

## The Persecution and Murder of the Jews, 1933–1945

The Persecution and Murder of the  
European Jews by Nazi Germany,  
1933–1945

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Volume 5

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The Persecution and Murder of the  
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Volume 5

# Western and Northern Europe 1940–June 1942

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## Foreword to the English Edition

*The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945* presents a broad range of primary sources in a scholarly edition. A total of sixteen English-language volumes will be published in this series, organized chronologically and according to region. The series places particular focus on the countries which had the highest Jewish populations before the outbreak of the Second World War, above all Poland and the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The English-language edition reproduces all the materials in the German edition and has been adapted for an English-speaking readership. Apart from those originally written in English, all documents presented here have been translated from the language of the original source.

This volume, the fifth in the series, covers the persecution of Jews in Western and Northern Europe from the invasion of Norway in April 1940 and of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France in May 1940 up to the start of the major wave of deportations in summer 1942. Volume 12 of the series then documents the persecution of Jews in these countries, as well as in Denmark, from summer 1942 to the end of the war.

The foreword to the first volume of the series details the criteria for the selection of the documents. These criteria can be summarized as follows. First, the sources used are written documents and, occasionally, transcribed audio recordings, dating from the period of Nazi rule between 1933 and 1945. The decision was taken not to include memoirs, reports, and judicial documents produced after 1945; however, the footnotes make extensive reference to such retrospective testimonies and historical accounts. Second, the documents shed light on the actions and reactions of people with differing backgrounds and convictions and in different places, and indicate their intentions as well as the frequently limited options available to them. The volumes include a variety of document types such as official correspondence, private letters, diary entries, legal texts, newspaper articles, and the reports of foreign observers.

The contents of this fifth volume range from the diary entry of a Norwegian pastor on the arrest of the Jews in Trondheim to the farewell speech delivered by a Jewish law professor to his students at the University of Amsterdam, the Statute on Jews issued by France's Vichy government, and Adolf Eichmann's report on the planned deportations from Western Europe. Events and developments are therefore presented from multiple perspectives. The arrangement of the documents by country highlights regional similarities and differences regarding the situation of the Jews at the time. A detailed index makes it possible to locate documents by theme and emphasizes connections between them.

The editors wish to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for its generous funding of the German and English-language projects. The English-language volumes are produced in cooperation with the Yad Vashem International Institute for Holocaust Research. The editors are also grateful to the large number of specialists and private individuals who provided the editors with advice and comments on sources and with information for the annotations, including biographical details for the people featured in the documents.

Kathleen Luft, Todd Brown, Simon Garnett, David Hill, Sage Anderson, and Allen G. Blunden translated the German documents for this fifth volume in the series. Christine

Baycroft, Daria Chernysheva, Carol Sykes, Elizabeth Freeman, and Simon Knight translated the French documents. The Dutch and Flemish documents were translated by David Lee and Hilde ten Hacken. Karine Zbinden and Rivka Baum assisted with the checking of the French, Flemish, and Dutch translations. The Norwegian translations were completed by John Kingmann and checked by Rasmus Rønn. Rona Johnston Gordon, Alissa Jones Nelson, and Merle Read provided proofreading and copy-editing services. Peter Palm created and Giles Bennett advised on the maps, and Frank Ortmann and Martin Z. Schröder designed the book jacket. Nora Huberty, Lea von der Hude, Ashley Kirspel, Priska Komaromi, Benedict Oldfield, Charlie Perris, Aliena Stürzer, Barbara Uchdorf, Lena Werner, and Max Zeterberg contributed to this volume as student assistants. The following people contributed to the original German volume as student assistants: Romina Becker, Giles Bennett, Florian Brandenburg, Florian Danecke, Johannes Gamm, Anna Gaßner, Stefanie Haupt, Anne-Christin Klotz, Bernhard Lück, Miriam Schelp, Remigius Stachowiak, and Barbara Wünnenberg. Ingo Loose, Sonja Schilcher, Gudrun Schroeter, and Maria Wilke worked on the volume in their capacity as research fellows. Bjarte Bruland assisted with the research into Norway and Olav Bogen conducted follow-up research at the Riksarkivet in Oslo.

Despite all the care taken, occasional inaccuracies cannot be entirely avoided in a document collection on this scale. We would be grateful for any notifications to this effect. The address of the editorial board is: Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History, Edition ‘The Persecution and Murder of the European Jews by Nazi Germany, 1933–1945’, Finckensteinallee 85/87, 12205 Berlin, Germany.

Berlin/Munich/Freiburg/Klagenfurt/Jerusalem, November 2021



## Editorial Preface

This document collection on the persecution and murder of the European Jews should be cited using the abbreviation PMJ. This citation style is also used in the work itself where there are cross references between the individual volumes. The documents are consecutively numbered, beginning anew with each volume. Accordingly, 'PMJ 1/200' refers to document number 200 in the first volume of this edition. The individual documents are presented as follows: title (in bold type), header, document, footnotes.

The titles have been formulated by the editor(s) of the respective volume and provide information on the date of origin of the document, its core message, author, and recipient(s). The header, placed underneath the title, is part of the document itself. It specifies the type of source (letter, draft law, minutes, and so on), the name of the author, the place of origin, the file reference (where applicable), remarks indicating confidential or classified status, and other special features of the document. The location of the ministries or other central agencies in Berlin at the time, for instance the Reich Security Main Office or the Chancellery of the Führer, is not cited. The header also contains details about the addressee and, where applicable, the date of the receipt stamp, and it concludes with the date of origin and reference to the stage of processing of the source, for instance 'draft', 'carbon copy', or 'copy'.

The header is followed by the document text. Salutations and valedictions are printed, though signatures are only included once, in the header. Instances of emphasis by the author in the original document are retained. Irrespective of the type of emphasis used in the original source (for example, underlined, spaced, bold, capitalized, or italicized), they always appear in italics in the printed version. Where necessary, additional particulars on the document are to be found in the footnotes. In order to enhance readability, letters and words are added in square brackets where they are missing in the original due to obvious mistakes, or where the meaning would otherwise be unclear in the translation.

Abbreviations are explained in the List of Abbreviations. Uncommon abbreviations, primarily from private correspondence, are explained in a footnote at the first mention in a given document.

Handwritten additions in typewritten originals have been adopted by the editors without further indication insofar as they are formal corrections and most probably inserted by the author. If the additions significantly alter the content – either by mitigating or radicalizing it – this is mentioned in the footnotes, and, if known, the author of the addition(s) is given.

As a rule, the documents are reproduced here in full. Documents are only abridged in exceptional cases where the original source was overly long, or where, in the case of the written records of meetings, Nazi policies relating to the persecution of Jews, or reactions to these policies, were only addressed within a single part of the proceedings. Any such abridgements are indicated by an ellipsis in square brackets; the contents of the omitted text are outlined in a footnote.

Documents within each section are presented in chronological order, except for a few cases where they are presented after the date of the event described. A number of descriptive texts written soon after the period covered, but nonetheless retrospectively, are classified according to the date of the events portrayed rather than the date of origin.

Where there is any uncertainty regarding the date of the documents or whether they constitute originals or copies, reference is made in the footnotes. The first footnote for each document, which is linked to the title, contains the location of the source and, insofar as it denotes an archive, the reference number, as well as the folio number(s) if available. Reference to copies of archival documents in research institutions and in the German Federal Archives in Berlin is always made if the original held at the location first mentioned was not consulted there. In the case of printed sources, for instance newspaper articles or legislative texts, this footnote contains standard bibliographical information. The documents in this series have been translated from the original source. If the source has already been published in a document collection on National Socialism or on the persecution of the Jews, reference is made to its first publication, alongside the original location of the source. The next footnote places the document into context and, where appropriate, mentions related discussions, the specific role of authors and recipients, and activities accompanying or immediately following its genesis. Subsequent footnotes provide additional information related to the theme of the document and the persons relevant to the content. They refer to other – published or unpublished – sources that contribute to historical contextualization.

The footnotes also point out individual features of the documents, for instance handwritten notes in the margin, underlining, or deletions, whether by the author or the recipient(s). Annotations and instructions for submission are referred to in the footnotes where the editors consider them to contain significant information. Where possible, the locations of the treaties, laws, and decrees cited in the source text are provided in the footnotes, while other documents are given with their archival reference number. If these details could not be ascertained, this is also noted.

Where biographical information is available on the senders and recipients of the documents, this is provided in the footnotes. The same applies to persons mentioned in the text if they play an active role in the events described. As a general rule, this information is given in the footnote inserted after the first mention of the name in question in the volume. Biographical information on a particular person can thus be retrieved easily via the index.

The short biographies draw on data found in reference works, scholarly literature, or the Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names established and run by Yad Vashem. In many cases additional information was retrieved by consulting personnel files and indexes, municipal and company archives, registry offices, restitution and denazification files, or specialists in the field. Indexes and files on persons from the Nazi era held in archives were also used, primarily those of the former Berlin Document Center and the Central Office of the Judicial Authorities of the Federal States for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in Ludwigsburg, the latter now stored in the German Federal Archives. National archives and special archives on the Second World War and the persecution of the Jews in the respective countries were also consulted. Despite every effort, it has not always been possible to obtain complete biographical information. In such cases, the footnote in question contains only verified facts such as the year of birth. Where a person could not be identified, there is no footnote reference.

As a rule, in the titles, footnotes, and introduction inverted commas are not placed around terms that were commonplace in Nazi Germany, such as Führer, Jewish Council,

or Aryanization, but German-language terms expressing ideological concepts of race, such as *Mischling*, are placed in italics. In line with the circumstances of the time, the terms 'Jew' and 'Jewish' are used for people who did not consider themselves as Jewish but were defined as such on the basis of racial legislation and thus subjected to persecution. References in the documents to the 'Gestapo', an acronym of the German GEheime STAatsPOLizei, and to the 'State Police' denote one and the same institution: the Secret State Police.

The glossary contains concise descriptions of key terms and concepts that are repeated on multiple occasions or are related to the events and developments described in the volume. All primary and secondary sources consulted are listed in the footnotes and bibliography. Where English-language versions of these sources are available, these are included. If a document has already been published in English translation but has been newly translated for this volume, this is indicated in a footnote.

### *Note on the translation*

British English is used in all translations into English. Where a document was originally written in British or American English, the spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the original have been retained, with silent correction of minor typographical or grammatical errors and insertions in square brackets to clarify the meaning if necessary.

The spelling, grammar, and punctuation of the translated documents broadly conform to the guidelines in *New Hart's Rules: The Oxford Style Guide* (2014). Accordingly, the ending -ize rather than -ise is preferred throughout.

SS, Wehrmacht, and certain other ranks are given in the original German, as are titles where there is no standard equivalent in English or where there may be confusion with contemporary usage. A table of military and police ranks is included as an appendix, along with English-language equivalents of these terms and an indication of their position in the National Socialist hierarchy. Administrative ranks and other terms have been left in the original language where there is no satisfactory equivalent in English. These terms are either explained in a footnote or, if they appear on multiple occasions, in the glossary.

Where the documents contain quotations from the Bible, the King James Version (KJV) has been preferred, especially where the context is religious or ecclesiastical.

In the Netherlands, qualified lawyers use the title 'mr' (*meester der rechten*). To avoid confusion with the English word 'Mr', this term has not been included in the translated documents or footnotes, but the individual's status as a lawyer is noted. In Belgium, physicians and lawyers are awarded the title 'Dr' upon qualifying, but the title is not generally used for those holding a doctorate in another discipline. For this reason, 'Dr' is only used in the biographical footnotes if this is standard practice in the respective country.

All laws and institutions are translated into English in the documents. In the introduction and footnotes, foreign-language terms and expressions are added in brackets after the translation where this is considered important for understanding or context. The original spelling of foreign organizations is retained in the footnotes. The titles of published works not in the English language are not translated unless the work in question is of contextual or substantial relevance. If a foreign-language word or phrase appears in a document, this is retained in the translated text and its meaning explained in a footnote or, if necessary, the glossary.

In order to avoid confusion between British and American English, dates are spelt out in the order day, month, and year. Foreign proper names are not italicized. Thus, names of institutions, organizations, and places are written in roman type in the footnotes, but legislation and conceptual terms are in italics.

In the titles, footnotes, and translated documents, place names are generally written according to the contemporary (English) name or the variant commonly used in scholarly literature on the period. This also applies to places that have since been renamed. The seat of government of the Netherlands is known both as The Hague and 's-Gravenhage. The translated documents follow usage in the original document, while the individual document titles and footnotes refer to The Hague. Belgian place names are given according to the language divisions within the country or standard usage in English (for example Brussels or Liège). The footnotes give place names in Flanders in Flemish with French in brackets, and places in Wallonia are presented in French with the Flemish name in brackets. Many places in Luxembourg have German, French, and/or Luxemburgish equivalents – for example, Esch a. d. Alzette (German); Esch-sur-Alzette (French); Esch-Uelzecht (Luxemburgish). The translated documents follow usage in the original. Alternative place names within each country are given in the index. Regardless of usage in the original, French street names in the documents are spelt with rue, boulevard, and avenue in lower case.

Diacritical marks in languages such as Czech and Polish are retained, with the exception of the names of the extermination camps in Eastern Europe, where they have been removed in order to emphasize that these camps were established by the German National Socialist regime. Language-specific characters such as the German ß (*Eszett*) for ss have also been retained.

Hebrew and Yiddish terms are described in the footnotes or glossary, along with any other words requiring explanation.

After the war the Dutch language underwent a spelling reform to make orthography closer to actual pronunciation. The names of Dutch organizations and periodicals are spelt as they were prior to the spelling reform, for example Joodsche Raad rather than Joodse Raad for 'Jewish Council'.

The term 'Israélite' (in French) as a designation for 'Jew' originated in 1808 in Napoleonic France and spread from there to German- and Dutch-speaking countries ('Israelit' and 'Israëliet' respectively), based on the notion that Jews should be defined as belonging to a faith – 'Mosaic' – rather than an ethnic entity, and intended as a means of integrating Jews into West European societies. In contemporary discourse the term 'Jew' often had a negative overtone. In France the term 'Jew' was reintroduced in official discourse after 1940, though the term 'Israélite' was not entirely abandoned – for instance, in the case of the Union générale des Israélites de France (UGIF). In Belgium, usage of the term 'Israélite'/'Israëliet' ceased with the establishment of the Association of Jews in Belgium (AJB/VJB) in 1941. In the Netherlands too, official usage of the term 'Israëliet' ceased shortly after the occupation but remained in the titles of Jewish organizations. The translated documents use the term 'Israelite' if this is in the original document. The exception is the Union générale des Israélites de France, which has been translated as the General Union of French Jews, as this has become the customary translation in scholarly literature.

## Introduction

On 9 April 1940, seven months after the start of the Second World War, German troops invaded Denmark and Norway, launching the assault on Northern Europe. The German command sought to pre-empt an invasion of Scandinavia by Allied troops and to prevent the emergence of an additional front to the north. In view of Germany's military superiority, the Danish leadership decided to offer no resistance. This enabled German troops to occupy the country within a few days, while at the same time the Danish army was demobilized. The Norwegian army, under the command of King Haakon VII, the government, and the parliament, resisted the advancing Wehrmacht troops and, fighting alongside British and French units, managed to push back the Germans to the brink of defeat. However, in the face of ominous developments in France, on 5 June the Western Allies began moving their troops towards the German front. With insufficient back-up, the Norwegians were forced to capitulate five days later. While the Danish leadership remained in the country, the Norwegian government – as well as the king – fled to London, where it established a government in exile.

On 10 May 1940 German troops had begun their offensive in the west and advanced into Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Neither the Belgian nor the Dutch army was able to offer sustained resistance to the Wehrmacht. Luxembourg capitulated on the day of the German invasion. Grand Duchess Charlotte left the country, along with the Luxembourg government. Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands and her cabinet went into exile in London on 13 May and the Dutch troops were forced to surrender two days later. On 28 May, Belgium also capitulated. King Leopold III was held prisoner by the Germans, while the Belgian government under Hubert Pierlot escaped, initially to France. In October 1940 Pierlot formed a government in exile, likewise in London. German troops managed to advance deep into France in just a few days following the invasion. They reached the English Channel on 24 May and entered Paris on 14 June. The Franco-German Armistice was signed on 22 June 1940.<sup>1</sup>

With the German occupation of Northern and Western Europe in the spring of 1940, more than half a million Jews came under German control. This volume documents the persecution of the Jews in Western and Northern Europe between April 1940 and the summer of 1942. During these two years the restrictions and requirements already being applied to Jews in Germany were also introduced to a substantial extent in the countries in the north and west of the continent, with the exception of Denmark, where Jews could live on almost undisturbed until 1943. The increasing isolation and deprivation of rights

1 Richard Petrow, *The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway, April 1940–May 1945* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1975); Werner Warmbrunn, *The German Occupation of Belgium, 1940–1944* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993); Jennifer L. Foray, *Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 20–56; Hans-Martin Ottmer, 'Weserübung': *Der deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen im April 1940* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994); Dirk Levsen, *Krieg im Norden: Die Kämpfe in Norwegen im Frühjahr 1940* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2000); Julian Jackson, *The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hanna Diamond, *Fleeing Hitler: France 1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Karl-Heinz Frieser, *The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

of all Jews in the occupied territories and the treatment of Jewish refugees, as well as the preparations for the deportations, are the focus of this volume. Although the German measures against the Jews in the occupied countries of Western and Northern Europe had similar features, their implementation was dependent upon the circumstances in the respective countries. For this reason, the documents in the present volume are arranged by country. Cross references between the individual countries and reference to documents addressing overarching themes serve to highlight similarities and differences.

## Jews in Western and Northern Europe prior to the German Occupation

Prior to the German occupation there were Jewish communities in every country of Western and Northern Europe, albeit of widely varying numbers and sizes. In Northern Europe they had come into being later than in the West, and the percentage of Jews among the overall population was markedly lower than in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Patterns of Jewish life and the degree of acceptance of or discrimination against the Jews also differed from country to country.

### *Norway*

There had been no Jewish population in Scandinavia before the early modern era. It was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that Jews, in scattered instances, were allowed to enter these Lutheran countries, with writs of protection. Norway was governed by a regent, the king of Sweden, from 1814 until it gained independence in 1905. However, the Norwegian constitution largely retained its legal force during the union with Sweden. Article Two not only prohibited the presence of Jesuits and monastic orders in the country, but also denied Jews entry to the kingdom. Only in 1851 did the parliament decide to abolish the 'Jew clause'. Contrary to the fears of some, only a small number of Jews emigrated to Norway in the years that followed. Fifty years after the constitutional amendment, just 642 Jews were living in Norway. The largest centre of Jewish life in Norway developed in the capital, Kristiania (renamed Oslo again in 1925). Norway's first Jewish Community was founded there in 1892, and the first purpose-built synagogue was erected in 1923.

Mass emigration of Jews living in Eastern Europe had begun in the 1870s, reaching a peak in the 1890s and again after the First World War. Despotism and oppression by the tsarist authorities, pogroms, and economic misery, on the one hand, and hope for a better future in highly industrialized America, on the other hand, led more than 3.5 million Jews to leave Eastern Europe during the fifty years prior to 1930. Most of them did go to the United States; only a small minority found their way to Western and Northern Europe.<sup>2</sup>

2 Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983); Heiko Haumann, *A History of East European Jews*, trans. James Patterson (Budapest: Central University Press, 2003 [German edn, 1990]); Lloyd P. Gartner, *History of the*

By 1920 Norway had admitted approximately 1,500 Jews, predominantly from Eastern Europe. Besides Oslo, the immigrants chose Trondheim in particular as their new home. By the time that its new synagogue was consecrated in 1925, Trondheim had around 300 Jewish residents, among them many Orthodox Jews. Some Jews also settled in Narvik in the far north of the country. In 1940 there were around 1,000 Jewish households in Norway and 400 companies, mostly small, run by Jews.

Even though the abolition of Article Two of the Norwegian constitution had made Jewish immigration into Norway possible, this by no means signified full legal equality. Jews continued to be subjected to a great number of restrictions. Many occupations, functions, and public offices were only open to Lutherans, though blatant antisemitic hostility was rare. A radically antisemitic world view on the German model was common only in the small *völkisch* circles, from which Nasjonal Samling (National Union, NS), a fascist party with a National Socialist orientation, emerged in 1933.

After 1933 Jews fled to Norway first from the German Reich and then also from Austria and Czechoslovakia (Doc. 1). Among them were the painter Kurt Schwitters and the psychoanalyst and sociologist Wilhelm Reich. Norway was not usually the exile country of first choice for Jewish refugees. Many of them sought to travel onwards to other countries willing to admit them, as strict laws made it difficult for foreigners to settle in Norway and become established there. Even the Jewish community in Norway and non-Jewish political exiles responded to the arrival of Jewish refugees warily and in some cases rejected them outright.<sup>3</sup> One of the conditions for a residence permit was that a refugee could not become a burden on the Norwegian state. Nansen Relief (Nansenhjelpen) and the Jewish Aid Society (Jødiske Hjelpeforening) sought to support refugees in need of welfare. By the spring of 1940 about 2,100 Jews were living in Norway, including 500 immigrants and refugees. This amounted to 0.08 per cent of an overall population of 2.8 million.<sup>4</sup>

### *The Netherlands*

Jews had begun to settle in the Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century, after the formation of the Union of Utrecht in 1579 marked the end of the Inquisition and the start of religious freedom. Sephardic Jews from Spain and Portugal, as well as Ashkenazim from Eastern Europe, benefited from the liberal policies in the Dutch Republic. They obtained full civil rights in 1796 after France's revolutionary army had conquered the country the previous year and the Batavian Republic was established as a French

Jews in Modern Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Gur Alroey, 'Patterns of Jewish Migration from the Russian Empire in the Early 20th Century', *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, no. 57 (Winter 2006), pp. 24–51.

3 Einhard Lorenz, *Exil in Norwegen: Lebensbedingungen und Arbeit deutschsprachiger Flüchtlinge 1933–1943* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992), pp. 282–310.

4 Per Ole Johansen, *Oss selv nærmest: Norge og jødene 1914–1943* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984); Oskar Mendelsohn, *Jødernes historie i Norge gjennom 300 år*, vol. 1: 1660–1940 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987); Samuel Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response to the Holocaust: A Historical Perspective* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1991), pp. 24–36; Bjarte Bruland and Mats Tangestuen, 'Norway's Role in the Holocaust', in Jonathan C. Friedman (ed.), *The Routledge History of the Holocaust* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 232–247.

satellite state. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the boundaries between the two Jewish groups and between the Jewish and non-Jewish Dutch populations increasingly lost their significance. At the same time, while Dutch Jews were largely integrated into civil society and economic life, they remained a clear subgroup within Dutch society, especially in the capital, Amsterdam, where they constituted about 12 per cent of the population and lived in clearly 'Jewish' neighbourhoods. In the second half of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century, Dutch Jewry underwent a rapid process of secularization. Crucial factors in this process were the increasing urbanization of the Netherlands, industrialization, and the emergence of four sociocultural milieus (*zuilen*, or 'pillars') at the end of the nineteenth century. Catholics, Protestants, socialists, and liberals had their own political parties, trade unions, newspapers, and schools, which governed nearly every aspect of life in this 'pillarized society', divided by confession or ideology. The Jews in the Netherlands usually aligned themselves with the liberals or the socialists and even played leading roles in political life, especially in the Social Democratic movement, but they also maintained a distinct subculture.

On the eve of the German occupation, about 80,000 Jews (60 per cent of the Dutch Jewish community) were living in Amsterdam, while the rest lived in mostly tiny communities all over the country. The major umbrella organizations of Dutch Jewry were the Orthodox Dutch Israelite Religious Community and the Portuguese Israelite Religious Community. Both were set up at the initiative of the state after the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A religious reform movement did not emerge until the beginning of the 1930s and it remained very small until after the Second World War. Though limited in size, the nationwide Dutch Union of Zionists, which came into being at the end of the nineteenth century, played a considerable role in public Jewish life.<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to Germany, in the Netherlands there was very little antisemitism after the First World War, yet Jews encountered a 'glass ceiling' in many spheres of life. On the radical right, only the National Socialist Movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, NSB), founded in December 1931 by Anton Mussert and Cees van Geelkerken, succeeded in taking root. It followed the programme of the National Socialist Party in Germany – but without the latter's conspicuously antisemitic orientation. Until 1938 the NSB even accepted Jews as members, but in the second half of the 1930s, after enjoying its biggest electoral successes, it grew incrementally more antisemitic and pro-German, though at the same time advocating 'Dutchness'. There were, in addition, several very minor fringe movements on the extreme right that were both pro-German and antisemitic.<sup>6</sup>

5 Mozes Heiman Gans, *Memorbook: History of Dutch Jewry from the Renaissance to 1940, with 1100 Illustrations* (Baarn: Bosch & Keuning, 1977), pp. 610–613; Jozeph Michman, Hartog Beem, and Dan Michman, *Pinkas: Geschiedenis van de joodse gemeenschap in Nederland* (Amsterdam/Antwerp: Uitgeverij Contact, 1999), pp. 90–128; J. C. H. Blom and J. J. Cahen, 'Jewish Netherlands, Netherlands Jews, and Jews in the Netherlands, 1870–1940', in J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuks-Mansfeld, and I. Schöffer (eds.), *The History of the Jews in the Netherlands* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2002), pp. 230–295, here pp. 271–279.

6 Konrad Kwiet, 'Zur Geschichte der Mussert-Bewegung', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 18 (1970), pp. 164–195; Dan Michman, 'What Distinguishes Fascism from Nazism? Dutch Fascism before and during the Holocaust as a Test Case', in Dan Michman, *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective. Conceptualizations, Terminology, Approaches and Fundamental Issues* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003), pp. 129–147.



Following Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933, Jews and political opponents of the National Socialists fled the German Reich in large numbers, and many sought refuge in the Netherlands. In the period before the German occupation, some 34,000 Jewish refugees had crossed the border to the Netherlands: of these, about 23,000 stayed for periods longer than two weeks, and about 16,000 were still in the country in May 1940. Many of them continued their journey and sailed from Dutch ports to Britain or other overseas destinations. Those refugees who remained in the Netherlands generally lacked the money to travel onwards or hoped for a swift collapse of the Nazi regime and a speedy return home. If nothing else, the Netherlands, with its language akin to German and a similar culture, offered the refugees a haven that appeared to resemble their old homeland. 'It wasn't such a big step from the Kurfürstendamm in Berlin to Beethovenstraat in Amsterdam,' Werner Cahn later recalled. He came to Amsterdam in 1934.<sup>7</sup>

At first refugees could enter the Netherlands unimpeded, but from 1934 the Dutch government adopted a less welcoming approach. This shift was motivated not only by a fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants but also by the conservative economic policies adopted in response to the international economic crisis. After the elections in February 1938, the new cabinet decided to completely close the borders to refugees. Now only someone who could demonstrate that they were in acute danger was allowed to officially enter the country from Germany. In a circular letter dated 7 May 1938, the new minister of justice, C. M. J. F. Goseling, stated, 'Henceforth, a refugee is to be regarded as an undesirable element for Dutch society and therefore as an unwelcome foreigner' (Doc. 25). As a result, by November 1938, only around 800 additional refugees had been granted an entry permit, on humanitarian grounds. However, the pogroms of November 1938 in Germany and the ensuing public outrage in the Netherlands led the government to admit a further 7,000 refugees. More than two thirds of them lived with friends or relatives or in private accommodation, while the others were housed in refugee camps located throughout the country. In addition, many Jews attempted to cross the border illegally to escape persecution in Germany or were driven out by the Gestapo<sup>8</sup> and reached the Netherlands despite the increasingly tight controls. In 1939 approximately 120,000 Dutch and 20,000 foreign Jews (who had come mostly from Germany, but also from Austria and Eastern Europe, some of them in the 1920s) were living legally or illegally in the

7 Bob Moore, *Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933–1940* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 20–27; Dan Michman, 'Die jüdische Emigration und die niederländische Reaktion zwischen 1933 und 1940,' in Kathinka Dittrich and Hans Würzner (eds.), *Die Niederlande und das deutsche Exil 1933–1940* (Amsterdam: Athenäum, 1982), pp. 73–89, here p. 74. Quotation cited in Philo Bregstein and Salvador Bloemgarten (eds.), *Remembering Jewish Amsterdam*, trans. Wanda Boecke (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2004 [Dutch edn, 1978]), p. 176. For an overview of the situation of Jewish refugees in the Netherlands before, during, and after the German occupation, see Daan Bronkhorst, *Een tijd van komen: De geschiedenis van vluchtelingen in Nederland* (Amsterdam: Federatie VON, 1990) pp. 2–19.

8 Jacob Toury, 'From Forced Emigration to Expulsion: The Jewish Exodus over the Non-Slavic Borders of the Reich as a Prelude to the "Final Solution"', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 17 (1986), pp. 51–91.

Netherlands. This equated to around 1.4 per cent of an overall population of approximately 9 million inhabitants.<sup>9</sup>

The Dutch population reacted with ambivalence to the growing number of Jewish refugees. The first boycotts of Jewish shops in Germany in April 1933 had generated interest in what was happening in Germany and a willingness to help those affected. The response was the same after the pogroms of November 1938. At the same time, however, the measures taken by the government to close the borders and to turn away German refugees were met with approval, motivated not least by fears that the economic situation would deteriorate further. According to a member of the Committee for Jewish Refugees (Comité voor Joodsche Vluchtelingen):

These days, if you talk to people from the middle classes, as soon as the conversation turns to the refugees, you'll hear them say: Yes, it's quite sad, but all these Germans who take up residence here are competing in a big way with our own Jewish middle class, which already has to struggle so hard, you know. You'll hear this talk everywhere, among workers, among the middle classes, even among those who are better off.<sup>10</sup>

Many Dutch people also criticized the behaviour of the refugees from Germany, as the newspaper *Het Liberale Weekblad* reported on 15 July 1938:

The natural sympathy we have for the Jewish émigrés and our heartfelt willingness to help are diminished in this country by those émigrés whom we find disagreeable not because they are German *Jews* but rather because they are *German* Jews. Their preference for the German language and German customs and their glorification of Germany in contrast to Holland are offensive, not only to our national spirit but also to our philosemitic feelings.<sup>11</sup>

Many refugees nonetheless found support. German writers and artists such as the painter Heinrich Campendonk gained success in the Netherlands, and some scholars (such as the legal scholar and sociologist Hugo Sinzheimer and the philosopher Helmuth Plessner) were offered professorships at Dutch universities. Socialists and communists who had to flee Germany also came to the Netherlands, where they were supported by local party comrades.<sup>12</sup>

9 According to the census of 31 Dec. 1930 the Netherlands had a population of 8,883,977: Bob G. J. de Graaff, '“Strijdig met de tradities van ons volk”: Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van vluchtelingen in den jaren dertig', in Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Jaarboek buitenlandse zaken 1987–1988* (The Hague: SDU-uitgeverij, 2008), pp. 169–187.

10 Letter from R. H. Eitje to Dr A. Wiener, dated 12 Nov. 1933, cited in Dan Michman, 'Die jüdische Emigration und die niederländische Reaktion zwischen 1933 und 1940', in Kathinka Dittrich and Hans Würzner (eds.), *Die Niederlande und das deutsche Exil 1933–1940* (Königstein: Athenäum, 1982), pp. 93–108. See also Michman, 'Die jüdische Emigration', p. 83; Katja Happe, *Viele falsche Hoffnungen: Judenverfolgung in den Niederlanden, 1940–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017), p. 23.

11 *Het Liberale Weekblad*, 15 July 1938.

12 Dittrich and Würzner, *Die Niederlande und das deutsche Exil*, pp. 91–122, 226–237.

Various relief organizations looked after the Jewish refugees. The Committee for Special Jewish Interests (Comité voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen), founded on 21 March 1933, played a central role in this respect. Initially responsible only for the Jewish immigrants in Amsterdam, it soon expanded its activities to include all of the Netherlands and coordinated the work of other relief organizations. The funds distributed by the relief organizations came from Jewish communities in the Netherlands and from international Jewish organizations.

The Dutch government considered it necessary to tighten control over the refugees, and in February 1939 it ordered the creation of a central camp designated for Jewish refugees. After prolonged discussion, the government decided upon a site at Westerbork in the north-east of the Netherlands. Though the decision to establish a refugee camp and incarcerate illegal refugees there was a governmental one, the costs of construction and maintenance, amounting to more than 1.25 million guilders, were borne by the Jewish relief organizations. The first refugees moved into the camp in October 1939. Its first director reported optimistically that:

The mood was excellent, a hearty soup stood ready, and the barracks made a good impression and awaited the arrivals with decent beds and splendid blankets. That very evening, the first reports went out from the camp, saying that life in the new camp was not so bad after all.<sup>13</sup>

However, the isolated location in a sparsely populated region made it difficult for the inmates to expedite their emigration applications at the various embassies and consulates of countries that were willing to admit them. And yet despite all the restrictions, the adverse attitude of the Dutch government, and everyday difficulties, most German refugees felt they were safe in the Netherlands.<sup>14</sup>

### *Belgium*

Jews had settled in the territory that is now Belgium since the Middle Ages. A small group of Jews, living primarily in Antwerp, Mons (Bergen), Brussels, and Ostend, obtained limited civil rights under Austrian rule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Political and religious equality for the Jews, achieved in 1791 in France during the French Revolution, was also introduced in 1794 in what later became Belgian territory. During the Belgian Revolution of 1831 the predominantly Catholic provinces of Flanders and Wallonia broke away from the Protestant Netherlands and declared independence as the Kingdom of Belgium. The constitution of 1831 granted equal rights to all Belgians, regardless of ancestry or religion, and thus paved the way for the integration and assimilation of the country's Jews. As in France and the newly unified Germany after 1871, the

13 Dirk Mulder and Ben Prinsen, *Uitgeweken: De voorgeschiedenis van kamp Westerbork* (Hooghalen: Herinneringscentrum Kamp Westerbork, 1989), p. 25.

14 Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore (eds.), *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States* (New York: Berghahn, 2010); Dan Michman, 'The Committee for Jewish Refugees in Holland 1933–1940', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 14 (1981), pp. 205–232.

antisemitism that spread during the second half of the nineteenth century also found its way into some sections of the population in Belgium.<sup>15</sup>

Most Jews who came to Belgium from Eastern Europe from the late nineteenth century onwards continued their journey from Antwerp to countries overseas, but several thousand stayed in Belgium, thereby increasing the number of Jews in Belgium to between 10,000 and 12,000. The long-established Jewish population was largely assimilated, and most of the new arrivals from Eastern Europe were also successful in integrating into Belgian society. Around 80 per cent of the predominantly Francophone Jews lived in Antwerp and Brussels, with smaller communities in cities such as Liège and Charleroi. In these cities separate Jewish quarters developed, in which the residents spoke mainly Yiddish and cultivated the traditions of Eastern European Jewry. The Flemish city of Antwerp became the religious, political, and cultural centre of a multifaceted Jewish life in Belgium. Many Jewish citizens of Antwerp had successful careers in commerce, banking, or finance, and they were particularly prominent in the diamond industry. However, most Jews in Belgium were involved in the retail trade. The East European immigrants had specialized primarily in the processing of textiles, furs, or leather. Many of them lived in relatively humble circumstances. The Jewish community in Brussels was characterized by its political life, much of it left-leaning on the one hand and Zionist on the other. Altogether, some 70,000 Jews were living in Belgium on the eve of the occupation.

In the 1930s antisemitic and xenophobic tendencies had increased markedly in Belgium against the backdrop of the general economic crisis and the rising numbers of refugees. From 1933 onwards, Jews from the Reich – and later, after the Anschluss, from Austria too – also took refuge in Belgium, in spite of the Belgian government's restrictive policy towards refugees. Belgium recognized as refugees only those persons who had been persecuted for political reasons, and not those persecuted on the basis of race. Yet, at the same time, it tolerated Jews who had entered the country illegally. The expropriation of Jewish assets carried out by the Nazi regime meant that most Jews had been forced to leave their German, Austrian, or Czech homelands without funds. They received support from Belgian relief organizations such as the Committee for Assistance to Jewish Refugees (CARJ), which were aided by international Jewish relief organizations such as HICEM and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). By 1940 more than 25,000 Jews had fled to Belgium from the territory of the Reich, especially after the November pogroms of 1938. Approximately 4,000 of them were held in specially created 'reception camps' (*Auffanglager*) such as Merksplas, near Antwerp, and Marneffe, near Liège.<sup>16</sup> About 94 per cent of the Jews living in Belgium at the time of the German occupation did not have Belgian citizenship.

15 Ephraim Schmidt, *L'Histoire des Juifs à Anvers (Antwerpen)* (Antwerp: Excelsior, 1969), pp. 3–132; Jean-Philippe Schreiber, *Politique et religion: Le Consistoire central israélite de Belgique au XIXe siècle* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1995); Jean-Philippe Schreiber, *L'Immigration juive en Belgique du Moyen Âge à la Première Guerre mondiale* (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1996).

16 Frank Caestecker, *Ongewenste gasten: Joodse vluchtelingen en migranten in de dertiger jaren in België* (Brussels: Vupress, 1993), pp. 162–171; Dan Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998); Insa Meinen and Ahlrich Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land: Jüdische Flüchtlinge in Westeuropa 1938–1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2013), pp. 42–98.

New, blatantly nationalist organizations pursued antisemitic agendas. The Diets Nationalist Solidarity League (Verdinaso),<sup>17</sup> founded as early as 1931, was explicitly opposed to all immigrants and regarded Jews as ethnically alien. The Flemish National League (Vlaams Nationaal Verbond) followed in 1933. Headed by Staf De Clercq, it campaigned for the independence of Flanders. The Catholic nationalist Rexist Movement, founded in 1936 and led by the Walloon Léon Degrelle, sought the abolition of democracy in Belgium and the introduction of an authoritarian system, and it opposed any form of Jewish influence on politics and the economy. Established parties, such as the Catholic Party, and other organizations incorporated several antisemitic clauses into their manifestos in the mid 1930s.<sup>18</sup>

### *Luxembourg*

Jews had lived in the territory of present-day Luxembourg since the high Middle Ages. Its first synagogue was established in 1828, and Jews from Germany and Lorraine emigrated to the Grand Duchy. Most members of the Jewish population belonged to the lower middle classes and earned their living from the retail or livestock trade. In 1927 there were approximately 1,770 Jews in Luxembourg, corresponding to 0.62 per cent of the overall population.<sup>19</sup>

Following Hitler's accession to power in January 1933, Jews from the Reich sought refuge in Luxembourg. Many then continued their journey to seek asylum in Belgium, France, or other countries. The reincorporation of the territory of the Saar Basin into the Reich in 1935 led numerous Jews to flee the Saar and seek refuge in nearby Luxembourg. Jews also fled across the border from Trier. A population census in December 1935 revealed that the number of Jewish inhabitants had increased to 3,144. Of that number, however, only 870 held Luxembourg citizenship; 2,274 (about 75 per cent) were foreign or stateless Jews. The estimated number of Jews in Luxembourg on the eve of the occupation was 4,000, less than 25 per cent of whom had citizenship of the country; Jews accounted for just over 1 per cent of Luxembourg's total population of around 300,000.<sup>20</sup>

Initially, many refugees hoped the political situation in Germany would soon change, but anti-Jewish legislation and the anti-Jewish pogroms of November 1938 diminished the chances of their safe return. In response to the rising numbers of (not only Jewish) refugees, in 1934 the Luxembourg government had introduced a residence permit for aliens, and with it restrictions on conducting business and practising a profession. The

17 'Diets' was the term used to indicate the ethnic group comprising the Dutch, the Flemish, and people in the parts of Germany bordering on the Netherlands.

18 Martin Conway, *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

19 Charles and Graziella Lehrmann, *La Communauté juive du Luxembourg dans le passé et le présent* (Esch-sur-Alzette: Imprimerie coopérative luxembourgeoise, 1953); Laurent Moyse, *Du rejet à l'intégration: Histoire des Juifs du Luxembourg des origines à nos jours* (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 2011).

20 Commission spéciale pour l'étude des spoliations des biens juifs au Luxembourg pendant les années de guerre, 1940–1945, *La Spoliation des biens juifs au Luxembourg 1940–1945: Rapport final* (Luxembourg: La Commission, 2009), p. 11.

new government elected in 1937 pursued a more moderate refugee policy. The Consistory of the Israelite Religious Community and ESRA (from the Hebrew *ezra*, meaning aid or relief), an association founded by the Jewish communities, assisted refugees by providing financial support from the JDC. The number of illegal refugees in particular increased markedly, with Luxembourgers frequently serving as accomplices in their escape. In some cases even the German Border Police supported attempts to cross the border illegally into Luxembourg, in order to ensure that Jews were removed from the Reich. The government of Luxembourg expelled some of those who had entered the country in this manner.

In Luxembourg, as in the other countries of Western Europe, an increasing number of far-right groups had emerged since the late 1920s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-semitism were propagated in various newspapers, such as the *Volksblatt* or the *National-Echo*, the official newspaper of the Luxembourg National Party. In addition, the NSDAP was able to recruit approximately 600 active members (mainly Germans) in Luxembourg. The first antisemitic attacks took place in March and April 1938, when shops in Luxembourg City were defaced with anti-Jewish slogans. The synagogue was attacked in September of the same year.<sup>21</sup>

### France

Jews had lived in the territory that is now France since the fourth century CE. Towards the end of the eleventh century, two separate centres of Jewish life with a rich Jewish culture had developed in the southern part of the country (Provence) and especially in the north. In the centuries that followed, Jews in France, as almost everywhere else in Europe, were frequently threatened with marginalization and persecution. In 1394 they were expelled from the lands of the French crown; only in a few regions of France were small Jewish communities able to survive. The French Revolution brought the 40,000 French Jews recognition as fully fledged citizens for the first time. On 27 September 1791 the National Constituent Assembly passed a decree granting equality to all Jews living in the country. France thus became the first country in Europe in which the Jews obtained full legal emancipation. After the official recognition of the Jews as a religious community, Napoleon I called for the assimilation of the French Jews. Established in 1808, the Central Consistory (along with local consistories at the département level) was the first organization to unite the extremely heterogeneous Jewish community in France – while also placing it under state control. At the same time, Napoleon

21 Paul Cerf, *L'Étoile juive au Luxembourg* (Luxembourg: RTL Edition, 1986), pp. 11–34; Ruth Zarith, 'The Jews of Luxembourg during the Second World War', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1993), pp. 51–66; Serge Hoffmann, 'Luxemburg – Asyl und Gastfreundschaft in einem kleinen Land', in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzels (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit, Regionalstudien*, vol. 1: *Polen, Rumänien, Griechenland, Luxemburg, Norwegen, Schweiz* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996), pp. 187–204; Moïse, *Du rejet à l'intégration*, pp. 175–179; Willard A. Fletcher and Jean T. Fletcher (eds.), *Defiant Diplomat: George Platt Waller, American Consul in Nazi-Occupied Luxembourg, 1939–1941* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2012), pp. 101–110; Marc Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', in Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh (eds.), *The Greater German Reich and the Jews: Nazi Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories 1935–1945* (New York: Berg-hahn, 2015), pp. 289–315.

restricted the equality obtained during the French Revolution by issuing the so-called Infamous Decree (*décret infâme*). This limited the freedoms of Jews in trade and commerce and in money lending, restricted their freedom of movement, and placed them at a disadvantage during military service. These forms of discrimination remained until the decree was rescinded in 1818 under the Bourbon monarchy, which had been restored to the throne four years previously. In the decades that followed, a Jewish middle class developed and succeeded in integrating into French society without being forced to give up its Jewish identity. Some customs in the synagogues, such as the official dress of the functionaries, were adapted to match official norms existing in the Catholic Church. Jews also changed their common language to French. However, as Pierre Birnbaum writes, 'social assimilation beyond emancipation remained very fragile during the latter part of the nineteenth century'.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, there were marked differences between the long-established Alsatian Ashkenazi Jews, the Portuguese Jews in southern France, and the rapidly growing Jewish community in Paris.<sup>23</sup>

Since the 1880s Jews had also been emigrating to France from Central and Eastern Europe and from the Ottoman Empire. This development contributed not only to the growth of the Jewish community, but also to the rise of a new Jewish proletariat and to the creation of many Jewish organizations outside the Consistory.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, antisemitic views were embraced by the early 'utopian' socialist thinkers such as Charles Fourier, Pierre Leroux, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who adapted the traditional stereotype of the connection between Jews and money to their anti-capitalist world view. In this context, the Rothschild family became the icon of Jewish financial power in the modern economy.<sup>24</sup> In French colonial Algeria, where the local Jews were emancipated by the Crémieux Decree of 1870, antisemitism found fertile ground among the French population. Resurgent antisemitism coincided in right-wing circles with criticism of the liberal, secular constitutional structure of the Third Republic (1870–1940), and came to a head with the Dreyfus affair. The Alsatian Jew Alfred Dreyfus, a captain in the army, was accused in 1894 and again in 1899 – unjustly, as it later turned out – of espionage for the German Reich. He was exonerated and rehabilitated in 1906. The affair split the nation for years into liberal supporters and nationalist opponents of Dreyfus, and its after-effects were palpable well into the 1940s.<sup>25</sup>

22 Pierre Birnbaum, 'Between Social and Political Assimilation: Remarks on the History of Jews in France', in Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson (eds.), *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 110.

23 Paula E. Hyman, *The Jews of Modern France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 115–135.

24 Edmund Silberner, *Sozialisten zur Judenfrage: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sozialismus vom Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1914* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1962), pp. 23, 57, 99; Léon Poliakov, *Histoire de l'antisémitisme*, vol. 3: *De Voltaire à Wagner* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1968), pp. 351–391.

25 Vincent Duclert, *Die Dreyfus-Affäre: Militärwahn, Republikfeindschaft, Judenhass* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1994); Leslie Derfler, *The Dreyfus Affair* (Westport: Greenwood, 2002); Jean-Denis Bredin, *Dreyfus, un innocent* (Paris: Fayard, 2006); Méhane Mouhou, *Affaire Dreyfus: Conspiration dans la République* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006); George R. Whyte, *The Dreyfus Affair: A Chronological History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Ruth Harris, *The Man on Devil's Island: Alfred Dreyfus and the Affair that Divided France* (London: Penguin Books, 2011); Eric Cahm, *The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

With the start of the First World War, antisemitism receded into the background, along with religious and social differences. The sacred union (*union sacrée*), the wartime consensus that brought together all groups of society, aimed to unite France in the face of an external threat. In the 1920s, migrant labour was very much welcomed because of the high number of casualties during the First World War. With the influx of approximately 70,000 Jewish immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe, the Jewish community in Paris became one of the world's largest, and the number of immigrants soon surpassed the number of native Jews. By the end of the 1920s, France had become the chief destination for emigrating Jews, more important even than the United States.<sup>26</sup> Between 1933 and 1939 an additional 55,000 Jewish refugees came to France from German-controlled territory, with many continuing their flight to destinations overseas.<sup>27</sup> In 1939 around half of the 300,000 Jews living in France were foreign-born; approximately one third of these held French citizenship. A liberal naturalization law passed in August 1927 had allowed around 50,000 Jewish immigrants to be granted citizenship by 1940.<sup>28</sup>

France's policy towards immigrants and refugees became appreciably tougher during the 1930s. Access to the medical and legal professions and to the civil service was made more difficult for immigrants.<sup>29</sup> In 1931 the global economic crisis also reached France. Frequent changes of government, high unemployment, social tensions, and fear that there could be another war radicalized the political parties and threatened the stability of the Third Republic. Xenophobic tendencies intensified, and many French people increasingly viewed the more than 2 million foreigners living in France as unwelcome competitors. Right-wing extremist groups gained new members, especially after the appointment of Léon Blum, who was Jewish, as prime minister in 1936 and the formation of the left-wing Popular Front coalition government.<sup>30</sup>

Although the Popular Front initially attempted to pursue a more humane refugee policy, in 1937 France's borders were closed to non-German Jews from the Reich. This meant that many East European Jews living in Germany were denied entry into France. In addition, from May 1938 illegal immigrants could be sent back to their home countries, while stateless refugees were to be assigned a mandatory place of residence (*résidence assignée*). The shooting on 7 November 1938 in Paris of the German diplomat Ernst vom Rath by Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew living illegally in France, which led to vom Rath's death two days later, was used as a pretext to launch the wave of

26 Esther Benbassa, *The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present*, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Princeton University Press, 2001 [French edn, 1997]), pp. 148–153.

27 Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2.

28 Anne Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte: Les internés juifs des camps français 1939–1944* (Paris: La Découverte, 1999), p. 96; Renée Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II* (Paris: Pluriel, 2005), pp. 7–18.

29 Caron, *Uneasy Asylum*, pp. 3–4; Denis Peschanski, *La France des camps: L'internement 1938–1946* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), pp. 33–34; Vicki Caron, 'Unwilling Refuge: France and the Dilemma of Illegal Immigration, 1933–1939', in Caestecker and Moore, *Refugees from Nazi Germany*, pp. 57–81.

30 Sean Kennedy, *Reconciling France against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français, 1927–1945* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Julian Jackson, *The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934–38* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).



anti-Jewish pogroms in the German Reich on the night of 9/10 November 1938.<sup>31</sup> On 12 November the French government enacted an amendment to the naturalization law of 1927, making it possible to revoke the naturalization of immigrants who were deemed to have proved themselves ‘unworthy’ of French citizenship. In addition, illegal refugees could now be sent to purpose-built internment camps. At first, this measure was primarily targeted at the hundreds of thousands of Spaniards and others who had come to France following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, or who had fought on the Republican side and sought refuge in France following the victory of Franco’s troops. Soon, however, foreign Jews were also interned in the camps if it was not possible to deport them.<sup>32</sup>

After France’s entry into the war, the French government additionally mandated the internment of male citizens of hostile nations between the ages of 17 and 65. Viewed as enemy aliens and a danger to French security, they were detained in the camps at Gurs, Les Milles, or Le Vernet, regardless of whether they were political or Jewish refugees or, alternatively, supporters of the National Socialist regime.<sup>33</sup>

The danger that Jews would face in the event of a military defeat of France was described by Jo Goldenberg, who had arrived in France with his family in 1920:

What would befall us here in France was foreseeable. Those Jewish friends who had fled Nazi Germany strongly advised my father to leave France with the entire family before it was too late. They described the camps in Germany and predicted that others would be set up in France.<sup>34</sup>

## The Context and Development of National Socialist Policies against the Jews, April 1940–June 1942

Between April and June 1940, vast sections of Northern and Western Europe, from the North Cape to the Pyrenees, came under National Socialist control. The organization of German rule in these regions was uncertain at first and varied from one occupied state to the next. The experiences of the First World War had already taught the German

31 Alan E. Steinweis, *Kristallnacht 1938* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 16–35, 41–42.

32 Michael Mayer, *Staaten als Täter: Ministerialbürokratie und ‘Judenpolitik’ in NS-Deutschland und Vichy-Frankreich: Ein Vergleich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010), pp. 25–27.

33 Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), pp. 54–71; Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte*, pp. 34–36; Christian Eggers, *Unerwünschte Ausländer: Juden aus Deutschland und Mitteleuropa in französischen Internierungslagern 1940–1942* (Berlin: Metropol, 2002); Fritz Kieffer, *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002). See also PMJ 2/59.

34 Jo Goldenberg’s recollection of a conversation that took place just after the outbreak of war, between his father and a Jew who had fled Germany. Cited in Myriam Foss and Lucien Steinberg, *Vie et morts des Juifs sous l’Occupation* (Paris: Plon, 1996), p. 25. His father decided against leaving France with his family. He was deported, along with Jo Goldenberg’s mother, sister, and brothers. Goldenberg managed to secure the release of his two brothers from the Gurs and Pithiviers camps, but did not know where his mother, father, and sister had been deported; they never returned.

leadership that in a prolonged war it would be crucial to utilize the economic resources of the occupied territories. Therefore, in addition to military security concerns and the strategic significance of a country – especially in the war against Britain – economic considerations were at the forefront of occupation policies. Nationality and ethnicity also played a role, particularly because plans circulating among the German leadership proposed the future annexation of parts of Western and Northern Europe to the German Reich or their integration into a ‘Greater Germanic Reich’. Other factors, including resistance movements, the attitude of the population towards the occupiers, and, not least, chance, also influenced the course of German policy.

In light of Germany’s expanding sphere of control, the Germans were dependent upon effective cooperation in the occupied countries. The aim was to control these territories by minimizing the use of German military, financial, and human resources, and at the same time by exploiting the occupied country’s own resources to the maximum. However, that approach required a certain willingness to cooperate on the part of both the administration and population of the occupied country. German occupation policy was neither consistent nor systematic, as political and institutional arrangements varied greatly. The Nazi leadership competed in its attempts to establish which of the various forms of occupation was ‘best’ for Germany’s interests. This competition led to a power struggle between officials within the Reich Foreign Office, the Party Chancellery, the Wehrmacht, and the SS. How the success of the occupation policy was to be judged, however, was unclear – military and domestic security, the volume of economic resources that could be channelled into the Reich, and the political attitude of the population towards National Socialism or ‘Germandom’ were all possible criteria.<sup>35</sup>

As a result of the swift military successes during the first year of the war, more than 3 million Jews came under German control, including approximately 500,000 Jews in Western and Northern Europe. Their fate was not yet clear to the German leadership in Berlin. Plans to concentrate the Polish Jews in specific regions had been drawn up and debated since the autumn of 1939. Proposals to resettle all Jews, including German Jews, in the newly established General Government were opposed by Hans Frank, the German head of this administration. In a letter dated 24 June 1940, Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service (SD), informed the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, that ‘*the problem as a whole* – this already involves around 3¼ million Jews in the territories *presently* under German jurisdiction – can no longer be solved *by emigration*’. Rather, he wrote, a ‘territorial final solution’ must now be sought.<sup>36</sup>

35 Hans Umbreit, ‘Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa’, in Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, and Hans Umbreit (eds.), *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 2, pp. 235–327; Hans Umbreit, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Kontinentalherrschaft’, in *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 5/1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), pp. 3–345; Wolfgang Benz, ‘Typologie der Herrschaftsformen in den Gebieten unter deutschem Einfluss’, in Wolfgang Benz, Johannes Houwink ten Cate, and Gerhard Otto (eds.), *Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa* (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), pp. 22–26; Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (New York: Penguin, 2009).

36 Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 24 June 1940, PA AA, R 100857, fol. 192; PMJ 3/89. See also Christopher R. Browning, ‘The Decision concerning the Final Solution’, in *Fateful Months: Essays on Launching the Final Solution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 8–38; Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews* vol. 2, *The Years of Persecution, 1939–1945* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), pp. 30–37; Götz Aly, ‘Final Solution’: *Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of*

With the victory over France, such a territory seemed to have been found: the island of Madagascar, a French colony and now seen as part of the German sphere of influence. Since the end of the nineteenth century, antisemites in several European countries had repeatedly referred to the island when the resettlement of the Jews was under discussion.<sup>37</sup> The plans drawn up for this purpose presupposed that the war against Britain would end in German victory and that the estimated 120 ships that were to carry 1 million Jews per year to the Indian Ocean could actually reach their destination unimpeded. After the autumn of 1940, it seemed unlikely that these conditions would be met in the foreseeable future. The German leaders thus abandoned the Madagascar Plan.

As a result of developments in the war against Britain, new attempts were made to find a 'final solution to the Jewish question', an expression which began to gain currency in late 1940. This solution was to consist in deporting all European Jews to an as yet undetermined territory.<sup>38</sup> In the meantime, both operational staff and the senior staff at the departments and Party offices in Berlin had gradually come to the conclusion that such a deportation – whatever its destination – would lead to a massive decrease in the Jewish population. But as long as this destination was still unclear, the Jews had to be left in their home countries. As far as practicable, they were concentrated in certain cities or regions. In the ghettos set up in Poland, the living conditions soon deteriorated so drastically that there was a sharp increase in the mortality rate among the Jews confined there.

New prospects for deportation emerged in late 1940 and early 1941, during preparations for war against the Soviet Union. After what was expected to be the certain and speedy defeat of the Red Army, the broad expanses of the East would provide, it seemed, the territory to which the European Jews could be deported after the war. The plans had not been fleshed out at this stage, but, nonetheless, other options were now shelved. On 20 May 1941 the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) announced that 'in view of the undoubtedly imminent final solution to the Jewish question, emigration of Jews from France and Belgium is therefore to be prevented'.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, more extensive plans for the German occupation policy in the Soviet Union were formulated during these weeks. These plans reckoned with the death by starvation of a large section of the country's population. This burst of radicalization and brutalization swept aside any legal or moral restraint still prevailing.<sup>40</sup>

After the start of the war against the Soviet Union, the course of Germany's policy in occupied Western and Northern Europe also changed. For one thing, it now seemed a

the European Jews, trans. Alison Brown and Belinda Cooper (London: Arnold, 1999 [German edn, 1998]), pp. 79–80, 113–119; Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews*, trans. Shaun Whiteside (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 [German edn, 1998]), pp. 143–176.

37 Leni Yahil, 'Madagascar: Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question', in George Mosse and Bela Vago (eds.), *Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974); Magnus Brechtken, 'Madagaskar für die Juden': Antisemitische Idee und politische Praxis 1885–1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997); see also PMJ 3, pp. 46–48, and PMJ 3/101.

38 See PMJ 3, p. 56, and PMJ 3/125.

39 Letter from the Reich Security Main Office, 20 May 1941, PMJ 3/182.

40 Economic policy guidelines for Economic Organization East, Agriculture Group, 23 May 1941, Doc. 126-EC, IMT, vol. 36, pp. 135–157, BA-MA, RW 31/144. See Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999), pp. 45–78.

matter of only a few more months until the Jews could be deported from these countries. Therefore, the German authorities began to concentrate a portion of the Jews in camps, so that they could be deported quickly at a later stage. Moreover, the period after June 1941 also saw a distinct increase in resistance to the German occupying force. The communist parties in particular, which had been politically paralysed up until that point because of the alliance between Hitler and Stalin, now took action against the German occupiers. Hence, in France there was a close correlation between the crackdown on the resistance movement and the efforts of the German occupiers to push ahead with the deportation of Jews.

In the meantime, the military setbacks experienced by the Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union at the end of 1941 made it clear that a swift German victory was unlikely. Preparations for deporting the Jews to the Soviet Union thus came to a standstill. The German leaders responsible for the deportation were still unclear where the Jews should go. At the same time, however, the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD at the rear of the Eastern Front had already begun to murder the local Jewish population. By March 1942 the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen SS, police, Wehrmacht, and other units had murdered more than 800,000 Jews in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup>

In this situation, during the autumn of 1941 the course of action to be taken by the German leadership assumed a more concrete form. First, the leaders no longer wanted to wait until the end of the war to deport the European Jews; rather, they planned to begin the deportations as soon as possible. Second, the European Jews were now to be deported to Poland after all. Third, only those Jews who were considered fit for work were to be left in Poland; all the others were to be killed, as was already happening in parts of the Soviet Union. This plan, the result of decision making that had already advanced to this point by December 1941, was presented in detail by Heydrich and Adolf Eichmann to representatives of the authorities and departments concerned at the so-called Wannsee Conference on 20 January 1942. The participants at this meeting were informed about the practical implementation of the deportations, the scheduled timetable, and the sequence of deportations from individual countries. In the process, Heydrich emphasized that the long-standing strategy of forcing the Jews to emigrate had now been halted 'due to the dangers of an emigration in wartime and due to the possibilities of the East'. A corresponding directive for Western Europe had already been forwarded to the German occupation authorities on 23 October 1941 (Doc. 286). Now, Heydrich continued, the Führer had authorized the process of 'evacuating Jews to the East', with a distinction to be made between smaller anticipatory steps and the 'final solution', which would involve 11 million Jews in total, from every part of Europe.<sup>42</sup>

41 See the introduction to PMJ 7.

42 Invitation and minutes for the Wannsee Conference, published in Kurt Pätzold and Erika Schwarz (eds.), *Tagesordnung: Judenmord: Die Wannsee-Konferenz am 20. Januar 1942: Eine Dokumentation zur Organisation der 'Endlösung'* (Berlin: Metropol, 1992), pp. 100–112; Mark Roseman, *The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution* (London: Penguin, 2002), pp. 56–79, 108–118; Elke Gryglewski, Hans-Christian Rasch, and David Zolldan (eds.), *The Meeting at Wannsee and the Murder of the European Jews: Exhibition Catalogue*, trans. Caroline Pearce (Berlin: House of the Wannsee Conference, 2020 [German edn, 2020]). On the Wannsee Conference, see also Peter Klein, *Die 'Wannsee-Konferenz' am 20. Januar 1942: Eine Einführung* (Berlin: Metropol, 2017), and Hans-Christian Jasch and Christoph Kreutzmüller (eds.), *Die Teilnehmer: Die Männer*

In the weeks following the Wannsee Conference, systematic preparations began for the deportation of the Jews from Western Europe to the extermination camps. On 4 March 1942 the officials in charge of Jewish affairs in these countries, under the direction of Eichmann, coordinated the further course of action and agreed that the first transport should leave France on 23 March 1942, with Auschwitz as its destination.<sup>43</sup> The technical preparations for the deportation of Jews from France were completed in late March. The first transport, which in fact departed on 27 March 1942, deported 1,112 foreign and stateless Jews from the Drancy and Compiègne camps to Auschwitz (Doc. 318). The deportees were among those who had been arrested back in December 1941. At a further meeting with Eichmann at the RSHA on 11 June 1942, the representatives of the Security Police and the SD in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands decided to speed up the deportation of the Jews from Western Europe. In the following months, 15,000 Jews were to be deported to the East from the Netherlands, 10,000 from Belgium, and a total of 100,000 from France.<sup>44</sup> A few days later these figures were revised again: now, 40,000 Jews were to be deported from France, an equal number from the Netherlands, and 10,000 from Belgium.<sup>45</sup>

## Anti-Jewish Measures in Western and Northern Europe, 1940–1942

From the point of view of the National Socialist regime, the territories of Western and Northern Europe were more ‘civilized’ than Eastern Europe. These were not viewed as a future German Lebensraum and were therefore not included in resettlement or colonization plans. Political and military considerations dictated the nature of the occupation or collaborationist regimes established in these countries, which were left with considerable room for manoeuvre. The National Socialists regarded some of the local populations of these countries as ‘Nordic’ or ‘Germanic’, with potential for integration into a Greater Germanic community; more generally, they saw the peoples of Western and Northern Europe as prospective allies in a new European and world order, from which the Jews would be excluded.

In the countries of Western and Northern Europe – Denmark excepted – the persecution of the Jews began shortly after the occupation by German troops, though it did not proceed with the same speed or intensity in every country until the deportations started in the summer of 1942. The reasons for this lay, on the one hand, in the differently

der Wannsee Konferenz (Berlin: Metropol, 2017). The number of 11 million Jews was incorrect, having resulted from miscalculations: see Dan Michman, ‘Were the Jews of North Africa included in the practical planning for the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question”?’ in Alex J. Kay and David Stahel (eds.), *Mass Violence in Nazi-Occupied Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), pp. 59–78.

<sup>43</sup> Notes by Zeitschel, 11 March 1942, Mémorial de la Shoah, XXVb-10, published in Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz: Die ‘Endlösung’ der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, trans. Ahlrich Meyer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007 [French edn, 2001]), pp. 402–403.

<sup>44</sup> Notes by Dannecker, 15 June 1942, IMT, RF-1217; *ibid.*, pp. 410–411. See also Doc. 145.

<sup>45</sup> See the letter from Eichmann to Rademacher, dated 22 June 1942, in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, series E: 1941–1945, vol. 3: 16. Juni bis 30. September 1942 (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1974), no. 26.

structured occupation regimes that had been installed by the Germans. Wherever the institutions of the RSHA, the Security Police, and the SD had established themselves with their own officials in charge of Jewish affairs, measures against the Jews were generally implemented more swiftly. On the other hand, the development of antisemitic persecution also depended crucially on how closely the local authorities cooperated with the Germans, the level of antisemitism, and, above all, the level of support within the ministries and administration, as well as the population's reaction to anti-Jewish policies.

Despite the differences, the persecution of the Jews in occupied Western Europe comprised many of the measures that had been introduced in Germany after 1933 and some that had been implemented in Poland in 1939 and 1940. In a first phase, the official census and registration of the Jews were followed successively by numerous forms of legislative discrimination and official harassment intended to isolate the Jews from the local population of the occupied country. These included the prohibition of kosher slaughter, the removal of Jews from the state and local bureaucracy and from public positions, the exclusion of Jews from state education and the establishment of a segregated Jewish education system, and the creation of compulsory organizations for Jews under the supervision of the German or local authorities.<sup>46</sup> In a second phase, the Jews suffered increased economic persecution, their property and assets were expropriated, and from 1942 male Jews in particular were recruited as forced labour. Preparations for the deportations from Western Europe began with the ban on emigration from the German sphere of control in October 1941, at a time when the first transports were already leaving the Reich and Luxembourg, mainly headed towards Poland, but also to destinations in the occupied Soviet territories. Preparations accelerated in the spring of 1942, shortly after the Wannsee Conference. These included restrictions on places of residence and freedom of movement, curtailed shopping hours, and finally the labelling of identity documents and the requirement for the Jews themselves to wear visible identification.

### Denmark

Denmark occupied a special status in comparison with all the other German-occupied countries in Europe.<sup>47</sup> Following the German invasion in April 1940, the German government emphasized that it harboured no hostile intentions towards Denmark, but rather sought close cooperation with the Danish government. The Danish constitution remained in force; the king, the government, and the administration remained in office. The German envoy, Cécil von Renthe-Fink, represented German interests. The German military authorities held no executive authority; rather, their task was limited to safeguarding militarily this strategically important country. This resulted in a unique situ-

46 Dan Michman, 'Re-evaluating the Emergence, Function and Form of the Jewish Councils Phenomenon', in Christopher R. Browning et al., *Ghettos, 1939–1945: New Research and Perspectives on Definition, Daily Life, and Survival* (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005), pp. 67–84.

47 Jørgen Hæstrup et al., *Besættelsen 1940–1945: Politik, modstand, befrielse* (Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1979); Hans Kirchhoff, *Kamp eller tilpasning: Politikerne og modstanden 1940–45* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1987); Robert Bohn (ed.), *Die deutsche Herrschaft in den 'germanischen' Ländern, 1940–1945* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997); Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903–1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 2001).

ation with respect to international law, in that diplomatic relations existed between the Reich and a country occupied by its troops and were managed by the Reich Foreign Office. German instructions were conveyed to the Danish government through the envoy in Copenhagen, and their implementation was supervised by the same envoy.

The Danish side reacted to the German approach with a mixture of compliance and distance. Initially, this ‘cooperation policy’ proceeded without major conflicts and the Jewish population lived largely undisturbed by the German occupation forces. The marginalization and persecution of the approximately 7,000 Jews in Denmark were not a priority for the German leadership in the first three years, as adopting such a line of action would have jeopardized the willingness of the Danish leaders to cooperate. Discriminatory measures to exclude Jews from society and from economic and professional life – as implemented in the other German-occupied countries – were not introduced. For these reasons, the persecution of the Jews began considerably later in Denmark than in the other countries of Western and Northern Europe. It took hold only in the autumn of 1943, after cooperation with the Danish administration had broken down because of increasing Danish resistance to the German occupiers.<sup>48</sup>

### Norway

In Norway the Reich Commissariat for the Occupied Norwegian Territories was set up, a German administration requiring considerably more personnel than that in Denmark. In April 1940 Hitler appointed the Gauleiter of Essen, Josef Terboven, as Reich commissioner. After the flight of the Norwegian government and the king, Terboven alone held full governmental power and oversaw the central authorities in the country. After a breakdown in cooperation with the Administrative Council, which consisted of senior Norwegian civil servants, from 25 September 1940 onwards Norwegian acting state councillors took over the running of the individual ministries under the supervision of the Reich commissioner. This phase lasted until 1 February 1942, when Terboven announced the appointment of Vidkun Quisling as prime minister. Quisling’s efforts to head a Norwegian collaborationist government were initially unsuccessful. Quisling, a former Norwegian minister of war, was the leader (*fører*) of the fascist Nasjonal Samling party. Through its idealization of the age of the Vikings and the spirit of the Teutons, it fostered a corporatist, anti-Marxist, and *völkisch*-racist world view and was organized in accordance with the Führer principle.<sup>49</sup> Although in 1940 Nasjonal Samling had no appreciable backing from the Norwegian populace, following the prohibition of all other parties that September it was proclaimed to be the party that represented the interests of the state and pursued the cause of ‘national revolution’ in Norway.<sup>50</sup> The RSHA was

<sup>48</sup> The persecution of the Jews in Denmark under German occupation is dealt with in volume 12 of this series.

<sup>49</sup> Autocratic method of governmental organization whereby all power – legislative, executive, and judicial – is concentrated in the hands of the leader and extended downward through each level of the hierarchy.

<sup>50</sup> Hans-Dieter Looch, *Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven: Zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Revolution in Norwegen* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1970); Paul M. Hayes, *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887–1945* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1971); Oddvar K. Høidal, *Quisling: A Study in Treason* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1989); Hans

represented in Norway by a senior commander of the Security Police and the SD. Heinrich Fehlis assumed this role in the autumn of 1940. The head of Section IV B 4 (Jewish affairs) was Wilhelm Wagner. The State Police (Statspoliti) was established on 1 July 1941 under the leadership of Jonas Lie, the head of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police. Formed to enable close collaboration with the German Security Police, it was modelled on the latter and bound by its instructions. Almost all members of the State Police were also in Nasjonal Samling.<sup>51</sup>

In June 1940 Ruth Maier, a young Jewish woman who had fled Vienna for Norway, commented on the Wehrmacht's occupation of Western and Northern Europe: 'I'm very pessimistic. Unless America joins [the war], Germany will win and then ... Oh, I fear the day when we will read: German-English peace treaty signed.'<sup>52</sup> An increasingly aggressive anti-Jewish propaganda campaign in the Norwegian press framed the 'Jewish question' as also being a Norwegian problem. However, fears that the German occupiers might clamp down on the Jewish population in Norway as rigidly as in Poland were not confirmed. Overall, in comparison to the occupied countries of Western Europe, Norway saw fewer systematic efforts by the German authorities to persecute the Jews during the first two years of the occupation. The Reich Commissariat initially contented itself with acquiring an overview of the exact number of Jews residing in the country and their assets (Doc. 9). The first anti-Jewish measure taken by the German authorities was the confiscation of radio sets belonging to Jews, carried out in May 1940. Between autumn 1940 and June 1941 there were only sporadic arrests of Jews, although Jews were repeatedly assaulted by members of the paramilitary organization Hird.<sup>53</sup> Even as late as January 1942 the Reich Commissariat stated that it had no intention of undertaking 'any radical official measures' in order to 'resolve the Jewish question'. It would, however, ensure 'that the Jews are eliminated from the civil service'.<sup>54</sup>

Nonetheless, the Norwegian acting state councillors appointed in the autumn of 1940 did introduce anti-Jewish measures in line with those in Germany. Jewish lawyers and physicians were no longer permitted to practise their professions, and the 'racial' ancestry of employees in the public administration was investigated. Music by Jewish composers could no longer be performed; books by Jews or by opponents of the new system were banned; the landholdings of Jews were to be systematically registered.<sup>55</sup>

Fredrik Dahl, *Quisling: A Study in Treachery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Robert Bohn, *Reichskommissariat Norwegen: 'Nationalsozialistische Neuordnung' und Kriegswirtschaft* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000).

51 Nils Johan Ringdal, *Mellom barken og veden: Politiet under okkupasjonen* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1987); Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Beatrice Sandberg, and Volker Dahm (eds.), *Meldungen aus Norwegen 1940–1945: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Norwegen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. xi–xxii.

52 Diary entry by Ruth Maier, dated 14 June 1940, in 'Das Leben könnte gut sein': *Tagebücher 1933 bis 1942*, ed. Jan Erik Vold (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), p. 316.

53 Oskar Mendelsohn, 'Norwegen', in Wolfgang Benz, *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), pp. 187–197.

54 Memorandum by Rudolf Schiedermaier regarding the meeting of the Main Department for Administration with the department heads on 9 Jan. 1942, in NRA, Reichskommissariat 1940–1945, Serie Eca Allgem. Abt., box L0007 D, p. 2.

55 Oskar Mendelsohn, *Jødenes historie i Norge gjennom 300 år*, vol. 2: 1940–1985 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987), pp. 15–25.



In April 1941 the synagogue in Trondheim was expropriated, vandalized, and turned into quarters for German troops. In addition, the police requisitioned the homes of Jews. In a conversation with a local pastor, one of the Jews affected said, 'We will gladly endure the suffering that other Norwegians have to endure in these times, but we are outraged at being treated in a special way. We are, after all, also law-abiding Norwegian citizens who pay their taxes' (Doc. 8). Beginning in October 1941 Gerhard Flesch, the commander of the Security Police in Trondheim, took action against the Jewish population on his own initiative. By the summer of 1942 Flesch, in cooperation with local members of Nasjonal Samling, had instigated the expropriation of Jewish businesses, and some of the Jewish owners were imprisoned in Falstad camp near Trondheim (Doc. 16).

The first discriminatory measures concerning Jews in Norway evoked a rather muted response from the public. Nonetheless, there were many instances of support for Jews from non-Jewish circles, from both private individuals and the organized resistance. A number of pastors stood up for Jews (Doc. 8), although the Protestant Church of Norway did not speak out against the treatment of the Jews until 1942. In a pastoral letter from the Norwegian bishops, published in February 1941, the Church expressed opposition to Nasjonal Samling and the Nazification of Norwegian society, but failed to mention the antisemitic measures. The bishop of Oslo and primate of the Church of Norway, Eivind Berggrav, did, however, repeatedly protest behind the scenes against the unequal treatment of Jews, with reference to Christian doctrine (Doc. 13).<sup>56</sup> For example, Berggrav rejected the proposal by the Norwegian minister of church and education that marriages between Norwegians and Jews or Sami (Laplanders) be prohibited: 'Our people are steeped in this Christian and humane outlook and the Church thus speaks in the name of the Norwegian people when it objects to the proposal to forbid marriages to Jews' (Doc. 13). The Church's protest against the Norwegian collaborationist government culminated in a statement that was read aloud on Easter Sunday 1942 (5 April) in almost every church in Norway. The statement not only opposed Nasjonal Samling's efforts to subject the Church to its influence, but also dared to voice sharp condemnation of National Socialism.<sup>57</sup>

Even before and increasingly after the occupation of Norway by German troops, many Norwegian Jews and Jewish exiles fled to Sweden. Some soon returned to Norway, hoping that the German occupation would pose no threat to them and that no further action would be taken against the small Jewish segment of the population. Before the end of the war approximately 1,100 Jews had managed to escape to neighbouring Sweden, often with the assistance of the Norwegian resistance movement.<sup>58</sup> Initially, however, Sweden had pursued a restrictive refugee policy towards Jews. While persons subject to political persecution were granted entry, Sweden sent Jewish refugees back

<sup>56</sup> Arne Hassing, 'The Churches of Norway and the Jews', *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 496–522.

<sup>57</sup> As a result, 93 per cent of the pastors resigned from their church offices. See Hassing, 'Churches of Norway and the Jews', p. 509.

<sup>58</sup> Ragnar Ulstein, *Jødar på flukt* (Oslo: Samlaget, 1995); Bjarte Bruland and Mats Tangestuen, 'The Norwegian Holocaust: Changing Views and Representations', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol. 5 (2011), pp. 587–604, here p. 594.

across the border (Doc. 17). Some of them were later arrested and deported to Auschwitz. Only with evidence of the deportations from Norway in the autumn of 1942 did Sweden offer asylum to all persecuted Jews.<sup>59</sup>

Two days after the invasion of the Soviet Union (22 June 1941), the German authorities in Norway had instructed the Norwegian State Police to carry out the first targeted arrests of Jews (Doc. 10), whereupon almost all male Jews in the northern part of the country were detained. Some were released again after two to three weeks, but others were later transferred to the Norwegian-run camp at Grini, near Oslo, where they remained until the autumn of 1942, when they were deported to Auschwitz. In the southern part of the country, stateless male Jews were interned shortly after the first wave of arrests.

On 10 October 1941 the Higher SS and Police Leader North, Friedrich Wilhelm Rediess, instructed the Norwegian State Police to prepare for the stamping of Jews' identity documents. A corresponding decree was issued on 10 January 1942 (Doc. 20), and on 22 January 1942 it was announced in the daily press. After receiving the order to have their identity documents stamped, the Jews were required to report to local police stations in February to fill out detailed questionnaires regarding their ancestry, family, and occupation (Doc. 21). This directive was issued on the initiative of the Norwegian Security Police. Not least with the aid of these registrations, Nasjonal Samling's Office for Statistics was able to compile a list of the Jews. From the autumn of 1942, this list served as the basis for arrests and deportations. By that time, approximately 1,400 Jews had been registered in this way.<sup>60</sup>

After Quisling had been appointed prime minister, his Nasjonal Samling government – on the initiative of the Germans – reinstated Article Two of the Norwegian constitution as a token of the government's anti-Jewish policy. Article Two, which had been revoked in 1851, forbade Jews to enter Norway (Doc. 23). The law had no direct effect, admittedly, because at the time it was issued scarcely any Jews had been able to enter Norway or had even attempted to do so. However, the decree and its strident promotion in the press acted as a portent of the subsequent deportations from Norway.<sup>61</sup>

Because there were so few Jews in Norway, they were exempted from the deportations for the time being. At the Wannsee Conference the representative of the Reich Foreign Office, Undersecretary Martin Luther, had pointed out 'that in some countries, such as the Nordic states, difficulties will arise if this problem is dealt with thoroughly,

59 Leo Eitinger, 'Als Arzt in Norwegen von 1939–1942, in Auschwitz von 1943 an', autobiographical eyewitness report dated 1959, YIVO RG 1565, box 1, p. 7; Christhard Hoffmann, 'Fluchthilfe als Widerstand: Verfolgung und Rettung der Juden in Norwegen', in Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit, Regionalstudien*, vol. 1: *Polen, Rumänien, Griechenland, Luxemburg, Norwegen, Schweiz* (Berlin: Metropol, 1996), pp. 205–232; Paul A. Levine, *From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–1944* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Library, 1996); Esben Söbye, *Kathe: Deportiert aus Norwegen* (Berlin: Assoziation A, 2008), p. 73; Pontus Rudberg, *The Swedish Jews and the Victims of Nazi Terror, 1933–1945* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2015); Pontus Rudberg, *The Swedish Jews and the Holocaust* (Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis, 2017).

60 Söbye, *Kathe*, pp. 80–83.

61 Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response to the Holocaust*, pp. 73–74.

and [...] it is therefore advisable to defer action in these countries'.<sup>62</sup> However, the news of mass murders of Jews in the East spread quickly here too (Doc. 19). Until early 1942 the Jews in Norway continued to live relatively undisturbed, yet the fear of further persecution dominated everyday life. By requiring Jews to register and to have their identity documents stamped, and by making the first arrests of Jews, the Reich Commissariat and the Security Police, with the assistance of the Norwegian institutions, had created conditions that paved the way for the extensive arrests and deportations of Jews from Norway, which began in October 1942. On 26 November 1942 the first main transport left Oslo by ship, bound for Stettin, and arrived at Auschwitz on 1 December 1942.

### *The Netherlands*

Anti-Jewish policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France shared common features, but because of the different occupation regimes in the three countries, the pace and intensity of persecution varied during the period up to summer 1942. Some of these differences, as well as the very diverse composition of the Jewish communities, also meant that even in the years after 1942 the fate of the Jews unfolded in various ways.<sup>63</sup>

In the Netherlands the flight of the queen and the government to London and the occupation of the country evoked consternation. 'Now we feel we have no leadership, like sheep without a shepherd,' Dordrecht lawyer Jaap Burger noted in his diary.<sup>64</sup> Only later during the occupation period did commitment and loyalty to the House of Orange become an important feature of Dutch national identity. The relatively restrained behaviour of the German soldiers in public made it easier for many Dutch people to adjust to the new situation and return to their usual daily routines.<sup>65</sup>

The Jewish population reacted ambivalently. Many Jews, particularly Dutch Jews, could not imagine that the Germans would take action against the Jews in the Netherlands. As Edith van Hessen, a 15-year-old Jewish girl, noted in her diary on 19 May 1940: 'It could all be worse. The past five days seem like a bad dream. Now everything is business as usual.'<sup>66</sup> Dutch Jews who had followed the fate of German Jews in the previous years, as well as Jewish refugees from Germany who had already experienced the Nazi regime, feared immediate arrest and incarceration in concentration camps or, at the very least, the deprivation of rights and persecution as had been the case in Germany since 1933.<sup>67</sup> Many tried to flee at the last minute, but only a few, among them

62 Roseman, *Villa, the Lake, the Meeting*, p. 114; Pätzold and Schwarz, *Tagesordnung*, pp. 102–112, here p. 108.

63 For a comparison of these three countries, see Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, *Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België 1940–1945: Overeenkomsten, verschillen, oorzaken* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), pp. 999–1011.

64 Jaap Burger, *Oorlogsdagboek* (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1995), entry dated 17 May 1940, p. 61. Burger later himself fled to England and held a ministerial position in the queen's cabinet in exile.

65 Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation, 1940–1945* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1988) pp. 15–17; L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, 12 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969–1986), in particular vol. 3: *Mei 1940* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).

66 Edith Velmans-van Hessen, *Ich wollte immer glücklich sein: Das Schicksal eines jüdischen Mädchens im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 1999), p. 42.

67 De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 3: *Mei 1940*, p. 103.

seventy-five German-Jewish refugee children, succeeded in escaping, aboard a ship that left for Britain from the port of IJmuiden (Doc. 28). Fear of the German occupation drove more than 100 German and Dutch Jews to take their own lives in the first few days after the German invasion (Doc. 30).<sup>68</sup>

Two weeks after the military victory over the Netherlands, Hitler installed a civil administration and appointed the Austrian National Socialist Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who had previously been instrumental in the Anschluss of Austria (March 1938) and afterwards as Hans Frank's deputy in the General Government (October 1939–May 1940), to serve as Reich commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories.<sup>69</sup> He had the support of four commissioners general, who were placed in charge of the various Dutch ministries, as well as thirteen representatives (*Beauftragte*) for the provinces and the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The four commissioners general were the Austrians Hanns Albin Rauter, Friedrich Wimmer, and Hans Fischböck and the German Fritz Schmidt. While they were all involved in shaping aspects of anti-Jewish policy, as commissioner general for security Rauter was directly responsible for its planning and implementation. He also held the post of Higher SS and Police Leader North-West in the Netherlands. Until September 1943 the senior commander of the Security Police was Wilhelm Harster. In August 1941 a special office for Jewish affairs, Sonderreferat J, headed by Erich Rajakowitsch, was established in The Hague. In February 1942 it was replaced by Section IV B 4 of the Security Police, headed by Wilhelm Zoepf. The section was in continuous contact with Section IV B 4 of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin, which was run by Eichmann. The Amsterdam branch of the Security Police, headed first by Carl Ditges and then by Willy Lages, was of particular significance because most Jews traditionally lived in Amsterdam, and thus most anti-Jewish measures were first carried out there. In addition, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration was established in Amsterdam on 31 March 1941. It had the task of coordinating the persecution of the Jews along the same lines as the Central Offices in Vienna, Prague, and Berlin. In the Netherlands, however, a number of other institutions continued to participate in the planning and execution of anti-Jewish measures. Also involved were the representatives of the provinces and the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, who acted independently of the senior commander of the Security Police and reported directly to Seyss-Inquart. In particular, the representative for Amsterdam, Hans Böhmcker, was responsible for many municipal orders pertaining to the Jews.<sup>70</sup>

68 While Jacques Presser refers to 150 Jewish suicides, Hirschfeld cites a number of around 100. See Jacques Presser, *Ondergang: De vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom 1940–1945* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), p. 14 (abridged English-language edition: *Ashes in the Wind: The Destruction of Dutch Jewry*, trans. Arnold Pomerans [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988]), and Gerhard Hirschfeld, 'Niederlande', in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991), pp. 137–165, here p. 139. See also Wout Ultee, Ruud Luijkx and Frank van Tubergen, 'The Unwholesome Theme of Suicide: Forgotten Statistics of Attempted Suicides in Amsterdam and Jewish Suicides in the Netherlands for 1936–1943', in Chaya Brasz and Yosef Kaplan (eds.), *Dutch Jews as Perceived by Themselves and by Others* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 325–354.

69 Johannes Koll, *Arthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in den Niederlanden (1940–1945)* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015).

70 Nanno in't Veld, *De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976); Jozeph Michman, 'Planning for the Final Solution against the Background of Developments in

After capitulation the senior civil servants – known as the secretaries general – in each of the Dutch ministries had remained in the Netherlands, and the cabinet had entrusted them with continuing to run the country's affairs. They assured the German occupiers of their loyal cooperation as long as they were not forced into action that contravened the Dutch constitution. In so doing they created a model for cooperation that was adopted by many Dutch organizations and institutions in the years that followed. The secretaries general and other civil servants voiced very little criticism even as the German occupiers introduced increasingly extensive measures and had long ceased to comply with the Dutch constitution. Some of the secretaries general who were in office at the onset of the occupation period had resigned or been dismissed by mid 1941. The vacant posts were generally filled by Dutch National Socialists. For example, Meinoud M. Rost van Tonningen, one of the most influential leaders of the NSB, took the position of secretary general in the Ministry of Finance in March 1941. As a result, the influence of National Socialist representatives increased at the most senior level of the Dutch administration. The NSB wanted the Netherlands to be incorporated into the new Nazi Europe to an extent that would allow it to retain a certain independence and to preserve Dutch characteristics, while the Germans sought the complete incorporation of the Netherlands and the assimilation of its population into a 'Greater Germanic Reich'. Despite a certain amount of friction between the German occupiers and the Dutch secretaries general, the number of protests against German measures in fact decreased as time went on and related only to isolated cases. Much the same was true for local administration. Up until the end of the occupation period, Dutch National Socialists accounted for around half of all Dutch mayors. These officials implemented the orders of the German occupiers at the local level.<sup>71</sup>

The German occupation authorities were initially guided by a directive issued by the military leadership in February 1940, which stated that the so-called race question was not to be tackled, as doing so might stoke fear among the population of an annexation. According to the directive, the mere fact that someone was a Jew provided no grounds for special measures against that person.<sup>72</sup> In this respect, the commissioner general for administration and justice, Friedrich Wimmer, had assured the Netherlands that the 'German authorities believe there is no Jewish problem'.<sup>73</sup> This assurance and the fact that the Germans had not imposed any restrictions on the Jews immediately after the invasion prompted a sense of security in many Dutch Jews. In contrast to Germany, the

Holland in 1941', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 17 (1986), pp. 145–180; Guus Meershoek, *Dienaren van het gezag: De Amsterdams politie tijdens de bezetting* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1999), pp. 124–131; Anna Hájková, 'The Making of a Zentralstelle: Die Eichmann-Männer in Amsterdam', *Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente*, vol. 10 (2003), pp. 353–381.

71 Peter Romijn, *Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd: Besturen onder Duitse bezetting* (Amsterdam: Uitg Balans, 2006), pp. 20–25; Nico Wouters, *Mayoral Collaboration under Nazi Occupation in Belgium, the Netherlands and France, 1938–46* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 96.

72 Directive from the senior general staff officer of the 6th Army, dated 22 Feb. 1940, regulations of the 6th Army/OQu/Qu 2 (signed Pamberg, Oberquartiermeister) for 'Administration and Pacification of the Occupied Areas of Holland and Belgium', NOKW-1515. Cited in Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, vol. 2 (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 636. See also Werner Warmbrunn, *The German Occupation of Belgium, 1940–1944* (New York: Lang, 1993), p. 150.

73 Hirschfeld, 'Niederlande', p. 139.

occupation appeared to have no major adverse effects on everyday life in the Netherlands, and most people saw themselves obliged, as Dutch citizens, to return to their work and not to abandon their country at this difficult time.<sup>74</sup>

In reality, however, the period of relative calm for the Jews in the Netherlands had already come to an end by August 1940. First, Jews were excluded from the Air Raid Protection Service (Doc. 35). In August the introduction of a regulation on the 'prevention of animal torture', which was targeted at kosher slaughter, began to have a significant impact on Jewish life.<sup>75</sup> The Dutch chief rabbis managed to find a solution to the problem through cooperation with the well-known company Philips, which developed an electronic stunning device that conformed to Jewish religious law.<sup>76</sup> At the end of August, Commissioner General Wimmer instructed the Dutch secretaries general that Jewish civil servants should no longer be appointed or promoted. The secretaries general implemented this instruction, though under protest. On 5 October, Wimmer went one step further and ordered that all Jewish civil servants should be dismissed. For this purpose, every civil servant had to sign a so-called Aryan Declaration, which was disseminated in a circular letter in mid October and had to be returned by 26 October. The data gathered in this way was used as the basis for the dismissal of all Jews and *Mischlinge* from the civil service. The dismissal directive, which gave an implementation deadline of 1 March 1941, was made public on 21 November 1940 and affected 2,535 people. Wimmer had ordered the measure two and a half weeks earlier in a letter to the secretaries general.<sup>77</sup> Almost all civil servants complied and completed the declaration, including the eleven queen's commissioners (in charge of the provinces) and all 912 mayors. Only ten civil servants in the entire state and local bureaucracy and the state education system refused, and lost their jobs as a result. The president of the Supreme Court, Lodewijk Ernst Visser, was dismissed on the order of the German authorities. The Supreme Court itself decided, with twelve members voting in favour and five against, to approve the Aryan Declaration, which violated the Dutch constitution, thus assenting to the dismissal of their colleague, Visser.<sup>78</sup> The secretaries general subsequently declared that while they opposed such a course of action, they would nonetheless implement it as it was merely a 'temporary measure' (Doc. 46).

The secretaries general subsequently raised no objection when, on 22 October 1940, compulsory registration was introduced for Jewish businesses and a first definition of

74 On the history of the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, see Presser, *Ashes in the Wind*; Bob Moore, *Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940–1945* (London: Arnold, 1997); Peter Romijn, 'The War, 1940–1945', in J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuks Mansfeld, and I. Schöffer (eds.), *The History of the Jews in the Netherlands* (Oxford: Littmann Library of Jewish Civilization, 2002), pp. 296–335; Happe, *Viele falsche Hoffnungen*.

75 Verordnung des Reichskommissars für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete zur Vermeidung von Tierquälerei beim Viehschlachten, 31 July 1940, *VOBl-NL*, 80, 1940, 3 August 1940.

76 Dan Michman, 'Problems of Religious Life in the Netherlands during the Holocaust', in Jozeph Michman (ed.), *Dutch Jewish History I* (Jerusalem: Institute for Research on Dutch Jewry, 1984), pp. 382–386.

77 De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 3/2: *Mei '40–maart '41*, pp. 780–781.

78 Corjo Jansen (in cooperation with Derk Venema), *De Hoge Raad en de Tweede Wereldoorlog: Recht- en rechtsbeoefening in de jaren 1930–1950* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), pp. 155; de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 4/2: *Mei '40–maart '41*, pp. 821–822.

the term 'Jew' was decreed – nor did they protest against the order for the registration of all Jews that was issued on 10 January 1941. Previous censuses (the most recent having been carried out in 1930) and municipal registers provided a substantial amount of information on the Jews, but the German authorities wanted more precise and racial data. Still not expecting the worst, most Jews registered. Some hesitated, as did the Jewish journalist Jo Alexander Polak, who wrote in his diary: 'The Jews have to register soon, but I will take the liberty of waiting until the end to do so. One never knows whether it will still be required then.'<sup>79</sup> This registration at the beginning of 1941, which was considered by the Germans to be the most thorough census of Jews carried out anywhere in Nazi-controlled Europe,<sup>80</sup> provided the German occupation authorities with up-to-date information which served as a basis for their next steps against the Jews: at the time, there were 140,245 'full Jews' (*Volljuden*) living in the Netherlands, of whom 118,455 were Dutch citizens, 14,493 were German citizens, and 7,297 were from other countries or stateless. In addition, according to National Socialist categories for defining racial descent, in the Netherlands there were also 14,549 'half-Jews' and 5,719 'quarter-Jews' (Docs. 54, 90).<sup>81</sup>

The tightening of the antisemitic measures met with incomprehension and protest from many Dutch people. In particular, a number of representatives of the Christian churches espoused the cause of the Jews. They protested against the dismissal of Jewish civil servants and lent their support above all to the members of their churches who had converted to the Christian faith but were classified as Jews according to National Socialist criteria (Doc. 43).<sup>82</sup> The protest by the churches reflected a fundamental Christian conviction held by the populace, one that is expressed in many diaries and written sources (Docs. 52, 91, 119). In addition to some professors – for example, the jurist Rudolph Cleveringa gave a prominent speech on 26 November 1940 and was arrested shortly thereafter as a result<sup>83</sup> – numerous students also protested against the suspension of their Jewish professors and the barriers to admission for Jewish students. However, after the authorities closed the University of Leiden because of the continuing protests, willingness to take part in further initiatives at other universities declined sharply. Illegal newspapers reported time and again on anti-Jewish measures and appealed for support (Doc. 59). *Het Parool*, one of the largest and best-known illegal newspapers, emphasized: 'In fact, this is not only about the Jews, but about our entire people.'<sup>84</sup> However, the majority of the population generally adopted a passive wait-and-see approach, not only

<sup>79</sup> Jo Alexander Polak, diary entry for 10 Feb. 1940, NIOD 244/1131, p. 66.

<sup>80</sup> This was the view expressed in a letter from the planned Nazi Party Advanced School (Hohe Schule) to the Department of Administration and Justice in the Reich Commissariat, 23 September 1942. See de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5/1, *Maart '41–juli '42*, p. 533.

<sup>81</sup> The official results, published in 1942 by the Dutch Central Office for Statistics, differed slightly, recording a total of 140,001 full Jews, of whom 117,999 had Dutch nationality, 14,381 had German nationality, and 7,621 had a different nationality or were stateless. See *Statistiek der bevolking van joodschen bloede in Nederland* (The Hague: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1942), p. 18.

<sup>82</sup> See, for example, Martin Bachmann, *Geliebtes Volk Israel – fremde Juden: Die Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk und die 'Judenfrage', 1933–1945* (Münster: Lit, 1997).

<sup>83</sup> See J. C. H. Jansen and D. Venema, 'De 26-november rede van prof. mr. R.P. Cleveringa: Wat eraan voorafging en wat volgde', *Nederlandsch Juristenblad* (2006), pp. 984–992.

<sup>84</sup> *Het Parool* (Nieuwsbrief van Pieter 't Hoen), 30 Nov. 1940, p. 2.

with respect to the Jews. Most Dutch people did not consider the anti-Jewish measures to be of major significance during the first two years of the occupation. One of the expressions of the accommodating tendency was the establishment of the collaborationist Nederlandsche Unie (Netherlands Union) on 24 July 1940, shortly after the occupation; it was dissolved by the German authorities in December 1941. Although it did accept Jews as members, this movement did not actively oppose German anti-Jewish policies.<sup>85</sup> Until well into 1942 there was no organized resistance movement in the Netherlands that had substantial backing from the population. Only thereafter did various resistance groups slowly begin to develop. Jewish resistance to persecution during the first two years was essentially channelled into organizational, cultural, and educational activities, in order to strengthen cohesion within the community, to nurture a positive Jewish spirit, and to struggle for the rights of Jews as Dutch citizens. This approach was reflected in the founding of the Jewish Coordination Committee (JCC) at the end of 1940 as an organization to represent the interests of Dutch Jews. Organized underground resistance with the aim of escaping and hiding from the German authorities emerged only after the beginning of the deportations in the summer of 1942.<sup>86</sup>

From 1941 anti-Jewish policies became more stringent. In February of that year there had been conflicts and brawls between members of the Weerbaarheidsafdeling (National Socialist Defence Section, WA)<sup>87</sup> and young Jews in Amsterdam's Jewish quarter, in the course of which a WA man was severely wounded and died three days later. The German authorities reacted swiftly. On 12 February 1941 the representative for the city of Amsterdam, Hans Böhmcker, ordered the chief rabbis of the Ashkenazi and Portuguese Jewish communities and David Cohen, a professor of history at the University of Amsterdam, to set up a representative body for the Jews of Amsterdam. The Jewish Council (Joodsche Raad) was subsequently established on 13 February 1941. It was chaired by Cohen and by Abraham Asscher, who was a diamond merchant, liberal politician, and chairman of the Ashkenazi community. In taking up this position, they aimed to preserve peace and order and to alleviate the situation of the Jewish community, and for these reasons they chose cooperation with the occupiers over refusal and active resistance. Critics who spoke out against cooperation with the German authorities were unable to prevail (Doc. 56). The leading members of the Jewish Council came from the educated, affluent upper classes, while the Jewish working class and foreign Jews were involved in only small numbers in the decisions of the body. The Jewish Council had to implement the orders of the German occupiers and was responsible for enforcing them. However, in order to sustain Jewish life, it also developed activities beyond the edicts of the German authorities in various fields, such as culture. After several months, the authority of the Amsterdam Jewish Council was extended to the entire country, and local representations

85 Wichert ten Have, *De Nederlandse Unie: Aanpassing, vernieuwing en confrontatie in bezettingstijd 1940–1941* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999).

86 Roni Hershkowitz, 'The Persecution of the Jews, as reflected in Dutch Underground Newspapers', in Chaya Brasz and Yosef Kaplan (eds.), *Dutch Jews as Perceived by Themselves and by Others* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 307–322; Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, pp. 168–170; Ben Braber, *This Cannot Happen Here: Integration and Jewish Resistance in the Netherlands, 1940–1945* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); Michman et al., *Pinkas*, pp. 167–168, 177–180.

87 The 'militia branch' of the NSB, a paramilitary force comparable to the German SA.



were appointed in the main Jewish communities. As a supervisory body with extensive powers over the Jewish population, the council thus made it easier for the German authorities to execute anti-Jewish measures.<sup>88</sup> The compliant attitude of the Jewish Council not only was criticized by various parties during the occupation, but also gave rise to heated debate in the post-war period.

On 19 February 1941 a German Order Police patrol forced its way into an ice-cream parlour owned by two German-Jewish refugees; according to the German police report, the two defended themselves with ammonia gas. This event was seen as an attack on the patrol, and the two owners were arrested. Rauter, the commissioner general for security, reacted by setting in motion the first roundups of Jews in Amsterdam on 22 and 23 February. The German Order Police arrested 425 young Jewish men, who were taken to Mauthausen in Upper Austria. This brutal course of action against the Jews swiftly induced a general strike (the 'February Strike'), which brought public life to a standstill in Amsterdam and several other cities on 25 and 26 February 1941 (Docs. 55–65). Notary Jan Christiaan Kruisinga described the mood of the Dutch population in his diary: 'law and order are increasingly difficult to maintain. Everywhere patience and the willingness to cooperate seem to be giving way to cold hatred' (Doc. 66). For broad segments of the population, the February Strike provided an outlet for feelings that had been suppressed since the beginning of the occupation. The exploitation of the Dutch economy to benefit Germany's war industry, the loss of national independence, and, not least, the repressive measures directed at Jewish fellow citizens had gnawed away at the self-confidence of the population. The strike gave many the feeling of being able to take direct action against the occupiers. The extent of the protests took the Dutch police and the occupiers by surprise. Not until the second day did Rauter take steps to put an end to the strike. He assumed command of the Amsterdam police and instructed them, together with the German Order Police, to crack down on the strikers and demonstrators. In addition, the German military commander, General Christiansen, imposed martial law in the province of North Holland, which was particularly affected by the strike. This gave the occupying force extensive opportunities to quash the strike, which ended on the evening of 26 February. Owing to a large police presence and the threat of further arrests, it was possible to restore a semblance of normality in the following days.<sup>89</sup>

The strike had manifold repercussions. For one, the Reich Commissioner imposed punitive fines on various cities. The strike caused the German occupying powers to adopt a markedly tougher approach towards the Dutch population. By using force to end the

88 Benjamin Aäron Sijes, 'Enkele opmerkingen over de positie der Joden tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog in bezet Nederland', in *Studies over Jodenvervolgung* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974), pp. 136–137; Hirschfeld, 'Niederlande', p. 143.

89 Guus Meershoek, 'Der Widerstand in Amsterdam während der deutschen Besatzung', in *Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 14: *Repression und Kriegsverbrechen: Die Bekämpfung von Widerstands- und Partisanenbewegungen gegen die deutsche Besatzung in West- und Südeuropa* (Berlin/Göttingen: Schwarze Risse, Rote Straße, 1997), pp. 13–125; Guus Meershoek, 'Onder nationaal-socialistisch bewind', in Doeko Bosscher and Piet de Rooy (eds.), *Tweestrijd om de hoofdstad 1900–2000* (Amsterdam: Sun, 2007), pp. 234–321; Friso Roest and Jos Scheren, *Oorlog in de stad: Amsterdam 1939–1941* (Amsterdam: Van Genneep, 1998), pp. 247–283; Benjamin Aenja Sijes, *De februari-staking: 25–26 februari 1941* (Amsterdam: H. J. W. Becht, 1978); Annet Mooij, *De strijd om de Februaristaking* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2006).

strike, they made it clear that they would not tolerate further actions against the occupation. This lent new credence to the reports of refugees from Germany, which had previously often been thought to be exaggerated. As a non-Jewish journalist from Amsterdam commented in his diary: 'Now everyone knows that the accounts, which seemed incredible, are true in every respect.'<sup>90</sup> The principles of the German occupiers were made public in a lengthy programmatic speech by Seyss-Inquart to a specially convened meeting of members of the organizational unit of the German Nazi Party in the Netherlands on 12 March 1941. Seyss-Inquart declared that the strike had been part of a war of annihilation waged by the Jews against the German people, and that it had to be crushed with the most extreme means. Germany, he proclaimed, had come to the Netherlands with a mission to reunite the Dutch, whose path had, since the sixteenth century, diverged from the rest of the Germanic 'tribes', with the Germanic ethnic community. The attitude of the Dutch to the Jews and to the 'Jewish question' was a litmus test for this process:

We do not consider the Jews to be Dutch. They are an enemy with whom it is impossible to reach an armistice or peace. [...] We will smite the Jews wherever we find them, and anyone who goes with them will bear the consequences. The Führer has declared that the role of the Jews in Europe is finished, and consequently their role is finished. The only thing that can be discussed is the institution of a tolerable transition stage that maintains the fundamental attitude that the Jews are enemies, in other words, that takes the caution appropriate for enemies.<sup>91</sup>

The Germans considered this speech to be so important that it was immediately translated into Dutch and disseminated in pamphlet form.<sup>92</sup>

In June 1941 the German authorities reacted to further acts of sabotage by ordering the immediate arrest of 300 Jews. Instead of conducting a roundup and thereby spreading disquiet in Amsterdam once again, the German Security Police now forced the Jewish Council to release a list with the names and addresses of more than 200 residents of the 'work village' (*werkdorp*) at Wieringermeer in the province of North Holland, where young Jews were prepared for emigration to Palestine and elsewhere. The persons included on this list were arrested and, as in the case of those picked up in the February raids, deported to Mauthausen concentration camp. When death notices from this camp began to reach the Netherlands with increasing frequency in the summer of 1941, 'Mauthausen' became synonymous with deportation to certain death. Just one of the approximately 1,700 Jews deported to Mauthausen from the Netherlands survived.<sup>93</sup>

90 T. M. Sjneitzer-van Leening, *Dagboekfragmenten 1940–1945* (Utrecht: Veen, 1985), p. 71.

91 Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart, *Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden: Gesammelte Reden* (Amsterdam: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1944), pp. 37–66, here pp. 57–58. Cited in Dan Michman, *The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos during the Holocaust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 101.

92 *Rede van den Rijkscommissaris Rijksminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart gehouden op Woensdag 12 Maart 1941 in het Concertgebouw te Amsterdam voor het Arbeidsbereik der N.S.D.A.P. in de Nederlanden* (n.p., n.d.).

93 Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, pp. 81–82; Hirschfeld, 'Niederlande', p. 161; Hans de Vries, 'Sie starben wie Fliegen im Herbst', in Hans de Vries, Luise Jacobs, and Bertrand Perz (eds.), *Mauthausen 1938–1998* (Westervoort: Van Gruting, 2000), pp. 7–18; Presser, *Ashes in the Wind*, p. 489.

The registration of the Jews in January 1941 was followed by a sharp increase in the number of regulations and orders issued by the Germans. Organized repression took place on an ever-greater scale. As previously in Germany, the main objective was to isolate Dutch Jews from society, deprive them of their rights, and exploit them economically. From January 1941, Jews were forbidden to go to the cinema or to donate blood, the number of Jewish university students was sharply restricted, and the Aryanization of Jewish businesses began. In April 1941 the first signs with the words 'No Jews allowed' began to appear on public buildings, restaurants, and cafés. Jews were no longer permitted to have non-Jewish household helps, and they were forced to hand in their radios. Jewish doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers were no longer allowed to practise their professions (Docs. 73, 78).

In June 1941 Jews were barred from seaside resorts, spa towns, and public swimming pools. They were required to register their property and to transfer their assets to the Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. bank, thereby bringing these assets under German control.<sup>94</sup> From summer 1941 Jews were also prohibited to visit parks and other public places, and a daily curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. was imposed; they were allowed to shop only between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. Shops owned by Jews had to be marked as such. Jews were also barred from all general organizations and non-Jewish societies. In August 1941 all Jewish children were excluded from state schools and a separate Jewish school system was opened under the auspices of the Jewish Council. The prohibition imposed by the occupation authorities on 15 September 1941, which banned Jews from entering stock exchanges and markets and from engaging in trading there, deprived many of their livelihood.

Within the Jewish Council the German directives were usually passed on under protest but in hope of 'preventing worse things'.<sup>95</sup> When the council, initially established only for Amsterdam, expanded its operations to the entire country on 25 October 1941 by order of Seyss-Inquart, it became the only institutional link between the Jewish population in the Netherlands and the German occupiers. In accordance with the mandate of the occupiers, its authority extended to every sphere – from healthcare and the disbursement of the monthly living allowance authorized by the Germans, to the organization of cultural and social life, to the processing of emigration applications. The administrative staff of the Jewish Council under the leadership of Asscher and Cohen soon came to include thousands of employees and formed a kind of state within the state, albeit one that could operate only with the consent of the German authorities.<sup>96</sup>

94 In Aug. 1941 the German authorities thereby established a counterpart to an existing Jewish-owned bank under the same name. This counterpart was responsible solely for the management of Jewish assets. The Jewish-owned bank was later liquidated and its assets likewise transferred to the establishment newly set up by the Germans. See Gerard Aalders, *Nazi Looting: The Plunder of Dutch Jewry during the Second World War* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), pp. 127–145; Happe, *Viele falsche Hoffnungen*, pp. 68–69; and Christoph Kreutzmüller, *Händler und Handlungsgehilfen: Der Finanzplatz Amsterdam und die deutschen Großbanken (1918–1945)* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), pp. 149–151.

95 Nanda van der Zee, 'Um Schlimmeres zu verhindern ...': *Die Ermordung der niederländischen Juden. Kollaboration und Widerstand* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999).

96 Moore, *Victims and Survivors*, p. 106.

In reaction to the increasingly stringent economic restrictions and their social isolation, many Jews sought a way to emigrate legally. Promoting or forcing emigration had been a Nazi policy since the 1930s, and this was officially still the case in 1941. The Jewish Council had set up a special department for emigration headed by Gertrude van Tijn-Cohn, a German-born Dutch Jew who had had close contact with a number of international Jewish organizations, including the JDC, since the 1930s. Van Tijn sought to facilitate emigration from the Netherlands through cooperation with the JDC, but few Jews succeeded in leaving the country.<sup>97</sup> Many lacked the financial resources for emigration or the foreign contacts to obtain the requisite sponsorship for the period following arrival in a new country (Doc. 75).

The emigration ban imposed on Jews in Europe in October 1941 closed the door on this opportunity once and for all (Doc. 286). Nonetheless, the Jews in the Netherlands, above all stateless and foreign Jews, continued to be urged by the German authorities, through the Jewish Council, to submit emigration applications to make it seem as if this was still an option. Wilhelm Halberstam, a German refugee, wrote the following to his daughter in Chile:

One should surely think less than ever about onward emigration now, but a great desire is often all-consuming and so now all I can think about is addressing a petition to the president of Chile, most humbly asking him to issue visas to me for my wife, for me, and for my son.<sup>98</sup>

Illegal escape from the Netherlands (either across the Channel to England or through other occupied countries to Switzerland or to Spain and Portugal) entailed great risks. Many Jews therefore saw no realistic way of getting out. Most decided to try and survive the occupation period, with all the restrictions and problems experienced thus far, as best they could.

The Dutch government in exile in London learned about the anti-Jewish measures from intelligence reports and from refugees who had made their way to Britain. However, there is scant evidence of any official responses or action to protect the Jews in the Netherlands during the first years of the occupation. The prime objective of the government in exile and Queen Wilhelmina continued to be to stabilize the position of the Netherlands vis-à-vis the Allies.<sup>99</sup> One of the few government institutions in London to raise the topic of the anti-Jewish measures in the Netherlands was Radio Oranje. From July 1940 onwards, the broadcaster aired daily Dutch-language programmes over the airwaves of the BBC, which could be received secretly in the Netherlands. Anti-Jewish measures were addressed on many occasions, and reference was repeatedly made to the unity of the Dutch people, with one such broadcast stating: 'Fellow countrymen, if we are now

97 Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1939–1945* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp. 273–277; Bernard Wasserstein, *The Ambiguity of Virtue: Gertrude van Tijn and the Fate of the Dutch Jews* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

98 Irmtrud Wojak (ed.), 'Geliebte Kinder...' *Briefe aus dem Amsterdamer Exil in die Neue Welt 1939–1943* (Essen: Klartext, 1995), p. 187.

99 De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 3: *Mei 1940*, p. 463.

very worried about our Jewish fellow citizens, this is not because we doubt you, our people, even for a single second.’<sup>100</sup> However, the international community had little interest in the events in the Netherlands and in the persecution of the Jews in this small country. Reports in the international press were usually limited to announcing new measures and restrictions in the Netherlands. Only the riots in Amsterdam’s Jewish quarter in February in 1941 received greater attention (Doc. 55), as did the February Strike.

Persecution intensified during the first half of 1942. On 10 October 1941 Seyss-Inquart had ordered the founding of labour camps for Jews in the eastern provinces of Drenthe and Friesland. The Jews were recruited through the respective Dutch employment offices. The German official in charge of this forced labour (officially known as ‘labour deployment’, *Arbeitseinsatz*) was the rabidly antisemitic commissioner for social affairs, H. Rodegro. At the beginning of January 1942, the Jewish Council was ordered to provide 1,402 ‘unemployed’ people to be sent to Drenthe (Docs. 110, 111). After initially refusing, and under duress, the Jewish Council gave in; Amsterdam’s Municipal Social Service and the local police were also involved in coercing impoverished Jews into attending a medical examination to check fitness for work. The camps set up for forced labour were supervised by the Dutch National Agency for Work Creation (Rijksdienst voor de Werkverruiming). The first transport to the camps in Drenthe consisted of 905 Jews. Additional transports were to follow (Docs. 121, 134). After a few weeks the Germans increased the number of Jews required for labour to more than 5,000. In March 1942, when the quotas for the labour camps could no longer be met by conscripting the unemployed, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration ordered the Jewish Council to change its approach and start conscripting unmarried men between the ages of 18 and 40 for labour service (Doc. 121). A total of around 7,500 male Jews from 85 towns were sent to those labour camps; about 2,500 were released, but the majority were still incarcerated when the deportations to the death camps began. Although the Germans had assured the Jewish Council that conditions in the labour camps for Jews would meet normal Dutch standards, the situation in the camps deteriorated rapidly and the conditions were harsh (Doc. 129). Those who became incapacitated were no longer allowed to return home, food rations were reduced, and earnings were 25 per cent below the average rate otherwise paid in labour camps. An inspector described the camps as being ‘effectively concentration camps under the management of the National Agency for Work Creation’.<sup>101</sup>

While forced labour was not initially intended as a preparatory step for the rounding up of Jews as part of the ‘final solution’, it did in fact turn out to be so.<sup>102</sup> Several hundred German-Jewish refugees were forced to relocate to Westerbork camp, which had been established for refugees in 1939 by the Dutch government (Doc. 113). On 10 October 1941 Seyss-Inquart ordered that the camp be turned into a ‘reception camp’. Dutch Jews living in a number of smaller towns and villages, mostly in the western parts of the country, were forced to move to Amsterdam. On 12 January 1942 the Jews from the town of Zaandam in the province of North Holland were the first group to be affected. On 14 January 1942

100 Broadcast by Radio Oranje on 17 Sept. 1941 titled ‘Anti-Jewish Measures’, text by M. Sluysers; NIOD, Radio Oranje.

101 Cited in de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5/2, p. 1060.

102 Ibid., pp. 1053–1059; Presser, *Ashes in the Wind*, pp. 95–111; Michman et al., *Pinkas*, pp. 180–182.

they were told to prepare for relocation, which took place on 17 January. The German Jews were taken directly to Westerbork camp, while the Dutch Jews were forced to settle in Amsterdam. The Dutch police sealed their abandoned apartments and houses, and members of the Rosenberg Task Force subsequently emptied them of their contents. A process of concentrating the Jews had thus begun (Doc. 135).<sup>103</sup>

Although the Nuremberg Laws were not officially promulgated in the Netherlands, on 23 March 1942 Seyss-Inquart decided that they would be applied in practice. On 27 March the Jewish Council proclaimed that Jews were forbidden to marry or have extramarital relationships with non-Jews.<sup>104</sup> Harster instructed all Security Police and Security Service offices to act according to these laws (Doc. 126).

At the beginning of March 1942 the coordination of the 'final solution' in Western Europe was discussed at a meeting of the officials from Eichmann's department in charge of Jewish affairs at the RSHA.<sup>105</sup> From April 1942 Eichmann, his staff in Berlin, and their counterparts in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France began to undertake co-ordinated 'cleansing' measures, including the visible identification of Jews. On 29 April 1942 the Jewish Council was ordered to distribute a yellow 'Jewish star' (*Judenstern*) to all Jews in the country within three days. It disseminated 569,355 stars, which had been produced at a Jewish textile factory in Enschede run by a German administrator.<sup>106</sup> Following the issue of the corresponding directive from the senior commander of the Security Police, David Cohen spoke of a 'terrible day in the history of the Jews in Holland!' (Doc. 130). Reactions to the visible identification varied widely among the Jewish population (Docs. 32, 140). The young Dutchwoman Edith van Hessen noted:

We all wear our stars. It always makes me laugh. What nonsense, this silly fuss with these stars. One hears the funniest things about it, and the jokes do the rounds even faster than the rumours. The people who wear the stars are greeted in the street. The men doff their hats, and one gets all kinds of encouraging comments.<sup>107</sup>

By contrast, the Jewish writer Sam Goudsmit considered the star a 'hostile badge of shame', as he wrote in his diary.<sup>108</sup> Three weeks later, on 21 May 1942, it was announced that the Jews were required to hand in all their assets, including works of art, precious stones, and gold, with the exception of a sum of 25 guilders, to the Lippmann, Rosen-

103 Aalders, *Nazi Looting*, pp. 203–210. Presser, *Ashes in the Wind*, pp. 111–114; de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5/2, pp. 1064–1068. The Rosenberg Task Force for the Occupied Territories (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, ERR) was an agency founded on Hitler's orders in July 1940 and led by Alfred Rosenberg: see BArch, B 323/257. Its purpose was to seize pieces of art and cultural assets, libraries and archives, and furniture and household goods owned by Jews and other 'enemies of the Reich', firstly in Western Europe. Its activities began in France in September 1940 and were subsequently extended to Belgium and the Netherlands and, after the invasion of the Soviet Union, to the occupied Eastern territories.

104 De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5/2, p. 1071.

105 Yaacov Lozowick, *Hitler's Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), pp. 151–152.

106 De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5/2, pp. 1081–1094.

107 Velmans-van Hessen, *Ich wollte immer glücklich sein*, p. 108.

108 Diary of Sam Goudsmit, entry for 3 May 1942, University Library of Amsterdam, Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, HC-ROS-006.

thal & Co. bank in Sarphatistraat (Doc. 136). In view of the massive deportation plans, the expropriation process now reached its peak.

On 11 June 1942 the officials in charge of Jewish affairs in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands met with Eichmann in Berlin and a consensus was reached regarding the number to be deported from each country in the first wave of deportations. Just eleven days after the meeting, the target for the Netherlands increased from 15,000 to 40,000.<sup>109</sup>

During the first two years of the occupation, an intensive anti-Jewish campaign had segregated Dutch Jews in legal, occupational, educational, and cultural terms and they were ultimately also marked out visibly. This was accompanied by a rapid process of impoverishment. While no ghetto was established and the Jews could still interact with the non-Jewish population in the streets, they had developed separate cultural and educational activities and managed to maintain religious life.<sup>110</sup> Yet at the start of summer 1942 the mood of Dutch Jews had plummeted and pessimism prevailed. At this time, the Jewish Council was informed on 24 June 1942 that the first deportations were imminent and that the deportees would be taken to labour camps in Germany. Three weeks later, on 15 July 1942, the first train left Westerbork camp for Auschwitz, with 1,135 Dutch Jews on board.

### Belgium

After the invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940, between 10,000 and 15,000 of the Jewish refugees living in Belgium fled the advancing Wehrmacht and sought safety in France. The remaining non-Jewish and Jewish German males of military-service age were generally interned by the Belgian authorities, suspected of being enemy aliens. In view of the German advance, between 6,000 and 10,000 of them were transported to France by the Belgian authorities, with the consent of the French government. They were interned in the St Cyprien and Le Vernet camps, located in the south of France, which had not yet been occupied. Only very few Jews were able to return to Belgium after the capitulation on 28 May 1940 (Doc. 156).<sup>111</sup>

In Belgium, King Leopold stayed in the country, which created a more complex situation than in the neighbouring occupied countries of Western and Northern Europe. In contrast to Norway and the Netherlands, on 31 May 1940 a military administration was set up to serve as the occupation authority. In July 1944 the military administration was replaced by a civil one, headed by the Reich commissioner for the occupied Belgian and northern French territories, Josef Grohé, which lasted until the liberation of Belgium in September 1944. The military administration was assigned to the Armed Forces High

109 Gerald Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 113.

110 Michman, *Emergence of Jewish Ghettos*, pp. 94–101.

111 Eggers, *Unerwünschte Ausländer*, pp. 64–67; Marcel Bervoets-Tragholz, *La Liste de Saint-Cyprien: L'odyssée de plusieurs milliers de Juifs expulsés le 10 mai 1940 par les autorités belges vers des camps d'internement du Sud de la France, antichambre des camps d'extermination* (Brussels: Alice Éditions, 2006); Rudi van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile: Les autorités belges et la persécution des Juifs en Belgique pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (Brussels: Ceges, 2007), pp. 223–226 (published in Dutch as *Gewillig België: Overheid en jodenvervolgning tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Brussels: Soma, 2007), pp. 207–209. Subsequent references to this source will cite *La Belgique docile* with the page numbers from *Gewillig België* also given in brackets.

Command and was under the control of General Alexander von Falkenhausen, military commander in Belgium and northern France. While Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet had already been annexed by the German Reich on 18 May 1940, for strategic and economic reasons the northern French départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais were placed under the remit of the military commander in Belgium and northern France. The German occupation administration was divided into two branches. The command staff under Bodo von Harbou was responsible for military duties within the occupation administration. Eggert Reeder headed the administrative staff and also led the Belgian police authorities. As chief of the administrative staff Reeder subsequently had a key function in planning and implementing the persecution and deportation of the Belgian Jews. Between June 1940 and autumn 1941, Max Thomas was the representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Belgium and occupied France, and in this capacity was also largely responsible for organizing anti-Jewish measures. He was succeeded by Karl Constantin Canaris and later Ernst Ehlers.<sup>112</sup>

Much as in the Netherlands, the secretaries general who remained in Belgium took over the helm of the ministries as the highest-ranking administrative officials. Seeking to continue to wield influence despite the German occupation regime and to represent Belgian interests as far as possible, these officials, with the support of the Belgian institutions, pursued a strategy of the 'lesser evil'. In other words, they approached the occupiers with a certain degree of pragmatism and willingness to cooperate.<sup>113</sup>

In Belgium, as in the other countries of Western and Northern Europe, the German occupation authorities abstained from measures against the Jewish population during the first few months after capitulation. In the summer of 1940, Military Commander von Falkenhausen was still assuring the leading socialist politician and intellectual Hendrik de Man that the occupation authorities were not planning to take any measures against the Jews.<sup>114</sup> The military administration reported to the leadership in Berlin that steps against the Jews in Belgium were politically inopportune at the time.<sup>115</sup> However, an ordinance issued on 23 May 1940 (amended on 2 July) regarding 'enemy assets' (*Feindvermögen*) in the occupied territories of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France meant that these territories could no longer determine what to do with assets belonging to nationals of countries at war with Germany. The ordinance was later used against Jews in Belgium, most of whom were foreigners.

112 Nanno In 't Veld, 'Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer und Volkstumspolitik: Ein Vergleich zwischen Belgien und den Niederlanden', in Wolfgang Benz, Johannes Houwink ten Cate, and Gerhard Otto (eds.), *Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa* (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), pp. 121–138; Frank Seberechts, 'Les instances allemandes et la politique antijuive', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, pp. 279–295 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 271–276); Insa Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), pp. 17–20.

113 Wolfram Weber, *Die innere Sicherheit im besetzten Belgien und Nordfrankreich 1940–1944: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Besatzungsverwaltungen* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978); Peter Klefisch, *Das Dritte Reich und Belgien 1933–1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1987); Warmbrunn, *German Occupation of Belgium*.

114 Jan Velaers and Hermann Van Goethem, *Leopold III: De koning, het land, de oorlog* (Tiel: Lannoo, 2001), p. 350.

115 Warmbrunn, *German Occupation of Belgium*, p. 150.



In early October 1940 the secretaries general, as heads of the Belgian administration, were informed that anti-Jewish measures were imminent. On 28 October 1940 the military administration in Belgium issued the first two 'Jew Regulations' on the basis of those issued by the Military Commander in France (Docs. 158, 159).<sup>116</sup> Referring to the Belgian constitution, the secretaries general had, however, turned down the request of the German occupation administration that the directives be issued by Belgian authorities (Doc. 157). The military administration therefore issued the directives itself, but ordered the Belgian authorities to implement them. In the 'Jew Regulations' the military administration defined who was to be considered a Jew. These regulations also made it compulsory for Jewish enterprises to be registered and issued occupational bans for Jews in all public service positions; this also affected all levels of the educational system, including universities.<sup>117</sup> Similarly, the occupying forces ordered the registration of all Jews as well as the stamping of their identity cards with the words 'Juif – Jood'. No municipality resisted or protested against this instruction.<sup>118</sup> In November 1940 all mayors were required to register the Jews in their municipalities. By the end of the occupation period, approximately 56,000 persons had been recorded in the registry of Jews in Belgium. However, the actual number of Jews in Belgium was probably greater, as not all Jews complied with the requirement to register, and children up to the age of 15 did not have to. Of those who did register, only 7 per cent (3,680) were Belgian citizens; 93 per cent were foreigners or stateless, as most Jews who entered the country after 1914 had been denied Belgian citizenship.<sup>119</sup> The administration of the city of Antwerp, in particular, made haste to identify and record the Jews. Around 70 per cent of the immigrants living there were registered as Jews.

Between December 1940 and February 1941 the military administration expelled 3,273 Jews from Antwerp, citing military security as the reason. Accompanied by the Antwerp police, the Jews were taken to various municipalities in the neighbouring province of Limburg, where they were required to report to the police on a regular basis (Doc. 163). Because the expellees were only allowed to take luggage weighing up to 25 kilograms with them, they were reliant on aid at their point of arrival. Aid, including housing, food, and medical care, was provided by the population of Limburg and the Christian churches. On 29 August 1941 the military administration decreed that the only authorized places of residence for Jews were to be the cities of Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, and Liège. Immediately thereafter, most of the Jews affected by the expulsion order were able to return to Antwerp.<sup>120</sup> However, several dozen were sent to a labour camp

116 Maxime Steinberg, *L'Étoile et le fusil*, 3 vols. (Brussels: Vie Ouvrière, 1983–1986); Maxime Steinberg, 'The Judenpolitik in Belgium within the West European Context: Comparative Observations', in Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust*, pp. 199–221.

117 Barbara Dikschen, *L'École en sursis: La scolarisation des enfants juifs pendant la guerre* (Brussels: Didier Devillez Éditeur, 2006), pp. 57–95.

118 Frank Seberechts, 'Les Autorités belges, et la persécution des Juifs, 1940–1942', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, pp. 250–369 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 253–373).

119 Mark van den Wijngaert, *Het beleid van het comité van de secretarissen-generaal in België tijdens de Duitse bezetting 1940–1944* (Brussels: Paleis der Academien, 1975), pp. 64–65; Maxime Steinberg, *La Persécution des Juifs de Belgique (1940–1945)* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2004), pp. 131–132.

120 Lieven Saerens, *Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad: Een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn joodse bevolking (1880–1944)* (Tiel: Lannoo, 2000), pp. 370–374; Steinberg, *La Persécution des Juifs*, pp. 133–141.

in Overpelt, where they were incarcerated for several months. An interesting aspect of the Limburg expulsions is that in this province the Jews made personal contacts with locals, which were drawn upon during the deportation period when they were looking for hiding places.

The anti-Jewish regulations set in motion the elimination of Jews from Belgian economic life. However, most Belgian Jews were not at all wealthy. Contrary to the belief of the Belgian Right, Jews also had no appreciable influence on the country's economy beyond the traditionally large number of Jews employed in the diamond industry in the Antwerp area. Jews now had to register their businesses with the authorities, and occupational bans were also imposed. Within the military administration's Department for Economic Affairs, the section for enemy nationals and Jewish assets, headed by Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Theodor Pichler, was responsible for the registration of assets. The section worked closely with the newly established Brussels Trust Company and with the Foreign Exchange Protection Commando (Devisenschutzkommando), which was under the authority of both the Reich tax authorities and the military administration.<sup>121</sup> Approximately 8,000 Jewish-owned companies were registered in accordance with the first 'Jew Regulation', which concerned the Aryanization of Jewish businesses (Doc. 158).

By the end of 1942 the Aryanization of the Belgian economy was largely complete and the majority of the Jewish-owned companies had been liquidated. The proceeds went into blocked accounts at the Société française de banque et de dépôts which, under the control of the Brussels Trust Company, was responsible for the centralized administration of all Jewish assets in Belgium. While Jewish business persons found it hard to elude the grasp of the German authorities, the registration and expropriation of goods such as gold, jewellery, securities, and financial assets was less exhaustive. With the help of Belgian banks that refused to pass on information about their Jewish clients, many Jews managed to keep money and valuables out of the clutches of the German authorities.<sup>122</sup>

Of particular interest to the German leadership was the Belgian diamond industry, more than 90 per cent of which was in the hands of Jewish merchants. Around 80 per cent of the world's trade in cut diamonds was based in Antwerp. The military administration's Department for Economic Affairs decided not to exercise direct control over the diamond industry for the time being, but rather to regulate the trade in diamonds through the usual distribution channels and to siphon off the profits for the German

121 Aalders, *Nazi Looting*, pp. 37–39. On Belgium, see Insa Meinen, 'Die Deportation der Juden aus Belgien und das Devisenschutzkommando', in Johannes Hürter and Jürgen Zarusky (eds.), *Besatzung, Kollaboration, Holocaust: Neue Studien zur Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. 45–79; Insa Meinen, 'Facing Deportation: How Jews Were Arrested in Belgium', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2008), pp. 39–73.

122 Hilberg, *Destruction of the European Jews*, p. 634; Rudi van Doorslaer, 'The Expropriation of Jewish Property and Restitution in Belgium', in Martin Dean, Constantin Goschler, and Philipp Ther (eds.), *Robbery and Restitution: The Conflict over Jewish Property in Europe* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), pp. 155–170; Jean-Marc Dreyfus, 'The Looting of Jewish Property in Occupied Western Europe: A Comparative Study of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands', *ibid.*, pp. 53–67; Martin Dean, *Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Reich (Doc. 178). On 30 January 1941 the Department for Economic Affairs established the Diamond Control Office (Diamantenkontrollstelle) for this purpose.<sup>123</sup>

Failure to comply with anti-Jewish legislation was punished in hundreds of cases with imprisonment in the so-called reception camp at Breendonk, a military fortification dating from the nineteenth century situated between Brussels and Antwerp. The prisoners lived in primitive conditions, were made to undertake heavy physical labour, and, in many cases, were subjected to mistreatment (Doc. 175). From 1940 to 1942 Jews made up the majority of the inmates, along with political prisoners, primarily communists.<sup>124</sup>

Beginning in the summer of 1941, the anti-Jewish measures implemented by the Germans in Belgium were tightened considerably. According to Reeder, the chief of the military administration, the objective was ‘the moral ghettoization of the Jew economy in Belgium, in particular its elimination from social life’ (Doc. 176). As already mentioned, the directive of 29 August 1941 prohibited Jews from living anywhere other than Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, and Charleroi. They were allowed to spend the night only in their own homes and had to obtain official approval for every change of residence. A short time later a nightly curfew for Jews was introduced in some cities. These moves heralded a shift in German policy pertaining to the Jews. In October the Reich Security Main Office prohibited the emigration of the Jews to third countries (Doc. 286). Military Commander von Falkenhausen followed suit a few months later.<sup>125</sup> The objective now was to consolidate the Jews in certain places in order to deport them at a later date.

Another important step was the creation of a mandatory organization for all Jews. As early as November 1940, Ernst Ehlers, representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, had asked the chief rabbi of Belgium, Salomon Ullmann, to establish an organization to represent all Jews. Ullmann had rejected the request on the grounds that religious representatives of the Jews were prohibited from being active in politics by Belgian legislation that remained in effect. In April 1941, however, he declared himself willing to chair a coordination committee in which every Jewish community in Belgium was represented. Ehlers, along with Kurt Asche, the Security Police official in charge of Jewish affairs, planned an organization that, modelled on the Reich Association of Jews in Germany, was to represent the Belgian Jews and Jewish organizations in their entirety. The regulation establishing the Association of Jews in Belgium (Association des Juifs en Belgique/Vereeniging van Joden in België, AJB/VJB) was issued on 25 November 1941; the association was to have its headquarters in Brussels (Doc. 176). The German authorities appointed Salomon Ullmann as chairman. He was assisted by a management board with seven members, who represented the Jewish communities of Antwerp, Brussels, Liège, and Charleroi. Membership was compulsory for Jews, and all Jewish associations

123 Eric Laureys, *Meesters van het diamant: De Belgische diamantsector tijdens het nazibewind* (Tielt: Lannoo, 2005).

124 Markus Meckl, ‘Unter zweifacher Hoheit: Das Auffanglager Breendonk zwischen Militärverwaltung und SD’, in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen: Nationalsozialistische Lager in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Luxemburg 1940–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 25–38; Patrick Nefors, *Breendonk, 1940–1945: De geschiedenis* (Antwerp: Standaard, 2004); French edn.: Brussels: Racine, *Breendonk, 1940–1945*, trans. Walter Hilgers (Racine: Brussels, 2005); James M. Deem, *The Prisoners of Breendonk: Personal Histories from a World War II Concentration Camp* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).

125 Regulation on the Emigration of Jews, 17 Jan. 1942, *VOBl-BNF*, 67, no. 2, 2 Feb. 1942, pp. 836–837.

and societies were merged into the association. Formally the AJB/VJB was answerable to the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and Public Health, but the German Security Police was de facto in charge.<sup>126</sup> The designated objective of the AJB/VJB was to promote emigration. Its tasks also included implementing the anti-Jewish measures ordered by the German authorities and dealing with healthcare provision and social welfare for the Jewish community. From December 1941 the AJB/VJB was also responsible for setting up Jewish schools. The establishment of the AJB/VJB triggered the first resistance from Belgium's Jewish population, in the form of a clandestine Yiddish-language press. The first issue of one of its publications, *Unzer Vort*, called for non-compliance with German orders in general, and with the compulsory association in particular.<sup>127</sup>

A new escalation of anti-Jewish measures occurred in March 1942. On 6 March the German military administration imposed a decree enabling general labour conscription in Belgium to carry out work of 'special importance'. Five days later, on 11 March, a special ordinance for compulsory labour deployment of Jews, who were particularly hard hit by unemployment due to their exclusion from economic and professional life, was enacted. Further details concerning the forced labour of Jews were contained in a subsequent ordinance of 8 May 1942, which was then implemented. All Jewish men between the ages of 18 and 60 and all Jewish women between 20 and 55 were forced to accept any work assigned to them by the employment office.<sup>128</sup> The conditions of Jewish forced labour as specified in these ordinances were significantly worse than those of non-Jews. The Belgian employment offices received an order from the military administration, requiring them to make preparations for the deployment of Jews in the labour camps of the Wehrmacht's construction force, Organization Todt, in northern France and to coordinate the process.<sup>129</sup> As a result, the employment offices sent 2,252 Jews, whose personal details they had gathered from the registry of Jews, to ten labour camps between Calais and Abbeville (Docs. 196, 197). The labour force in these camps constructed the Atlantic Wall to prevent an invasion by the Allies. In October 1942 the Jews in these camps were sent directly to the transit camp at Mechelen (French: Malines) and from there to the death camps in the East. Another forced labour camp for Jews was established in Charleville-Mézières in the Ardennes. Several hundred Jews were put to work in factories, such as the well-known weapons factory Fabrique nationale d'armes de Herstal, a mine, and other enterprises in the Liège area.<sup>130</sup>

126 Dan Michman, 'La fondation de l'AJB dans une perspective internationale', in Rudi van Doorslaer and Jean-Philippe Schreiber (eds.), *Les Curateurs du ghetto: L'Association des Juifs en Belgique sous l'Occupation nazie* (Brussels: Labor, 2004), pp. 27–56 [published in Dutch as *De curatoren van het ghetto: De vereniging van de joden in België tijdens de nazi-bezetting* (Tiel: Labor, 2004), pp. 33–45]. Subsequent references to this source cite *Les Curateurs du ghetto* with the page numbers from *De curatoren van het ghetto* also given in brackets.

127 Steinberg, *L'Étoile et le fusil*, vol. 2: 1942: *Les cent jours de la déportation des Juifs de Belgique* (1984), pp. 111–112.

128 Sylvain Brachfeld, *A Gift of Life: The Deportation and Rescue of the Jews in Occupied Belgium (1940–1944)* (Beth Shemesch: Institute for the Research on Belgian Judaism, 2007), pp. 27–29.

129 Frank Sebrechts, 'Le travail obligatoire', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, pp. 413–450 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 434–460).

130 Sophie Vandepontseele, 'Le travail obligatoire des Juifs en Belgique et dans le nord de la France', in van Doorslaer and Schreiber (eds.), *Les Curateurs du ghetto*, pp. 189–231 (*De curatoren van het*

During this time, the German authorities also enforced the visible identification of Jews in Belgium. According to an ordinance of 27 May 1942, which was published in the *Verordnungsblatt* on 1 June, all Jews in Belgium over the age of six had to wear a yellow star with a black 'J' in its centre. The Belgian municipalities were initially responsible for issuing the badges. However, the mayors in the Brussels region refused to stigmatize their fellow citizens, with the result that the German authorities forced this task upon the AJB/VJB (Doc. 193). Salomon van den Berg, a board member of the association, noted:

Seeing Jews in Brussels running around with the Star of David sewn onto their clothes, yellow fabric with the letter J in the middle, was the saddest of sights. But the Belgians behaved magnificently, they pretended to see nothing and they showed a good deal of consideration for those who were obliged to wear the badge. (Doc. 196)

The underground newspaper *La Libre Belgique* reacted to the introduction of the yellow star by issuing an appeal: 'Citizens! Out of hatred for the Nazis – and out of self-respect: do what you have not done thus far: greet the Jews!'<sup>131</sup> In Antwerp and Charleroi the local municipalities handed out the star, and in Liège the distribution was carried out by the Feldkommandantur. However, a considerable number of Jews refused to wear it, which caused repeated warnings by both the German authorities and the AJB/VJB (Docs. 192, 193, 194).<sup>132</sup>

In the first weeks after the occupation of Belgium there had been some acts of resistance against the occupiers, but this soon ceased. In light of the German successes in Europe, many tended towards a form of accommodation, as exemplified by King Leopold remaining in the country and by Hendrik de Man, who became involved in collaboration. The Belgian population's reaction to the anti-Jewish measures during the first two years was divided. Nationalist parties and movements, which had espoused anti-semitic views even before the occupation, welcomed them. Many Belgians, however, disapproved of the German directives. There were significant regional differences in this respect, especially between the cities of Brussels and Antwerp, which had large concentrations of Jews. In Antwerp a predominantly pro-German attitude on the part of the authorities and the police, as well as a relatively large part of the population, fostered a

getto, pp. 149–181); Seberechts, 'Les instances allemandes et la politique antijuive'; Seberechts, 'Le travail obligatoire'; Meinen, *Die Shoah in Belgien*, pp. 31–33; Jean-Émile Andreux, 'Mémorial de déportés du Judenlager des Mazures', *Tsafon: Revue d'études juives du Nord*, no. 3, special issue (October 2007), pp. 9–21; Thierry Rozenblum, *Une cité si ardente: Les Juifs de Liège sous l'Occupation (1940–1944)* (Brussels: Luc Pire, 2010), pp. 92–97; Meinen and Meyer, *Verfolgt von Land zu Land*, pp. 123–124.

<sup>131</sup> Cited in Bernard A. Cook, *Belgium: A History* (New York: Lang, 2002), p. 128.

<sup>132</sup> Laurence Schram, 'La distribution de l'étoile,' in van Doorslaer and Schreiber (eds.), *Les Curateurs du ghetto*, pp. 263–276 (*De curatoren van het ghetto*, pp. 204–214); Rozenblum, *Une cité si ardente*, pp. 81–85; Lieven Saerens, *Onwillig Brussel: Een verhaal over Jodenvervolging en verzet* (Leuven: Standaard, 2014), pp. 114–116.

climate hostile to the Jews. In April 1941 this motivated a group of Anti-Jewish League<sup>133</sup> sympathizers to commit violent assaults against Jews. With the aim of inciting a pogrom against the city's Jews, supporters of extremist groups, including the Volksverweering, the SS Vlaanderen, the Zwarte Brigade, and De Vlag, destroyed two hundred shops belonging to Jews, and two synagogues were set on fire.<sup>134</sup> In Brussels, by contrast, the majority of the population and of the municipal administration were either neutral towards the Jews or supportive of them, and moderately critical of the German occupation in general and the anti-Jewish measures in particular. The first president and the chief public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation and the president of the Bar Association at Brussels Court of Appeal protested against the occupational ban imposed on Jewish lawyers. In a letter to Military Commander von Falkenhausen, they argued that the measures conflicted with Belgian constitutional law and Belgian legislation. It did not seem, they wrote, 'as if the presence of Jews in the administration of justice would be likely to disrupt public order and public life' (Doc. 161). Other institutions protested too, including the Free University of Brussels and the National Relief Agency for War Veterans.

During the first two years of the occupation there were some major instances of opposition to and protest against anti-Jewish policies, but most of the population was not overly interested in the fate of the Jews and did not participate in the protests. The religious Catholics were largely indifferent, the liberals were individualistic and organizationally inept, and while the socialists expressed a certain interest, their ideology caused them to misunderstand the particular fate of the Jews.<sup>135</sup> The situation of the Jews in Belgium deteriorated significantly during those years. The introduction of forced labour and the yellow star triggered a change in the attitude of the Jews, and their suspicion regarding the fate awaiting them grew, especially within political organizations comprising foreign Jews.

In accordance with the plans made by the German authorities for the deportation of the Western European Jews, 10,000 foreign Jews were initially to be deported from Belgium (Doc. 145). At the end of July 1942 an order was issued to approximately 12,000 Jews requiring them to report to the Dossin Barracks at Mechelen, in the province of Antwerp, for labour deployment 'in the East'. An SS transit camp had been set up here in July for persons designated for deportation. When many Jews refused to comply with the summons, the German authorities threatened to impose severe penalties on each person summoned, as well as his or her family members and the Jewish community. Roundups of Jews were carried out in July and August. Those arrested were taken to

133 Ligue Anti-Juive Belge: a militant group founded prior to the Second World War. Its membership was small, numbering around 1,000 in 1940. The group was later incorporated into the Flemish SS.

134 Steinberg, *La Persécution des Juifs*, pp. 122–129.

135 Jose Gotovich, 'Resistance Movements and the "Jewish Question"', in Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust*, pp. 273–285; Mark van den Wijngaert, 'The Belgian Catholics and the Jews during the German Occupation', *ibid.*, pp. 225–228; Dan Michman, 'Problematic National Identity, Outsiders and Persecution: Impact of the Gentile Population's Attitude in Belgium on the Fate of the Jews in 1940–1944', in David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds.), *Nazi Europe and the Final Solution* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), pp. 460–464.

Mechelen. On 4 August 1942 the first transport from Belgium left this camp with 998 Jews, destined for Auschwitz.<sup>136</sup>

### *Luxembourg*

The neutral Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was almost completely occupied by the Wehrmacht on 10 May 1940. Because the leadership of Luxembourg had sided with the Allies at the beginning of the war, the Reich now considered Luxembourg a hostile country.<sup>137</sup> After the flight of Grand Duchess Charlotte and her government, the day-to-day running of the country was initially assigned to an administrative commission made up of Luxembourg civil servants under the supervision of the German military administration. On 2 August 1940 Hitler appointed Gustav Simon, Gauleiter of the neighbouring Gau of Koblenz-Trier, to serve as chief of the German civil administration. There was a de facto annexation of Luxembourg. The administration was restructured along German lines, and Simon filled all the top positions with German civil servants.

The chief of the civil administration also defined the objectives of the policy concerning Jews: Luxembourg's Jews were to be expelled as soon as possible. Measures for their economic exploitation were drawn up by the relevant department within the Office of the Chief of the Civil Administration. Measures against the Jews were also initiated and carried out by the section for Jewish affairs (Department II B 3, later IV B 4) of the Luxembourg Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD, an entity that was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader for the Rhine and established in Luxembourg City in August 1940; Paul Schmidt and Otto Schmalz were the officials in charge of Jewish affairs. The Einsatzkommando was led by the head of the Gestapo in Luxembourg, Wilhelm Nölle, who was succeeded in March 1941 by Fritz Hartmann. Most of the expulsions and deportations were carried out during Hartmann's term in office (until 1943).<sup>138</sup>

The German invasion and the rapid occupation of this tiny country had driven approximately 1,500 Jews, in addition to approximately 40,000 Luxembourgers, to flee from the southern part of the country, mostly to France. The German military authorities initially assured the remaining representative of the Luxembourg government and the chief rabbi of Luxembourg, Dr Robert Serebrenik, that no measures of any kind against Jews were planned.<sup>139</sup> However, pressure on the Jews began to mount following

136 Nico Wouters, 'La chasse aux Juifs, 1942–1944', in van Doorslaer et al. (eds.), *La Belgique docile*, pp. 547–662 (*Gewillig België*, pp. 434–460).

137 Emile Krier, 'Deutsche Besatzung in Luxemburg 1940–1944', in Wolfgang Benz, Johannes Houwink ten Cate, and Gerhard Otto (eds.), *Die Bürokratie der Okkupation: Strukturen der Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa* (Berlin: Metropol, 1998), p. 30.

138 Paul Dostert, *Luxembourg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe: Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Volksdeutsche Bewegung 1940–1945* (Luxembourg: Imprimerie Saint-Paul, 1985), pp. 205–209; Änder Hohengarten, *Die nationalsozialistische Judenpolitik in Luxemburg* (Luxembourg: Saint-Paul Luxembourg, 2004), pp. 13–27; Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', pp. 296–298.

139 Memorandum by Robert Serebrenik, 'Les Juifs sous l'occupation allemande, 10 mai 1940–26 mai 1941', New York, 3 Nov. 1961, published in Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, pp. 248–254, here p. 249. See also Albert Wehrer, 'La Seconde Guerre mondiale: La mission et l'activité politiques de la Commission administrative: Aide-mémoire sur les événements politiques de mai à octobre 1940' (typescript, 1945), p. 7.

the establishment of the civil administration several weeks after the start of the occupation. Although Hitler had first decided to introduce German law only sparingly in Luxembourg, in August 1940 Gustav Simon was already seeking to draft two regulations that largely transposed the anti-Jewish legislation from the Reich to Luxembourg (Docs. 199, 200). These regulations were the first in the German-occupied regions of Western and Northern Europe to provide for such drastic measures as the introduction of the German racial laws and the official dispossession of the Jews.<sup>140</sup> Parallel to these first anti-Jewish measures, the Einsatzkommando in Luxembourg began to systematically record the Jews in a 'Jew registry' (*Judenkartei*), which later provided the basis for the compilation of deportation lists.<sup>141</sup>

On 12 September 1940 the Gestapo ordered the approximately 2,000 Jews remaining in Luxembourg to leave the country within two weeks (Doc. 202). Although the Consistory, as the representative of the Jews, successfully opposed this directive, the civil administration and the German police continued to push ahead with the deportation of Jews. Some Jews succeeded in leaving the country on their own initiative. From October 1940 some fifteen transports deported Jews, usually accompanied by Gestapo officials, from Luxembourg to Belgium or, alternatively, through France and Spain to Portugal. From there, some were able to continue their journey to an overseas destination. However, transports were repeatedly stopped at the borders of the transit countries because valid entry permits or visas for one of the few third countries willing to admit the Jews were lacking. The Jews in question were sent from one border to the next until finally being interned in camps in the south of France (Doc. 204). One well-documented such case was a convoy of Luxembourg Jews that arrived at the Portuguese border at Vilar Formoso on 11 November 1940. From 1942 some of them were deported, along with the other inmates, to the extermination camps; others joined resistance movements or managed to flee to the free world.<sup>142</sup>

The situation for the Jews remaining in Luxembourg worsened appreciably. From September 1940 Jewish children were no longer allowed to attend school, and the Consistory was only permitted to set up one Jewish school. Moreover, the Regulation on Jewish Assets in Luxembourg, issued on 5 September 1940, marked the beginning of the elimination of Jews from economic and professional life. Shops and firms belonging to Jews were placed under temporary administration or were liquidated. Assets had to be registered and Jewish accounts were blocked. Only a small amount of money was released for living expenses (Doc. 227). Although Simon was completely in favour of having Luxembourgers profit from Aryanization, their interest in doing so was slight.<sup>143</sup>

140 Regulation on Measures Related to Legislation Pertaining to Jews (5 September 1940), *VOBl-L*, no. 2, 24 Sept. 1940, p. 10, and Regulation on Jewish Assets in Luxembourg (5 September 1940), *ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

141 Hohengarten, *Die nationalsozialistische Judenpolitik*, pp. 29, 34.

142 Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, pp. 53–69; Hoffmann, 'Luxembourg', pp. 196–203; Laurent Moyse, *Du rejet à l'intégration: Histoire des Juifs du Luxembourg des origines à nos jours* (Luxembourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 2011), pp. 212–216; Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', p. 299; Margarida de Magalhães Ramalho, *Vilar Formoso – Frontier of Peace/Vilar Formoso – Fronteira de Paz* (Almeida: Almeida Council, 2014), pp. 97–119.

143 Hans-Erich Volkmann, *Luxemburg im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes: Eine politische Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1933 bis 1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), pp. 228–231.



The confiscation of the Jews' property followed as a result of additional regulations issued on 7 February and 18 April 1941. Department IV A of the civil administration, which was responsible for administering the assets of Jews and emigrants, kept tabs on this property. In November 1941 and January 1942 Jews were required to surrender almost all their personal and household effects, including furniture, pieces of art, household items, pets, and clothing, so that they were left with only basic essentials. The civil administration had the power to have Jews evicted from apartments and houses at will. Jews were also barred from additional occupations, and a directive issued on 5 May 1941 ordered the dismissal of Jews employed by Luxembourg businesses (Doc. 266).<sup>144</sup>

Only around 950 Jews still remained in Luxembourg by the spring of 1941, many of them elderly and ill. Here too anti-Jewish measures escalated constantly. Indeed, the assets of Jews in Luxembourg were seized before those of Jews on Reich territory. In February 1941 the chief of the civil administration ordered the seizure of the assets of Jews who had emigrated or fled. He extended the order on 18 April to include the assets of all Jews still remaining in the country, and finally, on 6 July 1941, to include those of deceased Jews. In May 1941 the civil administration ordered the demolition of the synagogues in Luxembourg City and in Esch-sur-Alzette.<sup>145</sup> On 29 July 1941 it banned Jews from public facilities and restaurants and imposed a curfew, requiring Jews to remain indoors after 7 p.m. (Doc. 212). From August 1941 Jews were required to wear a yellow armband 10 centimetres wide, following the example set by the introduction of compulsory identifying badges for Jews in the General Government. This step was initiated by the Luxembourg Einsatzkommando and preceded the introduction of the yellow star in the Reich in September 1941 and in the other countries of Western Europe. On 14 October 1941 the armband was replaced by the yellow star as an identifying badge for Jews in Luxembourg. In contrast, the yellow star was introduced in the Netherlands only on 29 April 1942, in Belgium on 27 May 1942, and in France two days after that.

Along with marginalizing the Jews, the civil administration and Einsatzkommando hastened their removal from Luxembourg. Eichmann had expressly summoned the chief rabbi of Luxembourg, Robert Serebrenik, and the president of the Consistory, Louis Sternberg, to the RSHA in Berlin on 24 April 1941 to work out ways to accelerate the emigration of the Jews remaining in Luxembourg (Doc. 207). Serebrenik later recalled that Eichmann had left no doubt about the fact that emigration from the Reich and the occupied territories would soon cease to be a possibility: 'Luxembourg must be made "Jew-free", and if I was not able to achieve this goal by arranging for emigration to the West, he would see to it that the Jews would be taken to the East (where they would be forced to work).'<sup>146</sup>

144 Commission spéciale, *La Spoliation des biens juifs*, pp. 16–35; Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, p. 52; Volkmann, *Luxemburg im Zeichen des Hakenkreuzes*, pp. 221–243.

145 Hohengarten, *Die nationalsozialistische Judenpolitik*, p. 39; Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, p. 75.

146 Memorandum by Serebrenik, 'Les Juifs sous l'occupation allemande', pp. 251–252. In August 1940 Serebrenik, together with members of the Consistory, had already begun arranging the emigration of many Jews from Luxembourg.

When Hitler decided in September 1941 that 'the Old Reich and the Protectorate [are to be] emptied and liberated of Jews from west to east as soon as possible',<sup>147</sup> this applied also to Luxembourg, which was regarded as part of the territory of the Reich. On 5 October 1941 the Consistory had to inform the Luxembourg Jews of the impending deportations to the East (Doc. 214). In the faint hope of being able to avoid the deportations, on 13 October 1941 the Consistory proposed that all Jews still present in the country be brought together in one place (Doc. 217). That suggestion proved highly opportune for the German authorities. As early as the summer of 1941, a Jewish home for the elderly had been set up in the former abbey at Cinqfontaines (Fünfbrunnen), near Troisvierges (Ulflingen), in northern Luxembourg.<sup>148</sup> It now became a compulsory place of residence for most of the remaining Jews and simultaneously an assembly and transit camp for transports to the East.

On 15 October 1941 the last of a total of thirteen transports of Jewish emigrants departed the country westwards, taking 120 Jews to Portugal. Up until then an estimated 1,450 Jews had succeeded in escaping to the free world.<sup>149</sup> However, the following day, a first deportation eastwards would take place; nowhere was the shift in Germany's anti-Jewish policy from forced emigration to deportation towards the East more manifest. This first train carried 331 Jews to the Lodz ghetto. It was combined with a transport of 181 Jews from Trier. The SD was displeased that the transport's departure had not escaped the notice of the Luxembourg public. Recently, it reported, 'a large number of Catholic priests, amid warm handshakes and tears, told the 350 Jews being deported to the Lodz ghetto that they hoped to see them again soon'.<sup>150</sup> Even the *New York Times*, which ordinarily did not address the topic of Luxembourg, mentioned the deportations of Jews from Luxembourg in its edition of 22 October 1941, citing the *Kölnische Zeitung*.<sup>151</sup>

Many of the Jews who were taken to the Lodz ghetto were subsequently deported, along with the other residents of the ghetto, to Chelmno extermination camp. Only eleven Jews from this first Luxembourg transport survived.<sup>152</sup> Owing to the small number of Jews from Luxembourg, subsequent transports from that country were combined with transports from the Reich. The second transport left Luxembourg on 23 April 1942 (Docs. 223 and 224). It was coupled to a transport from Stuttgart and routed to Izbica in the district of Lublin. From there, the deportees were presumably sent to the Belzec or the Sobibor extermination camp. Not one of the Jews deported to the East on this transport from Luxembourg survived.<sup>153</sup>

147 Letter from Heinrich Himmler to the Gauleiter in the Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, dated 18 Sept. 1941, announcing transports of Jews from the Reich to Litzmannstadt/Lodz, BArch NS 19/2655, fol. 3, cited in Longerich, *Holocaust*, p. 267.

148 Marc Schoentgen, 'Das "Jüdische Altersheim" in Fünfbrunnen', in Wolfgang Benz and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen: Nationalsozialistische Lager in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Luxemburg 1940–1945* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 49–70.

149 Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', p. 301.

150 Meldungen aus dem Reich, no. 238, 17 Nov. 1941, published in Heinz Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS*, vol. 8 (Herrsching: Pawlak, 1984), p. 3001.

151 'Anti-Jewish Drive Renewed in Reich', *New York Times*, 22 Oct. 1941, p. 11.

152 Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, p. 101.

153 Ibid., pp. 121–125.

A further aspect of anti-Jewish policy in Luxembourg was an organizational one: the establishment of a Jewish Council. As Luxembourg's Jewish community had diminished, Gustav Simon apparently did not see the need to change the structure and status of the Consistory. However, in October 1941, when the direction of deportations changed from the west to the east, the Gestapo intervened: Alfred Oppenheimer was forcibly appointed head of the Consistory, and several months later, on 15 April 1942, his title was changed to Jewish elder (*Judenältester*), similar to Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski's title in the Lodz ghetto.<sup>154</sup>

The reactions of the Luxembourg population to the anti-Jewish measures varied. The Ethnic German Movement (Volksdeutsche Bewegung, VdB) disputed the existence of a separate Luxembourg nation and favoured the incorporation of the country into the German Reich. On 7 September 1940 VdB members pasted notices reading 'Jewish shop' onto display windows, but the public denunciation failed to achieve its purpose. Instead, many Luxembourgers voiced their disapproval or purchased more frequently from Jewish-owned shops.<sup>155</sup> Luxembourgers were generally reluctant to participate in the Aryanization process.<sup>156</sup> Nevertheless, antisemites did raid the homes of Jews, loot shops, and cause damage to synagogues, and denunciations did occur.<sup>157</sup> The Luxembourgier Alfred Oppenheimer later recalled:

In every case, a simple, even anonymous letter from some malicious neighbour was all the Gestapo needed to proceed to arrest and immediately transport those concerned to a prison camp. Not one of these unfortunates ever returned.<sup>158</sup>

## France

Nazi Germany established different occupation regimes in the countries of Western and Northern Europe. The situation in France was the most complex. After the armistice agreements between Germany and France signed on 22 June 1940, only the northern part of France and the strategically important Atlantic coast were under German military administration. While the northern French départements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais fell under the jurisdiction of the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, Alsace and Lorraine were placed under German civil administration. Because the Gauleiter of Baden and the Gauleiter of Saar-Palatinate exercised control over these regions with a joint staff, both regions – like Luxembourg – were in effect annexed and incorporated into the territory of the Reich. After the establishment of the German civil administration, several thousand Jews were expelled from Alsace in July 1940 and from

154 Ludwig Nestler et al., *Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Belgien, Luxemburg und den Niederlanden (1940–1945)* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1990), pp. 25–26; memorandum by Serebrenik, 'Les Juifs sous l'occupation allemande'.

155 Dostert, *Luxemburg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbstaufgabe*, p. 162.

156 Schoentgen, 'Luxembourg', p. 304.

157 Cerf, *L'Étoile juive*, pp. 82–84.

158 Affidavit of Mr Alfred Oppenheimer, 2 Nov. 1960, Police d'Israel, 6-ème Bureau, cited in Tōviyyā Friedman (ed.), *Die Deportation der Juden aus Belgien und Luxemburg während der Nazi-Besetzung 1940–1944* (Haifa: Institute of Documentation in Israel for the Investigation of Nazi War Crimes, 1999), no pagination.

Lorraine in August of the same year and sent into the unoccupied southern zone of France. The subsequent destruction of the synagogues in Strasbourg and Thionville was intended to emphasize the finality of the expulsion of the Jews from these areas (Doc. 243). In October 1940, shortly after the expulsion of the Jews from Alsace and Lorraine, 6,500 German Jews were also deported from Baden and the Saar-Palatinate to southern France, where they were interned in the camp at Gurs. They were barely able to take any personal possessions with them, and all the belongings they left behind were confiscated (Doc. 250).<sup>159</sup>

A military administration was set up in Paris. From October 1940 to February 1942, the military commander was General Otto von Stülpnagel. The chief task of the military administration was to ensure military and political control in the occupied region, as well as the continuation of industrial and agricultural production for the German war economy. This was to be accomplished with relatively sparse resources and only around 1,000 German civil servants. In accordance with the principle of 'supervisory administration' (*Aufsichtsverwaltung*), the German authorities themselves did not govern; rather, they directed and controlled the French administration. This required that French administrative activities continued to run smoothly.<sup>160</sup>

In the southern zone of France, which was not occupied until November 1942, a formally independent French government, with its seat at Vichy, was established with the consent of the Germans. On 10 July 1940 the French Chamber of Deputies and the Senate had empowered the new government of Marshal Philippe Pétain to draw up a new constitution (which, however, never materialized).<sup>161</sup> Under the terms of the armistice agreement, the new French leadership had explicitly pledged to cooperate with German agencies and authorities. It endorsed political collaboration in the attempt to preserve at least a measure of state sovereignty for France after the defeat, and also in the hope of securing an advantageous place for the country in a 'new Europe' following the seemingly inevitable German victory in the war.

In the occupied region of France, the French administration had to take orders both from the Vichy regime and from the German authorities. In Paris, so-called authorized representatives of the ministries implemented the policies of the Vichy regime for the occupied territory. Most of the civil servants in the ministries had remained in Paris. A stable administrative routine thus soon developed between the French ministries and the

159 The removal of the Jews from Germany gave rise to protests from the French leadership, which, under the armistice agreements, had consented to accept solely the French Jews from Alsace and Lorraine. See Lothar Kettenacker, *Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik im Elsaß* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973); Freddy Raphael and Robert Weyl, *Juifs en Alsace* (Toulouse: Privat, 1977); Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte*, pp. 141–144; and PMJ 3, p. 47. On the deportations from Baden and the Saar-Palatinate in October 1940, see Uwe Schellinger, '22. Oktober 1940: Die Deportation der Juden aus Südwestdeutschland nach Gurs', in Andreas Nachama and Klaus Hesse (eds.), *Vor aller Augen: Die Deportation der Juden und die Versteigerung ihres Eigentums: Fotografien aus Lörrach, 1940* (Berlin: Hentrich & Hentrich, 2018), pp. 11–26, and PMJ 3/112 and 113.

160 The term 'supervisory administration' is explained in Werner Best, 'Die deutsche Militärverwaltung in Frankreich', *Reich – Volksordnung – Lebensraum*, vol. 1 (1941), pp. 29–76. See also Herbert, *Best*, pp. 251–254.

161 Jean-Pierre Azéma, *1940, l'année noire* (Paris: Fayard, 2010), pp. 246–256, 268–279.

German occupation regime.<sup>162</sup> The efforts of Pétain's government to have German directives implemented independently by the French administration largely complied with the German desire to control the country with as few civil servants as possible. Hence, the Aryanization of Jewish property in France – which was initiated by the Germans but carried out by the French administration (predominantly to the benefit of the French state coffers) – was overseen by a single civil servant in the military administration.<sup>163</sup>

The German military administration was the occupying force's supreme authority, with responsibilities including the implementation of measures against the Jewish population. In political questions, however, the Reich Foreign Office's branch in Paris, which was declared an embassy in November 1940, also had a say. SS-Sturmbannführer Carl Theo Zeitschel was in charge of 'Jewish and Freemason questions' there as of September 1940. The third, initially still relatively insignificant, instrument of power in the German occupying force was Helmut Knochen, representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, who had been dispatched by the RSHA. At first he had only twenty employees and was responsible for the surveillance of political opponents. Theodor Dannecker, who began working in Paris in September 1940 as Knochen's assistant for Jewish affairs, soon gained considerable influence over anti-Jewish policy. He had previously worked at the RSHA's section for Jewish affairs under Adolf Eichmann, from whom he continued to receive his instructions. In addition, representatives of a wide variety of German agencies were present in the country without an official assignment.<sup>164</sup>

From the beginning of the German occupation, the situation for the Jews in France was characterized by uncertainty and fear. Shortly after the Franco-German Armistice, supporters of far-right French groups, mostly youths, moved through Paris, beating up people whom they took to be Jewish, smashing the display windows of Jewish shops and affixing placards featuring antisemitic hate slogans to buildings. Even before the first official anti-Jewish measure was implemented, Jews had experienced blatant discrimination at work and in everyday life. Most members of the public rejected acts of violence against Jews, though not necessarily all anti-Jewish measures.

Both the German military administration in Paris and the government in Vichy began to take action against the Jews shortly after the armistice. In the process, a kind of parallel approach can be identified, whereby the German occupiers and the French government each issued the anti-Jewish directives that they considered to be most pressing, with the French government sometimes acting even more swiftly to impose anti-Jewish measures.

162 Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 25–71; Rita Thalmann, *Gleichschaltung in Frankreich 1940–1944* (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1999); Roland Ray, *Annäherung an Frankreich im Dienste Hitlers? Otto Abetz und die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1930–1942* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000); Barbara Lambauer, *Otto Abetz et les Français, ou l'envers de la collaboration* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 31–60; Mayer, *Staaten als Täter*, pp. 224–261.

163 Martin Jungius, *Der verwaltete Raub: Die 'Arisierung' der Wirtschaft in Frankreich in den Jahren 1940 bis 1944* (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2008), pp. 118–125.

164 Claudia Steur, *Theodor Dannecker: Ein Funktionär der 'Endlösung'* (Essen: Klartext, 1997); Ahlrich Meyer, *Die deutsche Besatzung in Frankreich 1940–1944: Widerstandsbekämpfung und Judenverfolgung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), pp. 19–67; Herbert, *Best*, pp. 251–258; Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, pp. 30–31; Peter Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), pp. 49–73.

While the German occupiers focused more on economic aspects and policing matters related to security, the attention of the Vichy government was directed primarily towards public administration and the professional sector, with the goal of purging them of foreigners, even those who were naturalized, and limiting them to 'men of French parentage', as Marshal Pétain stated in a decree issued on 13 July 1940.<sup>165</sup>

On 17 August 1940 Otto Abetz, the German ambassador, had already suggested to the military administration that it could '(a) order with immediate effect that no more Jews will be allowed to enter the occupied territory; (b) prepare for the removal of all Jews from the occupied territory; (c) determine whether Jewish property in the occupied territory can be expropriated' (Doc. 232). Abetz thereby clearly went beyond the anti-Jewish measures that had thus far been discussed or implemented in the other occupied countries of Western and Northern Europe.

The military administration was sceptical about such plans, partly on grounds of international law, but also because occupation rule in France would have been made more difficult as a result. At the same time, however, the civil servants in the military administration were convinced of the necessity of anti-Jewish measures. On 27 September 1940 the military commander of occupied France, Otto von Stülpnagel, issued the First Regulation on Measures Against Jews, which modified Abetz's proposals to a certain extent (Doc. 238). It forbade Jews to cross over into the occupied region, and therefore Jews who had fled from the German troops into the unoccupied region could no longer return. The Jewish population remaining in the occupied zone was under strict control. All Jews had to register with the local French police authorities, and Jewish businesses were labelled as such. Only three weeks later, on 18 October, von Stülpnagel announced the Second Regulation on Measures Against Jews, specifying which businesses in the occupied zone were to be deemed Jewish. All Jewish-run businesses were required to register (Doc. 246). The military administration had thus issued a comprehensive bundle of measures, as a result of which the Jewish population in the occupied zone was subject to extensive policing measures and economic controls, and preparations were made for their dispossession.

Immediately after the formation of the 'French state' (*État français*), the Vichy government laid the foundations for a discriminatory policy which was initially directed against foreigners living in France in general, but increasingly began to target non-French Jews in particular. From 17 July 1940 the process of 'cleansing' the administration, which had already begun in September 1939 under the republican government, was intensified. It was now possible to dismiss any civil servant or salaried employee who did not meet the expectations of the new state leadership. This measure was aimed at foreigners and political opponents, but it also affected Jews who had been naturalized in the preceding years. Likewise, Jews were the main group affected by the law issued on 22 July 1940,<sup>166</sup> which ushered in a review of all naturalizations performed since 1927.

The discriminatory measures pertaining to foreign Jews culminated in the internment law of 4 October 1940. Henceforth, 'foreign nationals of the Jewish race' could

165 Vicki Caron, 'French Public Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1930–1942: The Role of Middle-Class Professional Associations', in David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds.), *Nazi Europe and the Final Solution* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), pp. 384–385.

166 *Journal officiel*, 23 July 1940, p. 4567.

be sent to special internment camps without any reason given (Doc. 242). By the end of October 1941, the French government in the unoccupied zone had already had 20,000 Jews put in camps. In certain instances, internees from the territory of the German Reich and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were handed over to the military administration.<sup>167</sup>

Since July 1940 the French Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior had been working to produce a comprehensive regulation on the position of the French Jews. The Statute on Jews (*Loi portant statut des Juifs*), issued on 3 October 1940, formed the basis for their exclusion from the administration and from certain occupational categories (Doc. 241).<sup>168</sup> The law, the first to be directed exclusively against Jews in 150 years, left the Jews of France, especially those long established in the country, in a state of shock. The equality of citizens, one of the achievements of the French Revolution and one of the principles of the Republic, was hereby abolished – ‘a deed’, the Jewish delegate from the Indre département, Max Hymans, wrote to Marshal Pétain, ‘that can be compared only to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, whose consequences are still evident even three centuries after the fact’.<sup>169</sup>

In the French majority population, reactions to the Statute on Jews were muted. The French authorities, however, were able to learn from wire-tapped telephone conversations, opened letters, and the reports of the prefects that many French people approved of the restrictions for Jews, their degradation to second-class citizens, and not least their internment, particularly if the measures targeted foreign Jews (Docs. 296, 313).<sup>170</sup> Indeed, with some notable exceptions, many French people were either indifferent to the wave of anti-Jewish measures or actively involved in the process of social marginalization, and called for the state to take legal action against the Jewish minority.<sup>171</sup> The Vichy government also issued another law aimed at Jews on 7 October 1940, revoking

167 Grynberg, *Les Camps de la honte*, pp. 136–141; Jacques Fredj (ed.), *L’Internement des Juifs sous Vichy* (Paris: Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, 1996), pp. 15–17; Richard H. Weisberg, *Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 56–58.

168 André Kaspi, *Les Juifs pendant l’Occupation* (Paris: Seuil, 1997); Marc Olivier Baruch, *Le Régime de Vichy* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1996), pp. 22–25; Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Mayer, *Staaten als Täter*, pp. 39–74; Michael Mayer, ‘The French Jewish Statute of October 3, 1940: A Reevaluation of Continuities and Discontinuities of French Antisemitism’, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 33, no. 1 (2019), pp. 4–22; Laurent Joly, *L’Etat contre les Juifs: Vichy, les nazis et la persécution antisémite (1940–1944)* (Paris: Grasset, 2018), pp. 35–39; Laurent Joly, ‘The Genesis of Vichy’s Jewish Statute of October 1940’, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, vol. 27 (2013), pp. 276–298.

169 Letter dated 20 Feb. 1941, Alliance israélite universelle, CC-49, cited in Poznanski, *Jews in France*, p. 86. See also Adam Rayski, *Le Choix des Juifs sous Vichy: Entre soumission et résistance* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1992). The Edict of Nantes (1598), which granted extensive religious freedoms to France’s Protestant (Huguenot) minority, was one of the first decrees of religious tolerance in Europe. It was revoked by King Louis XIV in 1685, which led to the persecution and emigration of the Huguenots.

170 Stéphane Courtois and Adam Rayski, *Qui savait quoi? L’Extermination des Juifs 1941–1945* (Paris: La Découverte, 1987), pp. 79–102; Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 270–279; Pierre Laborie, *L’Opinion française sous Vichy* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001).

171 John F. Sweets, ‘Jews and Non-Jews in France during the Second World War’, in David Bankier and Israel Gutman (eds.), *Nazi Europe and the Final Solution* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), pp. 361–363; Caron, ‘French Public Opinion’, pp. 384–394.

the Crémieux Decree, according to which the Jews of Algeria had attained French citizenship in 1870 (Doc. 244).<sup>172</sup>

In its anti-Jewish measures, the military administration concentrated primarily on the economic dispossession of the Jews (Doc. 246). For this reason, the French government feared that German firms might buy up formerly Jewish businesses in order to gain economic influence in the country. With the consent of the German military administration, which did not have sufficient personnel of its own for this purpose, the Vichy government established a separate authority to carry out the Aryanizations under French supervision. The German military administration confined itself solely to random checks (Doc. 269). From December 1940 the French Ministry of Economics appointed 'temporary administrators' for expropriated businesses and assets and set up an agency to oversee their work, the Service du contrôle des administrateurs provisoires (SCAP). This agency became the most significant mechanism for Aryanizing the French economy. As of January 1941 the temporary administrators were empowered to purchase or to liquidate enterprises belonging to Jews. From July 1941 the profits were managed by the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, a government-run financial institution. From April 1941 Jews were denied access to business assets and the proceeds of liquidation and, as of that May, also to their private accounts. On 22 July 1941 the Vichy government regulated the Aryanization of the economy in a comprehensive law which also affected the unoccupied zone (Doc. 273). By the end of 1941 the Jews throughout France had by and large been dispossessed.<sup>173</sup>

Jews were also robbed of their possessions in other ways. The Rosenberg Task Force sought out and sifted through large Jewish-owned art collections to secure Jewish cultural holdings. Moreover, in the course of the so-called Furniture Operation (*Möbel-Aktion*), which began in January 1942, the Western Office (Dienststelle Westen) requisitioned furnishings and household items from the vacated homes of Jews. These articles were sent to Germany and were supposed to be allocated to Germans whose homes had

172 Henri Msellati, *Les Juifs d'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy: 10 juillet 1940–3 novembre 1943* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999), pp. 66–68. Vichy's anti-Jewish policies had further consequences for the Jews of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. However, there was no gearing up towards the 'final solution' because at this stage this was limited to the European continent. See Dan Michman, 'Le sort des Juifs d'Afrique du Nord pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale: fait-il partie de la Shoah?', in Haim Saadoun and Dan Michman (eds.), *Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord face à l'Allemagne nazie* (Paris: Perrin, Yad Vashem and Ben Zvi Institute, 2018), pp. 13–34; Filippo Petrucci, *Gli ebrei in Algeria e in Tunisia 1940–1943* (Florence: Giuntina, 2011); Michael M. Laskier, *North African Jewry in the 20th Century: Jews of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria* (New York: New York University Press, 1994).

173 Philippe Verheyde, 'The Looting of Jewish Property and Franco-German rivalry, 1940–1944', in Gerald D. Feldman and Wolfgang Seibel (eds.), *Networks of Nazi Persecution: Bureaucracy, Business, and the Organization of the Holocaust* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2005), pp. 69–87; Antoine Prost, *Aryanisation économique et restitutions* (Paris: La Documentation française, 2000); Jean Mattéoli, *Rapport général: Mission d'étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France* (Paris: Documentation française, 2000); Jean-Marc Dreyfus, *Pillages sur ordonnances: Aryanisation et restitution des banques en France 1940–1953* (Paris: Fayard, 2003), pp. 95–101; Götz Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries: How the Nazis Bought the German People* (Brooklyn/London: Verso, 2007), pp. 210–223; Jean-Marc Dreyfus, 'The Looting of Property in Occupied Western Europe: A Comparative Study of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands', in Martin Dean, Constantin Goshler, and Philipp Ther (eds.), *Robbery and Restitution: The Conflict over Jewish Property in Europe* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), pp. 53–67.



suffered damage in bombing raids.<sup>174</sup> On the request of the Army High Command, the Furniture Operation was also extended to Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.<sup>175</sup>

In Austria, the Old Reich, the Protectorate, and the annexed and occupied territories of Poland, the officials in charge of Jewish affairs at the SS were the driving force behind the establishment of Jewish councils. In France, too, Theodor Dannecker, from the moment of his arrival in Paris on 5 October 1940, worked to establish a similar structure. However, the situation in France was complicated and the power of the SS at that time was still limited. Dannecker began to collect information about French Jewry and exerted pressure on Jewish leaders in Paris to initiate the establishment of a new Jewish umbrella organization, separate and independent from the Consistory. Since 1933 some Jewish organizations had already been responding to the arrival of refugees from German-controlled territories by augmenting the assistance they offered. The relief organizations created committees in order to cope with the diverse needs of the victims of persecution, especially those interned in camps, and to organize their own work more effectively. Dannecker chose the relief and social aid organizations to achieve his goal of creating a separate Jewish organization. This culminated at the end of January 1941 in the establishment of a Coordination Committee of Charitable Organizations in Greater Paris (*Comité de coordination des œuvres de bienfaisance du Grand-Paris*) (Doc. 272). It was run by prominent Jews and responsible for coordinating aid for Jews. In March 1941 Dannecker brought two Jewish ‘advisors’ from Vienna to instruct the Coordination Committee on how to work with the German supervising authority. As a result of pressure from Dannecker, the chairman of the committee, Rabbi Sachs, acquired far-reaching powers that went beyond those usually held by a rabbi under French law. Yet Dannecker’s strategy to give the German authorities an initial tool for controlling the Jewish population in France failed in the short term, because the members of the committee revolted after a short while and succeeded in July 1941 in neutralizing the influence of the advisors.<sup>176</sup>

Meanwhile, in the hope of gaining greater influence over French anti-Jewish measures in general and over the organized Jewish community in particular, at the beginning of 1941 Dannecker and the German embassy had begun to call for the establishment of a single French authority, similar to the supervising authorities in Vienna and

174 Peter M. Manasse, *Verschleppte Archive und Bibliotheken: Die Tätigkeiten des Einsatzstabes Rosenberg während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (St. Ingbert: Röhrig, 1997); Anja Heuss, *Kunst- und Kulturgutraub: Studie zur Besatzungspolitik der Nationalsozialisten in Frankreich und der Sowjetunion* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2000); Willem de Vries, *Kunstraub im Westen 1940–1945: Alfred Rosenberg und der Sonderstab Musik* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000); Kenneth D. Alford, *Hermann Göring and the Nazi Art Collection: The Looting of Europe’s Art Treasures and Their Dispersal after World War II* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2012), pp. 48–60; Volker Koop, *Alfred Rosenberg: Der Wegbereiter des Holocaust: Eine Biographie* (Cologne/Vienna: Böhlau 2016), pp. 160–163.

175 Aalders, *Nazi Looting*, pp. 203–210; Aly, *Hitler’s Beneficiaries*, pp. 135–152.

176 Joseph Billig, *Le Commissariat général aux questions juives (1941–1944)*, 3 vols. (Paris: Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, 1955–1960), vol. 1, pp. 41–42; Jacques Adler, *Face à la persécution: Les organisations juives à Paris de 1940 à 1944* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1985), pp. 42–44; Richard I. Cohen, *The Burden of Conscience: French Jewry’s Response to the Holocaust* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 26–27.

Berlin, that would be in charge of all questions related to the policy concerning Jews (Doc. 260). While the military administration showed little interest in this proposal, initial attempts to sound out the Vichy government revealed that it was not averse to such a proposition. For one thing, the French were definitely interested in appeasing the German occupation authorities, which were displeased that Prime Minister Pierre Laval, a staunch supporter of collaboration, had been overthrown by the head of state, Marshal Pétain, in December 1940. For another, the French leadership itself had for some time been thinking about establishing a central authority for Jewish affairs in order to coordinate the drafting of further anti-Jewish legislation. On 28 March 1941 the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat général aux questions juives) was created for this purpose. Xavier Vallat was appointed to serve as the first commissioner general for Jewish affairs. Though an antisemite, Vallat was considered an opponent of German–French rapprochement and, during his time in office until May 1942, his efforts to curb German influence on the Commissariat General met with some success (Doc. 264).<sup>177</sup>

Up until the spring of 1942 the French government had a large degree of autonomy in implementing its anti-Jewish measures. The Germans only exerted direct influence when it came to the Aryanization of the economy. The Vichy regime used this time to fine-tune the persecution of the Jews and on 2 June 1941 issued a tougher Statute on Jews that expanded the measures taken thus far (Doc. 270). On the same day the government also ordered the registration of all Jews in France (Docs. 271, 275). The data gathered in the process went far beyond the information collected by the Germans in the occupied zone in the autumn of 1940 and provided the German authorities with the statistical basis for the subsequent deportation of the Jewish population, without this having been the actual intention of the French authorities. By the summer of 1941 the Vichy regime had largely excluded the Jews from politics, the state administration, certain professional fields, and economic life, and had subjected them to overarching surveillance by the Security Police.<sup>178</sup> ‘A dark, dark day’, wrote a French Jewish businessman, ‘this morning, a grim announcement in the press: the commentary on the regulation which appeared yesterday, giving notice of the ruthless campaign against Martin [here meaning Jews]. To be precise, there is a desire to chase us off the continent.’<sup>179</sup>

The Jewish communities in France, shocked at the introduction of racial legislation by the French government, tried but failed to intervene with the authorities to oppose it.<sup>180</sup> The chairman of the various Protestant groups in France, Marc Boegner, who was keenly aware of the persecution of his own religious community in the past, had also approached the former French foreign minister, Paul Baudouin, asking him to lend his support to the Jewish population. Baudouin considered it necessary to exclude the Jews

177 Billig, *Le Commissariat général aux questions juives*; Laurent Joly, *Xavier Vallat (1891–1972): Du nationalisme chrétien à l’antisémitisme d’Etat* (Paris: Grasset, 2001), pp. 85–93, 153–228; Laurent Joly, *Vichy dans la ‘Solution finale’: Histoire du Commissariat général aux questions juives (1941–1944)* (Paris: Grasset, 2006).

178 Joly, *L’Etat contre les Juifs*, pp. 41–61; Mayer, *Staaten als Täter*, pp. 109–166.

179 Diary of Pierre Lion, entry for 10 May 1941 (original privately owned). The reference is to the Third Regulation on Measures Against Jews (26 April 1941): see Doc. 266.

180 Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 85–101; Michel Laffitte, *Juif dans la France allemande: institutions, dirigeants et communautés au temps de la Shoah* (Paris: Grand Livre du Mois, 2006), pp. 99–116.

from the leadership of the state, but did not feel that this legitimized grave injustice. However, he was of the view that ‘our people are so “corrupted” that a revolution is inevitable’.<sup>181</sup> Despite his sympathy for the persecuted Jews, Boegner remarked to the chief rabbi of France that ‘as a result of the large-scale immigration of foreigners, whether Jews or not, and as a result of overly hasty and unjustified naturalizations’, the French state was indeed facing a major problem.<sup>182</sup>

At an early stage the Catholic Church in France had already made known its fundamental support for the enactment of the French Statute on Jews. Hence, on 31 August 1940 the French episcopate declared that it was ‘legitimate for a state to contemplate a special legal statute for the Jews (as the papacy in Rome had done)’.<sup>183</sup> However, Charles de Gaulle spoke on behalf of those who refused to exclude their Jewish fellow citizens. De Gaulle, who had formed the Free France committee in London along with a handful of loyal supporters, announced that the complete legal equality of the Jews would be guaranteed once again after the victory of the Allies (Doc. 235).

Jews reacted to the developments in various ways. The division of France into an occupied and a ‘free’ zone had an impact on the behaviour and feelings of the Jews in those zones due to the different composition of the authorities and the Jewish population. Refugees from the occupied zone and abroad were a notable presence in the ‘free zone’. Most French Jewish organizations relocated their headquarters to Vichy. The division between French *Israélites* and East European Jews was another factor affecting reactions. Many of the French *Israélites* tended to embrace the attitude of most of the non-Jewish population, hoping and believing that the Pétain regime would keep loyal to French traditions and the constitution, including the protection of the Jewish citizens. Though it did not fade entirely, this stance weakened once Vichy started to develop its own anti-Jewish policies. East European Jews, meanwhile, were warier from the outset.<sup>184</sup> Shortly after the armistice, Jews resumed their daily life, and Jewish institutions and organizations were reactivated. Religious life could continue during the first two years without major disruption, but religious leaders had to cope with new challenges, especially with regard to the deteriorating social and economic situation.<sup>185</sup> Jewish political movements and Jews affiliated with non-Jewish political parties and movements even intensified their activities, especially in the ‘free zone’. Communists, especially immigrants, became involved in general communist underground activities. The Jewish scout movement found ways to benefit from the Vichy regime’s goal of regeneration through agricultural training and attracted a considerable number of young French Jews. A new youth movement, the Jeunesse juive de France, was established in June 1941. Many cultural activities were developed; the number of homes for children, mostly refugees,

181 Philippe Boegner (ed.), *Carnets du pasteur Boegner 1940–1945* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), p. 59.

182 Ibid., pp. 92–93.

183 Cited in François Delpech, *Sur les Juifs: études d’histoire contemporaine* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1983), pp. 286–287; Michèle Cointet, *L’Église sous Vichy, 1940–1945: La repentance en question* (Paris: Perrin, 1998).

184 Asher Cohen, *Persécutions et sauvetages: Juifs et Français sous l’Occupation et sous Vichy* (Paris: Cerf, 1993), pp. 25–30.

185 Anne Grynberg and Catherine Nicault, ‘Le culte israélite en France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale: Droit et réalités d’exercice’, *Archives Juives*, vol. 28, no. 2 (1995), pp. 72–88.

grew; special medical services emerged; and assistance for interned Jews in the Vichy camps was organized.<sup>186</sup>

Because of their escalating social isolation and economic exclusion, the Jews were increasingly dependent on external aid granted to them by various Jewish or non-Jewish relief organizations. Besides the French Jewish institutions, these included organizations such as the JDC and Christian communities such as the American Quakers. Special assistance was given to Jewish children whose parents were interned or were unable to look after their children themselves on account of the dire living conditions. The children lived in homes set up for them by the Children's Aid Society (*Cœuvre de secours aux enfants*, OSE) (Docs. 231, 284). The OSE had previously managed to secure the release of many of them from internment camps.<sup>187</sup> Camp inmates also received assistance from Jewish and non-Jewish organizations (Doc. 307). In many cases, people were housed in buildings or barracks that had been hastily built or repurposed (Doc. 280). Poor nutrition and disease claimed many lives, especially among older internees. The living conditions were so catastrophic that the French administration soon felt obliged to improve the medical care and sanitary conditions, as well as the rations, in the camps (Docs. 239, 303, 314).

In April 1941 the German military administration indicated to the commissioner general for Jewish affairs, Vallat, that the goal of the German leadership was the 'total de-Jewification of Europe'. To achieve this goal, foreign Jews were to be deported, tougher anti-Jewish legislation was set in motion in France, and 3,000 to 5,000 Jews were placed in custody. Finally, Vallat was to begin the preparations for a subsequent 'emigration' of all Jews, including those with French citizenship.<sup>188</sup>

On 14 May 1941, during the first roundup in France carried out with the consent of the Vichy government, 3,733 foreign Jews were arrested and sent to the internment camps at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande (Doc. 268).<sup>189</sup> However, the Vichy government declined to intern Jews with French nationality if the sole ground for their detention was that they were Jews. Therefore, the German authorities now sought ways that would allow them also to take action against Jews who held French passports.<sup>190</sup>

Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German authorities in France anticipated increased activity by communist resistance groups. On 4 August the

186 Léo Hamon and Renée Poznanski, *Avant les premières grandes rafles: Les Juifs à Paris sous l'Occupation (juin 1940-avril 1941)*, Cahiers de l'IHTP 22 (Paris: IHTP, 1992); Cohen, *Persécutions et sauvetages*, pp. 83–84; Alain Michel, *Les Éclaireurs israéliques de France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, septembre 1939-septembre 1944: Action et évolution* (Paris: Éditions des EIF, 1984); Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 137–140; Daniel Lee, *Pétain's Jewish Children: French Jewish Youth and the Vichy Regime, 1940–1942* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

187 Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 140–143; Bob Moore, *Survivors: Jewish Self-Help and Rescue in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 99–165, 262–275.

188 Diary of Best, dated 4 April 1941, published in Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, p. 387.

189 David Diamant, *Le Billet vert: La vie et la résistance à Pithiviers et Beaune-la-Rolande, camps pour Juifs, camps pour chrétiens, camps pour patriotes* (Paris: Renouveau, 1977); Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, pp. 34–35.

190 Ahlrich Meyer, "Fremde Elemente": Die osteuropäisch-jüdische Immigration, die "Endlösung der Judenfrage" und die Anfänge der Widerstandsbewegung in Frankreich', in Eberhard Jungfer (ed.), *Arbeitsmigration und Flucht: Vertreibung und Arbeitskräfteeregulierung im Zwischenkriegseuropa, Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik 11* (Berlin/Göttingen: Schwarze Risse, Rote Straße, 1993) pp. 82–129.

military administration ordered the French police to respond to anti-German demonstrations by conducting a major wave of arrests. As a result, the city police cordoned off entire streets in Paris and made 4,232 arrests in the course of identity checks and house searches (Doc. 276). Officially the roundup was directed not against Jews, but rather against supporters of the communists. On this pretext the first arrests of Jews with French citizenship now took place. Among them were 200 intellectuals and well-known figures.<sup>191</sup> Many of the arrested Jews were taken to a newly created camp in Drancy, a Paris suburb. The camp, in which French and British prisoners of war had previously been interned, was under the control of the Paris Police Prefecture. It had been set up provisionally in half-completed social housing, and the facilities were completely inadequate. The first deaths were reported after just a few weeks. The military administration eventually reacted by releasing around 800 of those arrested and allowed those who remained to receive food parcels (Doc. 280).<sup>192</sup>

As the occupiers had anticipated, the French communists began to intensify their resistance efforts against the German authorities in the summer of 1941. The first assassination of a member of the German armed forces occurred on 21 August. This marked the start of a series of operations carried out by the resistance movement and of heightened repression from the Germans. On the day after this assassination, the Germans declared that all French people who were detained by or on behalf of the German authorities in occupied France were to be regarded collectively as hostages. On 3 September, when a further assassination took place, the German military commander, Otto von Stülpnagel, ordered that three hostages be shot in retribution. Hitler wrote a sharply worded note condemning this as a completely inadequate reaction.<sup>193</sup> After the field commander of Nantes was shot on 20 October and a German military official was shot in Bordeaux the following day, Hitler ordered that fifty hostages be shot immediately. In the event, ninety-eight hostages were executed on 22 and 24 October 1941, a measure that was met with horror both in France and abroad (Doc. 288).<sup>194</sup>

The prerequisites for Germany's occupation policy – the collaboration of the French administration and the pragmatic wait-and-see attitude of the French population – appeared to be in jeopardy. The military administration therefore proposed that instead of hostages being shot in retribution, arrangements be made to deport a larger number of people, specifically foreign Jews and communists, 'to the East for forced labour'. With Jewish resistance fighters among the convicted assassins, politically and ideologically

191 Ulrich Herbert, 'The German Military Command in Paris and the Deportation of the French Jews', in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), pp. 128–162; Ahlrich Meyer, *Täter im Verhör: Die "Endlösung der Judenfrage" in Frankreich 1940–1944* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), pp. 67–137.

192 Renée Poznanski, Denis Peschanski, and Benoît Pouvreau, *Drancy, un camp en France* (Paris: Fayard and Ministère de la Défense, 2015), pp. 29–96; Annette Wiewiorka and Michael Lafitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy* (Paris: Perrin, 2012).

193 'Das Geiselfverfahren im Bereich des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich vom August 1941 bis Mai 1942', memorandum, part 1, BArch, RW 35/542, p. 41; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKH) (Wagner) to the Military Commander (MBF), 7 Sept. 1941, BArch, RW 35/543, p. 18.

194 MBF to OKH, 24 Oct. 1941, cited in Hans Luther, *Der französische Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzungsmacht und seine Bekämpfung* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1957), pp. 206–207.

motivated repression could be combined. Following a further assassination on 28 November 1941, von Stülpnagel planned the killing of 'fifty Jews and communists' and the 'imposition of a fine of 1 billion francs upon the Jews of Paris', as well as the 'internment and deportation to the East of Jews who have come to the attention of the authorities because of their criminal or anti-German activities'. Here a figure of up to 1,000 persons was initially envisaged.<sup>195</sup>

A total of 742 Jews were arrested in Paris during the third roundup, which took place on 12 December 1941. Most of them were French, and they included many intellectuals, businessmen, and prominent figures. Three days later von Stülpnagel had seventy-five hostages executed at the Mont-Valérien fortress, including 21-year-old Jacques Grinbaum (Docs. 300, 301).

In view of Nazi Germany's seemingly unassailable military position and with the rising power of the SS, from the end of August 1941 Dannecker intensified his pressure on the French authorities to establish a mandatory organization of all Jews.<sup>196</sup> The Germans were in fact interested in a kind of Jewish Council which would be, directly or indirectly, under their control. Negotiations between the Germans, the Vichy authorities, and Vallat lasted around two months. Eventually, Vallat gave in to the idea itself but countered with an organization that had a different form: countrywide, with sections for the occupied and unoccupied zones; anchored in French law and subordinated to the French authorities; and using the French term *Israélites*. On 29 November 1941 the General Union of French Jews (Union générale des Israélites de France, UGIF) was established (Docs. 287, 295). All Jews in France were under the jurisdiction of this state-sanctioned Jewish organization, which incorporated existing organizations and their assets, most importantly the Coordination Committee of Charitable Organizations. Like developments in Belgium and in the Netherlands, the founding of the UGIF did not entail the dismantling and incorporation of all existing Jewish organizations, and thus the Consistory, and religious associations, continued to function separately.<sup>197</sup>

There were heated arguments among prominent French Jews about whether to accept such an umbrella organization. Nonetheless, to avoid the German authorities assuming direct control of the new mandatory association, which seemed all too likely, Albert Lévy, secretary general of the Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CAR), finally consented to take on the job of running the UGIF. Following his resignation, Raymond-Raoul Lambert became chairman. He sought to come to an arrangement with the Vichy government, in

<sup>195</sup> MBF to OKH, 1 Nov. 1941, in 'Das Geiselfverfahren', p. 77; Regina Delacor, *Attentate und Repressionen: Ausgewählte Dokumente zur zyklischen Eskalation des NS-Terrors im besetzten Frankreich 1941/42* (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000), pp. 17–45; Meyer, *Die deutsche Besatzung*, pp. 55–72; Christopher Neumaier, 'The Escalation of German Reprisal Policy in Occupied France, 1941–1942', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 41 (2006), pp. 113–131; Julia S. Torrie, *German Soldiers and the Occupation of France, 1940–1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 181.

<sup>196</sup> Cohen, *Burdens of Conscience*, pp. 50–52; Billig, *Commissariat*, vol. 1, pp. 210–211; Joly, *Xavier Vallat*, p. 239.

<sup>197</sup> As one example, with the establishment of the UGIF, the Central Commission of Jewish Relief Associations and the Camps Commission were dissolved. The chief rabbi of France, Isaïe Schwartz, then formally established the Aumônerie générale des Israélites de France (Jewish Chaplaincy) on 15 March 1942. The rabbis working for this organization could continue their work within the camps. The organization came under the authority of the Central Consistory and thus was not incorporated into the activities of the UGIF.

order to moderate the latter's anti-Jewish measures wherever possible (Doc. 298).<sup>198</sup> The UGIF effectively commenced operations at the beginning of 1942.

In the wake of the establishment of the UGIF in continental France, Vichy decided to establish a similar institution in Algeria. The Vichy Ministry of the Interior issued a decree ordering the creation of the Union générale des Israélites d'Algérie (UGIA) on 14 February 1942. The UGIA was subordinated to the governor general of Algeria, Yves Châtel, who ordered the chief rabbi of Algeria, M. Eisenbeth, to prepare a list of forty-five candidates from which he would choose the members of the UGIA board. Rabbi Eisenbeth submitted the list on 5 May, but it took the governor four months to make his choice. It was not until 6 November 1942 that the list was published in the *Journal officiel d'Algérie* and thereby sanctioned the appointment. However, two days later the Allies landed in Morocco and Algeria and the UGIA never materialized, even though the Vichy laws and decrees were not annulled until one year after the Allied landing.<sup>199</sup>

By the summer of 1941 information and rumours had begun to circulate in France regarding crimes committed in Eastern Europe against the local Jewish population. The editors of the Jewish underground press had known about the actions of the Germans in the Soviet Union since June 1941 and warned the Jewish population of Paris that the Germans were likely to introduce increasingly repressive measures in France.<sup>200</sup> At the same time, antisemitic propaganda and attacks on Jews increased considerably, particularly in Paris. The spiral of violence arising from the assassinations and the shooting of hostages affected every French citizen, but the Jewish populace faced particular dangers because it was primarily Jews who were used as hostages in reprisal. Fearful for their family members, a group of Jewish women wrote to the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs on 9 April 1942:

We wives and mothers of the men interned at Drancy and in Compiègne and in the other concentration camps are sending you this letter in order to apprise you of the situation in which we and our husbands find ourselves.

Our husbands and our sons were only going about their everyday business, but now they are being held in horrible conditions. In addition to their severe hunger and unsanitary environment, they live in constant anxiety, not knowing if they will live to see another day or whether they will be shot, as was the case on December 15, 1941, for 43 of them who were sent before a firing squad.<sup>201</sup>

During this phase, disputes between the various German authorities in Paris escalated. The military administration was responsible for anti-Jewish policy as well as all police matters related to security in the occupied zone, and – unlike in the occupied Netherlands, for example – in France insufficient Security Police or Order Police personnel

198 Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 131–135; Michel Laffitte, *Juif dans la France allemande*, pp. 81–88.

199 Msellati, *Les Juifs d'Algérie*, pp. 87–88; Maurice Eisenbeth, *Pages vécues 1940–1943* (Alger: Charra, 1945), pp. 56–57.

200 Rayski, *Le Choix des Juifs*, p. 175; Jacqueline Baldran and Claude Bochorberg, *David Rappaport – 'La mère et l'enfant' – 36 rue Amelot* (Paris: Montorgeuil, 1994), pp. 56–57.

201 Delivered to the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs on 9 April 1942, AN, AJ 38, vol. 76, cited in Poznanski, *Jews in France*, p. 306.

were available to the RSHA. Nonetheless, the military administration turned down the requests of Helmut Knochen, representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, for a large-scale roundup to deport several thousand Jews. Following a series of bomb attacks on Paris synagogues in October 1941, which Knochen had instigated to prompt the French population into committing excesses against Jews, a power struggle broke out openly between the military administration and the Security Police. At the same time, the military administration continued to express strong objections to the hostage shootings ordered by Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel, chief of staff of the German Armed Forces High Command. In January 1942 Military Commander von Stülpnagel again suggested that Jewish and communist inmates of the German internment and police detention camps instead be deported to the East.<sup>202</sup> After lengthy debates, his suggestion finally found formal expression in a Führer decree issued in April 1942. This stipulated that 'for each future assassination, apart from the shooting of a number of appropriate persons, 500 communists and Jews are to be handed over to the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police for deportation to the East.'<sup>203</sup>

Meanwhile, permission from Berlin arrived to have a first deportation train depart from France. The plan was to deport 743 Jews who had been arrested in Paris in December 1941 and about 300 Jews from Drancy camp.<sup>204</sup> In the meeting between Dannecker and Eichmann in Berlin on 4 March 1942, it was agreed to propose to the French government that 5,000 Jews be deported 'to the East'.<sup>205</sup> In the wake of this planning and further intensive activities by Dannecker (and Zeitschel), the first transport of Jews, composed of prisoners from Drancy and Compiègne camps, departed for Auschwitz on 27 March 1942. Dannecker personally accompanied this train along the entire route and into Auschwitz.

Additional deportation orders followed as retaliation for attacks carried out by the French resistance. From now on, the hostage shootings and deportation orders spiralled – 18 April: 24 shootings, 1,000 deported; 24 April: 10 shootings, 500 deported; 28 April: 1 shooting, 500 deported; 5 May: 28 shootings, 500 deported; 7 May: 20 shootings, 500 deported. By 31 May a total of 993 shootings had been ordered and 471 had been carried out. Approximately 6,000 Jews and communists had been deported by this date.<sup>206</sup> Subsequent transports were now postponed temporarily, however, because the Reich Railway lacked sufficient capacity.

Otto von Stülpnagel, who had fallen from Hitler's favour owing to the so-called hostage crisis and resigned as a result, was replaced by his cousin Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel in February 1942. This gave rise to a comprehensive reconfiguration of the structure

202 MBF to OKH, 15 Jan. 1942, BArch, RW 35/543, pp. 51–57.

203 See the Military Commander's decree dated 10 April 1942, Nürnberger Dokument RF-1241, published in Ludwig Nestler (ed.), *Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich (1940–1944)* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1990), p. 209, and letter from Schleier (embassy in Paris) to the Reich Foreign Office, dated 11 April 1942, in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, series E: 1941–1945, vol. 2, no. 128.

204 Memo from Dannecker to Lischka, 'Deportierung von 1000 Juden nach dem Osten', 10 March 1942, in Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz, pp. 401–402.

205 Memo from Dannecker to Lischka and Knochen, 'Abschub von 5000 Juden aus Frankreich', 10 March 1942, *ibid.*, p. 402.

206 'Das Geiselfverfahren', pp. 40–42.



of the occupation regime, to the benefit of the RSHA. The military administration had to cede to the Office of the Higher SS and Police Leader, newly created in France in March 1942, all Security Police responsibilities that could not be assigned to the narrower remit of the military. The new office also acquired all responsibilities for issues related to the 'Jewish question'. Only Aryanization continued to be overseen by the military administration. Henceforth, the representatives of the RSHA in Paris had both the power and the authority to implement the 'final solution' in France, an issue that had now, after the Wannsee Conference, become a top priority.<sup>207</sup>

In April 1942, in response to German pressure, Pierre Laval, the proponent of Franco-German collaboration who had been dismissed as prime minister in December 1940, was appointed head of government and given broader responsibilities. With Laval's consent, the Germanophile collaborator Louis Darquier de Pellepoix succeeded the French nationalist Vallat as commissioner general for Jewish affairs in May 1942. In the period that followed, the Commissariat General for Jewish Affairs increasingly acted as an executive body of the RSHA in France.<sup>208</sup> This allowed for the coordination of the preparations for the deportations from France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. On 4 March 1942 the officials in charge of Jewish affairs in these countries, under Eichmann's direction, had set out the further course of action. The newly acquired dominance of the Higher SS and Police Leader within the occupation regime in France made it possible to introduce the yellow star in June 1942, a step that the military administration had rejected until then (Doc. 323). From 7 June, all Jews – foreign and stateless Jews, as well as French Jews – over the age of six had to wear the star. However, the regulation was only implemented in the occupied zone of France, as the Vichy government refused to introduce it in the unoccupied zone.<sup>209</sup>

Parts of the French population increasingly criticized the actions of the Germans. Many non-Jewish French people were now far more sympathetic and helpful to the Jews than before, even if the majority in France still did not question Vichy's Statute on Jews. Non-Jews sometimes wore the yellow star in order to protest against it, risking internment at Drancy. Fifteen people were arrested for this offence on 7 June 1942 alone, and ten days later the number had gone up to forty; most of the arrests involved minors. The last of the internees were released at the end of August.<sup>210</sup> Similarly, both the French Catholic episcopate and Protestant groups, which were far less influential in the country than the Catholics, wrote a letter of protest to the head of state, Marshal Pétain.<sup>211</sup> Nevertheless, collaborationist and antisemitic audiences were no less active,

207 Bernd Kasten, 'Gute Franzosen': *Die französische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im besetzten Frankreich 1940–1944* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1993), pp. 26–29; Raphaël Delpard, *Aux ordres de Vichy: Enquête sur la police française et la déportation* (Paris: Lafon, 2006); Wolfgang Seibel, *Macht und Moral: Die 'Endlösung der Judenfrage' in Frankreich, 1940–1944* (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2010), pp. 81–99.

208 Laurent Joly, *Darquier de Pellepoix et l'antisémitisme français* (Paris: Berg, 2002); Joly, *Vichy dans la 'Solution finale'*, pp. 277–328; Carmen Callil, *Bad Faith: A Forgotten History of Family, Fatherland and Vichy France* (New York: Jonathan Cape, 2006).

209 The Vichy government introduced only the marking of identity papers, which was implemented in December 1942. See Serge Klarsfeld, *L'Étoile des Juifs: témoignages et documents* (Paris: L'Archipel, 1992), pp. 23–24.

210 See Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 244–245.

211 Cointet, *L'Église sous Vichy*, pp. 222–223.

and the antisemitism that had existed in France long before 1940 was expressed in both political and cultural fields.<sup>212</sup>

By early 1942 the Jews in France had already been almost completely forced out of professional and economic life and largely excluded from French society. As a result, their living conditions deteriorated drastically, as did the standard of their nutrition and often their housing as well.<sup>213</sup> Many Jews had also been arrested and harassed. But they still lived among non-Jews and their appearance was indistinguishable from that of their non-Jewish compatriots. However, the requirement that they wear an identifying star stigmatized the Jews. It became clear to many Jews that additional measures would follow, and the fear of roundups increased. After the first deportation of interned Jews to Auschwitz on 27 March 1942, the second transport left Compiègne on 5 June, after Himmler at the beginning of May had approved continuing with the deportations.<sup>214</sup> Additional transports to Auschwitz followed on 22 June (from Drancy), 25 June (from Pithiviers), and 28 June (from Beaune-la-Rolande). The German authorities planned major roundups for the summer of 1942.

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In the spring of 1940, when the German military and civil authorities established occupation regimes in Western and Northern Europe, they encountered very different conditions in the respective countries and reacted to these conditions in differing ways. Unlike in Poland, which had been occupied a few months before, here the German authorities were guided by the objective of inducing at least part of the local populace and administration to collaborate wherever possible. The anticipated collaboration also included anti-Jewish policies, although not all parts of the respective German administrations were equally committed to this goal. Within this context, the power relations and division of responsibilities between the civil administration, the Wehrmacht, and the SS played a role during the two first years of the occupation.

As the documents published here indicate, many members of the non-Jewish population had palpable reservations about the anti-Jewish policies of the occupiers, which aimed at separating the Jews, whether locals or foreigners, from public life in general. However, these reservations were not expressed in such a manner that they altered German policies. This generally also applied to the local administrations. With the passage of time – to a different extent in each individual country – the German occupation authorities succeeded in imposing a stronger hold over local administrations. This in turn enabled the Germans to exert constant pressure upon these local administrations to participate in the persecution of the Jews. The degree to which this pressure was effective would be of great importance for the later overall success in deporting all Jews

212 See Philippe Ganiayre, *Une certaine France: l'Antisémitisme 40-44* (Paris: Balland, 1975); Simon Epstein, *Les Dreyfusards sous l'Occupation* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001); Joly, *Darquier de Pellepoix*; Renée Poznanski, *Propagandes et persécutions: La Résistance et le 'problème juif' 1940-1944* (Paris: Fayard, 2008); and the various contributions in *L'Antisémitisme français sous l'Occupation*, *Revue d'Histoire de la Shoah*, no. 198 (March 2013).

213 Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 104–135.

214 Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, pp. 76–77.

from each country. Northern and Western Europe differed from Poland (and the Soviet Union), and even from Germany and Austria, in that during the period between summer 1940 and summer 1942 most Jews continued to live in their homes and among the non-Jewish population without being concentrated in designated districts and ghettos. They thus could continue communal, religious, social, cultural, and even political activities which were tolerated by the German authorities.

The Jewish leaderships and representatives in the countries of Western and Northern Europe pursued differing strategies in their conflict with the occupation authorities. Whether they chose refusal, obedience, or efforts at mitigation through legal action or negotiations, the dilemma they faced was essentially similar to that of the Jewish associations and Jewish councils in other occupied and satellite countries, even though during this period the occupiers did not generally force them to cooperate with the same brutality applied there. The fact that they were living without physical separation from the non-Jewish population made things feel less extreme than in Eastern Europe.

After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, however, the hitherto diverse measures taken against the Jews of Western Europe were increasingly brought into line with each other. Following the Wannsee Conference, held in January 1942, the RSHA accelerated this process of synchronization and made concrete preparations for the deportation of the Jews from the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Most of Luxembourg's Jews had already been deported by this time, and the Jews of Norway had only a few months remaining until the first transport left that country too, headed for Auschwitz. The 'final solution to the Jewish question' in Western Europe had begun.



# List of Documents

## Norway

- 1 On 31 October 1939 the Czech literary historian Pavel Fraenkl writes to Professor Harald Schjelderup requesting support for his efforts to emigrate to Norway
- 2 *Egersundsposten*: in an interview published on 30 January 1940, Moritz Rabinowitz comments on antisemitism and the situation for Jews in the war
- 3 On 18 May 1940 Ruth Maier from Vienna describes her loneliness as a refugee in Norway
- 4 On 29 May 1940 the publisher of the National Socialist periodical *Ragnarok* informs the commandant of Oslo about reactions to the visible identification of Jewish businesses
- 5 On 1 April 1941 the Nasjonal Samling newspaper *Fritt Folk* publishes a speech by Vidkun Quisling on the Jews in Norway
- 6 On 21 April 1941 the Jewish Community of Oslo asks its sister community in Trondheim how many Jews are living in northern Norway
- 7 On 9 May 1941 the writer Eugen Lewin Dorsch is arrested by the Gestapo in Norway on account of his anti-German stance
- 8 In diary entries for 30 April to 21 May 1941, Pastor Arne Fjellbu records measures against Jews in Trondheim
- 9 On 5 June 1941 the Reich Commissariat for the Occupied Norwegian Territories informs the Reich Foreign Office about the distribution of the Jewish population in Norway
- 10 On 22 June 1941 the Security Police arrest Jewish employees of the Soviet trade mission in Oslo
- 11 On 3 July 1941 the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD informs the Reich Security Main Office about attacks on Jewish shops
- 12 On 6 September 1941 the Norwegian Minister of Justice Sverre Riisnæs revokes lawyer Willy Rubinstein's licence on account of his Jewish ancestry
- 13 On 9 September 1941 the Bishop of Oslo, Eivind Berggrav, rejects the prohibition of marriages between Norwegian citizens and Jews or Sami
- 14 On 10 October 1941 the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD instructs the head of the Norwegian police to prepare for the stamping of identity documents belonging to Jews
- 15 In a diary entry for 11 November 1941, Pastor Arne Fjellbu describes the arrest of Jews in Trondheim
- 16 In November 1941 an anonymous author reports on the forced closure of Jewish businesses in Trondheim

- 17 On 22 November 1941 Norway's representative in Stockholm criticizes Swedish officials' practice of apprehending refugees from Norway in border areas and sending them back
- 18 *Die Zeitung*, 2 December 1941: article on measures against Jews in Norway and the founding of an anti-Jewish league in Denmark
- 19 *Vestfold Presse*, 10 January 1942: a Norwegian SS member describes his deployment in the war against the Soviet Union and the murder of Jews in Lwów
- 20 On 10 January 1942 the chief of the Norwegian Security Police briefs all police stations about the requirement for Jews to have their identity documents stamped with a 'J'
- 21 On 6 February 1942 the Norwegian Security Police inform the heads of the local police stations about the registration of Jews
- 22 *Fritt Folk*: report published on 9 March 1942 on the first execution of Jews in Norway
- 23 *Aftenposten*, 14 March 1942: article on the reinstatement of the ban on Jews emigrating to Norway
- 24 On 20 June 1942 Ruth Maier describes her ambivalent feelings towards other Jews and towards Austrian members of the Wehrmacht

## Netherlands

- 25 On 7 May 1938 Dutch Minister of Justice Carel Goseling announces that refugees from Germany are no longer to be accepted into the Netherlands
- 26 In a poem dated 31 August 1939, Wilhelm Halberstam describes the life of Jewish refugees in the Netherlands
- 27 In a farewell letter dated 14 May 1940, Mr and Mrs Levy arrange the handling of their estate
- 28 Harry C. Schnur describes the German invasion of the Netherlands and his escape on 15 May 1940 from the port at IJmuiden
- 29 On 18 May 1940 a section head at the Reich Security Main Office asks his superiors for permission to confiscate valuable books from Jewish libraries in Amsterdam
- 30 On 20 May 1940 the mayor of The Hague honours a Jewish member of the city council who has taken his own life
- 31 *Het Nationale Dagblad*, 4 June 1940: article welcoming the end of Jewish influence
- 32 On 5 June 1940 Egon von Bönninghausen congratulates the NSB functionary Meinoud Rost van Tonningen on his return from internment
- 33 On 8 June 1940 Einsatzkommando III of the German Security Police reports on the mood in the Netherlands
- 34 *Der Stürmer*, June 1940: article containing a German soldier's initial impressions of Amsterdam
- 35 On 1 July 1940 the Senior Commander of the German Order Police excludes Jews from the Air Raid Protection Service

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- 36 Excerpt from the minutes of an Amsterdam City Council meeting, dated 5 July 1940, concerning the German administration's conduct towards the Jews
  - 37 *De Doodsklok*, 24 August 1940: article demanding that Jews no longer receive ration coupons
  - 38 On 16 September 1940 the head of the Social Youth Service protests against the unequal treatment of Jews and is arrested
  - 39 On 11 October 1940 the secretary general of the Dutch Ministry of Justice asks all officials to prove their Aryan ancestry
  - 40 *De Unie*, 12 October 1940: the heads of the Nederlandsche Unie comment on the situation of the Jews in the Netherlands
  - 41 On 17 October 1940 the secretary of the Central Association of Dutch Postal Workers advises the Rienks sisters on how to fill out the Aryan Declaration
  - 42 On 22 October 1940 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart forces all Jews to register their businesses and determines who is considered a Jew
  - 43 On 24 October 1940 six Dutch Protestant churches write to Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart criticizing the regulations regarding Jewish public officials
  - 44 Willem Limburg issues an invitation to the inaugural meeting of a representative body of Aryan diamond workers on 26 October 1940
  - 45 In a broadcast on Radio Oranje on 29 October 1940, Marcus van Blankenstein condemns the measures taken against the Jews
  - 46 On 25 November 1940 the Dutch secretaries general summarize their position on German policy towards the Jews in a letter to the Reich Commissioner
  - 47 On 26 November 1940 Isaak Kisch, professor of law, delivers a farewell speech to his students
  - 48 On 26 November 1940 the Berlin publisher Erich Erdmenger asks the Office for Economic Investigation in The Hague to provide him with the names of Jewish firms that he could acquire
  - 49 On 28 November 1940 Gertrud van Tijn-Cohn from the Committee for Jewish Refugees asks the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to take up the case of refugees in the Netherlands
  - 50 On 29 November 1940 the Dutch National Socialist P.H. Hörmann writes to his children in Germany about the political situation in the Netherlands
  - 51 Report dated November 1940 on the presence of Jews in the liberal professions and economic life of the Netherlands
  - 52 In an illegal pamphlet written in November 1940, Jan Koopmans criticizes the lack of moral courage within Dutch society
  - 53 *Die Judenfrage*, 20 December 1940: article on the German occupying forces' anti-Jewish policies in the Netherlands
  - 54 On 10 January 1941 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart issues a regulation requiring all Jews to register with the authorities
  - 55 *New York Times*, 14 February 1941: article on riots in Amsterdam

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- 56 On 14 February 1941 the Dutch Israelite Religious Community circulates Abraham Asscher's speech concerning the establishment of the Jewish Council
- 57 On 17 February 1941 a representative of the Reich Foreign Office branch in the Netherlands reports to his office in Berlin on the unrest in Amsterdam
- 58 On 17 February 1941 Hans Böhmcker, the Reich Commissioner's representative for the City of Amsterdam, informs the city council about sealing off the Jewish quarter
- 59 *Het Parool*, 17 February 1941: article on the failure of German plans for the Nazification of the Netherlands and the unrest in the Jewish quarter
- 60 On 22/23 February 1941 Commissioner General for Security Hanns Albin Rauter announces the arrest of 400 Jews in response to the unrest in Amsterdam
- 61 On 24 February 1941 an illegal flyer calls for a general strike in protest against the mass arrests of Jews
- 62 In diary entries for 25 and 26 February 1941, Police Inspector Douwe Bakker records the suppression of the February Strike
- 63 On 26 February 1941 the commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands declares martial law and orders an end to the strikes
- 64 On 26 February 1941 P.D. Sondervan describes her impressions of the February Strike in her diary
- 65 On 27 February 1941 Commissioner General for Security and Higher SS and Police Leader Hanns Albin Rauter reports that the situation has eased after the strikes
- 66 In diary entries for 27 February and 2 March 1941, J. C. M. Kruisinga reports on the strike in Amsterdam
- 67 On 12 March 1941 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart issues his Regulation on the Removal of Jews from Economic Life
- 68 In her diary entry for 15 March 1941, Etty Hillesum reflects on her hatred of the German occupiers and their policies
- 69 On 8 April 1941 the café owner Arie Verhoog accuses a Jewish businessman of slander and threatens revenge
- 70 On 18 April 1941 Commissioner General for Security Hanns Albin Rauter orders the establishment of a Central Office for Jewish Emigration
- 71 On 19 April 1941 Maria Grutterink asks the Office for Economic Investigation for permission to sell her pharmacy in Amsterdam's Jewish quarter to a Jew
- 72 *Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden*, 20 April 1941: article on the local population's reaction to the persecution of Jews in the Netherlands
- 73 In April 1941 the physician Oscar Cahen announces that he is henceforth only permitted to treat Jewish patients
- 74 British Secret Service report, dated 13 May 1941, on living conditions in the Netherlands and the treatment of Jews
- 75 On 21 May 1941 Arthur Frank asks his cousin Emil Mayer in New York to help him emigrate



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- 76 *Time*, 2 June 1941: article on protests by Dutch students against the dismissal of their Jewish professors and lecturers
- 77 On 4 June 1941 Commissioner General for Security Hanns Albin Rauter bans Jews from public facilities and establishments
- 78 On 12 June 1941 the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD informs the Dutch Ministry of Justice how radio ownership in mixed marriages is to be regulated
- 79 On 12 June 1941 Dutch Secretary General Tobie Goedewaagen receives permission to establish a Jewish orchestra
- 80 *Het Parool*, 23 June 1941: article on a new round of anti-Jewish riots in Amsterdam
- 81 In a letter dated 24 June 1941, Emil Mayer expresses regret that he cannot help his cousin emigrate to the USA
- 82 On 3 July 1941 Secretary General of the Dutch Ministry of the Interior Karel J. Frederiks instructs Dutch mayors to stamp a 'J' on all identity cards belonging to Jews
- 83 On 11 July 1941 the Jewish Coordination Committee informs its regional representatives of the German administration's plans to liquidate Jewish businesses
- 84 On 1 August 1941 manufacturer Carl Hubert refuses to pay licensing fees to two agencies that he considers to be Jewish
- 85 Regulation issued by Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart on 8 August 1941 concerning the handling of Jewish financial assets
- 86 On 8 August 1941 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart orders the establishment of separate schools for Jews
- 87 On 14 August 1941 municipal director Klaas Kaan describes the measures already introduced to isolate the Jews and gives his overall assessment of the situation
- 88 On 18 August 1941 representatives of the Jewish Council explain to the Reich Commissioner's representative for Amsterdam why there have been no volunteers for labour deployment
- 89 On 28 August 1941 the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD clarifies the responsibilities of the newly created Special Department 'J' with regard to the deportation of all Jews
- 90 On 5 September 1941 the Commissioner General for Administration and Justice informs the Commissioner General for Finance and Economic Affairs of the results of the registration of Jews
- 91 On 5 September 1941 a mother refuses to fill out an Aryan certificate for her two daughters, citing her Christian beliefs
- 92 On 11 September 1941 the Archbishop of Utrecht states his refusal to exclude baptized children from Catholic schools on the basis of their ancestry
- 93 On 15 September 1941 Commissioner General for Security Hanns Albin Rauter further curtails Jews' freedom of movement in public
- 94 On 25 September 1941 the Dutch Ministry of Public Enlightenment and the Arts complains to the Commissioner General for Security about a Jewish ensemble

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- 95 On 2 October 1941 Representative for Amsterdam Hans Böhmcker reports to the Reich Commissioner on measures already taken against Jews in the Netherlands
- 96 *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, 11 October 1941: article on relations between Jews and the non-Jewish Dutch population
- 97 In a memorandum to his colleagues dated 12 October 1941, Meijer de Vries reflects on the role of the Jewish Council and its current options
- 98 On 14 October 1941 the Jewish Coordination Committee expresses concern over the increasing isolation of Jews
- 99 On 5 November 1941 the Reich Foreign Office raises the issue of Sweden's intervention on behalf of Dutch prisoners in Mauthausen concentration camp
- 100 On 5 November 1941 Baruch Wagenaar asks to be allowed to retain his mentally disabled daughter's non-Jewish carer
- 101 On 11 November 1941 the bank Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. Sarphatistraat draws up a first summary of compulsory deposits made by Jews
- 102 *New York Times*, 18 November 1941: article on the high death rate among Jews deported to Mauthausen
- 103 On 21 November 1941 Henricus van den Akker reports Hugo Kruijne to the German authorities for being a Jew and continuing to work in the civil service
- 104 On 25 November 1941 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart sums up the state of the 'Jewish question' in the Netherlands
- 105 At a meeting on 27 November 1941, David Cohen informs the Jewish Council about the latest directives from the German occupiers
- 106 In a letter to his friend Lodewijk Ernst Visser, dated 30 November 1941, David Cohen defends the Jewish Council's cooperation with the German occupiers
- 107 On 11 December 1941 Lodewijk Ernst Visser describes his unsuccessful attempts at bettering the situation of Jews arrested in raids
- 108 Report by a member of the British legation in Stockholm, dated 16 December 1941, regarding conditions in the Netherlands
- 109 On 28 December 1941 Rost van Tonningen expresses his dissatisfaction at the progress of Aryanization to Anton Mussert, the leader of the Dutch National Socialist Movement
- 110 On 8 January 1942 the Jewish Council urgently advises that all individuals summoned for labour service heed the directive
- 111 On 12 January 1942 the Jewish Council discusses the expansion of compulsory labour service for Jews
- 112 On 14 January 1942 representatives of the Dutch churches criticize the lack of rights for Jews and the actions of the occupying forces in a letter to the Secretary General for Justice and Administration
- 113 On 27 January 1942 the chairmen of the Jewish Council send out instructions to Jews from the Dutch provinces who are to relocate to Westerbork camp

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- 114 On 28 January 1942 Mayor Voûte asks the Reich Commissioner's representative for Amsterdam not to house any more Jews in the city
- 115 In a letter to his children dated 17 February 1942, Felix Hermann Oestreicher describes the tense situation in the family
- 116 *De Misthoorn*, 21 February 1942: article on the racial characteristics of Jews in the Netherlands
- 117 On 23 February 1942 the chief public prosecutor in Arnhem orders the local police to ensure that signs reading 'No Jews allowed' are displayed
- 118 On 25 February 1942 an employee of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture confirms the Aryanization of Lazarus Lazarus's farm in Winschoten
- 119 H. M. van Randwijk attempts to galvanize the Dutch people with his illegal pamphlet 'Unless ...', published in February 1942
- 120 On 5 March 1942 Pastor Willem Oosthoek informs the secretary of the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church of his actions on behalf of the Jews
- 121 On 5 March 1942 the Jewish Council discusses the German occupiers' demand that a further 3,000 Jews be sent to labour camps in the Netherlands
- 122 On 11 March 1942 Dutch Secretary General of the Interior Karel Frederiks criticizes the Reich Commissioner's position that Jews in the Netherlands are not to be regarded as Dutch
- 123 On 20 March 1942 the chairmen of the Jewish Council urge labour camp inmates currently on leave to return to the camps as instructed
- 124 On 23 March 1942 a member of the General Synod criticizes the Dutch Reformed Church's silence regarding the anti-Jewish measures
- 125 In letters dated 24 and 26 March 1942, the secretary of the council of governors of a hospital in Amersfoort and the Archbishop of Utrecht express their opposition to signs banning Jews
- 126 On 1 April 1942 the Senior Commander of the Security Police and the SD confirms that the Nuremberg Race Laws are being applied analogously in the Netherlands
- 127 On 23 April 1942 the Jewish Council appeals to the Central Office for Jewish Emigration for the return of confiscated devotional objects
- 128 *Vrij Nederland*, London, 25 April 1942: article on the increasing number of Jews getting married because unmarried Jews are liable to be sent to labour camps
- 129 On 29 April 1942 Flip Slier writes to his parents, describing life in Molengoot labour camp
- 130 On 29 April 1942 the head of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration describes the Jewish Council's dismay at the introduction of the yellow star
- 131 In late April 1942 an illegal pamphlet protests against the Aryanization of Dutch economic life
- 132 On 1 May 1942 the journalist J. A. Polak reports on the introduction of the yellow star

- 133 *Storm* SS, 8 May 1942: article on the introduction of the yellow star in the Netherlands
- 134 On 14 May 1942 the Jewish Council faces a demand from the German authorities to send a further 3,000 men to the labour camps, including from the provinces
- 135 *Het Joodsche Weekblad*, 15 May 1942: announcement of the directive concerning the billeting of Jews in Amsterdam
- 136 A regulation issued on 21 May 1942 requires Jews to transfer assets to the Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co. bank
- 137 On 21 May 1942 the chairmen of the Jewish Council warn of the possible consequences of failing to obey German regulations
- 138 On 1 June 1942 the Dutch National Socialist Antoon Reijnga asks the Office for Jewish Affairs to exempt his wife from wearing the yellow star
- 139 *Tijdschrift voor de Amsterdamsche Politie*, 6 June 1942: article justifying police measures against Jews
- 140 On 8 June 1942 the head of the section for Jewish affairs in The Hague informs the Reich Security Main Office of reactions to the introduction of the yellow star in the Netherlands
- 141 On 16 June 1942 Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart instructs the representative for the province of Limburg regarding the handling of cultural assets and household goods belonging to Jews
- 142 On 20 June 1942 Anne Frank describes how her family arrived in the Netherlands
- 143 In her diary entry for 20 June 1942, Etty Hillesum reflects on the humiliation of the Jews
- 144 Samson de Hond describes his family's flight to Switzerland from 17 to 25 June 1942, hidden in a railway wagon
- 145 On 22 June 1942 Adolf Eichmann informs the Reich Foreign Office about the planned deportation of Jews from Western Europe to Auschwitz
- 146 On 29 June 1942 Aaltje de Vries-Bouwes writes in her diary about rumours that hundreds of thousands of Jews have been gassed in Poland

## Belgium

- 147 On 8 July 1939 the German Consul General in Antwerp comments on the increasingly anti-Jewish mood in the city
- 148 On 16 February 1940 Gerhard Wolff informs Belgian acquaintances of his daughter's death in detention and appeals for help in returning to Belgium
- 149 In May 1940 Miriam Gretzer records in her diary her family's escape from Belgium
- 150 On 4 June 1940 Arthur Czellitzer describes his flight through Belgium following the German invasion
- 151 *Die Judenfrage*, 7 June 1940: article on the economic and political situation for Jews in Belgium

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- 152 Edith Goldapper describes her flight from Belgium to France in May 1940
- 153 On 16 July 1940 Marguerite Goldschmidt-Brodsky asks the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to help Jewish refugee children from Belgium
- 154 On 30 July 1940 the Belgian police report on how German soldiers mistreated Jews at Antwerp market
- 155 On 8 September 1940 the businessman Norbert Vanneste seeks the support of the German military administration to help him regain his ex-wife's shares in a business
- 156 Report for the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, dated 26 September 1940, on the situation of refugees from Belgium in St Cyprien camp in the south of France
- 157 On 11 October 1940 the Belgian secretaries general refuse to follow the instructions from the German military administration regarding the exclusion of the Jews from economic life
- 158 On 28 October 1940 the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France issues the First Jew Regulation
- 159 On 28 October 1940 the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France issues the Second Jew Regulation, ordering the dismissal of all Jewish public officials from the civil service
- 160 *Nationalzeitung*, 8 November 1940: article on the reactions of the Belgian press to the first anti-Jewish regulations
- 161 On 19 November 1940 representatives of Belgium's highest courts lodge a protest with the Military Commander against the dismissal of Jewish judges and lawyers
- 162 On 3 December 1940 the Belgian secretaries general discuss how the anti-Jewish regulations issued by the Military Commander should be implemented
- 163 Prior to 19 December 1940 the provincial government of Limburg instructs the municipal government of Genk on how to deal with the Jews expelled from Antwerp
- 164 On 21 December 1940 the German military administration explains the measures to be taken concerning Jewish public officials in Belgium
- 165 On 16 and 20 February 1941 Ilse Boehm writes postcards to her former teacher and classmates following the expulsion of her family from Antwerp
- 166 On 10 April 1941 the mayor of the municipality of Wilrijk removes Boris Melamid from the Jew registry
- 167 On 24 April 1941 a lawyer from Antwerp enquires into whether her exclusion from the Bar Association is permissible
- 168 On 31 May 1941 the German military administration issues the Third Jew Regulation, which sets out the procedure for the registration and identification of businesses and assets belonging to Jews
- 169 *Steeds Vereenigd-Unis Toujours*, late May 1941: article on looting and assaults on Jews in Antwerp
- 170 *Die Zeitung*, 10 July 1941: article on further economic restrictions imposed on Jews in Belgium

- 171 Excerpt from the German military administration's annual report, dated 15 July 1941, about measures against Jews in Belgium thus far
- 172 On 29 July 1941 the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior instructs the Belgian administration to stamp 'Jew' in the passports of Jewish citizens
- 173 On 29 August 1941 the Chief of the Military Administration restricts freedom of movement for Jews
- 174 *België Vrij*, 20 September 1941: article on the effect of anti-Jewish measures on the Belgian population
- 175 On 29 September 1941 the Chief of the Military Administration summarizes the conditions in Breendonk camp
- 176 On 15 October 1941 the German military administration decides to establish a compulsory association of Jews in Belgium
- 177 On 25 November 1941 the *Brüsseler Zeitung* comments on reactions of Jewish shop owners to the requirement that their businesses are visibly identified
- 178 On 17 December 1941 the head of the Commodity Office for Diamonds justifies the recognition of Jewish diamond brokers
- 179 On 4 January 1942 the internee Mordchai Max Epstein asks the secretary of the Association of Jews in Belgium to send money or food
- 180 In a letter written after 20 January 1942, the Reich Foreign Office warns the Reich Security Main Office about a backlash in the Belgian Congo should measures be taken against Belgian Jews
- 181 On 31 January 1942 the representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD outlines how the Belgian antisemitic movement is organized
- 182 On 5 March 1942 the management board of the Association of Jews in Belgium reports on the registration of Jews in Antwerp
- 183 *La Libre Belgique*, 15 March 1942: article on the recently decreed prohibition of all business activity by Jews
- 184 On 18 April 1942 Joseph Schuermans provides the German military administration with a list of the Jewish companies whose goods he wishes to acquire
- 185 Under a regulation issued by the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France on 22 April 1942, the assets of German Jews in Belgium fall to the German Reich
- 186 *Volk en Staat*, 23 April 1942: article warning 'Aryans' about Jews
- 187 On 27 April 1942 the Association of Jews in Belgium explains the structure and activities of the Jewish welfare system to the German military administration
- 188 *Jewish Bulletin*, April 1942: writing from London, Belgian Prime Minister Pierlot stresses the equality of all Belgian citizens before the law
- 189 On 4 May 1942 Szniereł Gecel writes to Salomon Ullmann, chairman of the Association of Jews in Belgium, asking to be released from Rekem internment camp
- 190 On 8 May 1942 the Rosenberg Task Force's head of operations for Belgium summarizes plans for the use of furniture stolen from Jews

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- 191** On 15 May 1942 the Brussels Trust Company comments on the liquidation of Marcel Halpern's company in Antwerp
- 192** On 2 June 1942 Henry Strauß asks the Association of Jews in Belgium whether he is required to register
- 193** On 4 June 1942 the mayors of Brussels refuse to distribute yellow stars
- 194** *L'Ami du peuple*, 13 June 1942: article on the unwillingness of many communities to distribute the yellow star
- 195** On 19 June 1942 the president of the mayoral conference of Brussels refuses to send Jewish students to separate schools
- 196** Salomon van den Berg reflects in his diary on the period from the start of the occupation of Belgium up to 30 June 1942
- 197** An unknown author reports to the World Jewish Congress on forced labour and anti-Jewish measures in Belgium from the start of the occupation to the summer of 1942

## Luxembourg

- 198** On 9 July 1940 a night watchman discovers antisemitic slogans on Luxembourg's synagogue
- 199** On 5 September 1940 the provisions of the Nuremberg Blood Protection Law prohibiting marriage and extramarital relations between Jews and non-Jews are introduced in Luxembourg
- 200** A regulation dated 5 September 1940 requires Jews to register their businesses and prevents them from disposing of their assets freely
- 201** On 5 September 1940 the Chief of the Civil Administration calls for the Luxembourg Administrative Commission to dismiss all Jewish public officials
- 202** On 16 September 1940 the Consistory of the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg comments on plans to expel all Jews from Luxembourg within two weeks
- 203** On 6 October 1940 Rosa Steinberg recounts her plight to the Jewish Community of Luxembourg
- 204** *Aufbau*, 7 February 1941: in a letter to the editor, Albert Nussbaum requests assistance for emigrants detained in France
- 205** On 8 February 1941 the government in exile's Minister of Justice requests that the ambassador of Luxembourg in Washington DC help persecuted Luxembourg Jews find asylum
- 206** On 27 February 1941 representatives of the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg call for the Courthéoux company to pay compensation to a Jewish employee who has been dismissed without notice
- 207** On 25 April 1941 Berthold Storfer and Paul Eppstein record Eichmann's orders for expediting the emigration of Jews from Luxembourg
- 208** On 7 May 1941 a Jew from Ettelbruck asks the office manager of the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg for advice following the theft of his furniture

- 209 On 13 May 1941 the Consistory of the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg requests permission from the Gestapo to hold services undisturbed
- 210 *Die Judenfrage*, 31 May 1941: article on the expropriation of the Jews in Luxembourg and the Aryanization of the economy
- 211 On 15 July 1941 the head of the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD in Luxembourg reports on progress regarding the expulsion and persecution of the Jews
- 212 On 29 July 1941 Chief of the Civil Administration Gustav Simon curtails Jews' freedom of movement and requires them to wear a yellow armband
- 213 On 16 September 1941 the musician Kurt Heumann asks the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg for help in obtaining an exemption from forced labour in road building
- 214 On 5 October 1941 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg announces the imminent deportations to the East
- 215 On 7 October 1941 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg informs the Jewish population of the Einsatzkommando's instructions for the deportation to the Łódź ghetto
- 216 On 10 October 1941 Gisela Kahn explains her emigration plans and asks to be exempted from the announced deportation to Łódź
- 217 On 13 October 1941 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg proposes to the Gestapo that the elderly and the sick be housed in Fünfbrunnen Abbey
- 218 On 19 October 1941 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg expresses the hope that it can still help recently deported people to emigrate to the United States
- 219 On 17 November 1941 the Consistory of the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg warns the Jews against personal contact with non-Jews
- 220 On 20 November 1941 Ester Galler writes a postcard to her son from Fünfbrunnen Abbey
- 221 On 8 December 1941 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg provides information about ways to make contact with persons deported to Litzmannstadt (Łódź)
- 222 By order of the Gestapo, on 7 January 1942 the Israelite Religious Community of Luxembourg instructs its members to hand in articles of warm clothing
- 223 On 16 April 1942 the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD in Luxembourg issues instructions regarding preparations for deportation to the General Government
- 224 On 16 April 1942 Alfred Oppenheimer, Jewish elder in Luxembourg, delivers a speech in advance of the impending deportation
- 225 On 22 April 1942 Gertrud Cahen asks Gauleiter Gustav Simon to exempt her mother-in-law from deportation
- 226 On 5 June 1942 the deportee Josy Schlang implores the Jewish Consistory in Luxembourg not to abandon him



- 227 On 20 June 1942 Siegmund Leib reports to the Luxembourg government in exile on the German measures against the Jews

## France

- 228 On 11 April 1933 the French chargé d'affaires in Berlin proposes that visas be granted only to carefully selected refugees
- 229 *L'Univers israélite*, 3 February 1939: article marking the 150th anniversary of the French Revolution with a look back at the history of the Jews in France
- 230 *New York Times*, 28 November 1939: letter to the editor regarding the situation for foreign refugees in France
- 231 *Revue OSÉ*, January 1940: article on the care of Jewish children evacuated from Paris by the Œuvre de secours aux enfants (OSE)
- 232 On 17 August 1940 the German ambassador in Paris proposes anti-Jewish measures to the military administration in France
- 233 On 20 August 1940 the German ambassador in Paris asks the Reich Foreign Minister to consent to the introduction of anti-Jewish measures in France
- 234 On 22 August 1940 the sub-prefect of Aix-en-Provence reports on clashes between German Jews and French soldiers in Les Milles internment camp
- 235 On 22 August 1940 General de Gaulle assures the Jewish World Congress that the anti-Jewish regulations will be repealed after the liberation of France
- 236 On 22 August 1940 the German military administration emphasizes the necessity of measures against Jews in the occupied zone of France
- 237 On 1 September 1940 Gabriel Ramet sends his first postcard from Drancy camp to his family
- 238 The Military Commander in France's First Regulation on Measures Against Jews, issued on 27 September 1940, contains provisions to control the Jews and prohibits the return of Jewish refugees to the occupied zone
- 239 In a poem composed in September 1940, the writer Walter Mehring records his experiences in St Cyprien internment camp in the south of France
- 240 *New York Times*, 2 October 1940: article on the Vichy government's plans to enact a law against the Jews
- 241 In the Statute on Jews of 3 October 1940 the Vichy government defines the term 'Jew' and bans Jews from certain professions
- 242 On 4 October 1940 the Vichy government resolves that foreign Jews can be interned by order of the prefect in charge
- 243 In his diary Jacques Biélinky describes life for the Jews in Paris from 19 July to 6 October 1940
- 244 On 7 October 1940 the Vichy government revokes the French citizenship of Jews in Algeria

- 245 On 16 October 1940 the Gauleitung in Baden writes to the Kreisleiter in Alsace about the future use of synagogues
- 246 The Military Commander in France's Second Regulation on Measures Against Jews, issued on 18 October 1940, marks the beginning of the Aryanization of Jewish property in the occupied zone
- 247 On 20 October 1940 Senator Pierre Masse asks Head of State Pétain whether he has to return his family's military decorations
- 248 On 26 October 1940 the Paris Police Prefecture informs the German occupiers of the results of the census of Jews
- 249 While interned at Gurs, Ludwig Baum from Baden writes a letter on 4 November 1940 seeking to secure the release of his personal property
- 250 On 12 and 13 November 1940 Rabbi Kapel shares impressions from his visit to Gurs camp and calls for support for the interned Jews from Baden and the Saar-Palatinate
- 251 In the Third Regulation on Measures Against Jews of 18 November 1940, Oberfeldkommandantur 670 sets out measures to exclude the Jews in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais départements
- 252 On 21 November 1940 the Reich Foreign Office discusses the Vichy government's protests against the deportation of the Jews from Baden and the Saar-Palatinate to the south of France
- 253 On 21 November 1940 the French Minister of Justice lists ways of establishing the racial status of people who fall under the Statute on Jews
- 254 On 4 December 1940 a French Jew expresses his indignation about the Statute on Jews in a letter to Marshal Pétain
- 255 *Völkischer Beobachter*, 8 December 1940: article on the utilization of furniture belonging to Jews expelled from Alsace
- 256 On 16 December 1940 representatives from the French ministries discuss the practical implementation of the Statute on Jews
- 257 Between 24 July and 20 December 1940 Raymond-Raoul Lambert writes in his diary about how life has changed for the Jews
- 258 On 30 December 1940 a pupil writes to her teacher, Fanny Lantz, who has been dismissed from her post, to say that she hopes she will return to school soon
- 259 The police in Marseilles report on the speech given by the chief rabbi of France in the main synagogue on 10 January 1940
- 260 On 30 January 1941 the German military administration and deputies of the representative of the Chief of the Security Police discuss the establishment of a French Office for Jewish Affairs
- 261 On 26 February 1941 the Crédit Lyonnais bank gives its regional branches instructions for handling accounts belonging to Jews
- 262 *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1941: article describing the conditions for German Jews in Gurs camp

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- 263 On 4 April 1941 the German military administration outlines its next steps against the Jews
- 264 On 4 April 1941 Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs, Xavier Vallat, outlines the Vichy government's intended policy on Jews to the German Military Commander
- 265 On 23 April 1941 an internee asks the management of Les Milles camp for permission to travel to Marseilles to take care of formalities required for his departure
- 266 On 26 April 1941 the Military Commander's Third Regulation on Measures Against Jews further restricts occupational and economic opportunities for Jews
- 267 In the course of the first roundup of Jews, the Paris Police Prefecture summons Pinkus Eizenberg to appear on 14 May 1941
- 268 *L'Œuvre*, 15 May 1941: article on the arrest of foreign Jews
- 269 With the Fourth Regulation on Measures Against Jews, issued on 28 May 1941, the Military Commander also places Jewish businesses without temporary administrators under German control
- 270 The Vichy government intensifies the exclusion of Jews from professional and economic life with the second Statute on Jews, issued on 2 June 1941
- 271 On 2 June 1941 the Vichy government introduces compulsory registration for Jews
- 272 On 1 July 1941 Theodor Dannecker, head of the Reich Security Main Office's section for Jewish affairs, reports on his plans for the treatment of Jews in France
- 273 On 22 July 1941 the Vichy government enacts the law on the Aryanization of Jewish property in the occupied and unoccupied zones of France
- 274 On 28 July 1941 the wives of interned Jews storm the office of the Coordination Committee of Charitable Organizations and demand the release of their husbands
- 275 On 31 July 1941 Rabbi Kaplan criticizes the Vichy government's directive introducing compulsory registration for Jews
- 276 *New York Times*: article published on 22 August 1941 on the arrests of Jews in France
- 277 On 26 August 1941 the Chief of the Civil Administration in Alsace considers the use of former Jewish cemeteries
- 278 On 2 September 1941 Pierre Lion makes notes on the course of the war and the situation in France
- 279 On 4 September 1941 Paul Sézille explains the aims of the exhibition *The Jew and France*
- 280 On 10 September 1941 the prefect of the Seine département reports to the Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs on the camp at Drancy and its supply problems
- 281 On 10 September 1941 Algerian Jews write to Head of State Marshal Pétain to express their indignation at the anti-Jewish measures enacted
- 282 On 13 September 1941 Pierre Lion writes in his diary about the latest events in Paris and the course of the war
- 283 On 29 September 1941 the director of a Jewish orphanage sends the prefect of the Creuse département the requested information about the religious affiliation of his wards

- 284** In September 1941 the children's aid organization Union OSE reports on its activities for the months of June, July, and August
- 285** On 8 October 1941 the official in charge of Jewish affairs at the German embassy in Paris proposes that Jews held in internment camps in occupied France be deported
- 286** On 23 October 1941 the Reich Security Main Office forbids the emigration of Jews to third countries
- 287** On 24 October 1941 Jewish aid organizations in Marseilles discuss the planned creation of a compulsory organization for Jews
- 288** *New York Times*: article published on 26 October 1941 on President Roosevelt's response to the shooting of hostages in France
- 289** On 6 November 1941 Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Security Police and the SD, comments on his office's involvement in the bombing of synagogues in Paris
- 290** On 11 November 1941 a married couple describe their escape from Paris across the demarcation line into the unoccupied zone
- 291** On 13 November 1941 Fanny Lantz relates the sympathy of friends and relatives to her husband, who is interned in Drancy
- 292** On 15 November 1941 Chaim Rachow asks the Coordination Committee of Charitable Organizations for agricultural work in order to be able to feed his wife and children
- 293** On 17 November 1941 the Association of French Artists asks that its members submit a declaration of descent
- 294** On 19 November 1941 Gabriel Ramet writes to his parents from Drancy camp
- 295** On 29 November 1941 the Vichy government decrees a compulsory merger of Jewish organizations
- 296** In November 1941 an anonymous writer complains to Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs Xavier Vallat about Jewish influence in France
- 297** At the end of November 1941 an anonymous letter to Head of State Marshal Pétain denounces discrimination against Jews on the basis of France's race laws
- 298** In diary entries written between 30 November and 11 December 1941, Raymond-Raoul Lambert describes his encounters with Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs Xavier Vallat
- 299** On 12 December 1941 the Security Police arrest more than 700 Jews in Paris
- 300** On 14 December 1941, after attacks on German soldiers, the German Military Commander in France orders executions and the deportation of Jews
- 301** On 14 December 1941 Jacques Grinbaum writes a final letter to his family before his execution
- 302** *Manchester Guardian*, 15 December 1941: article on the shooting of hostages in France
- 303** On 15 December 1941 Isaac Schoenberg writes a letter to his fiancée, describing his life in Pithiviers camp