Cognitive Paths into the Slavic Domain

Cognitive Linguistics Research
38

Editors
Dirk Geeraerts
René Dirven
John R. Taylor

Honorary editor
Ronald W. Langacker

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Cognitive Paths into the Slavic Domain

Edited by
Dagmar Divjak
Agata Kochańska

Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

∞ Printed on acid-free paper
which falls within
the guidelines of the ANSI
to ensure permanence and durability.

Printed in Germany

Preface

The present volume contains a selection of research on Slavic languages carried out within the Cognitive Linguistics framework. Most of the papers were originally presented at the 3rd Slavic Cognitive Linguistics Conference, which took place in September 2004 in Leuven (Belgium). Contributions by Barbara Dancygier, Laura Janda and Elżbieta Tabakowska were later solicited specifically for this volume. All of the papers have been written or revised with one goal in mind: presenting a volume of interest to both Slavic linguists and cognitive linguists.

To the extent that we have succeeded in achieving our goal, we are greatly indebted to the many linguists who have lent us their expertise, be it on Slavic or non-Slavic languages, in cognitive or descriptive linguistics, i.e. Neil Bermel, Mario Brdar, Alan Cienki, Steven Clancy, Hubert Cuyckens, Östen Dahl, David Danaher, Barbara Dancygier, Larry Feinberg, Dirk Geeraerts, Elżbieta Górska, Stefan Gries, Gaëtanelle Guilquin, Tuomas Huumo, Laura Janda, Robert Kirsner, Wojciech Kubiński, Ron Langacker, Geoffrey Nathan, Elena Petroska, Anna Siewierska, Michael Smith, Elżbieta Tabakowska, Willy Van Langendonck and Margareth Winters. We would also like to express our gratitude to René Dirven, Dirk Geeraerts, Laura Janda and Ron Langacker for aiding us in taking our idea from book proposal to final product. Torkel Uggla and Ines Van Houtte prepared the manuscript for publication – a task that was financially supported by the Science Foundation Flanders (Belgium) – while Birgit Sievert walked us through the production process. Last but not least, warm thanks go to our respective husbands, Torkel and Andrzej, for supporting our work, both in theory and in practice, as well as to Agata's mother Elżbieta Horszczaruk for her assistance in matters of everyday life.

While working on this volume we were guided by the strongly-felt hope that the wide spectrum of cognitively-oriented research on Slavic data presented would contribute to the appreciation of both the beauty of the notoriously complex Slavic languages and the power of the theoretical tools developed within the cognitive framework. These tools allow a linguist to tackle language phenomena in all their wonderful complexity and to enjoy subtleties and intricacies without any need to disregard non-conforming facts or to force natural language into artifical shapes.

Dagmar Divjak and Agata Kochańska
Sheffield and Warsaw, October 2007

Table of contents

Why cognitive linguists should care about the Slavic languages and vice versa

Dagmar Divjak, Laura A. Janda and Agata Kochańska

1. The cognitive paradigm and Slavic linguistic research

From its early days, cognitive linguistics has attracted the attention of linguists with research interests in Slavic languages (to name but a few, Cienki 1989; Dąbrowska 1997; Janda 1993a; Rudzka-Ostyn 1992 and 1996). In recent years this interest has rapidly expanded, as can be witnessed by the establishment of the Polish Cognitive Linguistics Association, the Russian Cognitive Linguistics Association, and the Slavic Cognitive Linguistics Association, as well as by the many Slavic Cognitive Linguistics conferences held at various venues in Europe and North America over the last seven years.

This is not surprising, for at least two reasons. First, one of the founding assumptions of cognitive linguistics has been present in Slavic linguistics all along: Slavic linguists have always recognized the fundamentally symbolic nature of language and hence the fact that diverse formal aspects of language exist for the purpose of conveying meaning. One striking illustration of the close affinities between cognitive linguistics and ideas formulated within traditional Slavic linguistics comes from the relatively early days of modern linguistic research on Slavic languages. In a study devoted to the nature of the contrast between the perfective and the imperfective aspect in Polish, a German Slavicist, Erwin Koschmieder (1934), proposed two conceptualizations of time which could easily be paraphrased as involving either the MOVING TIME metaphor for the perfective or the MOVING EGO metaphor for the imperfective (for a discussion of the two time metaphors see Radden 1991: 17ff). Other examples abound. Traditional analyses of Polish case by Kempf (1978), Klemensiewicz (1926) and Szober (1923 [1963]) aimed to provide a full-fledged semantic analysis of Polish case. This type of work with its emphasis on psychologically realistic explanations, has always been "a characteristic feature of Polish (Slavic?) linguistics" (Tabakowska 2001:12; translation AK), and contin-

ues to constitute an important source of insight and inspiration for cognitive research in the area of Polish case.

In order to appreciate properly how cognitive linguistics resonates in the Czech context, it is necessary to outline some basic facts pertinent to the history of the Czech language and the development of linguistic ideas in Prague. The Czech language had been excluded from the public arena for nearly two hundred years and seemed headed for extinction when Josef Dobrovský published a grammar of the language in 1809. Unbeknownst to him, the Czech national revival was to follow shortly thereafter, and his grammar was used to revive Czech and to restore its use in official domains. In order to achieve this goal the vocabulary of the language needed to be enriched, and metaphorical extension and metonymy played an important role. Lexical creations attributed to Josef Jungmann (the central figure in this process) include *odstín* 'nuance, shade of meaning' (a metaphorical extension from *stín* 'shadow') and *savec* 'mammal' (a metonymical creation with the literal meaning 'one that sucks'). Thus, the idea that metaphor and metonymy play an important role in language remains beyond doubt for Czech scholars. In 1928-1939 the Prague Linguistic Circle boasted famous Russian and Czech linguists who collaborated on developing a structuralist framework that in the post-WWII era evolved into linguistic functionalism. These linguistic models contained concepts similar to category structure and center (a.k.a. prototype) vs. periphery distinctions (Vaňková et al. 2005: 33–34; Janda 1993b). The recognition of the role of pragmatics in linguistics is a consistent theme in the history of Czech linguistics and likewise provides a point of contact for cognitive linguistics.

Close affinities between the ideas developed within traditional Slavic linguistics and the assumptions of the cognitive paradigm are also clearly visible in Russian linguistics, especially in writings by followers of the Moscow Semantic School. Cognitive linguists study how the structure of language is dependent on our physiology, and our interaction with the environment. Langacker (1987a: 47) argues that language-specific semantic structure, made up of "conventional imagery", must be distinguished from a universal conceptual structure: "Lexicon and grammar are storehouses of conventional imagery, which differs substantially from language to language. (…) It is therefore a central claim of cognitive grammar that meaning is language-specific to a considerable extent. It is this imagery that has to be described, not the presumably universal cognitive representations that these conventional images construe". In the Russian tradition a similar idea is expressed by the term "anthropocentrism" (Rakhilina 2000: introduction): language is tailored by human beings to their needs. Followers of the

Moscow Semantic School propound that language structures on all levels reflect the collective experience of the speakers of a language, and thus linguistic data provide a "linguistic world view" (Rakhilina 2000: 10–11), shared by the speakers of that language.

Politics have played a crucial role in bringing the Slavic linguistic tradition and the cognitive paradigm close to each other. Political circumstances in Slavic-speaking countries during the Cold War era forced many linguists into exile. Among them was one individual who had an enormous impact on Slavic linguistics: Roman Jakobson. Despite his own experiments with formalist descriptions (such as the one-stem verb system), Jakobson was sympathetic to many functionalist ideas that would later form the core of the cognitive linguistic framework (cf. Janda 1993b). Jakobson's presence shielded Slavic linguistics in the West, especially in the US in the 1980s, from being entirely consumed by mainstream formalism, which almost eclipsed all other approaches. The Cold War era was the time when Eastern European linguists in general and Russian linguists in particular were largely isolated from theoretical discussions in the West, and the politically unrestrained writings of Chomsky led to the censorship of his entire oeuvre. As a consequence, East-European linguists were never forced to experiment with autonomous theories of language, but rather maintained focus on the form-meaning relationship and how it is embedded in the larger reality of human experience. They turned their energies inward, developing their own home-grown traditions, some of which became known in the West. These include the Russian Smysl↔Tekst framework, first developed by Mel'čuk (1995 and 1999) in Moscow and the Natural Semantic Metalanguage theory formulated by Wierzbicka (see 1972 for the first book-length treatment). Most of the work done in Eastern Europe, however, never made it to the other side of the Iron Curtain, which is all the more regretful since analyses presented, for example, by followers of the Moscow Semantic School focus on precisely those issues that are of interest to cognitive linguistics. This is illustrated, among others, by the work done on metaphor by Arutjunova (1999) or on polysemy and synonymy by Apresjan (Apresjan 1974 and 1995). The data presented and the conclusions drawn are so relevant to cognitive linguistics that it has been claimed only a list of terminological equivalents is needed to bridge the gap (Rakhilina 1998).[1]

Given that the fundamentally symbolic nature of language has always been recognized in the Slavic linguistic tradition, one might doubt that cognitive linguistics would have something to offer researchers working on Slavic languages. After all, trying to look at Slavic data from a cognitive

linguistic perspective could be considered as merely recasting old ideas, revamping them using a perhaps more fashionable vocabulary, with no real gain as far as depth of understanding or explanatory power is concerned. We believe, however, that this line of reasoning is misguided in several important respects. It is of course short-sighted to assume that every theoretical claim made or assumption put forward by cognitive linguists has the character of a truly revolutionary insight that was entirely alien to and perhaps even unthinkable in the "pre-cognitive" linguistic world. Quite the contrary, it seems that when the evolution of linguistic thought is looked at from a sufficient distance, one finds more continuity than expected (cf. Geeraerts 1988). Progress in linguistic science seems to resemble an upward spiral movement. In a sense, we move in circles and return to those places we have visited before, albeit that, with each new lap, we reach a higher level. The theoretical framework of the cognitive paradigm has the potential to move research in the domain of Slavic languages a level up, where precise and detailed descriptions of the conceptual import of multiple linguistic structures can be offered, where numerous and diverse linguistic phenomena can be characterized in terms of a limited number of general well-attested cognitive mechanisms, where not only the workings of languages can be meticulously described, but can also be seen as motivated by things larger than language itself – by the general human cognitive make-up, by our biological, social, and cultural experience of the world.

In the remaining part of this introduction we would like, first, to consider some of the attractions that Slavic languages hold for cognitively-minded researchers (section 2). Then, in section 3, we will discuss some of the main theoretical assumptions of the cognitive paradigm, with special emphasis on those ideas that are particularly relevant to the research in the domain of Slavic languages presented in this volume. Finally section 4 will be devoted to an overview of the volume, which is meant as a representative selection of work, illustrating a wide array of research topics that are currently on the Slavic cognitive linguistic agenda.

2. Slavic languages: an ideal laboratory for a cognitive linguist

Slavic languages have multiple attractions in store for a cognitive linguist, in particular in terms of the range of linguistic phenomena available. They have few, if any, peers worldwide in terms of the size of this family of languages: by any count (and the counts vary with the political allegiances

of the counters) there are at least a dozen Slavic languages, spoken by close to a half billion people across an area covering over 1/6 of the dry land on Earth. Also, few languages can compete with the Slavic family as far as the documentation of their characteristics, both diachronic and synchronic is concerned. By a great stroke of luck, SS. Cyril and Methodius, the "Apostles to the Slavs", undertook their Moravian mission and thus inaugurated the development of a Slavic literary language just in time to capture a very near equivalent to Late Common Slavic, the shared language of the Slavs prior to their further linguistic differentiation. In their late ninth century translations of the gospels, these saints codified what is now known as Old Church Slavonic, a language which, despite certain Greek influences and artificial features, allows us to triangulate effectively between the modern languages and the Proto-Indo-European trunk. Thus the Slavic languages have something that even English (and its Germanic siblings) lack: a fully-documented mother tongue. Though the record is not without gaps, we do have over a thousand years of Slavic texts, enabling us to trace in detail the histories of the daughter languages, and new discoveries are still being made. Given this breath-taking affluence of the historical data available to students of Slavic languages, it is not surprising that the present volume contains papers which are explicitly concerned with issues pertaining to diachronic language change.

The menu of potential objects for linguistic inquiry (both diachronic and synchronic) among modern Slavic languages is quite rich, thanks to the roster of linguistic categories exquisitely articulated by their inflectional and derivational morphology. The two main courses are case and aspect and some issues pertaining to both of these areas of empirical investigation are addressed in the present volume. Selecting from a long list of appetizers and side dishes that Slavic languages have to offer their connoisseurs, the volume further discusses the proliferation of impersonal constructions in Slavic languages, with special emphasis on constructions used to convey the idea of a highly diffuse and unspecified causer. It also reflects on the way in which Slavic languages encode complex events and the means they use to convey the speaker's epistemic stance; it also deals with issues related to the relatively free word order in Slavic languages and, finally, it considers sound symbolic expressions.

Obviously, the present volume merely touches upon the above-mentioned topics, leaving aside a vast range of other and equally delicious specialties in the Slavic cuisine. Let us mention just a few items to whet the appetite. Bulgarian and Macedonian have retained all the inherited past tenses without compromising the distribution of aspect, yielding unex-

pected combinations such as imperfective aorists and perfective imperfects. The old perfect has matured in these languages into an evidential tense with a fascinating array of uses, including the "admirative". Czech is probably in the process of developing its own set of articles, oddly enough recapitulating the history of English, with the numeral *jeden* 'one' serving as the source for the indefinite article and the demonstrative *ten* 'this/that' as the source for the definite article (Kresin 2001). All Slavic languages have a three-way gender distinction of masculine vs. feminine vs. neuter, usually with further distinctions within the masculine involving various construals of animacy and virility. Slavs show evidence of an enduring preoccupation with counting men, since most of their languages have special numerals and plural desinences used only with reference to male human beings. In Polish there are even special syntactic constructions just for reference to the "virile" category. Sorbian, which shares with Slovene the maintenance of the dual number, further observes a virility distinction in the dual, which is labeled in Sorbian textbooks as an opposition of "rational" (i.e., male human beings) vs. "irrational" (including everything else, ranging from women over rabbits to books). Ergativity may be creeping into Polish, where the logical subjects of reflexive verbs are marked with the Accusative, not the Nominative, as in *Brown ma doskonały styl i książkę się czyta szybko i przyjemnie* [Brown.NOM has perfect style.ACC and the book.ACC REFL reads quickly and pleasantly] 'Brown has a perfect style and the book reads (literally 'is read') quickly and pleasantly'. Of course, one could go on listing numerous other entrees on the Slavic menu and still remain far from being exhaustive. Perhaps it is an overstatement to say "If it has happened in any language, it has happened in a Slavic language", but this claim is not far from the mark: most known linguistic phenomena do indeed have Slavic parallels.

Importantly, none of the above-mentioned or a host of other fascinating phenomena have been "overstudied" in the literature. Fortunately, several of the Slavic-speaking countries have created on-line national corpora that support searches for linguistic parameters, such as the Russian National Corpus (http://www.ruscorpora.ru), the Czech National Corpus (http://ucnk.ff.cuni.cz), the Polish National Corpus (http://www.pelcra.pl) and the Croatian National Corpus (http://www.hnk.ffzg.hr). We hope that the present volume will be instrumental in bringing the richness and beauty of Slavic languages closer to the cognitive community at large as this rapprochement would be beneficial to both the study of Slavic languages and the development of cognitive theory.

In the next section we will briefly discuss the main theoretical concepts developed so far within the cognitive paradigm, with special emphasis on those assumptions and ideas that are most directly relevant to the analyses offered in the present volume.

3.   The theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics

3.1. The prototype approach to categorization

Over the last three decades in mainstream linguistics the conviction has grown that language is not a purely formal, algorithmic system processed in a separate language faculty. Instead, our language capacity is considered an integrated part of human cognition. The description of language is thus a cognitive discipline, part of the interdisciplinary field of cognitive sciences. One of the fundamental qualities of human cognition that is most pervasively present in language is categorization.

> Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action and speech (…) An understanding of how we categorize is central to any understanding of how we think and how we function, and therefore central to an understanding of what makes us human (Lakoff 1987a: 5–6).

Categorization, in other words, matters to the linguist in at least two ways, i.e. "both in its methodology and in its substance" (Taylor 1989: 1). A linguist needs categories to describe the object of investigation, while the objects that linguists study also stand for categories.

The view on categorization that prevails in cognitive linguistics is no doubt prototype theory, introduced now more than three decades ago by Eleanor Rosch (for an overview of her main psychological writings as well as diverse kinds of linguistic applications see Taylor 1995). In the prototype approach to categorization, concepts are categories comprising prototypical members (be they local or global), as well as more peripheral members, which constitute diverse kinds of motivated extensions from that prototype. Two such motivating mechanisms are conceptual metonymy (the mechanism of mentally accessing one entity via another (salient) entity co-occurring within the same conceptual domain – cf. e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980 ch. 8; Langacker 1993: 29ff) and conceptual metaphor (partially understanding one – typically more abstract – domain of experience

via another – typically more concrete – domain of experience – cf. e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1990; Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 45ff).

Often, category members are linked to one another just via the proto-type, that is, if member A is the prototype, member B will be similar to A, and member C will be similar to A, but B and C are not necessarily similar to each other. The link that exists between members in a radial category does not need to reflect any objective relatedness between the entities in reality. Instead, their conceptual relatedness is a reflection of what the human conceptualizer *experiences* as a result of his biological and cognitive make-up, as well as his bodily, social, and cultural baggage. Members of a linguistic category, e.g., interrelated senses, are linked to each other by categorizing relationships such as instantiation and extension (Langacker 1999: 101–103). Both involve an act of comparison in which a standard is matched against a target. Instantiation is a limiting case of extension that arises when the discrepancy is zero. Extension constitutes recognition accomplished only with a certain amount of "strain". Extension does not occur at random, however – it implies some abstract commonality. "[T]he 'outward' growth of a lexical network by extension from prototypes is inherently associated with its 'upward' growth by extraction of schemas" (Langacker 1987a: 373). Perceived similarities among sub-groups of members of a conceptual category are captured by schemas at various levels of abstraction, a schema being an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines. Importantly, in the schematic network model low-level schemas are claimed to be conceptually more salient than higher-level ones, and there is no necessity to postulate the existence of the highest-level schema capturing what is common to all category members for each conceptual category. Hence, it is the norm (rather than a deviation from the norm) that there are conceptual categories with not even a single property shared by *all* category members.

Recognizing that linguistic categories (such as e.g., meanings of linguistic expressions, grammatical constructions as well as categories, etc.) can also have a prototype structure equips a linguist with the theoretical scaffolding on which to build a principled approach to synchronic polysemy (or synonymy, for that matter), be it the polysemy of individual morphemes, words, or grammatical constructions. The same scaffolding, when considered from a slightly different perspective, is a fundamental part of the theoretical apparatus that can open up new and revealing venues in the investigation of diachronic language change (cf. Geeraerts 1997), which may be viewed as a diachronic consequence of synchronic polysemy.

3.2. A conceptual and imagistic approach to meaning

Meaning in the cognitivist framework is no longer defined in terms of out-side-world entities to which the expressions in question might refer, but rather in terms of the conceptualizations they evoke in the minds of language users (cf. e.g., Langacker 1987a: 116ff; 1988: 49f). Conceptualization, in turn, should be understood as both the conceptual content and the specific construal imposed on that content by the conceptualizer (cf. Langacker 1988: 58ff).

A conceptualist approach to meaning facilitates a systematic recognition and principled treatment of the subjective dimension of language: when human beings conceptualize aspects of the world around them they are often preoccupied with their own role in the conceptualization process and their own relation to the entities they conceptualize. In other words, human beings often do not merely conceive of outside entities, but also of *themselves conceptualizing the entities in question*. This peculiarity finds important reflections in language: linguistic expressions that speakers employ in discourse are used not only to comment on states of affairs in the outside world, but also to convey the speakers' epistemic evaluation of what they are talking about, their assessment of their relation with their interlocutors, comments pertaining to the development of the current discourse itself, etc. It is an explicitly conceptualist view of meaning that facilitates analyzing subjectivity in language in as systematic and detailed a way as the phenomenon in question deserves.

Moreover, a truly conceptualist view of meaning allows us to construct a comprehensive, principled framework for all instances of language use in which conflicting characterizations are assigned to the "same" aspects of the universe of discourse (cf. e.g., the traditional problems associated with an analysis of the semantic behavior of expressions in the context of predicates of propositional attitudes). For this purpose, cognitive linguistics has developed mental space theory (cf. e.g., Fauconnier 1985). In this theory, it is explicitly recognized that conceived situations in the universe of discourse may be conceptualized from multiple vantage points, each of them having the potential to constitute a separate mental space. A change in vantage point may bring about a change in how the observed parts of the universe of discourse appear to the conceptualizing subject. As the growing body of work in cognitive linguistics demonstrates (cf. e.g., Cutrer 1994; Dancygier 1998; Dancygier and Sweetser 2005; Fauconnier 1997:95ff; Sweetser 1990 ch.5), the theoretical constructs postulated within mental space theory are of fundamental importance for a unified analysis of the

semantics of tense, aspect, and mood, to name but a few grammatical categories.

An important aspect of the conceptualistic view on meaning is the recognition of the imagistic component of semantics, that is, of the fundamental role construal plays in meaning. A precise characterization of its dimensions allows an analyst to offer detailed and rigorous characterizations of meaning contrasts among linguistic structures which are equivalent in truth-conditional terms, but nevertheless exhibit subtle yet important differences in meaning, resulting in otherwise unexplainable differences in discourse behavior. A principled account of construal is a necessary prerequisite for developing a full-fledged symbolic approach to grammar: grammatical meaning is by necessity abstract and can hardly be characterized in terms of specific conceptual content. It may, nevertheless, be insightfully analyzed in terms of the type of construal it imposes on conceived scenes, as demonstrated, for example, by the highly revealing notional characterizations of nouns and verbs proposed by Langacker (cf. e.g. 1987b).

3.3. A usage-based approach to language

The third theoretical assumption we would like to highlight here concerns the motivation of linguistic phenomena. By rejecting the "autonomy of language" principle, cognitive linguists abandoned any intention of formulating generalizations with absolute predictability. Human behavior is not governed by deterministic laws, and language cannot be separated from other cognitive abilities, so absolute predictability cannot be achieved. This turns out to be an advantage. The cognitive linguist, freed from the task of looking for deterministic rules, is allowed to look for cognitive motivations behind linguistic facts and to discover that these facts "make sense" within a pattern larger than language itself – the pattern of how intelligent creatures strive to understand the world around them and how they communicate their insights to others of their kind.

Yet, if there are no deterministic rules to discover and learn, then how do children acquire language and what are linguists looking for? In the usage-based approach propounded by cognitive linguists, knowledge of a language emerges from actual usage, i.e. as the result of the entrenchment and abstraction of patterns that recur in multiple usage events. A usage-based view of language structure offers a promising framework for a cognitive approach to first language acquisition (cf. e.g. Dąbrowska 2004;

Tomasello 2003). At the same time, a usage-based view provides the right perspective for the full appreciation of corpus studies in linguistic research that no longer asks whether a certain phenomenon is possible or impossible, but instead focuses on how likely or unlikely the pattern is to occur (see Gries and Stefanowitsch 2006). Last but not least, the adoption of the usage-based model is important for the study of language change, as it lays the ground for recognizing the role that is played in historical linguistic evolution by factors such as frequency and mechanisms such as context-bound pragmatic inferencing.

4. Why cognitive linguists should read this volume

The purpose of the present volume is twofold. On the one hand, we want to investigate to what extent the theoretical framework and analytic tools developed within cognitive linguistics can be insightfully applied to the study of Slavic languages. As may be apparent from the brief discussion in section 2 above, Slavic languages, with their rich inflectional morphology in both the nominal and the verbal system, provide an important testing ground for a linguistic theory that seeks conceptual motivation behind grammatical phenomena. On the other hand, the specific observations and insights arrived at in the course of cognitively-oriented analyses of diverse phenomena in Slavic languages may enrich the understanding of already established aspects of the cognitive model of language and serve as catalysts for their further development and refinement.

This volume is important for a number of reasons. First, as far as its descriptive range is concerned, the volume deals with a variety of empirical phenomena that are of major interest to any linguistic theory. As mentioned above, the topics discussed include the semantics of case, tense, and aspect, complex event conceptions, voice phenomena, word order, sound symbolism, and language change. Secondly, the analyses address a variety of theoretical issues that are important for cognitive linguistics in general. Among them the reader will find: the role of virtual entities in language, the importance of subjectification in motivating both synchronic polysemy and diachronic language change, different ways of conveying the speaker's epistemic attitude, various kinds of non-prototypical event conceptions and their grammatical reflections, the role of metaphor in grammaticalization, and the influence exerted by local, contextual factors of pragmatic nature in diachronic morphosyntactic change. Topics of general theoretical interest also include the issue of iconicity in language and the idea that overtly

occurring language structures are "hints" helping language users construct and manipulate complex configurations of mental spaces with differing epistemic status. Finally, it should also be mentioned that the studies collected in this volume incorporate insights from a variety of theoretical frameworks that together form cognitive linguistics proper, such as e.g., cognitive grammar, mental space theory, construction grammar, frame semantics, grammaticalization theory and prototype semantics with special emphasis on its applicability to historical semantics. It is the diversity of this volume on both the empirical and theoretical level that makes it appealing to the cognitive community at large.

The contributions we have selected offer a representative sample of current research in cognitively oriented Slavic linguistics, touching upon five areas of interest to both Slavic linguists and cognitive linguists in general: (i) the highly developed nominal system with its extensive case morphology; (ii) the rich verbal system with its aspectual markers and multiple tense distinctions; (iii) clausal syntax as a reflection of how events are construed for the purpose of linguistic communication; (iv) strategies of change that illustrate how the current systems have come into existence and how they are likely to change; and finally, (v) motivations for the structure of the existing systems, as offered by principles such as iconicity.

Part One of this volume presents two articles devoted to case. Israeli's article is a detailed analysis of contextual factors that motivate the choice of the Instrumental rather than the Nominative in Russian predicates with the copula *byt'*. She argues that the decision of the speaker to represent events as or as if observed triggers the Nominative in the predicate. Focus on something other than the participant described, or on time comparison and on time limitation, trigger the Instrumental. In turn, Mitkovska's study explores the conceptual motivation for the double marking of possession in Macedonian constructions in which the Dative appears together with a possessive pronoun. She argues that the double marking of possession is motivated pragmatically, i.e. by the need of the speaker to present the possessive relationship from the perspective of the possessor and to highlight the possessed.

Part Two deals with issues pertaining to the semantics of tense and aspect markers in Slavic languages. Janda presents an empirical study of the aspectual behavior of borrowed verbs in Russian. She finds that 40% of them are imperfective, whereas 60% are bi-aspectuals that do not exhibit the traditional imperfective/perfective distinction. The strong correlation between the aspectual profile of a borrowed verb and its tendency to form *po-* prefixed perdurative verbs reveals the influence the lexical semantics

of a borrowed verb plays in determining whether it will be recognized as a bi-aspectual or a more ordinary simplex imperfective verb. The article by Geld and Zovko-Dinković is an analysis of the non-present uses of the present tense in Croatian. The authors suggest that the link between these uses and the prototypical present-time meaning is the notion of epistemic immediacy. In turn, Kochańska's paper considers the respective epistemic values of the Polish perfective and imperfective aspect in the past and the non-past tense. The epistemic meanings of the two aspectual variants are analyzed as motivated extensions from their prototypical senses. The author's claim is that although each of the two aspectual variants exhibits conflicting epistemic behaviors in the past and in the non-past tense, this may be accounted for by taking into consideration the prototypical meanings of both aspects and how they interact with the epistemic values of past, present and future time frames. The last study in this part, by Dancygier and Trnavac, is a mental-space analysis of conditionality in Polish and Serbian, with reference to English. Data from temporal, conditional, and coordinate constructions in Polish and Serbian are used to establish the basic formal and semantic parameters defining conditional meaning. In contrast to English, Polish and Serbian rely less on conjunctions and clause order, and more on tense, mood and aspectual forms, as well as on overt markers of sequentiality.

The next section, Part Three, contains two articles dealing with questions of how clausal syntax reflects the way in which events are conceptualized. Divjak's article investigates degrees of verb integration as well as factors motivating them in the case of the $[V_{FIN}V_{INF}]$ construction in Russian. Playing on the human capacity to impose alternate structurings on a conceived phenomenon, she provides evidence for the existence of an experientially motivated binding scale in Russian, a cline of eight different degrees of integration between the events expressed by means of a $[V_{FIN}V_{INF}]$. In turn, Słoń's article deals with the use of a Polish impersonal construction, the 3rd SG NEUTR construction, that defocuses a non-human and inanimate instigator. She shows that this construction is used when the instigator is particularly diffuse and difficult to identify.

Part Four of the volume is concerned with issues pertaining to language change. Fried's study analyzes mechanisms of morphosyntactic change on the basis of the diachronic evolution of the Old Czech "long" present active participle *věřící* '(the one) believing' in relation to the polysemous verb *věřiti*, from which it is derived. She concludes that the relative survival rates of individual uses are determined by an equilibrium between polysemy and isomorphism. Dickey's paper applies principles of prototype

semantics to explain the development of the Russian prefix *po-* from a primarily resultative prefix to a delimitative prefix. He argues that the development of modern Russian delimitatives followed the development of *po-* as a perfectivizing prefix for determinate motion verbs. The last study in this part, by Bužarovska, focuses on the semantic change of the indefinite pronoun *nešto* into an epistemic mitigation modal in Macedonian, within a wider Balkan Slavic context. She suggests that the strengthening of invited inferences and subjectification are the two cognitive mechanisms that play a major role in this metonymically-based process.

Finally, Part Five addresses the issue of iconic motivation in language. Tabakowska's article investigates the ordering of multiple (mainly double) adjectival modifiers within Polish nominal phrases. Although the structure of these NPs is shown to depend on the traditional dichotomous division of adjectives into two categories – the characterizing (attributive) and the specifying (restrictive) – for prototypical cases, the article demonstrates that the borderline between them is fuzzy: an adjective may be allotted to either category depending on communicative needs, which are often discourse-sensitive. In turn, Fidler focuses on sound symbolic expressions (SSEs) in Czech and investigates how SSEs relate to grammar. By analyzing how SSEs develop into discourse-aspectual markers, she contributes to our understanding of processes of word derivation and variation in language.

It is our hope that this collection of diachronic and synchronic research on a wide range of phenomena in Slavic languages, carried out within a variety of cognitive linguistic frameworks, will invite to explore the Slavic domain further along cognitive paths. We remain confident that any such exploration will be a fruitful and exciting enterprise.

Notes

1.   This is, of course, an oversimplification of the situation. Where cognitive linguists recognize the crucial role the structure and functioning of the human brain plays in language and strive both to implement cognitive findings in their linguistic models as well as to inform cognitive science with their linguistic findings, linguists belonging to the Moscow Semantic School do not show great interest in the cognitive physiological and psychological side of language. This difference in focus results in differences in heuristic methodology. According to the Moscow Semantic School, combinability of words signals combinability of concepts (Rakhilina 2000: 10–11). Russian cognitive lin-

guists therefore claim that a cognitive approach to language "should rely on the experience of all native speakers, as it is consolidated in their language, and that experience reveals itself in the linguistic behavior of the lexeme, above all in its combinatorial possibilities" (Rakhilina 2000: 353). In other words, as opposed to American and European cognitive linguists who more and more frequently resort to psycholinguistic methods to investigate conceptual structure, Russian linguists believe it should suffice to rely on linguistic evidence of conceptual structure (cf. Rakhilina 2000: 10–11).

References

Apresjan, Ju.D.
  1995 *Izbrannye Trudy. Tom 1, Leksičeskaja Semantika* [Selected Writings, Part 1, Lexical Semantics]. Moskva: Škola "Jazyki Russkoj Kul'tury".
Apresjan, Ju.D.
  1974 Regular polysemy. *Linguistics. An international review* 142:5–32.
Arutjunova, Nina D.
  1999 *Jazyk i mir čeloveka* [Language and the world of man]. Moskva: Škola "Jazyki Russkoj Kul'tury". [2nd corrected edition].
Cienki, Alan
  1989 *Spatial Cognition and the Semantics of Prepositions in English, Polish, and Russian*. Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner.
Cutrer, Michelle
  1994 Time and Tense in Narrative and in Everyday Language. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
Dancygier, Barbara
  1998 *Conditionals and Prediction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dancygier, Barbara, and Eve Sweetser
  2005 *Mental Spaces in Grammar: Conditional Constructions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dąbrowska, Ewa
  1997 *Cognitive Semantics and the Polish Dative.* Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
  2004 *Language, Mind and Brain: Some Psychological and Neurological Constraints on Theories of Grammar*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Fauconnier, Gilles
  1985 *Mental Spaces*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  1997 *Mappings in Thought and Language*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Geeraerts, Dirk
    1988   Cognitive Grammar and the History of Lexical Semantics. In *Topics in Cognitive Iinguistics,* Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.), 647–677. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
    1997   *Diachronic Prototype Semantics.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gries, St.Th., and A. Stefanowitsch
    2006   *Corpora in Cognitive Linguistics: Corpus-based Approaches to Syntax and Lexis.* Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Janda, Laura A.
    1986   *A Semantic Analysis of the Russian Verbal Prefixes za-, pere-, do-, and ot-.* Munich: Verlag Otto Sagner.
    1993a   *A Geography of Case Semantics: The Czech Dative and the Russian Instrumental.* Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
    1993b   Cognitive Linguistics as a Continuation of the Jakobsonian Tradition: The Semantics of Russian and Czech Reflexives. In *American Contributions to the Eleventh International Congress of Slavists in Bratislava,* Robert A. Maguire and Alan Timberlake (eds.), 310–319. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica.
Janda, Laura A., and Steven J. Clancy
    2002   *The Case Book for Russian.* Bloomington, IN: Slavica.
Kempf, Zdzisław.
    1978.   *Próba teorii przypadków* [An attempt at a theory of case]. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
Klemensiewicz, Zenon
    1926   Orzecznik przy formach osobowych *być* [The predicate with personal forms of 'be']. *Prace filologiczne* [Philological works] XI: 123–181.
Koschmieder, Erwin
    1934   *Nauka o aspektach języka polskiego w zarysie. Próba syntezy.* [An attempt at a comprehensive theory of Polish aspect. An outline]. Wilno.
Lakoff, George
    1987   *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    1990   The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-Schemas? *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 39–74.
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson
    1980   *Metaphors We Live By.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.
    1999   *Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought.* New York: Basic Books.
Langacker, Ronald W.
    1987a   *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar.* Vol. 1. *Theoretical Prerequisites.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
    1987b   Nouns and Verbs. *Language* 63: 53–94.

1988.   A View of Linguistic Semantics. In *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics,* Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.), 49–90. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

1993   Reference-Point Constructions. *Cognitive Linguistics* 4: 1–38.

1999   *Grammar and Conceptualization.* Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Mel'čuk, Igor', A.

1995   *Russkij jazyk v modeli "smysl ↔ tekst"* [The Russian language in the "meaning↔text" model]. Moskva: Škola "Jazyki Russkoj Kul'tury" [Wiener Slawistische Almanach Sonderband 39.]

1999   *Opyt teorii lingvističeskich modelej "smysl ↔ tekst"* [An attempt at a theory of linguistic "meaning↔text" models]. Moskva: Škola "Jazyki Russkoj Kul'tury".

Radden, Günter

1991   The Cognitive Approach to Natural Language. *L.A.U.D. Papers* Series A, No. 300. Linguistic Agency of the University of Duisburg.

Rakhilina, Ekaterina V.

1998   Kognitivnaja semantika: istorija, personalii, idei, rezul'taty [Cognitive semantics: history, figures, ideas and results]. *Semiotika i informatika* 36: 274–323.

2000   *Kognitivnyj analiz predmetnych imen: semantika i sočetaemost* [A cognitive analysis of physical names: semantics and collocation]. Moskva: Russkie Slovari.

Rudzka-Ostyn, Brygida (ed.)

1988   *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Rudzka-Ostyn, Brygida

1992   Case Relations in Cognitive Grammar: Some Reflexive Uses of the Polish Dative. *Leuvense Bijdragen* 81: 327–373.

1996   The Polish Dative. In *The Dative*. Vol. 1. *Descriptive Studies,* William Van Belle and Willy Van Langendonck (eds.), 341–394. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Szober, Stanisław

1963   Reprint. *Gramatyka języka polskiego* [A grammar of Polish]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1923.

Tabakowska, Elżbieta

2001   Kognitywizm: Obrazki z polskiej sceny [Cognitivism. Images from the Polish scene]. *Glossos* 1 at http://seelrc.org/glossos/.

Taylor, John, R.

1989   *Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tomasello, Michael

2003   *Constructing a Language. A Usage Based Theory of Language Acquisition*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Vaňková, Irena, Iva Nebeská, Lucie Saicová Římalová, and Jasňa Šlédrová
    2005   *Co na srdci, to na jazyku: Kapitoly z kognitivní lingvistiky* [What's on the heart is on the tongue: Chapters from cognitive linguistics]. Prague: Karolinum.
Wierzbicka, Anna
    1972   *Semantic Primitives*. Frankfurt: Athenäum.

Part one
The nominal system: the meaning of case

Nominative and instrumental variation of adjectival predicates with the Russian copula *byt'*: reference time, limitation, and focalization

Alina Israeli

Abstract

This article reexamines the nominative/instrumental variation of adjectival predicates. The nominative suggests either the permanence of the feature or the speaker's presenting events as if witnessed. The instrumental suggests change, comparison, time limitation, or scope limitation. There are two possible ways of describing a changed state: either as temporal sequencing or via a retrospective perspective. The first mode of description calls for the nominative of the adjectival predicate referring to the earlier state while the second mode calls for the instrumental of the adjectival predicate referring to the earlier state. Additionally, the feature of focalization explains the use of nominative as opposed to non-focalized instrumental.

1. Introduction

The nominative/instrumental variation of adjectival predicates, including those with the copula *byt'*, has been studied previously, in particular by Nichols (1981 and 1985), Černov (1983), and most recently by Zel'dovič (2005). A variety of meanings have been postulated for the two cases to account for the observed differences in their distribution. Nichols (1985: 362–363) suggests that the nominative case expresses "simple aorist past" while the instrumental means "past habitual":

(1) *Včera   on   byl   veselyj.*
     yesterday he   was.M[1] cheerful.M.SG.NOM
     'Yesterday he was cheerful.'

(2)   *V detstve   on byl   **veselym***.
       in childhood he was.M cheerful.M.SG.INSTR

                                    (both from Nichols 1985: 362)

       'As a child he was cheerful.'

Černov (1983: 91), who analyzes the same constructions, observes that in the case of the "actualization of the temporal plan", particularly with time expressions emphasizing distance in time, the instrumental is usually used. Černov labels this usage 'pluperfect' (the following examples are from Černov 1983: 91):

(3) a. *Togda, šest' let   nazad ètot mal'čik byl*
         then   six years ago   this boy   was.M
         malen'kim,   *a*   *ženščina* ***molodoj***.
         small.M.SG.INSTR   and woman   young.F.SG.INSTR

                                                 (K. Simonov)

         'At that time, six years ago, this boy was small and the woman was young.'

     b. *Kogda on byl   ešče **molodym***   *i*
         when he was.M still young.M.SG.INSTR and
         partizanil   v   ètix mestax,   ego
         fought (as guerilla) in   these places   his
         molodaja žena byla   vmeste s   nim.
         young   wife was.F together with   him

                                                 (A. Fadeev)

         'When he was still young and fighting as a guerilla around these places, his young wife was with him.'

     c. *Odnako, v tu poru, o   kotoroj idet reč', ona*
         however in that time about which   goes talk she
         *byla daleko ne takoj **dobroj***   *i* ***laskovoj***
         was.F far   not such kind.F.SG.INSTR and tender.F.SG.INSTR
         k   ljudjam.
         to   people

                                                 (M. Gor'kij)

         'However, at the time we are talking about, she was far from so kind and nice towards people.'

Recently, Gasparov (1996: 227), comparing the nominative long form and the short form of predicates, suggested that by using the nominative the speaker invites the interlocutor to share his immediate impression of the state/situation. Zel'dovič (2005) in his examination of the nominative vs. instrumental adjectival predicates follows Gasparov in describing the nominative use as "nabljudennost'" '*sharing an observation*'. Zel'dovič (2005: 150) provides a rule that the instrumental is appropriate where neither sharing an observation nor the isolated quality of the situation is desirable.

But what makes either of those conditions undesirable? We do find parallel examples, such as (4), and consequently we must look for factors that motivate the speaker to choose one construction over the other.

(4) a. *Da, ded*   **byl**   **staryj**   *i*   *xlopot* *s*
        yes grandfather was.M   old.M.SG.NOM and hassles with
        nim ne men'še, čem   s   malym   rebenkom.
        him not less   than with small   child
                            (zhurnal.lib.ru/b/borzow_a_a/letter.shtml)
        'Yes, grandfather was old and caused no less hassle than a
        small child.'

     b. *No ded*   **byl**   **starym***,   *i*   *azbuku   Morze*
        but grandfather was.M   old.M.SG.INSTR and alphabet Morse
        uže   zabyl ...
        already forgot.M.SG
                            (zhurnal.lib.ru/c/cwirk_a/provbud.shtml)
        'But grandfather was old and had already forgotten the Morse
        code …'

This article will examine different types of narrative time, comparison, limitation and focalization as features that determine the case of the predicate adjective. Their implications for the lexical meanings of nouns and adjectives, which in turn affect the choice of case, will also be examined. The availability of data bases and search engines enables the selection of parallel examples much more easily than previously. Out of the vast number of parallel examples, thoses with the most clearly juxtaposing pragmatic contexts were chosen.

2. Types of narrative time and comparison

The past form *byl* may represent three different types of narrative time, the first two of which involve comparison:

1. The time of the narrated event t_n is compared with the time of speech (or writing) t_s. I will call this use of *byl* t_n / t_s. This is the case in (5):

(5)   a.   *Znanie   rodnoj   istorii bylo   očen' **vysokim**   v*
           knowledge native   history was.N   very high.N.SG.INSTR in
           drevnej Rusi...
           old   Russia

                                   (D. Lixačev/ Nichols 1985: 363)
           'Knowledge of native history was very high in old Russia …'

       b.   *v   te   gody, kogda my ešče žili   v Staroj Russe i*
           in   those years when we   still lived in Old   Russa and
           *mama byla   sovsem **moloden'koj**.*
           mama was.F quite   young.F.SG.INSTR

                                        (D. Granin. Obratnyj bilet)
           '… during those years when we were still living in Staraya Russa and mother was very young.'

2. The time of one narrated event t_{n1} is compared with the time of another narrated event t_{n2}. I will call this use of *byl* t_{n1} / t_{n2}. This is the case in (6), where pre-war memories of seventh grade (*togda* 'at that time') are compared with post-war ones of a class reunion ('lived to have grey hair'):

(6)   *Iz   soroka čelovek, zakončivšix   kogda-to 7 "B", do sedyx*
       from forty   people   had-finished once   7 "B" till grey
       *volos požilo devjatnadcat'. ... Naša   kompanija **togda** byla*
       hair   lived nineteen   our   company   then   was.F
       ***nebol'šoj**:   tri   devočki i   troe   rebjat ...*
       not-big.F.SG.INSTR three girls   and threesome guys
                                   (B. Vasil'ev. Zavtra byla vojna)
       'Out of forty people who once had finished seventh grade, nineteen lived to have grey hair. … Our gang was small then: three girls and three guys …'

3. The time of the narrated event t_n is not compared with another moment in time. I will call this use of *byl* t_{n0}. This is the case in (4a) and (4b) above as well as in (7) below. It differs from type 1 by having to present events as frozen in the moment: unlike *Russia* and *mother* in (5), *raspberry* in (7) did not exist at a later moment thus not allowing even an implicit comparison. In (4), it is the choice of the narrator to present events as frozen in time and defying comparison.

(7) a. *Malina   byla   **sadovaja**,   očen'   **krupnaja** ...*
        raspberry was.F   garden.ADJ.F.SG.NOM very   large.F.SG.NOM
                                                (V. Solouxin. Dom i sad)
        'The raspberries were from the garden and very large …'

   b. **Malina   byla   **sadovoj**,   očen'   **krupnoj** ...*
        raspberry was.F garden.ADJ.F.SG.INSTR very   large.F.SG.INSTR

In (7b) the permanent nature of *sadovyj* 'garden variety', similar to *kirpičnyj* 'made of brick' below, makes it incorrect.

The predicative features may be of various kinds, the main one being permanence vs. non-permanence. In reality, the distinction is more complex, and we will discuss this point later on. First, however, we must consider in more detail the proposed dichotomy. The following is a discussion of how the three possible narrative time frames correlate with these two main types of features under consideration.

A permanent feature, such as a description of the material an object is made of, personal characteristics, and many others, exists as long as the object having that feature does. Comparing this feature at any two points during the life time of the object (t_{n1} / t_{n2}) yields no change, since the feature is perceived as constant. Consequently, describing the object at any moment (t_{n0}) yields the adjectival form that conveys no-change, i.e. the nominative. This form suggests the meaning of 'observation' (cf. Zel'dovič 2005).

If we compare *Dom byl kirpičnyj / kirpičnym* 'The house/apartment building was made of brick', clearly, being made of brick could not be perceived as temporary or evolving. And indeed in such stative descriptions the nominative predominates:

(8)   *Dom* **byl**   **kirpičnyj**   *i,*   *vidimo,*   *očen' drevnij.*
      house was.M   brick.ADJ.M.SG.NOM   and   apparently very   old
                                                       (*Genocid. Čuvstvo opasnosti*)
      'It was a brick house, and evidently a very old one.'

When an object ceases to exist, its feature ceases to exist along with it, and the information conveyed by the instrumental is that the comparison t_{n1} / t_{n2} indicates a change (cf. Filip 2001). A Google search <29.V.2006> produced eighty-seven examples of the nominative *dom byl kirpičnyj* and five examples of the instrumental *dom byl kirpičnym,* four of which pertained to one and the same event of the explosion and the subsequent collapse of an apartment building in Moscow. So in order to motivate this use of the instrumental, the apartment building had to cease to exist:

(9)   *Poisk ljudej osložnjalsja tem,*   *čto vzorvannyj*   *dom*
      search people complicated by-that that blown.M.SG.NOM   house
      byl   **kirpičnym***: ...*
      was.M   brick.ADJ.M.SG.INSTR
                                               (*Nezavisimaja gazeta No 170/1999-9-14*)
      'The search for survivors was complicated by the fact that the building that had exploded was made of brick: …'

When looking at a photograph, a speaker has no point of reference other than that frozen instant in time, and comparison is impossible:

(10) *Emu bol'še vsego ponravilas' fotografija,*   *potomu čto glaza*
      him more of-all pleased   photograph   because   eyes
      molodogo čeloveka ulybalis', a   lico bylo   **otkrytoe**
      young   man   smiled.PL and face was.N   open.N.SG.NOM
      i   **prijatnoe.**   *Emu, konečno i   v   golovu ne*
      and pleasant.N.SG.NOM   him of-course even in head   not
      prixodilo, čto   èto ego   otec.
      came   that this his   father
                                                       (*Èdgar Berrouz. Tarzan*)
      'He most of all liked the photograph, because the face of the young man was open and pleasant with smiling eyes. It of course did not occur to him that this was his father.'

In (11), the person in question has died, and consequently the feature ascribed to his face has gone with him:

(11) *Ego lico bylo* **otkrytym,**   **svetlym**.   *Èto bylo lico*
      his face was.N open.N.SG.INSTR light. N.SG.INSTR this was.N face
      Rossii.   Ne mogu   poverit', čto Georgij Stepanovič
      of-Russia not can.1SG   to-believe that Georgy   Stepanovich
      [Žženov] ot   nas ušel.
      Zhzhenov from us   left
                                      (Učitel'skaja gazeta No 05/ 2006-02-07)
      'His face was open, light. This was the face of Russia. I cannot be-
      lieve that G.S. Zhzhenov has left us.'

   With non-permanent features, the speaker / narrator can choose between
two modes of description: the [+observation] feature or the implied
[+change] feature. Example (12a) introduces the speaker as the observer,
while example (12b) implies a change or, in other words, an implicit com-
parison:

(12) a. *Deduška   byl   staren'kij*.
          grandfather   was.M   old.M.SG.NOM

      b. *Deduška   byl   staren'kim*.
          grandfather   was.M   old.M.SG.INSTR
          'Grandfather was old.'

   Similarly, in (13) the speaker sees the openness of the face as a fleeting
momentary feature:

(13) *Ego černo-sinie glaza vnimatel'no nabljudali za   nej, lico*
      his black-blue eyes   carefully   watched   after her face
      bylo **otkrytym**   *i*   **uprjamym**…
      was.N open.N.SG.INSTR and stubborn.N.SG.INSTR
                                      (zhurnal.lib.ru/h/hikaru_b/108.shtml)
      'His blue-black eyes carefully observed her, his face was open and
      stubborn …'

   As we have seen in the case of *otkrytyj* 'open', the same feature could
be a permanent characteristic or a non-permanent one. This is also true for
adjectives like *bol'šoj* 'big'. Comparing two types of elephants, the African
ones vs. the Asian one, while explaining the nominative vs. instrumental
variation in the predicates, Ionin and Matushansky (2002: 4) suggest that in
(14) "Nominative requires the subject to vary from situation to situation

while with an Instrumental predicate, the (definite) subject must be the same":

(14) a. *V Afrike slony   byli **bol'šie**,   a   v Azii –*
          in Africa elephants were big.PL.NOM and in Asia
          ***malen'kie**.*
          small.PL.NOM

      b. *# V Afrike   slony   byli **bol'šimi**,   a   v   Azii –*
          in Africa   elephants were big.PL.INSTR and in   Asia
          ***malen'kimi**.*
          small.PL.INSTR
          'In Africa the elephants were large, while in Asia they were
          small.'

In fact, it is not that the nominative case that requires the subject to vary, but the quality of the feature that the nominative case represents: this is what renders (14b) incongruent. Co-reference of the subject in (14b), as opposed to non-co-reference in (14a), can be explained via reference to permanence/ non-permanence of the charecteristic and to temporal comparison. In (14b) *v Afrike* 'in Africa' and *v Azii* 'in Asia' mean 'while in Africa' and 'while in Asia' respectively, thus involving a temporal comparison of the type t_{n1} / t_{n2} and yielding a pragmatically impossible sentence with non-permanent feature. In (14a) *bol'šoj* 'big' is a permanent characteristic (pertaining not to individual elephants but to a species) not allowing for temporal comparison.

The narrative time t_{n1} / t_{n2} de-facto means change or comparison. This type of narrative time, however, offers two possibilities. Analyzing evolving reference, Moeschler (1996: 21) suggests that it can be construed either as *temporal sequencing* (TS) or via a *retrospective perspective* (RP). In TS events are viewed sequentially, that is, t_{n1} is perceived and described as a point in time earlier than t_{n2}, and t_{n2} is compared to t_{n1}; in other words, we are dealing with t_{n1} / t_{n2} proper. In RP the narration can view previous points in time via flashbacks, or view the preceding moment t_{n1} as compared to the "present" (t_{n0}) or to a later point t_{n2}, so this is strictly speaking a reversed narrative time t_{n2} / t_{n1}. In terms of temporal perspective, TS views the narration as "then and later", while RP views it as "now and before". The TS perspective, as in (15), calls for the nominative in the ad-

jectival phrase describing the state at t$_1$, whereas the RP, as in (16), calls for the instrumental.

(15) – *Kogda* **ja byl** *takoj,*   *kak tvoj Aleša, –*
        when   I   was.M such.M.SG.NOM   as   your Alesha
      zagovoril   on, neskol'ko uspokojas', –   *mne nebo*
      started-speaking he somewhat having-calmed-down to-me sky
      kazalos' takim vysokim, takim sinim. **Potom** *ono dlja menja*
      seemed   such   tall   such blue   later   it   for me
      pobleklo, no ved' èto ot   vozrasta?
      faded   but PCL this from age
                                    (Ju. Kazakov. Vo sne ty gor'ko plakal)
      '"When I was like your Alesha," he began after calming down
      somewhat, "the sky seemed to me so high, so blue. Later it faded for
      me, but this is from age, right?"'

(16) a. *Kogda*   **ja byl**   **malen'kim**,   *risunki*   *byli*   *drugie*
          When   I   was.M little.M.SG.INSTR drawings   were   others
         i   *pravila drugie. Ty   mne   ob''jasni,   požalujsta,*
         and   rules   others you   to-me explain.IMP   please
         vaši **teperešnie**   *pravila.*
         your now.ADJ   rules
                                          (I. Grekova. Kafedra)
         '"When I was little, the drawings were different and the rules
         were different. Please explain to me your current rules."'

     b. *Togda* **ja byl**   **staršim**;   *a*   *čto*   *ja* **teper'**? *Ja*
          then   I   was.M older.M.SG.INSTR and what I   now   I
         značu men'še, čem   prjažka na   uzdečke.
         mean   less   than   buckle   on   reins
                                          (O. Genri. Serdce i krest)
         'At that time I was the elder, and what am I now? I mean less
         than a buckle on the reins.'

   The RP represents a form of comparison since the period which has ended is viewed from some later point in time. The TS views the earlier period as open-ended, as if the narrator placed himself back at the earlier moment as an observer avoiding any comparison.

The stative (non-evolved) view, as in (15), and RP, as in (16), can be combined and juxtaposed, as in (17):

(17)   *Deduška   u Nasti **byl**   **staren'kij**$_{t0}$.   Nu, konečno,*
grandfather at Nastya was.M old.M.SG.NOM   well of-course
*on ne vsegda **byl**   **staren'kim**$_{t2/t1}$. Kogda-to   on byl*
he not always was.M old.M.SG.INSTR   some-time he was.M
*sovsem **molodym**$_{t2/t1}$ i   učastvoval v vojne, no **teper'**,*
quite   young.M.SG.INSTR and   participated in war   but now
*nado priznat', on byl   **staren'kim**$_{t0/t1}$. Ešče kogda Nastja*
must to-admit he was.M old.M.SG.INSTR   still when Nastya
*byla   **malen'koj**$_{t2/t1}$, deduška   byl   **bodrym**$_{t2/t1}$,*
was.F   little.F.SG.INSTR grandfather was.M vigorous.M.SG.INSTR
*no   **teper'** on xodil,   opirajas na položku, i   kuril*
but   now   he walked.M leaning on cane   and smoked
staruju trubku, kotoraja byla   ego trofeem s   voennyx
old   pipe   which   was.F his trophy from   war.ADJ
vremen.
times

(*Deduška.* http://www.foryou.kherson.ua/slovo.1083.2.html)
'Nastya's grandfather was old. But of course he hadn't always been old. Once he was really young and participated in the war, but now, one must admit, he was old. When Nastya was still little, grandfather was full of energy, but now he walked with a cane and smoked an old pipe which was his trophy from the war times.'

The first occurence of *staren'kij* 'old' is stative, the kind that Nichols describes as having *descriptive force* and Zel'dovič as *observed,* while the second occurence with *teper'* 'now' (cf. Mel'čuk 1985) implies comparison, a change of state.

In (18), which refers to a meeting of two school friends some twenty years after graduation and the war, there are two instances of the nominative case:

(18)   *Ja pokosilsja   na Venju. On **byl**   **lysyj**,   glaza*
I   looked-slanted at Venya   he was.M bald.M.SG.NOM   eyes
*ego vycveli, no ja vspomnil, kakie oni **byli***
his faded   but I   remembered what   they were

nebesno-golubye *i* *kak* *on* *nravilsja* *devčonkam.* *On*
sky-blue.PL.NOM and how he pleased girls he
byl **samym** **dobrym** *iz* *nas* *i*
was.M most.M.SG.INSTR kind.M.SG.INSTR from us and
samym **doverčivym.** *On svjato veril* *vsemu,*
most.M.SG.INSTR gullible.M.SG.INSTR he holy believed everything
čto *govorili,* *pečatali,* *učili.*
that spoke.PL printed.PL taught.PL

(D. Granin. Dom na Fontanke)

'I glanced at Venya. He was bald, his eyes faded, but I remembered what a sky blue color they used to be and how girls liked him. He was the kindest among us and the most trusting. He faithfully believed everything he heard, read or was taught.'

One instance pertains to the moment t_{n0} (*on byl lysyj* 'he was bald') and the other to a moment twenty years earlier at t_{n1} (*oni byli nebesno-golubye* 'they were sky blue'). By using the phrase "I **remembered**", immediately before the second instance, the narrator justifies the transposition into a different time which allows him to present the quality of eye color as stative, despite the change. However, the features of kindness and gullibility are presented as changed, and consequently the message is that Venya no longer believed everything he heard or read. The speaker is thus able to interweave two different narrative times.

While future tense examples are not discussed here in the same detail due to their infrequency (relative to past tense examples), it is worthwhile to mention an example discussed in Zel'dovič (2005: 141). The author states that (19a) rather than (19b) suggests that the speaker intends to put the sweater on or empathizes with someone who intends to wear the sweater due to the *observation* factor:

(19) a. *Zavtra* *sviter* *budet* **suxoj.**
tomorrow sweater be.3SG.FUT dry.M.SG.NOM

b. *Zavtra* *sviter* *budet* **suxim.**
tomorrow sweater be.3SG.FUT dry.M.SG.INSTR
'Tomorrow the sweater will be dry.'

I believe that the fact that the speaker (or someone else) is planning to wear the sweater tomorrow makes the process of drying and implicit com-

parison between the current wet and future dry state of the sweater immaterial; what matters most is the state it is in when worn.

Conversely, in (20) it is the result of drying that is important, and thus implicit comparison is brought to the fore:

(20)   *Naprimer,   v   moroznuju   pogodu   vo   vremja   progulki*
for-example   in   frosty   weather   in   time   of-walk
povesit'   na   ulice   mokroe   polotence   i   posmotret',   čto
to-hang   on   street   wet   towel   and   to-look   what
s   nim   budet.   Na   sledujuščee   utro ...   voda   zamerzla
with   him   be.3SG.FUT   on   next   morning   water   froze
i   prevratilas'   v   led. No   k   večeru   polotence   budet
and   turned   in   ice   but   to   evening   towel   be.3SG.FUT
suxim –   *ne   budet   ni   l'da   ni   vody...*
dry.M.SG.INSTR   not   be.3SG.FUT   neither   ice   neither   water
(http://www.aseko.org/bull/08.htm)
'For example, in frosty weather during a walk, hang a wet towel outside and see what happens to it. The next morning … the water will have frozen and turned into ice. But by evening the towel will be dry, there will be neither ice nor water.'

There exist nouns and attributes that cannot pertain to any particular moment in time, but only to a period, yet the features that they describe cannot be considered permanent and described statively. This is the case with the nouns 'searches' and 'influence' in (21) below:

(21) a. *Moj   oxotničij   azart   usugubilsja,   vidimo,*
my   hunter.ADJ   excitement   aggravated   apparently
tem,   čto   dolgie   poiski   byli   besplodnymi
by-that   that   long   searches   were   fruitless.PL.INSTR
i   ja   daže   terjal   nadeždu.
and   I   even   lost   hope
(V. Solouxin. Trava)
'My hunter's excitement was aggravated, apparently by the fact that the lengthy searches had been fruitless and I was even losing hope.'

b. *Vozdejstvie ital'janskogo futurizma bylo   ves'ma*
influence   Italian   futurism   was.N   quite
***značitel'nym**,   osobenno   na   russkij   avangardizm.*
remarkable.N.SG.INSTR   especially   on   Russian   avant-garde
*(E. Xersonskaja. Možno tol'ko stroit' gipotezy.“Znanie – sila”,
1989: 01)*
'The influence of Italian futurism was highly significant, especially on the Russian avant-garde.'

3.   Non-temporal comparison

The use of the instrumental may signal not only a comparison between two different states of a single entity at two different points in time, but also a comparison between two different entities, or different parts of the same entity. In (22), the author compares two generations, and his verdict (using the instrumental) is that they are different, not alike:

(22)   a.   *Oni   uvereny   v   sebe točno   tak že   kak byli*
they   sure   in   self exactly   thus PCL   as   were
uvereny   my, no ...   ne   tak   rvutsja k   komandnym
sure   we but   not   thus   strive to   command
vysotam, kak   ljudi   našego   pokolenija. ... Èti
heights   as   people   our   generation   these
*byli,   požaluj,   **drugimi**.*
were   MODAL   others.PL.INSTR
(L. Zorin. Krapivnica)
'They are sure of themselves just as much as we were, but … are not striving for the leadership positions as did the people of our generation. … Come to think of it, these were different.'

b.   *Eti   byli   **drugie**.*
these   were   others.PL.NOM
'These were others.'

In (22a) Zorin is comparing the internal qualities of two generations that in his opinion are different. Had he used (22b) instead, he would have simply implied that those were different people in the sense of being different tokens, not the same entity.

The nominative use explicitly avoids comparison. The pseudo-comparison in (23) metaphorically explains that any comparison between the two women is as impossible as would be a comparison between a dog and a goat, whose only commonality, in the speaker's eyes, resides in the fact that they both have four legs and a tail.

(23) *Lora i   Tanja byli   **raznye**,   kak naprimer*
      Lora and Tanya were.PL different.PL.NOM as   for-example
      sobaka i   koza. Oni čem-to   poxoži: primerno
      dog   and goat they something alike   approximately
      odinakovoj vysoty, obe   na   četyrex   nogax   i   s
      same   height both on   four   legs   and with
      xvostom.
      tail

                          (V. Tokareva. Odin kubik nadeždy)
      'Lora and Tanya were different, as for example a dog and a goat.
      They have something in common: they are about the same height,
      and both have four legs and a tail.'

4.   Limitation

Zel'dovič (2005: 132), following Timberlake (1985: 278–282) points out that the instrumental signals temporal limitation. Some instances of time comparison could be viewed as time limitation. Yet there are clear instances of time limitation where there is no explicit comparison (discussed in 4.2).

   Zel'dovič (2005: 132) also mentions that the nominative form interprets the situation as isolated, "by itself" without correlation with anything else. In other words, the instrumental signals limitation in scope.

4.1. Limitation in scope

Limitation in scope refers to a feature either not being consistent, not manifesting itself constantly, apparent only within a given frame of reference, or not being assumed to have impact beyond the speaker. Consider (24), in which an intelligent person behaves stupidly, thus setting a limit to his wit.

(24) *On **byl** umnym,*   *no vel   sebja glupo.*
      he was.M smart.M.SG.INSTR but conducted self   stupidly
      On stesnjalsja, i   čtoby   skompensirovat'   èto,
      he was-bashful and in-order to-compensate   this
      pozvoljal sebe lišnee i   inogda   vel   sebja
      allowed   self extra   and sometimes conducted self
      sliškom   agressivno.
      too   aggressively

                              (cooler.irk.ru/hackers/hackers-69.html)
      'He was smart, but acted stupid. He was bashful and in order to
      compensate for this went overboard and sometimes behaved too ag-
      gressively.'

Other examples of limitation in scope are given in (25):

(25) a. *Pervyj ètaž **byl**   **kirpičnym**,   vtoroj i   tretij*
          first   floor was.M brick.ADJ.M.SG.INSTR second and third
          derevjannye.
          wooden.PL.NOM

                                                          (*Dombaj. Info*)
          'The first floor was made of brick, the second and third ones
          were made of wood.'

      b. *Dom   naš dlja Tuly **byl**   **svetskim**.*
          house our for Tula was.M worldly.ADJ.M.SG.INSTR
                              (*Knjaz' G. E. L'vov i ego tul'skoe okruženie*)
          'For Tula, our house was worldly.'

In (25a) the quality of being made of brick is limited to one floor (as
opposed to the rest of the house which is made of wood); in (25b), the limi-
tation is geographic (i.e. restricted to Tula) as well as in scope: the author
deliberately states the limit of their house's worldliness, which in other
places, e.g. St. Petersburg, might not have been considered worldly at all.

Going back to (4a) and (4b), repeated below, we can see that in (4a) it is
the grandfather's oldness and its ramifications that are the speaker's con-
cern, while in (4b), only the implication of the oldness with respect to his
remembering the Morse code is of note:

(4)   a.   *Da,   ded   **byl   staryj**   i   xlopot*
           yes   grandfather   was.M   old.M.SG.NOM   and   hassles
           s   nim   ne   men'še,   čem   s   malym   rebenkom.
           with   him   not   less   than   with   small   child
                                   (zhurnal.lib.ru/b/borzow_a_a/letter.shtml)
           'Yes, grandfather was old and caused no less hassle than a
           small child.'

      b.   *No ded   **byl   starym**,   i   azbuku   Morze*
           but grandfather   was.M   old.M.SG.INSTR   and   alphabet   Morse
           uže   zabyl …
           already   forgot.M.SG
                                       (zhurnal.lib.ru/c/cwirk_a/provbud.shtml)
           'But grandfather was old and had already forgotten the Morse
           code …'

4.2. Limitation in time

As was mentioned earlier, following Timberlake (1982) and Zel'dovič
(2005), it is possible to speak of limitation in time in isolated instances
such as (26), which – according to Zel'dovič (2005: 132) – implies that the
feature is no longer present:

(26)   *On   byl   **krasivym**.*
       he   was.M   handsome.M.SG.INSTR
       'He used to be handsome.'

It is interesting, however, to examine parallel examples to compare
when the narrator chooses the device of presenting an event as if being
observed versus when he chooses to present the event as limited in time.
Example (27) is a flashback to a time the speaker explicitly remembers,
and even though this state does not exist anymore, the narrator describes it
as if observed; in (28) below, where the instrumental is used, the desig-
nated state of loving is construed as experienced by the sentential subject
(the girlfriend) only at those limited moments when the object of love (the
rabbit) was cheerful:

(27*)   *Da,   no   ja   pomnju,   **kogda on   byl   veselyj***
        yes   but   I   remember   when   he   was.M   merry.M.SG.NOM

i   bespečnyj.
and carefree.M.SG.NOM

> *(È. Xeminguèj [Hemingway]. Ostrova v okeane)*

'Yes, but I remember when he was cheerful and carefree.'

(28) *Ego podružka, Pušanka, ljubila krolika Veselogo,* **kogda on byl**
his girlfriend Pushanka loved rabbit Vesely   when he was.M
veselym,   i   ne ljubila ego grustnym.
merry.M.SG.INSTR and not loved him sad. M.SG.INSTR

> *(A. Magidovič Obrečennost'.* www.proza.ru/texts/2005/07/31-
> 204.html)

'His girlfriend, Pushanka, loved the rabbit Vesely when he was cheerful, and did not love him when he was sad.'

5.   Focalization

Focalization is understood here in the sense of Genette (1972) and Moeschler (1996). For Genette, focalization revolves around the relationship between the narrator and the protagonists, whether the narrator is part of the narrative or just an outside voice, in which case he may focus his attention on one character or intermittently on a variety of characters.

In some contexts, an object or a person described with a predicative feature correlates in some way with other participants of the narrated event. The object or person in question could be seen through the eyes of or have some relation to another participant. I suggest that the nominative represents focalization on the object or person described by the nominative predicate, while the instrumental represents focalization on some other participant(s). Zel'dovič (2005: 144) clearly equates "observation" with "involvement". I believe the opposite is true: the speaker's involvement as a participant of a narrated event is clearly in opposition to his remaining in the role of a non-participant observer.

In (29) the speaker is a non-involved observer looking at archival photographs, whereas in (30) the speaker is a participant of the narrated event.

(29) *Pervyj fotosnimok ...* **Den' byl   solnečnyj,**   *no,*
first   photograph day   was.M sunny.M.SG.NOM   but
po-vidimomu, dostatočno proxladnyj, o   čem možno sudit'
apparently   rather   cool   about what possible to-judge

> *po   odežde prisutstvujuščix.*
> by   clothes present-people
>> *(L.P. Korsakov, T. V. Kirpičenko. Redkie fotosnimki...*
>> http://www.fessl.ru/publish/grodek/kor.shtml)
> 'First snapshot… The day was sunny, but apparently rather cool, judging by the clothing of those present.'

(30) *I   vot nakonec ja   vyzvan na tak nazyvaemuju"mandatnuju"*
      and here finally I   called on so called   mandate
      *komissiju, ... **Den' byl   solnečnym**.   Po pogode*
      commmittee   day   was.M sunny.M.SG.INSTR by weather
      bylo i   nastroenie vsex prisutstvujuščix na   komissii, ...
      was and mood   of-all present-people on   committee
>> *(K. Veter. Orbity ispytatelja "gestapo" ja vyderžal...)*
> 'And here finally I am summoned by the so-called "mandate" com-
> mittee, … The day was sunny. The committee members' mood was
> in accord with the weather.'

An involved observer (the instrumental use) either filters the informa-
tion, as in (31a) below where the grandfather's kindness is known through
Leka's perception as far as it is related to Leka, or implies the relevance of
the feature for the speaker or for the character who is the focus of the nar-
ration. This is the case in example (31b), where the emphasis is not just on
the quality of the letter, but on its impact:

(31) a. ***Deduška   byl   dobrym**.   Leka   znal   točno.*
          grandfather was.M   kind.M.SG.INSTR Leka   knew exactly
>> *(A. Lixanov. Zvezdy v sentjabre)*
> 'Grandfather was kind. Leka knew this for a fact.'

      b. *Pis'mo **bylo   strannym**,   polnym zagadočnyx*
          letter was.N strange.N.SG.INSTR full   of-enigmatic
          *namekov, ot   nix   stanovilos' **trevožno**.*
          hints   from them   became   alarmingly
>> *(I. Gerasimov. Otkrovennye proisšestvija/ Gustavsson-148)*
> 'The letter was strange, full of enigmatic hints; one became
> alarmed by them.'

Information that is not filtered, as in (32a), and has no impact on the
speaker, as is the case with a letter in (32b), is given in the nominative:

(32) a. *Vse ego očen' uvažali   i   ljubili, potomu čto   on **byl***
         all him very respected and loved because   he was.M
         ***dobryj   i   loxmatyj**.*
         kind.M.SG.NOM   and disheveled.M.SG.NOM
                                      (V strane černogo i loxmatogo)
         'Everyone respected and loved him very much, because he was
         kind and disheveled.'

     b. *Deneg, konečno, nikakix   ne   prišlo. Da i   samo*
         money of-course no-kind not came   PCL and itself
         ***pis'mo bylo   strannoe**,   otryvistoe, s   erničeskimi*
         letter was.N strange.N.SG.NOM abrupt   with jerky
         stixami i   pustjakovymi novostjami. A   v   konce
         poems and trifle   news   and in   end
         posle podpisi, – postskriptum. Teper' nikto   i
         after signature   post-scriptum now   no-one and
         ničego uže   bolee ne   uznaet. Da i   nadobnosti
         nothing already more not find-out PCL and need
         osoboj   net.
         particular isn't
                         (S. Vitvickij. Dvadcat' sed'maja teorema ètiki)
         'Of course, no money was sent. And even the letter itself was
         strange and abrupt, with ridiculous poems and trifling news.
         And at the end, after the signature, there was a postscript. Now
         no one will find out anything anymore. And there is no special
         need to.'

Similarly, the size of an object may either have an impact on the
speaker or not. In examples (33)–(34), all of which contain the phrase *dom
byl bol'šoj / dom byl bol'šim* 'the house was big', the narrators describe
either their own house/home or the one where they lived, i.e. they were
always involved with the house/home in question in some way. In (33), the
house is described objectively, that is its size and another attributes, or
features, by which the reader can identify the type of the house is given
(*dvuxètažnyj* 'two-story'):

(33) *Veter perestal, metelica končilas' – imy nakonec,*
      wind stopped blizzard ended   and we   finally
      stukotja (sic) zubami, obsypannye snegom,   vošli v dom.
      chattering   teeth   sprinkled   with-snow entered in house

> *A* ***dom   byl   bol'šoj,***   *dvuxètažnyj* –   *znaete*
> and house was.M big.M.SG.NOM two-storied.M.SG.NOM you-know
> *èti   severnye prostornye doma? –   xozjajka   naša, tetka*
> these   northern spacious   houses   landlady   our   aunt
> *moego   druga, spala vnizu,   my   raspolagalis' na*
> of-my   friend slept downstairs we   settled   on
> *vtorom   ètaže.*
> second   floor
>
> > *(Ju. Bondarev. Seans spiritizma)*
>
> 'The wind subsided, the blizzard ended, and finally with teeth chat-
> tering and covered with snow we entered the house. And the house
> was big, two-story – are you familiar with such spacious northern
> houses? – our landlady, the aunt of my friend, slept downstairs, and
> we had the second floor.'

In contrast, the example in (34) does not describe the house in objective
terms, but rather subjectively, and accordingly the case used is the instru-
mental.

(34) *Ja edu   i   ne udivljajus' ničemu.   Edu   25 let   žizni,*
I   travel and not surprised   at-nothing I-travel 25 years of-life
vse vremja k   odnoj svetloj točke. ***Dom byl   bol'šim,***
all time   to one   light   point house was.M big.M.SG.INSTR
nesmotrja na to,   čto   nazyvalsja kvartiroj,   čto vokrug
despite   on that that   called   apartment that around
bylo sovetskoe   vremja i   čto vremeni ne   bylo voobšče,
was Soviet   time   and that time   not was in-general
a   bylo tol'ko bol'šoe prostranstvo Doma.   Doma   byl
and was only   big   space   of-house at-home was
ja.
I

> (http://www.kulichki.com/moshkow/akm/txt/kelt/otschet.html)
> 'I am traveling and I am not surprised at anything. I've been travel-
> ing for 25 years of my life, always towards the same point of light.
> The House was big, even though it was called an apartment, and
> even though around us was Soviet time and there was no time in
> general but there was only the large space of the House. It was me
> who was home.'