commentary, since there is no real additional input of himself. As indicated at the beginning, the division of the divine science into 'universal science' and 'lordly science' might reveal a personal accent, although possibly still inspired by Ibn Sīnā. It is interesting to see how al-Lawkarī, in his introduction (p. 4), articulates this division. First of all, he specifies that the 'universal science' deals with the principles of all the sciences. As to the other part, it exposes the intentions of the *Lordly Book*, called *Uṯūlūǧiyā (Theology)*, – clearly a reference to the famous pseudepigrapic work called *Theologia Aristotelis*. A little later, the

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one edited by Badawī. It might be present in the so-called longer version, which till now has not yet been edited.

25 See Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla l-aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād*, p. 197,5–9.

proper object of this part is more precisely articulated as the establishment of the First Principle and Its attributes, and of the spiritual, angelic separated beings. In between, al-Lawkarī has noted that the name 'meta-physics' (*mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa*) applies in common understanding to both parts. In the introduction to the part on the lordly things (p. 265), he repeats that the lordly science is usually considered as a part of metaphysics, but now he adds that this is not out of necessity, but for the sake of brevity (*li-l-iḫtiṣār*). In this sense, the establishment of the First Principle is part of the science of meta-physics, the subject of which is 'being qua being' and which therefore can be called 'general divine science' (*al-ʿilm al-ilāhī al-ʿāmm*). From all this, one gets the impression that al-Lawkarī does not doubt the authenticity of the *Theologia*, and, moreover, seems to consider the inclusion of a theology in the *Metaphysics*, i. e., in lambda, as more a matter of convenience than of necessity. This might appear to sharply contradict Ibn Sīnā's basic *démarche* of an integrated project, as present in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, but this is not necessarily the case, insofar as Ibn Sīnā elsewhere, as indicated above, may have open the way to this kind of loosened link between metaphysics proper and theology.

Al-Lawkarī, in the first introduction (p. 4), mentions also that he will attach to the section of the *Lordly Things* selected aphorisms (*fuṣūl muntazaʿa*) on ethics, especially on the virtues of the soul and making firm the perfect state, and that he will conclude the book with questions and remarks (*masāʾil wa-nukat*) regarding the secrets of meta-physics, i. e., the divine attributes, the agent intellects and the celestial souls. It strikes one immediately that the addition of an ethical section fully corresponds with the structure of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, where X, 4–5 treat of the morals of the city, the household and the individual, although very briefly. But has al-Lawkarī effectively quoted these chapters? Al-Dībāǧī has not included the above-mentioned additional parts in his edition. They have been preserved in a single manuscript, i. e., Tehran University, Central Library 250 (= 108)[26]. Unfortunately, this manuscript is frequently damaged in the margins, especially near the end of the text. In spite of this damage, I succeeded in identifying the source of the vast majority of the passages. Before presenting the results of my research, I want to stress that the actual order is not that indicated by al-Lawkarī in his introduction. In fact, one first finds the appendix regarding the secrets of metaphysics; it is divided into

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26 Many thanks to Frank Griffel and Meryem Sebti, who each kindly provided me with a separate CD-Rom of the manuscript, thus giving me two scanned versions. For the analysis of the appendices, I have used both CD-Roms, since in Griffel's copy folios are lacking, whereas in that of Sebti the order of the different parts of the work is changed. Moreover, there is no numbering on the folios, but based on the information given by Naǧǧār in al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazaʿa*, p. 18, I fixed the folio numbering. However, even if it would be found incorrect, I am confident that the indications I offer will permit the reader to identify beyond any doubt the passage in the manuscript.

four chapters (*abwāb*): the attributes of the Creator, intellects, souls, sanctity and prophecy (*wilāya wa-nubuwwa*) respectively. Only afterwards does the ethical section follow. This, in its turn, contains five chapters, i.e., health and sickness of soul; social relations (*muʿāšira*); politics (*siyāsa*); theoretical and practical intellect; and classes of the virtuous city[27].

Let us now concentrate on the first appendix. Its first chapter (fols 212^r-214^v) starts with a rather long discursus on the divine attributes of knowledge, will, providence, power, wisdom and liberality. It is a literal reproduction of the discursus on these subjects in the *Taʿlīqāt*, which offers what I have characterized as the Arabic original of the corresponding chapters in the *Dāneš-Nāmeh*[28]. The three following subdivisions (*fuṣūl*), while focusing respectively on divine goodness, on the essential (not temporal) priority of God towards His action, and on the divine Light, reproduce three fragments derived from Ibn Sīnā's *Commentary on the Theology*[29]. Finally, three subdivisions have their source in Ibn Sīnā's *Mubāḥaṭāt*[30]: the first deals with God's being necessary (*wāǧibiyya*), the second insists that from the One only one can follow (*yalzimu*) and the third denies any multiplication in the divine essence. The divine *tawḥīd*, unity and unicity, plays a central role in this chapter. In spite of a possible (logical) distinction between several attributes in the divine essence, and in spite of God's acting resulting in a creation outside Him, He has a unique, indivisible fullness of being, more precisely of being *necessary*. This idea is certainly present in the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, but is now stressed in a more pronounced way, based on texts of the Šayḫ al-raʾīs himself!

The second chapter (fols 214^v-216^r) contains additional information on the higher intellects. Its first two subdivisions relate to the highest of them. This latter is designated as the *simple* intellect (*al-ʿaql al-basīṭ*) and both its essence and its action are discussed, once again based on the *Mubāḥaṭāt* (pp. 301–2, § 844, respectively p. 302, §§ 845,1–2 and 846). As to the third subdivision, which contains five proofs (i.e., necessity of essential unity of first emanated being; impossibility of existence of celestial bodies; essential separate nature of human soul; actualisation of human soul; eternal motion of universe), in order to justify the existence of the agent intellects, it copies *verbatim* an entire chapter

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27 The list of these headings is present in al-Lawkarī, *Bayān. Manṭiq. al-Madḫal*, pp. 90–91.
28 See Ibn Sīnā, *Taʿlīqāt*, pp. 13,4–22,9. Regarding the link with the *Dāneš-Nāmeh*, see Janssens, Le *Dānesh-Nāmeh*, pp. 163–5.
29 See Ibn Sīnā, Šarḥ Kitāb Uṯūlūǧiyā, pp. 46,4–15; 47,1–5 and 56,14–57,8.
30 See Ibn Sīnā, *Mubāḥaṭāt*, respectively pp. 140–41, §§ 386–90; p. 226, § 674; p. 271–2, § 787; p. 112, § 261,1–3 (al-Lawkarī introduces the two last fragments with *ayḍan*, 'also') and p. 366, § 1141. Unless otherwise indicated, page and paragraph references are in what follows always to the edition by Bīdārfar.

of the *Risāla marātib al-mawǧūdāt*, also known as *Risāla fī iṯbāt al-mufāraqāt*[31]. As to the fourth subdivision, it specifies that the higher intelligences are only able to grasp the First Principle thanks to a divine illumination (*taǧallī*) by quoting the *Commentary on the Theology* (pp. 49,6 – 50,10). The fifth subdivision emphasizes that these intellects do not act in view of what is beneath them and reproduces *Taʿlīqāt* (p. 49,16 – 18 and 11 – 12). Their possible nature is examined in the two following subdivisions, which have their source in the same work (p. 52,9 – 10, respectively p. 54,7 – 14)[32]. Eventually, the unavoidable presence of a multiplicity in their intellection is affirmed, once more based on the *Taʿlīqāt* (p. 62,20 – 24). In this chapter, the mediating – but indispensable – role of the higher intellects occupies a central place. Also this time, the idea itself is not foreign to the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, and, again, one has to do with a clarification expressed in Ibn Sīnāʾs own words.

As to the third chapter (fol. 216ʳ⁻ᵛ), it concerns the soul. The *Taʿlīqāt* forms its unique source. Only the first subdivision pays attention to the celestial souls and their role in the different circular motions of the spheres (*Taʿlīqāt*, p. 54,18 – 25). The seven remaining subdivisions all deal with the human soul: the identity in it between active and final cause; the fact that the goal of its motion is nothing outside itself; that its perception is not in view of what is perceived; that the perfection of the vegetative soul is not the real end of man; the goal-directedness of the soul as basis for the difference between voluntary and natural motions; perception (*idrāk*), not sensation, as activity proper to the soul; and the impossibility for an embodied soul to perceive itself directly as a separate being (*Taʿlīqāt*, pp. 63,20 – 8; 63,3 – 7; 63,8 – 9; 63,10 – 19; 53,20 – 25; 23,1 – 19 and 23,23 – 8). Except for the discussion of the celestial souls, the metaphysical relevance of this chapter is less evident. Nevertheless, one can make a link between the emphasis on the perfection of the human soul in its quality as separate substance, on the one hand, and the evocation of the *maʿād* in *Šifāʾ*, *Ilāhiyyāt*, X, 3, on the other.

Regarding the fourth chapter (216ᵛ – 218ʳ), it opens with the idea that a human soul has to prepare itself adequately in order to achieve its perfection, reproducing once again *Taʿlīqāt* (p. 37,22 – 4). The second subdivision is rather long. It spotlights the pure soul (*al-nafs al-zakiyya*), the significance of prayer

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31 Not only the title, but also the authorship of the treatise is doubtful: although other names are given as well, the best candidates for the latter are undoubtedly Bahmanyār and al-Fārābī. This problem certainly deserves a profound analysis that cannot be offered in the present paper. Let me simply note that al-Lawkarī copies c. 3, which corresponds to Bahmanyār (?), *Risāla marātib al-mawǧūdāt*, pp. 63,8 – 64,15.

32 In the former of the two fragments, al-Lawkarī adds to the affirmation of the *Taʿlīqāt* that this possibility is not like that of the generable beings. This addition was maybe already present in the copy of the *Taʿlīqāt* he had at his disposal. A systematic study of this latter work, and its different redactions, remains a major desideratum.

and extraordinary events such as magic, talismans and miracles. It copies *Taʿlīqāt* (pp. 47,20–48,12), but before quoting the final sentence (lines 10–12) introduces a large section of *Namaṭ* 10 of part II of the *Išārāt*[33]. The subdivisions 3–6 copy once more *verbatim* passages from the *Taʿlīqāt* (pp. 69,25–70,3; 77,3–5; 79,27–80,17; 82,22–5; 81,18–22; 81,26–8; 82,1–5; 82,17–18; and 193,25–194,5). Here, the soul is presented as a stable entity, as having a separate essence and as being self-perceptive. It is affirmed, moreover, that the body is a condition only with respect to the existence, not the survival of the soul; that the soul cannot reach anything of the *Malakūt*, i.e., the intelligible celestial world, unless it is entirely spiritual; and that the simple intellectual representation (*al-taṣawwur al-basīṭ al-ʿaqlī*), which is a gift of the Giver of Forms (*Wāhib al-ṣuwar*), brings our intellects from potency into act. The latest of these affirmations is supplemented with two additional remarks: intelligible things are devoid of change, and hence of individuality in the way sensible ones are; human beings cannot know intelligible things unless through a conjunction with the agent intellect. Regarding both, I looked in vain for a source. However, these additions might have been present in the copy of the *Taʿlīqāt* he had at his disposal[34]. In the following subdivisions, i.e., 7–11, al-Lawkarī extensively deals with the (self-)knowledge of the soul, paying special attention to its way of understanding after the separation of the body and to the way the soul links with the agent intellect. This time, he combines different passages taken from the *Mubāḥaṭāt* (pp. 155–6, §§ 427–8; p. 316, § 888; pp. 87–8, §§ 150–54[35]; p. 318, § 893; and p. 318, § 892). The last subdivision insists that the perfect human soul enjoys after its separation from the body a purely intellectual life; it offers a literal quotation of the final part of the *Risāla marātib al-mawǧūdāt*[36]. All in all, the chapter concentrates on the human soul and its ultimate perfection. Given its title, i.e., *On Sanctity and Prophecy*, this is somewhat surprising. Certainly the passage, which mentions a reaching of the *Malakūt*, deals with the mode of the prophet's receiving revelation[37], but generally speaking almost no attention is paid to the specific issue of prophecy (or sanctity). On the sole basis of the title, one might suspect that the chapter was meant as somehow supplementing *Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt*, X, 1–2. Based on its actual wording, this is, however, far from being evident.

Let us now turn to the second section, on ethics. It was already noticed by Fawzī M. Naǧǧār that this section in our manuscript corresponds to the *Fuṣūl*

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33 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārat*, IV, pp. 153,2–159,6.

34 See above, n. 32.

35 The beginning of the quotation corresponds to the version of the fragment as published by Badawī, p. 227, § 457.

36 See Bahmanyār (?), *Risāla marātib al-mawǧūdāt*, pp. 65,19–66,7: the actual wording of the text corresponds to the one given as variant p. 65, n. 14.

37 See Michot, *Destinée de l'homme*, p. 127.

muntazaʿa, i.e. §§ 1–61 (except §§ 3, 15, 23 and 40) commonly attributed to al-Fārābī[38]. Naǧǧār also observed that a large passage (from fol. 219ʳ to the beginning – in fact line 3 – of fol. 219ᵛ) has no direct counterpart in the actual text of the *Fuṣūl*[39]. However, he mentions another Iranian manuscript, i.e., Tehran University, Faculty of Theology, 695d, which contains the part of the *Fuṣūl* preserved in al-Lawkarī's *Bayān*. It omits the same paragraphs and also has a large – even larger than in our manuscript – section that does not derive from the *Fuṣūl*[40]. Also more important is the fact that it does not stop, as does our manuscript, in the midst of § 61 (p. 70,10), but at § 62 (still incomplete, since the last words correspond to p. 73,2). In none of the two manuscripts does there seem to be a closing formula, so that one suspects that al-Lawkarī's original text was longer and probably included still further aphorisms[41]. Anyway, for our present study the way in which he introduces this ethical section is more worthy of attention. Indeed, al-Lawkarī affirms[42]:

> These are the sentences and aphorisms chosen from the science of morals. They comprise: acquiring the virtues of the human soul, avoiding its vices; moving the human being from his bad habits to fine habits; making firm the virtuous city; making firm the household, i.e., the rulership over its members. They are all brought together in this note [in five chapters].

It is obvious that this is not a neutral statement. On the contrary, an outspoken interest in human virtue manifests itself. Certainly, attention is also paid to the

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38 See al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazaʿa*, p. 18, where it is given as one of the manuscripts used to establish the text. It has to be noted that the omitted paragraphs are exactly the same as the ones not present in Dunlop's edition (see al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-madanī*). It should be noted moreover that the wording of the passages corresponding to §§ 6 and 26 is exactly the same as in Dunlop's edition, hence omitting the last sentence in both cases.

39 In fact, the last two lines of fol. 218ᵛ are already not present in the *Fuṣūl*, but they most naturally continue the discursus on the nutriment of the body. This suggests that al-Lawkarī had at his disposal another version than the one actually available to us. It has to be noted moreover that this addition shows certain similarities with § 10 of the *Fuṣūl*. Naǧǧār obviously forgot to mention that al-Lawkarī's text, in turn, does not quote the paragraphs 8–11 of the *Fuṣūl*.

40 Unfortunately, I had no access to this manuscript and Naǧǧār's information remains very limited in this respect (see al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazaʿa*, pp. 18–19).

41 The actual state of affairs does not permit one to decide up to which point al-Lawkarī quoted the *Fuṣūl*. In MS Tehran University, Central Library 250 (= 108), it ends in the middle of § 61, whereas in MS Tehran University, Faculty of Theology, 695d, it ends in the middle of § 62 (see Naǧǧār's introduction to al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazaʿa*, pp. 18–19). In view of the title of the section one might guess that al-Lawkarī continued till § 67, and not further, since afterwards other issues come to the fore.

42 For the Arabic text, see al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl muntazaʿa*, pp. 18–19, as well as p. 23, n. 2; I quote the English translation (slightly modified) of Butterworth (al-Fārābī, *Political Writings*, p. 6). Note that the addition 'in five chapters' occurs only in MS Tehran University, Faculty of Theology, 695d.

social and political order, but this is not presented as the exclusive or primary object of the exposition that will follow. In this respect, it is most relevant that the long addition mainly deals with the issue of the possibility of changing one's moral conduct, i.e., one's habits. At the end, it is even stressed that the governance of the soul (read: of oneself) has precedence over all other kinds of governance and that one has to make a jihād in order to perfect one's habits. Before, a brief remark has been offered on the phenomenon of magic and other extraordinary arts. In my view, this fits better an Avicennian than a Farabian perspective[43]. This impression is only reinforced when one looks at the division into chapters.

The first (fols 218ʳ–220ʳ), containing fifteen subdivision (or aphorisms?), discusses the health and sickness of the soul in parallelism with the health and sickness of the body. The use of a medical metaphor is rather unusual – although not completely lacking[44] – in al-Fārābī, while it is quite natural in Ibn Sīnā. Suffice to say that the latter calls his major philosophical encyclopedia *Book of Healing* – his 'healing' being that of the soul. In the second chapter (fols 220ʳ–221ʳ), which has seven parts, the medical metaphor is maintained in the explanation of the social relations. One detects moreover a strong emphasis on the necessity of being virtuous for each individual person. As to the third (fol. 221ʳ), it briefly – in only three subdivisions – deals with the notion of *malik*, king. Unsurprisingly, the kingly craft is compared to the medical craft of the physician. It may be noted that the largest of the three subdivisions offers a survey of different historical opinions about the goal intended in kingship. This kind of historical doxography is once again more typical of Ibn Sīnā than of al-Fārābī[45]. The fourth chapter (fols 221ʳ–222ᵛ) deals with both theoretical and practical intellection and is divided into no less than twenty subdivisions[46]. In this section, there is no room for any medical metaphor, but it is striking that in one passage (fol. 222ʳ, lines 3–8; *Fuṣūl*, § 41) the idea is evoked that a sick person imagine what is sweet bitter, and vice-versa, an idea one also encounters in Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Nafs* of the *Šifāʾ*[47]. Regarding chapter five, which might be

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43 Regarding the primacy of the governance of one own's soul, see e.g. Ibn Sīnā, Fī l-siyāsa l-manziliyya, pp. 232–60 (240). With respect to magic and other occult phenomena, see for example Ibn Sīnā, *al-Išārāt*, IV, pp. 158–9, and compare moreover above, p. 19. The same basic idea is also present in the *Kitāb al-nafs* of the *Šifāʾ* (especially IV, 4).

44 See al-Fārābī, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm, pp. 67–76 (71), where the need of the king in his political practice for experience is compared to that of the physician in his medical practice; see Janssens, *Experience*, pp. 45–62 (49). Charles Burnett kindly informed me that this kind of metaphor is the subject of a Ph.D. thesis by Badr el Fekkak.

45 See Janssens, Ibn Sīnā, pp. 83–93.

46 Due to heavy damage, the title of the chapter is not readable, but in view of the space seems to have been *taʿaqqul*, 'intellection'.

47 See Ibn Sīnā, *'De Anima'*, p. 62,16–17.

incomplete as indicated above, it might be worthwhile to note that it seems to involve in its second subdivision (*Fuṣūl*, § 57) a conception of jihād that substantially differs from that of al-Fārābī's *al-Madīna al-fāḍila*[48].

Certainly, none of these elements definitely excludes a Farabian origin. However, if the work is authentically Farabian, then Ibn Sīnā has largely used it in his early work on ethics, i.e., *al-Birr wa-l-iṯm* (*Piety and Sin*)[49]. Indeed, a part of the *Risāla l-birr wa-l-iṯm*, which seems to be a part of the otherwise lost work, shows a very close similarity with *Fuṣūl*, §§ 1–19, respectively 33–56, while omitting as al-Lawkarī §§ 3, 15 and 40[50]. If this were correct, the young Ibn Sīnā would have been profoundly indebted to his great predecessor. However, one may wonder then why he has chosen a rather small, and, moreover, not very typical work of the Second Master? Or did there exist a nucleus of aphorisms assembled by al-Fārābī and has Ibn Sīnā enlarged it? But the attribution of the *Fuṣūl* to al-Fārābī may be mistaken, since it is, after all, only explicitly present with the title in one single manuscript, namely Bodleian, Hunt 307[51]. A thorough examination is needed in order to settle this complex issue. It clearly exceeds the limits of the present paper. But whatever hypothesis one favours, it is clear that for al-Lawkarī the *Fuṣūl* was sufficiently Avicennian in contents to be included in a kind of *florilegium* of Avicennian texts. Even more strikingly Avicennian is his decision to make this ethical tract an appendix of *Divine Science.* This corresponds to the fact that Ibn Sīnā himself, in his *al-Birr wa-l-iṯm*, probably treated ethics in the context of what D. Gutas has labelled 'metaphysics of the rational soul'[52].

Looking over the whole, one has to admit that al-Lawkarī gives an overwhelming impression of a desire to reproduce to the utmost possible degree an encompassing synthetic survey of Ibn Sīnā's *Ilāhiyyāt*. Still, one may remain somewhat hesitant, insofar as al-Lawkarī, contrary to Ibn Sīnā in the *Šifāʾ*, seems to dissolve the unity of metaphysics in favour of a sharp bipartition. The intimate link between universal Science and theology appears to have been dramatically loosened. But this might have already happened in Ibn Sīnā, as indicated at the beginning[53]. Moreover, one must not forget that the latter, in

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48 See Dunlop's introduction to al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-madanī*, p. 13.
49 According to his autobiography, he wrote the work when he was still in Buḫārā, just after having finished at the age of twenty-one the *Compilation for ʿArūḍī* (see Ibn Sīnā, *The Life of Ibn Sina*, pp. 38–41) This information permits one to date *al-Birr wa l-iṯm* around the year 1000.
50 See Ibn Sīnā, Risāla l-birr wa l-iṯm, pp. 360–68. It has to be observed that the wording in this *Risāla* is rather of a summarizing nature, but that a close link between both texts is beyond any doubt. I hope to publish later a more detailed comparison.
51 See al-Fārābī, *Political Writings*, p. 5.
52 See Gutas, *Avicenna*, pp. 95 and 254–61.
53 See above, p. 7.

the general prologue to the work, has characterized the *Šifāʾ* as 'accommodating his Peripatetic colleagues'[54].

On the other hand, al-Lawkarī's work clearly lacks originality. Most of the time, not to say always, he copies *verbatim* large passages, and even entire chapters of different works of Ibn Sīnā, supplemented with fragments taken from the *Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl* of the latter's immediate disciple, Bahmanyār and of the *Fuṣūl*, which might be a work of the latter's master, al-Fārābī (if it is definitely not an Avicennian text, which, in my view, in the actual state of affairs, cannot be proven). Anyhow, in all cases, the quotations are so literal that al-Lawkarī's text may be used as an independent testimony, besides available manuscripts, for the establishment of the critical edition of the respective works. In this respect, it is worthwhile to note that the oldest known manuscript of the *Bayān*, i.e., Tehran University, Central Library 250 (= 108), is explicitly dated 601 H. (beginnings twelfth century) and is hence very old[55]. A first rapid survey has permitted me to detect a large number of interesting variants in comparison with the existing editions of the works in question. Of course, a thorough investigation is needed for a final judgement. But just to show how really interesting some of these variants are, I will quote three cases by way of example. They all are related to the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*.

The first occurs at p. 171. Having affirmed that the relationships in irrational roots and in numerical relations are easily accessible to the soul, Ibn Sīnā continues to state that 'it does not follow that the soul in one state would intellectually apprehend (*an takūna … tuʿqila*) all of these', adding a little later 'within its proximate power to intellectually apprehend (*an tuʿqila*) this' (*Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt,* p. 211,4–5). In al-Lawkarī 'intellectually apprehend' is twice replaced by 'do' (*an yufʿala*). Even if the context favours rather the reading of the edition of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, the variant of al-Lawkarī, which seems not to occur anywhere else, is not totally devoid of sense. Moreover, it sheds light on why the Latin translation has 'agat', or 'agere'; a rendering that corresponds perfectly to al-Lawkarī's variant, and hence might not constitute a free rendering of the Arabic verb *ʿaqala* (normally translated as *intelligere*)[56].

The second concerns the possibility of an intellectual knowledge of an individual entity, namely when it is unique in its species. According to the

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54 Ibn Sīnā, *Šifāʾ*, *al-Madḫal*, p. 10,14.

55 It is almost as old as several of the rather old known manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, see Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'*, p. 486, although approximately a century later than the oldest one, i.e., Tehran, Malik 1085, see *ibid.*, p. 486, n. 21.

56 See Van Riet (Ibn Sīnā, *Liber de philosophia prima*, V-X, p. 243,58–9). Van Riet limits to indicate in the second apparatus (Latin-Arabic) that *agat/agere* is here to be understood in the sense of *intelligat/intelligere*, suggesting that the Latin translator has used a not very literal, but nevertheless acceptable translation of the Arabic verb *ʿaqala*, there being no variant present in the apparatus of the Cairo edition.

Cairo-edition of the *Ilāhiyyāt* – once again without any variant attested – Ibn Sīnā affirms that 'if the mind intellectually apprehends that species through its individual instance (*bi-šaḫṣihi*), it will have knowledge of it' (*Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt*, p. 247,1–2). In al-Lawkarī's version (*Bayān*, p. 195,3), this becomes: 'if the mind intellectually apprehends that species and represents it as individual (*wa-tašaḫḫiṣu*), it will have knowledge of it'. In this case, this variant seems to be entirely proper to al-Lawkarī, although the Latin translation 'et eius individuum' (*Philosophia prima*, p. 277,12) also presupposes the presence in the Arabic (at least, in the manuscript on which it was based) of the conjunction *wa-*.

Finally, al-Lawkarī (*Bayān*, p. 261,8) confirms the reading *fāʾilin* instead of *kāmilin* (*Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt*, p. 318,12) in accordance with many other testimonies[57].

I am aware that I do not do full justice to the relevance of al-Lawkarī's text, since it contains hundreds of variants. Its significance is undoubtedly still much higher with respect to Ibn Sīnā's *Commentary on the Theology*, since for that text thus far only two manuscripts are known, i.e., Cairo, Ḥikma 6M, and Bursa, Hüseyin Çelebi, 1194[58]. I therefore believe that the *Bayān* may help us in editing better, and thus in understanding better a large variety of Avicennian, or related, fragments of texts. On the doctrinal level, its value is much more limited. Nevertheless, it draws our attention to the delicate way in which Ibn Sīnā seems to have conceived the relationship between the different parts of the science of metaphysics.

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57 For more details, see Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'*, p. 529. It is worthwhile to note that many of Bertolacci's proposals of correction to the Cairo edition are confirmed by the *Bayān*, although not all of them. But it has to be stressed that Bertolacci has formulated his proposals of correction with due care.

58 See Michot, *Recueil avicennien*, p. 125.

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Essence and Existence in the Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic East (*Mašriq*): A Sketch*

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Introduction

In a well known section of his *Ḥikmat al-išrāq* (*Philosophy of Illumination*), Šihābaddīn as-Suhrawardī (i. e., aš-Šayḫ al-Maqtūl, d. 587 H./1191) attacked the doctrine that existence (*wuğūd*) is something superadded to (*maʿnan zāʾidun ʿalā*) the substance or quiddity of things in the concrete, extramental world (*fī l-aʿyān*)–a doctrine he associates with those he refers to as the followers of the Peripatetics (*atbāʿ al-Maššāʾīn*).[1] Suhrawardī maintains, by contrast, that existence is among those aspects (*iʿtibārāt*) of a thing that belong purely to the intellect.[2] Partly because of Suhrawardī's insistence on the subjective nature

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1   Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-išrāq*, I.3, § 59, p. 46,8-ult.
2   Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-išrāq* I.3, § 56, p. 45,1-ult., and § 60, p. 47, 1–13. The term *iʿtibār* is difficult to translate into English. In his extended discussion of this issue, T. Izutsu cites the famous passage in the *Madḫal (Isagoge)* section of the *Manṭiq (Logic)* of Avicenna's *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ (The Healing)* where Avicenna claims that quiddity (*māhiyya*) has three *iʿtibārāt:* as a universal existing in the mind; as an essence existing in a concrete individual; and taken in and of itself, i. e., as neutral with respect to either mental or concrete existence. In light of this passage, and in light of Suhrawardī's uses of the term in the *Ḥikmat al-išrāq*, Izutsu takes *iʿtibār* to mean '… a subjective manner of looking at a thing, something produced or posited through the analytic work of the reason. It is an aspect of a thing which primarily appears in the subject and which, then, is projected onto the thing itself as if it were an objective aspect of the thing.' See T. Izutsu, The Distinction between *essentia* and *existentia*, pp. 49–70 at 65. The Avicenna passage is

of existence, his view was later used as an essentialist foil by Mullā Ṣadrā and other members of that school of Islamic metaphysics which saw itself as upholding 'the fundamentality of existence (aṣālat al-wuǧūd)'.[3]

Suhrawardī's use of the phrase 'the followers of the Peripatetics' in this context is usually taken by medieval as well as modern commentators to refer to Fārābī and especially Avicenna. In a broad sense this is perfectly plausible. After all, Suhrawardī attacks the idea that existence is an attribute that itself has real existence in the concrete world, in the context of pointing to 'the fact that some followers of the Peripatetics construct their entire metaphysical project on [the basis of] existence (anna baʿḍa atbāʾi l-maššāʾīna banaw kulla amrihim fī l-ilāhiyyāti ʿalā l-wuǧūdi)'. This must at least partially refer to Avicenna, who explicitly claimed, in the final chapter of Section 4 ('On existence and its causes') of his al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders), to have created a new proof of God's existence (viz., burhān aṣ-ṣiddīqīn) that was superior, by virtue of its basis in existence alone, to proofs of God's existence from motion, such as Aristotle's proof of the need for an Unmoved Mover based on the impossibility of an infinite regress of movers and moved things. Since existence provides us with such a shaky foundation, Suhrawardī argues, we need to turn elsewhere, and create an alternative metaphysical basis in the form of 'light' (nūr).

Nevertheless, a question arises, because to my knowledge Avicenna never explicitly committed himself to the thesis that existence is something 'super-added to' (zāʾid ʿalā) a thing's quiddity.[4] True, there is one passage in the Taʿlīqāt (Marginal Notes) where Avicenna states that 'The existence of each category is extrinsic to its quiddity and superadded to it (fa-inna kulla maqūlatin fa-wuǧūduhā ḫāriǧun ʿan māhiyyatihā wa-zāʾidun ʿalayhā); whereas the quiddity of the Necessary of Existence is its thatness; ⟨and its thatness is not⟩ superadded to [its] quiddity'.[5] But given our current uncertainty about the circumstances in which the Taʿlīqāt were composed, it would be rash to extrapolate a full-fledged theory from this isolated instance. In Book IV, Chapter 3, of the Ilāhiyyāt of his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ (The Healing), Avicenna does use the phrase al-wuǧūd az-zāʾid. But

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Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ/Manṭiq (1): al-Madḫal I.2, p. 15,1–7. J. Walbridge translates iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya as 'intellectual fictions', on the basis of an analogy with 'legal fictions': The Science of Mystic Lights, pp. 45–6, n. 43.

3   This label would probably have surprised Suhrawardī, given that in the passages just cited he maintains the subjective nature not only of existence but also of the various ways of conceptualizing essence, including quiddity (māhiyya), thingness (šayʾiyya) and inner-reality (ḥaqīqa). On Suhrawardī's role in Mullā Ṣadrā's historiography of Islamic philosophy, see S. Rizvi, An Islamic Subversion of the Existence-Essence Distinction?, pp. 219–27.

4   Walbridge raises this question but does not offer an answer: Science of Mystic Lights, pp. 47–8.

5   Ibn Sīnā, at-Taʿlīqāt, IV.32, p. 164,18–ult.

what he is clearly referring to in this passage is the extra existence that God, who is above perfection (*fawqa tamām*), does not need for Himself and which He therefore passes on to other, lower beings.[6]

In a broader sense, Avicenna's ontology could doubtless be interpreted as implying the thesis that existence is 'superadded to' (*zāʾid ʿalā*) a thing's quiddity. As I have discussed extensively in other publications, Avicenna's general position on essence (or quiddity) and existence is that essence and existence are extensionally identical but intensionally distinct. In other words, every essence must either be an individual existing in the concrete, extramental world (*fī l-aʿyān*), or a universal existing in the mind (*fī ḏ-ḏihn*). Even so, essence and existent have different meanings: essence refers to *what* a thing is, whereas existence refers to the fact that a thing *is.* More important for my discussion here is the series of hints, given by Avicenna, that despite the fact that essence and existence are co-implied (the term he uses in *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ/Ilāhiyyāt* I.5 is *mutalāzimāni*), essence nevertheless enjoys some kind of logical priority over existence. The sense that essence is logically prior to existence is conveyed by – among other clues – Avicenna's frequent uses of the terms *lāzim* ('is logically entailed [by]'), *ʿāriḍ* ('attaches accidentally [to]'), *lāḥiq* ('is a concomitant [of]') and *muḍāf* ('is related [to]') to describe how existence connects to essence.[7] An interpreter could reasonably infer that describing existence as *zāʾid* ('is superadded [to]') would be perfectly in line with these other descriptions of how existence connects to essence – despite the fact that, apart from its lonely appearance in the *Taʿlīqāt, zāʾid* is never used by Avicenna in this way.

Given the prominence of Suhrawardī's critique of the thesis that existence is something superadded to quiddity, and given the uncertainty about its Avicennian genealogy, we should still try to find out more precisely who Suhrawardī was referring to when he targeted 'the followers of the Peripatetics' in this context. Avicenna may well have been in Suhrawardī's sights, as has been commonly assumed. But the fact remains that the most prominent exponent of the thesis that existence is superadded to quiddity was Faḫraddīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), a contemporary of Suhrawardī's and a fellow alumnus of Maǧdaddīn al-Ǧīlī's (n.d.) circle in Marāġa. My hypothesis is that the balance of evidence compels us to think that Suhrawardī was not so much targeting Avicenna's *own* ontology as he was targeting an emerging *Avicennian* ontology – that is, the systematic reconstruction of Avicenna's ontology that Rāzī was just beginning to undertake. Because Rāzī appears to have left Azerbaijan in 580/

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6   Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ/Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, IV.3, p. 188,11–13.
7   I discuss Avicenna's developing ideas about the relationship between essence and existence in my Notes on Avicenna's concept of thingness (*šayʾiyya*), pp. 181–221; *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context,* pp. 143–80; and Avicenna and the Avicennian tradition, pp. 105–13.

1184 for Transoxania, where he wrote most of the works in which he claims
that existence is superadded to essence; and because Suhrawardī finished his
Ḥikmat al-išrāq in 582/1186, it is unlikely that Rāzī himself was in Suhrawardī's
sights. But regardless of the identity of the particular person whom Suhrawardī
saw himself as opposing (Ǧīlī as well as Rāzī's father and his Ašʿarite circle in
Rayy present themselves as possibilities, but further research will be needed in
order to determine this), Suhrawardī's arguments in favor of the conceptual
nature of existence clearly recapitulate an earlier attack, by the mathematician-
poet ʿUmar Ḫayyām (d. 517/1123), against the tendency of certain Ašʿarite
mutakallimūn, such as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 478/1085), to appeal
to the theory of modes (*aḥwāl*) – a theory associated with the Basran Muʿtazilite
mutakallim Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī (d. 321/933) and his followers, the
Bahšamites – as the best way to construe and promote Avicenna's concept of
existence.

Avicenna's Two Distinctions

To begin this story, I must turn first to Avicenna himself. Avicenna's two key
metaphysical distinctions were between essence (or more properly, 'quiddity',
māhiyya) and existence (*wuǧūd*); and between the necessary of existence in itself
(*wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihi*) and the necessary of existence through another
(*wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-ġayrihi*), which Avicenna appears to have taken as
convertible with the possible (or 'contingent') of existence in itself (*mumkin
al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihi*). Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence, in its
mature formulation in *al-Ilāhiyyāt* (*Metaphysics*) I.5 of his *Šifāʾ* and in *Išārāt* 4,
can be seen from one angle as a compromise position, stated in Arabic-
Aristotelian terminology, between the view of the early Muʿtazilite *mutakallimūn*
and that of al-Ašʿarī.[8] Like Ašʿarī, Avicenna maintains – in *Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt* I.5 –
that thing (*šayʾ*) and existent (*mawǧūd*), and by implication quiddity and
existence, are extensionally identical: every existent will also be a thing, and vice
versa. This is in contrast to the position of the early Muʿtazilites, who believed
that thing was a broader category than existent, in that thing subsumes both the
non-existent (*maʿdūm*) and the existent. To the Muʿtazilites, entities that had not
yet come to be, and concepts in the mind, are examples of non-existent things:
therefore, non-existents as well as existents possess thingness (*šayʾiyya*). By
contrast, Avicenna argues that things such as concepts in the mind do enjoy a
kind of existence – they simply possess mental existence (*al-wuǧūd aḏ-ḏihnī* or
al-wuǧūd fī ḏ-ḏihn) as opposed to the concrete existence found in individuals
(*al-wuǧūd al-ʿaynī* or *al-wuǧūd fī l-aʿyān*; also referred to as 'extra[mental]

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8   Ibid.

existence', *al-wuǧūd al-ḫāriǧī*). But unlike Ašʿarī, who maintained that thing and existent were also intensionally identical, in the sense that thing means no more or less than existent, and vice versa, Avicenna claimed that quiddity or thingness (abstracted from thing) on the one hand, and existence (abstracted from existent) on the other hand, were intensionally distinct. As I mentioned above, for Avicenna, thingness and quiddity refer to *what* X is (i. e., as opposed to what Y is); existence, by contrast, refers to the fact that X *is* (i. e., as opposed to X's not existing).

Unlike his distinction between essence and existence, which appears to have evolved over the course of his career but only in a subtle way, Avicenna's distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically necessary existence underwent some dramatic developments from its first appearance in *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya (Philosophy for ʿArūḍī)* to its final appearance in the *Išārāt*. More directly relevant to this chapter is the fact that in addition to articulating each of these two distinctions in slightly different ways in books that he wrote at various points in his life, Avicenna appears to have bound the two distinctions more closely together as his ideas developed over time.[9] Thus in the very early *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya*, the distinction between essence and existence had hardly crystallized, and the distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically necessary existence was not thought through; and the two distinctions do not touch upon one another at all.[10] In the slightly later *al-Mabdaʾ wa-al-maʿād (Origin and Destination)*, the distinction between quiddity and existence is still only latent, while the distinction between necessary and possible existence is quite fully articulated; still, neither is linked directly to the other.[11] In chapters I.5 and I.6 of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of his *Šifāʾ*, from Avicenna's middle period, the two distinctions receive their fullest expression.[12] And while in those chapters neither distinction is brought directly to bear on the other, they are later, in Book VIII of the *Ilāhiyyāt*.[13] There Avicenna buttresses the distinction between God, the Necessary of Existence in itself, and all other beings in the universe, which are necessary of existence through another, by appealing to the notion that in God quiddity and existence are identical, while in all other beings, quiddity and existence are distinct. In his final major work, the *Pointers and Reminders (al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt)*, the two distinctions operate entirely in tandem, and the distinction between quiddity and existence lays the basis for, and leads directly to, the distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically necessary existence.[14]

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9 Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, pp. 245 – 63.
10 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya* (MS Uppsala Or. 364), fol. 2ᵛ8 – 10 and fols 3ᵛ16 – 4ʳ12.
11 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*, pp. 2,4 – 3,15.
12 Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ/Ilāhiyyāt (1)*, I.5, pp. 31,5 – 33,18 and I.6, pp. 37,7 – 38,5.
13 Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ/Ilāhiyyāt (2)*, VIII.4, pp. 343,10 – 347,16.
14 Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt*, pp. 138,2 – 139,13 and pp. 140,12 – 141,2.

Why did Avicenna decide to bind the two distinctions together in his middle and later works? I maintain that it is because he realized, during the process of writing the *Ilāhiyyāt* of the *Šifāʾ*, that he could use the intensional distinctiveness between quiddity and existence to show how beings other than God were composites, that is, composed of quiddity and existence. God, by contrast, could be held to be simple by virtue of the identity of quiddity and existence in Him. Because every composite needs a composer to bring its components together, and because of the impossibility of an infinite regress, the chain of composites and composers must originate in a non-composite composer, namely, God. Partly because Avicenna's use of the quiddity-existence distinction to support the intrinsically necessary-extrinsically necessary distinction was most obvious in the *Išārāt*, and partly because of that work's abbreviated and allusive style, which invites decompression and commentary, the *Išārāt* received more attention from subsequent Muslim philosophers (including the *mutakallimūn*) than any other of Avicenna's writings – at least until the sixteenth century CE, when the attention of commentators shifted to the *Šifāʾ*.

Avicenna's pressing of the essence-existence distinction into the service of his intrinsically necessary-extrinsically necessary distinction was a crucial event in the history of metaphysics. This is because it provided a method of distinguishing God from both eternal and non-eternal beings that was based on God's simplicity and all other beings' compositeness; and because, when understood as the Necessary of Existence in itself, whose essence is not even conceptually distinct from its existence, Avicenna's God enjoyed a more watertight simplicity than that of the Neoplatonists, whose God *as One* could be held to be conceptually distinguishable from their God *as Good*.[15] As will become apparent, Faḫraddīn ar-Rāzī's ontology can be seen as a continuation of this trend in Avicenna's own thought, that is, the trend towards using the essence/existence distinction to explain the compositeness of all extrinsically necessary beings.

Theological Ramifications

To be sure, it was not Avicenna's proof of God's existence from the distinctiveness (and hence compositeness) of essence and existence in all beings other than the Necessary of Existence in itself, which first made Avicenna's metaphysics attractive to Sunni *mutakallimūn* (specifically, those of the Ašʿarite and Māturīdite schools) from the two or three generations immediately

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15   On this see my Final and Efficient Causality in Avicenna's Cosmology and Theology, pp. 97–123, and *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, pp. 181–95.