

## LOGOS AND EIDOS

# JANUA LINGUARUM

STUDIA MEMORIAE  
NICOLAI VAN WIJK DEDICATA

*edenda curat*

C. H. VAN SCHOONEVELD  
INDIANA UNIVERSITY

SERIES MINOR

93



1970  
MOUTON  
THE HAGUE · PARIS

# LOGOS AND EIDOS

THE CONCEPT  
IN PHENOMENOLOGY

*by*

RONALD BRUZINA

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY



1970

MOUTON

THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1970 in The Netherlands.  
Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague.

*No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.*

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 70-129299

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . .	9
List of Abbreviations . . . . .	13
I. Phenomenology: Beginnings . . . . .	15
A. Background of a Philosopher . . . . .	15
B. Beginnings and First Critical Rethinking . . . . .	18
C. The Achieving of Phenomenology . . . . .	20
1. <i>Logical Investigations: Prolegomena to a Pure Logic</i> . . . . .	20
2. <i>Logical Investigations II</i> and Its Sequels: Into the Phenomenology of Consciousness . . . . .	29
II. Phenomenology: Basic Plan . . . . .	35
A. Presuppositionlessness . . . . .	35
B. Intuition of Essence . . . . .	39
C. The Phenomenological Program Itself . . . . .	44
D. Techniques in Application: The Program Performed . . . . .	45
1. The Eidetic Reduction . . . . .	46
2. The Phenomenological Reduction . . . . .	48
E. Basic Phenomenological Findings . . . . .	57
1. Intentionality . . . . .	57
2. Constitution in Phenomenological Subjectivity . . . . .	60
III. Phenomenology: Perception and World . . . . .	66
A. The Structure of Perceptual Experience . . . . .	68

1. Horizons . . . . .	68
2. The World . . . . .	71
3. Typicality . . . . .	73
4. Active and Passive Genesis: Strata of Constitution . . . . .	75
B. The Life-World . . . . .	78
C. Divergent Paths? . . . . .	82
IV. The Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty . . . . .	85
A. Maurice Merleau-Ponty . . . . .	85
B. Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perceptual Consciousness. . . . .	89
1. The Phenomenological Reduction: General Character. . . . .	89
2. Specifics of Merleau-Ponty's Reduction: The Basic Phenomenon . . . . .	92
3. The Locus of the Phenomenon of Meaning-in-Genesis: Existence. . . . .	99
C. The Phenomenon of Expression: From Ambiguity of Sense to Committed Articulation . . . . .	105
V. From the Static to the Genetic in the Phenomenology of Husserl . . . . .	116
A. Husserl and Language: <i>Logical Investigations</i> . . . . .	116
B. Husserl and Language: Studies on Time and History . . . . .	126
1. Time and the Phenomenon of Consciousness . . . . .	126
2. Consciousness as Temporal and Language . . . . .	129
a. Phenomenological Time . . . . .	130
b. Teleology . . . . .	130
c. Phenomenological History . . . . .	132
d. Language as Essential to the Constitution of Meanings . . . . .	133
C. Point of Contact . . . . .	137
VI. The Concept in Phenomenology . . . . .	139
A. Consequences of Expression . . . . .	139
1. Sensible Meanings and Categorical Forms . . . . .	139

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

7

2. The Thematic Object of an Act of Expression . . .	140
2. The Result of Expression: Generalizability . . .	141
4. A Note on Categorical Forms . . . . .	144
5. Summation . . . . .	145
B. Levels of Constitution and Orders of Generality. .	146
1. Generalization and Formalization . . . . .	146
2. Ideation and Idealization . . . . .	147
C. The Phenomenological Meaning of 'Concept': Step 1	150
D. Essence, Eidos, Idea . . . . .	154
E. The Phenomenological Meaning of 'Concept': Step 2	155
1. Significative Intention in Genetic Phenomenology	155
2. Application to 'Concept' . . . . .	163
3. Merleau-Ponty and the 'Conceptual' . . . . .	164
Conclusion. . . . .	171
Bibliography . . . . .	174
Index . . . . .	182





## INTRODUCTION

Edmund Husserl was called a Platonist, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty an existentialist, both in the extreme senses, and both in gross misunderstanding. Nevertheless, "between Platonism and Existentialism" could be useful as a title indicating both the extremes to be avoided and the opposing insights that have to be harmonized. "The concept" at first sight may not seem to be a very promising topic in which to attempt such a harmonization. The conceptual is almost synonymous with the abstract, the ideal, the suppositional. But at the same time, it is according to the conceptions one has that one sees, acts, and verifies. The conceptual is the realm of logic and of reason, but the conceptual is also the plane on which human consciousness humanly assumes the significance of a world and of actions in it.

The study that follows sketches out a phenomenology of the concept through the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty precisely in an attempt to delineate the elements that would make possible a setting of the concept at the point of complementarity for an idealist phenomenology and an existential phenomenology. Complementarity, perhaps, but there also where opposition can exist: phenomenology as idealistic, phenomenology as existential. That aspect of conflict is, however, one of the many things not deeply examined, for in the end it is the possibility of a balance within a common framework that is aimed at.

Consequently, a large part of the study is given to outlining the main elements of Husserlian phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty drew much of his philosophical apparatus from Husserl,

even though in doing so he adapted it to his own insights and needs. Moreover, as with others whose thought was influenced and formed through contact with Husserlian phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty adopted and adapted phenomenological notions as achieved, rather than as needing preliminary justification and presentation all over again. As a result, in the study here Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology operates more as a supplement than as a complement — except that the dimension “supplementarily” supplied is so radically fundamental even on precisely Husserlian terms, that it becomes in fact a complement of primary weight. And the arena in which this primary value is established turns out to be that of the phenomenon of language. Language, then, is reached as at once the matrix and the agency for reaching conceptuality.

The present work, however, is hardly a complete treatment. Many absolutely essential factors are only mentioned if even that. For example, there is almost nothing here of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, yet this is integral to an understanding of language. Again, the Husserlian treatment of evidence and ideality in the constitution of science and the scientific project is not taken up. Yet this is one of the principal aims of Husserl's whole effort, namely, to articulate the grounds and the conditions of science as theoretical knowledge.<sup>1</sup> But even the matters explicitly taken up are in reality only sketched, rather than profoundly examined or critically justified. Nevertheless, it is hoped that, outline as it is, the work will be useful both in phenomenological studies as an arguable programmatic, and for those unfamiliar with the immense domain of phenomenology as an introduction, one that opens up a perspective complementary to the one they may be following with regard to the same issues of the concept and language.

The present work is a revised version of a study originally presented as a doctoral thesis. My acknowledgments are due to Professor Frederick Crosson of the University of Notre Dame for

<sup>1</sup> Thus, for example, the program of LU, PSW, FTL, and EU. Cf. Scherer, *La phénoménologie des “Recherches logiques”*, Bachelard, *La logique de Husserl*.

his assistance and guidance during the course of its preparation in that form. In addition, I wish to thank the University of Kentucky Research Foundation for the grant offered towards the publication of the book.

A final remark, regarding mechanics, is that in all cases of emphasis in quotations, except in one or two instances explicitly noted, the emphasis is that of the cited author himself, although occasionally the author's emphasis has been omitted as irrelevant outside the full context in which the text is originally placed.



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

For convenience in the references, the titles of works of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty used most frequently are abbreviated to the designations which follow. For details, see the Bibliography at the end and the specification made in the footnote mention of the work indicated below in parentheses after the title. For other works, an author's last name alone is usually given, together with the title sometimes shortened to the most important words. Again, for details see the Bibliography.

### *Husserl*

- Prol*<sub>1</sub> = *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, 1st edition (p. 20, n. 17)
- LU*<sub>1II</sub> = *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1st edition (p. 20, n. 17)
- Prol*<sub>2</sub> = *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, revised edition: 2nd, 3rd, and 4th (p. 31, n. 45)
- LU*<sub>2II</sub> = *Logische Untersuchungen*, revised edition: 2nd, 3rd, and 4th (p. 31, n. 45)
- ZB* = *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (p. 33, n. 50)
- PSW* = "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" (p. 31, n. 44)
- PSWf* = The same, French translation and commentary by Lauer (p. 31, n. 44)
- PSWe* = The same, English translation by Lauer (p. 31, n. 44)
- ID* = *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (p. 30, n. 42)
- IDf* = The same, French translation and commentary by Ricoeur (p. 30, n. 42)
- FTL* = *Formale und Transzendente Logik* (p. 32, n. 46)
- CM* = *Cartesianische Meditationen* (p. 32, n. 47)
- CMf* = The same, French translation by Peiffer and Levinas (p. 32, n. 47)
- CMe* = The same, English translation by Cairns (p. 32, n. 47)
- NW* = "Nachwort" (p. 52, n. 49)
- NWe* = The same, English translation by Boyce Gibson (p. 52, n. 49)
- EU* = *Erfahrung und Urteil* (p. 33, n. 52)
- K* = *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (p. 32, n. 49)

- UG = "Ursprung der Geometrie" (p. 71, n. 17)  
UGf = The same, French translation and introduction by Derrida (p. 129, n. 43)

*Merleau-Ponty*

- SC = *La structure de comportement* (p. 87, n. 11)  
PP = *Phénoménologie de la perception* (p. 85, n. 2)  
S = *Signes* (p. 88, n. 12)  
SP = "Les sciences de l'homme et la phénoménologie" (p. 168, n. 87)

# I

## PHENOMENOLOGY: BEGINNINGS

### A. BACKGROUND OF A PHILOSOPHER

Edmund Husserl is perhaps the consummate example in our times of the power of reflective reason. We can, furthermore, find no one who better illustrates the first principle for the relevance and validity of theoretical reflection, namely, that a decision to reason carefully and rigorously be motivated precisely by an intense, personally felt concern for the vital issues of the age in which one lives. This is the context, therefore, within which alone one should consider the qualities of distance and detachment in a thinker; and again, Husserl's possession of these qualities is legendary.<sup>1</sup> Finally, and most remarkably, it was in the midst of circumstances of the most trying sort, Nationalist-Socialist Germany in the 1930's, that Husserl produced perhaps his richest work, again, out of a passionately made decision to reason dispassionately in the face of error.<sup>2</sup>

It is true, though, that this dedication to reasoned consideration was inculcated in Husserl's philosophic effort during the first

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Jean Héring, "Malvine Husserl", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 11:610-611: by the same author. "La phénoménologie d'Edmund Husserl il y a trente ans: Souvenirs et réflexions d'un étudiant de 1909", *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 2:366-373; Roman Ingarden, "Edith Stein on Her Activity as an Assistant of Edmund Husserl", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 23:155ff. Cf. also the tributes to Husserl by W.E. Hocking, Wilhelm Schapp, Jean Héring, Helmut Plessner, Fritz Kaufmann, and Karl Löwith, in *Edmund Husserl, 1859-1959* (La Haye, 1959).

<sup>2</sup> A brief good account of Husserl's life that includes this period is given in Kelkel and Scherer, *Husserl* (Paris, 1964).

period of his intellectual development, in late 19th century Germany and Austria. The conflict, political upheaval, and personal tragedy he would later confront in the First World War and its aftermath would put that dedication to a severe test,<sup>3</sup> but Husserl had already reached intellectual maturity by that time, and the foundations were too solidly laid.

As with a number of the western world's philosophical geniuses, Husserl was first trained in mathematics before turning to philosophy. He had gone to Berlin at the age of nineteen to study under the renowned mathematician Karl Weierstrass, staying there for three years, from 1878 to 1881, and even serving as an assistant to him a year or so later. Husserl, however, decided to complete work for his doctorate at the University of Vienna, and received the degree there in 1883, with a thesis on the calculus of variations. Prior to his move to Vienna, Husserl's introduction to philosophy consisted in some lectures by the famous Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in 1876-1878, the first university Husserl attended. At that time Husserl had not been inclined to either philosophy or psychology, and Wundt failed to win his interest. However, while in Berlin he had become somewhat attracted to the philosophy of mathematics through another then well-known mathematician, Leopold Kronecker, and soon after, still in Berlin, the lectures of Friedrich Paulsen had strengthened this new philosophical bent. Yet it was another man who drew Husserl's reflective nature finally and dominantly in the direction of philosophy, Franz Brentano.

During his final mathematical studies in Vienna in 1881-1882, Husserl went to hear this celebrated ex-priest "out of mere curiosity to hear for once the man about whom everyone in Vienna was talking so much".<sup>4</sup> But such was the power of Brentano's personality and teaching depth, that before long Husserl was completely won over. As he himself recounts: "It was from his lectures that

<sup>3</sup> To give but two examples: Husserl's youngest son was killed in the First World War, and under the Nazi regime in the 1930's he and his family were humiliated and harassed because they were of Jewish extraction.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted by Osborn, *Edmund Husserl* (Cambridge, 1949), p. 16.



I first derived the conviction that gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life's vocation, that is, that philosophy is a sphere of serious work, that it can also be treated in the spirit of the most exact science, and consequently that it should be so treated."<sup>5</sup> This conviction having taken root, Husserl finished out his mathematical work, served for a time as assistant under Weierstrass in Berlin, and returned to Vienna to spend the years from 1884 to 1886 studying with Brentano in the closest contact.

By his interest in logic and exactness of method in approaching a wide range of philosophical problems, Brentano provided an easy path for Husserl to move from the familiar area of mathematics to the more comprehensive problems of philosophy,<sup>6</sup> and, indeed, Husserl's own studies and publications followed this same order. It remains to be mentioned that despite Brentano's book, *Psychology from an Empirical Point of View*,<sup>7</sup> published in 1874, for which he was best known, his interest had been occupied by psychology for only a few years, and that was mainly before Husserl knew him.<sup>8</sup> Apart from Brentano's doctrine of intentionality, of major importance for Husserl's own thinking, Husserl's acquaintance with psychology came largely from studies with Carl Stumpf in Halle, to whom Brentano advised him to go for further work. (Stumpf was as well a former student of Brentano's.)<sup>9</sup> During the year of study at Halle with Stumpf, 1886-1887, Husserl prepared his inaugural dissertation, delivering it in July of 1887. With that first lecture at Halle, Husserl's teaching career began, to continue uninterrupted successively at Halle (1887-1901), at Göttingen (1901-1916), and at Freiburg-in-Breisgau (1916-1929), until his retirement in 1929.

The first decades of Husserl's university career were dominated by two currents, one of optimism in science as an all-efficient positivism, the other of remarkable progress in mathematics. At

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Osborn, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2.

<sup>7</sup> Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig, 1874).

<sup>8</sup> Osborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 29-30.

<sup>9</sup> On Stumpf, cf. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague, 1965), I, pp. 54-69.

the same time, the old Kantian double problem of the validity of natural laws on the one hand, and of the ground of logic and mathematics on the other, returned seeking a new solution. Neo-kantianism was one effort to cope with it, while another was the life philosophy of Dilthey. It was in a third direction, however, that Husserl found his intellectual sympathies to lie, namely, in the psychological study as pursued by Brentano.<sup>10</sup>

Psychology in the latter half of the 19th century shared the scientific optimism of the age, and empirical studies of psychic life were pursued with full confidence that factual certitude was as attainable here as in other fields of investigation. Brentano shared this enthusiasm and certainty, but he reached back to an older tradition, the Aristotelian, for his basic inspiration, namely, that psychic life is characterized by an intentional relationship to its objects. But in Husserl's hands, this notion became transformed from an element of interior psychic fact to a structure of pure subjectivity.

#### B. BEGINNINGS AND FIRST CRITICAL RETHINKING

Husserl's interest in psychological studies, however, was based on a PHILOSOPHICAL problem, namely, how to account for the absoluteness, certitude, and universality of mathematics and logic, given the fact that it is the factual and individual human mind that thinks and develops those sciences. This was the concern of Husserl's first major work, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891),<sup>11</sup> into which, with appropriate rearrangement, he incorporated his inaugural dissertation of 1887, "On the Concept of Number, Psychological Analyses". However, in attempting to account

<sup>10</sup> On the movements and major figures of Husserl's time, cf. Tatarkiewicz, "Réflexions chronologiques sur l'époque où a vécu Husserl", *Husserl* (Paris, 1959), pp. 16-26.

<sup>11</sup> *Philosophie der Arithmetik: Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen* (Halle, 1891), Vol. I. This was supposed to be the first of a two-part work, but because Husserl's thought soon after underwent serious modification, the second part was never completed.

genetically for the basic mathematical concept of number, Husserl employed an approach and a terminology that was at best ambiguous. He seemed to seek in the factual psychic processes of grasping a concrete multiplicity the origin of the concept itself, allowing thereby the implication that number results from the way the human mind happens to work. Yet in seeming inconsistency with this psychologistic tendency, Husserl later in the work recognizes the special independent status of the mathematical concept as such.<sup>12</sup>

Fortunately for Husserl, an able critic soon published a devastating analysis of the psychologistic elements of this kind of position, first in more general terms, and shortly after directed specifically at Husserl. Gottlob Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* had appeared in 1884, and Husserl was familiar with the work.<sup>13</sup> In 1893 Frege published his *Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic*, taking pains in that work to point out what 'law' means in logic and mathematics, as distinct from 'law' in empirical science, such as psychology was aiming to be. Then in 1894 Frege wrote a review of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic*,<sup>14</sup> analyzing in detail its arguments and pointing out their weakness and indefensibility. So effective were Frege's criticisms that Husserl had no choice but to agree with them. But he was not satisfied to let the matter stand. The irrefutable principle that formal concepts were distinct and independent from psychological data did nothing to explain how there was nevertheless knowledge of those concepts in psychological acts. That question remained, but Husserl had to

<sup>12</sup> On Husserl's analyses in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, cf. Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague, 1964), pp. 6-36. Also, Biemel, "Les phases décisives dans le développement de la philosophie de Husserl", in *Husserl* (Paris, 1959), pp. 32ff.

<sup>13</sup> In this *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl had, in fact, repeatedly criticized Frege's views on the relations of psychology and logic. Cf. Farber, *The Foundation of Phenomenology* (Cambridge, 1943), pp. 36-43. Husserl later explicitly retracted his disagreement with Frege's antipsychologism. *Prol*<sub>2</sub>, p. 169, note 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 103: 313-332 (1894). Extracts have been translated by Geach and Black, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 79-85.