

APPROACHES TO SEMIOTICS

edited by

THOMAS A. SEBEOK

*Research Center for the Language Sciences
Indiana University*

FOLKLORE

Performance and Communication

edited by

DAN BEN-AMOS

and

KENNETH S. GOLDSTEIN

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INTRODUCTION

At the 1969 American Folklore Society Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, we organized a session devoted to "Folklore and Communication". The papers which Richard Bauman, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, and Bruce A. Rosenberg then read serve as the nucleus of the present volume. Dell Hymes, who also participated in this session, had his paper published elsewhere¹ and contributed his present work instead. The other authors whose articles make up this book, Roger Abrahams, İlhan Başgöz, Linda Dégh and Andrew Vázsonyi, Herminia Meñez, and J. Barre Toelken, read their papers at other conferences and meetings of scholarly societies; they contributed their essays to the present volume out of the conviction that the direction it represents constitutes a new turn in folklore research, in the formation of which they and other folklorists in America all share.

Within the framework of folklore scholarship in the United States this research trend has gained force only in the late 1960's. Two versions of a single essay by Richard M. Dorson, published nine years apart, demonstrate the emergence of this trend as a major research direction. In 1963, surveying the then current folklore theories, Dorson discussed the comparative, the national, the anthropological, the psychological, and the structural theories as dominant in folklore research. However, when in 1972 he re-worked the same essay as an introduction to the volume *Folklore and Folklife, An Introduction* he appended a discussion of what he has termed "the contextual approach to folklore".² The use of the notion context, in this case, takes its point of departure from and does not dupli-

¹ "The Contribution of Folklore to Sociolinguistic Research", *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (1971), 42-50.

² Richard M. Dorson, "Current Folklore Theories", *Current Anthropology* 4 (1963), 93-112, and Richard M. Dorson, ed., *Folklore and Folklife, An Introduction* (Chicago, 1972), 45-47. For another discussion of the present developments in folklore research in the United States, see Jan Harold Brunvand, "New Directions for the Study of American Folklore", *Folklore* 82 (1971), 25-35.

cate Malinowski's concepts of context of culture and context of situation which he advanced in connection with problems of meaning and translation of the then so called 'primitive languages'. Reacting against missionary-type dictionaries which purported to provide English equivalents to Oceanic languages, Malinowski suggested that outsiders can correctly understand these languages only if they consider the context of cultural reality, that is, "the material equipment, the activities, interests, moral and aesthetic values with which words are correlated".³ Very often, knowledge of cultural reality in general is insufficient for the elucidation of the meaning of texts, and the particular context of situation has to be accounted for. By this latter term Malinowski meant both the circumstantial information surrounding speaking, and the "facial expression, gesture, bodily activities, the whole group of people during an exchange of utterances and the part of the environment on which these people are engaged".⁴ Malinowski did not fully develop these terms into distinct conceptual tools of research. While in an earlier essay⁵ he proposed the concept "context of situation" as the key for language interpretation, he later fused the two terms and suggested that "this context of cultural reality is strictly analogous to the context of speech [i.e. situation]".⁶ Furthermore, as Langendoen points out, though Malinowski was concerned with adequate interpretation of Oceanic languages he maintained the perspective of outsiders and not that of native speakers.⁷ Yet in spite of these inadequacies, Malinowski shifted the focus in the study of non-written languages, their magic formulas, and their narratives from the reported document back to their existence as living, dynamic, verbal, social reality.

The import of such a shift in focus from text to context for folklore studies⁸ extends beyond even Malinowski's own theory of functionalism

³ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic II: The Language of Magic and Gardening* (Bloomington, 1965 [2nd ed.]), 22. (First published 1935.)

⁴ Malinowski, *Coral Gardens*, 22.

⁵ Malinowski, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages", in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (New York, 1956), 296-336. (First published 1923.)

⁶ Malinowski, *Coral Gardens*, 22.

⁷ D. Terence Langendoen, *The London School of Linguistics: A Study of the Linguistic Theories of B. Malinowski and J. R. Firth* (= *Research Monograph* 46) (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 18. For another evaluation of Malinowski's contribution to the notion of context in linguistics, see R. H. Robins, "Malinowski, Firth and the 'Context of Situation'", in Edwin Ardener, ed., *Social Anthropology and Language* (= *ASA Monographs* 10) (London, 1971), 33-46.

⁸ See Alan Dundes, "Texture, Text, and Context", *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 28 (1964), 251-65.

which it was designed to accommodate. Such a change involves a conceptualization of folklore in which communication and performance are key terms. It releases folklore from the literary bonds imposed upon it in archives and libraries and views it as human verbal symbolic interaction of a performing kind. The native cognition of folklore, the *a priori* cultural knowledge required for speaking folklore, consists of more than the possession of a store of traditional items which can be retrieved from memory whenever a situation calls for them, as Abrahams seems to contend.⁹ The performer of folklore knows – though he may not be overtly aware of such knowledge – a set of rules, a system of communication, a grammar, in which the relationships between the attributes of verbal messages and the social-cultural reality are in constant interplay, transforming symbols and metaphors, styles and structures, themes and forms in response to social variables of a situation. From a purely linguistic point of view “it makes no sense to say that the meaning of narrative has anything to do with the context of situation of the moment of narration, for in what sense does the meaning of what is said depend upon the attitude of the listeners”.¹⁰ Yet from the perspectives of the contextual approach to folklore, in which its communicative attributes are primary, not only does it make good sense to base the meaning of a text upon both the intent of the speaker and the attitude of the listener, but also to consider the meaning of messages as interdependent upon their actual communicative events. “Meaning” in that sense is not only the paraphrase of a statement into its logical constituents, but the comprehension of the entire system of relationship that made the communication of an act of speaking possible, including its cognitive, expressive, and behavioral dimensions.

The concept of folklore as communication derives much of its theory and method from the field of sociolinguistics. It owes a direct debt to Hymes’ idea of “the ethnography of communication”.¹¹ This application

⁹ Roger D. Abrahams, “Personal Power and Social Restraint in the Definition of Folklore”, *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (1971), 16-30.

¹⁰ Langendoen, *The London School*, 23.

¹¹ Dell Hymes, “Introduction Toward Ethnographies of Communication”, in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds., *The Ethnography of Communication* (= *American Anthropologist* 66:6 [1964]), 1-34. Other essays in which Hymes deals with various aspects of this research direction are “The Ethnography of Speaking”, in T. Gladwin and Wm. C. Sturtevant, eds., *Anthropology and Human Behavior* (Washington, 1962), 13-53; “Directions in (Ethno-) Linguistic Theory”, in A. Kimball Romney and Roy Goodwin D’Andrade, eds., *Transcultural Studies of Cognition* (= *American Anthropologist* 66:3 [1964]), 6-56; “Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting”, *Journal of Social Issues* 33 (1967), 8-28; “Sociolinguistics and the Ethnography of

of linguistic theories and methods to the social dimensions of speaking recast communication in culture into a new mold. It demonstrates patterns of speaking, not only of language. Hymes suggests, concurring with other studies in sociolinguistics and cultural anthropology, that using the analogy of language, the entire network of cultural communications has its rules of appropriateness. Not only is language systematic, but also language use, encompassing linguistic as well as social constituents into its sphere and affecting the meaning of utterances. This description of speech behavior has a new theoretical basis; micro-analysis of communicative events in society is not merely a preliminary step in the comparative mode of anthropological inquiry; it also uncovers rules for social verbal behavior. Like most new research directions the ethnography of communication requires the formulation of analytical concepts and terms to handle the data; on close scrutiny it appears that there is even a more fundamental need, namely the basic observation of speech behavior itself. Ethnographic descriptions which were geared to other purposes do not suffice.

Hence, with that need in mind, we gathered here essays which concentrate upon primary ethnographic observation. The authors abandoned the artificial dichotomy that prevailed in folklore studies between collecting and analysis. They do not subscribe to the naive position that it is possible to observe and record information without having a point of view. Hence all of them combine the description of folkloric behavior with methodological analysis. The contextual approach in folklore narrows the perspective of sociolinguists somewhat, focusing not on the entire network of culturally defined communicative events, but upon these situations in which the relationship of performance obtains between speakers and listeners. It concentrates on those utterances which transform the roles of speaker and listener to those of performer and audience. The nature of this transformation is one of the main analytical tasks for the study of the communicative process of folklore. The discovery of the attributes of speech and behavior change reporting into narrating, stating fact into stating proverbs, inquiring into riddling, and describing this transition as it happens is one of the main objects of the study of folklore in context.

Speaking", in Edwin Ardener, ed., *Social Anthropology and Language* (= *ASA Monographs* 10) (London, 1971), 47-94. See also his article on the usage of the concept 'communication' in anthropology, "The Anthropology of Communication", in Frank E. X. Dance, ed., *Human Communication Theory* (New York, 1967), 1-39.

Previously in the quest of methodological rigor, folklore scholars insisted upon the authenticity of the text; as Dorson stated

a text, in the parlance of the folklorist, represents the basic source, the pure stream, the inviolable document of oral tradition. It comes from the lips of a speaker or singer and is set down with word for word exactness by a collector, using the method of handwritten dictation or mechanical recording. What the state paper is to the historian and creative work to the literary scholar, the oral traditional text is – or should be – to the student of folklore.¹²

For contextual folklore studies a text is necessary but not sufficient documentation; they require proxemic, kinesic, paralinguistic, interactional descriptions, all of which might provide clues to the principles underlining the communicative processes of folklore and its performing attributes. While the native speaker derives the clues for the nature of communication from the many signs and symbols that converge in the situation, the researcher finds himself inundated by information which he often does not consider related to the act of performance. The necessity of systematization of the analysis of the communication and performance of folklore is obvious. The authors of the present essays utilize concepts, terms, and methods which are currently available. They resort to relevant works in literature and linguistics, anthropology and sociology, and more specifically to recent studies on human communication, interactional analysis, semiotics, proxemics, kinesics, ethno- and psycholinguistics, applying them with the necessary modifications to folklore. At the same time, by their very detailed analysis of folklore communication they bring forward the particular attributes of this process, for which scholars in other disciplines do not account.

In their quest for concepts and terms, folklorists do not hesitate to turn to relevant disciplines. The very concept of communication was popular, in danger of becoming a cliché, during the fifties in the surge of mass-communication research in sociology and following the advent of cybernetics as a distinct field of study.¹³ For some time, folklorists themselves, groping for terms with which to analyze the cultural reality of folklore, have used, though sparingly, the two key terms of this volume, performance and communication. William H. Jansen proposed to apply the concept of performance to the central problem of folklore studies

¹² Richard M. Dorson, ed., *Buying the Wind: Regional Folklore in the United States* (Chicago, 1964), 1.

¹³ See Frank E. X. Dance, ed., *Human Communication Theory: Original Essays* (New York, 1967).

back in the fifties, namely classification.¹⁴ He schematized a model for classification of folklore in which performance and participation serve as two polarities, having an inverse relation to each other in every folklore genre. The forms with the lowest degree of performance factor are those which require the highest degree of participation (i.e. collective singing), and vice versa, genres which have the highest degree of performance quality are those which have the lowest degree of participation. Elli-Kaija Kõngäs Maranda incorporated the concept of communication into her work "Finnish-American Folklore: Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis" (unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1963), considering the process of transmission of mentifacts as the focus for the analysis of the degree of popularity of folklore items, and the psychological dynamics involved in their acceptance or rejection by the community.

In pursuit of terms to cope with the dynamic nature of folklore, Roger Abrahams proposed a *rhetorical* theory of folklore, in which he emphasized the controlling power of folklore and its manipulative qualities in social situations.¹⁵ More recently, in a volume devoted to method and theory in folklore, however, the terms performance and communication seem to have gained wider currency and are adopted by Abrahams as well.¹⁶ They are more inclusive terms which account for the rhetorical attributes of folklore and accommodate also the concerns with the symbolic qualities of face-to-face interaction.

Perhaps of the five folklore theories that Dorson mentioned in his 1963 survey, the comparative, the national, the anthropological, the psychological, and the structural, the last has the closest affinity to the present studies. Research in the communication of folklore broadens the perspective initially provided by inquiry into folklore structures. Both trends are concerned with the symbolic communicative capabilities of folklore. While structural studies for the most part focused primarily on the text itself, communicative studies of folklore performance concerned themselves with the interrelation between texts and situations.

¹⁴ "Classifying Performance in the Study of Verbal Folklore", in *Studies in Folklore in Honor of Distinguished Service Professor Stith Thompson* (= *Indiana University Publications, Folklore Series* 9) (Bloomington, 1957), 110-18.

¹⁵ "Introductory Remarks to a Rhetorical Theory of Folklore", *Journal of American Folklore* 81 (1968), 143-58.

¹⁶ See *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (1971). It is published as a separate volume: Américo Paredes and Richard Bauman, eds., *Toward New Perspectives in Folklore* (Austin, 1972). Concurrent with this approach, though tackling the attributes of communicative events from a different perspective, is Robert A. Georges, "Toward an Understanding of Storytelling Events", *Journal of American Folklore* 82 (1969), 313-28.

Both aim at discovering the symbolic codes of folklore as they relate to situations within the constraints of particular genres. Both are synchronic studies considering the holistic entities as their prime objective. While the text of a tale, or the entire narrative production of a culture, may be the whole in structural analysis, communicative research considers as holistic entities communicative events or the entire network of folkloric communication in a society. Both search for the principles of transformations within these holistic entities and both attempt to unveil the self-regulating rules that govern them.¹⁷

These papers search for these principles in the performance attribute of folklore, in the components of the communicative situation, in the social relations within particular situations, and in the cultural cognition. The four sections of the book, Performance, Performance and Communication, Transmission and Communication, and Cognitive Aspects of Folklore Communication, represent these respective concerns. The integration of this information, analyses, concepts, terms, and methods will contribute hopefully to the study of folklore not as a completed structured text but as the structuring of verbal symbolic expressions.

Dan Ben-Amos

Kenneth S. Goldstein

¹⁷ In singling out these basic principles of structuralism we followed Jean Piaget, *Structuralism*, Chananah Maschler, trans. (New York, 1970), 3-16.

J

PERFORMANCE

DELL HYMES

BREAKTHROUGH INTO PERFORMANCE

The notion of performance is central to the study of folklore as communication. Indeed, it is through the study of performance that folklore can integrate its scientific and humanistic aims in a forward-looking way. On the one hand, the notion focuses attention on social interaction and the kinds of communicative competence that enter into interaction. Here folklore research joins hands with a number of interests and approaches in the social and behavioral sciences. On the other hand, folklore makes a distinctive contribution to the study of communicative events, by focusing attention on the stylized content and conduct within them. Here folklore enhances its concern with the aesthetic and evaluative dimensions of life. One might even hope that folklore would take the lead in showing how appreciation and interpretation of performances as unique events can be united with analysis of the underlying rules and regularities which make performances possible and intelligible; in showing how to overcome the divorce between the emergent and the repeatable, between the actual, the realizable, and the systemically possible that has plagued the study of speech.

Several folklorists have made important use of the notion of performance, e.g. Abrahams, Bauman, Ben-Amos, Dundes, Goldstein, Kirshen-

Field work with Wasco was begun in 1951 on a grant from the Phillips Fund of the Library of the American Philosophical Society to Professor Carl Voegelin. Field work in 1954 and 1956 was supported by grants from Indiana University Graduate School (Dean Ralph Cleland) and the Laboratory of Social Relations (Professor Samuel Stouffer). Further support from the Phillips Fund to Michael Silverstein and myself has helped shape the present work. Silverstein has valuable instances of the phenomena discussed here from his work at Yakima reservation, Washington, including a case of code-switching that is telling for the interpretation of a version of the myth of Seal and her daughter. (See Dell Hymes, "The 'wife' who 'goes out' like a man. Reinterpretation of a Clackamas Chinook Myth", *Social Science Information* 3 [1968], 173-99. Reprinted in P. and E. Maranda, eds., *Structural Analysis of Oral Narrative* [Philadelphia, 1971]). I am indebted also to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Senior Fellowship in 1972-73 that has enabled me to continue work in Chinookan mythology.

blatt-Gimblett, Lomax.¹ The term has come to prominence also in linguistics through the work of Noam Chomsky. The relation between these two approaches is discussed in another paper,² in which I argue that the analysis of verbal performance offers folklore a special opportunity for progress as a field with a distinctive methodology. Here I should like to develop further one implication of the notion itself.

Some remarks on the relation of performance to behavior are needed as a preliminary. Then I shall present three instances of performance of traditional material by speakers of Wasco, the easternmost variety of Chinookan, now spoken by a few people in Oregon and Washington.³ The three instances illustrate three types of situation that seem important if we are to understand the subtle relation between traditional material and its contemporary use.

¹ Cf. the earlier distinction between active and passive bearers of tradition (C. W. von Sydow, "On the Spread of Tradition", in Laurits Bødker, ed., *Selected Papers on Folklore* [Copenhagen, 1948], 11-18) and the influential posing of the questions, "What is meant by performance? And, what are the degrees of performance?" (by William H. Jansen, "Classifying Performance in the Study of Verbal Folklore", in *Studies in Folklore in Honor of Distinguished Service Professor Stith Thompson* [= *Indiana University Publications, Folklore Series* 9] [Bloomington, 1957], 112).

I am indebted to Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett for this and several other points; to Michael Silverstein for his penetrating critique, informed by his intensive knowledge of the language and culture; and I should like to thank Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, John Gumperz, and William Labov for discussions over the years that have helped shape the perspective of this paper.

² Hymes, "The Contribution of Folklore to Sociolinguistics", *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (1971), 42-50.

³ The term 'Wishram' is retained here, insofar as it identifies the material published by Sapir as *Wishram Texts*, and because Mr. Kahlamet had accepted this identification in his work with Sapir's student, Dyk, and Sapir himself. In the ethnographic and linguistic literature it would appear that there were two aboriginal communities, Wishram on the Washington side of the Columbia river, Wasco on the Oregon side, and that the Chinookan speakers surviving today on the Yakima reservation, Washington, and the Warm Springs reservation, Oregon, are, respectively, Wishram and Wasco. In point of fact, the particular villages from which 'Wishram' and 'Wasco' derive were but two prominent villages among a number of others. At the level of language, the native term *kiksht* embraces the slightly varying forms of speech of all of them. In terms of culture, the communities were essentially the same, and in terms of social structure, closely interconnected, through intermarriage, trade, common activities, change of residence, and the like. Many 'Wasco' have 'Wishram' ancestors and conversely. The descendants of the aboriginal eastern Chinookan communities are closely interconnected today, through ties of marriage, inherited property, visiting, ceremonial trading, etc. On both sides of the river they refer to themselves and their language today in English as 'Wasco'. Clear realization of the extent to which a common community links eastern Chinookan descendants in both states is due to the recent field work of Michael Silverstein. On the aboriginal and historically known culture of these people, see David French, "Wasco-Wishram", in Edward H. Spicer, ed., *Perspectives in Amerindian Culture Change* (Chicago, 1961), 337-430.

PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR

In contemporary transformational generative grammar the term performance treats overt behavior as a realization, quite likely imperfect, of an underlying knowledge on the part of a speaker. In contemporary folklore the term performance has reference to the realization of known traditional material, but the emphasis is upon the constitution of a social event, quite likely with emergent properties. In each of the cases to be presented below, these two latter considerations will be essential – the performance as situated in a context, the performance as emergent, as unfolding or arising within that context. The concern is with performance, not as something mechanical or inferior, as in some linguistic discussion, but with performance as something creative, realized, achieved, even transcendent of the ordinary course of events.⁴

Within this concern, several distinctions seem to be necessary. Performance is not merely behavior, but neither is it the same as all of culture (or conduct, or communication). It ought to be possible to compare communities as to the degree to which performance is a characteristic of life, ranging from those in which it is salient and common, as Abrahams⁵ has shown to be the case in parts of the West Indies, to those in which it is subdued and rare. And it ought to be possible to distinguish performance according to the key in which it occurs; some performances are desultory, or perfunctory, or rote, while others are authoritative, authentic.

If some grammarians have confused matters, by lumping what does not interest them under 'performance', as a residual category, cultural anthropologists and folklorists have not done much to clarify the situation. We have tended to lump what *does* interest us under 'performance', simply as an honorific designation.⁶

⁴ Cf. Melville Jacobs, *Content and Style of an Oral Literature* (Chicago, 1959), 7; and my discussion of Burke, "Review of Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*", *Language* 44 (1968), 664-69.

⁵ Roger D. Abrahams, "The Training of the Man of Words in Talking Sweet", *Language in Society* 1:1 (1972).

⁶ There has been little or no fruitful integration of work concerned with the methodology of observational description, and work concerned with the methodology of cultural description, culture being conceived as a set of recurring standards or arrangements, or both. Some observational work has concentrated on painstaking dissection of components of behavior (kinesics, for example) vital to adequate account of folkloristic performance, but no way of making such analysis part of a normal ethnographic tool kit (as phonetic transcription can be) has been provided. The path-breaking and invaluable work on sequential observation, behavior settings, etc. of Roger Barker and his collaborators (see Roger G. Barker and H. F. Wright, *Midwest and Its Children*

Recently the linguist William Labov has suggested some interesting, rather operational distinctions that have arisen from his research into naturally occurring verbal conduct, both linguistic and folkloristic (Columbia University Seminar on the Use of Language, 1967). Labov has found it useful to distinguish that behavior which persons in a community can interpret (find culturally intelligible) and can report; that which they can interpret but cannot report; and that which they can neither interpret nor report. These distinctions of course imply a fourth behavior which persons can report but not interpret (though they may seek an interpretation).

The notion of performance, as developed in this paper, introduces an additional dimension, that which people can do or repeat.

Each of the three dimensions – the INTERPRETABLE, the REPORTABLE, the REPEATABLE – can be regarded as an aspect of the abilities of competent

[Evanston, 1954], now happily again in print) has been taken up and elaborated with new ideas by Marvin Harris (*The Nature of Cultural Things* [New York, 1964]), but one-sidedly. Whereas Barker and Wright had not taken local definitions of behavioral standards, as verbally expressed, into account, Harris excludes them on principle, and sets behavioral observation and analysis of verbal behavior in opposition (as 'etic' vs. 'emic'). A significant new approach to behavioral description, emically conceived, by Maner Thorpe was refused acceptance as an anthropological dissertation at Harvard and remains unpublished, apparently because its methodological efforts were thought inappropriate. Probably the best and clearest account of cultural description from a standpoint incorporating language (W. H. Goodenough, *Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology* [Chicago, 1970]) finds it necessary to separate cultural description from systematic variation that is central to the Sapirian conception of cultural behavior followed here (see Note 11 below), and apparently also from the character of cultural behavior as situated and emergent that is intrinsic to the Chinookan cases below (Goodenough, 101-03). Generally speaking, the study of behavior and the study of culture go separate ways, and if 'cultural behavior' is spoken and written as a phrase, the integrated conception that it bespeaks is not much realized. The situation is deleterious for study of performance, since, as here conceived, performance is by nature simultaneously cultural and behavior. On the other hand, study of performance may remedy the situation. Finally, there has been no helpful attention by American anthropologists and folklorists, so far as I am aware, to the issues concerning action and performance raised in analytic philosophy in recent years. For a useful summary and an original contribution with direct implications for the study of folkloristic performance, see Quentin Skinner, "On Performing and Explaining Linguistic Actions", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 21:82 (1971), especially pp. 4-5 and 15ff., respectively. My own discussion here does not pretend to do more than briefly open up a part of the general subject, as it impinges on the process and goal of ethnographic inquiry. Relevant recent articles include Robert Georges, "Toward an Understanding of Story-telling Events", *Journal of American Folklore* 82 (1969), 314-28; Lee Haring, "Performing for the Interviewer: A Study of the Structure of Context", *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 36 (1972), 383-98; and papers in Americo Paredes and Richard Bauman, eds., *Toward New Perspectives in Folklore* (Austin, 1972).

members of a culture or community. Each can also be regarded as an aspect of the circumstances facing the investigator of a culture or community. In either respect, the dimensions would entail the general questions: what behavior is interpretable (cultural?) in this community? for this person? what behavior is reportable in this community? by this person? what behavior is voluntarily doable in this community? by this person? As an aspect of abilities, the questions would lead to a description of the distribution of kinds of competence typical of the community or culture, including the distribution of capacity for performance. As an aspect of investigation, the questions would lead to strategies for discovering the cultural behavior of the community, according as it could be done, or reported, or neither, by whom, where, and when, for whom.

Together the three dimensions imply eight categories of abilities, or circumstances of inquiry. Before illustrating these categories, we must notice that within each of the three dimensions there is a continuum from a minimal to a maximal realization. With regard to the dimension of interpretability in connection with language, for example, Chomskyan transformational grammar postulates and requires of speakers at least a minimal ability to respond to sentences as either interpretable (within the grammatical system under consideration) or not. Speakers may not be usually able to explicate their judgments,⁷ and such reflections as they may have on interpretability (here, grammatically) are not taken systematically into account. The linguist's grammatical system itself is relied upon to decide difficult cases. The supposed minimal ability itself may not be what it seems, however, for it begins to appear that it involves in important part a rather refined and instructed skill, if it is utilized in isolation from knowledge of other cultural systems. It may be that the more complex judgment of acceptability (subsuming interpretability as a component) must be the true object of investigation.

In any case, the polarity just indicated between *classifying* and *explaining*, on the dimension of INTERPRETABILITY, can be generalized to all of cultural behavior. The dimension would entail specific questions of the type: "Is this an X?" (say, a proverb, or a myth) 'classifying), and of the type, "Why?" or "Why not?" (explaining).

Ability to interpret (in the sense given above) of course is often connected with ability to report. An answer to the question "Is this an X?" may entail an answer to the question, "Is this an X (for any one, for others) in this community?", or to the question, "Was that an X?"

⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

and hence draw on a person's ability to report or describe cultural behavior.

The polarity just indicated between *reporting* and *describing*, on the dimension of REPORTABILITY, like the other polarities, manifests considerable underlying complexity. Someone may be unable to report that an act or event has occurred, because to him it was not interpretable; because of the circumstance of not having been present; because in the nature of the phenomenon it is not something he is able to report; because it is not culturally appropriate or permissible for him to report it. The same observations hold, of course, for ability to describe.

If what persons can or will report is less than what they can interpret, what they can or will do is less than what they can report. In a recent class I had thought that a clear instance of something that everyone could interpret (recognize as culturally possible and structured), report (recognize as having occurred), and also do would be to recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag. I was mistaken. Eventually the class settled for recitation of the alphabet. Even here one had to take their word for it, and only after an interval was one older member of the class prepared to offer a recitation. And it was clear that under the circumstances performance would have been accompanied by much evincing of what Erving Goffman has termed 'role distance'.⁸

There is thus a polarity between voluntarily *doing* and *performing*, on the dimension of REPEATABILITY, taking performing in the sense of truly or seriously performing. There is further the distinction between those ground characteristics of performances that are indeed repeatable, as a musical score or a play is repeatable, and those qualities that emerge in a given interaction or occasion.⁹

Running through the discussion has been a fourth dimension, not hitherto singled out as such, that of the ACCEPTABLE OR APPROPRIATE. In one sense, the dimension has to do with the distinguishing of what persons will do in particular contexts from what they can do in principle. In another sense, the relation between the possible and contextually doable is itself specific to a community, and that which the investigator thinks ought to be doable may, if inappropriate, be literally not doable for the person in question. The first Chinookan case below may be an

⁸ *Interaction Ritual* (New York, 1967).

⁹ On the complexity of what may count as repetition, cf. Albert Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) and Michael K. Foster, "Speaking in the Longhouse at Six Nations Reserve", in R. Darnell, ed., *Linguistic Diversity in Canadian Society* (Edmonton and Champaign, 1971), 142-48.

example. An instance of a type fairly familiar to linguists is that of a fieldworker among a group in the American Southwest some years ago. His nickname was 'Robin'. Dutifully eliciting a possessive paradigm for the noun 'wing' he was brought up short by his Indian colleague, who refused to give the first person possessive, although both parties knew what it would be if it could be. Suddenly a pleasant thought occurred. "Only a bird could say that, but you can say that, because your name is 'Robin'." And so that summer it was a standing joke that only one person in the pueblo could say 'my wing': the anthropologist.

Abstracting from the dimension of ACCEPTABILITY, the range of possibilities implied by the other three dimensions is tentatively illustrated in Table I.

TABLE I

INTERPRETABLE	REPORTABLE	REPEATABLE	
+	+	+	(1) Recitation of the alphabet.
+	+	—	(2) Recitation of Mark Antony's funeral oration from <i>Julius Caesar</i> .
+	—	+	(3) As 'report': many skills expected of a linguistic informant, such as paraphrase, phonological contrast; as 'describe': tie a shoelace.
+	—	—	(4) Verbally uncoded cultural behavior, such as some maternal behavior according to Bateson's 'double-bind' theory of schizophrenia.
—	+	+	(5) As 'classify': "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" as a reportable, repeatable, semantically uninterpretable sentence; as 'explain': rote use of an uncomprehended religious language, rote recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
—	+	—	(6) Dreams reported to a psychiatrist; visions requiring a specialist; speech in a language recognized but not known.
—	—	+	(7) A reinforcing tic in one's own behavior, elicitable and even conditionable without one's own awareness.
—	—	—	(8) Speech in an unrecognizable language.

As has been noted, these distinctions may have some value in reflecting on the general problem of assessing behavioral repertoire, and also for alerting students to the small portion of cultural behavior which persons can be expected to report or describe, when asked, and the much smaller portion which an average person can be expected to manifest by doing on demand. (Some social research seems incredibly to assume that what there is to find out can be found out by asking.) Most important for the present purposes is the showing that *performance*, as cultural behavior for which a person assumes responsibility to an audience, is a quite specific, quite special category. *Performance* is not a wastebasket, but a key to much of the difference in the meaning of life as between communities.

It would not be wise to insist on any one set of terms at this stage of our understanding of performance, and the distinctions just drawn are intended only to open up the subject a little further in linguistics and folklore than has been usually done. (The major contribution in general social analysis is that of Goffman.)¹⁰ Analytical categories no doubt will change and improve as a broader base of empirical research is given to them. It does seem clear that at one level there can be agreement on the distinctions with which this section began: there is *behavior*, as simply anything and everything that happens; there is *conduct*, behavior under the aegis of social norms, cultural rules, shared principles of interpretability; there is *performance*, when one or more persons assumes responsibility for presentation. And within performance itself, as the doable or repeatable, there is the pole that can be termed performance full, authentic or authoritative performance, when the standards intrinsic to the tradition in which the performance occurs are accepted and realized.

In each of the cases to be presented, authentic or authoritative performance occurs only at a certain point or in a certain respect. Other parts or aspects of the performance must be considered illustrative, or reportive, or even as oral *scholia*. Each of the cases raises questions as to the difference between knowing tradition and presenting it; between knowing what and knowing how; between knowledge, on the one hand, and motivation and identification, on the other, as components of competence in the use of language.¹¹ In each case it is in certain respects, not all,

¹⁰ Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City, 1959), and *Behavior in Public Places* (New York, 1963), and *Interaction Ritual*.

¹¹ On identification as a notion central to the understanding of speech, see Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York, 1950), especially, Part I. The discussion is wise, prescient, and confirmed by events in its view of issues of science and politics (e.g. pp. 22, 26-31), and is even more pertinent today to the ethnographic study of speech and verbal art.

that to responsibility for knowledge of tradition the speaker joins willingness to assume the identity of tradition's authentic performer. The difference, I believe, is fundamental to interpretation of cultural materials.

Recognition of the difference serves obviously as a caution or warning, less obviously as an opportunity. As a matter of what could now be called 'data quality control',¹² concern for authentic performance has long figured in folkloristic research, although not often in published reports; and often enough the personal, situational, and linguistic factors that govern authentic performance in a tradition have not been explicitly investigated or adequately taken into account. Sometimes scholars have even ignored or tried to dismiss such a palpable factor as whether or not the language of presentation was the language of tradition. Perhaps the most obvious influence on what we know of the traditions of nonliterate groups has been the constraint of dictation, and dictation slow enough to be written down; the effect on sentence length and the internal organization of texts has been increasingly revealed by research with tape recorder.¹³ Less obvious is the dependence on what the speaker thinks the hearer capable of understanding; Boas remarked that Charles Cultee's Kathlamet periods became much more complex as their work progressed.¹⁴ But it is not at all my purpose simply to argue that material failing to meet certain criteria must be rejected or relegated to secondary status. Some material indeed must be rejected or restricted in the use made of it, for some purposes, because of such considerations, although if it is all there is of an aspect of tradition, we should and no doubt will make as much of it as possible. My major purpose is to argue for the systematic study of variation in performance. To think of performance constraints in terms of eliminating inadequacies and obtaining ideal conditions is to perpetrate the same error as the linguist who thinks of performance as something that can be ignored when adequate, something to be noted only when it interferes. On such terms, performance is but a means to an end. But especially in an oral tradition performance is a mode of existence and realization that is partly *constitutive* of what the tradition is. The tradition itself exists partly for the sake of performance; performance is itself partly an end. And while there are cases analogous to the *prima donna* who cannot go on if any detail is not right, more often the perform-

¹² Raoul Naroll, *Data Quality Control* (New York, 1962).

¹³ Cf. the work behind Dennis Tedlock, "Notes to 'Finding the Middle of the Earth'", *Alcheringa* 1 (1970), 6.

¹⁴ Franz Boas, *Kathlamet Texts* (= *Bureau of American Ethnology*, Bulletin 26) (Washington, 1901), 6.

ers of tradition are masters of adaptation to situation. There is no more an 'Ur-performance' than there is an 'Ur-text'. Only the systematic study of performances can disclose the true structure.¹⁵

THREE CHINOOKAN CASES

The Chinookan cases presented here permit comparative study of performances only to a limited extent, and only with regard to texts of the two narratives, the speech having no documented parallel. The results are still of some interest, as to the structure of Chinookan narratives, and as to the relation between myth and tale. The types of performance represented by all three cases are, I think, frequent in the world today, and worth being singled out. The simplest and clearest, a case of breakthrough into authoritative performance at a certain point within a single text, is presented first. It could be dubbed a case of simple breakthrough.¹⁶ The second and third cases each require comparison to another version of the same narrative and consideration of relations between native genres. Both narratives involve, I think, realization as essentially a tale of what was once a myth, the retained mythical function being separated out and bracketed at an initial point. One (the first of the two to be presented) might be dubbed a case of simple metaphrasis; the other, because of the introduction of an additional function, as will be explained, can be dubbed a case of complex metaphrasis, *metaphrasis* being adopted here as a technical term for interpretive transformation of genre.¹⁷

¹⁵ Cf. William Labov's systematic study of variation in phonology (*The Social Stratification of English in New York City* [Washington, 1966]), and the theoretical analysis on which it is based, as stated by Uriel Weinreich, William Labov, and Marvin Herzog ("Empirical Foundations for a Theory of Language Change", in W. P. Lehman and Yakov Malkiel, eds., *Directions for Historical Linguistics: A Symposium* [Austin, 1968], 97-195).

As a precursor, see the theoretical perspective staked out by Edward Sapir ("The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures", *Journal of Social Psychology* 5 [1934], 408-15, and "Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist", *Psychiatry* 1 [1938], 7-15. Both are reprinted in David D. Mandelbaum, ed., *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949], 569-77). The perspective is elaborated in Dell Hymes, "Why Linguistics Needs the Sociologist", *Social Research* 34:4 (1967), 632-47, and "Linguistic Method in Ethnography", in Paul Garvin, ed., *Method and Theory in Linguistics* (The Hague, 1970), 249-311.

¹⁶ The use of the term 'breakthrough' here is by analogy to what Paul Friedrich has called "pronominal breakthrough" in his fine study of usage in Russian novels ("Structural Implications of Russian Pronominal Usage", in William Bright, ed., *Sociolinguistics* [The Hague, 1966], 214-53).

¹⁷ Cf. Barbro Sklute, "Folkstories about Supernatural Beings and Occurrences in

THE CRIER — A MORNING ADDRESS

The text to follow came about in the course of inquiry about the word *i-ya-gixhmnih*,¹⁸ literally, 'the one who speaks regularly (repeatedly)' with Philip Kahclamet (d. 1958), who spoke it the night of July 25, 1956 in a booth in the Rainbow Cafe, just across the Deschutes River from the eastern edge of the Warm Springs Reservation, Oregon. Mr. Kahclamet had been raised on the Washington side of the Columbia river, some miles east of The Dalles, Oregon, at the aboriginal site of the Wishram Chinook. He had a thorough knowledge of the language and was conversant with much of the traditional culture. In his youth he had served as interpreter and linguistic informant for Walter Dyk, a student sent out by Edward Sapir, who had himself studied Wishram for a short time in the summer of 1905, as a student of Franz Boas. Mr. Kahclamet had gone to Yale as an informant in Sapir's class for a

Swedish-American Life: A Fading Tradition", *The Swedish Pioneer* 17:1 (1966), 22-35. "Thus, old world tales about supernatural beings and occurrences change in function during the process of transmission from the immigrant generation to the following generation, if there is such a transmission at all. Among immigrants, such as Berta Arvidson, the stories exist as memories of strong experiences with the unseen powers in the old country. Among persons of a subsequent generation, such as August Nelson, they may persist, but merely as entertaining tales, since the very foundation for such stories, namely the belief in supernatural beings, is missing." (P. 35. I am indebted for this reference to Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett.)

¹⁸ In the transcription of Chinookan words the symbols usual in recent Americanist work are mostly employed, but several conventions have been adopted for ease of typesetting, or to preserve certain features of performance. As to vowels: the principal phonemic vowels are /i a u/, 'as in Italian', to which must be added /ae/ as in English *hat*, used for stylistic emphasis, and in color terms and a few other words, and a non-phonemic schwa, often carrying primary stress and sometimes stylistically significant. Schwa (written here [ə]) varies across a wide range, including the two nuclei of *button*. The transcription here is not strictly phonemic, indicating elided grammatical elements within parentheses, on the one hand, and certain phonetic realizations on the other. Thus, [o] is phonemically /u/, and [e] is phonemically /i/. Doubled vowels, such as [aa], indicate expressive length. Front and back vowels adjacent to velars are frequently [e] and [o], respectively; long [ee] and [oo] are sometimes used expressively; primary stress is usually penultimate, secondary stress is usually the second syllable away. As to *consonants*: ' marks glottalization; for certain consonants normally represented with other diacritics (superposed 'hatcheck', subposed dot, bar) *h* is used instead. Thus *sh* and *ch* are as in English *ship* and *chip*; *lh* is a voiceless lateral fricative, as in the *ll* and *fl* of Welsh *Llewelyn* and *Floyd*; whereas *q* is a voiceless velar stop, somewhat as in English *kohlrahi*, but with great local friction in its release in Sapir's texts, *gh* is the voiced velar stop counterpart, the two velars, *q* and *gh*, being parallel to the palatal pair, *k* and *g*. Whereas *x* is a palatal voiceless fricative, not quite as far front as that in German *ich*, *xh* is the velar counterpart, somewhat as in German *ach*. The two fricatives are parallel to the stop pairs just discussed.

semester, but he broke with Dyk and returned, having destroyed, it is reported, his copies of what he had written for Dyk. In the 1950's at Warm Springs Reservation, where he had land and was working, he was persuaded to collaborate with David and Kathrine French in their studies of traditional Chinookan and Sahaptin culture. (Chinookans from the Oregon side of the Columbia had been brought to Warm Springs, together with Sahaptins from adjacent areas, in the mid-nineteenth century.)

When I worked with Mr. Kahclamet in the summer of 1956, he was forthcoming in matters of lexicon and grammar, but resistant to requests to dictate connected text or to tell narratives in either Wishram or English. It was not that he did not know about narratives (as the last case below shows). I speculated that he still held to a certain faith with traditional conditions of proper performance, despite disappearance of any overt native context for such narration at least a generation earlier; that despite the absence of any one who could judge his narration in native terms, he carried internally a sense of the critical judgment that an older generation, a reference group now largely dead, would have made. There is some evidence that older Indians depreciated the lesser Indian language competence of their descendants, and that Mr. Kahclamet judged creative adaptation of the language to have ceased when he was young. (Acculturative vocabulary bears this out, ceasing effectively with the technology of the early part of this century.) Certainly he now resisted being put in the role of informant as such, having come to identify with the role of intermediary and, indeed, linguist. In any case, a booth in the Rainbow Cafe as setting, I as audience, at night after work, were suitable to lexicon and grammar, but not to narration. (Nor did other settings prove more suitable.) There were three exceptions. The first (June 22, 1956) was a traditional story, told in English, arising out of ethnobotanical inquiries already under way by David French (the last case below). The last (August 1) was an autobiographical account, also told in English, and corresponding in a way to disclosure of a guardian spirit experience, of the time as a child when he had lost consciousness and breath, and was thought to have died. He recovered and an old woman was able to explain the experience as one of his soul having been turned back at the fork in the road that leads to the afterlife (one road leads beyond, one road leads back to earth and to existence as an evil ghost). After he was twelve, the woman told him that he had been turned back because he had some Sahaptin ancestry; had he been full-blood Chinook, he would have been dead. "I wouldn't be here now. That's the reason I believe in this longhouse religion [the dominant native religious practice on the reserva-

tion]; and I'm going to stay with it." And on the night of July 25, 1956, he told me the text that follows.

The Crier (Philip Kahclamet)

In the morning he steps out. He intones his words.

"This is Sunday morning. You people should know – I don't have to come round this morning to tell you – that you people should put on all your trap-pings; that you will come to church.

"You know that we were put here by the Great Spirit. We have to worship him. I am getting to my old age; some of you will have to take my place when I'm gone.

"When you hear the drum this morning, it's calling you to worship the Great Spirit. That's where all our ancestors went. If you go by the old religion, you will see them when you leave the earth. You know we are going to have to leave our flesh in the ground; only our souls go; and we'll be sure we'll meet our ancestors.

"You people know that we didn't come here ourselves. He who created us is above. He put us here. We have to be where we are today. Me – I'm not telling you this myself. I'm only giving you the revelations which I've learned from somebody else.

"When you hear these drums, go. We are Nadidanwit here; this is our country. These white people came; they brought Christianity. It's not for us. The Christianity was brought here for the white people only. The white people cheated us out of our country. So don't follow them whatever they teach you. Shushugli was a Jew; he was not Nadidanwit and he was not for the Nadidanwit. *Shushugli i-ju i-kixhaxh. Yaxdau i-pendikast, i-kaethlik, 'Presbyterian', 'Methodist', kwadaw i-shik, k'aya amxhawixha. K'aya t'uwit amduxha.*"¹⁹

There is reason to believe that formal oratory, such as this, was important to Chinookan communities. The title itself names a role. The end of the fifth paragraph ("I'm only giving you the revelations which I've

¹⁹ *Shushugli* is from the French *Jesus Christ* [zhezū kri]. As to consonants, the initial voiced fricative, not found in Chinookan, goes to the voiceless fricative that Chinookan does have (zh – sh); while the second consonant might have been adapted in parallel fashion (z – s), Chinookan words tend to have consonantal harmony in this regard, either *sh...sh*, or *s...s*, and *sh* is the normal form. Moreover, French Canadian /s/ may have been a somewhat palatalized [s'], hence closer to Chinookan /sh/. The *r*, not found in Chinookan, goes to the nearest equivalent, *l*. As to vowels, the third vowels match [i : i], and *u* is the nearest Chinookan equivalent to the second French vowel [ü]. The first French vowel might have been expected to become [i], giving *Shishugli*, but has been assimilated to the following vowel, perhaps somehow in connection with the matching of consonants in the two syllables. The word is known in Chinook jargon. *Nadidanwit* is a formal, collective name for Indians as contrasted to other kinds of people and beings. The final two sentences translate: "Jesus Christ is a Jew. That Pentecostal, Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, and that Shaker [church], don't concern yourselves with them. Don't believe in them."

learned from somebody else”) reflects a fundamental criterion of formal speech events, that the speech be repeated; in that lay its formality and often certainty. (Thus, to have claimed to speak on one’s own authority alone would have deprived what was said of authority.) I have tried to reconstruct a cultural pattern underlying such formal speaking elsewhere.²⁰ Very little is known of actual oratory. There are indications in Sapir’s *Wishram Texts*.²¹ This mostly English text is the only other instance, and the longest recorded instance, known to me.

The special interest of the speech here is that it begins as a report, in the third person, in English (“In the morning he steps out...”) and ends as authentic performance, in the first person, in Wishram. This is the only time at which I knew Philip Kahclamet to assume the role of speaker, in Wishram. The setting was late at night, after a good deal of beer drinking that night, after a good part of a summer working together. And even so, the switch into authentic performance, into Wishram was brief, two sentences, at the end of, or ending, the speech.

Code-switching, from one language to another, is here, I believe, a sign of ‘breakthrough’ into full performance.²² This case might be said

²⁰ David French, “Cultural Matrices of Chinookan Non-Casual Language”, *International Journal of American Linguistics* 24 (1958), 258-63; Dell Hymes, “Two Types of Linguistic Relativity”, in William Bright, ed., *Sociolinguistics* (The Hague, 1966), 114-58.

²¹ *Publications of the American Ethnological Society*, 2 (Leiden, 1909), 206, 210, 218, 228-29.

²² Three possible aspects of such a switch, regarding the white interlocuter (myself), would be (1) to express distance, (2) to soften the impact, (3) to express community, sincerely or by way of flattery (‘one of us’ by virtue of sharing understanding of our language). A fourth possible aspect would be to prevent other people from knowing what was said. With regard to the content of what is said in *kiksht* (Wasco), note that the indictment of white people occurs in English before the switch, and the identification of *Shushugli* as a Jew is stated in English before being repeated in *kiksht*. The material in *kiksht* thus begins and ends with repetition of what has been said in English (*Shushugli*, exhortation not to believe in Christian denominations); only the intervening specification of denominations, partly quoted English, is novel content. With regard to other auditors, Mr. Kahclamet and I were in a booth at the end of the row, and had been working for some time out of contact with other persons in the cafe, as we had many times before. Thus there do not appear to be reasons for concealment from others or softening with regard to myself. Expression of social distance, either distancing or intimacy, cannot be ruled out as a component of the significance of the switch. I think that in a way both were involved, distancing from the immediate scene and myself insofar as I was perceived as part of it, intimacy insofar as I was accepted as audience for oratory. The key, however, is in my opinion the evidence that the switch is prepared for and seems literally a switch into *kiksht* for the sake of *kiksht*. As mentioned in the text below, the full use of *kiksht* is preceded and perhaps precipitated by three uses of individual *kiksht* terms in the prior sentence; as mentioned above, the first sentence in *kiksht* is not new in content, but repeats a

to develop through three stages: *Report: Translation: Full Performance*. The first line is report, concerning a third person. There follows address, quoted in translation. (English performance of such an address is unattested and unlikely, although Mr. Kahclamet very likely had heard such addresses in Sahaptin, a language with which he was familiar.) The last three sentences are full performance, anticipated by the introduction of native terms in the preceding sentence. The dominant speech function is clearly rhetorical in nature, a hortatory focus on the addressee, and a perfect example of enlisting an audience in terms of identification and division.²³

The sincerity of the identification with the role of speaker is evidenced by the personal experience, summarized above, which Mr. Kahclamet recounted a week later that summer, directly in English. ("Directly", because in our relationship Wishram was not a medium of communication, but an object of study. I take the breaking into Wishram at the end of the speech to imply not only subjective assumption of the role of the speaker, but also momentary forgetting of the immediate audience.)

The third of Mr. Kahclamet's extended discourses that summer, the traditional story, will be presented later. It is the most complex of the three cases, and can be more readily understood after consideration of a performance in which the realization of a tale-like adventure – only one dimension of Mr. Kahclamet's narrative – is the central concern.

MYTH INTO TALE: "THE STORY CONCERNING COYOTE"

The performance to be considered here is of one part of the cycle of Coyote stories that constituted the most characteristic, salient feature of the oral literature of Chinookan groups. We have three renderings of the cycle, one collected in 1905 on Yakima reservation,²⁴ one collected in English a little later at the ancestral home of the Wishram on the Columbia,²⁵ and one obtained by myself in 1954. The 'breakthrough' in the present case thus is not signalled by code-switching, as the story is but

content already given in English. Moreover, my remembered impression (the scene returns vividly) is that it was when Mr. Kahclamet realized that he was launched in oratory in *kiksht* that he became self-conscious, aware of surroundings, and stopped. In sum, it does appear that the initial impetus to the switch was not distance, near or far, or concealment, but an impulse to full appropriateness.

²³ Cf. Burke, *The Rhetoric of Motives*.

²⁴ Sapir, *Wishram Texts*.

²⁵ Edward S. Curtis, *The North American Indian*, VIII (Seattle and Cambridge, Mass., 1911).

one in a sequence of native language dictations. The authoritative assumption of responsibility for presentation manifests itself rather in context and in style.

As to context: in mid-summer of 1954 Mr. Hiram Smith was working at a small farm near Sandy, Oregon. In late afternoon and early evening he would work with me on the language. At first he demurred at the suggestion that he narrate full myths, just as he had the previous summer I had been with him (1951). He had then spoken of the skill at narration of his dead father (from whom he had traditional stories)²⁶ but disclaimed ability to tell them himself, although he took evident pleasure in references to mythological characters in conversation, and when the myth was mentioned in which Coyote transforms two women into stone, he volunteered the location on the Columbia of the particular rocks. After several requests, and then with some seeming reluctance, Mr. Smith did supply two short passages that were missing from the myths collected by Sapir. Both involved mythological characters named but left hanging in *Wishram Texts*.²⁷ In contrast, Mr. Smith related several narratives of late nineteenth century wars and adventures with relish and assurance. The tales were partly dramatized when Mr. Smith would take both parts of a short dialogue. All the tales were volunteered by him, and enjoyed by his wife and children, who showed no interest in the mythology.

In 1954 I offered to prompt Mr. Smith by getting a copy of *Wishram Texts*, as a guarantee of the order in which the stories of the Coyote cycle should go. This seemed to reassure Mr. Smith. I would indicate the stories in turn, and Mr. Smith would narrate without reference to the texts. In the event, Mr. Smith did not rely on *Wishram Texts* for order, much less for content. His sequence shares certain fixed reference points at beginning and end with that of Louis Simpson (the narrator of Sapir's *Wishram Texts*) and that of the Curtis volume. All agree, for example, on locating the "origin of fish" story near the Pacific and as the first story on Coyote's way up the river. Mr. Smith's sequence, however, goes its own way in between that beginning and the last episodes, for the most part, and consciously so. In *Wishram Texts*, for example, the second story on the river is that of "Coyote and the mischievous women"; Mr. Smith

²⁶ A collection of Wasco stories taken in dictation from Mr. Smith's father perhaps still exists somewhere. Mr. Smith remembers a woman recording stories from his father, perhaps thirty or forty years ago, and particularly that she did not blush at the sexual parts, but kept right on writing. She went, he thinks, somewhere in the Southwest. Efforts to identify the person or to locate the material have been unavailing.

²⁷ See Hymes, "Two Wasco Motifs", *Journal of American Folklore* 66 (1953), 69-70, on which the account of the 1951 work is based.