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Saint Paul and Philosophy

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The Consonance of Ancient and Modern Thought

Edited by
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and Antonio Cimino

DE GRUYTER

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It is with great sadness that we must report the death of one of our contributors, Professor Françoise Frazier, who deceased on December 14, 2016. We were very impressed by the erudition and warm interest with which she participated in our conference, and are very proud that her contribution in English to our volume will make her scholarship more widely accessible for non-Francophone readers.

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List of Abbreviations

For the references to books of the Bible, we use the following abbreviations:

Gen.	*Genesis*
Deut.	*Deuteronomy*
Jer.	*Jeremiah*
Hab.	*Habakkuk*
Mal.	*Malachi*
Matth.	*Matthew*
Mark	*Mark*
Luke	*Luke*
Acts	*Acts*
Rom.	*Romans*
1 Cor.	*1 Corinthians*
2 Cor.	*2 Corinthians*
Gal.	*Galatians*
Eph.	*Ephesians*
Phil.	*Philippians*
Col.	*Colossians*
1 Thess.	*1 Thessalonians*
2 Thess.	*2 Thessalonians*
1 Tim.	*1 Timothy*
2 Tim.	*2 Timothy*
Tit.	*Titus*
Philem.	*Philemon*
Heb.	*Hebrews*

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Introduction: On the Philosophical Affiliations of Paul and Πίστις

From July 2012 until October 2016, philosophers from Radboud University, Nijmegen, and theologians from the University of Groningen worked together on a project entitled "Overcoming the Faith-Reason Opposition: Pauline *Pistis* in Contemporary Philosophy." During several seminars in the course of the project and one concluding international conference in June 2015, the members of the research team discussed the various aspects of this topic with experts from the field of philosophy, classical studies, and theology. They examined the meaning and impact of the notion of πίστις (faith, conviction, or belief) in the letters of the apostle Paul, in the Greco-Roman world he inhabited, and in the present-day philosophical interpretation of these letters. The results of these discussions are presented in this volume that gathers together sixteen essays as well as a concluding discussion of the implications of the essays for the general line of inquiry of this project as a whole. To introduce these essays and the goal of this volume, we will first explicate the underlying premises of the research project "Overcoming the Faith-Reason Opposition" and subsequently indicate how the essays contribute to this project.

In contemporary debates on the place of religion in society and on the relation between religion and science, the parties often play the card of the (in)famous opposition—more than a mere distinction—between faith and reason. Perhaps one reason that this opposition is stressed is that it is embraced by the two extreme, opposing parties in the debate: Both the protagonists of fundamentalist forms of religion and the protagonists of what one might term "Enlightenment fundamentalism" (which is indeed thus termed in the Dutch societal debate) propagate the concept of a faith that excludes reason, and a reason that excludes faith. Hence, these opposing parties share an opinion about what faith and reason are, but, by identifying themselves exclusively with either faith or reason, they exclude the possibility of a genuine debate with the other party. The conjunction "faith *and* reason" is actually treated as the disjunction "*either* faith *or* reason," as if these two terms set up a dualism. Yet, it remains to be seen whether such a dualism or opposition is sustainable from both a theological and a philosophical point of view. When we consider the origins of the notion of faith, is it indeed the case that it excludes every form of rationality? And

when we look at philosophical accounts of reason, do they indeed exclude every form of faith?

To address these questions, it might not be too far-fetched to turn to one of the main religious sources in the history of Christianity, the letters of Paul, and to examine how he uses the language of πίστις as a determining factor in his letters. In fact, the choice to adopt Paul's letters as point of departure was inspired by two important developments taking place in philosophy and theology today. The first concerns the increasing attention to Paul's letters in present-day continental philosophy. The second concerns the rise of a new paradigm in Pauline studies in theology. Both of these developments suggest that the interpretation of Paul's letters has much in store for a reassessment of the importance, meaning, and impact of Paul's notion of faith and its relation to reason. Where the development in continental philosophy gives rise to the question of how πίστις influences present-day conceptions of reason and rationality, the development in biblical scholarship prompts the question of how ancient philosophy and its rationality influenced Paul's notion of πίστις. It is particularly exciting to see what happens when we bring these two developments into dialogue and observe how they cross-pollinate each other. Let us therefore briefly outline the questions these two developments inspire.

Paul in Continental Philosophy. Since the 1990s, the interpretation of Paul's letters has become a booming business in continental philosophy. One of the reasons why this interest grew up in the 1990s may be found in the publication of at least four important books. The foremost of these is perhaps Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," an interpretation of Paul's letters which, though it presents lecture series dating back to 1920 – 1921, was published only in 1995. Given the importance of Heidegger's work for the field of continental philosophy as a whole, it would hardly be surprising that such a publication turned the attention of the philosophers to Paul. Yet this was not all. Two years earlier, in 1993, Jacob Taubes's philosophical legacy and his testimonial regarding the importance of Paul for his work, which he presented just before his death in Berlin in 1987, was published under the title *The Political Theology of Paul.* This text makes Paul a major point of reference in the pivotal discussions on political theology. In the same decade, in 1997, Alain Badiou's *Saint Paul* was published. Badiou presents Paul not so much in his Lutheran-Kierkegaardian guise as the one who offers a theological account of the individual's salvation, but rather as the one who forges the notions of universalism and equality. Discussing, interpreting, and criticizing insights from Heidegger, Taubes, and Badiou, at the close of the decade, in 2000, Giorgio Agamben published yet another interpretation of Paul entitled *The Time That Remains.* If we view these developments together with reflections on Paul from other authors who determine the debate in

continental thought—such as Stanislas Breton, Gianni Vattimo, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-François Lyotard, and Slavoj Žižek, to mention but a few—it is hardly surprising that in the succeeding years Paul's letters turned out to have a remarkable fecundity in philosophy, inspiring a vast and ongoing discussion between philosophers, philosophers of religion, and theologians.[1]

Interestingly enough, in many, if not all, of these philosophical readings, Paul's notion of πίστις plays a pivotal role. In fact, as the reader will find in the essays of this volume, it is exactly the notion of πίστις that provides present-day philosophers with the means to reinterpret concepts such as truth, subjectivity, universality, and temporality. Given the perceived opposition between faith and reason, is it not striking that philosophers reinterpret πίστις to rethink their fundamental concepts? What does this imply for their account of reason and rationality and philosophy itself? Inspired by this question, we may wonder *why* these philosophers reinterpret Paul's conception of πίστις, and *how* they do so. In light of the essays presented here, it may be helpful to distinguish two motives. First, contemporary thought is clearly motivated by a critique of metaphysics and its specific forms of rationality, which also impacts our scientific and institutional practices. One of the concerns of present-day philosophy is that, although these forms of rationality are a strong factor in many of our practices, Paul's notion of πίστις contests these forms and offers alternative perspectives. Second, these ontological, or metaphysical, considerations are very often—but not always—elaborated in terms of their consequences for political theology or political ontology. Especially πίστις in its relation to trustworthiness, fidelity, and conviction proves to be an important source of inspiration for these more political theoretical reflections; another important concept is the specific ethos or attitude to the world this notion inspires, as articulated for instance in Paul's formula ὡς μή ("as not" or "as if not"). As one might expect, the Pauline reflection on the law and the difference between the law of works and (the law of) faith also has a particular bearing on these politically inspired interpretations of Paul.

Paul in New Testament Studies and Classical Studies. The second development is taking place at the interface between New Testament research and classical studies, including ancient philosophy. Recent research findings confirm not only that Christian origins take shape in the Greco-Roman world, in which there is a continuity between religious philosophy and philosophical religion, but also

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[1] See, for example, Caputo and Martín Alcoff, *St. Paul among the Philosophers*; Loose, *The Apostle Paul in Modern Philosophy*; Blanton and de Vries, *Paul and the Philosophers*; Frick, *Paul in the Grip of the Philosophers*.

that Christianity in its early stages can be understood and was practiced as a philosophy in the ancient sense of the word. As we can glean from the letters of Pliny the Younger, Christianity, unlike early Judaism and Greco-Roman religion, ends the ritual-cultic practice of animal sacrifice and provides a strongly ethical religion. Recent results of New Testament research show in particular that ancient philosophical thinking, both Platonic and Stoic, had a huge impact on Paul's letters and on the meaning of the terms he uses to understand reality.

Due to these developments in biblical scholarship, a new paradigm in Pauline studies is taking shape, and many of the following essays contribute to its elaboration. In this new paradigm, Paul is approached as a Jew from the Greco-Roman period who read the Greek translations of Hebrew texts and was in full interaction with contemporary Greek discourse. Paul's background in Tarsus, a city celebrated by Strabo for its philosophical, rhetorical, and educational training, underpins his profound acquaintance with ancient education. The essays related to this line of inquiry focus on Paul's usage of πίστις language and his interaction with Greco-Roman schools of thought.

Finally, from the perspective of present-day philosophy, these developments in New Testament scholarship are important for the discussion of in what sense the philosophical readings are attuned to New Testament scholarship, and to what extent the kinship that today's philosophy discovers in Paul's letters is confirmed by other scholarship. It is the goal of this volume to address these issues and to show, by bringing the individual contributions of this volume into discussion with each other in an extended epilogue, the deep consonances between the ancient thought of Paul, its world, and the thought of today. Clearly, when we speak of consonances, we are not referring to a complete overlap. Rather, what we are interested in is showing which particular motifs, themes, and notions allow for a fruitful dialogue between ancient thought and modern thought, without losing sight of the important dissonances and differences there will always remain. The attention for the resonances, consonances, cross-fertilizations, and dialogues with ancient thought is because only they allow us to capture the significance of Paul's ancient texts for philosophy today.

To do justice to the diversity of directions in which the interrogation of Paul, his πίστις language, and his affiliation with present-day philosophy can lead us, we have divided this volume into three parts. The first part displays a number of philosophical portraits of Paul as painted in philosophy today, with a particular eye to the notion of πίστις. The second part discusses Paul's letters and πίστις in a Greco-Roman context. The third part discusses the political theology that philosophers find in Paul.

Part I. Philosophical Portraits of Paul and Πίστις

Western history has produced many images of Paul. Different interpretations and reinterpretations of Paul appear in different periods, and each brings its own application of Paul to the time in which he is read. Perhaps, if one were to attempt the impossible task of pointing out one shared characteristic of these many images, interpretations, and applications, one could quote Simon Critchley: "Saint Paul is trouble. It is simply a fact about the history of Christian dogma that a return to Paul is usually very bad news for the established church."[2] Yet perhaps even this attempt is not simply descriptive but mainly reflects the interest in Paul as offering a political theology that places the establishment under threat and pressure. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to pause a little first to consider more closely the portraits that are painted, which notions they highlight in Paul's letters, and in light of which concepts the philosophers appropriate these notions and let them resonate with their own systematic philosophical concerns. In particular, it is important for the purpose of this volume to capture the color in which they paint Paul's notion of πίστις, and how it can offer an alternative to the forms of rationality and concepts the philosophers want to call into question, such as truth, law, necessity, and (the onto-theological) God. Philosophers find these alternatives in Paul's description of the καιρός or of the attitude of the ὡς μή; in accounts of Paul's God favoring what is not (τὰ μὴ ὄντα) over what is (τὰ ὄντα); in the universality of this God, as professed in the famous phrase "neither Jew nor Greek"; and in the importance of the conversion of the self, and so on. Following the hermeneutic adage that interpretation is always also application, one might perhaps suggest that for these philosophers, interpreting Paul is nothing but the contestation of certain philosophical concepts. The essays that follow will show why this is so.

In the opening essay "Reading, Seeing and the Logic of Abandonment," Andrew Benjamin investigates the significance of images of Paul and strikingly notes that "every image of Saint Paul is an attempt to singularize or at the very least to secure an identity, and thus an identity as a singularity, for Paul. Paul as image therefore continues to stage, in different ways and with different emphases, the network of relations of which Paul, his image, is always the after-effect." Benjamin explores this impact of the image by seeing, contemplating, and reading a number of paintings of Paul with special attention to Rembrandt's *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul*. In particular, he discusses how the play of light in some of these paintings stages the fundamental moment of Paul's conversion, as Ben-

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2 Critchley, *The Faith of the Faithless*, 155.

jamin interprets: "The lit face is therefore the sign of conversion." Yet, unlike what authors such as Badiou seem to suggest, this conversion does not come out of nowhere. It entails, and can only occur in accordance with, an implied logic of abandonment, of a turning away from the past so that the converted face can show itself as and in light. With this first exploration of what it means to offer an image of Paul, and to paint his picture, this volume turns to fifteen images, sculpted or painted with the tools of theology, philosophy, and philology, to deepen our understanding of Paul, the importance of his letters, and in particular the specific sense of his account of faith.

The first engagement with present-day readings of Paul is by Jeffrey Bloechl, who in his article entitled "The Invention of Christianity" examines Paul as the first theologian of the Church, who thus invented Christianity. The Christianity that Paul invents in his preaching is born first in his heart, and moreover according to a violence that is well known. What could have prepared Paul for the event on the road to Damascus, and how should we later interpret it? What concepts today, after his singular experience and the urgent preaching gave rise to a worldview, best enable us to hear some of what Paul heard and wished to have repeated in the life of faith? Such questions, as Bloechl explains in his contribution, point beyond, or rather beneath the systematic explanations—dogmatic and speculative—that would have us render the meaning of faith in scientific propositions. Philosophers have their own reasons for contesting the reign of science, and some have appealed to Paul for material support (for instance, Agamben and Badiou). Others, however, have aimed first to simply understand Paul on his own terms (for example, Heidegger and Breton). Bloechl addresses the question of which philosophy hearkens most closely to the experience of Paul, and how its thinking meets the words that pass between the voice heard from on high and the voice in which it is announced.

In "Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Paul," Ben Vedder meticulously analyzes Heidegger's interpretation of Paul. To that end, he first discusses Heidegger's concern with facticity, and the way he sees the need of a philosophy that is connected with and emerges out of human facticity. This leads to a philosophy that tries to avoid petrified concepts and is a-theistic in principle. According to Heidegger, classical philosophy is not able to do justice to human facticity and historicity. Thus, the question imposes itself of how a philosophy has to be in order to make human facticity understandable. For Heidegger, as Vedder indicates, the early Christian texts of Paul are an expression of the experience of this human facticity. Especially the notion that Christ will come like a thief in the night expresses the unpredictability of the future. Subsequently, the question is raised whether an atheistic philosophy can understand religion. For Heidegger, an atheistic philosophy is the only possibility, and this also applies to the philoso-

phy of religion. The unpredictability of the future is also expressed in early Christianity in those passages where Paul writes about the "as not." The "as not" expresses that humans live not as completely open to the unpredictable future but still have to use concepts that are framed already beforehand. This means that human self-understanding remains always a vulnerable and broken understanding. This, as Vedder argues, applies also to the hermeneutics of religion.

In "The Philosopher's Paul," Ezra Delahaye looks at the so-called turn to Paul in contemporary continental philosophy. The question he asks is: Why do these philosophers read Paul? Even though there were a multitude of other circumstances that led these philosophers to Paul, Delahaye focuses exclusively on the philosophical problems that are addressed by these philosophers through Paul. After dividing the philosophers who deal with Paul into groups that have similar theoretical motives, Delahaye argues that there are two main approaches to Paul in contemporary philosophy: the universalist approach and the ontological approach. The main difference between these groups can be understood through the Pauline texts that serve as their reading key, that is, Gal. 3:28 and 1 Cor. 7:29 – 31. Delahaye goes on to show how Badiou, as the representative of the universalist approach, reads Paul as a political thinker based on Gal. 3:28. The representative of the ontological approach, Agamben, centers his reading of Paul on 1 Cor. 7:29 – 31 and the ontological interpretation of this text. This brings us, as in the text by Vedder, to the important theme of the ὡς μή, the "as (if) not," to which some of the philosophers who read Paul, such as Heidegger and Agamben, pay special attention and tribute. Both the universalist and the ontological approach, as Delahaye claims, ultimately read Paul as a political ontological thinker, who re-grounds the political order in a renewed ontology.

In "Disillusioning Reason—Rethinking Faith," Peter Zeillinger analyzes how Agamben's book on Paul paved the way for some of his later works, such as *The Sacrament of Language*. These texts focus on specific performative gestures and their efficacy in juridical, political, and religious contexts. Starting from Agamben's reading of Paul's understanding of faith and its specific messianic temporality, Zeillinger shows how the performative gestures of faith correlate to early cultural practices of establishing social and political bonds. These analyses are connected to Agamben's important allusions to the later works of Foucault and his research on the early Christian practices of penance, as well as to Agamben's later elaborations on the structure of the oath and its relationship to the cultural and social development of man. By these reconstructions, Zeillinger reveals—with Agamben and Foucault—the eminent role that performative gestures like πίστις, *fides,* confession, and the oath played in the development of Occidental culture and political history. In this way, the acts of faith are absolved from

their restriction to the realm of religion and their opposition or even contradiction to reason. Especially the structure of the specific temporality attached to *performativity*, which Paul identifies as messianic, attests to the efficacy of speech acts for the establishment of social and political bonds.

In "On What Remains," Gert-Jan van der Heiden shows how the senses of crisis, transformation, and contingency that mark the present-day philosophical interest in Paul can be traced in the philosophical readings of Paul's accounts of time, law, and world—and especially in their accounts of Paul's almost nihilistic language concerning the end of time, the universal condemnation of the law, the passing away of the world, and the description of himself as the waste of the world. If time, law, and world are marked by a crisis and are coming to an end (or being transformed), two questions arise, which determine the order of this article: First, what remains of time, law, and world in and by this ending? Second, what type of comportment, attitude, or ethos allows the believer to have a sense of, or access to, what remains of time, law, and world? The latter question delves into the nature and the meaning of the notion of faith, or πίστις, since faith is the word that characterizes this comportment, or ethos, of the believers. Van der Heiden addresses these questions in three steps. First, he discusses the specific conception of time as a time of urgency or emergency. Subsequently, he shows in relation to *Romans*, in which sense this account of urgency affects what humans *can do* (or cannot do). Finally, he shows what this urgency means for what humans or the world *can be* (or cannot be) according to Paul; he explicates this in relation to his comments on the form of this world, τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, and some other τοῦ κόσμου-formulas as used in *1 Corinthians*.

Part II. Paul and Πίστις in the Greco-Roman World

What happens to our understanding of Paul if we approach him in light of his own historical context and follow up on the recent research? This research suggests that the Greco-Roman world does not know the same strict opposition between philosophy and religion, as we tend to maintain today, but rather displays a continuum between religious philosophy and philosophical religion. Given this more open relation between philosophy and religion, it makes sense to compare the content of Paul's letters to the philosophical schools of his time. What does such a comparison reveal? The essays collected in the second part of this volume show us possible answers to this question. In particular, they disclose this ques-

tion in relation to Paul's πίστις language, and explore the influences of and affinities with his surrounding schools, such as the Stoic and Neoplatonic schools. In addition, these essays offer a first indication of how this approach to Paul gives rise to questions concerning the present-day philosophical readings of Paul.

The first essay of this second part, "Paul's Stoic Onto-Theology and Ethics of Good, Evil and 'Indifferents'" by George van Kooten, exemplifies what types of questions these might be. Van Kooten's essay constitutes an important transition and confrontation between the present-day philosophical portraits discussed in the first part and the particular perspectives one may open up on Paul by positioning him more strongly in his Greco-Roman context. Van Kooten discusses the characterization of Paul as an anti-philosopher and messianic nihilist by modern philosophers such as Badiou, Agamben, and Taubes. These philosophers focus mainly on passages in *1 Corinthians*. Whereas they show themselves sensitive to philosophically relevant sections in this letter, the current article challenges their far-reaching interpretations by exploring the similarities of these Pauline passages with the discourse of ancient philosophers, notably the Stoics. Differently from Badiou, who interprets 1 Cor. 2:1–5 (with its disapproval of "persuasive words of wisdom") as an anti-philosophical passage, this article views Paul's criticism as directed not against philosophy but against the sophists who championed effective rhetoric instead of truth. And in contrast with Badiou's interpretation of 1 Cor. 1:26–29 as an anti-onto-theological reflection about "the things that are not" (τὰ μὴ ὄντα) which God preferred over "the things that are" (τὰ ὄντα), it actually seems that Paul shares the ontology of the Stoics, who believe that all things emerge from God and return to God, just as Paul states. Paul does not believe that the universe has been created from nothing but rather, in Stoic fashion, that it emerged from God himself. Finally, in contrast with Taubes and Agamben, who see Paul's "nihilism" at work in his statements in 1 Cor. 7:29–31 about performing particular actions "as (if) not" (ὡς μή) performing them, Van Kooten seeks to understand this passage against the background of the Stoic theory of the so-called ἀδιάφορα: the things that are morally indifferent and located between absolute good and absolute wrong. In this way, the author shows that Paul is not nihilistic but rather merely indifferent about certain things, although he does articulate his preferences. He is not anti-philosophical, but actually draws on the philosophical criticism of the sophistic movement. Finally, he is not anti-onto-theological either, but rather deeply convinced that the whole of reality is grounded in God.

In "Narratives of Πίστις in Paul and Deutero-Paul," Teresa Morgan argues that a narrative of the analysis of πίστις in *1 Thessalonians*, *Galatians*, *Ephesians*, and *1* and *2 Timothy* "helps to reveal the subtle variations and, in some cases,

evolutions of thinking in early churches about Christ, salvation, and the nature of the new divine-human community on earth." Combining these five letters, Morgan shows how "πίστις language is used to tell stories about the relationship between God and Christ and God, Christ and humanity; about the working of God's mercy, salvation, and the restoration of the faithful to righteousness; about the appointment of apostles to preach the gospel and their relationship with those they preach to; about how the faithful are chosen to accept the apostles' preaching; about how community members should live and relate to one another; about how traditions and writings are authorized as objects and tools of πίστις." This indicates that the use of πίστις language by Paul and his followers cannot be properly understood from the distinction between faith and reason. Rather, in addition to the concern of present-day philosophers with, for instance, the structure of the oath and the particular comportment of the believers to the world, Morgan shows that once one approaches the narratives in which πίστις figures, it becomes clear that πίστις language functions on many different levels. Πίστις is not only a theological notion, but also a term with ethical and ecclesiological connotations, informing the developing structure and life of churches. As Morgan concludes, "It is hard to conceive of any other lexical family in Greek that could have captured all these stories and bound them together into one grand, complex, (more or less) integrated system of thought and practice."

In "Returning to 'Religious' Πίστις," Françoise Frazier deepens and extends the discussion on the meaning and importance of πίστις language in the ancient world by discussing how Plutarch's successors use this language and by comparing the use of πίστις in Neoplatonism and Plutarch. This essay continues her previous studies on "religious" πίστις in Plutarch, which show that for Plutarch πίστις does not yet indicate "suprarational faith," that his use of the word still remains close to Plato's, and that for all Middle-Platonists πίστις remains at the level of δόξα. For the comparison between Neoplatonism and Plutarch, two aspects need to be taken into account, as Frazier shows. As far as the intellectual and doctrinal aspect (i.e., Platonism) is concerned, the case of Plotinus emerges as particularly illuminating: Πίστις does not mean "suprarational faith" in the *Enneads* either. Πίστις appears, with πιστεύειν, in the ascension of the soul, which may be compared to the philosophical approach of the Intelligible in Plutarch. Whereas Plotinus thinks the soul can join the Intelligible because the One has replaced it as an unattainable Absolute, for Plutarch contemplation is still impossible here below. As a consequence, the second, existential aspect—"Piety"—requires another Neoplatonist: not Plotinus, for whom philosophy and piety are one and the same, but rather his disciple Porphyry and, after him, Iamblichus and Proclus, who trace a spiritual itinerary through the triad (or

the tetrad) πίστις, ἔρως, ἀλήθεια (and ἐλπίς). In Plutarch, these elements are not yet linked together, but ἐλπίς, associated with joy and a mystic imagery (borrowed from Plato and still used by Neoplatonists), suggests that God's presence may be felt already in this world. By following this line of thought, Frazier reinterprets important themes and imageries that are used throughout the history of Platonism and thus situates Plutarch more precisely in this movement.

Suzan Sierksma-Agteres continues the inquiry into the πίστις language in Paul's letters by connecting it to the language of δίκη, which appears not only in Paul's justification by faith, for instance, but can also be traced in many other ancient sources. In line with the title of her contribution, "The Metahistory of Δίκη and Πίστις," she explores how the axiom of justification by faith is not so much concerned with an atemporal care for the individual sinner, as the traditional Lutheran interpretation has suggested. Rather, first, it is concerned with the universal application of this justice, now transcending ethnic boundaries as emphasized by the so-called New Perspective, and, second, it belongs to a particular understanding of history. Greco-Roman "metahistorical," grand narratives show a widespread belief in an initial golden age of divine rule, followed by a period of retreat of virtues and moral decline, sometimes including utopian, universalistic visions of a return of the days of faith and justice. A similar metahistorical discourse can be discerned in Paul's *Romans*. Moreover, Sierksma-Agteres's semantic research confirms the proximity of justice and faith as virtues of high regard in Greco-Roman sources. This ethical approach to justice is further developed by the Platonic concept of an internal law, identified as a divinely given "mind" or "measure." In *Romans*, these findings resonate with the moral reform of the mind according to the "measure of faith" (Rom. 12:1–8). Hence, as the author shows, Pauline justice can be argued to be deeply universal, ethical, and participational in nature. Moreover, by emphasizing the twofold dimension of Paul's axiom of the justification of faith—universalizing and belonging to a metahistory—Sierksma-Agteres succeeds in offering both a historical context for, and a historical critique of Badiou's insistence on Paul's universalism and its relation to the notion of faith.

By focusing on "Paul's Use of Πίστις/Πιστεύειν as Epitome of Axial Age Religion," Anders Klostergaard Petersen alludes to an old debate that has harassed the study of biblical studies, classics, and the history of religion: the Judaism–Hellenism discussion. Despite the immensely influential book *Judentum und Hellenismus* by Martin Hengel, in which he once and for all undermines the dichotomic manner of formulating the relationship between the two entities, much of this debate lingers on in different repercussions of the binary scheme in which the gain of the one is understood to imply the loss of the other. Petersen targets this debate by focusing on the question of Paul's use of πίστις and πιστεύειν,

which has also come to play a dominant role in current scholarship. However, he localizes the discussion in a far wider frame of reference than is traditionally done. He does so by pursuing the question of the meaning of the terms in the context of cultural evolution, with a special focus on the transition from archaic to axial age types of religiosity. Needless to say, this is a moot theoretical perspective that has not previously been applied to the field of late Second Temple Judaism. Yet, Petersen shows that much can be gained—both at the theoretical, methodological, modular, and empirical level—by endorsing such an approach.

Part III. The Political Theologies of Paul

The question of the politics that Paul inspires is vast and has many different answers. The interest in political theology, revived by Taubes in relation to Paul's letters, seems to determine the course—or at least a part of the course—of the important texts by Agamben, Badiou, Taubes, and Žižek, affecting the themes of messianism and sovereignty. The interest in Paul's discovery of universalism and equality gives rise to unexpected alliances and is argued to be at the core of both Badiou's communism and, more recently, Siedentop's liberalism (and both Agamben and Siedentop argue that the Pauline inheritance that should be revived has come to us through the Franciscan order—another unlikely alliance).[3] Yet, as in the case of more ontological considerations, Paul's letters are open to different accounts of what a political theology looks like and what makes it a *political* theology. In this sense, it is better to speak of political *theologies*, with different repercussions for the mode of political action to which they inspire. Moreover, these different political theologies bring into play a particular sense of faith: as fidelity and conviction, on the one hand, or more as oath and veridiction on the other. In a certain sense, the essays of this part expand on the themes and concepts introduced in the first part and apply them to more or less concrete political circumstances or phenomena.

The idea that Paul offers a political theology was developed by Jacob Taubes in *The Political Theology of Paul*. In "The Management of Distinctions," Marin Terpstra raises the question whether it is justified to depict Paul's letters as an example of political theology, as Jacob Taubes did in his Heidelberg lectures on *Romans*. As Terpstra suggests, the justification lies in the fact that as a founder of non-Jewish "Christian" communities Paul had to act as a politician. Yet, he was a politician of a special kind, one who claimed to be called by God (or

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3 See Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual.*

Christ) to be a spiritual leader with the task of establishing a new people. To clarify what this implies and means, Terpstra discusses the way Paul manages distinctions—between Jews and non-Jews, between followers of Christ and those who adhere to the status quo, and so on—as well as the impact of Paul's theology on these distinctions. In fact, as Terpstra argues, this impact is to be found in an intensification of distinctions. In its extremes, this intensification leads to the distinction between friend and enemy. By way of this possible consequence Taubes's reflections on political theology are connected with Carl Schmitt's use of the term "political theology." As Terpstra shows, it turns out that Paul's political theology cannot be taken in the sense in which Roman intellectuals already used the term (namely, as state cult), but points in another direction, namely, towards a messianic subversion of the state. Terpstra concludes his essay with a comment on what Taubes called the "Gnostic temptation" hidden in this reversed political theology.

In "Paul as Political Theologian," Carl Raschke explores how the so-called new perspective of Paul, focusing on the Jewish context of the apostle's writings and exemplified in the biblical scholarship of N.T. Wright and others, has profound implications for contemporary political theology. Raschke gives careful consideration to an important book by the American theologian Theodore Jennings, *Outlaw Justice*, and compares Jennings's approach with key contemporary European philosophical ventures in recent decades, which aim to reinterpret Paul and Jewish eschatology in political terms. Raschke argues that the central term δικαιοσύνη in Pauline soteriology is also a fundamental concept for the ancient theory of the πόλις. Where Plato, in the *Republic*, seeks to explicate the integral relationship between the soul and the well-ordered πόλις in accordance with the notion of δικαιοσύνη, Paul follows a comparable trajectory in setting forth the theme of participation "in Christ" as an existential as well as a socio-normative project. In this way, Raschke shows how the considerations we encounter in Sierksma-Agteres's essay can be taken up in the context of a reading of Paul inspired by Derrida. It is this unique, tensive relationship between the two meanings of the word δικαιοσύνη—both ethical and political—that not only makes Paul intelligible in a whole new way within his own historical setting, but re-contextualizes him as an important figure—as Jennings discerns—for political thinking through the ages. Raschke can thus begin to re-conceive Paul's *Romans*, especially, not only as an ongoing polemic against Judaism and paganism, but as a "radical political theology" that confronts and critiques the apparatus of the imperial state itself. As Raschke concludes, just as the Roman conqueror, in bringing the benefits of imperial rule, establishes δικαιοσύνη, so does Christ in not succumbing to crucifixion and death: God, through his suffering servant, has triumphed over all the erstwhile "visible"

and "invisible" would-be sovereigns of the *saeculum* itself, the "rulers of this age," including Caesar.

Paul, as Holger Zaborowski argues in his "Church, Commonwealth, and Toleration," is not only a source of inspiration for the left-wing, post-modern accounts of politics and political theology, as can be found in thinkers as diverse as Agamben, Badiou, Taubes, and Žižek, but also an important source of inspiration for modernity, in particular for modern political liberalism, and for John Locke as one of its fathers. Zaborowski goes on to show this by interpreting Locke, specifically his *Letter Concerning Toleration*. The author argues that "even though the biblical passages do not justify his arguments strictly speaking and play a rather illustrative role in the context of his argumentation, Locke does not merely pay lip service to the New Testament, but tries to do justice to its teaching from a philosophical position." Locke's account of the difference between Church and commonwealth, in particular, may be understood in light of the Pauline heritage. As Zaborowski argues: "It is clear that Locke's definition of the church and of the commonwealth, as defined in the *Letter*, shows striking parallels to the view of Paul as explained by Locke. There can be, therefore, no doubt about a distinctly Pauline dimension of Locke's political thought. One could argue, of course, that he reads his own political philosophy into Paul's *Romans*. ... It seems more plausible, however, that he was truly inspired by Paul." Zaborowski concludes his essay with a question concerning the necessity of a political theology for liberalism today.

In "Europe and Paul of Tarsus," Antonio Cimino turns to the political implications of Agamben's reading of Paul, but this time in relation to the current crisis and the future of Europe. Cimino concentrates on a recent interview given by Agamben, in which the Italian philosopher analyzes the current European political and social crisis and sketches his own solution to it. Remarkably, Agamben's analysis relies on concepts and frameworks he outlines not only in some of his major works—such as *Homo Sacer* and *State of Exception*—but also in his book on Paul. In this context, the Pauline notion of the ὡς μή plays a pivotal role, since it helps Agamben to delineate a new alternative to the logic of sovereignty that dominates European modernity and the current political shape of Europe. Cimino singles out the theoretical frameworks that implicitly underlie Agamben's diagnosis of Europe's crisis and shows some problematic aspects of it. In this connection, he attempts to show the extent to which the politics of the ὡς μή—albeit outlined by Agamben in a philosophically original and provocative way—does not constitute a feasible solution that can break the logic of sovereignty.

With "The Invisible Committee as a Pauline Gesture," Ward Blanton introduces a rather different aspect of the political implications of Paul in telling the

story of the French collective Tiqqun, or the Invisible Committee, and its political manifestos, such as *Introduction to Civil War*, *This is Not a Program*, and *The Coming Insurrection*. As Blanton shows, these manifestos demonstrate "strong affinities with recent philosophical work on Pauline messianism." And he asks: "How has it gone unnoticed that their efforts to render a protreptic or conversionistic call to a radical politics are, in central and serially repeated respects, articulated through a Pauline legacy, especially the Pauline legacy as read through the messianic Paulinism of Giorgio Agamben (for instance, *The Time that Remains*)?" In the essay that follows, Blanton not only informs the reader about the Tarnac events and the particular political response to this French collective, but also explains in which sense the thought of this collective is Pauline as well as inspired by Francis of Assisi—much like the work of Agamben. Finally, Blanton shows how these Pauline resonances are first and foremost concerned with retrieving Paul's πίστις: "In the end, the struggle to invent a contemporary Paulinist gesture will have been then about the preservation or recuperation of a messianic πίστις."

By Way of Conclusion

For the reader of the different essays in this volume, it will become increasingly clear that they demand at least one additional reflection. How do the essays of the first, second, and third part relate to each other? How do the concepts introduced in the first part connect with the description of the πίστις language and the positioning of Paul in a Greco-Roman context to which the second part is devoted? And in what sense can the political theologies under discussion in the third part be connected to ethical or political concerns in the Greco-Roman period? Or perhaps more importantly: to what extent does taking Paul's own historical circumstances and culture into account improve our understanding of the Pauline influence on the political theologies that concern philosophers today? Or should we rather say that this influence is to be understood solely in terms of the effective history of Paul's letters in Western culture? Or yet again, is this a false dichotomy since, after all, the present-day historical and theological accounts are also formed by the same effective history? Most importantly of all, what, when reflecting on the collection of essays we present in this volume, can we say about the crucial themes and concepts by which Paul's letters prove their philosophical and theological fecundity today? An attempt to answer these questions will be offered in the epilogue, "Paul and Philosophy: The Consonance of Ancient and Modern Thought," in which Gert-Jan van der Heiden and George van Kooten reflect on and connect the essays collected in this volume in

order to explicate the deep consonances they reveal between ancient and modern thought. Based on the individual contributions, the epilogue will show which motifs, themes, and notions serve as the building blocks of these consonances.

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Part I. **Philosophical Portraits of Paul and Πίστις**

Andrew Benjamin

Reading, Seeing and the Logic of Abandonment: Rembrandt's *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul*

Abstract: In this essay, Andrew Benjamin investigates the significance of images of Paul. The author striking notes every image of Saint Paul is an attempt to singularize or at the very least to secure an identity, and thus an identity as a singularity, for Paul. Consequently, Paul as image therefore continues to stage, in different ways and with different emphases, the network of relations of which Paul, his image, is always the after-effect. Benjamin explores this impact of the image by seeing, contemplating, and reading a number of paintings of Paul with special attention to Rembrandt's *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul*. In particular, he discusses how the play of light in some of these paintings stages the fundamental moment of Paul's conversion, as Benjamin interprets: "The lit face is therefore the sign of conversion." Yet, unlike what authors such as Badiou seem to suggest, this conversion does not come out of nowhere. It entails, and can only occur in accordance with, an implied logic of abandonment, of a turning away from the past so that the converted face can show itself as and in light. With this first exploration of what it means to offer an image of Paul, and to paint his picture, this volume turns to fifteen images, sculpted or painted with the tools of theology, philosophy, and philology, to deepen our understanding of Paul, the importance of his letters, and in particular the specific sense of his account of faith.

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What is an image of Saint Paul? Even if this question is addressed, if only initially, within the space opened by the suspension of the question of the image as it occurs within Paul's own writings, what continues to insist is the presence of Paul. To return to the beginning therefore: What is identified within an image of Paul? Once the image becomes the locus of consideration, what cannot be avoided is the question both of the image and the way that examination is itself to be understood.[1] As a beginning there is Paul. Hence, the answer to the ques-

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1 The status of the image remains a question that continues to attract considerable attention.

tion of the name's identity, the name Paul, necessitates developing the logic within which this particular name appears. While that name generates an inevitable conflict concerning its precise determination, it is also the case that the name provides a setting within which that conflict can occur. Indeed, conflict, which is the result here of Paul's indeterminate presence, is created by a setting that nonetheless yields forms of coherence. Coherence is not a mere formal quality of a work. Coherence marks the necessity that images have an ideational content; a content that is itself staged by the work of paint thus color, line, light, etc. One works with and through the other. In sum form is always informed.[2] Within such a setting every image of Paul is an attempt to singularize or at the very least to secure an identity, and thus an identity as a singularity, for Paul. Paul as image therefore continues to stage, in different ways and with different emphases, the network of relations of which Paul, his image, is always the after-effect.

Rubens' early painting *The Conversion of Saint Paul* (1602; Fig. 1) presents Paul—constructs Paul thereby allowing Paul to figure—through its creation of the space of "conversion."[3] Within it the motif of Paul takes on a determined quality.[4] Paul's image cannot be thought other than in relation to light. Light, which is the work of paint and thus paint's formal presence, brings with it the question of what precisely informs form. Here, in Rubens' painting the light beneath the Christ figure dramatizes the dark within which "Paul" is located. In moving from the dark to the light, Saul will become Paul. The event within

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For a survey of recent investigations see the papers collected in the volume Alloa, *Penser l'image.* See in addition the philosophical and historical study of the image in Lechte, *Genealogy and Ontology of the Western Image.*

2 This is the point at which to note the distance that this paper attempts to stage, albeit *sotto voce*, from the analysis of Rembrandt that occurs in Riegl, *Das holländische Gruppenporträt.* Riegl is interested in the structure of the content of images. However, that content is purely formal. Thus, when he argues that he is not in tested in the "*Was*" but rather his interest lies "*im Wie der Darstellung*" (ibid., 245), this "*Wie*" (How) is simply a formal presence. It is neither a presence in which form is informed nor one in which form's relation to a "beholder" (*Beschauer*) involves a complex set of relations such that there cannot be mere seeing and thus mere beholding.

3 For a discussion of this painting and its contextualization within a larger history of European painting see, Müller Hofstede, "An Early Rubens Conversion of St Paul." The work is currently in the Courtauld Gallery.

4 I have developed the term "motif" in my *Art's Philosophical Work.* In sum, a motif is a figure or term that is repeated within a range of images in which while what is repeated is the same, the sameness in question allows for differences. Hence the motif of Paul allows for his presence to be repeated, and for that presence to have coherence even if there are important differences within the motif's repeated presence. Equally, the motif of the book will allow for a sense of difference that has a more profound effect.

Figure 1. Peter-Paul Rubens (1577–1640), *The Conversion of Saint Paul* (1602). Vaduz, Lichtenstein. The Princely Collections, Vaduz-Vienna. Oil on oak panel, 72 x 103 cm. © 2017. Liechtenstein, The Princely Collections, Vaduz-Vienna/Scala, Florence.

art's work is held by—if not structured by—a relation between light and dark. In other words, the painting allows a motif of Paul to figure, a motif that is positioned within and as the work of art. Unseated from his horse, his having fallen he becomes, as a result, the presentation of a state that presages. No longer standing he will be able to stand again (and anew). Standing no longer as Saul, a positioning within the context of the painting that is the fallen state, the state that is obscured, he will, nonetheless, come to stand. That standing, which has to be understood as an emergence into being, (interplaying *stare* and *stand*) is an emerging from that which obscures. Light is directed from the figure of Christ standing forth from the dark of the clouds within a form of radiance and illumination that is not just carried by the body of the horse directly beneath him, the direction of the traces of light is itself repeated by the direction taken by the horse's twisting head.[5] They reinforce each other creating what here is light's overall force. Color and movement combine. This combination, thus this moment within the work's work, is interrupted by the color of the cloak worn by the boy trying to subdue the horse from which Saul has fallen. Not only does the color as present recall the color of the cloak worn by the Christ figure, it is also the case that this interruption stops the play of light that would have reached the body of Saul. That body is obscured. As a result, it is darkened. And yet, light plays on his face. This is the decisive point since it allows the now lit face to rise from obscurity while maintaining its relation to the obscure. One works with the other. As a consequence, it is as though his lit face is rising from the obscurity. The lit face is therefore the sign of conversion. Recalled here is of course the other Paul, Paul the writer of text, and thus recalled with that name is the decisive passage from *2 Corinthians* in which what is central is the lit face of Christ:

> For God, who said, "Let light shine out of darkness," made his light shine in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of God's glory displayed in the face of Christ. (ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ὁ εἰπών Ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψει, ὃς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ.)[6]

Paul's face is not the face of Christ. (In addition, in these lines there is no statement of a Pauline conception of the image even though, as will be developed at a later stage, the use of the term "glory (δόξα)" refers to the setting in which it does occur.) Rather the lit face is always already related to the face of Christ. As is

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5 Burckhardt describes Christ appearing "as a rent in the night sky" (Burckhardt, *Recollections of Rubens*, 84).

6 2 Cor. 4:6; the textual reference is here Acts 9:1–22.

clear, what is central to that face is God's "glory (δόξα)." The latter has to be identified with its presence in the lit face. Hence Paul's face is glorified. This is form informed. Moreover, this is what it means, in this context, for the face of Paul to appear; appearing as an emerging, thus appearing to stand over Saul. The prone figure has therefore a doubled presence insofar as Paul's conversion is Saul's abandonment. Here it is essential to be clear. The contention is that there cannot be one without other. Conversion and abandonment are interconnected. Hence what is at work is what might best be described not as a conversion but more accurately as a logic of abandonment in which that conversion is inscribed. That logic constructs the Pauline event.[7] The event is anoriginally doubled; abandoning leaves its traces in the identity it founds and that identity has to be understood as related to the abandoned *as* abandoned. The event that is founded in the case of Rubens' painting is given in the face; the face is marked in advance therefore by its having a foundational position.

The form of complexity present in Rubens' scene of conversion is however not there in Caravaggio's painting—a work with the "same" set of relations— which is located in the Cerasi Chapel in the Church of Santa Maria del Popolo in Rome, namely the *Conversion on the Way to Damascus* (1601; Fig. 2).[8] In this particular painting whilst there is the work of light, light works in another way. Form is informed differently. What is of significance therefore is how the differences in question are to be understood. The work of light within Caravaggio's painting is such that Saul is already Paul. The motif of Paul figures differently precisely because the work of light stages a transition that has already taken place. What occurs here is a different point in the overall narrative. This is the light that dominates. The entire body is lit. Obscurity therefore has a different role. In Rubens' painting the body of Paul was divided. Here in Caravaggio's the division is located elsewhere. Rather than the body of Saul/Paul being a divided and thus present as a transitional body, in this instance division as the work of light only really pertains to the man holding the horse. In this painting of triumphant conversion, he is no longer part of Paul's accompaniment (even though he is accompanying Paul). He is both there and not there. Retained as aban-

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7 The argument is that the event in question is not a singularity. It is always doubled. The argument therefore is pitted against Badiou's interpretation of Paul. One that has to neglect the implicit abandoning that is inscribed in the act of conversion. Badiou's universalism cannot think the complexity at work in the logic of abandonment. See Badiou, *Saint Paul.*

8 In Parmigianino's drawings of *The Conversion of St Paul* (1527– 30) (specifically the ones in the Courtauld Collection, Princess Gate Collection, 360) precisely because the specificity of the medium—drawing as opposed to painting—hands and thus modalities of touch, rather than the interplay of color and light, play the effecting role. Again, there is another motif of Paul.

Figure 2. Caravaggio (1571–1610), *Conversion on the Way to Damascus* (1601). Rome, Italy. Church of Santa Maria del Popolo. Cerasi Chapel. Oil on canvas, 230 x 175 cm. © 2017. Photo Scala, Florence/Fondo Edifici di Culto – Ministero dell'Interno.

Figure 3. Rembrandt Harmensz. van Rijn (1606–1669), *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul* (1661). Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Rijksmuseum. Oil on canvas, 91 x 77 cm. © Public domain.

doned he becomes therefore what might be described as the figure of abandonment. It is as though Rubens is more concerned with the way the logic of abandonment has constructed the motif of Paul, rather than with its triumphant after-effect. And yet, it is not as though the after-effect is itself unaffected by the presence of that logic. Indeed, if it can be argued that the motifs of Paul are produced by that logic's work, then what gives ideational coherence to these paintings of Paul is way the work of that logic acquires specificity. (This has to be the case since at play here is a logic that does not have an already determined and thus singular form.) Hence in Caravaggio's painting the event cannot be seen except in relation to the ineliminability of the obscured figure who is present and thus who is the presence of the abandoned. Caravaggio's painting retains the abandoned by positioning it within obscurity—leaving it there, positioning it, *qua* figure, within the necessity of its own abandonment and thus its already having been abandoned.

The complex logic of abandonment, which is the Pauline event, sets the scene allowing for an approach to another motif of Paul, specifically, here, Rembrandt's *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul* (1661; Fig. 3).[9] Not only is the image of Paul fundamental, what cannot be avoided is the link established by Rembrandt between that image (Paul) and his own self-image. Rembrandt continued to paint himself. Self-portraiture forms a fundamental part of his overall project.[10] If there is a final point that needs to be made prior to turning to Rembrandt then it concerns how the formal arrangement of the figures within a painting is to be understood. While there may be a compositional set of relations that might establish an affinity between Caravaggio and Rembrandt on the one hand, and while therefore there may be a commensurability of project between paintings of Paul in both Rubens and Caravaggio on the other, the overriding interpretive claim is that despite the presence of purely formal relations once there is an insistence on art's material presence, that is as a beginning the work of color, line, light, and so on—and working with the assumption that it is art's material presence and thus its mattering that produces meaning, form endures as informed—then what emerges as of interest are the differences that the image of Paul creates; in other words, the creation of the discontinuous continuity of Paul as motif. It is within that setting that the particularity of Rembrandt's Paul appears.

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9 The argument that the painting is Paul was established in the early 20th century by Schmidt-Degener and Valentiner. The argument had to do with the presence of what H. Perry Chapman describes as Paul's "traditional attributes." For an extended discussion of this evidence and then an interpretation in light of it see Chapman, *Rembrandt's Self-Portraits*, 121–28.
10 The significance of this painting for a general consideration of self-portraiture has also been noted by Douglas P. Lackey in "Rembrandt and the Mythology of the Self-Portrait."

Part of the argument to come is that in Rembrandt's Paul the logic of abandonment, while present, is staged in terms of a complex of relations between seeing, reading and blinding.

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It is always a question of what is seen. And yet, once posed as a question, seeing as a question, then its contents, the set of demands that are being made and which pertain to the seen, are far from as clear as may first have appeared. The painting—*Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul*—is seen.[11] Viewing occurs. Viewing takes place within it. Paul/Rembrandt looks out. He looks out seeing. He lifts his head from a book that is, as a consequence, within the staged set of relations that comprise this particular painting, no longer seen. What is seen, viewed, stages a relation to seeing even though what counts as seeing is problematized and as a result emerges as a question. The presence of a book that had been seen, is now—in the "now" of the painting—no longer seen; the status and nature of this book becomes a locus of inquiry and thus are a setting to which a return must be made. As his head looks out seeing has a relation to the not seen. The face is given within that relation and thus given with the staging of the logic of abandonment. The anoriginal complexity of seeing occurs in this "now," the "now" that is simultaneous with the turn of the reader's head leading him to look out, to move, that is from reading to seeing. What has to be taken up is the possibility of this "now": In other words, the question at hand concerns the possibility of a pure now in which there is just a body that turns or moves. With the head having turned, what would have been the book's solicitation and thus its presence as a site of reading are, for its now putative reader, no longer in play. And it is this "no longer," that is itself a temporal marker that forms part of the "now." One cannot be separated from the other. The "now" is equally the "no longer." That is what is seen. As a consequence, what is raised is the complex way the work of art, as part of its work, registers time. At the beginning, therefore, the possibility of a pure now is undone. What this means is that any original singularity which would have included, the singular now, the exclusivity of movement, gesture, facial expression, and so on,

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11 Importantly, Steven Goldsmith has also identified Pauline impulse in this painting in "Almost Gone." The argumentation presented here however is different. As he writes: "His *Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul* (Fig. 2), like *Bartholomew* signed and dated 1661, seems to espouse the Pauline doctrine of salvation by grace alone, available even to a feeble old man surprised to receive it" (ibid., 411).