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Preface

This volume has a special position in the IADA *Dialoganalyse* series as it collects the proceedings of a conference that celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Association in the year 2000. As organizers of the conference we felt the need to make a choice between a focus on past achievements and future research in the discipline. On the one hand we could review and assess the work of previous conferences and workshops organized by the Association, to include a history of the 250 membership and of the countries they represent. On the other hand we could outline possible trends for future research in the first decade of the new century and millennium. The final decision opted for a middle path: "The Tenth Anniversary might be an apt occasion to look both backwards and forwards – what has occupied us in the past ten years and what will be expected of us and has to be done in the future" (Hundsniurscher).

The Association has often been characterized as – and sometimes criticised for – lacking in both a) a set of theoretical principles that guide and inform research practices, and b) a uniform methodological tradition of "regulae ad directionem ingenii". Even though we do not yet have a definitive set of "Bologna theses" these matters were discussed at length in the Round Table sessions on general, theoretical and methodological issues. The discussions are synthesized by Edda Weigand in her contribution to this volume.

The choice of what we have called a middle path – "a retrospect and a prospect" (Daneš) – is reflected in most of the contributions, though in many of them there is a greater focus on past achievements. Many of the themes dealt with in this volume are well known to us and yet often presented in a new light ranging from Maier's "structural view of language", to Dem'jankov's "strategies of understanding in dialogue", to Aijmer's comparative analysis of pragmatic particles in Swedish and English.

Basic concepts, such as communication itself, are also explored from different perspectives by some contributors: John Sinclair, for example, while focusing on "conversation with a computer" raises a number of issues concerning over-simple models of communication itself and highlights some of the key features of human conversation: participants have their own personal agendas, they maintain a coherent stance, they monitor the discourse as it takes shape and express evaluation in manners that are simultaneously collaborative and competitive. Similar concerns, with a literary slant, are expressed by Bernd Naumann (organizer of the Erlangen Workshop).

Methodologically the dominant approaches are those of discourse analysis and conversation analysis. A new interest emerges in the application of dialogue analysis to areas of dialogic interaction in specific contexts. This is the case in forensic linguistics, as exempli-

fied by Coulthard's analysis of different types of dialogue in police interviews, and similarly in Čmejrková's study of the role of interviews in media discourse: "Interviewing a person is a highly individualised practice. There is no simple hunting method. It depends whether you are hunting a lion or catching a butterfly".

This volume includes contributions that address both traditional areas of dialogue analysis such as politeness, and more recent areas of interests such as argumentation. A great many of the papers explore specific genres or communicative situations: attention is drawn to different types of interaction in the field of media communication (with particular emphasis on computer-mediated interaction and news interviews) and institutional and professional interaction. Other contributions deal with fictional dialogue, scientific controversies, and pathologies of speech. The (inter)personal and (inter)cultural dimensions of interaction also emerge as areas of research of increasing interest.

Contributions to the conference were numerous and the majority are published in this volume. Those that are not included have been or will be published elsewhere. Although published with some delay, we hope that these proceedings will be of interest to the many disciplines and perspectives involved in the study of dialogue. Within these pages, the reader will not find a singular approach to the study of dialogue, an inevitable limit of a publication of this kind, but they will find a clear picture of the existing "state of the art", and for this the editors are grateful to all the contributors.

Bologna, July 2002

Marina Bondi
Sorin Stati

Part One

Bologna 2000 Round Table

Franz Hundsnurscher

Introductory Remarks

Ten years ago the International Association for Dialogue Analysis was founded by Sorin Stati here in Bologna. This was a grand idea and a courageous enterprise, and we all have reason to be grateful to Professor Stati, who has taken it into his hands and put it to the test. We all know the society has been a success. Over the years the society has brought together a great number of people from all over the world and has provided stimulus and encouragement to many students and scholars with an interest in dialogical matters.

The tenth anniversary might be an apt occasion to look backward and forward – to discuss what has occupied us in the past ten years and what will be expected of us and has to be done in the future. When the Society was founded in 1990 here in Bologna, the pragmatic turn in linguistics was in full bloom and it looked as if the shift from monologicistic speech act theory to dialogue theory would lead on to a paradigm change in linguistics altogether.

In this last decade, at least to my mind – and I can only, of course, give my subjective view – the issues have indeed become clearer and one may well notice progress in the fields that have been covered by numerous papers given at our big conferences in Bologna 1990, Basel 1992, Paris 1994, Prague 1996 and Birmingham 1999 with six smaller conferences in between in Bologna, Toulouse, Lugano, Erlangen and Tel Aviv.

At one of our pre-conferences in Bochum in 1988 Sorin Stati pointed out to me that in doing dialogue analysis we take our stand at the ‘Carrefour de communication’, right at the centre of human affairs, where the action is. Indeed it is from such a stance that we can take a broad outlook on the things going on in all directions and see how people get along with each other in the pursuit of their goals. Dialogue analysis certainly is a ‘carrefour de linguistique’ because from there we can watch the continuous flow of ideas and the emergence of new modes of linguistic thought in progress.

As members of a society for Dialogue Analysis, people will not only expect us to be Masters of Dialogue, who set standards of how to converse with each other successfully and in an amiable way, but also to be able to tell others what dialogue is all about and how one should go about analysing, criticising and improving it. So one central point, to my mind, is and always will be ‘Discours de la Méthode’ – the proper way of doing Dialogue Analysis. It is the age-old problem of how to reconcile Empiricism and Rationalism which is of crucial importance in dialogue analysis. On the one hand we have all sorts of authentic discourse which can be observed and documented by modern technical means – tape

recording and video devices –and then transcribed, scrutinised and interpreted in detail. On the other hand, we have a variety of traditional methodologies – the philological tradition, the structuralist tradition, the tradition of generative grammar and the tradition of ordinary language philosophy and on top of it the tradition of Ethnomethodology – but all these methodologies have been developed with a background of different theories of language and with specific problems in mind – most of them not exactly problems of dialogue.

We may, of course make use of all these methodologies, as has been done in a variety of ways, but if Dialogue is to be our focus of interest we should not rely too much on old methods but be careful in developing a guiding methodology and keep on refining for the purpose of dialogue analysis. What we need is an interactive model of verbal communication where speakers talk to hearers that in their turn turn into speakers. Trivial as this may sound, if we really make this the focus of our research, it will have far-reaching consequences.

Most of the work in dialogue research is being done by observation; this is of course, necessary because we still have to discover a lot of facts about conversations. The problem is what to do with the material once we have recorded it and transcribed it. We have to treat it as evidence for certain underlying patterns of verbal interaction that make up our communicative competence. A lot of work has been done in distinguishing and identifying such patterns and studying them in detail and hopefully we will arrive at a system to describe and analyse them on different levels of generality. These patterns will have their exemplifications in varying situations and will be combined and interwoven in authentic conversation. This is the center of work in DA, as I see it.

One remarkable trend in the last decade is that work in dialogue analysis has had an effect on linguistics in general. If it is true that dialogue is the core of language, then a dialogical view of verbal communication is bound to yield new and essential insights into the fabric of language and this will have consequences in other fields of linguistic thought and research; I shall give a few examples where I find a dialogue-analytic perspective has yielded some interesting results.

The focus of analysis in syntactic studies has been on the well-formedness of isolated sentences, and much insight has indeed been gained by the rigorous and explicit model-building done by Chomsky and his followers. Although they are more interested in universal and neuro-biological aspects of language in general, many things have become clearer in detail about specific natural languages. Yet with respect to sentence complexity and sentence-combination the advantages of a dialogical view have to be realised. Most complex sentences, especially conjunctive clauses can be more plausibly explained as anticipatory queries of a dialogue partner:

Sp1 "Monkeys do not go to heaven"

Sp2 "Why is that so?"

Sp1 "Well, they are not human".

Sp2 "Now I see: Monkeys do not go to heaven because they are not human".

Complex sentences are condensations of dialogue sequences. In classical Speech Act Theory working with the simple scenario of a speaker talking to a hearer, the main focus is on single initial speech acts: the hearer is only considered as one who is exposed to the speech act and passively lets it take effect on him. This is the reason why the special nature of sequence-dependent speech acts have not been given much attention; and hence speech act theory can only be considered as a first step in the analysis of verbal communication. The hearer as second speaker has his own repertoire of speech acts, so to react in a systematic way to what has been said, and this is what is expected from him by Sp1. Sequence-sensitive speech acts as second, third or fourth moves like agreeing, justifying, objecting, rejecting, insisting, admitting are indicative of the many devices that have been developed in natural languages for the dialogue game.

Texts may be considered as complexes of sentences that are brought into a linear order due to the conditions of monologue inherent in the secondary system of writing. Texts can in many respects be reconstructed as dialogues with an interested listener. One has only to think of narratives where many things can be queried: how it all started, how it went on, why it took this turn or what happened next, what special things were involved, what the point of it was and so on. Written texts can be analysed and reconstructed on the basis of underlying dialogical patterns.

Let us finally look at Rhetoric. From the start Rhetoric has been devised for the public speaker, and its monological characteristics have become even more pronounced when Ancient Rhetoric (Aristotle) turned into Literary Rhetoric (Cicero, Quintilian). What has been missing for a long time is a Rhetoric of Dialogue, working out how to engage in conversation, keep a good conversation going and unfold the various sides of a matter in a discussion, how to be cooperative and polite in conversation: all this needs more than just elocution. Dialogue analysis as we see from these examples is not only faced with the task of working in its own field, but is called upon to revise and re-conceive the linguistic concepts of other disciplines, too.

If we look at the overall trends that have surfaced in the last decade, not only in the manifold contributions at our meetings but also at other congresses and in the international discussion on pragmatics, we could point out eight different domains with respect to subject:

- The first domain – the one with the most numerous contributions – is private conversation in all its facets: I shall not go into this, because this will probably be everybody's casual talk between meetings, in party conversation, social exchange at the cocktail bar, at table, at work, on a journey und so on as the conversational main stream.

There are seven more that I shall shortly comment on:

- Specific Dialogues in Institutions
- Controversial discussions in society
- Mass-Media-related dialogue
- Computer and dialogue
- Literary dialogues
- Historical dialogue forms
- Contrastive studies in culture-specific phenomena of conversation

Each of these domains exhibits a highly complex and fascinating world of forms and problems for analysis. Institutions like Courts of Justice, Administrative Bodies, Firms, Clinics, Churches, Universities and Schools etc. are prone to develop special hermetic forms of communication, that work under special conditions with institutionally defined purposes. The implications of these conventions are not easy to explain to the public, and by investigating these highly specialised domains of dialogue analysis we can do a good job in bringing light there and drawing public attention to some of the consequences.

Quite remarkable is the interest that scholars of linguistic pragmatics take in political and social controversies e.g. about matters of ecology, of politeness or in precarious types of social intercourse connected with rumour, gossip and scandals in public and private life.

The mass-media are gradually developing into an all-dominating form of communication. At the Tel Aviv Congress, members of IADA were welcomed by the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He made a remark that had a profound impression on me. He said: We all know that in our Western Society freedom of Speech for the individual is no longer the problem; we need no longer fight for it; we now have to fight for access to the stage and for freedom of the stage. Dialogue in the media and through the media is a real problem, much more than a decade ago. Just think of the multitude of talk shows, round tables, family comedies and other series where all kinds of dialogue are organised and put on stage under the conditions and for the purposes of the media. The consumer of these programs is immersed in dialogue, but is he taking part in the dialogue? The concept of dialogue underlying these performances is bound to have some aftermath with respect to the modes of talking in everyday life.

We have at the moment a wave of enthusiasm that keeps us surfing in the Internet. Modern technical devices make it possible in theory for every person living on this planet to communicate with any other person and enter into conversation with them. New forms of dialogue are being created under these conditions and change the way people use language.

A highly interesting branch of research in dialogue analysis is literary dialogue. Because these are prefabricated texts organised on certain conceptual and aesthetic principles it would be a mistake to treat them just as examples of normal dialogues and to analyse them according to the same categories and criteria as we do with spontaneous every-day conversation. Nevertheless, as linguists, we can learn a lot from the classical dialogue forms of Ballads, Drama, radio feature, conversations in novels, philosophical and didactic dialogues because the basic forms are worked out there in a stylised and precise way and dialogue strategies, forms of escalation and solution are brought to the point in an effective way. It is somehow amazing how little reflection one finds in scholarly work on literature concerning problems of dialogue typology and dialogue structure.

In connection with the analysis of literary dialogues another interesting field of research has emerged: investigating the origin and development of dialogue types in a historical perspective. A new volume on this topic has just appeared in our series 'Contributions to Dialogue Research' with Niemeyer, Tübingen. Dialogues are in a special way mirrors of ways of life that undergo specific change under the social conditions of the age. Scarce as the sources may be, there are many old documents that show us how, e.g. conversion talks and didactic talks were performed, what course juridical procedures took, how theological dispute and scientific controversies were conducted, how saloon talk was organised. This is a very promising field that not only may shed light on our own dialogue conventions but can also make us better understand some conversational remarks we find in old literary texts. One will of course have to keep in mind the conditions of the codifying tradition every historical text is subject to, because everything written has been written down under certain conditions and for certain purposes and only behind this veil of literacy can we get a glimpse at reality.

Investigations into culture specific principles and forms of conversation have been of great interest in the last ten years. It has been shown, for instance, that business talks between German and Norwegian partners have their problems. In one culture one listens and sometimes asks a simple question, whereas in the other culture one makes objections at every point and tries to clear it up on the spot, and if the other does not object, everything is supposed to be clear. John Gumperz has pointed out another interesting perspective. Cultural differences may be the origin of problems, e.g. between immigrants and local institutions; discrimination and frustration can be the result of different communicative conventions.

These, I am sure, are not all the trends that can be found in dialogue research. I hope that this short outlook on 10 years work in Dialogue Analysis is another source of encouragement for our Society and for our President to enter into another decade of successful work.

A Retrospect and a Prospect of Dialogue Studies

1. Introduction: Dialogue analysis means science based on mutual understanding

A browse through the long series of the red volumes of *Dialogue Analysis* convincingly reveals an increasing “boom” in dialogue studies (and not alone in the framework of the IADA activities, to be sure). We find there a broad diapazon of topics (from the classical to the most up-to-date ones), of rather different kinds of dialogue, of different text genres (from research articles to essays and theoretical or methodological reflections), as well as a pleiade of authors from various countries, employing diverse methodological approaches. This does not suggest, however, that our work represents a variegated mosaic of contributions: on the contrary. Even a mere look at the titles of the particular volumes reveals a firm hand and prospective views of the organizers: *Methodology of Discourse Analysis*, *Concepts of Dialogue (considered from the perspective of different disciplines)*, *Future Perspectives of Dialogue Analysis*. The two comprehensive volumes from the last Congress in Prague are divided into six thematic sections, presenting a number of topical and partly newly emerging thematic domains, such as “Dialogue and Institutions”, “Dialogue in Politics”, “Mass Media and Electronic Communication”. The fact that two of the topics were taken up and discussed as general themes of the next two IADA sessions (“Rhetoric and Argumentation” and “Dialogue and Mass Media”) witnesses the coherence of the IADA agenda.

The thematic field “Dialogue” is certainly immense, with a rich inner differentiation. It comprises a considerable range of objectives, theories and methods as well as diversity of academic disciplines drawing upon the field and contributing to it. This state of affairs inevitably finds reflection in the scientific production of IADA. For all that, the scholars of our Association endeavour to take up mutual communication and arrive at mutual understanding – an inevitable condition for scientific progress. I would only subscribe to and emphasize the happy formulation of Edda Weigand (in the Preface to the Stati’s Festschrift) that “beyond different scientific schools, DIALOGUE means science based on humanity and cross-cultural understanding”.

2. A critical examination of two authoritative methodological paradigms in present-day dialogue studies

Recently Jiří Kraus aptly remarked that the development of a field of research is largely contingent upon texts of authorities, who raise topical themes as well as methodological approaches. It would be easy to adduce names of authoritative scholars from particular currents in the broad field of discourse studies. But in the context of my talk I will touch only some of them, whose influential ideas deserve, in my view, to be critically discussed just at the present.

It is hard to find any contemporary approach to discourse studies which does not more or less explicitly refer to the works by Goffman and Grice as well as to the later Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness, developing some ideas of the two pioneers.

2.1. Grice's Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims

With the name of Grice two ideas are connected, namely the *Co-operative Principle* and *Conversational Maxims*. Grice regards the assumption of cooperation of the partners as the basis of any communication and presupposes that they never fail to attempt a coherent and effective dialogue. Nevertheless, this very strong presumption of the essential, if not unexceptional rationality of human behaviour is hardly acceptable for those who have enough experience from empirical research. Thus Marcelo Dascal (1998: 18) very aptly remarked that even though in many cases communication seems to be at odds with the old comfortable notions of cooperation and rationality, it is still possible, and he concludes that it is no longer feasible to base one's theory of communication upon unexamined principle of (instrumental) rationality. A similar argument formulated E. Weigand (1998: 39). But in spite of this counterevidence, some scholars obstinately try to rescue the idea of their master at all costs, even by means of tricky formulations. Thus Brown and Levinson (1987) defend the presumed universal validity of the Cooperative Principle maintaining that "the assumption of cooperative behaviour is actually hard to undermine, tokens of apparent uncooperative behaviour tend to get interpreted as in fact cooperative at a deeper level (5)".

In a similar way the same authors defend Grice's Maxims: They admit that "the majority of natural conversations do not proceed in such a brusque fashion at all", "[...] one powerful and pervasive motive for not talking Maxim-wise is the desire to give some attention to the face". I find this to be a rather curious assumption: if polite conduct infringes Conversational Maxims, then politeness and the normal efficient course of

conversation are incompatible. Nevertheless, we are told that “even in such departures from the Maxims, they remain in operation at a deeper level” (95). Our intuition says that there must be something wrong in the premises of the argument and I will try to show their fallacies.

In the set of Grice’s well-known Maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manners I recognize the following problematic points. First, they have evidently a character of moral precepts or commandments such as “Do not lie”, “Be not loquacious”, “Behave decently” and the like, in essence a kind of didactic counsel rather than a scientific statement based on empirical investigation. Second, even when taken seriously, their application would meet with interpretational problems connected with the vagueness of expressions like “Do not say less/more *than required*”, “Be *relevant*”. How could a speaker plausibly decide what is in fact required or relevant to his partner(s)? Relevance is a gradual and changeable quality. In other words, since the whole field of “conversation” contains a very high number of varieties of the rather different types of “conversations”, any attempt at a purely rational construction of generally valid primitive “Maxims” is doomed to failure. Consequently, also a presumed cross-cultural or universal validity of them appears as rather questionable.

2.2. Brown and Levinson’s concept of Politeness

Let us now take up the problem of *politeness*, a highly important phenomenon of conduct (not only of the verbal one, to be sure). It does not represent a new theme and for a long time it has been studied mainly by students of East-Asian and other “exotic” cultures. Nevertheless, politeness was drawn into the focus of attention of the wider scholarly audience due to Robin Lakoff’s essay from 1972 on the pragmatics of politeness, followed by contributions of G. Leech (1977: 1983) and of Brown and Levinson (1978: 1987). Among them, the last named approach gained wide publicity and politeness has become an enormously influential paradigm in discourse analysis.

The politeness theory of Brown and Levinson is built primarily around Goffman’s notion of *face*. He found inspiration in Durkheim’s dichotomy positive versus negative religious rites or rituals and retaining the ritualistic frame he introduced the notion of *face*, defining it as “an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (306). Following Goffman, the two authors define negative face as “the want of every adult member that his actions be unimpeded by others” and positive face as “the want of every adult member that his actions be desirable to at least some others”. Certain kinds of interlocutor’s acts intrinsically *threaten face* (“face threatening acts” is the central notion of the theory) and *politeness* (again a negative and a positive one) is seen in the speaker’s en-

deavour to *mitigate* or *minimize* in communication the possible impact of such an act, by the use of different strategies (the employment of the term *strategy* in contradistinction to *rule* or *maxim* reveals an interactional approach). While that section of the book which offers a taxonomy of these strategies represents, in my view, the most valuable part of it, some points of the underlying theoretical assumptions appear disputable.

First of all, our intuitive understanding of *politeness* comprises a far more extensive domain of the universe of conversation than that restricted sector of the "mitigation of face-threatening acts" or "strategic conflict avoidance". Moreover, we all feel "politeness" as something that is in essence of a positive nature. A severe criticism of "face" in this direction expressed R. Schmidt (1980): "This theory represents an overly pessimistic, rather paranoid view of human social interaction in language, viewing politeness as a response to threats of face rather than as an essentially positive phenomenon." The unsharp outlines of the field called politeness is also revealed by the terminological diversity: along with *politeness* we find in English *courtesy*, *deference*, *tact*, *respect*, *regard*, *considerateness* and some others, focusing on this or that aspect of the many-sided phenomenon. As J. Hoffmannová (1967) aptly suggested, we have to assume a rich set of *qualities* that dominate the whole behaviour of participants in interaction. In this context, politeness appears as a bundle or a fuzzy complex of qualities rather than one simple quality item. In general, it appears to me advisable to work, in our analytical practice, with complexes and subcomplexes of particular qualities (also in view of the certain vagueness of their identification or specification) on the principle "which goes with which" rather than with isolated units.

Brown and Levinson's model has found several followers and is widely applied. E.g. G. Myers (1989, etc.) tried to extend its principles to scientific texts, so that this kind of discourse would appear as a fundamentally dangerous and antagonistic endeavour (cf. Hyland 1998: 67). On the other hand, the approach suggested by G. Leech (1983) seems to me to reflect the field of politeness in a far less one-sided and distorted way. He proposed six Maxims of Politeness: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy, and accounts for their flexible hierarchy, changeable according to different discourse types and different cultures.

Another disputable feature of the criticized model is its presumed *universality*, nevertheless, in fact, with a strong *anglocentric bias*. This point has found a number of critics, viewing it as inappropriate for speakers of several different cultures. The authors of the model, in their rejoinder (attached to the second edition of their work, 1987: 13) admit that their universalistic account might be thought as an "inexcusable cultural denudation, or worse, ethnocentric projection". But, they maintain, "despite the rich cultural elaboration, the core ideas have a striking familiarity". They are certainly right that very probably in all cultures the interactants more or less often mitigate their polemical speech acts (cf. the notion of "hedging"). But what I and others criticize and dismiss is the idea that a mere

fragment of the rich domain of politeness should be taken as *the politeness*, in the full and broad sense of the term.

Also the choice of the expression *face* in connection with politeness deserves to be commented. Brown and Levinson mention that their selection of this metaphor was partly derived from the English folk usage. It is true that in English (as well as in other languages) this word occurs in a number of phraseological idioms (many of them were interestingly listed by Čmejrková in her essay “The stony face of a Sfinx” (1993)). But that reading of *face*, which is relevant in our discussion, namely “self-respect, a good name, dignity, prestige”, is in fact a translation of one Chinese idiom (even Goffman mentioned that he was following Chinese usage). This metaphorical expression seems to bear a mythical connotation, which I find not very appropriate for the European cultural sphere (in spite of the true statement by Karl Popper that from historical perspective a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theory).

At last I will touch on a problematic point of a philosophical nature. Brown and Levinson’s model is built as a fully rational and closed system, and the course of discourse is expected to be a totally purposive and strategical activity. The authors adhere to Aristotle’s “practical reasoning”, which – like in standard logic – “guarantees inferences from ends or goals to means that will satisfy them” (54). But in the same way as in other spheres of human life, also in their communicative interaction people behave partly in non-rational ways and exhibit all their abilities (including emotion) in different ways and with variable results, without a guarantee of success. (Cf. the discussion of a similar approach of Grice above.)

3. Conclusion: Conflict or Cooperation? A plea for a humanistic stance

I have arrived at the concluding part of my paper. It is very difficult and risky to make prognosis of the future development of a scientific discipline. Thus I have to content myself with expressing some of my expectations, hopes and wishes.

From the methodological viewpoint, it seems to be primarily desirable to avoid one-sided, narrow, and unduly simplifying or reductionist approach, exaggerating one aspect only. I would advocate a complex, integrative view, in all cases and all the time keeping in mind the very rich and complicated contents and structure of the vast phenomenon of DIALOGUE.

Studying language usage as a component of the complex human communication requires a holistic and process-oriented approach. One of such approaches may be seen in

Edda Weigand's conception of the "Dialogic Action Game". It is broadly, undogmatically and humanly based, with "human beings at the centre". I dare to characterize it as *functional*, since it sounds as a reformulation of Vilém Mathesius postulate of linguistic functionalism, namely to take systematically into account the speaker and the hearer, always to see them behind the words. This humanistic stance (as he called it) and the accent on understanding as the very aim of communication is also in line with Weigand's "democratic, humane and civilized background", rejecting "the demagogic direction and the direction homo homini lupus" (1999: 65). She is certainly not alone with her opinion. Thus also de Beaugrande is convinced that "cooperative and constructive uses of communication should prevail over confrontational and destructive ones". This dictum may also be seen as a reply to Sorin Stati's question (1998: 3) "Conflict or/and cooperation?" Let us remember that people have not only their faces but also their hearts.

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Edda Weigand

Dialogue Analysis 2000: Towards a Human Linguistics

1. Dialogue Analysis 2000 and the scientific claim of the new millennium

A decade of Dialogue Analysis within the framework of our International Association reminds us to reflect on the results we have achieved. Moreover, after more than two millennia of classical Western thinking, we are called on to relate our analyses to general changes in scientific theorizing in other disciplines. The year 2000 invites us not only to look back but also to give our science future guidelines. I am going to take up these claims: sketching the *state of the art in Dialogue Analysis* with respect to the *background of Western science* and trying to *redefine linguistics* as a genuine human science.

Looking around at other disciplines beyond the limits of linguistics, such as physics, biology, neurosciences, there seems to prevail a *general methodological rethinking*, a departure from classical theorizing to a new way of addressing the object-of-study. *The object in science has always been the complex*. The *ways of addressing the complex* however have changed significantly in time. At the beginning of the new millennium, it is indeed this question of how to address the complex which apparently calls for a new response. *Classical theorizing* as it has prevailed since Aristotle and as it still pervades Western thinking has never really addressed the complex. Classical thinking starts from the premiss that there is only one way of explaining the complex, namely by reduction to rules. If an explanation claims to count as a theory it has to be based on a closed rule-governed system. This type of classical theorizing is characterized by total abstraction from complexity, i.e., it starts with *methodology*. Finally it is time to free ourselves from the underlying methodological fallacy and to focus again on our complex *object* and the way it functions. It is the *object-in-function* which will tell us how to construct methodology.

It might seem strange that it is precisely the so-called exact natural sciences which can give us some ideas for how to proceed. Our complex object-of-study is not at all defined by order and definite rules. It contains a *Principle of Uncertainty*, analogous to the Principle of Uncertainty in quantum physics, which calls to mind that our object represents a mix of order and disorder, general regularities and individuality, even chance (cf. Weigand 2002a). *The question is how the complex and the simple are interrelated*, or, to express it with Gell-Mann (1994) with reference to physics, how the quark, the elementary

particle, and the jaguar, the perfect wildcat, are interrelated. Indeterminacy of meaning is present at the very outset and may increase exponentially to chaos as Prigogine (1998) taught us with respect to modern chemistry. Neuroscience unmasks 'Descartes' error' in demonstrating that *different human abilities are intrinsically integrated* (cf., e.g., Damasio 1994). Recent research in neurophysiology on so-called mirror neurons seems to confirm that perception and doing, namely perceiving and making a gesture, are signalled in the same way by the brain (Rizzolatti/Arbib 1998, Weigand 2002b). Integration seems to be a basic feature of every discipline, not only of linguistics where 'Integrational Linguistics' has already exposed the orthodox linguistic view as the language and communication myth (Harris 1981).

2. The state of the art in Dialogue Analysis

Against this background of a general rethinking in science, I will try to sketch the state of the art in Dialogue Analysis from my point of view with special reference to the research done in our Association and presented in the papers of this Round Table.

The first point to be made is that *classical theorizing still remains*. Classical theorizing has not stopped with the pragmatic turn. The essential point in defining the orthodox view is based on the fact that it starts with methodology and reduces the natural object to an artificial one by establishing an own methodological level of *competence* as a rule-governed closed system. In this way, Dialogue Grammar has focused on what I would like to call the 'deep structure' of dialogue. I remember Hundsnurscher's programmatic article of 1980 in which he postulated a method contrasting with Conversational Analysis by substituting so-called well-formed dialogues for the natural object of authentic texts. The point of rules is also focused on by Sorin Stati (1982) in his book 'Il dialogo'. We will not forget that rules remain an important methodological technique. However, in dialogue considered as dialogic interaction, rules are tools used by human beings and thus dependent on their individual decisions. What we thought to be the great merit of Dialogue Grammar, namely, that it complied with the methodological conditions of generative grammar, turns out, in my opinion, to be the main obstacle we have to overcome. Thus we are not departing from the hard line, we are departing from the simple which avoids the complex. Martinet (1975), a long time ago, showed us the right way by urging us '*not to damage the integrity of the object* by methodological exigencies'. Excluding constitutive features of our natural object, human dialogic interaction, such as cognition and the fact that we are always different human beings interacting in the action game, cannot be the

right method for describing and explaining our object. We have to *accept that our object consists of a mix of various integrated variables ranging from order to disorder*. The attempt to describe it *by total abstraction from disorder can only result in a theory myth*.

Problematizing orthodox theorizing and accepting the complex mix of order and disorder that our object-of-study represents is in my opinion the challenge we have to tackle when facing the new millennium. It requires us to recognize the *object-in-function* and to *derive from it an adequate new way of theorizing*. Most of the approaches used in Dialogue Analysis recently have tried to address the object-in-function in the belief that it is the *authentic text* that has to be analysed and dealt with. Karin Aijmer (1996) demonstrated convincingly that discourse particles can be comprehended in their multiple variety and multifunctionality only with the support of large text corpora. Large text corpora may be used for the analysis of verbal phenomena like discourse particles; they must however not be identified with our object-in-function. Text corpora are usually analysed from the observer perspective and contain only empirically registrable means. These are heavy restrictions imposed on human dialogic interaction which do not allow our object-in-function to be identified with text corpora. What is it about human dialogic interaction that cannot be gained from text corpora? That is the question. Or to put the question from John Sinclair's perspective (in this volume): What is it about a conversation that seems alien to computers?

The conclusions to be drawn seem evident. We must not think that it suffices to analyse authentic texts as an observer. There are *various cognitive phenomena influencing dialogic interaction* which are not registered in text corpora and which can be understood only from inside the Action Game. Various contributions of this Round Table refer to these cognitive phenomena which are constitutive for dialogic interaction. Power, for example, is dealt with by Michael Metzeltin, identity is the topic of Robert Maier's contribution, or emotion is addressed by Jackie Schön. Světlá Čmejrková and Adriana Bolívar also deal with aspects of dialogue which cannot totally be figured out from authentic texts. It is these aspects which are among the prospective research objectives indicated by František Daneš. The cognitive level is addressed by Valerij Dem'jankov. In dialogic interaction we use different communicative means, empirical verbal and perceptual means and cognitive means which must not be separated. 'Integration is the name of the game' as Marcelo Dascal calls it. According to recent research in the cognitive sciences we have to account for the integration of different dimensions from the very outset. Linguistics therefore can no longer be considered a science of language in the narrow sense but has to be comprehended as a science of a complex human ability which integrates the verbal, cognitive and perceptual dimensions.

Further conclusions result from the fact that it is different human beings, different individuals interacting. This property is focused on in the contributions by Malcolm

Coulthard (e.g., 1985: 145) pointing to individuality and by Bernd Naumann (in this volume) pointing to chance and chaos. Dialogue at the beginning of the new millennium indeed has to be seen as an *open system ranging from order to disorder*, from rules to principles of probability, from conventions to presumptions (cf. Weigand 2000a).

3. Some examples

Before revisiting the fundamentals of dialogue, let us first analyse some authentic examples which demonstrate basic features of our object-in-function.

3.1. Meaning is not defined

The orthodox view of language and communication is, in its strict version, based on so-called pattern transference (Harris, e.g., 1981). The pattern model or the model of fixed codes starts from the hypothesis that meanings are defined and understanding can be presupposed. Dialogue can thus be outlined in advance and 'transferred' to the interlocutor as a fixed pattern of defined possibilities, which is meant and understood in the same way by the speaker and the interlocutor. Dialogue thus is achieved by simply doubling the speaker side.

In contrast to the pattern view, dialogic interaction in the action game is considered to be interaction between different human beings. The means they use are not restricted to explicit verbal means. Let us look at authentic examples like

- (1) If you are homeless, you will find a home in Hong Kong because there all are homeless.
(heard on German television, translated into English)
- (2) Change is the only constant in the life of a company.
(*'The Economist'*, March 25th-31st 2000, p. 115).

We immediately notice that we are not decoding verbal signs with fixed meanings but primarily using cognitive means in order to understand what these examples mean. We do not reject these utterances because they seem to contain a contradiction between two defined signs: *to be homeless* and *to find a home*, or *change* and *constant*. We accept these utterances as quite natural and negotiate meaning and understanding in dialogue.

An interesting authentic example in this respect is the following which again confirms the basic feature of indeterminacy of meaning. The situation is that of an exchange between the organizer of a conference S and two of his chairpersons E and F:

- (3) S (to F) Sie waren nicht streng als Diskussionsleiter.
 E Also muß ich morgen strenger sein.
 S Nein, nicht strenger, streng!

(in English translation)

- S (to F) You were not strict as chairperson.
 E So tomorrow I have to be stricter.
 S No, not stricter, strict!

Neither the adjective nor the grammatical category of the comparative appear to have a definite meaning. Both are used relatively to the extent that the category of the positive might be stronger than the comparative.

If we consider dialogue as a process of negotiation we are no longer forced to keep literary and everyday action games separate but can describe them in a unified model. They only take different positions on the same scale between order and disorder. It is simply not the case that everyday action games can be restricted to rule-governedness and well-formedness whereas creativity and innovation would be reserved for literary texts (Harris 1981: 153). Creativity and innovation are constitutive features of everyday conversation insofar as meanings are constantly made and remade by the interlocutors in the process of dialogue (Toolan 2000).

3.2. Different communicative means are integrated

It is not a new insight that we do not communicate with verbal means only. Nevertheless, the view that dialogue is based on the same communicative competence for speaker and interlocutor seems to prevail. Such a view can only be understood by reference to the fixed pattern model and to the belief that native speakers of a language all have the same competence. If we presuppose the fact that we are different individuals and that we communicate not only with verbal but also with perceptual and cognitive means – i.e. by presumptions, associations, moment-to-moment decisions, creatively making and remaking meaning and understanding –, it becomes impossible to start from the view of an ideal or well-formed pattern competence. We have to start from human beings. There are no utterances independent of the speakers, and the minimal dialogically autonomous unit is to be considered the action game which combines different communicative worlds of different interlocutors. *Integration* is to be taken as a key concept for the action game insofar as it reflects a basic human condition, namely that different abilities are integrally

used. Even if we wanted, we could not separate our abilities of speaking, thinking, and perceiving. We make use of these abilities as communicative means in dialogic interaction. As we are different individuals the means, especially the cognitive ones, used by different interlocutors are also different. We accept utterances like our examples (1), (2) and (3) and play our part, our cognitive part, to make them understandable, coherent. We do not know exactly what the interlocutor means and understands. Problems of understanding can be clarified in so-called metacommunicative dialogues. Metacommunication also confirms that meaning and understanding are negotiated in dialogue. The orthodox hypothesis of fixed codes has to be replaced by meaning indeterminacy (Harris 1981: 55 ff.). The model of negotiation is substituted for the model of pattern transference (Weigand/Dascal 2001).

There is a special type of action game which is based precisely on the differences between the cognitive background of the interlocutors, namely action games between experts and laymen, and it seems strange that this type of action game did not cause us to problematize the view of pattern transference earlier. Maybe the reason is that dialogue in the pattern view is – even if unconsciously – restricted to verbal means in the belief that cognitive differences could be verbally clarified. What is going on in expert-laymen dialogues is however not only a question of more or less information. To take it in this way represents a technique of self-defence of the orthodox view.

The point I want to emphasise in this respect is however another. Languages for specific purposes, for instance, the language of law, have the tendency to define their meanings precisely because in ordinary language use meanings are not defined, not unequivocal. The tendency to make meanings definite can however be fulfilled only within certain limits. Thus, for instance, in linguistics we can define concepts like the ‘phoneme’, the ‘morpheme’, because they are concepts introduced within the artificial system of language as sign system. If we consider language as a natural phenomenon, we are confronted with different lines of argumentation and terms used differently depending on the author, such as the terms ‘dialogue’, ‘discourse’, ‘action’, ‘action game’, etc. Moreover, we know from the language of law, that even seemingly defined juridical terms have to be applied to particular situations and individual conditions. Thus in the end it is again individual human beings, in this case the judges, who decide on the basis of their particular cognitive backgrounds.

3.3. Concepts of probability are constitutive components in the action game

On the level of action, it is always the individual speakers who decide how to mean and how to understand the utterance. They cannot refer to rules only. In the complex range between order and disorder they orientate themselves by Principles of Probability. These

Principles make use of other methodological techniques such as rules and conventions but also suppositions, presumptions, moment-to-moment decisions, etc. (cf. Dascal 1994). In dialogic action games we negotiate our positions regarding specific states of affairs which intrinsically contain concepts of probability such as preferences or habits. It is not only the fact that we are different human beings interacting with each other but also the fact that our way of life is based on probability, fluctuation and approximation that dialogic interaction can only be considered as an attempt to come to an understanding. It is the open-endedness of life which requires human dialogic interaction to be based on an open system of Principles of Probability.

In this respect let us analyse another authentic example. The situation is the following: The mother enters the room where the daughter is playing the piano:

- (4) Mother You are playing the piano again.
 Daughter Shall I stop it?
 Mother No, it doesn't matter. I'm going to work outside.

This example demonstrates several points: In most cases, intonation is not so clear that we can decide what the utterance means. In the end, the speaker alone knows what he/she meant, as in our case the mother with her first utterance. Linguistic rules do not tell the interlocutor how the utterance is meant. The daughter must use cognitive means in order to come to an understanding. This understanding however is based on probability. The daughter cannot refer only to generalised cultural evaluations of playing the piano; she has to include the particular situation and the individual attitude of her mother, i.e., she has to make assumptions which refer to usual *preferences*. Preferences however represent concepts of probability which carry the risk of *misunderstanding*. The mother usually prefers the daughter to play the piano when she does not have to work. It is this preference the daughter is thinking of, understanding the mother's utterance as a reproach. However, in this particular situation, the mother intends to work in the garden and corrects the daughter's misunderstanding with her second utterance.

I hope it has become clear from this example that open points carrying the risk of misunderstanding are not a disturbing factor which can be ignored but are constitutive for human dialogic interaction (Weigand 1999a). It is simply a myth to believe we could postulate a closed system of rules and exclude problems of understanding from our model. Naturally, we can exclude them, but the model then is not appropriate for our object-in-function.

3.4. Not everything is said explicitly

The last point I would like to mention contradicts the orthodox view that maintains that in principle everything could be expressed explicitly. If indeed we tried to express everything verbally, dialogue would become as clumsy and never-ending as it would be inefficient. We could not even start talking but would have to reflect on all the points to be mentioned. If at all, only trained linguists could dare to converse. Looking at authentic examples, it becomes immediately evident that even the most important points do not have to be expressed explicitly. This happens not only inadvertently but also deliberately with specific effects. Let us take an authentic example from the journal 'The Economist', an advertising text for the Allianz Group:

- (5) Wherever you are. Whatever you do. The Allianz Group is always on your side.

For over 75 years we have successfully managed the assets of life insurance policy holders. This, together with the close cooperation of our global partners and the experience of our asset management team leads to improved long-term investment performance. It's no wonder then, that we were recently awarded the prestigious Standard & Poor's AAA rating. Maybe that's why we insure more Fortune 500 companies worldwide than anyone else. Allianz. The Power On Your Side.

('The Economist', March 25th-31st, 2000, p. 3)

Many points relevant to our discussion, which I can only briefly mention, become evident from this example:

- The verbal text is not an autonomous unit but only a component in the action game.
- It seems to be a monological text but nevertheless it is part of dialogic interaction with the reader.
- The action game is a cultural unit. You have to know many things in order to understand the publicity function of the text in the unit of the action game.
- The main message is not explicitly expressed: 'Join Allianz!'
- Meaning is persuasion.
- Syntactic meaning can also be persuasive as can be seen from the heading *The Allianz Group is always on your side*. The indicative construction does not describe an existing but only a potential or conditional fact insofar as, in a strict sense, something like *if you want* would have to be added.
- Verbal and cognitive and also perceptual means (a picture is included) are integrated.
- Word meaning is on the one hand indeterminate, open to negotiation, for instance, in *to be on your side, successfully managed, power*. On the other hand word meaning is, at least in part, defined, due to the tendency of languages for specific purposes to name things unequivocally, for instance, in *life insurance, policy holders, long-term investment performance*.

These points demonstrate that it is simply absurd to assume pattern transference would be a useful method for describing texts. Texts have meaning only in the process of negotiation within the action game.

4. Fundamentals of dialogue

Let us now turn to the fundamentals of dialogue to be described in a Theory of the Dialogic Action Game. Three issues have to be tackled: first, the access to the object, second, the issue of understanding the object, and, third, the problem of deriving an adequate methodology from it.

The *issue of access* refers to the problem that there is no empirical evidence as such. We might stress the point that our object is authentic texts but nevertheless I am not of the opinion that the text alone tells us its truth. There is no reality as such, it is always filtered by theoretical questions. We cannot say that we have to start either from empirical texts or from theoretical questions. That is not the issue; it is the *integration* of empirical data and cognition which is our starting point. Recent research in neurobiology on mirror neurons confirms that at the very outset we have to assume the integration of different abilities such as perception, doing, cognition.

The *theory itself contains two parts*, first, fundamental assumptions on our object, second, the methodology to be derived from them. Having dealt with these issues in detail in my Birmingham paper (Weigand 2000a) and in other articles, I can restrict myself to a few points. Before postulating that there must be rules, we should try to *understand our object*. Our object, human dialogic interaction, is not a homogeneous, clearly separable object. It is the complex ability of human beings to negotiate interactive purposes in the Dialogic Action Game. Human beings, their abilities and the world cannot be separated. We perceive the world as our abilities allow. Human beings are socially purposeful beings and they are different beings. It is their purposes and needs which give us the key concept to guide our analyses.

The second part of the Theory addresses the question of *methodology*. How do human beings behave in the complex dialogic world of the action game? There is no pattern predefined in advance, the same for both speaker sides. We are always confronted with different human beings and behave like 'complex adaptive systems', to use Gell-Mann's term (1994), orientating ourselves according to Principles of Probability in a complex mix of order and disorder. On the level of action, which is the level of performance, in the end, everything is dependent on individual human decisions. Principles of Probability can be

seen as guidelines of behaviour, as guidelines of our *competence-in-performance* (cf. Weigand 2001). They make use of other methodological techniques, among them rules and conventions. We always try to identify regularities in order to structure the complex. The complex however cannot be captured as a whole by regularities.

The Principles of Probability are based on *three fundamental principles*, the Action Principle (AP), the Dialogic Principle proper (DP), and the Coherence Principle (CohP). The AP refers to the correlation of purposes and means. Purposes are dialogically orientated purposes to be distinguished in a dialogic speech act theory. Means are integrated dialogic means based on the abilities of speaking, thinking, and perceiving:

(Fig.1) dialogic purposes (state of affairs) \leftrightarrow integrated dialogic means

The crucial point of this correlation refers to the arrow. Following Dialogue Grammar, ten years ago, I defined the arrow as a conventional relation of interdependence. Following the open model of the Dialogic Action Game, the arrow is to be reconsidered as Principle of Probability. We understand an utterance, for instance, the utterance *You are playing the piano again*, in example (4), with a certain probability as specific action. In the end, however, i.e. with certainty, only the speaker knows what he/she meant.

The DP proper refers to the fundamental dialogic principle which correlates initiative action and reaction. The correlation is again based on a certain probability by which we can expect that it is the same dialogic claim dealt with by action and reaction. In my opinion, dialogue is mainly based on two claims, a claim to truth and a claim to volition. Let me illustrate that point with example (2):

(2) Change is the only constant in the life of a company.

Superficially, it seems to be an independent utterance. As a representative speech act it is however directed at a speech act of acceptance, both speech acts, the initiative representative and the reactive act of acceptance, being interrelated by the same dialogic claim to truth.

Finally, the third fundamental Principle of Probability, the Principle of Coherence, clearly demonstrates another basic feature of human behaviour, namely the integration of means. Coherence has remained elusive as long as we sought it on the verbal level. Coherence may sometimes be verbally expressed by the interrelation of different textual constituents. However, to define it in this way has to be considered a methodological exigency provided by the orthodox view. The phenomenon coherence, in principle, is established by the integration of dialogic means, including cognitive means, i.e., it is established in the mind of the interlocutors (cf. Givón 1993, Weigand 2000b). Coherence thus is to be conceived of as the result of the interlocutors' joint attempt to understand the means, verbal, cognitive and perceptual ones, offered to them in the action game.

A series of *corollary principles* operates on the basis of these three fundamental Principles. I can only briefly mention a few of them. There are *Principles of Rhetoric* at the very outset insofar as we, in principle always try to be more or less effective in dialogue (Weigand 1999b). Principles of rhetoric referring to the speaker's interests contrast with *Principles of Politeness* referring to the interlocutor's 'face' or to the respect to be shown for the other. Different cultures deal differently with Principles of Politeness, assigning them a different value in the relation between respecting the other and pushing one's own interests. *Principles of Emotion* have also to be included as a constitutive component in the action game (Weigand 1998).

The Principles of Probability, the basic and the corollary ones, make use of other techniques as reference points for orientation such as the Maxim of Rationality or Clarity, the Principles of Convention, of Supposition, etc. In this way, the Theory of the Dialogic Action Game starts from a set of basic assumptions about the object, and explains the object-in-function by methodological principles of probability.

5. Redefining linguistics as a human science

What consequences should we draw from such a theoretical and methodological view for redefining linguistics? The rule-governed model of well-formed patterns adopted from natural sciences has been unmasked as language-and-communication myth. It is not rules which form the central reference point but human beings acting and reacting in the action game by using different integrated abilities. Linguistics therefore has to be redefined as a human science which takes account of the specific conditions of human behaviour.

Human behaviour, in my opinion, is mainly characterized by the integration of different dimensions and abilities:

- First, language cannot be separated from human beings and the world. It is an integrated part of a complex human ability.
- Trying to describe the interaction of human beings has to cope with the fact that different human beings interact and different communicative worlds have to be related.
- As a consequence, there are open points at the very outset which inevitably carry the risk of misunderstanding.
- Indeterminacy of meaning and understanding is a basic constituent.

- Dialogue emerges as a process of negotiating meaning and understanding. On the action level, it is carried out by Principles of Probability which make use of other techniques such as rules and conventions.

The different methodological views of pattern transference and of negotiation can be schematically contraposed:

(Fig. 2)

pattern transference

methodology

closed system of rules

only verbal means

→

artificial object

language as a sign system

negotiation

natural object

human dialogic interaction

→

methodology

open system of principles of probability

integration of means

In this sense, the view of linguistics orientated towards human beings and their abilities replaces the orthodox view of pattern transference and fixed codes adopted from natural sciences. Dialogue Analysis 2000 should rise to the challenge of re-defining linguistics as a *human dialogic science*.

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Robert Maier

A Process and Structure Conception of Dialogue

1. Introduction

During the last decades studies of dialogue have progressively introduced a process view and restricted more and more a structural view of dialogue. To conceive dialogue as a process means for example that dialogue produces continuously novelties as well on the level of meaning as on the level of the linguistic means used and also on the level of the participants, their social relations and their respective identities. These new conceptions of dialogue have been stimulated by the conviction that dialogue is a rich and complex human interaction which cannot be understood with the help of fixed structures of a logical, linguistic or social nature. In particular, the pragmatic turn and several new approaches of the social sciences, such as conversation analysis and discourse analysis have contributed to destroy the self-evident predominance of a structural view of dialogue.

However, the progressive shift from a structure view to a process view of dialogue has not been made in any consistent way. In the different studies of dialogue all kinds of combinations between structural elements and process conceptions can be found without any reflection concerning the tensions and inconsistencies which might exist between these two views of dialogue. Therefore it is worthwhile to explore here more systematically the problems and difficulties attempts of integration of these two worldviews necessarily encounter. Some examples of such tensions and inconsistencies will be pointed out in later sections.

In this contribution I will attempt in the first place to present explicitly the worldviews of structure and process. As neither view is completely satisfactory I will argue that a combination of these two worldviews is asked for, and I will point out the particular difficulties such a combination has to confront. There is no satisfactory solution at the moment, but I will suggest that power and identity of the participants are basic building blocks of a satisfactory and stimulating view of dialogue.

2. Worldviews of structure and process and their integration

"A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible" (cf. Worldviews 1994: 17).

This definition of worldviews formulated by the Worldviews group should be sufficient for the present purpose. In this perspective, worldviews are attempts of individuals or groups to construct a global framework for the answers to the questions concerning their being and becoming and the being and becoming of the world. A worldview is a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representation offering a global picture.

A worldview as a global framework offers schematic answers to the following questions (see Worldviews 1994: 25): What is the nature of our world? How is the world structured and how does it function? Why do we feel the way we feel in this world? How are we to act and to create in this world? How, and in what ways can we influence the world and transform it?

Worldviews as conceptual and symbolic frameworks are not necessarily explicitly formulated, that is why they belong to the historical and cultural context. Worldviews are not exclusively concerned with questions of knowledge, also emotions and values have a place in a worldview, as can be seen by the questions formulated in the last paragraph.

At present, in the modern world (or the post-modern one according to some), characterized by pluralism and individualism, the classic worldviews have not disappeared. On the contrary, some of these worldviews which have been constructed in specific historic periods are reactivated and transformed, and others are rather original creations of the present time.

At the moment, none of the known worldviews is completely worked out, we dispose only of partial constructions of worldviews. As each of the known worldviews offers a global, symbolic framework, it is possible to integrate the same experience in different worldviews. However, the different worldviews exclude each other on the one hand, but on the other hand they need each other for further constructions.

Here I will limit myself to examine the worldview of structure and the worldview of process. These two worldviews have a certain robustness, which means that even if they have been elaborated in specific historic periods, they are constantly taken up again and re-elaborated in later periods up to the present. In other words, these worldviews have a high degree of fitness, adaptability and also of internal variability.

To the worldview of structure or form belongs typically a substance philosophy. Similarity is the basic metaphor. Reality is made up by elementary entities and by

characteristics which some of the entities have in common. These characteristics can either belong to a separate sphere or be immanent; think of Plato or Aristotle. (Neo-)scholastic thinkers and modern Cambridge realists such as Russell and Moore can be identified as representatives. The elementary concrete entities and the concrete elementary characteristics can constitute more complex entities and characteristics which can be ordered in hierarchies. The two basic experiences of this worldview are on the one hand the work of producers who manufacture many exemplars according to a basic plan and on the other the existence of natural kinds, such as minerals or plants. The duality between entities and characteristics entails also a duality between forms and materials.

The ethics which belongs to this worldview consists of norms which specify static or dynamic forms of equilibrium between persons and groups. Deviations from these norms will cause suffering. Because of the dual nature of this worldview norms have to be realized as ideals. However, it will be an objective ethic. What is of value for a species will depend on the place this species occupies in the hierarchy of reality. Truth will be defined as a correspondence with reality.

Modern versions of this worldview use set and group theory and the relation of equivalence. In other words, modern formulations of such a world hypothesis will conceive reality as constituted by and through sets, relations and groups, with the emphasis on 'by' and 'through'.

In dialogue studies one can find examples of a structural worldview in the theory of Habermas (1981) of the ideal dialogue situation or in the pragma-dialectical theory of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) with the notion of a 'critical rational discussion'.

The process worldview uses as basic metaphor the complex process (historic action or event). Acts and events are in principle complex, they are composed of a great number of interrelated activities with continuously changing patterns. Fundamental for this world hypothesis are the passages from chaos to order and from order to chaos and the importance attributed to transformation and novelty as a global quality. The quality of a process will be described by its extension (the number of objects the process will involve), the degree of change it can bring about and the continuity of the process. Important will be the number of partial (sub)processes, their interrelations and their relations with other processes. However, no definitive analysis of a process will be possible.

Typical representatives of this worldview are the pragmatists such as Peirce, Mead, James, Bergson and Dewey. It is worth mentioning that Dilthey (1960, first published at the end of last century) in his 'Weltanschauungslehre' did not identify this worldview, but some of its characteristics can be found in the worldview he called 'idealism of freedom' which comprises also many aspects of the worldview of form. Pragmatism was not fully developed at that time, which might be one reason why Dilthey did not distinguish the worldview of process as separate. But the fact that he presents the worldviews of form and

process together (or at least many of their characteristics) already shows that attempts of integration have been attempted by many thinkers.

Persons and also groups are conceived as historical processes. Values are defined in an indirect way, by the degree of complexity, novelty and emergence (in the sense of new qualities which arise in a process) of actions. A rather dynamic version of ethic has to be formulated. Knowledge is also conceived as a process. This means that new forms of knowledge should be conceived as enrichments of earlier processes, and this enrichment can be analyzed as a greater extension of the process, as new sub-processes or as a higher degree of transformation a process can bring about. Contrary to the worldview of structure a knowledge theory will not be based on correspondence. Only a constructivist knowledge theory can be consistent with a worldview of process.

The work of Prigogine (1996), which is concentrated on irreversible processes which produce radical novelty, unicity and individuality is a good illustration of this worldview.

Some authors include in this worldview also the totalizing processes, others situate these conceptions within a different worldview, called *organicism*. This term is from Pepper, Dilthey used the term 'objective idealism'. This worldview uses integration or the organism as a basic metaphor. It also refers to processes as the previous one, but in difference with it, this worldview inscribes processes and time in a totality. A model thinker of this worldview is Hegel, but there are many other versions.

Rescher (1996) in his 'process metaphysics' combines the worldview of process and the 'organismic' worldview as worldviews which are opposed to a worldview of 'form' and 'machine', which he calls substance metaphysics. This combination has a certain tradition, and can be understood by the fact that both versions have common characteristics.

Process conceptions of dialogic interactions can be found in the work of Garfinkel (1967), in some versions of discourse analysis (Foucault 1971, Fairclough 1995), in 'natural logic', a theory developed by J. B. Grize (1996), and many others. Characteristic for these conceptions is the fact that any event, such as a single contribution of one participant in a dialogic interaction can transform completely the nature of the interaction and therefore the meanings which are constructed or the goals of the different participants.

There are certainly many other types of worldviews. There are to begin with the various religious worldviews, which all use to some extent elements of already mentioned worldviews. And there are mythical and animistic types of more or less private worldviews. I will not be concerned here with these worldviews, but they certainly merit to be studied. A systematic overview can be found in Maier (1999). There is however one quite particular worldview which has been developed only recently in a systematic way. It should be mentioned here, because it can offer valuable insights. This worldview conceives the *world as play* without any meaning. Fink (1960) in his 'Spiel als Weltsymbol' has presented a systematic overview. This worldview refers to play as a basic

metaphor. The world is conceived as having no cause, no aim, no reason, no value and also no plan. In other words, there is no totality but only chaos. Conceiving the world as play in this sense, means that there are no players and that the play is not performed for anybody.

As none of the mentioned worldviews is fully worked out and as there exist many versions of each of these worldviews, it should not be astonishing that it is rather difficult to identify scientists and philosophers who either are pure representatives of one given worldview or who do not try to some extent to combine elements of two or more of the various worldviews. One could start with Plato, who in his last phase, with his unifying concept of love tended towards an organicism, or with Descartes who can be seen as a representative of mechanicism, but who certainly uses also elements of a worldview of structure. Prigogine, who has been mentioned as possible modern representative of a worldview of process also uses aspects of the worldview of form. In other words, as the worldviews are in general not explicitly elaborated, it is necessary to be rather careful when using the worldviews as a matrix of classifying thinkers. These thinkers may use implicitly elements from several worldviews, and moreover, they can in the different phases of their work and depending on the problem they investigate use more elements of one worldview or a specific combination of worldviews.

However, there are a number of authors who recognize the need or even the necessity to combine and to integrate these two worldviews, because of the exclusion of novelty and emergence by a structural worldview on the one hand, even if emergence seems a historic, social and psychological evidence. On the other hand, a radical process view seems to exclude the evident presence of stability characteristic for human interactions. These authors attempt more or less explicitly to combine and even to integrate the worldviews of structure and process. By the way, this problem of integration has not only be recognized in the social sciences but also in the natural sciences.

A main difficulty when attempting to integrate the worldviews of structure and process arises from the fact that they are based on different ontologies. Indeed, the worldview of structure or form affirms the existence of elementary entities (natural kinds or produced) and elementary characteristics, which can be immanent or transcendent. These elementary entities and characteristics can be combined and form hierarchies. Quite different is the case of a worldview of process. In this case, the basic constituents of reality are events, and these events are processes which are constituted once more of an infinite number of other processes.

Many authors do not really recognize this problem at all. It seems that they are doing their best to avoid it by using one of the following two strategies:

Giddens (1984) for example, uses either a terminology of structure or of process depending on the context of investigation. Also Pinxten and Verstraete (1998) use this

strategy, by using exclusively concepts of process. Only in their general theoretical statements do they affirm the co-existence of structure and process.

A second strategy is to give an ontological priority to one of the alternatives. This is for example clearly the case of the epistemology of Piaget (1967), who favors structure. The cognitive structures of genetic epistemology have for Piaget a definite degree of reality. Piaget even attempted to look for physiological correlates of the cognitive structures. Genesis on the other hand, or in terms of Piaget, his model of equilibration, is a highly abstract mechanism of construction, which is presented as tentative and hypothetical.

However, recognizing the need or the necessity of integrating the two worldviews does not mean to be able to solve this problem. Deleuze and Guattari (1980) on the one hand, and also Apostel (1995) have identified this problem. Deleuze and Guattari have presented a metaphorical solution. What exists, is a rhizome. A rhizome is a kind of strange root, which can grow in all directions, make new connections, make bulbs, degenerate partly, and produce all kinds of forms. This biological metaphor is certainly quite powerful, and it is complemented in other parts of their work by a nomadic metaphor. The use of these metaphors helps to understand what they are talking about, and they contribute to formulate new and complicated questions concerning reality. This strategy is certainly a very fruitful one, but it cannot really offer a theoretical solution because of its deliberate vagueness.

Apostel is the only author who accepts the challenge, and who introduces a completely new entity, which he calls X, which is at the same time structure and cause, system and process. He also specifies some of the properties of this new basic entity, but he acknowledges also that a lot of work has to be done, and that his solution can at best be considered as suggestive, it will be discussed later on.

Another reason which can explain the difficulties of integration of these two worldviews can be identified in the different knowledge theories associated with these worldviews. The worldview of structure favors a theory of knowledge where truth is defined by correspondence. In other words, between the theory, which is a representation and reality there should be a correspondence, and if the correspondence is perfect, the theory will be true. In the case of a worldview of process, theory will be another process. However, here we can not find a simple criterion of truth. At best, a theory will be interesting, new and constructive, and as such it will enable new connections between processes, or it will enlarge the application of a process, it will eventually introduce new sub-processes, etc. These criteria of knowledge are quite incompatible with the criterion of correspondence of the worldview of structure.

Anybody who plays in one way or another a role in writing research applications or in evaluating these applications knows quite well that a very delicate compromise has to be found in specifying criteria for knowledge, which should be new and stimulating on the