Cognitive Models
in
Language and Thought

Cognitive Linguistics Research
24

Editors
René Dirven
Ronald W. Langacker
John R. Taylor

Cognitive Models in Language and Thought

Ideology, Metaphors and Meanings

Edited by
René Dirven
Roslyn Frank
Martin Pütz

Preface

This collection of papers is the result of the 29th International LAUD Symposium entitled "The Language of Socio-Political Ideologies", which was held at the University of Koblenz-Landau in Landau (Germany) on March 27-29, 2002.

Thanks to the generous support by the DFG (German Research Foundation), the University of Koblenz-Landau, the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Rhineland-Palatinate, the Gillet Foundation (Edenkoben) and the Friends and Supporters of the University of Koblenz-Landau (Campus Landau), many internationally well-known scholars could participate in the symposium. Thanks are also due to the organizing LAUD team of the conference, in particular Heike Ramsauer, Angelika Daniel and Holly Hirzel for their enthusiasm and kind assistance.

Beyond these, a sincere thanks goes out to the authors in this volume, who have responded with alacrity and professionalism to all the requests that have been made of them. We are also indebted to two of the editors of the book series *Cognitive Linguistics Research*: Ronald W. Langacker and John R. Taylor, whose support was crucial to the emergence of the present volume.

Our deep gratitude must also go to those who made this publication possible: to all colleagues who kindly agreed to act as referees and who reviewed the papers, offering valuable advice both to the contributors and to the editors; furthermore, to Anke Beck and Birgit Sievert (Mouton de Gruyter), for their kind assistance and cooperation with this venture; and to Jörg Behrndt (Duisburg), whose expertise and infinite patience gave the volume its final computerized shape.

<div align="right">

René Dirven (University of Duisburg)
Roslyn Frank (University of Iowa)
Martin Pütz (University of Koblenz-Landau)

</div>

Contents

Section 3: Cognitive models as covert ideologies

Section 4: Cognitive models in covert social debates

Introduction:
Categories, cognitive models and ideologies

René Dirven, Roslyn M. Frank and Martin Pütz

This volume results from the 29th International LAUD Symposium, held on March 27-29, 2002 at the University of Koblenz-Landau in Landau, Germany. The conference theme "The Language of Socio-Political Ideologies" concentrated on various aspects of the theory and application of cognitive linguistics and other linguistic models, and more particularly on the interplay between language and ideology seen from various linguistic sub-disciplines. While the present volume has a clear focus on cognitive linguistics in general and cognitive models and metaphor in particular, the other conference volume (eds. Pütz, Neff-van Aertselaer & van Dijk forthcoming) likewise deals with language and ideology, but takes a different perspective, i.e. critical linguistics in discourse and ecolinguistic studies.

In this introduction the focus is on the societal orientation of cognitive linguistics, on the many descriptive tools developed in cognitive linguistics, and on the way the contributors have explored and exploited these tools in their analyses of ideologies.

1. The interplay between cognitive linguistics and ideology

On the one hand, this collective volume is an attempt to investigate empirically what cognitive linguistics has to offer as research tools for the definition, detection, analysis and interpretation of language-based societal systems such as ideology. Both in its neutral and in its "loaded" senses, ideology is a system of beliefs and values based on a set of cognitive models, i.e. mental representations – partly linguistic, partly non-linguistic – of recurrent phenomena and their inter-

pretations in culture and society. As such, the volume is an invitation to all scholars in neighboring fields, such as functionalism, pragmatics and critical linguistics or critical discourse analysis, to take cognizance of the instrumental repertoire developed within cognitive linguistics and its ability to address symbolization of overt and covert conceptualizations of belief and value systems and their expression in language.

On the other hand, this volume is also an invitation to cognitive linguists, and to all linguists of whatever orientation, to put their analytical tools to work, not only on the system-internal areas of conceptualization and linguistic structure, but also on the crucial areas of socio-political thought, organization and communication. To be more concrete, this volume acts as an incentive to further develop and expand cognitive linguistics in the direction of a cognitive sociolinguistics, i.e towards investigations encompassing cognitive views of language politics and language attitudes, cognitive discourse analysis, cognitive stylistics and cognitive rhetoric. Functioning together in one broad theoretical framework, these various sub-disciplines will be far better equipped to develop large-scale ideology research programs. In this way, cognitive linguistics is heading for its own built-in final destination, that of cognitive semiotics.

The ball is in both courts now. Scholars not yet familiar with the tenets and analytical tools of cognitive linguistics are invited to find out more about them. And cognitive linguistic scholars are invited to look beyond the familiar so-called language-structure areas and to come to grips with the societal belief and value systems that these linguistic structures serve, maintain and perpetuate. This may be, in a nutshell, the essence of ideology research.

Linguistics, as an academic subject of critical reflection on the many aspects of linguistic structuring and functioning, has, just like most academic disciplines, witnessed the total split between the various paradigms which have developed because of the changing spirit of the times. In turn, due to the neglect or even total exclusion of meaning as a central concern in structuralist thought, and due to its minimalist role in the successive generative approaches, it was only a matter of time before vigorous new sub-disciplines such as pragmat-

ics and discourse analysis would arise. Similarly, due to the lack of concern for the social symbolizing function of language, it was equally natural that with time other vigorous sub-disciplines such as sociolinguistics, ethnomethodology, conversational analysis, critical linguistics, and critical discourse analysis would come into being. This picture of a total split between all these sub-disciplines in the global linguistic scene may look gloomy, but it is even more disheartening to witness that most linguists seem to feel rather safe in their isolated niches.

Yet, cognitive linguistics does not intend to become a new niche for all those who want to safeguard the primacy of meaning. Because cognitive linguistics is fully committed to meaning, it must approach meaning in its deepest societal reality, that is, as negotiated meaning, i.e. as symbolization by human conceptualizers who wish to create and construe the meaning complexes they want to exchange with partners in interaction. Grammar, viewed as the inventory of all possible conventionalized assemblies and constructions of meaning complexes in a given language, is moreover usage-based. As such, cognitive linguistics aims to integrate all the multi-faceted dimensions of linguistic communication. It has an equal commitment to the structuring of linguistic exchanges and to the communicative functions that linguistic expressions are supposed to serve.

Cognitive linguistics thus claims to be the very first linguistic model that is all-inclusive or all-embracing. That is, cognitive linguistics is simultaneously both a fully developed grammatical model and a fully user- and usage-oriented model covering the functional, pragmatic, interactive and socio-cultural dimensions of language-in-use. This theoretical stance is not really new for it has been implicit in most of Ron Langacker's and George Lakoff's writings, and it has come to explicit formulations, for example, in Langacker's essay "Culture, cognition and grammar (Langacker 1994). What is new, however, is that a number of cognitive linguists are beginning to explore the second route offered by this all-embracing commitment.

2. Cognitive tools for ideology research

The research tools that the papers in the present volume explore and exploit are not new, but rather they are the very tools inherent to the cognitive approach. Problems of ideology are analyzed from two basic vantage points: a non-metaphorical one (Geeraerts, Kristiansen, Sego, Nerlich & Dingwall), or else a metaphorical vantage point (most other papers), or a mixture of both (Hamilton). This gives ample proof of the fact that cognitive linguistics has much more to contribute to the study of ideology than its know-how on metaphor and metaphorical thought. Indeed, its most basic and strongest research tool is its insightful ability to lay bare the structuring of conceptions and concepts. Therefore, it is only natural that this most basic tool is central to the contributions that cognitive linguists can make to the analysis of ideology. Cognitive linguistics is an approach to language that, as Langacker (2000: 1) puts it, sees the semantic pole as inseparably linked to the phonological pole in the symbolic structure that is language. Though there is dispute about the exact differentiation between meaning and conceptualization (see Levinson 1997), there is no doubt that meanings are conventionalized conceptualizations (see Bartsch 2002).

In fact, metaphoric thought should not in any way be seen as opposed to this basic conceptualization tool. Rather it should be understood as a special although all-pervasive subtype of conceptualization. What the metaphorically based papers show is that because of their very nature, metaphors and metonymies offer a surplus in that they often have a great deal of ideological impact. But it is also clear from the content of the various papers in this volume that this ideological potential can equally well be pinpointed by non-metaphorical, that is, non-imaginative, approaches.

2.1. Common, non-imaginative conceptualization

From a cognitive perspective, conceptualization operates on various units of conceptual structures, such as categories, cognitive models,

prototypes and stereotypes, frames, domains, and mental spaces. Langacker (1987: 118ff.) sees a **category** as a gestalt-like structure, consisting of a profile and a base; the profile is the selected chunk of perception, or more generally, of experience, and the base is the wider context or background against which the profile is projected. Thus a *tongue,* as the movable and flexible organ in the mouth, has 'the mouth' as its base; the mouth itself is profiled against the face, the face against the head, the head against the body, etc. Category disputes can arise whenever an important component of a category is at stake, e.g. when Hamilton (this volume) reveals the now fuzzy boundaries between animal and human genomes in the special case of the implanting of genetically manipulated organisms in food, or, in the foreseeable future, the implanting of animal parts in humans.

Just like Langacker, Lakoff (1987: xv) also considers the gestalt character of any category as essential. But, as a philosophically-oriented linguist, he also connects this to parameters of the origin and goal of categories, or more generally, of thought. Categories are either grounded in bodily experience through perception or body movement (this is their *"embodied"* aspect or else they result from *"imaginative"* processes (metaphor/metonymy, or other mental imagery). Thus in English, *tongue* as a physical/physiological category - or its equivalents in Latin and French, i.e. *lingua / langue* - is metonymically extended to denote non-bodily experienced entities such as "speech" and "language." From a goal-oriented viewpoint, categories and thought have "ecological" structure, i.e. they depend for their efficiency on the overall structure of the conceptual system. Lakoff uses the term *cognitive model* for any category, since categories exhibit most of these characteristics. As may be clear from the structuring of the four parts of the present book, the notion **cognitive model** is taken here in a somewhat more specific sense, i.e. as denoting societal categories. Nonetheless, in essence this view is fully compatible with Lakoff's description of the term, the only difference being that here in our case it is reserved for a more abstract type of categories encountered in culture and society, such as linguistic variation, social or cultural identity, ideology as a system, and many more.

As Eleanor Rosch (1978) revealed, categories (or cognitive models) have internal structure, i.e., all members of a category do not have the same status within the category: some occupy a more central place while others are relegated to a less central or even a peripheral one. As Taylor (1995: 226) and Winters (1998: 231) convincingly show, this also holds for categories used to describe language, i.e. linguistic categories such as phonemes. Thus the linguistic category of the English consonant /t/ has as its members: [tʰ] (aspirated t as in *top*), [t] (unaspirated t as in *fat*), [ʔt] (glottal stop plus t, as in *catcall*), lateral [ɾ] (flap in intervocalic position as in *city* [siɾi], or reduced to zero [ø] as in [sii]. The more central allophones [tʰ] and [t] are the **prototype**, whereas the others are less central or even peripheral. A peripheral allophone may come to be used as a social marker, e.g. the widespread use of the glottal stop in Cockney English. Then, as Kristiansen shows in her contribution, a small set of such markers may constitute a **stereotype**, a simplified, although not necessarily negative picture of a social group, whose main function is to serve as a reference point for the given social or regional group.

In between a (simple) "category" and the very wide notion of "domain", we make use of categories of intermediate complexity which we can, after Fillmore (1975), Fillmore, & Atkins (1992) or Minsky (1975), though in somewhat different senses, call "frames". According to Kristiansen (this volume), **frame** is a category composed of a number of other categories which form an internally structured whole. Simple examples are *chair, window, car;* more complex ones are *commercial transaction scene, lawsuit, social identity*. As a frame, the category "social identity" contains a number of slots such as religious values, (other) ideological values, economic factors, and appearance (sex, skin color, hair, etc.). Part of the appearance is also the use of given allophones, so that, as Kristiansen puts it, a very peripheral element of a phoneme in a very peripheral personality trait of social identity can metonymically come to stand for the whole of a speaker's social and/or regional identity.

The various slots of a frame (or parameters, or any other term suggesting a set of different elements) invoke different **domains**, i.e. various dimensions against which a (complex) category is profiled,

such as the abstract domains of religion or other belief and value systems, the economic domain, the physical domains of sex, skin and hair color, pronunciation, etc. In contrast to these various usage-based types of categories, the actual use of categories in discourse can only be accounted for by means of a "bridge" between them. This takes the form of what Fauconnier (1985) calls "mental spaces". **Mental spaces** are small packages of knowledge and information set up during discourse which enable the interactants to keep a record of the entities (or categories) actually called up in discourse or implied in other categories, especially in frames. Even if the elements of a frame like *car* are not all activated by referring to this category, (e g. we do not necessarily think of the car's petrol tank when we refer to a car), no problems arise when we ask at a petrol station *Can you fill her up?*, since the petrol tank is actually accessible as part of the overall car frame. This brief overview of the battery of cognitive tools may have shown sufficiently that cognitive linguistics can make serious attempts at exploring the links between language and thought.

2.2. Imaginative conceptualization

In addition to these non-imaginative ways of conceptualizing, cognitive linguistics has revealed the conceptual potential of imaginative routes of conceptualization, especially by means of metaphor and metonymy. The volume's metaphor-based papers all reveal that it is not so much a single metaphor that is apt to carry ideological associations, but rather the various metaphorical instantiations of a common underlying **conceptual metaphor**. This is especially made clear in the papers by Frank, Santa Ana, Wolf & Polzenhagen, and White & Herrera, who all in different ways exploit and explore the concept of conceptual metaphor. For example, Wolf & Polzenhagen illustrate the potential of conceptual metaphor for the domain of trade negotiations. These can be conceptualized by means of a variety of conceptual metaphors. In turn, each conceptual metaphor acts to impose its particular perspective, i.e., the metaphorical instantiations inherent in the conceptual metaphor chosen. Thus the conceptual metaphor

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BATTLES (as a sub-category of ARGUMENT IS WAR) imposes a conflict perspective, whereas ARGUMENT IS SPORT(S), while still keeping the competitive winner-loser antonymy, fore-grounds a game-like scenario (not taking things too seriously), e.g. allowing for cheating, and even allowing for a draw in some favorite sports such as soccer (see Cubo de Severino et al. 2001). Still there are other conceptual metaphors for TRADE NEGOTIATIONS such as MARKETS ARE CONTAINERS and TRADE IS A JOURNEY. But it is not only the conceptual metaphor as such that determines the ideological per-spective, but also, and equally decisively, the various linguistic ex-pressions instantiating the underlying conceptual metaphor. Here stylistic factors are of fundamental importance. Thus in the trade war between Japan and America, the American phrasing of the TRADE IS WAR image is rendered in terms of *demanding,* which reflects a non-hostile stance on the part of one party, namely, America, and hence serves to promote a positive auto-stereotype; in contrast to this, the xeno-stereotype, associated with the Japanese posture is portrayed by aggressive verbs as in "Hashimoto *accuses* the U.S. of *bullying* Japan by *threatening*...". The conceptual frames of "self-presentation" and "other-representation" (see Morgan 1997, Sandikcioglu 2001) are caught up in the antonymy US vs. THEM, which obviously is part and parcel of ideological categorization.

A highly specific and usually visual representation of a conceptual metaphor is what Hawkins (2001) has called **iconographic refer-ence**. This term can be understood as the metaphorical pendant of a stereotype in that it is a representation based on simplistic images of the targeted people, groups or ideas, and associated with familiar values, either positive or negative ones. All these conceptualizations tend to operate at a subconscious or unconscious level of thought. This lack of consciousness is directly linked to the rather convention-alized character of conceptual metaphor and iconographic reference. As is the case with all conventionalized categories, so too for meta-phorical categories does the rule hold true: the more deeply catego-ries and metaphors get entrenched in people's consciousness, the less conscious people become of their existence. Whereas conceptual metaphor and iconographic reference tend to operate automatically

and hence remain below the level of conscious awareness, **conceptual blending** or conceptual integration is rather a dynamic process, as the two nominalizations already suggest. Mental space theory not only solves a number of referential problem areas previously thought to be insoluble, it also represents a congenial contribution to the cognitive theory of metaphor. And again as with the natural link between categorization and metaphorization, there is a natural link between the two uses of conceptual blending in referential blends and in metaphorical blends. In comparison with the two-domain theory of metaphor, the blending theory of metaphor is revolutionary, firstly because it breaks through a fairly static two-domain view with a source domain being mapped onto a target domain, and secondly because it develops a multi-space view. This allows elements from various input spaces associated with the source domain and the target domain to be joined together as a generic space, and to be mapped into a blended space, or blend. This volume clearly underscores the success of the "conceptual blend" approach for it is exploited or, at least implicitly invoked in many of its papers, i.e. in those by Kristiansen, Medubi, Wolf & Polzenhagen, Musolff, Nerlich & Dingwall, and Hamilton. The most typical representative is perhaps Medubi's discussion of the lack of awareness of a national ideology or identity in her country, Nigeria. In her approach, blending theory can account both for non-metaphorical and metaphorical blends. A non-metaphorical blend occurs in the coining of the term *Military President*, which blends the military dictatorship space with the democratically elected head of state space, and thus creates the illusion that there is still a democratic component in such a military type of president. In a more subtle way, the iconographic reference represented by the conceptual metaphor OUR LITTLE SON is used as a conceptual metonymy standing for the split into ethnic identities of Nigeria's ethnically thinking and acting groups. Since the source OUR LITTLE SON as an iconographic reference stands for the target FAMILY AS AUTHORITY, the implicit inference is that the SON-politician's actions must respond to the interests and expectations of his FAMILY subjects, i.e. the members of his ethnic group.

In summary, in this section we have looked at the various analytical instruments the papers use, illustrate or develop. In the next section, we will examine the contribution that each paper makes individually in terms of its insights into various other aspects and areas of socio-political ideology.

3. Single cognitive inroads to ideology research

In the present volume, cognitive models and the ideologies of which they are constitutive, are approached along two different axes: a thematic axis (sections 1 and 2) and a methodological axis (sections 3 and 4). The papers selected thematically focus on cognitive models of linguistic variation and on cognitive models of cultural and/or social identities. On the other hand, the papers selected methodologically focus on the way cognitive models in ideologies are communicated, which can be accomplished either in a covert form or in overt public debates. Therefore, we can state that along the thematic axis it appears that human communities have built up cognitive models, not only of social structures, but also of the instrument used to develop social structures, i.e. language itself.

3.1.   Cognitive models of linguistic variation

In his contribution "Cultural models of linguistic standardization", **Dirk Geeraerts** starts out from the simple assumption that any language, or a particular type of discourse, contains or expresses ideological elements. His paper, however, is focused on a more encompassing area of interest, namely the field of language variation and linguistic standardization which likewise is inherent in the relationship between language and ideology. According to Geeraerts, the choice of a particular language variety as the standard is an ideology-laden decision; as such, it can implicate concepts such as emancipation, democracy, participation in public life, etc. His discussion of the standardization of one (or more) of the language varieties within a

language community shows that in Western thought two basic cognitive models have prevailed as a means of conceiving the relation between social reality and language, i.e. a rationalist and a romantic model. On the one hand, there is the Enlightenment rationalist model, which views language as a neutral medium of democratic participation and emancipation, transcending geographical differences and social distinctions. On the other hand, there is the Romantic model, which sees language as the intimate expression of a specific identity, foregoing the necessity of mediating between identities. The 19th century witnessed the development of an influential nationalist model that combined issues from both basic models; finally, the late 20th century was characterized by a shift towards questions of globalization, linguistic imperialism and the international position of English. Thus, although both of these models have developed over time, they still continue to be the fundamental determinants of language policies and people's acceptance of norms or standards which shape the language attitudes of linguistic communities.

In strong contrast to most studies in the field of stereotypes carried out so far, **Gitte Kristiansen,** in her paper "How to do things with allophones: Linguistic stereotypes as cognitive reference points in social cognition", takes a positive view of stereotypes as manifested in regional and social accents and the covert ideology encapsulated in them, since accents function as reference points in social cognition. Using models of cognitive linguistics, Kristiansen argues that phonetic variants form part of larger cognitive structures which in turn relate to social categorizations and self-categorization. Seen from a listener-oriented perspective, the hearer can be provided with answers to essential questions such as "Where is this speaker from?" and "What is this speaker like?" The second part of her paper deals with the claim that the categories themselves may be caused to change which she explains in terms of a conflict between core and peripheral components, core components often being ideological in nature. Her theoretical framework is cognitive in nature in the sense that the use we make of non-cotext dependent phonetic variants should entitle us to place them at least in a fuzzy area as far as

meaning-making is concerned. In a more general sense, in Kristian-sen's opinion one of the current challenges of cognitive linguistics is the application of models to levels of linguistic structure apart from that of the lexical item, namely the identification of allophonic varia-tion which may become part of linguistic stereotypes. The latter are regarded as cognitively useful tools relative to which speaker and hearer locate each other and actively position themselves, i.e. as cog-nitive reference point constructions which in turn relate to larger con-ceptual frames of a more propositional content. Kristiansen con-cludes that allophonic variation may actually embody and express ideology thus playing a socially distinctive role and even represent-ing a distinct world. Unarguably, the papers by both Geeraerts and Kristiansen can thus be seen as manifestations of a nascent cognitive sociolinguistics.

3.2.   *Cognitive models of cultural/social identities*

Cognitive models may be idealized representations of smaller sys-tems such as variation in language, or of much larger cultural sys-tems such as, for instance, the European or Western model, African ethnic models, ethnic minority models, or even lesser known indige-nous cultural models. **Roslyn Frank**'s paper entitled "Shifting iden-tities in Basque and Western cultural models of Self and Being" in-vestigates the influence of the general European model on a specific aspect of the Basque model. Each of the two models is based on dif-ferent image schemata, which shape overarching cultural models laid down in the root metaphors of language. Thus the Basque model re-lates more to indigenous models of different continents than to the European one. Still, socio-cultural identity, especially that of the younger Basque generation, appears to be increasingly affected by the European model. Frank shows that the different image schemata structure the cognitively backgrounded field of conceptual categories and related strategies upon which representations of ideology, as well as definitions of Basque identity, have been and are played out, often quite unconsciously. The study deals with the way certain conceptual

frames are undergoing change and reorganization in Euskera, the Basque language. Furthermore, the thesis is defended that - in line with Sapir – perception remains susceptible to the influence of language habits. At the same time, language choices by both the European and the Basque group involve ideological positioning on the part of the individual speaker.

In the article "Language and ideology in Nigerian cartoons" **Oyinkan Medubi** reveals how in Nigerian politics one can witness the lack of a national ideology and identity, and how social group ideologies, either ethnic or regional ones, gain prevalence, leading to ethnic and regional models of power as well as to profit seeking for the in-group. Due to the fact that Nigeria is a conglomeration of peoples of disparate experiences and diverse languages/dialects the country seems to be ideologically confused to a large extent. Medubi has looked at 150 political cartoons from three of Nigeria's most important newspapers, *The Punch*, *The Guardian* and *Vanguard*. She starts out discussing three approaches as complementary instruments for analyzing ideological situations in the ongoing political life in Nigeria, namely Turner and Fauconnier's blending theory, Raskin's script/scenario approach, and Voloshinov's semiotic theory. Her research questions deal with issues relating to how speech patterns function to express the individual's or group's social identity and in what ways the linguistic behavior and lexical choices are reflective of the perceived aims of the individual or group. Medubi shows that cartoons serve as vehicles in the construction of a society's socio-political life: they function as mirrors in which sociocultural realities and ideologies are reflected. As a result, careful interpretation of the ideological positions portrayed in the cartoons provides a means of reconstructing the understandings implicit in them as well as their role in directing these socio-political processes. She concludes her article by asserting the view that the underlying ideology in Nigeria today is one of political coercion, manipulation and power control through forceful subjugation (the military) and blackmail (ethnic politics). The study unearths a disturbing fact: the desire to dominate other groups and individuals is still unusually strong in each identi-

fied collective, and furthermore, this was one of the fundamental causes of the last civil war.

Likewise focusing on the interrelationship between language, power and society, **Otto Santa Ana** unmasks the American cognitive model of U.S. Latinos that excludes them from the dominant model of American identity. In his article "Three mandates for anti-minority policy expressed in U.S. public discourse metaphors" the model is shown to be based on three predominant conceptual metaphors which are all negative in orientation, i.e. PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, SOCIAL BACKWARDNESS IS A DISEASE, and SOCIAL MEASURES ARE MERELY REMEDIES FOR THE SYMPTOMS OF THE DISEASE. Making use of a full-scale study (4,500 text metaphors extracted from 670 *Los Angeles Times* articles, dating from 1992–98), Santa Ana examines the linguistic material of naturally-occurring public discourse, in order to preclude common criticisms of metaphor analysis of ideology, i.e. bias and non-representativeness. Santa Ana maintains a strong form of the view that language constitutes ideology and that human knowledge is constituted in terms of metaphor. He argues that metaphor constitutes public opinion and the publicly shared world view, specifically how U.S. public discourse reproduces and reinforces the unjust social order which debases Latinos as an ethnic group. Generally, the metaphors used by Americans to speak about Latinos constitute the key elements of the national ideology that drives policy decisions affecting this large minority population. Santa Ana therefore demonstrates that the long-sought unit of analysis for critical discourse analysis is indeed common everyday metaphor. The study of metaphors that Americans unthinkingly use in legitimated discourse potentially offers a window into the US public's worldview, i.e. its ideology: Latinos are never the arms or heart of the U.S.; they are portrayed as burdens or diseases of the NATION AS BODY, or as foreigners that invade the NATION AS HOUSE.

Lewis P. Sego, in turn, analyses the traditional cognitive model of the "housewife", one that is now disappearing in a world where more and more women are occupying full-time jobs that take them out of the home. Referring to the rapid economic and technological changes that have taken place since the beginning of the industrial age and the

subsequent information age, Sego examines how the term 'house-wife' has responded to these cultural changes. The article "Has the consciousness of modern industrial societies rendered 'Housewife' no longer a value-free cultural model?" demonstrates that the new socio-cultural context favors new conceptualizations such as *home-maker* or *house husband*, but still regards them as unstable neologisms. Making use of concepts such as form and structure, function and essence, Sego demonstrates the cognitively complex nature of the model. For example, in regard to the functional value of the term 'housewife', the assumption is that there is an aspect of causation to everything we can talk about or examine or imagine, i.e. once we see a few housewives performing a certain service, the image may become integrated into our cognitive model. Following Fauconnier and Turner, Sego sees compression and conceptual integration as some of the most basic phenomena in an understanding of human life. Cause and effect offer the mind a grasp of most things around us and this is no less the case with the underlying cultural model supporting the term *housewife*. Moreover, in the world of work the entry of many women into a place of prominence within the professions and within businesses and places of commerce certainly has redefined what 'work' is.

4. Cognitive models as covert ideologies

Covert cognitive models and ideology are strongly associated with the functions of conceptual metaphors. The paper "Conceptual metaphor as ideological stylistic means: An exemplary analysis" by **Hans-Georg Wolf** and **Frank Polzenhagen** integrates conceptual metaphors, ideology research, and stylistics. The authors introduce three theoretical models in the respective research areas of metaphor, style and critical linguistics, namely (i) the distinction between conceptual and linguistic metaphors, (ii) the concepts of "global stylistic pattern" and "local stylistic effect", and (iii) the notion of "systematicity" in the selection of ideologically charged linguistic categories which by their varying specific instantiations in the dis-

course create coherence in the text and a certain image of the parties involved. The three positions, which are said to be mutually supportive of each other, are carefully outlined and the way in which their convergence can benefit a linguistic analysis of ideology is explained. In the final part of the paper, a text is exemplarily analyzed to show how the methodological tool of conceptual metaphor can be applied to the study of style and ideology. The object of study is a newspaper article taken from USA TODAY where the economic tensions between the US and Japan are outlined. Wolf and Polzenhagen explain the metaphoric structure of the text and then trace the ideological underpinnings and implications of the conceptual metaphors identified, i.e. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BATTLES and, closely related, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTESTS. The authors convincingly show that metaphor, ideology and style become interdependent; consequently this approach can be said to be a first attempt at setting up a cognitive stylistics (but see also Sego 1985) within the framework of critical linguistics.

Michael White and **Honesto Herrera** show that in journalism the prevailing cognitive model which assumes a complete separation between information and opinion in press coverage, is another unsustainable and, therefore, false dichotomy and that, like most other oppositions, they are best understood as endpoints on a conceptual continuum. In their paper entitled "Metaphor and ideology in the press coverage of telecom corporate consolidations" this becomes especially apparent when one takes a wider view of the discourses going on in society, e.g. when the discourse on trade is itself seen as composed of many different domains and their discourses, such as those of economics, business, politics, government, etc. For example, business events are characteristically explained via core metaphors such as MONOPOLIES ARE DINOSAURS, BUSINESS IS WAR; BUSINESS IS COLONISATION and COMPANIES ARE ANIMALS, which impose a particular profile and which allow the same metaphor to be exploited in different ways. These metaphors, and the particular aspects highlighted through the different instantiations are examined from different perspectives. White and Herrera claim that the metaphors in question are overtly and covertly used with ideological charges and implications

and that they play an essential role in how the companies involved present their decisions to the public. By using evidence from press coverage in English and Spanish, White and Herrera highlight cultural similarities and differences and they furthermore show how stereotypes are more prone to enter the scene where transnational coverage is involved.

5. Cognitive models in overt social debates

An interesting insight into the covert and overt ideological functioning of conceptual metaphors and conceptual blends is provided in **Andreas Musolff**'s paper entitled "Ideological functions of metaphor: The conceptual metaphors of *health* and *illness* in public discourse". The paper analyzes parts of a bilingual German-English corpus concerning the use of imagery in German and British press coverage on European Union topics during the 1990s. Musolff combines a cognitive metaphor analysis with corpus-based methods in order to show the characteristic ideological contrasts between the uses within a source domain in the German and British communities. Because conceptual metaphors are largely linguistic habits that are automatic and unconscious, they can strongly favor the spread of ideological thought. Moreover, conceptual metaphors rely on deeply felt patterns of experience and are thus apt to appeal to the emotions. Whereas all this happens unconsciously, conceptual metaphors can be consciously developed into all sorts of blends by ideologues, thus directing the course of metaphoric reasoning and the related inferential processes. Musolff's discussion of metaphors of health and illness reveals these to be richly textured conceptual metaphors which historically have had strong ideological purport in public discourse. Different cognitive models of the European Union are identified. For instance, in Germany the public debate centers around illness metaphors, while in Britain it is carried out in terms of heart metaphors; and in both cases many blends may arise. However, rather than analyzing the characteristic contrasts between German and British metaphor use as conceptual differences in the Lakoffian sense, it seems to

be more appropriate to view them as variations in the argumentative application of 'internal'meaning aspects of the metaphorical source domain.

In his paper "Genetic roulette: On the cognitive rhetoric of Biorisk", **Craig Hamilton** investigates the public discourse surrounding genetically manipulated food (GMF) and organisms (GMO) by analyzing the category struggles that have arisen between interest and action groups over the issue of which of the two types of food (GMF or GM-free food, i.e. natural food) is exempted from being specifically labeled as such, and thus destined to become the default case. Generally, Hamilton assumes, the connection between language and ideology is clearest in recent debates over the production and consumption of genetically modified food. At the two extremes of the discussion he sees biotech companies producing genetically modified foods and green consumer groups. He compares the positions these stakeholders take in both spoken and written texts (e.g. television documentaries, print advertisements, newspaper articles). By making reference to 'cognitive rhetoric' (Turner 1991), the linguistic constructions and conceptual frames are highlighted and by doing so a better understanding of how ideology is served by language in the fight over genetically modified food can be achieved. The competing ideologies of the biotech companies and the green groups rely heavily on category disputes, metaphors, and conceptual blends in order to frame the debate on their terms and for their specific purposes. As Hamilton argues in his paper, it is precisely at this point where language and ideology converge that the cognitive rhetoric inherent to the debate provides interesting insights into the issues analyzed.

In their article entitled "Deciphering the human genome: The semantic and ideological foundations of genetic and genomic discourse" **Brigitte Nerlich** and **Robert Dingwall** explore the semantic and ideological foundations of genetic and genomic discourse. The production of a 'working draft' of the human genome was announced on June 26, 2000 at a linked US/UK press conference involving President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair. Their paper analyses the politicians' speeches, the accompanying press releases, with contri-

butions from leading scientists associated with the project, and British national newspaper coverage of this event. Nerlich and Dingwall expose the false categorization of the DNA or human genome as "a code" or as "the book of life" which is to be deciphered by scientists. This decontextualized view of the genome is a reflection of the earlier view in linguistics of language as a decontextualized code and has misguided much of past genetic and genome research. The authors argue that if this research continues to use a language metaphor, it can only make new gains by exploiting the more recently developed contextualized, usage-based cognitive views of language. By critically analyzing a series of speeches they show that the older genetic discourse still permeates modern genomic discourse, notably through the use of metaphorical expressions such as "the book of life". In their conclusion the authors ask the question as to whose language is more 'ideological', that of the politicians, the media or the scientists themselves.

References
Titles referred to in the contributions are not listed here

Bartsch, Renate
    2002   Generating polysemy: Metaphor and metonymy. In: René Dirven and Ralf Poerings (eds.), *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast* (Cognitive Linguistics Research 20), 49–74. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Bolinger, Dwight L.
    1980   *Language: The Loaded Weapon*. London: Longman.
Dirven, René, Bruce Hawkins and Esra Sandikcioglu (eds.)
    2001   *Language and Ideology. Volume I: Theoretical Cognitive Approaches* (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 204). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Dirven, René, Roslyn M. Frank, and Cornelia Ilie (eds.)
    2001   *Language and Ideology. Volume II: Descriptive Cognitive Approaches* (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 205). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Fauconnier, Gilles
    1985   *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Fillmore, Charles J.
    1975   *Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis 1971.* Bloomington, Indiana: In-
                  diana University Linguistics Club.
Fillmore, Charles J and Beryl T.S. Atkins
    1992   Toward a frame-based lexicon: The semantics of RISK and its
                  neighbours. In: Adrienne Lehrer and Eva F. Kittay (eds.),
                  *Frames, Fields and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and
                  Lexical Organization,* 75–102. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Hawkins, Bruce W.
    2001   Ideology, metaphor and iconographic reference. In: René Dirven,
                  Roslyn M. Frank, and Cornelia Ilie (eds), 27–50.
Johnson, Mark
    1993   *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics.*
                  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George
    1987   *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal
                  about the Mind.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago
                  Press.
    1992   Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in
                  the Gulf. In: Martin Pütz (ed.), *Thirty Years of Linguistic Evolu-
                  tion.* Studies in Honour of René Dirven on the Occasion of his
                  Sixtieth Birthday, 463–481. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Ben-
                  jamins.
    1996 a   The metaphor system for morality. In: Adele E. Goldberg (ed.),
                  Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language, 249–266. Stan-
                  ford, Cal.: CSLI Publications.
    1996 b   Sorry, I'm not myself today: The metaphor system for conceptu-
                  alizing the self. In: Gilles Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser (eds.),
                  Spaces, Worlds and Grammars, 91–123. Chicago: University of
                  Chicago Press.
    1996 c   *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don't.*
                  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Langacker, Ronald W.
    1987   *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. I: Theoretical Prereq-
                  uisites.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    1994   Culture, cognition and grammar. In: Martin Pütz (ed.) *Language
                  Contact. Language Conflict,* 25–53. Amsterdam/Philadelphia:
                  John Benjamins.
    1999   A dynamic usage-based model. In: Michael Barlow and Suzanne
                  Kemmer (eds.), *Usage-based Models of Language,* 1–63. Stan-
                  ford, Cal.: CSLI Publications.

2000   *Grammar and Conceptualization* (Cognitive Linguistics Research 14). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Levinson, Stephen C.
1997   From outer to inner space: Linguistic categories and non-linguistic thinking. In: Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (eds.), *Language and Conceptualization* (Language, Culture and Cognition 1), 13–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Minsky, M.
1975   A framework for representing knowledge. In: P. H. Winston (ed.), *The Psychology of Computer Vision*, 211–277. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Morgan, Pamela S.
1997   Self-presentation in a speech of Newt Gingrich. *Pragmatics* 7: 275–307.

Pütz, Martin, JoAnne Neff-van Aertselaer and Teun van Dijk (eds.)
Forthcoming *Language, Discourse, and Ideology.* 2 vols.

Rosch, Eleanor
1978   Principles of categorization. In: Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (eds.), *Cognition and Categorization*, 27–48. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sandikcioglu, Esra
2001 b   Orientalism: The ideology behind the metaphorical Gulf War. In: René Dirven, Roslyn M. Frank, and Cornelia Ilie (eds.), 161–188.

Sego, Lewis
1985   [Conference paper] "A model for computerized analysis of cognitive stylistics in literary texts", Midwest Modern Language Association, St. Louis, MO.

Taylor, John R.
1995 [1989] *Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Winters, Margaret
1998   Language across time: Historical linguistics. In: René Dirven and Marjolijn Verspoor (eds.), *Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics,* 217–246. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Section 1

Cognitive models of linguistic variation

Cultural models of linguistic standardization

Dirk Geeraerts[*]

Abstract

In line with well-known trends in cultural theory (see Burke, Crowley & Girvin 2000), Cognitive Linguistics has stressed the idea that we think about social reality in terms of models – 'cultural models' or 'folk theories': from Holland and Quinn (1987) over Lakoff (1996) and Palmer (1996) to Dirven, Hawkins and Sandikcioglu (2001) and Dirven, Frank and Ilie (2001), Cognitive linguists have demonstrated how the technical apparatus of Cognitive Linguistics can be used to analyze how our conception of social reality is shaped by underlying patterns of thought. But if language is a social and cultural reality, what are the models that shape our conception of language? Specifically, what are the models that shape our thinking about language as a social phenomenon? What are the paradigms that we use to think about language, not primarily in terms of linguistic structure (as in Reddy 1979), but in terms of linguistic variation: models about the way in which language varieties are distributed over a language community and about the way in which such distribution should be evaluated?

In this paper, I will argue that two basic models may be identified: a *rationalist* and a *romantic* one. I will chart the ways in which they interact, describe how they are transformed in the course of time, and explore how the models can be used in the analysis of actual linguistic variation.

Keywords: cultural model, Dutch, Enlightenment, nationalism, romanticism, standard language.

---

1. Cultural models and language variation

There are two preliminary remarks that I should make in order to situate the present paper against a wider background. First, the analysis is a marginal offshoot of a more central interest in empirical methods for studying linguistic variation and change. The work that I have been doing over the last ten years or so with my research group has specifically focused on various aspects of lexical variation and change: diachronic semantics (Geeraerts 1997), the relationship between semantic and lexical variation (Geeraerts, Grondelaers & Bakema 1994), and lexical variation within pluricentric languages such as Dutch (Geeraerts, Grondelaers & Speelman 1999). Within the latter line of research, we have been particularly concerned with the development of quantitative techniques for measuring lexical variation and processes of lexical standardization (see section 4 below).

There are two ways, then, in which the present more or less essayistic paper links up with the more rigorous descriptive and methodological work that is my basic field of interest. For one thing, an investigation into linguistic usage needs to be complemented by an investigation into the way in which the users of the language perceive the actual situation. The cultural models that I will be talking about define, in a sense, basic language attitudes – and an adequate interpretation of language variation should obviously take into account language attitudes along with language behavior.

At the same time, both perspectives (the behavioral and the attitudinal) have links with Cognitive Linguistics. Whereas the attitudinal approach draws inspiration from the Cognitive Linguistic analysis of cultural models and folk theories, the descriptive approach is a further development of the Cognitive Linguistic interest in lexical-semantic variation as represented by prototype theory. Underlying the publications mentioned above is a logical line of development from semasiological prototype theory (Geeraerts 1997) to a model of lexical variation encompassing onomasiological variation (Geeraerts, Grondelaers & Bakema 1994), which then further broadens to the

investigation of 'external', sociolectal and dialectal factors of variation (Geeraerts, Grondelaers & Speelman 1999).

As a second preliminary remark, is there a difference between a 'cultural model' and an ideology? It is a common idea in Cognitive Linguistics that the cultural models underlying reasoning and argumentation are to some extent idealized entities (see, for instance, the notion of ICM's or 'Idealized Cognitive Models' as introduced in Lakoff 1987). Actually occurring phenomena and situations usually differ to a smaller or a greater extent from the models that act as cognitive reference points: the models themselves, then, are to some extent abstract, general, perhaps even simplistic, precisely because we use them to make sense of phenomena that are intrinsically more complicated.

With regard to social phenomena, this means that cultural models may turn out to be not just idealized entities, but also ideological ones. Cultural models may be ideologies in two different respects: either when their idealized character is forgotten (when the difference between the abstract model and the actual circumstances is neglected), or when they are used in a prescriptive and normative rather than a descriptive way (when they are used as models of how things should be rather than of how things are). In the latter case, an ideology is basically a guiding line for social action, a shared system of ideas for the interpretation of social reality, regardless of the researcher's evaluation of that perspective. In the former case, an ideology is always to some extent a cover-up, a semblance, a deliberate misrepresentation of the actual situation, and a description of such ideologies will of necessity have to be critical.

The distinction is of course well-known in ideology research, and there is an extensive linguistic literature probing the relationship between language and ideology. There are two basic (and to some extent overlapping) approaches here: on the one hand, all forms of critical discourse analysis, as represented by van Dijk (1998), Wodak and Meyer (2001), or Blommaert and Bulcaen (1997); and on the other, the 'ideologies of language' approach, as represented by Joseph and Taylor (1990), Woolard, Schieffelin and Kroskrity (1998), and Schiffman (1996). The former approach critically analyzes any

text with regard to its position in the social power play – with regard to the way, that is, in which it reproduces or counteracts existing social relations. The latter approach concentrates on how beliefs about language variation and specific linguistic varieties manifest themselves explicitly (as in language policies) or implicitly (as in educational practices), and how they interact with group identity, economic development, social mobility, political organization.

In the following pages, I will not take a critical approach, but rather start from a neutral and descriptive conception of linguistic cultural models. Rather than critically analyzing specific practices and policies as ideological, I will try to explore the underlying structure and the historical development of the competing cultural models that lie at the basis of such practices and policies as well as their critical analysis.

2. The rationalist and the romantic model

In this section, I will present the two basic cultural models that I think need to be distinguished if we want to get a grip on the logic of standardization debates: the rationalist one and the romantic one. I will present them in mutual contrast, showing how they are to a large extent each other's counterpart, and how they are dialectically related. The present section will not however exhaust the comparison between both models. In the next section, the comparison will be further expanded, leading to the identification of two historical transformations of the basic models, in the form of a *nationalist* and a *postmodern* model.

2.1.   The rationalist model

So what are the characteristics that are ideally (and perhaps ideologically) attributed to standard languages? The most conspicuous feature is probably the *generality* of standard languages. Standard lan-

guages, in contrast with dialects and other restricted languages, are general in three different ways.

They are *geographically* general, in the sense that they overarch the more restricted areas of application of dialects. Further, they are *socially* general because they constitute a common language that is not the property of a single social group but that is available to all. Finally, they are *thematically* universal in the sense that they are equipped to deal with any semantic domain or any linguistic function. More advanced domains of experience in particular (like science or high culture) fall outside the range of local dialects.

Because of their generality, standard languages have two additional features. First, they are supposed to be a *neutral* medium, with a mediating function, in an almost philosophical sense of 'mediation'. Standard languages, in fact, transcend social differences: they ensure that men and women from all walks of life and from all corners of the nation can communicate freely.

In that sense, they are a medium of *participation and emancipation*. Because of their neutrality and because of their functional generality, standard languages are a key to the world of learning and higher culture: functional domains par excellence for standard language use (or, reversing the perspective, functional domains that cannot be accessed on the basis of dialect knowledge alone). Perhaps even more importantly, standard languages are supposed to contribute to political participation. The possibility of free communication is a feature of a democratic political organization, in the sense of the ideal 'herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation' as described by Jürgen Habermas. If then linguistic standardization contributes to mutual understanding and free communication, it is a factor of political emancipation – just as it is a factor of social emancipation when it contributes to the spreading of culture and education. By contrast, if you believe in the beneficial effects of standardization, dialects are mere relics of an obscurantist social and political system that opposes democracy and emancipation.

In a context of postmodern ideological debunking, such a positive conception of standardization is definitely suspect, but it is crucial for my line of argumentation that at least in the context in which it origi-

nated (that of the 18th century Enlightenment), there was a genuine positive appraisal of standardization. To illustrate, let us have a look at some excerpts from reports presented to the revolutionary Convention in France. Barère (1794 [1975]) puts matters as follows:

(1)   Citoyens, la langue d'un peuple libre doit être une et la même pour tous. (1794 [1975]: 297) [Citizens, the language of a free people has to be one and the same for all.]

(2)   Les lumières portées à grands frais aux extrémités de la France s'éteignent en y arrivant, puisque les lois n'y sont pas entendues. (1794 [1975]: 295) [The *lumières*, when they are brought with great difficulty to the remote corners of France, die out when they arrive there, because the laws are not understood.]

(3)   Laisser les citoyens dans l'ignorance de la langue nationale, c'est trahir la patrie; c'est laisser le torrent des lumières empoisonné ou obstrué dans son cours; c'est méconnaître les bienfaits de l'imprimerie, car chaque imprimeur est un instituteur public de langue et de législation. (1794 [1975]: 296–297) [To maintain the citizens in their ignorance of the national language is to betray the country. It permits the torrent of the *lumières* to be poisoned or obstructed in its course. It means disavowing the blessings of the printing press, because all publishers are public teachers of the language and the legislation.]

(4)   Citoyens, les tyrans coalisés on dit: l'ignorance fut toujours notre auxiliaire le plus puissant; maintenons l'ignorance; elle fait les fanatiques, elle multiplie les contre-révolutionnaires; faisons rétrograder les Français vers la barbarie: servons-nous des peuples mal instruits ou de ceux qui parlent un idiome différent de celui de l'instruction publique. (1794 [1975]: 291) [Citizens, the allied tyrants have said: ignorance has always been our most powerful helper. It creates fanatics, it breeds counter-revolutionaries. Let's make sure

the French degrade into barbarity: let's take advantage of the badly educated peoples or of those that speak a language that is different from that of public education.]

(5)   Les habitants des campagnes n'entendent que le bas-breton; c'est avec cet instrument barbare de leurs penseés supersti-tieuses que les prêtres et les intrigants les tiennent sous leur empire, dirigent leurs consciences et empêchent les citoyens de connaître les lois et d'aimer la République. Vos travaux leur sont inconnus, vos efforts pour leur affranchissement sont ignorés. (1794 [1975]: 292–293) [The inhabitants of the countryside speak only the Breton dialect. It is with that in-strument of their superstitious way of thinking that the priests and the plotters keep them under their thumb, control their minds, and prevent the citizens from knowing the laws of the Republic. Your works are unknown to them, your ef-forts to bring them liberty are ignored.]

The characteristics that we have attributed to standard languages (generality and communicative neutrality, emancipatory and partici-patory effects, opposition to obscurantism) can be easily identified in these fragments. Fragment (1) expresses the generality and uniform-ity of the standard language. Fragments (2) and (3) stress the eman-cipatory function of knowledge of the standard: citizens who only know their dialect will not understand the laws of the Republic (the assumption being, of course, that these have a liberating effect), nor will they, more generally speaking, be able to profit from the benefits brought by the printed press. Fragments (4) and (5) associate dialects more directly with counter-revolutionary obscurantism: it is sug-gested that priests and 'tyrants' deliberately maintain ignorance by preventing the common people from acquiring the standard language.

A similar pattern can be found in the following quotes from Grégoire (1794 [1975]), who actually presents an entire educational project to the Convention to 'abolish the dialects and generalize the use of the French language'. (His notion of 'dialect' actually includes not just the dialects of French, but also the different languages spo-

ken in the territory of France, like German in the Alsace region, Flemish in the northern area, or Breton in Brittany.)

(6)   Mais au moins on peut uniformer le langage d'une grande nation, de manière que tous les citoyens qui la composent puissent sans obstacle se communiquer leurs pensées. Cette entreprise, qui ne fut pleinement exécutée chez aucun peuple, est digne du peuple français, qui centralise toutes les branches de l'organisation sociale et qui doit être jaloux de consacrer au plutôt, dans une République une et indivisible, l'usage unique et invariable de la langue et de la liberté. (1794 [1975]: 302) [But at least one can standardize the language of a great nation, to the extent that all its citizens can mutually communicate their thoughts unhindered. Such an enterprise, which no people has fully achieved as yet, is worthy of the French nation, which centralizes all aspects of the social organization and which must endeavour to endorse as soon as possible, in a Republic that is one and indivisible, the sole and invariable use of language and freedom.]

(7)   'Il y a dans notre langue, disait un royaliste, une hiérarchie de style, parce que les mots sont classés comme les sujets dans une monarchie'. Cet aveu est un trait de lumière pour quiconque réfléchit. En appliquant l'inégalité des styles à celle des conditions, on peut tirer des conséquences qui prouvent l'importance de mon projet dans une démocratie. (1794 [1975]: 316) ['There is in our language, a certain royalist said, a hierarchy of styles, because the words are classified just like the citizens in a monarchy'. This confession constitutes a ray of insight for any thinking person. If we apply the inegality of the styles to the inegality of the conditions under which people live, we may come to conclusions that prove the importance of my project *(of linguistic standardization through an educational language policy)* in a democracy.]

(8)   Tous les membres du souverain sont admissibles à toutes les places; il est à désirer que tous puissent successivement les remplir, et retourner à leurs professions agricoles ou mécaniques. Cet état de choses nous présente l'alternative suivante: si ces places sont occupées par des hommes incapables de s'énoncer, d'écrire dans la langue nationale, les droits des citoyens seront-ils bien garantis par des actes dont la redaction présentera l'impropriété des termes, l'imprécision des idées, en un mot tous les symptômes de l'ignorance? Si au contraire cette ignorance exclut des places, bientôt renaîtra cette aristocratie qui jadis employait le patois pour montrer son affabilité protectrice à ceux qu'on appelait insolemment les petites gens. [...] Ainsi l'ignorance de la langue compromettrait le bonheur social ou détruirait l'égalité. (1794 [1975]: 303) [All members of the sovereign people are eligible for all positions. It is desirable that all may successively fill these positions, and afterwards return to their agricultural or industrial professions. This state of affairs yields the following alternative. If the positions are taken up by men incapable of expressing themselves or of writing in the national language, will the rights of the citizens be safeguarded by laws that are characterized by improper choice of words, by imprecise ideas, in short by all symptoms of ignorance? If on the contrary this ignorance prevents people from taking up office, then soon enough we will witness the rebirth of that aristocracy that once used the dialects to demonstrate its affability with regard to those that it insolently named 'the small people'. [...] Thus, ignorance of the language either compromises social happiness or destroys egality.]

Fragment (6) points to the communicative generality of the standard language: having a unitary language not only symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it also ensures that the citizens can freely communicate their thoughts. Fragment (7) symbolically links the absence of standardization to the pre-revolutionary situation: the existence of

hierarchically ordered varieties within the language mirrors the hier-archical organization of society. Fragment (8) aptly describes the politically emancipatory function of standardization. The egalitarian ideal implies that any citizen can take part in the government of the nation; in fact, the ideal would be that all citizens successively fulfill political functions and then return to their professional environment. However, in order to be able to fulfill these functions, a thorough knowledge of the common language is necessary. People should not be prevented from taking up office by their ignorance of the lan-guage. Hence, an educational effort to ensure standardization is nec-essary: Grégoire is an ardent defender of the 'Ecole publique' as a standardizing force.

In section 3, I will describe the transformations that the rationalist, Enlightenment ideal of standardization goes through in the course of the last two centuries. Even in its transformed shape, however, the positive evaluation of standardization refers to one or another of the features mentioned here: a neutrally mediating communicative func-tion, and an emancipatory and participatory effect, both of these sup-ported by an educational system geared towards the spreading of the standard language.

2.2.   *The romantic model*

The romantic conception of standardization may be easily defined in contrast with the two dominating features of the rationalist model. First, as against the emancipatory and participatory goals of the en-lightened view, a romantic view will tend to point out that standard languages are themselves instruments of oppression and exclusion. At this point, of course, the analysis of standardization takes the form of an ideological criticism: it will argue that the enlightened ideals are not often realized, and that, in fact, processes of standardization typically achieve the reverse of what they pretend to aim at. Al-though the term is not often used, this type of critical discourse boils down to a demonstration that linguistic standardization exemplifies what Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) called the 'Dialektik der Auf-

klärung' – the (negative) dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that rationalist positions have a tendency to lead to their own dialectical counterpart (in the sense, for instance, in which a growing technical mastery of man over nature may lead to the destruction of the natural world).

Now, if we look back at the three types of generality that standard languages are supposed to characterize, it is easy to see that the actual realization of the ideal may tend to contradict the ideal – which is then a case in point of the 'Dialektik der Aufklärung'.

First, standard languages are supposed to be geographically neutral, but in actual practice, processes of standardization often have their starting-point in a specific region that is economically, culturally, and/or politically dominant. For people in the other, outer provinces, then, the standard language is not an impartial medium, but it rather affirms the dominance of the leading province. Standard French, for instance, is not just an unbiased language coming out of the blue; it is the language of the upper and the middle classes of Paris and the Ile-de-France, and it is associated with the role that the central province has played since the medieval era.

Second, standard languages are supposed to be functionally general, but in actual practice, they are typically used in cultural, educational, scientific, administrative, and political contexts – at least in those circumstances in which a language community is not entirely standardized. Non-standard varieties may then naturally acquire additional, contrastive overtones. For one thing, if the standard language is the language of public life, the non-standard varieties will be appreciated as the language associated with intimacy, familiarity, the personal rather than the public sphere. For another, if the standard language functions in typically intellectual contexts (education and science), non-standard varieties will be invested with emotional values. For speakers of a dialect, the dialect is often the language of the emotions, of spontaneity, of naturalness, in contrast with the official and educational language. Ironically, the functional generality of standard languages engenders a functional specialization, separating the public sphere from the personal, and the emotional sphere from the intellectual.

Third, standard languages are supposed to be socially neutral, but in actual practice, they are typically the language of an elite. The link between an economical, cultural, or political elite and the standard language is in fact an inevitable side-effect of the functional generality of standard languages. If standard languages are typically used in cultural, educational, scientific, administrative, and political contexts, then those speakers of the language that act in these contexts will more easily learn the standard language or adopt it as their first language than speakers who remain foreign to these functions. The outsiders may then perceive the greater linguistic proficiency of the elite as a factor contributing to social exclusion. In Grégoire's view, knowledge of the standard language contributes to social mobility, but conversely, the real social distribution of standard language functions may turn the standard language into an instrument of discrimination.

We can see, in other words, how the alleged generality of standard languages actually takes the form of a series of specializations. The process of standardization takes its starting-point in the language of specific regions, specific groups of speakers, specific domains and functions, and this largely inevitable fact may subvert the very ideal that standardization was supposed to serve. When that happens, the original ideal may be critically unmasked as an ideological pretence.

Needless to say, this dialectical reversal may also affect the educational system. If the standard language is recognized as an instrument of oppression, discrimination, social exclusion, the educational system will likewise be rejected as contributing to such processes of social exclusion. Rather than seeing the school as an institution that spreads knowledge of the common language (and knowledge in general), creating possibilities for social mobility, it will then be pointed out that the educational system, relying on perhaps more than contributing to the knowledge of the language, favors those language users whose background makes them more familiar with the standard language, and thus reproduces rather than neutralizes social inequality.

But why call this critical reversal of the appreciation of the standard language a 'romantic' model? Why not simply call it a 'realis-

tic' or a 'critical' or an 'anti-ideological' one? The reason is that this
critical stance is often (though not necessarily always) accompanied
by a second feature, that may be contrasted with the second charac-
teristic of the rationalist model. That is to say, we have just seen how
a critical approach questions the emancipatory, participatory concep-
tion of the Enlightenment model. But what about the second feature?
What about the communicative aspects of the rationalist model?

We get a truly 'romantic' model of language variation when the
critical attitude towards official standards is coupled with a view of
language as *expression* rather than *communication*. According to the
Enlightenment perspective, languages are means of communication,
and a standard language is a superior communicative tool because it
is functionally general and socially neutral.

According to a romantic perspective, languages are primarily ex-
pressive rather than communicative. They express an identity, and
they do so because they embody a particular conception of the world,
a world view or 'Weltanschauung' in the sense of Herder. The link
between this well-known romantic conception of the relationship
between language and thought and the standardization debate will be
clear. If languages or language varieties embody a specific identity,
then a preference for one language or language variety rather than
another implies that the specific identity of a specific group of people
is neglected or denied. Not recognizing the language is not recog-
nizing the language users. If some language varieties are relegated to
second rate status through the existence of a standard variety, then
the speakers of those language varieties are denied a fundamental
right: the right to express themselves in their own language – the
only language, in fact, that could do justice to their individual iden-
tity, according to the romantic conception of the relationship between
language and identity.

A correlate of this position is the positive evaluation of variety.
Whereas the rationalist approach cherished linguistic uniformity as
the symbolic expression of a free and open community in which all
citizens have equal rights to speech, the romantic approach values
diversity as a recognition of a fundamental respect for different iden-
tities.