How to Show Things with Words

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How to Show Things with Words

A Study on Logic, Language and Literature

by

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Para a Vânia
Para os meus pais, Manuel e Romualda
Para o Ivo, in memoriam

Preface

Even if the successful application of formal logic to natural-language semantics does not require one to be a logician, as Landman claims, still it is reassuring to have their support for problem-solving tasks. To my regret, my logician-friends were too far away to prevent me from possibly incurring in errors that I would like to have eschewed. And yet formal semantics is only part of a lifetime interdisciplinary research program whose findings are finally materialized in this book, at the intersection of logic, linguistics, philosophy and literary theory. As a full mastery of the relevant literature was simply impracticable, some topics are barely discussed and others passed over into silence. Fortunately, books are not expected to provide full coverage of their subject matters or to be completely flawless and accurate products; their goal is to get some stimulating proposals into the public arena for critical consideration among those who share the same interests. It is my turn to enter the lists.

Vânia proved an indefatigable partner in elaborating the indices, and my parents provided the only financial support that I ever had. To get the book published was the least I could do in memory of Ivo.

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Abbreviations

AC	aspect calculus
BI	bare infinitive
Col	change of location
CoP	change of position
CR	construction rule
CRIL	conceptual route instruction language
CUM	cumulative reference
DC	disconnected
DL	dynamic logic
DMP	defeasible *modus ponens*
DR	discourse representation
DRS	discourse representation structure
DRT	Discourse Representation Theory
DT	discourse-time
EC	external contact
ES	event semantics
FG	Functional Grammar
FOL	first-order logic
GA	geometric agent
GCS	geometric concept specification
GPSG	Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar
HITL	hybrid improved tense-logic
IL	intensional logic
IMP	*imparfait*
INCR	incremental relation
IPVC	infinitive perception verb complement
ITL	improved tense logic
KB	knowledge base
LF	logical formula
MP	*modus ponens*
MS	meaning structure
MtE	mapping to events
MtO	mapping to objects
NEP	natural event predicate

NTL	nominal tense logic
NTPP	non-tangential proper part
PDL	propositional dynamic logic
PHITL	backwards-looking fragment of HITL
PO	partial overlap
PPVC	participial perception verb complement
P-Q-P	*plus-que-parfait*
PREP	projective terms
PROG	progressive
PS	*passé simple*
PVC	perception verb complement
QUA	quantized reference
RC	referential centre
RCC	Region(al) Connection Calculus
Rpt	reference point
SCUM	strictly cumulative reference
SDRT	Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
SIP	strictly internal path
SNG	singular reference
SOA	state of affairs
ST	story-time
STAT	stative
STP	set terminal point
SVC	serial verb construction
TDIP	temporal discourse interpretation principle
TP	temporal logic
TPP	tangential proper part
TPpt	temporal perspective point
Tql	text qualifier
TS	text structure
UG	Universal Grammar
UoO	uniqueness of objects
Z-IH	inner-halo zone
Z-IT	inner-transit zone
Z-OH	outer-halo zone
Z-OM	outer-most zone
Z-OT	outer-transit zone

Introduction

1. There is a deep-seated belief among opera-goers and opera-lovers that any really successful overture is that which manages to provide as plain succinct a foreshadowing of the subsequent drama or comedy. If in a wonderful tone picture such as the overture to *Tannhäuser* we do indeed apprehend two broad *leitmotiven* in admirable contrast, where the solemn chant of the Pilgrims ceaselessly struggles with the wild insistence of Tannhäuser on his trenchant song in praise of Venus, the truth pure and simple is that the baffling plot of *Le Nozze di Figaro* ensures that its equally remarkable brief overture can hardly achieve more than creating a delightful atmosphere of gaiety and amusement. In a sense, the introduction to a book is subject to the same fate. Thus, in those monographs focussing on a particular subject matter, it is by no means difficult to circumscribe the range of data addressed nor to state how they depart from concurrent literature on the field. However, when it comes to a complex interdisciplinary research study straddling the border between formal logic, linguistics and philosophy to solve a longstanding issue originating in narrative–theoretical soil, the introduction is almost as hopeless as the overture to classical opera and so cannot but simply *sketch* what the book is and is not about. The whole thread of the argument will then be deferred to Chapter 1.

2. Considering that the term 'deixis' is etimologically derived from a Greek root whose meaning is 'to show', 'to point' or 'to indicate', it seems reasonable to assume that *How to Show Things with Words* is essentially about the class of linguistic expressions used to relate utterances to the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the act of utterance: *I/you, this/that, here/there, now/then, today/tomorrow* and the like. Demonstrative reference processes are really alluded to apropos of Husserl's essentially occasional, as opposed to objective, expressions and also in the context of Bühler's so-called *demonstratio ad oculos*, not to mention that the indexical function of perceptual intimation is certainly part and parcel of any serious attempt to shed new light on the narrative–theoretical issue of proximal vs. distal stance adoption.

Narrative discourse, however, is of a kind that is chiefly characterized by a number of negative features such as present-tense exclusion and the absence of deictics of time and place (Benveniste [1959] 1966) (except with those forms of the past-tense system referred to below.[1]) Instead of lexical and grammatical features of speaker-based centres, narrative discourse is anchorable to an allocentric reference system contextually salient in the so-called diegetic(al) world it gives rise to, and avails itself of anaphoric expressions like the temporal adverbials for ordering the chain of events along the time axis, on the one hand, and the spatial locutions for describing the environment, on the other. On the face of it, it is certainly not in the deictic sense of the word that natural-language narrative systems can show anything at all. Consider now the following excerpts from *L'Éducation Sentimentale*:

(1) a. *Jamais Frédéric n'avait été plus loin du marriage. D'ailleurs, Mlle Roque lui semblait une petite personne assez ridicule. Quelle différence avec une femme comme Mme Dambreuse! Un bien autre avenir lui était réservé! Il en avait la certitude <u>aujourd'hui</u>* ... (Flaubert [1869] 1983: 409)
'Frédéric's thoughts had never been further removed from marriage. Besides, Mademoiselle Roque struck him as a somewhat ridiculous little thing. What a difference there was between her and a woman like Madame Dambreuse! A very different future awaited him! He was certain of that <u>now</u> ...'
(Flaubert 1964: 347)

  b. *Il se demanda, sérieusement, s'il serait un grand peintre ou un grand poète; et il se décida pour la peinture, car les exigences de ce métier le rapprocheraient de Mme Arnoux. Il avait donc trouvé sa vocation! Le but de son existence était clair <u>maintenant</u>, et l'avenir infaillible.* (Flaubert 1983: 59)
'He asked himself in all seriousness whether he was to be a great painter or a great poet; and he decided in favour of painting, for the demands of this profession would bring him closer to Madame Arnoux. So he had found his vocation! The object of his existence was <u>now</u> clear, and there could be no doubt about the future.' (Flaubert 1964: 61)

The co-occurrence in (1a)–(1b) of imperfective past tenses with deictic temporal adverbs like *aujourd'hui* ('today') and *maintenant* ('now') shifts the perspective from the narrative-discourse generating source to the internal sphere of the reflector-character's own consciousness, thus expressing his thoughts and feelings in free indirect speech form. Again, focalization shifts are a matter of *psychological* point of view and should not be confused with issues of proximal/distal perspective dependent on spatio-temporal properties of eventuality descriptions and their bearing upon phenomenological aspects of event cognition, as those subject to investigation in the sequel.

3. If it will have become quite clear that this investigation is not about space–time deixis and pronominal/demonstrative reference systems, nor about the division of *focal* labour between narrator and characters, to speak of a phenomenology of event semantics leaves one at a loss. The best way to reveal what the present book is really about is thus viewing a sample of the material to be studied later on in the text. With every single entry of quoted speech expunged from the first one, there follows a couple of examples to start with:

(2) *Nick followed the woman up a flight of stairs and back to the end of a corridor. She knocked on the door. ... Nick opened the door and went into the room. Ole Andreson was lying on the bed with all his clothes on. He had been a heavyweight prize-fighter and he was too long for the bed. He lay with his head on two pillows. He did not look at Nick. ... Nick went out. As he shut the door he saw Ole Andreson with all his clothes on, lying on the bed looking at the wall.* (Hemingway [1928] 1984: 374)

(3) *She sat at the window watching the evening invade the avenue. Her head was leaned against the window curtains and in her nostrils was the odour of dusty cretonne. She was tired. Few people passed. The man out of the last house passed on his way home; she heard his footsteps clacking along the concrete pavement and afterwards crunching on the cinder path before the new red houses.* (Joyce [1914] 1993: 42)

Based on what might sensibly be called his innate stylistic intuition, the reader who has skimmed through these texts will have a feeling, no matter how loosely structured, of what it is they have in common. The motto might well run along these lines:

> All facts, both "material" and psychic, are shown to the reader as if he directly "saw" them. The narrator – of course only illusorily – has the function of a mere object-glass of a photographic camera or of an exactly registrating scientific apparatus. (Mukařovský, quoted in Doležel 1967: 548)

To see how Mukařovský accutely seizes the quiddity of (2) and (3), one must first consider what kind of texts they are both opposed to and which constitute the default or untutored mode of storytelling. The following examples bring out the contrast:

(4) *Il fallait chaque mois payer des billets, en renouveler d'autres, obtenir du temps. Le mari travaillait, le soir, à mettre au net les comptes d'un commerçant, et la nuit, souvent, il faisait de la copie à cinq sous la page. Et cette vie dura dix ans.*
(Maupassant [1885] 1973: 164)
'Each month they had to meet some notes, renew others, obtain more time. Her husband worked in the evening making a fair copy of some tradesman's accounts, and late at night he often copied manuscript for five sous a page. And this life lasted for ten years.'
(English translation in Brooks and Warren [1943] 1959: 111)

(5) *L'année dernière Jean escalada le Cervin. Le premier jour il monta jusqu'à la cabane H. Il y passa la nuit. Ensuite il attaqua la face nord. Douze heures plus tard il arriva au sommet.*
(Kamp and Rohrer 1983: 260)
'Last year Jean climbed the Cervin. The first day he climbed to cabin H. He spent the night there. Next he attacked the north face. Twelve hours later he arrived at the top.'

(6) *Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition, seemed to unite some of the best blessings of existence; and had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world with very little to distress or vex her.* (Austen 1994: 5)

A little knowledge of literature and its history in the recent past suffices to realize that both groups of texts are meant to (re)introduce a discussion of long standing in literary criticism and narrative theory about two narrative rendering techniques dubbed *showing* and *telling* by Anglo-American critics at the beginning of the twentieth century. Based on summary as the default or unmarked mode of storytelling, telling is nothing but a brief and generalized report of a series of events which covers extended periods of time as well as a variety of locales. To the extent that the discourse-time is shorter than the story-time, the narrative generating (in)stance cannot afford to dwell upon details and is thereby compelled to adopt a vantage point of view from the height of which the deeds described are retrospectively apprehended. Showing, by contrast, represents rather the incorporation of dramatic principles into narrative discourse in scenic-like (re)presentation form, consisting in a quite detailed account of a specific 'space–time region'. The quantity of information available in terms of text length is so close to the sequence of events in the space–time region that the fictional world is apprehended from an immanent temporal perspective and the listener accordingly becomes a(n eye)witness to the course of action. In present-day work subsidiary to Genette's narrative theory, however, showing and telling surge forth as mimesis and diegesis, respectively, and under this hellenophilical guise the aforementioned pro-illusionist approach to the structure of narrative transmission is simply dismissed on the grounds that natural languages do signify without imitating. If so, then not even some recent findings in current linguistic research seem to escape so zealous a commitment to pseudo-semiotic truisms. In fact, just as the deictic particle *'i-* in (Uto-Aztecan) Ute narratives represents the so-called mode of immediate deixis by means of which "... the hearer is *brought into the middle of the scene* so that the action takes place *right in front of his/her eyes.*" (Givón 1982: 40), the very act of affirming inherent in the thetic forms of judgement couched in *ga*-sentences of Japanese folk tales has perceptual grounds, creating the illusion that one is witnessing the events (Kuroda 1992). (The reader is referred to section 7.3.3 for a more detailed treatment.) In a similar fashion, it has also been argued that 'scene-describing' stative predicates figuring in the descriptive parts of narrative fiction should be taken as the perceptual observations made by an onlooker,

either the narrator or some reflector-character in the diegetical world, so that readers vicariously re-live these perceptual acts (Dowty 1986). (The reader is again referred to section 5.3.2 for further information.) Now, since the progressive form is a state-forming aspectual operator, the following passage makes just the same point:

> Emmon Bach (pers. comm.) pointed out that in stories the Progressive Form can pertain to States in such a way that the objects which are in a given state are temporarily experienced by the narrator (Galton 1984; Dowty 1979). Thus, a sentence like *The village was lying in the valley* seems to report a state of a village *as seen* by the narrator who is telling the story as if he just had entered the valley. The use of the Progressive Form tends to actualize its ephemeral nature: the state is reported from the point of view of the narrator. (Verkuyl 1993: 37; my emphasis on 'as seen')

and there are other 'villages' in real literary corpora like the French, where aspectually sensitive tenses such as the IMP play the same role as state-forming aspectual operators as the English progressive form. In *Madame Bovary*, for instance, Flaubert uses the imperfective form to indicate that Rouen *is seen* by an observer placed above the town:[2]

(7) *Puis, d'un seul coup d'oeil, la ville apparaissait. Descendant tout en amphithéâtre et noyée dans le brouillard, elle s'élargissait au delà des ponts, confusément. La pleine campagne remontait ensuite d'un mouvement monotone, jusquà toucher au loin la base indécise du ciel pâle. Ainsi vu d'en haut, le paysage tout entier avait l'air immobile comme une peinture; les navires à l'ancre se tassaient dans un coin; le fleuve arrondissait sa courbe au pied des collines vertes, et les îles, de forme oblongue, semblaient sur l'eau de grands poissons noirs arrêtés. Les cheminées des usines poussaient d'immenses panaches bruns qui s'envolaient par le bout. On entendait le ronflement des fonderies avec le carillon clair des églises qui se dressaient dans la brume. Les arbres des boulevards, sans feuilles, faisaient des broussailles violettes au milieu des maisons, et les toits, tout reluisants de pluie, miroitaient inégalement, selon la hauteur des quartiers. Parfois un coup de vent emportait les nuages vers la côte Sainte-Catherine, comme des flots aériens qui se brisaient en silence contre une falaise.* (Flaubert 1966: 287)

These data clearly show that from cross-linguistic typological studies to cutting-edge inquiries carried out within formal semantic research, it will have become a commonplace that whenever speakers/narrators are assumed to have seen whatever situations they set out to describe, readers/narratees automatically adhere to that perceptual parameter. It is thus likely that some knowledge of lexical decomposition analysis might have prevented Genette from prejudging a valuable inheritance. In fact, pairs of morphologically unrelated verbs like *to see* and *to show* bear the same semantic relation to one another as do pairs of verbs related by *causative* morphological constructions in other languages. Thus, *to show* is nothing but to cause others to see *that* one has seen, not in the non-epistemic sense of arousing an intuitive act character by means of which an object or situation is apprehended 'in the flesh', but rather as a sort of text-induced process of *epistemological transfer* such that the recipient will decode the perceptual information source as something he might have experienced if he had been on the spot. Showing and telling are hence just an epistemological epiphenomenon of the proximal or distal self-positioning of the narrative instance[3] as regards the space–time coordinate system of the diegetical world where the event(ualitie)s described are deemed to have taken place; these eventuality descriptions are then said to be *shown* whenever they come close enough to the narrative mediating stance[3] so as to be seen, or rather taken to be simply *told* whenever perceptually inaccessible from the spatio-temporal location it occupies in the universe of fiction. Thus, irrespective of describing space-occupying second-order entities or focussing instead on the psychic phenomena of reflector-characters, texts (2) and (3) are structured according to the order of perception and the listener vicariously partakes in the same direct experience made out without the priviledge of knowing what is about to come. The same does not hold of the other excerpts in the sample, however. In fact, instead of describing what happened on a single occasion, text (4) is nothing but an iterative report of a ten-year long period, whereas (5) is based on an analepsis-generating discourse relation[4] with the side-effect of mismatching descriptive and temporal order(s). The adoption of retrospective vantage points also extends to text (6), betraying *cognitive* processing systems of prepredicative experience; all facts, both 'material' and psychic, are now told rather than shown.

Though the showing–telling distinction has loomed larger than any other in twentieth-century narrative theory and literary criticism (indeed, to such an extent that the list of references thereon is almost as endless as Leporello's famous catalogue on his master's conquests), the discussion has nevertheless revolved around normative judgements passed on the basis of aesthetic considerations on the craft of fiction. As early as 1921, however, one of the leading figures of New Criticism had made it clear that:

> And yet the novelist must state, must tell, must narrate – what else can he do? *His book is a series of assertions*, nothing more. It is so, obviously, and the difference between the art of Defoe and the art of Flaubert is only in their *different method of placing their statements*. Defoe takes a directer way, Flaubert a more roundabout ... (Lubbock 1921: 63; my emphasis)

proving his awareness that narration was a fact of natural language and that issues of method should be traced back to linguistic structure; the only reason why the matter was not pursued any further was the lack of tools which modern linguistics provides for us to fill in the gap. Thus, if determining the source of knowledge for some course of events in languages endowed with morphological evidential-marking systems simply requires that closed classes of morphemes be properly decoded, the situation is quite different in those other families of languages on which the common run of current narratological research focus, since no paradigmatic evidential contrasts are part of clause structure. Although natural languages are by no means unifunctional systems, still the strictly subjective manifestations of language-using *personae* are not linguistically coded in formally traceable sets of morphemes. On the face of it, our first task is just to draw on and to elaborate on the rich philosophical research tradition on the functions of language in order to lay down the foundations of self-expression phenomena, while casting the net wider to encompass epistemological issues, too. Now, just as the '*i*- and *ga*-particles as well as the English progressive have been claimed to bring narratees into the midlle of the scene, there are arguably other linguistic devices to achieve that same effect. If so, then our second task is to *infer* the 'epistemological imprint' of the narrating stance from a specific set of surface discursive markers.

4. In her 1977 pioneering book on the language–literature interface, Pratt had to find her own way through people belonging in each other's vicinity but unwilling to exchange programs or street guides. Thirty years later, though literary scholars are no longer unfamiliar with linguistic theories nor are linguists indifferent to literary studies, they do not share the same language nor do they use the same tools. In a study straddling the border between linguistics and philosophy to solve narrative–theoretical issues on a sound interdisciplinary basis, one way to redress the balance between the interwoven research areas is certainly to pitch the discussion at a level appropriate to all of them. Thus, each new chapter provides, by way of introduction or otherwise, the background information relevant to the subject under discussion. The exposition, on the other hand, was made as simple as possible, and for preventing what is called 'math anxiety' (Landman 1991), 'heavy Quinean artillery' (Taylor 1985) has been kept to a minimum, which is not to say that it should be of no interest to the *cognoscenti*. And now a word about the overall organization of the book.

Chapter 1 resembles the symphonic suite from an opera or ballet, in that it offers a synoptic account of the common thread of the book. The contours of the basic distinctions adumbrated in this introduction are then toughened up with new texts and typological descriptions. Next, a batch of examples taken from typologically different languages illustrates how evidentials are used to build up narrative structures, as a foil for considering the indicative processes of evidential retrieval available in those languages with no obligatory coding of epistemology. The chapter ends with a series of brief introductory considerations on how the related linguistic categories of tense, aspect and *Aktionsart* are brought to bear on the two opposite modes of narrative rendering known as showing and telling.

Chapter 2 is a critical historical survey, necessarily incomplete, of some of the main contributions made in narrative theory to address the 'showing effect' of natural language reports of non-verbal events. To the extent that every new theory inevitably grows out of a feeling that those which precede it are manifestly insufficient or inadequate, this survey of, and/or debate with, the aforementioned contributions provides stimulating theoretical insights for subsequent developments in matters of tense, aspect and *Aktionsart*.

Chapter 3 constitutes an attempt to set up *l'instance racontante* as a source of epistemology on a par with illocutionary force marking, which is a new form of self-expression called 'locutionary subjectivity'. For that matter, the shortcomings of speech act theory are laid bare in the light of German philosophical research on linguistic functions, following a path from Marty's semasiology to Bühler's organon model and where Husserl's *Kundgebende Funktion* (announcement function) accommodates the intentional acts transpiring in narrative discourse as part and parcel of the speaker's overall communicative intention. Because these psychic phenomena are either intuitive or non-intuitive, the showing–telling distinction can thus be accounted for according to the locutionary subjectivity manifests itself in one or the other way. This being the case, the main task of the remaining four chapters, which lend a formal semantic vein to the second part of the book, is to cast about for the specific linguistic categories responsible for the temporal–perspectival organization of discourse underlying that particular function of announcing the kinds of psychic phenomena on which the showing–telling distinction has its epistemological roots.

Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of verbal tense based on Reichenbach's widespread three-point structured conception thereof. The ambiguity of the concept of 'reference point' is first disentangled, and after a brief excursus on the formalization of temporal anaphora, the main focus is on temporal perspective in the (con)text of narrative. The outcome of approaching tense via hybrid tense-logical systems or within the framework of DRT essentially amounts to the following: tenses with overlapping event and reference points, on the one hand, are unmarked forms to set the stage where the course of action occurs; tenses with non-overlapping pairs of such points, on the other hand, introduce sidelines for events viewed as past from that vantage point. Ultimately, the 'displaced immediacy' associated with the simple past is of no consequence provided that the proto-retentional horizon of (direct) experience be preserved under memory.

Chapter 5 reviews well-known systems of aspectual oppositions in order to arrive at a tentative reclassification against which to gain new insights on how viewpoint aspect bears on narrative transmission. Just as the English progressive is a state-forming sentential operator, the French *imparfait* is also taken to be an aspectually sensitive tense;

in either event, it is because the consequent stage-level predicates are perceptual state-descriptions that these imperfective forms are generally considered a device for heightening the sense of presentness couched in spatial metaphors such as 'on the spot' or 'from the inside'. After a brief account of the habitual reading of the French *imparfait*, the chapter closes with a note on iterative aspect.

Chapter 6 is what might be called an introduction to *Aktionsart*, a much neglected verbal category in narrative–theoretical scholarship. Besides providing syntactic criteria for aspectual class membership and (a)telic coercion principles for overcoming aspectual multivalence, there is a large spectrum of formal semantic approaches to the subject: from Dowty's Aspect-calculus built upon an improved first-order logic to Verkuyl's thesis on the compositional nature of aspect formation, and from multi-indexed tense-logical analyses of 'gradual becoming' to Krifka's most influential mereological approach to event semantics, not to mention more recent two-dimensional dynamic temporal logic. The chapter is meant to make the book self-contained.[5]

Chapter 7 represents the culmination point of a long process, showing how *Aktionsart*-dependent the showing–telling distinction is; packaging tense information in ordered triples of overlapping points is a necessary but not sufficient condition for certain narrative effects, and viewpoint aspect is ultimately amenable to situation aspect forms. $-STAT$ eventualities (achievements, accomplishments and activities) are thoroughly examined in the light of narrative mediation processes, paving the way for the necessary phenomenology of event perception; the results achieved within the paradigm of motional changes of state are then generalized to cover nonmotional patterns of change as well. $+STAT$ eventualities split into stage- and individual-level predicates, improving on the phenomenology of state perception of Chapter 5. The chapter is brought to its term by taking into consideration how empirical knowledge of the way situations do transpire in the world interferes with *Aktionsart* typologies based on logico-linguistic criteria.

The conclusion naturally collects the data amassed throughout the body of the book and assesses its main findings in the light of whatever competing theories are currently available in the literature. The first of the two appendices is a glossary of narratological terms; the second, a notation index.

5. Some final notes on other matters of interest are also in order here. Parenthetical abbreviations as in, say, Futebol Clube do Porto (FCP) are rather indicated by capitals in boldface or outside the parenthesis, i.e. either as **Futebol Clube** do **Porto** or F(utebol) C(lube) do P(orto).

Whereas sentences prefixed with an asterisk are ungrammatical, the symbol ♮ indicates non-standard readings.

In a book-length interdisciplinary research study like the present, it is normal that a good deal of information be relegated to the notes, lest the reader may definitely lose the main thread of the argument. However, this is not to imply that they are unimportant.

Although I am not much of a translator, quite on the contrary, not all English translations of German texts are referred to a source; in these cases they are of course my own.

Part 1

Prolegomena

Chapter 1

The linguistic structure of narrative transmission

1.1. Introduction

To the extent that the main thread of argument can be easily lost in a book-length piece of interdisciplinary research at the interface of narrative theory, linguistics, philosophy and neighbouring disciplines, this chapter has been designed to put the pieces together in a nutshell. One of the texts quoted from the outset is an instance of marked uses of narrative technique suggesting 'how to show things with words', but the associated quantitative indicators as well as the comparison with scenic models are hardly convincing tentative approximations; only a modal conception of narrativity broad enough to encompass both epistemic and evidential modalities can help forward the claim that narratees can be said to be witnesses to the events recounted. In fact, there is a host of languages across the world endowed with complex inflectional systems of linguistic (en)coding of epistemology, whereby it becomes relatively straightforward to determine whether the kind of knowledge transpiring along narrative discourse structures was arrived at on the basis of direct or indirect sources of experience: perception vs. reported- or inference-based knowledge and even belief. Though English and other familiar European and classical languages do not use to signal the evidentiary basis of epistemic commitment, it turns out that so-called intuitive and signitive objectivating acts, which are roughly equivalent to direct and indirect evidence markers, are inferable from the temporal-perspectival organization of discourse. Insofar as these psychic phenomena are manifested by indication signs, either the narrator is taken to have seen the situations he talks about, in which case he can then be said to be in a position to *show* them, or else to have been told of, or rather inferred, those same situations, in which case it is then assumed that he cannot but simply *tell* what he will not have managed to make out by direct sensory experience.

In particular, tenses with overlapping event and reference points are the *conditio sine qua non* of direct forms of narrative transmission, lest those perceptual idioms with *prima facie* non-epistemic readings be inevitably subject to evidential-skewing (re)interpretive processes. Predictions like these, however, are nonmonotonic forms of reasoning which turn out to be defeasible by quantificational-aspect distinctions and inherent meaning considerations based on the cognitive processes associated with eventuality-description types.

1.2. The showing–telling distinction

1.2.1. *Quantitative indicators of scene and summary*

A quarter of century ago, narrative transmission was defined as "the class of kinds of narrative presentation which includes as its two sub-classes showing and telling (always remembering that *narrative* showing is different from, say, theatrical showing)." (Chatman 1975: 215). To say that showing is characterized by its emphasis on the scene, while telling is characterized by its emphasis on pure narration or summary just begs the question; for what is it that distinguishes scene from summary and, in the last analysis, showing from telling? In order to throw light on this intricate narrative–theoretical issue, consider the following text:

(8) *Entre les charges de cavalerie, des escouades de sergents de ville survenaient, pour faire refluer le monde dans les rues. Mais, sur les marches de Tortoni, un homme, – Dussardier, – remarquable de loin à sa haute taille, restait sans plus bouger qu'une cariatide. Un des agents qui marchait en tête, le tricorne sur les yeux, le menaça de son épée. L'autre alors, s'avançant d'un pas, se mit à crier:*
– Vive la République!
Il tomba sur le dos, les bras en croix. Un hurlement d'horreur s'éleva de la foule. L'agent fit un cercle autour de lui avec son regard; et Frédéric, béant, reconnut Sénécal.
(Flaubert 1983: 489)

'Between the calvary charges squads of policemen came up to drive the crowds back into the side streets. But on the steps of Tortoni's a man stood firm, as motionless as a caryatid, and conspicuous from afar on account of his tall stature. It was Dussardier. One of the policemen, who was marching in front of his squad, with his three-cornered hat pulled down over his eyes, threatened him with his sword. Then Dussardier took a step forward and started shouting:

"Long live the Republic!"

He fell on his back, with his arms spread out. A cry of horror rose from the crowd. The policeman looked all around him, and Frédéric, open-mouthed, recognized Sénécal.'

(Flaubert 1964: 411)

Text (8) is the famous street-riot *scene* from *L'Éducation Sentimentale* in which Frédéric Moreau sees his former friend Dussardier being shot by a policeman who turns out to be another former friend, Sénécal. The scene is supposed to give the reader the feeling of witnessing the described course of events as something happening under his eyes, but the fact is that whatever sort of 'dramatic illusion' he might have experienced upon reading these last lines of Chapter V of Part III of Flaubert's novel is inevitably shattered at the turn of the page. Chapter VI indeed departs from the adagio-like cadence of that scene, offering a brief *summary* of Frédéric's subsequent deeds:

(9) *Il voyagea.*

Il connut la mélancolie des paquebots, les froids réveils sous la tente, l'étourdissement des paysages et des ruines, l'amertume des sympathies interrompues.

Il revint.

Il fréquenta le monde, et il eut d'autres amours encore. Mais le souvenir continuel du premier les lui rendait insipides; et puis la véhémence du désir, la fleur même de la sensation était perdue. Ses ambitions d'esprit avaient également diminué. Des années passèrent; et il supportait le désoeuvrement de son intelligence et l'inertie de son cœur.

(Flaubert 1983: 491)

'He travelled.

He came to know the melancholy of the steamboat, the cold awakening in the tent, the tedium of landscapes and ruins, the bitterness of interrupted friendships.

He returned.

He went into society, and he had other loves. But the ever-present memory of the first made them insipid; and besides, the violence of desire, the very flower of feeling, had gone. His intellectual ambitions had also dwindled. Years went by; and he endured the idleness of his mind and the inertia of his heart.'

(Flaubert 1964: 411)

As a first approach to the disparity in effects showing up in these texts, it is common practice in narrative theory to resort to quantitative indicators such as the ratio between story-time and discourse-time, (the *Erzählzeit* of Müller 1947 or the *temps-papier* of Barthes 1967) defined as the amount of text-space, measured in printed lines/pages, alloted to the different subperiods or time-sections into which the *erzählte Zeit* ('story-time') spanned by the entire novel can be divided. Thus, whereas text (9) compresses some sixteen years of diegetic time in scarcely ten lines, text (8) devotes sensibly the same amount of discourse-time to cover a series of physical actions of short duration, i.e. the kind that do not take much longer to perform than to relate. The whole episode is developed in the cadence of a slow movement, phase by phase, in the entire development of its concrete fullness. Admittedly, there is by necessity a detail that will have been omitted in this kind of minute rendering of what took place on the occasion; story-time is isomorphic to the set of real numbers and cannot be exhausted in its flowing continuity by a finite number of sentences. Unlike a passage of quoted speech, which is supposed to report every word pronounced in a dialogue,[6] it is only by convention that there is a sort of equality between discourse- and story-time in a text like (8). As soon as the page is turned, however, the speed limit of the average narrative rhythm of the novel taken as a whole is definitely broken. Text (9) is no longer the slow exposition of a single entire episode, but a generalized account or report of a series of recurrent situations covering a considerably lengthy period of time and a variety of locales.

The same amount of discourse-time alloted to a very brief time-span such as that of text (8) becomes obviously too meager to mention, even cursorily, each of the denumerably many incidents crowded on a sixteen-year long story-time, let alone to render them at any length. As a consequence, the narrator is compelled, not only to ignore the concrete course and multifarious detailing of the individual events, but also to group them together into equivalence classes of occurrence, whose recurrent features are summarily drawn in broad free strokes. In addition to its drastically foreshortened eventive or actional part, text (9) also contains stative information about certain dispostions like the idleness of mind and the inertia of heart that have become Frédéric's habitual mood all over the time stretch under consideration. Furthermore, the time-ratio of discourse-time to story-time stands in direct proportion to contextual relevance: while the most important passages in the overall economy of the plot are presented with detail, the interim periods, on the contrary, are rather rapidly summarized; to achieve certain unexpected effects,[7] however, the detailed rendering of trivial incidents is a subtle technique to conceal the centrality of the dramatic high-points, which are given a perfunctory reference, if any. However interesting, this toying with the plot can be dispensed with; only those variations in time-ratios that can be said to have a bearing on the structure of narrative transmission are of concern to us here.

1.2.2. Markedness in narrative pace: the dramatic method

Although much confusion has arisen about what it exactly means, 'markedness in oppositions' is a concept essentially characterized by: (i) the existence of alternative marked and unmarked constructions; (ii) the presence vs. the absence or nonpertinence of some feature x, which is just the mark of the opposition; (iii) the inverse proportion relation between the marked form and the frequency of its occurrence; (iv) the 'expressive' communicative value intended with the marked construction type, that is, the effects or implicatures of markedness. Since the concept of markedness is inversely correlated with frequency of occurrence, to say that "summary narrative ... seems to be the normal untutored mode of storytelling" (Friedman [1955] 1967: 119–120) is to imply that scene forms the marked member of the opposition.

As a corollary, the full-fledged discrimination of scenes is naturally supposed to occur less frequently than its unmarked counterpart, which runs against the fact that we have become so accustomed to the minute-detailing technique of the scenic model that we have great difficulty experiencing the broad and generalized strokes of summary found in Butler, Dickens, Fielding, Hardy, Thackeray and Trollope. Rather than an apparent contradiction, what really happened is that the modern novel has overexploited its characteristic propensity for scene in such a way that made it lose much of its markedness value. Note, however, that this is a *devaluation* of the mark through a sort of inflation process and not the *markedness shift* suggested in Table 1. For this to be the case, the marked member of the opposition would necessarily have to become 'demarked' and the unmarked one obsolete in order to make room for the appearance of a new marked category.[8]

Table 1. Pseudo-markedness shift in narrative discourse rhythmic oppositions

	Marked	Unmarked	Obsolete
Stage 1	Scene	Summary	—
Stage 2	—	Scene	(Summary)
Stage 3	?	Scene	—

In fact, as there is no new narrative form in the marked-member slot and as it cannot be predicted whether such a form will ever be realized, this phenomenon is hardly eligible as an instance of markedness-shift. Rather than implying that it got 'demarked', the historical process of devaluation of scene through an increase of frequency means only that this kind of detailing method is no longer a construction type (of narrative modelling) with the extra attentional-commanding value experienced after the first massive onslaughts on omniscient narration. The scene is still marked by the presence of some feature x to achieve specific communicative effects that are beyond the reach of summary, so that the task we next come to grips with is to determine what kind of feature x might be and for what purpose it will have been created.

As a rule, there are large stretches of the world (re)presented in fiction which are necessary to the plot but not worth being dwelt upon lest they become so exceedingly tedious as to dismay novel readers; these stretches are normally interspersed in the course of narration to fill the temporal gap between two scenes and betray the adoption of an Olympian vantage point of perspective beyond time and place, from the height of which they are surveyed with a sweeping glance. This method is thus clearly incompatible with the spatio-temporal constraints which discriminate the *hic et nunc* of particular occasions like Sénécal's shooting of Dussardier at the sight of Frédéric Moureau. Summaries like text (9) are meant to convey a piece of *information* about a tract of past time which they traverse as quickly as possible, but mere knowledge is more akin to history than to narrative fiction. "In history our object is to know. In fiction, our object is to feel and appreciate, and what counts is not the number of facts but the degree to which we have been made to live with them." (Beach 1932: 188). As reported in text (9), the events are too remote 'to be lived with'. Contrary to the characteristic looseness of *default* summary practices, the scene is governed by two closely related constraints by which it comes up as the marked construction type of narrative transmission. The first and foremost is undoubtedly the *time-limitation* constraint, which coerces the story-time into spanning a relatively short period and contributes thereby to the dense, strict partial order(ing) of events which is the hallmark of the scenic model of narrative presentation. Most narratives do not provide explicit markers of duration and a text like (8) is no exception. By everyday world-knowledge criteria, however, it is by no means unreasonable to assume that the street-riot scene does not considerably outlast the time it takes to read it. The second constraint is nothing but a mere corollary of the first one: it is the *space-limitation* as exemplified by the fact that the actional stage of text (8) is confined to a street around the steps of Tortoni's. Both space- and time-limitation are narrative-extraneous principles borrowed from dramatic representation, where the amount of action enacted has to be adjusted to the spatio-temporal frame of the stage. The scene represents therefore the incorporation of dramatic methods into narrative fiction, as a means of increasing the expressive power of an essentially symbolic and distorting medium like natural language.

The following five texts have been concocted in such a way that each one but the first takes its cue, as it were, from that which precedes it, adding up to a chronologically ordered, self-enclosed account of the dramatic method and its problems directly based on historical sources:

Alle mimischen Mittel, durch die der Dramatiker seinen Vorgang vor das äußere Auge und Ohr des Zuschauers bringt, gelangen zur Anwendung, um den Leser zu einer Art Zuschauer und Zuhörer zu machen, der – mittels des inneren Sinnes – Gestalten sieht und ihre Reden hört ... Ganz wie auf der Bühne. [All mimetic means by which the playwright places his scene before the external eye and ear of the onlooker are put to good use for turning the reader into a sort of spectator and hearer who sees characters and listens to their speech in his mind's eye ... Just like on the stage.] (Walzel 1926: 183)

On the stage everything is present because everything is enacted directly for our eyes and ears. In a story, we have the psychological equivalent of the dramatic present whenever we have a vividly "constituted scene", as Henry James calls it, a selected, a "discriminated occasion".   ... The dramatic method is the method of direct presentation, and aims to give the reader the sense of being present, here and now, in the scene of action. (Beach 1932: 148; 181)

The dramatic mode ... enables the reader to merge himself into the fictive present and fictional time of the book, and creates in him the illusion of being present at the action, in both meanings of the word 'present', as he is when seeing a play on the stage. It achieves these effects by the direct presentation of scenes, where the fullness of detail, the limitation of time and the exclusion of extraneous comment or explanation, all help to give the feeling of what Beach calls 'the continuous dramatic present'. (Mendilow [1952] 1972: 111)

Naturally, in all but the scenic arts – like drama and the ballet – pure mimesis, that is, direct witnessing, is an illusion. The question, then, is how this illusion is achieved, by what convention does a reader, for example, accept the idea that it is 'as if' he were personally on the scene, though the fact is that he comes to it by turning pages and reading words. (Chatman 1975:215)

This crucial question has never been satisfactorily answered by the pro-illusionists. (Sternberg 1978: 22)

In all these passages it is unequivocally assumed from the very outset that dramatic representation has an advantage over narrative fiction. To bridge the gap between the two genres, Walzel and Beach argue that narrative rendering should be modelled after the enacted scene, if not to achieve the immediacy in which that advantage consists of, at least to try to induce the reader to yield to an illusion of the sort. Mendilow does not fail to notice the temporal determination of scene (the limitation of time and the consequent fullness of detail is just the distinctive feature underlying that marked member of the opposition) and for Chatman the illusion of direct witnessing is called mimesis. The term designates the capacity of literature to represent reality, but had already been opposed to diegesis in the works of Plato and Aristotle in order to distinguish direct from indirect (re)presentation. The opposition, however, did not really come into play until it surged forth in Anglo-American criticism, rebaptized as showing and telling. Ever since then, dyads like mimesis vs. diegesis, showing vs. telling, dramatic vs. undramatic and, metonymically, scene vs. summary have become roughly equivalent forms to couch the same opposition. Chatman does not raise any objections against the illusionist tenet,[9] but it is clear that on implying that there is quite a difference between the enacted scene proper and what might be called the *paper-scene*, then the question which immediately arises has certainly to do with how that illusion is achievable in verbal reports of non-verbal events. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that this question has never been satisfactorily answered by literary criticism or by narrative theory. On the one hand, literary critics hardly ever addressed the question of narrative transmission without both partisanship and preconception, out of a wish not to pass judgements but just to describe and explain. On the other hand, those narrative theorists who have tried to account for the technical devices by which novelists are supposed to preserve the illusion were not prepared to correlate narrative categories with discourse structures in a systematic and linguistically informed way, since they had only old-grammar rags to dress their naked intuition. Some of these attempts/efforts will be briefly reviewed in Chapter 2, where it can be seen that there has been very little agreement as to the linguistic structure underlying the polarity of narrative presentation. The next sections outline the guidelines of a solution to this problem.

1.3. Narrative transmission as cognitive distance: from evidential modalities to indication signs

1.3.1. The problem of mimesis

In the last few decades at least, the neo-Aristotelian valuing of showing as being the quintessence of storytelling has been strongly criticized, on the grounds that narrative fiction is a fact of natural language and that natural languages are known to signify without imitating. For Genette, "... aucun récit ne peut "montrer" ou "imiter" l'histoire qu'il raconte. Il ne peut que la raconter de façon détaillée, précise, "vivante", et donner par là plus ou moins l'*illusion de mimésis* ..." (1972: 185) [... no narrative can "show" or "imitate" the story it tells. All it can do is is tell it in a manner which is detailed, precise, "alive", and in that way give more or less the *illusion of mimesis* (1980: 164)]. Applied to the theory and practice of the dramatic method, however, this sort of criticism is clearly misguided, all the more so since it is Genette who equates the idea of showing with the concept of imitation; in none of the texts quoted above is it implied that narration possesses the aptitude of showing, in the (pseudo) imitative sense of the word, the smile of the lover, the frown of the tyrant, the grimace of the clown. Literary theorists and critics need not read Saussure or be acquainted with the semiotics of Peirce to see what is obvious even to the layman, namely that the link between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Similarly, Genette's claim that the craft of showing ultimately boils down to an illusion of mimesis only achievable by different kinds of telling (i.e. more or less detailed, precise and 'alive') sounds as if he were proposing something unheard of, when the fact is that he is just repeating Lubbock, Beach, Stanzel, Mendilow and many other authors who have been blamed for not having said what they actually did and for having allegedly said what will never have crossed their minds. What is more, Genette did not quite succeed in his attempt to account for narrative rendering in terms of the modal category of *distance* because he failed to see that this is a question of the kind of evidence that narrators have about the diegetic world they proceed to recount. This section is meant to show how distance can be measured on an evidentiary scale between direct and indirect data-source information.

1.3.2. The linguistic coding of epistemology

All natural-language systems provide their users with the means for making statements, asking questions, issuing directives and the like. Which specific attitude a speech act expresses towards propositional content is called its illocutionary force and in most languages these attitudinal differences are cast in the grammatical category of mood. The main function of narrative fiction, however, is just to tell a story (to recount whatever events certain *dramatis personae* participate in) by making statements instead of asking questions or expressing wishes — the illocutionary force of interrogative and imperative sentences consubstantiates the *author's intrusions* of omniscient narration types but such garrulous excurses are clearly narrative-extraneous elements. Now, the particular kind of attitude which defines the illocutionary force of statement-making sentences is called epistemic commitment, and the grammatical mood that is used for the purpose of expressing unqualified epistemic commitment is just the indicative (Lyons 1995). Just as the illocutionary force of statements is not the same as that of questions and directives, there are also quite distinct ways by which speakers and/or narrators can qualify their epistemic commitment, depending on what sort of evidence is adduced to support their claims. "On peut en effet raconter *plus ou moins* ce que l'on raconte, et le raconter *selon tel ou tel point de vue* ... "Distance" et "perspective", ainsi provisoirement dénommées et définies, sont les deux modalités essentielles de cette *régulation de l'information narrative* qu'est le mode." (Genette 1972: 183–84) [Indeed, one can tell *more* or tell *less* what one tells, and can tell it *according to one point of view or another* ... "Distance" and "perspective", thus provisionally designated and defined, are the two chief modalities of that *regulation of narrative information* that is mood. (1980: 161–62. Genette's own emphasis)]. Unfortunately, this definition is too vague and does take into account the evidential categories required by a modal foundation of distance. The discourse of narrative can, indeed, provide more or fewer details and thus keep at a lesser or a greater distance from what it recounts, so that the quantity of information is in inverse proportion to distance: just as maximal information implies a minimum of distance (showing), a minimum of information corresponds to maximal distance (telling).

Ultimately, what this amounts to is that the fictional world presented is built around some 'deictic centre' defined by cognitive parameters: whereas some **States of Affairs** come closer to that deictic centre, carrying the bulk of detailed, action-centered, assertive information, others lie further away and are therefore much more difficult to access. Conceived of in this strictly cognitive sense, distance varies according to the reported SoAs are cognitively more or less close to the I-Origo, that is, according to the epistemic strength of the information source, so that narrative discourse develops along a modal axis representing transitional states from what is known to what is less so and vice versa. Consider a short passage from an autobiographical story in Tsez, (a Nakh-Daghestanian language spoken in the Daghestan Republic) where the narrator assigns a task to someone he is acquainted with but who fails to carry it out:

(10)   *t' aꞔizi-n*   *O-oq-no*   *O-oxi-n*   *idur-no*
       disappear-and   I-become-ANTCVB   I-run-ANTCVB   home-and
       Ø-ik' i-n   *paraq' at*   *kec-xo*   *zow-no.* ...
       I-go-ANTCVB   relax   sleep-SIMCVB   be-PSTUNWIT
       dahamaq' aw   *usyno*   *Ø-ꞔuλ'-er-si.*
       little   also   I-fear-CAUS-PSTWIT
       'He disappeared and ran off home and slept peacefully. ...
       I frightened him a little.' (Comrie 2000: 7)[10]

The self-evident part of (10) is marked in the witnessed past (PSTWIT) *-s(i)* and the bulk of the story in the unwitnessed past (PSTUNW) *-n(o)*, which seems to point out that direct-evidence signalling morphemes correlate with showing as do indirect-evidence markers with telling. The evidential parameter expressed in Tsez is basically that of mere witnessed vs. unwitnessed experience reported in the past tense and has been accordingly called a two-term evidential system of type A1, but there are languages with finer-grained models of evidential coding such as the four-term systems of type C1 (Aikhenvald 2003, 2004). Thus, in Tariana, a North Arawak language spoken in Amazonia, whereas both direct visual and auditory evidence is marked by verb suffixes like *ka* and *mahka* in the examples (11a) and (11b) below, indirect data-sources such as second-hand information and inference,

either from physical perception evidence (results) or mere reasoning, are coded by the system of verbal inflections in (11c), (11d) and (11e) (Aikhenvald 2003a: 134–135):

(11) a. *Ceci   tʃinu-nuku   du-kwisa-ka.*
   Cecília   dog-TOP.NON.A/S   3SGF-scold-REC.P.VIS
   'Cecília scolded the dog.' (I saw it: VISUAL)
  b. *Ceci   tʃinu-nuku   du-kwisa-mahka.*
   Cecília   dog-TOP.NON.A/S   3SGF-scold-REC.P.NONVIS
   'Cecília scolded the dog.' (I heard it: NONVISUAL)
  c. *Ceci   tʃinu-nuku   du-kwisa-pidaka.*
   Cecília   dog-TOP.NON.A/S   3SGF-scold-REC.P.REP
   'Cecília scolded the dog.' (I was told: REPORTED)
  d. *Ceci   tʃinu-nuku   du-kwisa-nihka.*
   Cecília   dog-TOP.NON.A/S   3SGF-scold-SPEC.INFR.REC.P.
   'Cecília scolded the dog.' (I inferred it: SPECIFIC INFERENCE)
  e. *Ceci   tʃinu-nuku   du-kwisa-sika.*
   Cecília   dog-TOP.NON.A/S   3SGF-scold-REC.P.INFR
   'Cecília scolded the dog.' (I assume it: GENERAL INFERENCE)

The sentences in (12) differ from those in (11) in propositional content, but the evidential paradigm is just the same (Aikhenvald 2004: 2–3):

(12) a. *Juse irida di-manika-ka.*
   'José played football (I saw him play).'
  b. *Juse irida di-manika-mahka.*
   'José played football (I heard him play).'
  c. *Juse irida di-manika-pidaka.*
   'José played football (Someone else told me).'
  d. *Juse irida di-manika-nihka.*
   'José played football (I see evidence for it).'
  e. *Juse irida di-manika-sika*
   'José played football (It is reasonable to assume so)'

Tariana developed under the areal influence of Tucanoan languages and the following examples show its evidential parallel with Tuyuca, a Tucanoan language spoken in Brazil and in Colombia (Barnes 1984):

(13)   a. *díiga apé-wi*.
         'He played soccer (I saw him play).'
       b. *díiga apé-ti*.
         'He played soccer (I heard, but did not see, him play).'
       c. *díiga apé-yigi*.
         'He played soccer (Someone else told me).'
       d. *díiga apé-yi*.
         'He played soccer (I see evidence for it).'
       e. *díiga apé-hiyi*.
         'He played soccer (It is reasonable to assume so).'

These data clearly indicate that in some languages an ±EXPERIENTIAL parameter subdivides into attested, reported and inferred evidence, each one further subcategorized as Figure 1 indicates (Willett 1988).[11]

$$
\text{Evidentials}
\begin{cases}
\text{+EXPERIENTIAL} - \textbf{Attested}
\begin{cases}
\text{Visual (a)} \\
\text{Auditory (b)} \\
\text{Other senses}
\end{cases} \\
\text{-EXPERIENTIAL}
\begin{cases}
\textbf{Reported}
\begin{cases}
\text{Hearsay (c)} \\
\text{Folklore}
\end{cases} \\
\textbf{Inference}
\begin{cases}
\text{Results (d)} \\
\text{Reasoning (e)}
\end{cases}
\end{cases}
\end{cases}
$$

Figure 1. Nested structure of evidential modalities according to Willett[12]

In order to pick up the thread of evidentiality in narrative rendering, consider now the contrasts in the verb inflection(al) system of Sherpa, a language from the Tibeto-Burman family closely related to Tibetan:

(14)   a. *daa   saap-p   mi ti yembur-laa   de -ki-nok*.
         rice   eat-NOMNLZR   man he Katmandu-DAT stay-HE
         'The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.'
         (I see or I have seen that ...)
       b. *daa   saap-p   mi ti yembur-laa   de -ki-wi*.
         rice   eat-NOMNLZR   man he Katmandu-DAT stay-GN
         'The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.'
         (It is known that ...) ·(Woodbury 1986: 191)

In the present-tense system, direct sensory evidence is marked by the HABITUAL EXPERIENTIAL form *no(k)* and unspecified indirect evidence, be it quotative and/or inferential, by the GNOMIC-signalling suffix *-wi*, but this evidential pair can be skewed in its meaning and distribution (Woodbury 1986: 193):

(15) a. *'jon-ki   'ti   'kuršiŋq   'ti   dzo -suŋ.*
          John-ERG   the   chair   it   build-PE
          'John built the chair.' (I saw that ...)
    b. *'jon-ki   'ti   'kuršiŋq   'ti   dzo -nok.*
          John-ERG   the   chair   it   build-PI
          'John built the chair.' (I inferred/was told that ...)

In the past-tense system, PAST EXPERIENTIAL value is marked by *-suŋ* in (15a) and *-no(k)* takes the place of *-wi* in (15b) as PAST INFERENTIAL. (The process by which a certain evidential marker in one tense takes on a different meaning in another tense is called evidential skewing.[13]) Now consider the *Life of the Buddha* told by a Lama (Givón 1982: 34):

(16)   *sangye čumden-dye thungup-ki nyima din žur-la,*
       Buddha Sakya-muni   birth-GEN   day   seven after-DAT
       Seven days after the birth of Buddha Sakyamuni,
       sangye čumden-dye-ki yum goŋ-pa-zoo-nok;
       Buddha Sakya-muni-GEN mother think-finish-PI
       his mother died;
       tema žur-la,
       then   after-DAT
       so after that,
       sangye čumden-dye-ki saŋ-yum zen-yi še-nok;
       Buddha Sakya-muni-GEN father-ERG secret-mother another-ACC marry-PI
       Buddha Sakyamuni's father took another wife;
       tema žur-la,
       then   after-DAT
       so after that,
       sangye čumde-dye-ki yap-taŋ uru-la see-čik šuŋ-nok. ...
       Buddha Sakya-muni-GEN father- and step-mother-DAT son-one be-PI
       Buddha Sakyamuni's father and mother had a son. ... [14]

Since the Lama will not have witnessed what was just passed down to him via a long chain of oral transmission (Givón 1982; Palmer 1986), the bulk of (16) is reported in the PAST INFERENTIAL marker -*no*(*k*), which is scant evidential justification for a 'true' story like Buddha's and thus casts doubt on the view that subjective epistemic certainty is necessarily based on the topmost categories of the evidentiary scale. The suffix -*suŋ* occurs only twice as part of direct-quoted speech forms:

(17) a. *ač[u-ti-ki-kii:*   '*nyal-i-luŋba khaŋ-khaŋ toŋ-suŋ?*' *suŋ-nok*
     brother-his-GEN-ERG   hell-Gen-land how-many   see-PE   say-PI
     his brother asked him: 'How many things did you see on hell?'
   b. '*nye nyal-i-luŋba-la ŏwa-laŋ-updaasa maa-mu toŋ-suŋ*'
     si-kyaa-nok ...
     I-ERG hell-GEN-land-DAT fear-rise-INF place many see-PE say-AUX-PI
     'I saw many fearful places in hell', the brother told Buddha ...

The WH-question in (17a) and the clause in (17b) within which the -*suŋ* form occurs are both embedded in -*no*(*k*)-marked *verba dicendi*, stemming thereby from the same source of oral transmission as (16); the difference is that while summary (16) is by nature a low-ranked *construct* on the scale of evidentiality (Chung and Timberlake 1985), speech transaction (17) is of a kind that one reports *as if* overheard, as it can be seen in the following Salar narrative (Dwyer 2000: 48):[15]

(18) a. *nenosur var a̲. bowusur var a̲r a̲.* ... *indzi awučuxniği abası*
     vursen adziuniği helli ŏcile apparmiš̲.
     'There was an old woman and an old man. ... So the boy's father borrowed some of Uncle Vursen's money.'
   b. *idzaniği   jahtuğuni   gün ana   appard̲zi.*
     mother-GEN   pillow-3POSS.ACC   sun girl   take-go-ANT.DIR
     'The sun maidens took your mother's pillow.'

Directly perceived events are marked in Salar with the verb suffix -*dzi* and indirectly experienced ones with the suffix -*miš* or the clitic -*a*. Because fictional narrative is taken to recount −REALIS occurrences, both indirective-signalling forms -*miš* and -*a* appear in the opening series of events (18a) but not in the -*dzi*-marked quoted speech (18b).

If to package chunks of experience into linearly ordered sets of events seems to be indeed a distance-inducing cognitive process linguistically coded by indirective markers like -*no*(*k*) in (16) and -*miš* or -*a* in (18a), to describe is, on the other hand, a perspectivally situated activity. "Man beschreibt das, was man vor sich sieht" (Lukács [1936] 1974:56) [We describe what we see], so that it should come as no surprise that evidentiality is marked by visual-perception signalling forms like *erken* in this paradigmatic descriptive passage from an Afghan Uzbek text (Jarring, quoted in Johanson 2000: 78–9):

(19) *Ušu* *toχtagan* *dzåjini*   *kordi*   *ki*
   that   stop-PART place-POSS3SG-ACC see-PAST3SG that
   He saw the place where he was staying (and established:)
   bær masdziidni bær ujidɛ   *turar*   <u>*ek'an*</u>.
   one mosque-GEN one house-POSS3SG-LOG stand-PRES ERKEN
   He was (as he saw) in a house belonging to a mosque.
   ujini   *taginda*   *bær jertola ba:r* <u>*ek'an*</u>,
   house-POSS-GEN bottom-POSS–LOC one cellar existing ERKEN
   Under the mosque there was (as he saw) a cellar,
   uša å:lip *ba:rɣan nⁱ ersɛlɛrni uša jerge qojar* <u>*ek'ɛn*</u>. ...
   that take-CONV go-PART thing-ACC that place put-PRES ERKEN
   where the thief put (as he saw) the things he had taken. ...
   Ertɛ   *bilɛn* ... *uša oɣri turgan* *dzåjge*   *bardi*.
   morning with   that thief stay-PART place-DAT go-PAST3SG
   In the morning he ... went to the place where was the thief.
   Qarasa-ki *uša oɣri* *uša* *masdzitni* *mullasi* <u>*ek'an*</u>.
   Look-COND-that that thief that mosque-GEN mullah-POSS ERKEN
   Looking (he saw that) the thief was the mullah of the mosque.

where the sole *event*-denoting sentence is unmarked for directivity. The coding of epistemology is a context-sensitive process determined by discourse-pragmatic factors such as the social intentions of the speech act participants and genre-bound conventions (Dwyer 2000). In particular, there seems to be evidence that evidential marking in narrative is based on world knowledge of the evidence-getting forms inherent in, say, direct speech and ±*STAT* eventuality descriptions, irrespective of empirically available data-source information, if any.[16]

Further evidence for the cognitive basis of these mismatches between source of information and evidential coding is provided by so-called epistemological stance adoption in the process of narrative retelling. Macedonian has a morphological paradigm of evidential oppositions such that the definite confirmative past-tense form is +EXPERIENTIAL and the nonconfirmative past with the *l*-participle codes reportedness. However, a narrative retelling fragment such as (Mushin 2001: 183):

(20) a. *Mnogu se   godel̲   lebot   kaj majka mu.*
       very   REFL turn.out:L bread:DEF LOC mother   3SG.DAT
       'The bread often turned out well at her mother's house.'
   b. *Sega ama ovoj pat mu   se   zgreschi   lebot.*
       now but   DEM time 3SG.DAT REFL be.wrong:SP bread:DEF
       'Now, but this time the bread had turned out wrong.'

brings out that the reportive epistemological stance adopted in (20a) then shifts to a definite past marked +EXPERIENTIAL strategy in (20b) to vouch for information about a single occurrence of the event type. Epistemological stance shiftings in English can be illustrated with the *Mouse soup* story also from Mushin's corpus-based study on retelling. The teller is a middle-age woman who was once in the living room with all the family when a 'plopping' sound came from the kitchen. Her mother then sent the father in and he found a mouse in the soup. This is part of one of the narrative retellings (Mushin 2001: 132; 138):

(21)   *so she sends the husband in*
      he's looking around
      and he notices that the cat's on the stove
      and apparently the cat never gets on the stove
      so he goes over to the cat and he looks into the pot ...

As the recount shows no marks of a reportive epistemological stance, (21) is quite reminiscent of current reports of direct perceived events, except when it comes to the background information about the cat. The reteller then has to resort to the reportive code by means of an adverbial of propositional attitude which betrays that this is just the kind of knowledge s/he could not have made out by direct experience.

The same goes for a second retelling of the mouse soup narrative, where the single clause under the scope of the reportive framing device drawing attention to the evidentiary source of the following excerpt:

(22) *and and when the father went into the kitchen*
      he saw the cat on the top of the stove
      and she[previous teller]said
      that the cat never used to do that
      right
      when the father saw that
      he∼
      you know
      he shushed it away
      and figured that the cat was trying to get some meat
      right

happens to be just the one modified by the reportive adverbial in (21). In fact, to the extent that habitual meaning is clearly inconsistent with singulative eventuality descriptions and threatens discourse coherence, epistemological stance adoption strategies redress the balance between the source of information and the pragmatics of discourse production.


Figure 2. Model of epistemological stance adoption according to Mushin (2001)

Epistemological stance adoption depends on genre-bound conventions, rhetorical purposes and world-knowledge of eventuality descriptions; evidential coding in Figure 2 is just the linguistic output of that choice.

1.3.3. *Evidential retrieval and perception verb complements (PVCs)*[17]

1.3.3.1. The use of the term 'evidential'[18] is clearly synecdochical; it refers to evidence proper as well as to all data-sources which are downgraded modifications of that *Urform* ('proto-form') of knowledge. Evidentials are also a subsystem of epistemic modalities *lato sensu*, in the sense that the (de)gradation of subjective certainty in which qualified epistemic commitment consists of is a necessary by-product of the evidentiary strength of the available data-source information. It seems thus in order to draw the distinctions depicted in Figure 3.

$$
\text{Modalities} \begin{cases} \textbf{Evidential} \begin{cases} \text{Experience} \\ \text{Inference} \\ \text{Hearsay} \\ \text{Belief} \end{cases} \\ \textbf{Epistemic} \begin{cases} \text{Certain} \\ \text{Possible} \\ \text{Probable} \\ \text{Doubtful} \end{cases} \end{cases}
$$

Figure 3. Evidential and epistemic modalities[19]

Now, although English has a rich repertoire of these modal categories (adverbs like *maybe*, modal verbs *may/might* and perceptual idioms), evidential specification is not as frequent as it is in those languages which explicitly mark it with coherent sets of verb affixes and clitics. For instance, the following excerpt from Hemingway's "The Killers":

(23)   *Nick opened the door and went into the room. Ole Andreson was lying on the bed with all his clothes on. He had been a heavyweight prize-fighter and he was too long for the bed.* (Hemingway 1984: 374)

does not specify whether the whole situation has been experienced rather than deduced or merely inferred from circumstancial evidence, or observed by someone who might have reported it to the speaker. On the face of it, the problem is to look for what has been called an *evidence evaluation procedure* (Givón 1982) with which to retrieve the epistemological imprint of the text from deep and surface information.

One way to carry this out is just take the sentences of which (23) is composed as clausal complements of high deep-syntactic structures containing perception verbs, modal auxiliaries and quotative phrases. The idea is to test the propositions in the subordinate clauses against different kinds of evidential categories for epistemological consistency, but it should be borne in mind that the interpretation of perception verbs varies according to the complement type that they occur with, as shown by the following examples:

(24) a. I SAW *Nick open the door and go into the room.*
      b. I SAW *Nick opening the door and going into the room.*
      c. *I SAW *Nick to open the door and to go into the room.*
      d. I SAW *that Nick opened the door and went into the room.*

(25) a. I SAW *Ole Andreson lie on the bed with all his clothes on.*
      b. I SAW *Ole Andreson lying on the bed with all his clothes on.*
      c. *I SAW *Ole Andreson to lie on the bed with all his clothes on.*
      d. I SAW *that O. A. was lying on the bed with all his clothes on.*

(26) a. *I SAW *him have been a heavyweight prize-fighter.*
      b. *I SAW *him having been a heavyweight prize-fighter.*
      c. ?I SAW *him to have been a heavyweight prize-fighter.*
      d. ⌐I SAW *that he had been a heavyweight prize-fighter.*

(27) a. I SAW *him be too long for the bed/*intelligent.*
      b. I SAW *him being too long for the bed/*intelligent.*
      c. I SAW *him to be too long for the bed/intelligent.*
      d. I SAW *that he was too long for the bed/intelligent.*

There are four types of Perception Verb Complement (Felser 1999): bare Infinitive Perception Verb Complements, Participial Perception Verb Complements, full infinitives or *to*-PVCs and finite *that*-PVCs. Except for their failure to occur with non-stative predicates in (24c), full infinitival clauses pattern with *that*-PCVs rather than with BIs. IPVCs and PPVCs, in turn, are small or reduced clausal constituents with no tense markers and subject to a set of restrictions on auxiliaries and predicate type that are different only in aspectual specification.