

The Construal of Space  
in Language and Thought



# Cognitive Linguistics Research

## 8

*Editors*

René Dirven  
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Mouton de Gruyter  
Berlin · New York

# The Construal of Space in Language and Thought

*Edited by*  
Martin Pütz  
René Dirven

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It is hoped that this volume will contribute to stimulating and broadening the research on the conceptualization of space, its functioning in human thought, and consequently to the further expansion of the new paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics.

**Martin Pütz**

**René Dirven**

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# **Introduction: Language and the cognitive construal of space**

**Martin Pütz**

The symposium held in Duisburg in the spring of 1989 marked "the birth of cognitive linguistics as a broadly grounded, self-conscious intellectual movement" (Langacker 1990: ix). What Langacker was referring to here, was the 14th International LAUD Symposium (*Linguistic Agency University of Duisburg*) held in Duisburg, Germany, in 1989. This symposium was the *First International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*. It was during that conference when the *International Cognitive Linguistics Association* (ICLA) was founded, the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* launched, and a new series *Cognitive Linguistics Research* set up. The proceedings of the Duisburg conference were published in the new series by Geiger & Rudzka-Ostyn (1993).

Five years later, from March 22-25, 1994, the newly named Gerhard Mercator University of Duisburg once again invited researchers from all over the world to present their views and insights on a conference theme entitled "Language and Space". On the 400th anniversary of Mercator's death, the University of Duisburg renamed itself as Gerhard Mercator University to honour the great 16th century Flemish cartographer and universal scholar who spent 50 years of his lifetime in Duisburg, measuring and describing the "space" of the whole world by putting together all his maps in his "Atlas" (posthumously published in 1606). The "Language and Space" Symposium in 1994 aspired to be a tribute to Mercator of the linguistic world. The celebration of the Mercator Year and the fifth anniversary of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association's public existence was more than just a happy coincidence. "Space" is also at the very heart of all conceptualization and consequently at the very heart of the new cognitive paradigm in linguistics that seeks to explore the fundamental, spatial basis of conceptualization in and through language. Originally, Langacker even intended to label his new grammar model as "space grammar" and only later, in line with other scholars, was the more abstract name "Cognitive Grammar" established.

The 30 contributions to this volume are a selection of the papers presented at that 19th International L.A.U.D. Symposium. The papers, which have been arranged in four parts, reflect some of the major aspects of the interaction between language and space:

Part A: "Space in language", i.e. the way it is reflected in its lexical and grammatical structures.

Part B: "Space as a cultural artifact", i.e. the variability in the construal of the domain of space.

Part C: "Space as a bridge to other conceptual domains", i.e. the metaphorical exploitation of space and its role as a dominant principle of thought.

Part D: "Space as an organizing principle of thought", i.e. the fundamental, "spatial" way of conceptualization itself.

These four main parts of the volume are further subdivided so that altogether the book contains eight sections.

Central among all contributions is the notion of 'construal', which refers to the relationship between a speaker (the conceptualizer's choice) and a situation that s/he conceptualizes and portrays in one of many alternative ways. This 'construal' relationship implies an active role on the part of the language user in organizing and structuring, i.e. "construing" his or her world (Taylor 1995). The 30 papers of this volume are a comprehensive account of the choices of conceptual and linguistic alternatives available to the speaker (hearer) which determine the construal of space in language and thought.

## **PART A: SPACE IN LANGUAGE**

### **Section 1: Pointing, deixis, and distance**

Since man is "in space" and since space is also "in man", the human conceptualizer must create a number of deictic pointers to trajectors in space which may be framed in collaboration with demonstratives (the prototypical device), but also in totally unexpected ways, e.g. as verb suffixes or prosodic markers.

The speaker's choice of certain linguistic expressions may suggest a construal of a situation in terms of communicative needs and intentions. In this respect Haruko Minegishi Cook's contribution "The Japanese verbal suffixes as indicators of distance and proximity" focusses on the more active role of the language user in portraying a given situation. Cook analyzes the Japanese verbal suffix *-masu* as an expression of 'social deixis' or distance and demonstrates how distance is interpreted in various speech contexts. She emphasizes the importance of recognizing the distinction between the interpreted meanings of a deictic word and the encoded meaning of its lin-

guistic form. The distinction is certainly necessary in order to account for the various meanings associated with the Japanese addressee-honorific suffix *masu*.

A more prototypical device in creating deictic pointers is the use of "Demonstratives as locating expressions". In his paper, Walter De Mulder attempts to show that demonstratives are not pointers which indicate where in the context their referent is to be found. Rather, by analyzing French demonstrative noun phrases such as *ce N* 'this/that N', he shows that the only meaning they convey is that their referent must be identified with the help of a contextual element within the spoken discourse. Identifying the referent of these opaque deictic expressions then means that it will be necessary to combine their linguistic meaning with perceptual interpretative strategies. To strengthen his views, De Mulder exploits the figure-ground model as a fundamental feature of cognitive organization, i.e. the perception of a visual scene divided into the foregrounded figure and the fixed background.

In the same vein, the importance of spatial deixis in language is taken up in Milena Žic Fuchs' paper entitled "'Here' and 'there' in Croatian: a case study of an urban standard variety". Žic Fuchs focusses on issues of spatial deixis and in particular on a number of the Croatian equivalents of the English demonstrative adverbs *here* and *there*, such as the pronominal demonstrative adverbs *ovdje*, *tu*, and *ondje* 'here' which form a three-number paradigmatic set for designating location. One of Žic Fuchs' conclusions is that, historically speaking, this three-way spatial distinction based on participant roles (proximal to the Speaker/Hearer and non-proximal to either of them) was originally found in the Stovakian dialect, and then taken over into Standard Croatian. She leaves the question open for further diachronic research as to why systems of deictic expressions change within languages and dialects.

In more marginal or peripheral ways, the construal of space encoded in "Prosodic and paralinguistic signals of distance" is the topic of Janina Ozga's contribution. Ozga analyzes the relation between prosody and distance from a cognitive point of view and examines the universal principles underlying the spatially constrained use of prosody and paralinguistic features. She shows that certain prosodic and paralinguistic features are non-trivially and non-randomly associated with linguistic forms involving the notion of space.

## Section 2: Conceptualizing space in prepositions and in morphology

Going beyond these first "localization" concepts from the speaker's viewpoint, the human conceptualizer has to structure the whole of his visual field along a number of vertical and horizontal axes so that subfields can be created into which motion can be projected. Here, it is especially prepositions and morphology which come into play.

Accordingly, Elena Bellavia's paper "The German *über*" proposes a radial lexical network symbolizing the whole semantic area covered by the lexical unit *über* 'over'. Exploiting the trajector/landmark distinction, Bellavia gives a detailed account of the different uses of 'über' (+noun) and 'über' as a verb prefix and then attempts to compare and unify their meanings in a radial lexical network approach. She concludes that the prepositional phrase '*über*+noun' represents a more general characterization of movement, while verbs prefixed by *über* are specifications for the purpose of construing particular aspects.

It is a happy coincidence that Robert B. Dewell also focusses on the German preposition *über* with respect to how the speaker "construes" his conceptualization in a specific way. In contrast to Bellavia, however, he concentrates on "The separability of German *über*", discussing the question of when this prefix is separable and when inseparable. He first offers a sharp criticism of traditional treatments of the subject, based on the ground that data on prefixes are not described adequately and, moreover, that basic underlying patterns are not being investigated. Instead, Dewell argues for new directions of inquiry, i.e. the consideration of some basic cognitive issues such as the representation of path, the development of specialized semantic variants from spatial-path images, and the role of prefixes in conveying aspectual contours or transitivity. He convincingly argues that there are regular patterns and semantic constraints which underlie and explain the alternate use of prepositional phrases both as separable and as inseparable prefixes.

In her paper "Prepositional prototypes", Sally Rice is more cautious in proposing an actual network for spatial prepositions, offering instead a "working 'regional' model". The model accounts for a prepositional network which may "ultimately reveal a structure with a temporal region and core sense, a spatial region and core sense, and a more diffuse but coreless abstract region surrounding them both". Rice presents an empirical analysis of the three most basic English spatial prepositions to show that there are prototypical semantic values for *at*, *on*, and *in* which are spatial in meaning. Furthermore, she suggests that in the subjective lexicons of speakers there may be multiple prototypes for a certain preposition, some of which cannot be spatially defined at all.

The semantics of English verbs with a focus on the tense modality system is the topic of Carlos Inchaurrealde's paper "Space and movement in the English verb system". He argues that space has certain topological properties that can be expressed mathematically. Resorting to mathematical formulae, he adopts a geometrical perspective through which he demonstrates that the tense modality system and the lexical characterization of verbs can be analyzed through the concepts "space" and "movement". In line with the general theme of the section - the structuring of the visual field along a number of vertical and horizontal axes - Inchaurrealde concludes that the same modal form, e.g. *would*, could be used for indicating remoteness either on the vertical axis of time or on the horizontal axis of hypotheticality or in a combination of the two.

The last contribution in this section is Dieter Kastovsky's paper "The representation of space in English derivational morphology". It is devoted to the interplay between the functions of morphological and word-formation issues and the notion of "space" as a "pervasive lexical-semantic category". Kastovsky focusses on various types of English word-formation patterns such as compounding, prefixation, and suffixation with reference to their involvement in creating space-denoting lexical items: in other words, processes in which spatial/locative relations play a certain role. It becomes obvious that English word-formation serves to encode spatial relations for nominating as well as for pronominalisation purposes and that e.g. prefixation exclusively yields relational formations, i.e. "formations which encode a spatial relation but do not directly refer to a space manifestation".

## **PART B: SPACE AS A CULTURAL ARTIFACT**

### **Section 3: Can language use cope with space?**

Having all these devices for the conceptualization of space at hand, the question arises: how do they function in actual language use and, even more fundamentally, do they function in any satisfactory way?

The question is taken up by Willem Botha in his paper entitled "Spatial deixis in Afrikaans dictionaries". Botha turns his attention to spatial deictic problems the lexicographer must take into account. First, s/he must portray the individual meanings of typical deictic words such as *here*, *there*, *front*, *back*. Second, s/he must project the meanings of certain localities which get their meanings from the locality of a conceptualizer in relation to certain arbitrary reference points, using typical deictic words which could not properly be understood outside a particular context. Botha addresses these

problems by analyzing the way in which some spatial deictic words are portrayed in an Afrikaans monolingual dictionary.

Eugene Casad provides us with data from Cora, a Uto-Aztecan language of Northwest Mexico and poses the question "What good are locationals, anyway?" In other words, do they function in any satisfactory way? The author attempts to reply to the question by illustrating some of the functional usages of various grammatical elements such as adverbs, particles, demonstrative pronouns, etc. which indicate various kinds of spatial, temporal and logical concepts. His general conclusion is that in Cora, many locational and directional morphemes and lexical items relate to other domains of the grammar: they may distinguish one word from another, or they may help to distinguish different tense aspect forms of the same verb. In short, "without locationals, the Coras would have to talk about the world in an entirely different way", which certainly emphasizes the active role of the language user in organizing and structuring his or her world.

Karin Wenz's paper "Iconicity in verbal descriptions of space" also begins with the assumption that the description of space presupposes previous cognition, namely internalization of the environment. She assumes that the verbalization of spatial experience yields insights into the processes of perceiving space. The iconic principles which govern the semiotic relationship between spatial cognition and the textual representation of space are empirically discussed and evaluated. The notion of 'iconicity' (Haiman 1985) as the conceived similarity between conceptual structure and linguistic form can therefore be seen as one of the salient aspects to the construal relationship discussed at the beginning of the Introduction.

#### **Section 4: Variability in the conceptualization of space**

The general idea presented in the previous papers that the conceptualization of space presupposes the knowledge of man's broad or particular environment inevitably leads to the next step in the exploration of the conceptualization of space: to what extent is space a cultural artifact or a social construct created by the mind of man as a social being, dependent on his environment. Indeed, the conceptualization of space varies considerably among non-European cultures, especially African and Oceanic.

An elucidating example revealing the variability in the conceptualization of space is John Taylor's paper "The syntax and semantics of locativized nouns in Zulu". Taylor provides a cognitive account of locativized nouns expressing spatial relations in Zulu, the largest language group of the Republic of South Africa. In particular, Taylor addresses the semantics of locativized nouns with reference to their expression in conjunction with



motion verbs, e.g. the use of these nouns in copulative constructions to indicate the place of a trajector entity. One of Taylor's suggestions is that the function of the locative morphology in Zulu is to convert a "thing" concept into a "place" concept. Furthermore, he claims that locativized nouns do not contain any notion of "to" or "from". They do not denote a place construed as goal, source, or path, but as a pure "place".

Yet another 'case study' emphasizing the cross-cultural variability in the conceptualization of space is illustrated by Deborah Hill in her paper "Distinguishing the notion 'place' in an Oceanic language". Hill analyzes data from the Oceanic language Longgu which is spoken on the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. She argues that in that language there is a linguistic and cultural importance attached to the notion "place" or, in more specific terms, "home place", which is the linchpin for the whole system of spatial reference. Hill concludes that there are recurring patterns of conceptualization or 'themes' in language. Thus the distinction between what is "home" and what is "not home", reflected in the distinction between direct and indirect possession (what is part of me and what is not part of me), can be seen as different manifestations of the same theme.

Variability in the conceptualization of space *per se* is also a prominent topic in Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky's paper "The linguistic, cognitive and cultural variables of the conceptualization of space". She convincingly argues that the variety of deictic systems operating in a multitude of languages requires a complex and multidisciplinary approach. From a synchronic perspective, deictic systems should not only be studied according to their use in standard varieties. In order to establish contrasts, dialectal features should also be part of the investigation. Furthermore, diachronically, deictic systems call for intralinguistic analyses so as to be able to detect the history of particular forms within the development of a single language.

In their contribution "Rethinking some universals of spatial language using controlled comparison", Sabine Neumann and Thomas Widlok present field research data from two languages of Southern Africa. The paper explores the potential of regional comparison in the field of spatial conceptualization and in particular discusses the question of whether the division between Bantu-speaking agropastoralists and Khoisan-speaking hunter-gatherers corresponds with two distinctive ways of encoding and conceptualizing spatial relations.

## **PART C: SPACE AS A BRIDGE TO OTHER CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS**

### **Section 5: From one meaning to another**

Now, even if "space" never exists or existed independently 'out there', and is basically a product of man's mind and social context, the concept of space has always served as the 'primary' conceptualization onto which many other conceptual domains have been mapped. Thus, spatial concepts can be shown to become a principle for the organization of the conceptualization of ever more abstract domains such as that of "total enclosure", as framed by the 'middle voice', and also of concepts such as viewpoint or subjectivity.

The construal of our world is not limited to the categories provided by our culture and fixed in our language. Human thought processes are largely metaphorical (Lakoff/Johnson 1987), which suggests that in creating new concepts from existing ones we are also able to extend our repertoire of linguistic expressions. The analysis of metaphorical concepts or nonliteral expressions is at the center of Carlo Serra Borneto's contribution entitled "Polarity and metaphor in German". Serra Borneto first examines the notion of "conceptual polarity", which reflects a general human tendency in thinking. Polarity is at work at all linguistic levels and refers to linguistic items which are conceptually in competition with one another such as the German verbs *liegen* 'to lie' and *stehen* 'to stand'. Serra Borneto attempts to show how the schema of polarity can be applied to a number of conceptual and orientational metaphors involving the use of the 'locational' verbs *liegen* and *stehen*.

More abstract domains are discussed in Susan Strauss' contribution "Metaphors of 'total enclosure' grammaticizing into middle voice markers". Strauss illustrates the value of cross-linguistic research and draws attention to the fact that human languages exhibit strikingly similar and consistent grammatical patterns in "describing, reacting to, and expressing particular types of experiences and events". Strauss examines how and to what basic degrees auxiliary verbs in Japanese and Korean function as grammatical analogues to the reflexive marker in Romance or the middle voice marker in Spanish.

## Section 6: From space to time, events, and beyond

One of the major domains that have been conceptualized in terms of space is time, which is even commonly referred to as "temporal space". But other linguistic and conceptual construals such as complementation, perfectivity, viewpoint and subjectivity are also relatable to notions of space.

The syntax of English complementation is certainly an area which cannot be adequately accounted for without conceptual explanations. The topic of sentential complementation is taken up in Marjolijn Verspoor's paper "The story of *-ing*: a subjective perspective", whereby she investigates the general cognitive principles that motivate complement distribution. One of her main concerns springs from the observation that each type of complement may occur with typical action verbs and/or mental causation verbs and also with typical perception verbs or cognition verbs. Since those different verb classes comprise both spatial and non-spatial members, she sets out to ask the question whether there is one abstract schema that plays a role in complement selection with both groups of verbs. She eventually shows that the query can be responded to positively.

Likewise, the notion of 'time' as conceptualized in terms of space is taken up by Kenneth W. Cook in his contribution entitled "The temporal use of Hawaiian directional particles". Cook deals with the extension of Hawaiian directional particles into the domain of time. The Hawaiian case seems to be peculiar in that the directionals are used to indicate degrees of temporal remoteness. Furthermore, Cook's paper motivates these degrees of temporal remoteness of Hawaiian directional particles in terms of human bodily experience. In particular, the direction indicated by *aku* ('away from the speaker') has no limits as one can traverse the earth/sea endlessly, whereas 'up' and 'down' are limited in traditional human experience: "one can only go up as far as one can jump or climb, and one is similarly limited in one's downward movement".

Conceptual construals such as perfectivity are taken up by Ewa Dąbrowska in her article entitled "The spatial structuring of events: a study of Polish perfectivizing prefixes". Using a cognitive grammar perspective, she gives a detailed analysis of five polysemous prefixes which are related to spatial prepositions and which are said to have clearly spatial meanings. Her main purpose is to show how these prefixes change the meaning of the verb to which they are attached and what determines which prefix is chosen in a given situation.

Also based on the Polish system of time is Agata Kochańska's account "Temporal meanings of spatial prepositions in Polish: the case of *przez* and *w*", where the temporal senses of two Polish prepositions are discussed within the cognitive framework. This approach makes it possible to analyze

temporal senses of prepositions as members of coherent categories centered around the prototypical spatial meanings. Kochańska also makes it clear that cognitive linguistics seems to account for the fact that the grouping of temporal and spatial senses of prepositions in one polysemous category is highly meaningful and natural for speakers of Polish and many other languages.

In any construal of a situation, the notion of 'perspective' is central to the construal relationship. It may refer to the conceptualizer's viewpoint, *viz.* the "mental route" that a speaker takes in presenting a scene or event. The choice of a particular perspective or viewpoint in construing the world is discussed in Heidrun Dorgeloh's contribution "Viewpoint and subjectivity in English inversion". Dorgeloh sets out to investigate three inversion types - after deictic adverbs and following locative as well as non-locative constituents - which are related in a specific way. Inversions contain a reference point as vantage point from which a scene or event is seen, thereby expressing a particular viewpoint or perspective which the speaker assumes. Inversion can then be described as one device "whereby the immediate nature of an experience is reproduced in a subjective manner".

The section concludes with a paper by Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt in which she poses the question: "How do we mentally localize different types of spatial concepts"? Zelinsky-Wibbelt is mainly concerned with the behaviour of spatial predicates and with their metaphorical and metonymic derivations. She ends up with a model in which three different contextual functions operate on accordingly different lexical representations: contextual 'selection' operates on lexical representations which are equally valid, contextual 'configuration' operates on an abstract schema, and contextual 'shift' operates on the prototypical sense of the spatial predicate.

## **PART D: SPACE AS AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE OF THOUGHT**

### **Section 7: Discourse as space**

Space serves as an organizing principle of thought not only in the iconic reflection of events in sentence order, but also in the structure of discourse as a whole. "Discourse space" thus becomes a complex metaphor reflecting various principles of organization.

In the same vein, Vimala Herman's paper "Space in dramatic discourse" looks at how space is created linguistically in fictional texts and how it can be put to use in interaction. Vimala's work also seeks to explore how the

non-verbal organization of physical space via architecture, stage design, and the relationship of stage and audience have contributed to the ways in which space may be conceptualized within the constraints of dramatic use.

'Conversation' as a genre is yet another example of discourse dealt with in Lorenza Mondada's paper entitled "How space structures discourse". Mondada sets out to analyze spatial expressions used as markers to structure discourse, e.g. 'to come to our subject', in a particular text corpus. These texts are descriptions of space, exploiting the ambiguity of those markers' referential domain, which can refer both to territory or to textuality. Mondada makes it clear that the ambiguity is used by speakers to structure and motivate their discourse.

"Discourse space", as a complex metaphor reflecting various principles of organization, is also dealt with by Winfried Nöth in his contribution "The (meta-)textual space". Nöth discusses two kinds of spatial metaphors of the metatext, i.e. "our way of referring to the text". These metatextual metaphors may be alive or transparent, at times opaque and, according to Nöth, apparent only to the etymologist. We can trace the geometry of these metatextual spatial concepts as it consists in its zero dimension of points, in its first dimension of lines, in its second dimension of surfaces or planes and in its third dimension of bodies. Nöth provides the reader with numerous other examples of metatextual metaphors, e.g. as they may be observed in the three dimensions of textual space reflecting the three main dimensions of human orientation: the horizontal (right/left), the vertical (above/below), and the sagittal (front/back).

## **Section 8: Abstract worlds as space**

Space also becomes an organizing principle in the structuring of other important domains of experience such as language acquisition, the understanding of science and of specific subfields of it such as geography.

The domain of language acquisition is focussed upon by Steven Frisson, Dominiek Sandra, Frank Brisard, and Hubert Cuyckens in their article "From one meaning to the next: the effects of polysemous relationships on lexical learning". The authors attempt to investigate the hypothesis that extension processes are an inalienable aspect of human categorization, one that is motivated in part by its warranting high efficiency in lexical learning. According to the authors, there seems to be clear evidence for the claim that the concept of semantic distance can serve as a key notion in the field of lexical acquisition. Thus, a series of experiments led to the assumption that notions of vagueness, homonymy, and polysemy obviously play an important role in determining the exact status of the results and

their implications.

A more abstract domain - metaphorically conceptualized in terms of more concrete domains - is examined in Olaf Jäkel's paper entitled "Metaphorical scenarios of *science*". Within a cognitive theory of metaphor, Jäkel seeks to investigate metaphors as observed in a highly abstract domain such as the discourse of science. Jäkel is mainly interested in the whole conceptual domain of science as it is organized by a scenario which consists of several elements such as nature, a scientist, methods, theories, and scientific progress. Jäkel assumes that this generalized science-scenario "includes all the ingredients necessary for a fully-fledged conceptualization of science".

Concluding this section is Jean-Pierre van Noppen's contribution entitled "Language, space and theography: the case of *height* vs. *depth*" which focusses on a religious domain of metaphorization processes. The author is concerned with descriptive theology ('theography') which, in many cases, deals with metaphorical modes of expression such as the spatial language of localization and orientation and which, according to van Noppen, provides important insights into the relationship between the human and the divine. In line with the cognitive commitment, van Noppen states that these spatial metaphors are based on the "universal human experience of interaction between the body and its environment".

The symposium's original theme was "Space in language and language in space". Both aspects of this theme have been developed in an extremely rich and encompassing manner. Space has been shown to be conceptualized by almost all word categories and by the most unexpected grammatical devices; space has moreover been conceptualized with such a great diversity in various languages that the concept of space is by and large a cultural artifact, just like emotions are now claimed by social constructionalists to be cultural creations. The second half of the theme "Language in space" has been widened and deepened as 'language and thought in space', whereby the concepts of space available to a speech community enable the creation of further abstract conceptualizations and the organization of thought as such. Space is therefore at the very heart of thought.

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## **Part A**

### **Space in language**

#### **Section 1**

#### **Pointing, deixis, and distance**



# The Japanese verbal suffixes as indicators of distance and proximity

Haruko Minegishi Cook\*

## 1. Introduction

Since language is used by human beings, it is situated in time and space. In this sense, we assume that all languages encode spatial notions. Languages extend the notion of space from the physical to the temporal, psychological and social domains. Honorifics are typically seen as a marking of social ranking and politeness but they can also be seen as markers of distance (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987).

This paper takes the view that a Japanese honorific form is an indicator of distance and that the indication of politeness is one manifestation of distance. It analyzes the Japanese addressee honorific form *masu* and its non-honorific counterpart, the plain form, as indicators of distance and proximity.<sup>1</sup> Although such a proposal has been previously made, the present study makes the following contribution: (i) Distance/proximity is not only interpersonal but also intrapersonal; (ii) The meanings of distance and proximity are encoded in the linguistic form and other meanings (including polite and non-polite) are implicatures in the speech context. This analysis can account for various meanings associated with the *masu* and plain forms which could not be explained in the conventional analysis. The data used in this study come from various genres of natural speech.

In Japanese, sentences end in either the *masu* form or in the plain form, as shown in (1a) and (1b).

(1a) John ga Mary to dekake-masu. (*masu* form, honorific)<sup>2</sup>  
S with go out  
'John goes out with Mary.'

(1b) John ga Mary to dekake-ru. (plain form  
non-honorific)  
S with go out  
'John goes out with Mary.'

The referential meanings of (1a) and (1b) are identical but their social meanings differ.<sup>3</sup> Previously a number of scholars (Goldstein and Tamura (1975), Harada (1976), Ikuta and Ide (1983), Martin (1964) and Neustupny (1978) among others) analyzed the *masu* form as a polite speech level marker. Under this analysis, sentence (1a) expresses politeness to the addressee, and sentence (1b) expresses intimacy or lack of politeness to the addressee. In much of the literature, it has been stated that the polite style is used when the addressee is a person who is socially superior or equal to the speaker (cf. Harada 1976) or is used to talk with outsiders (cf. Shibatani 1990). Mutual plain form exchanges indicate that there exists an informal, casual or inside relationship between the interlocutors. In this respect, the *masu* and plain forms respectively resemble the second personal pronouns V (as in French *vous*) and T (as in French *tu*) that occur in many European (and some other) languages. However, the difference is that the V and T pronouns are used only when the referent is the second person whereas in Japanese the *masu* and plain forms are used regardless of the referent of an utterance.<sup>4</sup> In this way, they are far more pervasive.

The *masu* form has been also analyzed as a marker of distance (Hinds 1976, 1978; Ikuta 1983; Jorden and Noda 1987; Shibatani 1990). Based on his findings in natural interview data, Hinds (1976) claims that the *masu* form is chosen when there is perceived distance between the speaker and the addressee. Hinds (1976) also reports that the *masu* form appears when a high status person other than the addressee is present, and when the situation is formal. Both Ikuta (1983) and Shibatani (1990) propose that the *masu* form indicates psychological distance between interlocutors. Examining conversations with respect to the *masu* and plain forms, Ikuta (1983) also notices that the *masu* form tends to mark topic shift. Thus she proposes that the *masu* form is a marker of not only interpersonal but textual distance. The assumption in these proposals is that the plain form is a marker of interpersonal or textual proximity.

Recently, Maynard (1991, 1993) has claimed that when speakers are more "aware" of the addressee as a separate entity, they are more likely to use the *masu* form and when they are less aware of the addressee, they are more likely to use the plain form. Maynard explains that in an intimate conversation the plain form is normally used because in such context, due to *amae* "psychological and emotional dependence", "the speaking self finds less need to address 'thou' as a completely separate and distinct entity" (1993: 178). Since separateness and oneness involve the notion of space, her proposal can be seen as one of distance and proximity. Although these proposals are insightful, these scholars have not clarified how their analysis relates to the conventional meaning of the *masu* form and its other social meanings.

In sum, there are at least three important questions yet to be answered: i) How is the meaning of distance/proximity related to the meaning of politeness/non-politeness? ii) How is the meaning of distance/proximity related to other social meanings? iii) Can the types of distance so far proposed (physical, psychological/interpersonal, and textual) adequately account for many uses of the *masu* and plain forms? In what follows, I will attempt to answer these three questions by showing that there is a difference between the encoded and situational meanings of these forms.

## 2. The encoded meaning

The idea of encoded meaning vs. implicature is not new in the literature. Grice (1975) discusses the notions of natural and non-natural meanings.<sup>5</sup> Natural meaning is directly linked to the linguistic form and non-natural meanings are implicatures that are derived from the literal meaning of an utterance used in a given context. For implicatures to arise, the literal meaning must be present. Similarly, in the case of deictics, for situational meanings to arise, the encoded meaning must be present. I use the terms encoded and interpreted meanings for Grice's natural and non-natural meanings, respectively.

Both Hanks (1990, 1992) and Levinson (1979, 1983) argue for the importance of recognizing the distinction between the interpreted meanings of a deictic word (i.e. conveyed meanings, situational meanings, or implicatures) and the encoded meanings of the linguistic form.

To understand and explain the nature of honorifics and the extent to which they are used in various social situations, it is important to clarify this distinction. More specifically, such a distinction can account for pragmatic processes in which various usages or situated meanings are established.

The question is what counts as an encoded meaning? Although Hanks (1990) states that there is no clear test to distinguish the encoded meaning from situational ones, he mentions, "The division [of the two levels of meaning] is mainly a matter of the relative consistency or constancy of association between form and meaning, not of the *kind* of information" (1990: 53). In this paper I assume Hanks' claim concerning the difference between encoded and situational meanings and further propose that the encoded meaning of a social deictic expression is the one that is always present and that it is a part of the meaning(s) of an utterance in any instance of use. In this formulation, there may be more than one meaning assigned to a form simultaneously: the encoded meaning is one, and the others are situational meanings derived from the encoded meaning in a given context.

In some instances, the encoded meaning may be the only meaning in the context. In other instances, since situational meanings are interpretations, there may be more than one situational meaning assigned to a deictic feature.

### 2.1. The encoded meaning of the *masu* form

In this section I propose that the encoded meaning of the *masu* form is not politeness but distance. Furthermore, my proposal is different from the previous analyses of the *masu* form as an indicator of distance in that it includes distance between the self and his/her social role (i.e. intrapersonal distance).

It is difficult for the conventional analysis of the *masu* form (i.e. politeness) to explain the use of *masu* in some social contexts such as that of scolding a child. Consider example (2). Here the mother is angry at child K (a seven-year-old boy) because he is not sitting at the dinner table properly and because he is shaking the table. She scolds K by using *desu*, the copula form of *masu*, and *-masen*, the negative of *masu*.

#### (2) Mother

- 1 --> *Dooshite soo yatte gatan gatan suru n desu ka?*  
       why so do rattle rattle do NOM COP INT  
       'Why are (you) shaking (the table)?'
- 2 --> *Tatehiza ikemasen.*  
       erect knee no good  
       'Don't draw up your knees.'

The use of *masu* in example (2) does not index politeness. It can be explained by the analysis that the *masu* form indexes distance between the speaker and the addressee. When the mother scolds the child, she creates psychological distance from the child. Since the encoded meaning must be present in all instances of the form, the meaning of politeness cannot be the encoded meaning of the *masu* form.

It is known that the deictic meaning of space is often extended to the feeling level. For example, based upon a study on demonstratives, R. Lakoff (1974) claims that emotional and spatial distance and closeness are clearly related. Haiman (1983: 800) also notes, "physical distance is an obvious metaphor for social distance ...". Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the distance encoded by the *masu* form can be physical and/or

psychological (i.e. interpersonal).

The claim that the encoded meaning of the *masu* form is distance can account for the fact that this form is generally used between speakers who are not in a close personal relationship and when the addressee is not present in the speech context (see Hinds 1976). Family members who usually speak in the plain form in face-to-face conversation often use the *masu* form when they are physically apart (e.g. in letters).<sup>6</sup> In my data, when the family members are making a cassette tape to send to one of the daughters, H, who lives in the U.S., the speakers generally shift to the *masu* form, which is illustrated in example (3). Normally AT, who is a sister of H, speaks to H with the plain form if H is in the immediate speech context. However, in (3) AT uses the *masu* form consistently with H.

(3) [AT is recording a message for her sister H]

1 --> *Kurisumasu kaado o todokimashita. Doomo arigatoo.*  
 Christmas card o reach past much thank  
 '(I) received (your) Christmas card. Thank you.'

2 --> *Eee kochira kara no Kurishumasu kaado mo*  
 FI this side from LK Christmas card also  
*todokimashita ka?*  
 reach past INT  
 'Did (you) receive (our) Christmas card?'

3 --> *Taakii wa umaku yakemashita ka?*  
 turkey T well bake past INT  
 'Did (you) bake (your) turkey well?'

4 *Eee, hajimete no Kurisumasu yama de sugosu no*  
 FI first time LK Christmas mountain at spend NOM  
 --> *totemo ii desu ne.*  
 very good COP FP  
 'Well, (it)'s very nice to spend the first Christmas  
 (after marriage) in the mountains.'

5 --> *Urayamashii desu.*  
 envious COP  
 '(I)'m envious of (you).'

- 6        *Atashi mo tabun Ichigatsu ni koo 'sukii ni*  
           I        too maybe January in        this ski to  
           *ikoo' nante kangaete,*  
           go        what Q        think  
           *boonasu mo deta koto de eee (.) hokuhoku*  
           bonus        also        paid        NOM        COP        FI        delighted  
       --> *shite imasu.* ((laugh))  
           do        exist  
           'I'm also thinking of going skiing in January, and  
           (I) got (my) bonus and well (.) (I)'m happy.'

\* -*mashita* is the past tense of -*masu*.

It is true that letters and recorded messages are potentially available to a third party. In this sense, they may lose some of the intimacy associated with a face-to-face conversation between people in a close relationship, which might motivate speakers to use the *masu* form. Although this effect is partially responsible for the use of *masu* form in letters and recorded messages between intimate parties, the fact that even letters which include highly private matters can be written in the *masu* form suggests that physical distance is also responsible for the use of the *masu* form in these genres.

The previous studies on the *masu* form which claim that it marks distance only consider the distance between topics in text and between the speaker and the addressee or the third party. However, as shown in example (4), this formulation is not adequate. In example (4), which comes from a dinner table conversation, the mother uses a *masu* form when she tells the children that there is more omelette. Note that child C does not use a *masu* form but uses a plain form *hoshii* 'want'. There was neither a higher status person nor an outsider in the speech situation.<sup>7</sup>

(4) Mother

Child C

*Tamagoyaki            hoshii hito*  
           omelette        want        person  
       --> *mada arimasu    yo,        okawari.*  
           still        have        FP        seconds  
           'Anyone who wants omelette,  
           there's still some more.'

*Kamaboko hoshii.*  
           fish cake        want  
           '(I) want fish cake.'



The mother's use of the *masu* form is difficult to explain within the proposal that it indexes distance between the speaker and the addressee or the third party. I propose that the *masu* form also indexes distance between the self and his/her social role that the self presents to others at the time of interaction (cf. Scollon and Scollon 1981). To speak like a 'mother', 'teacher', 'doctor', 'businessman' etc., the speaker creates distance from the innate mode of self and puts on a mask of a particular social role. Hinds (1976) also observes that professional opinions and evaluations can cause a shift from the plain to *masu* in adult-to-adult conversation. I claim that the *masu* can mark distance within one speaker. This analysis can account for example (4). One of the important responsibilities associated with the role of the Japanese mother is to provide food to the members of the family. The mother's use of the *masu* form here indexes distance between the speaker's self and her social role as a 'mother'.

In sum, I propose that the encoded meaning of the *masu* form is distance, which includes distance between the innate mode of self and his/her social role (i.e. intrapersonal distance).

## 2.2. The encoded meaning of the plain form

The previous studies on the *masu* form all suggest that the plain form marks intimacy or psychological proximity since a lack of interpersonal distance is intimacy. However, this formulation does not explain some uses. Consider example (5) which comes from a neighborhood quarrel. In this example, both speakers use the plain form. Here the landlord, Mr. Suzuki, is very angry because one of his tenants put out his trash without separating burnable and unburnable items.<sup>8</sup> A neighbor is defending the tenant. Clearly, in (5) the speakers are opposed to each other and do not share a sense of intimacy or oneness.

S=Suzuki, the landlord; N=neighbor

- (5) S: *Ne, chanto soo iu fuu ni hakkiri to wakatte iruba*  
 FI properly such way in clearly knowing exist if  
 --> *watashi wa okoranai yo.*  
 I T angry NEG FP  
 'You see, if you clearly separated it [the trash], I  
 would not get angry.'

N: *Kare, shiranakatta n da kara*  
 he know NEG past NOM COP because

--> *ma shooganai. Shooganai tte iu ka.*  
 FI help NEG help NEG Q say INT  
 'He did not know about it, so, it can't be helped.  
 We may say it can't be helped.'

--> S: (*Soide*) *shiranakatta tte iu n ja anta komaru yo.*  
 and know NEG past Q say NOM you trouble FP  
 '(Then) if he says he did not know, that's a problem,  
 you know.'

If the plain form indexes a lack of distancing in the speaker's own self (i.e. a lack of social role), the use of the plain form in (5) can be accounted for. In (5) both speakers, in particular Mr. Suzuki, are emotionally involved in the argument to the extent that they lose their composure. In such a state, it is difficult to act out their social roles. The speakers in the quarrel use the plain form to interact in the innate mode of self without marking their social roles.

I propose that the encoded meaning of the plain form is a lack of distance or proximity between interlocutors as well as between the self and his/her social role. Underlying this hypothesis is Haiman's (1983) claim that there is an iconicity between linguistic expressions and nonlinguistic features of both cognitive and social contexts of speech. In this analysis, the more morphemes in a word or the more words in a sentence, the greater the conceptual or social distance becomes. Haiman states:

The linguistic dimension is that of distance between linguistic expressions--which corresponds directly to, and in this sense is motivated by, a variety of conceptual dimensions (1983: 781).

The verbosity or prolixity of formal registers may then be a verbal icon of an envelope around the speaker's actual message. The addressee is protected by this envelope from the speaker's ideas in the same way that he is protected by physical distance from other emanations of a personality (1983: 801).

Crosslinguistically, it seems true that so-called polite or formal expressions are more morphologically complex. For example, euphemism, technical terminology, and honorifics are typically longer or contain more morphemes.

Now let us consider Table 1 which compares the morphology of the *masu* and plain forms of the verbal, adjectival and nominal predicates.

Table 1. Morphology of the *masu* and plain forms

verbal predicate: to look

<u><i>masu</i> form</u>	<u>plain form</u>
mi-mas-u stem-dis-prt	mi-ru stem-prt
mi-mas-ita stem-dis-past	mi-ta stem-past

adjectival predicate: to be large

<u><i>masu</i> form</u>	<u>plain form</u>
ooki-i des-u stem-prt COPdis-prt	ooki-i stem-prt
ooki-katta des-u stem-past COPdis-prt	ooki-katta stem-past

nominal predicate: to be a book

<u><i>masu</i> form</u>	<u>plain form</u>
hon des-u nom COPdis-prt	hon da nom COP-prt
hon des-ita nom COPdis-past	hon datta nom COP-past

dis=distance morpheme

COP=copula

prt=present tense

past=past tense

As Table 1 shows, the plain form consistently contains fewer morphemes. The plain forms of verbal and adjectival predicates consist only of the present tense markers *-(r)u* for verbs and *-i* for adjectives or of the past tense markers *-ta* for verbs and *-katta* for adjectives. The plain

form of the nominal predicate consists of a noun plus the present tense copula *da* or its past tense form *datta*. In contrast, the counterparts of the *masu* form include distance morphemes (*-mas* for the verbal and *des-* for the adjectival and nominal predicates). Given the iconicity proposal (Haiman 1983), which predicts that the morphologically simpler forms are more plain, it is reasonable to propose that the encoded meaning of the plain form is lack of physical, psychological and interpersonal distancing between interlocutors and between one's own self and his/her social role.<sup>9</sup>

### 3. Situational meanings

#### 3.1. The conventional meaning of the *masu* form

In my analysis of the *masu* form, the conventional meaning is one of the situational meanings. Due to a fit between the encoded meaning of the linguistic feature and native speakers' expectations of speech contexts (or written genres) in which the *masu* form is used and due to its frequent use in common speech contexts or written genres, native speakers are more aware of the conventional meaning than they are of the other situational meanings.

Generally, native speakers feel that speech with the *masu* form is polite. The proposed encoded meaning of the *masu* form (i.e. distance) can account for the politeness which is conventionally associated with the *masu* form.

As discussed by R. Lakoff (1973) and Brown and Levinson (1978), distance implicates the conventional meaning of politeness. R. Lakoff (1973) proposes that non-imposition, which presupposes the speaker's distance from the addressee or the content of speech, is a form of politeness. Related to what Lakoff proposes is the fact that in some Romance languages, a polite address and referent term for the second person takes the third person verb form, which, given that the third person is usually farther away from the speaker than the second person, can be said to indicate distance (e.g. Spanish *usted*, Portuguese *você*, Italian *Lei*). Similarly, Brown and Levinson (1978) propose that 'negative politeness', which minimizes the threat to the addressee's 'negative face want' (i.e. desire to be unimpeded), is indicated by various linguistic and nonlinguistic devices which create social distance. Brown and Levinson also note that honorifics are cases of 'frozen outputs of politeness strategies' (p.184). Taking all of these proposals into consideration, it makes sense to consider

that the conventional meaning of the *masu* form (politeness) derives from its encoded meaning of distance.

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), politeness is an outcome of a strategy that minimizes face risk. However, politeness does not have to be strategic (see Ide 1989). Certain speech events call for a polite use of language. These include ceremonial, business, and public situations among others. In these social situations the participants generally use the *masu* form.<sup>10</sup> Example (6) comes from a Diet interpellation, in which the speakers mainly use the *masu* form.<sup>11</sup> All three speakers here use the *masu* form at the end of the clause. The *masu* form is an appropriate speech style in a public speech event such as the Diet interpellation where the participants are expected to show interpersonal distance as well as the social role of a member of the Diet.

(6) K = Konishi, opposition party member

I = Inoki, opposition party member

Ka = Kaifu, Prime Minister

1 --> K: *Ee, Inoki giin ni tatchi itashimasu.*

FI Inoki M.P. to touch do

'Well, (I)'ll give the floor to Inoki M.P.'

2 --> I: ( ) *konn chotto kinchoo shite orimasu ga*  
this a little tense do exist but

'( ) (I) am a little tense but.'

3 *ee, saru juugatsu no juuyokka ni Aizu Wakamatsu*  
FI past October LK fourteenth on Aizu Wakamatsu

4 *ni okimashite, ee gookan ni osowareru to iu jiken*  
in FI ruffian by attacked Q say incident

5 --> *in aimashite, ookega o shimashita ga*  
with meet serious injury O did but  
'Uhh, last October 14, in Aizu Wakamatsu, uh, I was  
attacked by a ruffian, and was seriously injured  
but'

6 --> *ee taihen goshinpai o okakeshimashita ga*  
FI very worry O caused but  
'uh, (I) caused you to worry about me greatly but'

7 *maa kyoo kono yoo ni genki ni natte,*  
FI today this way health become

- 8       --> *tanin*                      *o shite mairimashita.*  
           leaving hospital    O do       existed  
           'well, today I was discharged from the hospital having  
           recovered like this.'
- 9       *ee supootsu wa kokkyoo ya hada no iro*  
           FI sport       T national boundary and skin LK color
- 10       *o chooetsu shite sekai jinrui ga moteru kyooyuu no*  
           O rise above do     world human S have common LK
- 11       --> *bunka da to omoimasu.*  
           culture COP    Q think  
           'uh, (I) think that sports is a culture commonly  
           shared by all human beings regardless of nationality  
           and race.'
- 12       --> *Ka: Saisho ni giin no itaitashii atama no shiroi hootai*  
           first           M.P. LK painful head LK white bandage
- 13       --> *o mite kokoro kara omimai mooshiagemasu (.)*  
           O see     heart from sympathy say  
           'First, seeing the white bandage on your  
           head, I sincerely express my sympathy.'
- 14       *Geejutsu, bunka no suijun wa dore kurai ka to*  
           art           culture LK standard    T how much INT Q
- 15       --> *osshaimasu keredomo*  
           say           but  
           '(You)'ve asked how high is the standard of art and  
           culture (of Japan) but'
- 16       *kuni ni yotte bunka, supootsu, sorezore*  
           country depending culture sports each
- 17       --> *rekishi ya dentoo ya tokui shumoku ga aru to*  
           history and tradition and special item S exist Q  
           *omoimasu.*  
           think  
           '(I) think that every country has a different  
           history, tradition, and specialties in sports.'

The *masu* form can be used strategically. In line 1 of example (7), which comes from the neighborhood quarrel, Mr. Kobayashi does not use the *masu* form in asking the addressee if he is the manager of the apartment. Once Mr. Suzuki has said that he is in fact the manager (line 2), Mr.

Kobayashi shifts his speech to the *masu* form (lines 6 and 8), even when he is quarreling with Mr. Suzuki. Mr. Kobayashi's use of the *masu* form can be interpreted as an indication of socially acceptable politeness on his part as a younger tenant toward the older manager of his apartment (i.e. indexing of interpersonal as well as intrapersonal distance). Such conduct is considered appropriate in Japanese society.

(7) K=Kobayashi, the tenant; S=Suzuki, landlord

- 1      K: *Otaku wa koko no kanrinin na no?*  
          you T here LK manager COP FP  
          'Are you the manager here?'
- 2      S: *Atarimae yo. Yatten no, uchi wa.*  
          of course FP do FP we T  
          'Of course. We are doing it.'
- 3      *Kotchi wa mada zembu yaru kedo sa*  
          this side T still all do but FP  
          'We are still doing all of it but'
- 4      *Hito no uchi made sa, konna oitette sa ( )*  
          other LK house even FP this leave FP  
          'You leave it [trash] even at another's house.'
- 5      K: [ *Dakara ( ) dakara*  
          so so  
          'So, ( ) so'
- 6      --> *dashitaku nai n desu kedo*  
          put out NEG COP but  
          'I wouldn't like to leave it but'
- 7      S: *Un*  
          'Uhuh'
- 8      K: *Hikkoshite ashita wa inai kara*  
          move tomorrow T exist NEG so  
          --> *shooganai ja nai desu ka.*  
          help NEG NEG COP INT  
          'Since I will move and won't be here tomorrow, isn't  
          it the case that it can't be helped?'

In sum, typically, the encoded meaning of the *masu* form, distance, is interpreted as politeness in social contexts in which politeness is socially expected.

### 3.2. The conventional meaning of the plain form

Contrasted with the *masu* form, the plain form is conventionally perceived as an intimate speech form. This is accounted for in the following way. The encoded meaning of the plain form, i.e. a lack of distance between the speaker and addressee, can imply interpersonal closeness when used in conversation in which intimacy or closeness is expected among interlocutors. Example (8) illustrates the use of the plain form in a family conversation. Notice the lack of *masu* forms in (8).<sup>12</sup> Here the parents and two male children, K (7 years old) and H (5 years old) are around the table after dinner. The mother addresses the younger child H while the father speaks to the older child K. Except for in H's utterance, which ends with the gerund form *-te*, in all utterances the verbs are in the plain form.

(8)

M: *Hiro warui kedo, ano*  
      Hiro       bad     but     FI  
      'Hiro, (I) bother (you) but, uh.'

F: *Ano, ojiichan ga sugoku kitte motten no shitteru?*  
      FI       grandpa   S   a   lot stamp have   NOM know  
      'Well, do (you) know grandpa has a lot of stamps?'

M: ((to H))   *Mame denki motte kite kureru?*  
               bean light bring           give (me)  
               'Will (you) bring the small light?'

F: *Sugoi takai kitte motteru yo, ippai.*  
      very expensive stamp have     FP a lot  
      '(He) has very expensive stamps, a lot of them.'

K: *Nani (     ) motteru?*  
      what           have  
      'What (     ) does he have?'



H: ( ) *motte kite.*  
           bring come  
 '( ) bring and.'

In sum, the encoded meaning of the plain form can imply interpersonal closeness when used in conversation in which intimacy or closeness is expected.

### 3.3. *Non-conventional situational meanings*

Besides the conventional meanings, there are numerous non-conventional situational meanings, of which native speakers are normally not consciously aware. Some situational meanings can be evoked by the contrast created by switching from one form to the other. In other cases, situational meanings can be derived from the overall pattern of the combination of the two forms and a given social situation. We should note, however, that since the social and linguistic contexts in which a particular form occurs are numerous, the following examples are by no means exhaustive and that in many instances multiple situational meanings are indexed simultaneously.

#### 3.3.1. Situational meanings of the *masu* form

##### 3.3.1.1. Social roles

In family conversations, the norm is to use plain forms. However, as mentioned in section 2.1., occasionally the members switch to *masu* forms, which evoke certain social roles of speakers. These instances cannot be adequately described if the *masu* form is merely a marker of polite speech. Certain of the social roles defined by their rights, duties and responsibilities are associated with a mode of self which is distant from one's own self. Thus, the *masu* forms can index certain social roles. For example, the parents' use of the *masu* form can evoke their social responsibilities (e.g. to teach children what they need to know in order to become members of society).

In (9) a mother and her child are talking about the time that the child should go to bed. The mother uses *desu* (the *masu* form of the copula) when she tells the child that he must go to bed at eight o'clock the day before he goes to school.

(9) Mother

Child K

*Kuji kana?*  
 nine wonder  
 '(I) wonder whether  
 (it's) nine.'

*Kuji de ii no, neru jikoku?*  
 nine COP good FP sleep time  
 'Is nine o'clock OK, the bedtime?'

*Un.*  
 'Uhn.'

*Natsuyasumi n nattara ne.*  
 summer vacation become when FP  
 'When the summer vacation comes.'

*Un.*  
 'Uhn.'

*Sono kawashi, gakkoo iku mae*  
 instead school go before  
 --> *no hi wa hachiji desu yo.*  
 LK day T eight o'clock COP FP  
 'Instead, before the days (you) go to  
 school, it's eight o'clock.'

In (9), the *masu* form indexes the aspect of the mother's social role as the person who brings up the children.

In this light, the use of *masu* forms in business or career contexts can be seen as an index of social role. It is possible to interpret the politicians' use of *masu* forms in the Diet interpellation in example (7) as an index of social role as well.

### 3.3.1.2. Negative affect

Hinds (1976) mentions that when the speaker expresses displeasure at the topic of conversation s/he often uses *masu* forms. In my family conversation data, parents often use them when they scold a child. When closeness is the norm between the speaker and the addressee, *masu* forms can mark negative affect, for sudden distancing from the intimate relationship can create coldness. The conversation in (10) illustrates negative affect expressed by *masu* forms. In (10) the mother is angry at child H because he is taking too long to finish his dinner and the mother has become impatient.

Here the mother's use of the *masu* form indicates negative affect.

(10) Mother

Child H

--> *Mama saki nemasu kara ne.*  
 Mom before sleep so FP  
 'I'm going to bed before (you).'

*Uun.*  
 'Uhn.'

*Hiroaki matte tara yo ga akechau.*  
 Hiroaki wait if night S lift  
 'If (I) waited for you, the day would break.'

In sum, the sudden creation of psychological distance by *masu* forms in an intimate family conversation can index negative affect. These uses of *masu* forms cannot be explained coherently if *masu* forms only mark polite speech.

### 3.3.2. Situational meanings of the plain form

The encoded meaning of the plain form can also index a variety of situational meanings contrasted with the meaning of the *masu* form and a given social situation.

#### 3.3.2.1. Immediate and spontaneous reaction

Occasional use of the plain form in the midst of a social context in which primarily the *masu* form is used indexes a value opposite of the one that is indexed by the *masu* form. Thus, when the *masu* form indexes a social role in a particular context, the occasional use of the plain form in that context indexes the lack of the social role. Without the facade of a social role, the speaker behaves spontaneously. Maynard (1993) also reports that the plain form is used to mark immediacy and vividness of a situation.

In my TV interview data, in which the host interviews a chef in a yakitori restaurant in Tokyo, several times the interviewer switches from *masu* to plain forms. He does so consistently when he expresses himself spontaneously. This use of plain forms suggests that the interviewer momentarily steps out of his social role as a TV interviewer and talks spontaneously in the innate mode of self. Consider example (11). Here, the chef is demonstrating the technique of piercing a stick into a piece of chicken

and green onions. Just as he has completed the demonstration, the interviewer describes the technique that he has just observed using the plain form. This is the interviewer's immediate and spontaneous reaction to the demonstration.

(11) C=Chef; I=Interviewer

- 1 C: *Chotto mawasu n desu ne*  
 little turn NOM COP FP  
 'Turn it a little bit.'

*Kyokutan ni mawasanakute mo, kagen de*  
 extremely turn NEG also degree COP  
 'Even though you don't turn it a lot, by adjustment.'

- 2 I: *Haa*  
 'Yes'

- 3 C: *warenai yoo n narimasu kara*  
 break NEG become so  
 'it won't break, so'

- 4 I: *Haa*  
 'Yes'

- 5 C: *Mawasanai to hosoi negi wa koo kushi ga futoi to*  
 turn NEG if slender onion T this stick S big if  
*toku ni warete shimaimasu shi*  
 particular in break end up and  
 'If you don't turn it, slender green onions, in  
 particular when a stick is big, will break and'

- 6 --> I: *Sasu shunkan ni mawasu.*  
 pierce moment at turn  
 'The moment you pierce (the onion), you turn (it).'

The interviewer's use of a plain form in line 6 could be a professionally calculated technique so as to give the effect of fresh sensation. It is not possible to tell whether the interviewer genuinely stepped out of his professional role or whether he purposely did so for effect. This distinction is not an important one here. In either case, the effect of switching from *masu* to plain in professional talk can index an immediate and spontaneous reaction.

### 3.3.2.2. Spontaneous assertion of the speaker's thought

In the data of the Diet interpellation, which is mainly carried on in *masu* forms, one of the major functions of plain forms in this speech event is to assert the speaker's position. In these instances, the utterance in plain forms is followed by a meta-sentence commenting on the assertion. The commenting sentence contains an anaphoric form, which refers to the speaker's belief or desire framed by the plain form. Since an anaphoric form refers to the sentence as if it were 'at a distance' from the speaker, it backgrounds the information referred to. This discourse structure of backgrounding information can be schematized in (12):

#### (12) Discourse structure of backgrounding information

- Utterance 1: Speaker's belief or desire typically  
framed by a plain form<sup>13</sup>  
(backgrounded by Utterance 2)
- Utterance 2: Speaker's meta-comment on Utterance 1  
ending in a *masu* form  
(Utterance 1 is referred to by an anaphoric  
device in Utterance 2)

The speaker asserts his belief or desire in Utterance 1 in the plain form, and an anaphoric device in Utterance 2 backgrounds this assertion. Utterance 2 is typically marked with the normative form for a given social context.

In example (13) the utterances ending in plain forms are followed by anaphoric devices such as *soo iu* 'such'. Note that the strong assertion in Utterance 1 is followed by *masu* forms, which indicate politeness in the Diet interpellation.

#### (13) Finance Minister Hashimoto

Utterance 1

- |      |   |                                    |
|------|---|------------------------------------|
| 1... | <i>rironteki na genshuu</i>                             | <i>no ooku no bubun to iu mono</i> |
|      | theoretical reduction                                   | LK much LK part Q say thing        |
| 2    | <i>ga shoohisha ga sore dake yasui kakaku de mono o</i> |                                    |
|      | S consumer S that only cheap price at thing O           |                                    |
| 3    | <i>koonyuu suru koto ga dekiru to iu jootai ni</i>      |                                    |
|      | purchase do NOM S can Q say situation to                |                                    |

- 4 --> *tenka*            *o*    *itashite oru.* (.)  
 transfer    O    do            exist  
 '... a large part of the theoretical tax reduction is  
 reflected in the situation in which consumers can  
 purchase goods at a lower price.'

#### Utterance 2

- 5 *Soo*    *iu*    *jittai*            *de gozaimasu.*  
 such            situation    COP  
 'Such is the actual situation.'

Here, the finance minister is defending a recent sales tax bill by stating the government position that introducing sales tax leads to overall tax reduction. This is the official belief of the finance minister. In Utterance 1 (lines 1-4) he asserts this position using the plain form *itashite oru* 'are doing' in line 4 and in Utterance 2 (line 5) his opinion is backgrounded by the anaphoric device *soo iu* 'such'.

Morphologically marking asserted information as the spontaneous expression of a speaker's belief or desire (with plain forms) and backgrounding this asserted information in discourse structure achieves two communicative goals: letting the addressee know the speaker's spontaneous assertion and redressing the face-threatening act (Brown and Levinson 1987) of the assertion by backgrounding it. Furthermore, the spontaneous expression of the speaker's voice in Utterance 1 is framed by a socially more appropriate *masu* form in Utterance 2. As long as the framing verb in Utterance 2 is socially appropriate, the form of the verbal in Utterance 1 has little effect on social appropriateness of the speech event. In this sense, Utterance 1 is similar to an embedded sentence. From the above discussion, we can conclude that for these politicians backgrounding information in discourse structure is a strategy to politely convey their views and opinions on record.

Discourse structure of backgrounding information is not only used in the Diet interpellation. Maynard (1991, 1993) found that in literary essays, written predominantly in *masu* forms, occasionally sentences end in a plain form, which is backgrounded in the following comment clause. She proposes that the use of plain forms can organize discourse structure in literary essays. Maynard's finding is not contradictory to the present finding. Indeed, these findings provide a good illustration of the very nature of deictic features, which function differently according to the specific aspects of the given context.

## 3.3.2.3. Higher social status

A higher status person typically does not keep a distance when talking to a lower status person whereas a lower status person typically keeps a distance when talking to a higher status person (see Goffman 1967). Thus the non-reciprocal use of the plain form can index a socially higher status and that of the *masu* form socially lower status. Consider a part of example (7), which is repeated here as (14). In this example, Mr. Kobayashi, the tenant, shifts to *masu* forms once he realizes that Mr. Suzuki is the apartment manager. The latter, however, does not reciprocate and keeps using plain forms in line 7. By so doing, he implicates that his social status is higher than that of Mr. Kobayashi.

(14) K=Kobayashi, the tenant; S=Suzuki, the landlord

- 1 K: *Otaku wa koko no kanrinin na no?*  
       you T here LK manager COP FP  
       'Are you the manager here?'
- 2 S: *Atarimae yo. Yatten no, uchi wa.*  
       of course FP do FP we T  
       'Of course. We are doing it.'
- 3 *Kotchi wa mada zembu yaru kedo sa*  
       this side T still all do but FP  
       'We are still doing all of it but'

((a few more lines by Suzuki))

- 4 K:--> *dashitaku nai n desu kedo*  
       put out NEG COP but  
       'I wouldn't like to leave it but'
- 5 S: *Un*  
       'Uhuh'
- 6 K: *Hikkoshite ashita wa inai kara*  
       move tomorrow T exist NEG so  
       --> *shooganai ja nai desu ka.*  
       help NEG NEG COP INT  
       'Since I will move and won't be here tomorrow, isn't it the case  
       that it can't be helped?'

- 7 S: *Dakara soo iu toki wa chanto hanashite kurereba sa,*  
 So such time T properly speak give FP  
*uchi mo chanto soo iu toki yaru kedo sa.*  
 we also proper such time give but FP  
 'So at such a time if (you) told (us), we'd certainly do that for  
 you at such a time.'

In non-reciprocal uses of *masu* and plain forms, the one who uses plain forms, which do not index distance, implicates a higher status, and the one who uses *masu* forms, which index distance, implicates lower status.

#### 4. Conclusion

In sum, in this paper I have shown that the spatial notions of distance and proximity are the core of the social deictics of addressee honorifics and the non-honorific counterparts. Although the previous researchers have proposed that the addressee honorifics mark distance, they have not considered distance between the speaker's own self and his/her social role. I have demonstrated that such a distance/proximity must be part of the meaning of the *masu* and plain forms. I have also shown how these spatial notions evoke various situational meanings (i.e. implicatures) in different social contexts, of which at least one is the conventional meaning. I claim that these spatial notions are directly linked to the linguistic forms even when their implicatures change from context to context.

The present analysis of these forms in terms of the encoded and situational meanings has at least two advantages over the previous analyses: first, it can systematically account for various situational meanings, including the conventional ones, some of which were not accounted for by the claim that the *masu* form is a polite speech marker and the plain form is an intimate speech marker; secondly, it provides a better understanding of pragmatic processes in which various meanings associated with the forms are indexed.

#### Notes

- \* I would like to thank Patricia Clancy, Shoichi Iwasaki, Naomi McGloin and an anonymous reader for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any shortcomings that remain are my responsibility.
- 1. As I will mention in section 3.2., the suffix *masu* consists of the so-called honorific morpheme *mas-* (*des-* for the copula) and the present tense marker *-u*. The plain form is also referred to as the abrupt form,



- dictionary form and *da* style.
2. The following transcription conventions are used:
    - (.) short pause
    - ? rising pitch
    - ((text)) information for which a symbol is not available
    - ( ) incoherent string
    - (word) conjectured string
    - > position of illustrative element
    - '(word)' a word that does not occur in the Japanese but is necessary in the English translation.

Also, for glossing the Japanese data, the following abbreviations are used:

    - COP various forms of a copula
    - FI filler
    - FP final particle
    - INT interrogative
    - LK linking nominal
    - NEG negative
    - NOM nominalizer
    - O direct object
    - PAS passive
    - Q quotative marker
    - S subject marker
    - T topic marker
  3. An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the use of the *masu* form correlates with addressee-oriented sentences and the plain form with content-oriented sentences. However, as a native speaker linguist, I do not find this suggestion plausible.
  4. Since the Japanese *masu* forms show politeness to the addressee who may not be mentioned in the sentence, Comrie (1976) classifies them as addressee honorifics. In contrast, Comrie refers to the T/V pronouns as referent honorifics, for they show respect to the referent which happens to be the addressee.
  5. Natural meaning is sometimes referred to as sentence or literal meaning and non-natural meaning is considered speaker meaning.
  6. Quasi-face-to-face conversations such as telephone conversations between speakers in close relationships are marked by a frequent use of the *masu* form. Since speakers are at a distance when they talk on the telephone, it makes sense in the present analysis that they would often use *masu*.
  7. The mother's use of the *masu* form in serving food and teaching social norms in family conversations occur frequently in my data. Clancy (1986) also reports similar examples.
  8. In Japan trash must be separated into burnable and nonburnable items, and the two types are collected on different days of the week.
  9. The plain form is also used in academic and scientific writings. This raises the question of why it is used in these written genres if it indexes a lack of distance. To answer this question, future research needs to examine the cultural meaning of writing in Japanese society.
  10. This does not mean that they use only *masu* forms. As discussed below, even in these situations, they once in a while switch to the plain forms.
  11. I will discuss the use of plain forms in the Diet interpellation in section 5.3.2.

12. As discussed in examples (2) and (4), this does not mean that in the family conversation *masu* forms do not occur.
13. Utterance 1 may also be framed by the quotative *to*.

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# Demonstratives as locating expressions

Walter De Mulder

## 0. Introduction

Near the end of the comic *Les Bijoux de la Castafiore* by Remi (on top of p. 59), there is a series of drawings in which Tintin tries to indicate to his companions, captain Haddock and the two detectives Dupondt, the exact place where an emerald, which had been stolen from the famous opera singer Castafiore, has been hidden by a magpie. In order to do so, he points upwards and says: '*Regardez là-haut! ... C'est là que se trouve certainement la clef du mystère!*' (Look up there! That's certainly where the key to the mystery is to be found!). It is interesting to note the reactions of both the two detectives Dupondt and captain Haddock:

<i>Dupont: Là-haut?</i>	(Up there?)
<i>Dupond: Où ça, là-haut?</i>	(Where then, up there?)
<i>Haddock: Oui, où là, ça-haut?</i>	(Yes, where there, that-up?)

This passage shows that a pointing gesture as such is not sufficient to identify a referent or its location. It is only when Tintin, in the following drawing, adds a nominal content to his gesture, by saying: '*Là-haut, dans ce peuplier ...*' (Up there, in that poplar), that his interlocutors can identify the intended referent, as is confirmed by Haddock's answer at this point: '*Dans ce peuplier? ... Tout ce que je vois, c'est un nid!*' (In that poplar? ... All I see is a nest!).

The purpose of this article is, first, to confirm what this passage suggests: contrary to what is suggested by their very name, demonstratives are not pointers, they do not indicate where in the context their referent is to be found. This thesis has already been defended by Kleiber (1983a) with respect to the French demonstrative determiner *ce* and I will start by resuming his arguments. However, I will then show that his analysis of the French demonstrative noun phrase *ce N* ('this/that N') as *ce + est + un N* ('this/that + is + an N') is also problematic and propose another analysis of these French demonstrative noun phrases used to refer to objects present before the eyes: it will be shown that the only meaning they convey is that

their referent is to be identified by means of an element of their context of utterance. They are thus opaque deictic words (Kleiber 1983a, 1986a) and to identify their referent, one has to combine their linguistic meaning with perceptual interpretive strategies (Searle 1983; Roberts 1993).

## 1. Demonstratives are not pointers

To say that demonstratives are pointers is to say that demonstratives, when used to refer to an object right before the eyes, convey an indication as to where their referent is to be found. This idea is, of course, based on the simple observation that I can say: "This is the Wolfsburg", with some kind of ostensive gesture, or even, in a lot of cases, without such a pointing gesture, and that you then readily identify what I am referring to. There is, however, an apparent objection to this conclusion: if demonstratives were pointers, if they were to localize their referent by themselves, then the ostensive gesture would be entirely redundant and we should be able to leave it out without any problems. This is not the case, however, at least in French.<sup>1</sup> If I say: '*Regarde cette fenêtre*' (Look at that window), I have to point at one of the windows in this room, otherwise you would not be able to single it out (Kleiber 1984: 104-105).<sup>2</sup>

This objection leads to a revision of the theory that demonstratives are pointers. In its new version, the theory accepts that demonstratives do not by themselves localize their referent and that the pointing gesture is indispensable; the revised theory then holds that the meaning of the demonstrative is the sense of the demonstration that accompanies it. This is an interesting idea, especially since it enables one to explain a demonstrative version of the traditional Fregean puzzle of identity.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, if the meaning of a demonstrative is the sense of the demonstration that accompanies it, a sentence like 'this is that' or 'this ship is this ship' (where *is* expresses identity) can be informative, since my first demonstration can be to the stem of the ship and my second to its stern. The sentence can then be informative if, for instance, the ship is the aircraft-carrier *Enterprise* and there is a building between the interlocutors and the *Enterprise*, such that we only see stem and stern and not what is in between them and connects them (Kaplan 1977).

The revised theory thus presents some advantages. Nevertheless, such a Fregean theory of demonstratives also has its problems. It would make demonstratives infinitely ambiguous, since one would have to assign to them as many meanings as there are demonstrations. To a linguist, it seems more appealing to hold that the meaning of the demonstratives is always the same, and that it is only the demonstration that changes (Kleiber 1983a:

106). This means, in fact, that the meaning of a demonstrative is not to be defined in the Fregean way, as the way it identifies its referent, if a demonstrative noun phrase indeed identifies its referent by the accompanying demonstration. If this were true, a Fregean would have to hold that the meaning changes constantly, whereas the linguistic meaning of the demonstrative is expected to stay the same in all its uses (Burge 1979, 1990).

There is another problem with the Fregean idea that the meaning of a demonstrative is the sense of the accompanying demonstration: it would make true propositions that are in fact false and vice versa. This is shown by the following thought-experiment devised by Kaplan (1977). Suppose I point to Bill Clinton and say: 'That man now lives in Washington D.C.'. What I say, the proposition this sentence expresses, is certainly true at this moment. Now suppose that I point to François Mitterrand instead, and utter the same sentence: "That man now lives in Washington D.C.". What is said now, the proposition expressed, is false. However, suppose that Mitterrand is disguised as Bill Clinton and plays the saxophone. Would the proposition expressed by "That man now lives in Washington D.C." be true in such a case? Kaplan holds it would not, since, of course, Mitterrand lives in Paris, France, and not in Washington. The problem is that a Fregean theory could make this proposition true, since it would hold that the sentence expresses a proposition that can be circumscribed as 'That man - that is, the man I am now pointing at and that is identified by the sense of my pointing - now lives in Washington D.C.'. This proposition seems to be true if Mitterrand has successfully disguised himself as Bill Clinton and has fooled us into thinking that the speaker is in fact talking about Clinton, whereas in fact he is talking about Mitterrand, who does not live in Washington D.C. This means, according to Kaplan (1977: 512 and 516-517), that the Fregean approach makes true a proposition that is clearly false and, thus, that it has to be rejected.

There is one last objection to the Fregean theory: if the meaning of the demonstrative were the sense of the associated demonstration, I should have the feeling that when a speaker does not point right, he makes a bad use of the demonstrative. In other terms, when I say: 'That table is white' and point in fact some five meters beside it, you should have the feeling that I don't know the meaning of the demonstrative. In fact, however, you will just think that I point wrong (Kleiber 1983a: 106).

We must conclude, then, that we must reject the Fregean version of the theory that demonstratives are pointers that localize their referent. There is, however, still a way to defend, in a very weak sense, the idea that demonstratives are pointers. Indeed, one could claim that demonstratives do not really localize their referent, but that they convey a more vague meaning,

something like 'the X which I am now pointing at', where the demonstration's role would be to act as a complement, to make this meaning more precise (Kleiber 1983a: 107). The demonstrative only signals to the hearer that the speaker is showing or localizing an object. However, this idea of 'showing' or 'localizing' a referent only applies naturally to the context considered here, that is, to uses of demonstratives to refer to objects present before the eyes, whereas demonstratives are used in a lot of other contexts: they refer to abstract objects, as in *this love is killing me*, to temporal objects as in *this century is really decadent*, or they can be used as anaphors, in which case they mean something like *the X just mentioned*, and so on. In most of these cases, it is difficult to understand exactly what it means to 'point' at the object identified by the demonstrative noun phrase. One could of course hold that these are typical cases where a spatial meaning is used to talk about more abstract domains and describe the metonymic and metaphorical processes underlying such transfers. Nevertheless, what one ends up with are cases where the demonstrative no longer literally indicates that the speaker points at a referent. The meaning of the demonstrative in those abstract and anaphoric uses is, rather, to indicate that the object referred to is to be found by making use of elements in the context of use of the demonstrative. But then, this meaning can also be attributed to the other deictic expressions such as *I*, *here*, *now*, and the like: they all indicate that the referent is to be found by using elements of the context of their use. Kleiber (1983a: 113) thus rightly concludes that the 'weak version' of the theory that demonstratives are pointers eliminates the difference between demonstratives and other indexical expressions.

There is a difference, though, between demonstrative determiners such as the French *ce* and other indexicals. It can readily be observed that, contrary to the demonstrative determiner, *je* ('I'), *maintenant* ('now'), *ici* ('here'), and so on, clearly indicate what element of the context they refer to. Omitting further complications, it can be said that *je* refers to the speaker, *maintenant* to the moment of speaking, and *ici* to the place of speaking. The demonstrative determiners do not seem to convey such a clear rule, especially not in French, where, contrary to other languages, there is only one demonstrative determiner, *ce*, and not two or more (like *this* and *that* in English or even more elaborate systems in Eskimo etc.).<sup>4</sup> Although there are slight differences in the distinctions drawn by different authors, let us say, for the moment, that demonstratives are opaque deictic expressions, whereas the other deictic expressions are transparent, meaning that they convey a rule that uniquely gives their referent once the context of their use is known, whereas demonstratives do not convey such univocal information. A demonstrative, then, functions as a signal, a bell that goes and tells us that there is a referent to be identified by elements of its context of



use. But the demonstrative by itself does not tell us where the referent is to be found, contrary to the other deictic expressions (Kleiber 1983a).

## 2. Demonstrations are not localizers

Kleiber (1983a) has shown that demonstratives are not pointers. Nevertheless, Kleiber (1984) analyzes demonstrative noun phrases like *ce N* as *Ce + est + un/du N* and holds that the demonstrative determiner *ce* seizes the referent as not yet classified ('non-nommé') and that the *N* classifies this referent as (an) *X* that is of the class denoted by *N*. Does this mean, then, that the demonstrative, as it were, identifies the referent all by itself, by means of the accompanying pointing gesture or (in texts) 'by proximity' (Corblin 1987)?

Kleiber (1984) defends his idea that the demonstrative adjective *ce* seizes the referent as 'not yet classified' by a comparison with the demonstrative pronoun *ce* which is opposed to the personal pronoun *il* in the following examples:

- (1) *Paul, c'est un acteur / Paul, c'est un monstre.*  
Paul, it is an actor / Paul, it is a monster.
- (2) *\*Paul, il est un acteur / \*Paul, il est un monstre.*  
Paul, he is an actor / Paul, he is a monster.
- (3) *Paul, il est monstrueux / \*Paul, c'est monstrueux.*  
Paul, he is monstrous / Paul, it is monstrous.
- (4) *Paul est acteur / \*C'est acteur / Il est acteur.*  
Paul is actor / It is actor / He is actor.
- (5) *Ma voiture, c'est une Peugeot.*  
My car, it is a Peugeot.
- (6) *\*Ma voiture, elle est une Peugeot.*  
My car, she is a Peugeot.

What explains the distribution of the pronouns *ce* and *il* in these sentences, is the character of the predicate: if the predicate is classifying (*X est un N*), *ce* is used; if, on the contrary, the predicate is not classifying (*X is N*), *il* is used. Kleiber goes on to say that the purpose of a sentence like (1) is to classify an object, i.e. to say that its subject is apprehended as an object that is yet to be classified. Thus, the use of the pronoun *ce* in such sentences shows that *ce* presents the object it refers to as an object that is yet to be classified. This is even more clear in (7), where, according to Kleiber (1984: 70), *ce* cannot be used, precisely because in the first sentence, its referent has already been classified as a car:

- (7) *J'ai acheté une voiture. Cette voiture/Elle est grise.*  
           \* *C'est gris.*

'I bought a car This car/She is grey'.  
           'It is grey'.

But of course, this example also seems to show that *ce* used as an adjective cannot be compared to *ce* used as a pronoun. For whereas *ce* (the pronoun) is excluded, *ce N* (with the demonstrative determiner) is not. In fact, why is the use of the noun phrase possible in this case, if its structure is *ce + est + un N*? Doesn't this structure imply an elaborate but vacuous operation whereby the referent is first seized as not classified and is thus de-classified, only to be re-classified afterwards in the same class as before? Kleiber's answer to this problem is that, in using a demonstrative noun phrase, the act of classifying is presupposed, whereas in a sentence like *c'est gris* it is asserted. He shows that the act of classification is presupposed by the traditional tests (8a-c): the negative and the interrogative versions of the second sentence of (7),

- (8a) *Cette voiture n'est pas grise*  
       'This car is not grey.'
- (8b) *Est-ce que cette voiture est grise?*  
       'Is this car grey?'

still presuppose that the object referred to by the demonstrative noun phrase is *a car*. Moreover, to refuse the classification, the interlocutor has to use a polemical negation:

- (8c) *Mais ce n'est pas une voiture!*  
       'But this is not a car!'

But if the classification is presupposed, how can Kleiber still hold that the determiner *ce* seizes its referent as not yet classified, just as the pronoun *ce* does? If it did, *ce* would seize a referent whose classification is already presupposed and then de-classify it, only to classify it again as it was classified before! In other terms, the problem with (7) still exists. One must conclude then, that the classification is indeed presupposed, but that this means that *ce* - the determiner, not the pronoun - grasps its referent as already classified. In fact, this is in conformity with the position defended in Kleiber (1990: 252), where it is shown that the descriptive content of the noun *N* in the demonstrative noun phrase has a role to play in the identi-

fication of the referent of this demonstrative noun phrase: it must be possible to consider the referent in some relevant way as an *N*.

This approach enables us to solve the enigma of (7):

- (7) *J'ai acheté une voiture. Cette voiture/Elle est grise.*  
 \* *C'est gris.*

The demonstrative determiner *ce* now no longer has to 'seize the referent' of itself. Its only function is to be a signal, a bell sound, to quote Kleiber (1983a), that the referent is to be identified by elements of its context of use (a demonstration, or, in this case, an element present in the linguistic context). To decide which referent the speaker refers to, the hearer then uses, among other things, the classification already introduced by the speaker. As Kleiber (1990: 252) says, the context must allow the hearer to understand the classification of the referent as *N*. The advantage of this model is that it does not use an otiose mechanism of de- and re-classification, as Kleiber's (1984) approach still seems to do. Moreover, it allows us to explain all the facts explained by Kleiber, since it does not reject his explanation of *ce* used as a pronoun; it only rejects the idea of transferring the sense of 'not yet classified' from the use of *ce* as a pronoun to its use as a determiner.

All this confirms what was already suggested by the passage from Tintin at the beginning of this article: it is only when the demonstrative and its associated demonstration are combined with the noun phrase that the referent can be identified. This is not a surprising conclusion, since it can already be found in Wittgenstein (1958: §28):

28. Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number two, 'that is called 'two' - pointing to two nuts - is perfectly exact. - But how can it be defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesn't know what one wants to call 'two'; he will suppose that 'two' is the name given to *this* group of nuts! - He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it as a numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in *every case*.

29. Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined in *this* way: 'This number is called 'two''. For the word 'number' here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word 'number' must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood. The word 'number' in the definition does indeed show this place; does show the post at which we station the word.

or in Lyons (1972: 65):

Any theory of deixis must surely take account of the fact (much discussed in the philosophical treatments of ostensive definition) that the gesture of pointing of itself will never be able to make clear whether it is some entity, some property of an entity, or some location that the addressee's attention is being directed to.

### 3. Figure and ground

For a demonstrative noun phrase used to refer to an object present before the eyes, the preceding paragraph suggests the following division of labour:

- (1) The demonstrative gesture as such does not by itself identify the referent; it only serves to point to a region in space where the referent is to be located. The same function can be fulfilled by additional linguistic information, such as '*Look up there*' in the example from Tintin at the beginning of this article.
- (2) The descriptive content of the noun phrase gives a classification of the referent making it possible to distinguish the referent from other objects in the region of space already singled out by the demonstration and accompanying linguistic information.

As has been pointed out by Roberts (1986: 1993a-d), this means that when we use demonstrative noun phrases to refer to objects present before the eyes, we apply the figure-ground model as used in perception to the domain of natural language communication. Indeed, what is proposed here is that the demonstration and, possibly, complementary linguistic information like *regardez là-haut*, identify a background, whereas the linguistic meaning of the noun gives the information necessary to distinguish a figure against this background. The combination of these elements then allows the hearer to localize the referent.

This is, of course, but another way of saying that demonstratives are grounding predications (Langacker 1991, 1994). However, what interests us here, is to unravel the contribution made by the different components of the use of a demonstrative to the grounding process. Roberts' idea implies that reference by a demonstrative NP is fundamentally a perceptual process: what starts the demonstrative process is the very perception of the demonstrative, its sound, or its written form. It is this perceptual form that is spatio-temporally linked to other elements of the *Zeigfeld*, as Bühler (1934: II) called it: the spatio-temporal structure surrounding speaker and hearer with all the objects contained in it. As Bühler also held, it is the perception of the demonstrative expression that starts the process of demonstrative reference: the demonstrative 'rings a bell', as Kleiber says; it says that there is a referent to be identified, but does not say of itself where this referent is to be found.

This is even more true if one accepts that demonstratives, contrary to other deictic expressions, are opaque in the sense mentioned above: they do not express a rule which leads to their referent.<sup>5</sup> The only rule demonstrative determiners convey is the general deictic rule that the referent is to be identified by means of elements of the context of utterance of the demonstrative determiner itself. This means that demonstratives are self-referring, meaning that, to identify the referent of a demonstrative noun phrase, it is necessary to use its very utterance (Searle 1983: 223; Benveniste 1966). As Searle stresses, this does not mean that they perform a speech act of referring to their own utterance; it only means that they 'show themselves', that, in order to find the referent, one must take into account the very act of uttering them, with its perceptual qualities.<sup>6</sup>

Now, if perceptual qualities start off the process of demonstrative reference, it should come as no surprise that alongside the phonetic qualities, other, e.g. visual qualities such as pointing gestures, may have a role to play. This tight connection between these different aspects of the context is not brought about by association by contiguity, however (Peirce 1932-1954: 2.306). It is the result of a process whereby the hearer, upon hearing the demonstrative, constructs a context, actively integrating incoming information from different sources into a unifying scheme (Tracy 1983: 101-103). The only function of pointing gestures in this *Zeigfeld* is to attract attention to a particular region in it; to find the referent, one needs a figure, which is given by the descriptive content of the noun phrase. The perceptual nature of this process implies that the information given by the noun phrase does not function on the model of a definite description: the referent is not picked out because the descriptive content of the noun is true of the referent (Roberts 1993a-d). In Kripke's (1972) and Kaplan's (1977) terms, the descriptive content only serves 'to fix the referent'. It is sufficient for

the descriptive content of the noun phrase to enable the hearer to identify the referent in the background, as the preposition and the noun do in Tintin's *in that poplar* in our very first example; it does not really have to be true of the referent. It only has to be effective in enabling the hearer to perceptually identify the referent. This is nicely illustrated by another passage of *Les Bijoux de la Castafiore* (p.23), where two journalists walk in the gardens of the castle where Castafiore stays, hoping to find more information about the wedding they think is going to take place between Castafiore and Captain Haddock. Suddenly, they see Professor Tournesol, who is working in the garden. However, they don't realize that it is Tournesol who is before them. The following conversation ensues:

- Journalist 1: *'Oh! là un jardinier ... Viens, nous allons essayer de lui tirer les vers du nez ...'*  
 Journalist 2: *'D'ac! ...'*  
 Journalist 1: *'Mais ... Ce jardinier ... C'est le professeur Tournesol! ... Celui qui a été sur la Lune avec Tintin ... Il doit être dans le secret, lui ...'*  
 Journalist 2: *'Certainement!'*  
 (Journalist 1: *'There, a gardener ... Come on, we will try to interrogate him ...'*)  
 Journalist 2: *'OK'*  
 Journalist 1: *'But ... this gardener ... It's professor Tournesol! ... The one who's been to the moon with Tintin ... He must be in the secret ...'*  
 Journalist 2: *'Sure')*

Professor Tournesol is only an occasional gardener, therefore it is not really correct to characterize him as 'a gardener of the castle'. Nevertheless, the qualification works in the context at hand and it is easy to see why: it enables journalist 2 to pick out the referent as a figure against a ground, since the professor looks like a gardener.

The preceding example shows, in fact, that the noun phrase does not have to identify the referent as such, but the referent as perceived, as seen from a certain point of view. This is even more clear in the following use of a demonstrative noun phrase in a passage from *Les Bijoux de la Castafiore* (p. 50), where the two detectives Dupondt explain how, in their view, some gypsies have stolen the emerald of Castafiore:

Non seulement, on retrouve chez eux une paire de ciseaux appartenant à la bonne de madame Castafiore, mais, dans une roulotte ... on découvre un singe dressé! ... Or, finalement, le vol de l'émeraude n'a pu être commis que

par escalade; et encore, par un homme d'une agilité prodigieuse ... *Cet homme*, nous l'avons démasqué: c'est le singe! ... Bien sûr, toute la bande nie farouchement!

Not only do we find at their place a pair of scissors belonging to the maid of madam Castafiore, but in a trailer, ... we find a dressed monkey! ... Now, in the end, the emerald could only have been stolen after a climb; and even then, by a man of an astonishing limberness ... This man, we have unmasked him: it is the monkey! ... Of course, the whole gang denies vehemently!

Admittedly, this is not a use of a demonstrative noun phrase to refer to an object before the eyes, but a textual use. But it again reveals that what guides the choice of the nominal component is not the referent as it is (a monkey), but the referent as it is known at that point in the discourse, or, rather, as the speaker thinks the hearer knows it and thus, as known in the common ground of speaker and hearer (Clark, Schrueder and Buttrick 1983), as given in the current discourse space (Langacker 1991: 97).

As Roberts rightly notes, this has consequences for the thought experiment by which Kaplan meant to criticize a Fregean theory of demonstratives. Recall that, according to Kaplan, such a Fregean theory would identify what is said by 'This man now lives in Washington D.C.' as 'The man I now point at now lives in Washington D.C.'. However, when Mitterrand disguises as Clinton, this analysis makes the sentence true, whereas in fact it is false that Mitterrand now lives in Washington D.C., which is the proposition the sentence expresses when Mitterrand is disguised as Clinton. But is Kaplan right? Is 'This man now lives in Washington D.C.' false with Mitterrand disguised as Clinton? Only, in fact, when one already knows that the individual pointed at is Mitterrand, and not Clinton, and when one holds that it is this individual that is part of the proposition expressed. But this knowledge is not given by the use of the demonstrative noun phrase as such. If all that is used to find the referent of the demonstrative noun phrase is perceptual information, then this sentence can be true for the hearer.<sup>7</sup>

Let us resume: demonstrative determiners of themselves do not identify or localize the referent; they only signal that the referent is to be identified by means of elements of the context. These elements are, first of all, the perceptual aspects of the use of the demonstrative (its physical sound and the accompanying gestures), and, second, the noun that follows the determiner. The determiner of itself only signals that there is a referent to be identified. The spatial pointing gesture tells us that the referent is to be identified in a scene that is perceptually given and that is, thus, structured

along a figure/ground model.

This perceptual scene, the *Zeigfeld*, is not objectively given. As was already pointed out above, it is already itself a product of mental constructive activity, where incoming information is integrated according to a unifying frame (Tracy 1983: 101-103). Such frames or schemes can be seen to underly our dispositions to act and to interpret actions in a particular way; they are implicitly present in our practices, largely unreflective and 'embodied' (Hanks 1990).<sup>8</sup> Such schemes are used at different levels: to interpret our initial example, with Tintin pointing and uttering 'Look up there!', at least two schemes must be used. The first allows the detectives Dupondt to interpret Tintin's bodily activity as a pointing gesture - this is why they look in the direction of the pointing finger and not to the finger itself. The second allows them to assign an interpretation to the indication given by *up there*. It can be identified as a viewer-centered frame of reference: Tintin points above with respect to his body-centered coordinate system. Because this frame of reference does not allow the two Dupondt to find the referent, an indication is given with a more 'objective' value: 'Up there, in that poplar'. The word *poplar* introduces an object-centered frame of reference, where *up there* can be interpreted with respect to the intrinsic axes of the object (Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin 1993: 224, Vandeloise 1986: 89-106). Not only does this show that we use schemes in interpreting pointing gestures and referential expressions, the passage also demonstrates that the choice of scheme is a fundamentally conversational enterprise: the speaker must use a frame of reference that he can assume to be shared with his hearer (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). And Hanks (1990) has shown that the schemes themselves are already social products, the results of communicative activities.

The schemes used to interpret demonstrative noun phrases must not be limited to the frames of reference or of bodily movement of the preceding paragraph. All kinds of general knowledge frames can be made accessible by the content of the noun phrase and the context and used by the interlocutors. This is nicely shown by an example of Kleiber (1987). Suppose two participants for the LAUD-conference at Duisburg are waiting for the train that will take them from Antwerp to Duisburg; however, the train is late. In such a situation, one can say to the other: 'Ce train a toujours du retard' (*This train is always late*). In this situation, there is no element in the context that can be classified as *train*. The interlocutors use elements that are present in the context of utterance (the platform and the hour of arrival of the train) to identify the final referent of *this train* via a piece of common knowledge (x, which is a train, normally arrives at platform P at hour H).<sup>9</sup>



One could of course claim that in such cases the demonstrative noun phrase as such identifies an element of the context, the *demonstratum*, which leads to the final referent via some kind of conversational implicatures. Such an analysis would, however, face the following problem: if *this train* finds its final referent by first identifying an element of its context of use, then why would the noun phrase provide us directly with a classification of the final referent? Thus, it seems safer to hold that we try to make relevant the classification proposed by the speaker and that, in doing this, we directly identify the referent, without first identifying the *demonstratum*.<sup>10</sup> Consequently, these pieces of common knowledge have to be integrated in the analysis of demonstrative noun phrases.

I take it, then, that the speaker will give information that allows the hearer to find the referent in a scene structured by using general knowledge frames. The gestures and some linguistic information, together with the schemes, give the ground, and the noun gives a figure that directs our attention to something that can be classified as *N*. I thus endorse Roberts' idea that in perceptual situations, demonstrative noun phrases identify their referent by using the figure-ground model. However, I do not see this figure-ground model as part of the semantics of the demonstrative noun phrase. The linguistic meaning of a demonstrative is neatly captured by describing them as opaque deictic expressions; the use of the figure-ground model is a consequence of the search for the referent they require. In short, to interpret demonstrative noun phrases used to refer to objects present before the eyes, we have to combine the semantic value of the demonstratives with the strategy we use in visual experience, an idea that has already been defended by Searle (1983: 226) and Husserl (1901: I, §26,89).

Does this mean that we use different strategies to interpret demonstratives used in discourse? Not necessarily, since the figure-ground organization is a fundamental feature of our overall cognitive functioning (Langacker 1991: 120). To show that the figure-ground organization associated with demonstratives readily extends to their discourse uses, it is possible to take as a starting point the idea of Kirsner (1979: 358-359) that demonstrative determiners express deixis. This means that they signal that a search for the referent is called for. In this respect, demonstrative determiners must be distinguished from definite articles, which signal that, in the speaker's opinion, the hearer already has the necessary means to distinguish the referent. That the demonstratives have an imperative-like force (Kirsner and Van Heuven 1988: 236), urging the hearer to find the referent, is explained by the figure-ground model as it is interpreted by Roberts. For in his view, when using a demonstrative, the speaker asks the hearer not to match the descriptive content of the referential expression to a list of things, but to use the actions and descriptions accompanying the re-

ferential expression as a guide to the referent (Roberts 1993d: 31).

The difference between the demonstrative determiner and the definite article can now be reformulated as follows. The definite article signals that the referent can be found by matching its descriptive content with referents that are already given. This implies that the speaker assumes that the hearer already has access to a context where the referent is given. The demonstrative determiner, on the contrary, signals that the descriptive content cannot be matched with referents in a context already given to the hearer. It signals, consequently, that a search for the referent is called for, a search where the hearer has to identify a referent by using the elements of the context to set up a ground and by using the descriptive content of the noun as a figure.

This can be illustrated by the following example of Kleiber (1986b: 175-177). Whereas in French (9) is acceptable:

- (9) *Un avion s'est écrasé hier. L'avion/Cet avion venait de Miami.*  
'Yesterday, an airplane crashed. The airplane/That airplane came from Miami.'

(10) is not:

- (10) *Un avion s'est écrasé hier. \*L'avion relie habituellement Miami à New York.*  
'Yesterday, an airplane crashed. \*The airplane usually connects Miami to New York.'

In this context, the use of a demonstrative, as in (11), is much more natural:

- (11) *Un avion s'est écrasé hier. Cet avion relie habituellement Miami à New York.*  
'An airplane crashed yesterday. This airplane usually connects Miami to New York.'

Kleiber shows that the respective uses of the determiners can be explained by the differences in coherence between the first and the second sentences in these examples. Indeed, in (9), the second sentence is interpreted in the scene set up by the first one: the airplane clearly is the one of which it is true that it crashed yesterday. This is not possible in (10) and (11), however: the use of *habituellement* (*usually*) makes it impossible to interpret the second sentence in the scene set up by the first. In other words, the use of the definite article is impossible because the context is not

given, but has to be set up. The demonstrative is more appropriate in this case, since it signals that a search for the referent is needed. And the final effect of the use of a demonstrative noun phrase in this context can be likened to that of the pointing finger: just as the pointing finger singles out a referent, pushing the indexical frame into the background, the use of a demonstrative noun phrase in discourse attracts attention to its referent and pushes the context that allows the identification of the referent into the background (Kleiber 1991: 86).<sup>11</sup> The figure-ground model thus allows us to describe the functioning of demonstrative noun phrases in discourse and to explain their use as a marker establishing discourse coherence.<sup>12</sup>

#### 4. Conclusions

We can conclude that demonstratives are not pointers or localizers, since neither the demonstrative nor the demonstration identify the referent of themselves. Demonstrative noun phrases rather function in the following way:

- (1) The French demonstrative determiner is an opaque deictic expression: it signals that the referent is to be identified by using elements of the context of its own utterance, without identifying those elements of itself. It thus signals that the referent is to be searched for and that its identification cannot be taken for granted, as is the case for the definite article.
- (2) When the demonstrative noun phrase is used to refer to an object present before the eyes, this means that the demonstrative is linked to elements of a situation that is modelled, as perceived situation, along a figure-ground model. The linguistic meaning of the demonstrative thus gets combined to the cognitive structure imposed on the perceptual scene.
- (3) In such a case, the demonstration or any other perceptual means (an ostensive sniffing, for instance), or even linguistic information ('*Regardez là-haut*', Look up there), interpreted in accordance with general knowledge schemes, identifies a region of space that functions as a background, in which the descriptive content of the noun phrase then singles out a figure.
- (4) Since the figure-ground organisation is a fundamental feature of cognitive organization, it is not surprising to find that it can also be

used to explain the use of demonstrative noun phrases in discourse, where they have a particular cohesive force, to be distinguished from that associated with definite noun phrases.

## Notes

1. Haviland (1992: 9) suggests that such a redundancy would exist in Guugu Yimidhirr.
2. Let me point out here that one does not always need pointing gestures: what counts is that the referent gets attention. Thus, other devices than pointing, e.g. ostensive sniffing, can attract attention, or the referent can be salient by itself, as when I see one man running down the street and say to a companion: 'That man is in a hurry'.
3. I am, of course, referring to Frege's (1892) famous identification of the morning and the evening star.
4. There is, of course, in French the possibility of adding *-ci* and *-là* to mark an opposition that seems roughly parallel to that between *this* and *that*, but I am here interested in the most common demonstrative noun phrase in French, which is just *ce* followed by a noun (+ adjective, relative phrase, etc.).
5. In fact, it is not clear whether there are transparent, non-opaque deictic expressions, if this means that the rule expressed by them is sufficient to find their referent. This is, e.g., shown by Nunberg (1992, 1993), using examples like:  
*I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal. (uttered by a prisoner in death row)*  
 To understand the relevance of this sentence, one needs to interpret *I* as 'I, as a condemned prisoner', a qualification that is not given as such by the rule '*I* refers to the utterer of this token of *I*'.
6. Hence the original title of Récanati's (1979) introduction to pragmatics: *La transparence et l'énonciation (Transparency and uttering)*.
7. Kaplan (1977) holds that sentences containing demonstratives express singular propositions, that is, propositions that contain the individual itself which the demonstrative noun phrase refers to, or, in a slightly weaker version, propositions that one cannot understand if one does not know the individual referred to. This is why he interprets *This man now lives in Washington D.C.* as *Mitterrand (the man himself!) now lives in Washington D.C.* But then, of course, his argument against the Fregean theory is a *petitio principii* (Kleiber 1983b). Moreover, as shown, e.g. in Nunberg (1992, 1993) and Roberts (1993a-c), it is not part of the semantics of demonstrative noun phrases in natural language that they always express singular propositions.
8. See Hanks (1990) for further references.
9. Nunberg (1978) calls such pieces of common knowledge 'referential functions'; Fauconnier (1984) speaks of 'connectors'.
10. Nunberg (1992: 291-292) points out that there are comparable problems for a Gricean analysis of cases of deferred reference (Quine), as when I say: 'Murdoch bought that for 50 million dollars' and point to a newspaper copy, whereas what I want to say is that he bought the company that publishes the newspaper. Nunberg rejects an analysis of such deferred references via conversational implicatures, where some kind of metonymy

would link up the *demonstrata* to their final referents, because in the absence of *demonstrata*, there would be no (misplaced) literal meaning that could provoke the mechanism of conversational implicatures. However, recent proposals show that conventionalized conversational implicatures can make a contribution even before the level of literal meaning is reached. In the terms of Searle (1979, 1983): even literal meaning requires a background of common 'knowledge' and shared practices.

11. However, for reasons adduced, e.g. in Bosch (1983: 197), Bach (1987), Nunberg (1992/1993), Tasmowski (1990), I reject the idea that demonstratives would express direct reference. Moreover, contrary to Kleiber, I prefer to think of reference in terms of success rather than of truth or satisfaction. Briefly put, reference is a speech act and is a question of speaker's intentions.
12. For the different ways in which discourse uses of demonstratives can be connected to their spatial uses, also see Kirsner (1993).

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# 'Here' and 'there' in Croatian: a case study of an urban standard variety

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## 1. Introduction

The importance of deixis in language, and especially its inseverable ties with the situation of utterance, is recognized today by many linguists. During the last couple of decades deictic phenomena have been attracting more and more attention, which is not surprising since they can be seen as the meeting place of semantic, syntactic and pragmatic aspects of language, aspects through which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structure of the languages themselves.

Research in the domain of deixis can cover various aspects corresponding to the socio-spatio-temporal dimensions of the speech event, and the following kinds of deictic expressions are traditionally distinguished: *personal deixis*, such as 'I' and 'you', *spatial deixis*, such as 'here' and 'there', *temporal deixis*, such as 'now', 'today', and 'yesterday'. Relatively more recent research also includes *social* and *discourse deixis* (see for example Fillmore 1975, Lyons 1977 and Levinson 1983).

The main focus of this paper will be centered on *spatial deixis*, more specifically on some of the Croatian equivalents of the English demonstrative adverbs *here* and *there*, adverbs having primarily a locative function.

## 2. The Croatian language and the Zagreb standard

Interest in the various possibilities of expressing spatial relations in Croatian was initially triggered by the analysis of a corpus of recordings of naturally occurring spoken language recorded in the city of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, a city numbering approximately one million inhabitants.<sup>1</sup>

Traditionally, the Croatian language is classified into three major dialects - *Štokavian*, *Čakavian* and *Kajkavian* - the names of the dialects being based on the forms of the interrogative-relative *what*, that is, *što*, *ča*

and *kaj* respectively. Standard Croatian is based on the Štokavian dialect, but should not be fully equated with it since it has undergone its own specific development during the last couple of centuries.

The city of Zagreb is located in the midst of a large Kajkavian dialect area. Thus, the linguistic situation in the city is characterized on the one hand by the Croatian Standard, which is the language of the press, mass media, schools, government institutions, etc., and on the other hand by a specific variety of urban Kajkavian predominantly used in everyday informal situations. It should be noted that the Zagreb Kajkavian *koiné* is distinct from rural Kajkavian, and that through its close contact with the Štokavian standard it has developed specific features which can be recognized on all levels of linguistic analysis (Magner 1966, Šojat 1979). At the same time Zagreb Kajkavian has inflected Standard Croatian spoken in Zagreb, resulting in a special type of Štokavian which Šojat (1983) identifies as a special variety and names *Zagreb Štokavian*. Šojat (1983) also claims that Zagreb Štokavian, or Zagreb Standard Croatian, is gaining more and more ground in everyday (even informal) speech situations, while Zagreb Kajkavian can be primarily heard within the family circle.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the Zagreb Standard can be seen as a prestigious idiom, and should not be considered substandard, but rather as one of the varieties of Standard Croatian.

### 3. The data

The above mentioned corpus of naturally occurring spoken language is in its greatest part a corpus of Zagreb Štokavian. It was not only the very high frequency of deictic expressions in the recorded material that aroused our interest, but also the fact that some of the deictic expressions were not used according to the prescribed grammatical norm of Standard Croatian found in the grammars and dictionaries of the Croatian language. This prompted us to interview an initial group of 40 speakers of Zagreb Štokavian, as to when and how they use various expressions for spatial deixis, particularly those that are equivalents of *here* and *there* in English. They were also exposed to different elicitation contexts, concrete situations that prompted them to use various demonstrative adverbs as well as other deictic expressions.<sup>3</sup>

Out of the forty informants interviewed, 22 were women ranging in age from 18 to 66; 18 were men ranging in age from 18 to 73. The level of education spanned from those with a high school education to university professors. As far as occupation was concerned, businessmen, doctors, housewives, students, shop assistants, etc., were interviewed. Special attention was paid to place of birth and to the number of years the